CHAPTER IV THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law,
Republic Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007 and effective on July 15,
2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and
two (2) months after the holding of any election)
Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest.- The provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED
PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF
THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment said charged or suspected
person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody
by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest
of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination
of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining
the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any
judge at the latters residence or office nearest the place where the arrest
took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented
before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the
person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or
not the subject has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of
what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the
proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.

enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest; provided, That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice
shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding
paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack.- In the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may
not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a
municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission,
or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice
of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, or after office hours, the arresting
police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to
the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the
said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel
concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons
concerned; Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the
suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established,
shall be released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorismeven if they have been granted bail
because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:

Detained under house arrest;

Restricted from traveling; and/or

Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other

means of communications with people outside their residence.

Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and their outstanding
balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or
financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication
equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind
and nature belonging:

To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or

conspiracy to commit terrorism;

The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the
time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.

to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of

persons;

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of

the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law

to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,

association or group of persons,

-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use,

transfer or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and
security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed
by his family including the services of his counsel and his familys medical
needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of his property
that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment
as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason.
Section 40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank depositsshall be
deemed property held in trust by the bank or financial institution and that their
use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval
of the court before which the case or cases are pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment
or his case dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the
seizureshall be lifted by the investigating body or the competent court and
restored to him without delay. The filing of an appeal or motion for
reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.
If convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically
forfeited in favor of the government.
Requisites of a valid search warrant
Read:
a. Essentials of a valid search warrant,145 SCRA

739

demarcated in their supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN

DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN
THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR
THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was
not just a case of obvious typographical error, but a clear case of a search
of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the
search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and
the criminal action base don the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO
QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED
ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURTSUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.
d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip.
Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by
an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day with a large volume of marijuana. As a result of the tip, the policemen
waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo, near Rizal
Ave. When the accused got off, she was pointed to by the informer. She was
carrying a traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. She
was arrested without a warrant.

b. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained

in
violation thereof.

The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was
convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.

c. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling

Issue:

PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

Narvasa, CJ

Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible
in evidence.

In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first
four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in
Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The same was not, however,
what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT
WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any
evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that
indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
and in any proceeding.

Held:

This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searchedalthough not that specified in the search warrantis
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had

The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant, however,

should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:

customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.

against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of

probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In order that the information received by
the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause, it must
be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.
The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible
as evidence for the following reasons:
a.
the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but
they failed to do so;
b.
the accused was not acting suspiciously;
c.
the accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying for a
warrant should have been easy;
d.
the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a
street
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless
search of the accuseds bag, there being no probable cause and the
accuseds not having been legally arrested. The arrest was made only after
the accused was pointed to by the informant at a time when she was not
doing anything suspicious. The arresting officers do not have personal
knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that time.
Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it logically follows that
the subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. This is so because if a search is first undertaken, and an arrest
effected based on the evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, and PEOPLE
VS. ENCINADA.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin
of the Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug
courier would be arriving in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, from
Baguio City, with an undetermined amount of marijuana. The informer
likewise informed them that he could recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June 20, 1994, the appellant was
arrested by the above-named police officers while alighting from a passenger
jeepney near a waiting shed in Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, upon being
pointed to by the informer. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves. The arrest was without warrant.
The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana
based on the testimonies of the Above-named police officers without
presenting the alleged informer.

Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal
because the alleged information was received by the police on June 19, 1994
and therefore, they could have applied for a search warrant. The said
contention is without merit considering that the information given by the
informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is indication that the
informer knows the courier, the records do not show that he knew his name.
On bare information, the police could not have secured a warrant from a
judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.

Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the subsequent
search on his person is justified. An arresting officer has the right to validly
search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier,
the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents
of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the
same and upon cursory inspection, it was found out that it contains
marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and
cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing
a crime. In short, there was no probable cause for these policemen to think
that he was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court
considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that
the informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the
police in the past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect
the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. He is
merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable cause for a
warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES
IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY
DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144 SCRA
1; PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, 163 SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA,
October 2, 1997; PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).

The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching
party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA.

The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the appellant
was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the
strength of a tip from an informer received by the police the previous
afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. The
search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On Appeal, the SC
reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest
any suspicious behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the
attention of the police.

1.

ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004

Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not
authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable
search and seizure.
In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the
employer, the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the
authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house.
Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were
allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of
a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his
consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence?
Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and
seizure?
Held:

e. General or roving warrants

Read:
Stonehill vs. Diokno,June 19,1967

Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants
issued on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are
officers, directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, typewriters and other documents or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements
since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK
LAWS, TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the
Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that:
a. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents, books
and things to be seized;
b. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against
them;

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right

which may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY
IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must
be proof of the following:

d. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;

a.

Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the
petitioners valid?

that the right exists;

b.
that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or
actual, of the existence of said right;
c.

that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in

order that the said is to be valid.

e. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a

manner provided for by law.
Issue:

a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same
in their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality
separate and distinct with its officers. An objection to an unlawful search and
seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD
PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY
OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE

DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND

PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS
BELONG, AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS
IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners, the same
may not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were
in the nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional
requirement that:
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal
Code. IN OTHER WORDS, NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED
IN SAID APPLICATIONS. THE AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT
TO
THE
OFFENSE
COMMITTED
WEREABSTRACT.
AS
A
CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED
THE WARRANTS TO HAVE FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE, FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF
COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT
HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS, OR COMMITTED SPECIFIC
OMISSIONS, VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF OUR CRIMINAL LAWS.
5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa,
falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general warrant and
therefore not valid)
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995; PEOPLE VS. CA, 216 SCRA
101. A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more
than one specific offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft and qualified
theft)
f. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?
VICENTE LIM,SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS.HON. N. FELIX (G.R.
NO. 99054-57)
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:
Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr.
and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. They were
initially charged, with three others, with the crime of multiple murder with

frustrated murder. After conducting a preliminary investigation, a warrant of

arrest was issued on July 31, 1989. Bail was fixed at P200,000.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to review the case, issued
a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners
but ruled that a case of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled
instead against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to that
effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the petitioners
was granted by the SC. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the
RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati.
Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if
there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents
showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.
They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of
Masbate. These motions were however denied by the court because the
prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause, informations were
complete in form in substance , and there was no defect on its face. Hence it
found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each
information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists?
Held:
1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon
the fiscals certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the
judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the
search and seizure provision of the 1973 Constitution. Under this provision,
the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of information, the judge
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and
require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.
2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987 Constitution,
the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word
determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution
to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law

does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the
following doctrines:
(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the judge alone makes this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge.
It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutors present to him. By itself, the
prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting
documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in
assisting the judge to make his determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary
investigation proper. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for
the issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released.
4. 4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC
no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority
was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective
on January 1, 1985.
5.
In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the
certification of the prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he has not personally determined the existence
of probable cause. The determination was made by the provincial prosecutor.
The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal
Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in
Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his
personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the
issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not

have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same
functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report
and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of
these should be before the judge.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA 393
The word personally after the word determined does not necessarily mean
that the judge should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally
before issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive
responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. As such, there is no need to examine the complainant and
his witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the
existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the
complainant and his witnesses.
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to
determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
concerned)
JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO.
92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a
warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge, HON. JAIME SALAZAR,
Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in
the day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila, WITHOUT BAIL,
NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND
NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
a. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute
books;

b. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint

was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence, he was
denied due process;
c. denied the right to bail; and
d. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge
who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable
cause.
HELD:
The parties oral and written arguments presented the following options:
1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of
Justice Montemayor that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes;
2. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, BUT
NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A REBELLION WHICH
ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE
CHARACTER;
3. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
1. On the first option, 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning Hernandez.
Two members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. In view of the
majority, THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW, ITS SUBSTANTIVE AND
LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES
AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH
TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. This is so because of the fact
that the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. 942 which added a new provision of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly Art. 142-A which sought to nullify if not
repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect
of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent
any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
2. On the second option, the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to
reject the same though four justices believe that the arguments in support
thereof is not entirely devoid of merit.
3. With the rejection of the first two options, the Hernandez Doctrine remains
a binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
On the issues raised by the petitioner:

a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that the information filed against the
petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing
that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The petitioners
contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED
THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES
COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF, MUST THEREFORE BE
DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. Read in the context of
Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION.
b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a
complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director
and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation
was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR
OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN
INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS
CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT, IF WARRANTED BY THE
EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the
respondent judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally
go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Also, the
petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest
without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled
that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. MEREBY BECAUSE
SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY
A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT
DUTY , GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD
NOT HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE
SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL
DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. In
the light of the Courts affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against
him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion
which is bailable before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A
CORRECT PROPOSITION.

NOTES:

Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?

This might be useful also in your Remedial Law.

Held:

Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or

seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the
absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3 [2], of the Constitution. This is the
celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Justice
Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed.

The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge
is the normal venue for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The correct course was for the petitioner
to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE
INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE
THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioners premise that the information charges a
non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a
motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not. Is Operation
Kapkap valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 scra 174
Warrantless search and seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen. They approched these persons
and identified themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away
because of the other lawmen, they were unable to escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated
from the accused and several days later, an information for violation of PD
1866 was filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was
sentenced to sufferreclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the
principal evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:

Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see
how we we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine
ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or
Par. (b) of this Section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense,
(2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely looking from
side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in
thie presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
not necessary as long as Mengotes acts created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an

offense had been committed and that accused-appellant had committed it.
The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen and in aplace not exactly forsaken.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them
less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been
apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 oclock in the morning. But he was arrested at
11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with his companion.He was not skulking in the shadows but
walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his
being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
them innoent, why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding
his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their
suspicion was all about.
xxx
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support
the arresting officers suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes and his
hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the Court
held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
effected while he was coming down the vessel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
have also not been satisfied. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time
of Mengotes arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the
arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone
caller, and about a crime that had yet to bem committed.
xxx
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of
Mengotes identity, let alone the fact that he was involved in the robbery
of Danganans house.

In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, this Court
declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personalknowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in
his presence or within his view. (SAYO vs. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised
Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People
vs. Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested
and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly
because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on
any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a
criminal act is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over
liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
xxx
The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant
might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over zealousness
to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of
a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had
invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be
the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of the law, because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.

When illegal arrest is deemed waived.

Warrantless arrest; no personal knowledge of the arresting officer
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what
Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accusedappellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed, the prosecution
admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that the
accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested
nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating
that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant
cannot be justified.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the
accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest.
IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE
ENTERS HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED.
THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS
RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.

dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of
Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was
illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution
against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of
an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private
individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is
valid.
Held:
The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil
Code. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the
petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. The alleged reports that
the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities
does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of
the union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was
surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search warrant.

g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. (Valid since the
constitutional provision is not applicable to him; when it is not valid)

The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti,
a criminal case, the issue was whether an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of ones constitutional rights may be invoked against the
State. In other words, the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by
a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the
State, is admissible.

Read:

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI

1.

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991

Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals

Warrantless Search and seizure

2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL.,

482 SCRA 660

by a private person

Carpio-Morales, J.
The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis
International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel
in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution. They
arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was
opening the Union Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union
office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Once inside
the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the
confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the

Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no relation to Shirley), received
said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. Marti refused.
However later, following standard operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner
and husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection, before delivering
it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.

Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to
contain gloves. Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside
the box. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI, he told them that the
boxes to be shipped were still in his office. In the presence of the NBI agents,
Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that
the dried leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.

(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v. Bryan
(457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v. us
(373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329 sw 2d 135).

Two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars; also

revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves
respectively.

NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest
must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. As such, if
accused was arrested while inside a jeepney, there is no valid search
incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and
thereafter search the said place)

Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of
the dried leaves. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of
Manila convicted accused Marti of violatingsec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accuseds right
against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?
Held:
1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only
against the state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United
States constitution, the SC may consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise
doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US cases, the constitutional provision
against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against
private persons. If a search was initiated by a private person the provision
does not apply since it only proscribes government action. This view is
supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the
search. He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI
agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. This did not convert it to a
search as contemplated by the constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible
evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, likewise applies only to the
government and its agencies and not to private persons.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

1.

Search made incidental to a valid arrest

f.
ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in
the street during a buy-bust operation, the search of his house nearby is not
a valid search incidental to a valid arrest)
PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338
Where the gun tucked in a persons waist is plainly visible to the police, no
search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said
firearm, he may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. No warrant is necessary in such a
situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest inside the
nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126. This is a valid
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant
place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he
requested that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his warrantless
arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE
BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall
under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia
and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused.
2.

Search of moving vehicles

PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122

FACTS:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from
one of its informers about an organized group engaged in importation of
illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the crime
syndicate, they recruited confidential men and deep penetration agents
under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the
dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover

activities of suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan

sharon 887, in turned informed the Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tias activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent
named George. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business
trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was
introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later
turning out to be Tias intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia
telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on
October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland
China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw
these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. That evening, they
went to Lo Ho Wings room and he saw two other men with him. One was
fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning a substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man
and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo
Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila, the latter replied that they
would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags
containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely examined,
appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They were met by Lim
Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport
and loaded their luggage in the taxis compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed
them in another taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in
strategic areas around the airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia
followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by
Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team
asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team
asked permission to search their luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS
pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents.
Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags
opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia
and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to
escape. However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three
suspects were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug
Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was

discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the
testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the wellknown exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a
search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is
admissible as evidence in any proceeding.
3.

Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)

c.
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid
waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver or consent should be given by the
person affected, not just anybody. Example: The landlady could not give a
valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said tenant
himself should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs.
Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel
room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house
allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching for
rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they instead seized an unlicensed
firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)
6.

STOP AND FRISK.

a.

People vs. Mengote, June, 1992

b.

PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288

c.
MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them.
As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The
search is valid)
d.
MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient
to validate warrantless arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR
NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
zonings and saturation drives

Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution

Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military
and police officers from conducting Areal target zonings or saturation
drive in Metro Manila particularly in places where they suspect that the
subversives are hiding. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation drives
conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights because with no
specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours,
police and military officers without any search warrant cordon an area of
more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay. Most of them
are in civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or identification cards; that the
raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and
windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some)
and ordering the residents to come out; the residents are herded like cows at
the point of high powered guns, ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks; that while examination of the bodies of the men
are being conducted, the other military men conduct search and seizures to
each and every house without civilian witnesses from the neighbors; some
victims complained that their money and other valuables were lost as a result
of these illegal operations.
The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation
drives under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military operation
following constitutional provisions:

on the

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of

the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
xxxxxx
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police
action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly
violative of the Bill of Rights. If the military wants to flush out subversive and
criminal elements, the same must be consistent with the constitutional and
statutory rights of the people. However, nowhere in the Constitution can we
see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the military
to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming communist
activities. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the
Bill of Rights. The government cannot adopt the same reprehensible

methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left. This is so
because Art. III, Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in
Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals,
164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend ones sense of justice (Rochin vs.
California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes necessary as
long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. However, the
remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one
victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for
the executive department and the trial courts. The problem is appropriate for
the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence
supporting their allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed and
prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by
the petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until
such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a
specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical objections may be
brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met
(RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603; TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41
SCRA 702; PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS. ERICTA, 35
SCRA 481; GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS.
CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in
fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not
be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone
makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of a burning house who
has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A
SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY
COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS
STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court
should instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are
violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be stopped

immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military

operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that
Metro Manila is not such a battleground.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL
RAMOS, ET AL. and companion cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An
NPA may be arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a
hospital because his being a communist rebel is a continuing crime)
h. If the judge finds that theres probable cause, must he issue a warrant of
arrest as a matter of course? See the distinctions.
Read:
1.
SAmulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (No because a warrant
is issued in order to have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an
accused and to assure the court of his presence whenever his case is called
in court. As such, if the court believes that the presence of the accused could
be had even without a warrant of arrest, then he may not issue said warrant.
Note: This case involves a minor offense)

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives, hand grenades and ammunition intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense x x x;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x
.
In support of said application, P/Lt. Florencio Angeles executed a Deposition
of Witness dated October 31, 1987 .
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant
was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. Edgar Dula Torre
and Major Maganto;
4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando, a member of the searching team
executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudentes office a bulging brown envelope with three
live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old newspapers;
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant
on the grounds that:

2.
GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a
serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge must issue
a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of probable cause)

a. the complainants lone witness, Lt. Angeles had no personal knowledge of

the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;

i. Searching questions

b. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions
and answers;

Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No.
82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant;
searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge
DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14 as
well as its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, presided by
the respondent Judge, an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant
for violation of PD 1866 against the petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that:

c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme
Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and
on April 20, 1988, the same judge denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there
probable cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which
is to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
The probable cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. (Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable cause must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY
JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28
PHIL. 566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that he has been informed that
Nemesio Prudente has in his control and possession the firearms and
explosivees described therein, and that he has verified the report and found
it to be a fact. On the other hand, Lt. Angeles declared that as a result of
continuous surveillance for several days, they gathered informations from
verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not
licensed t possess them. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and
his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that he verified
the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact, YET THERE
IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN
SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY
HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might have clarified this point if
there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In
fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not,
vis-a-vis the said applicant.
In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following test must be
complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition based on personal knowledge or notThe true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of
a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts
merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do
not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much
so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the
issuance of the questioned search warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
694, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus
insufficient. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record.
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge
because as shown by the record, his questions were too brief and short and
did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. On the contrary, the questions asked were leading
as they called for a simple yes or no answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI,
June 23, 1988, the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general
manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, this requirements are stringent but the
purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the
place intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180). In the case at bar, the
warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP,
more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well
as the Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the one specific offense requirement
considering that the application for a search warrant explicitly described the
offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866.
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of
the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are complied
with.
a.

HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650

Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge
from an informant, the same is not valid)

6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and
witnesses should be attached to the record of the case)
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in the affidavits
of witnesses are mere generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive
statements of particular acts, the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2.

Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599

3.
PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked
to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid
since there could have been no searching questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA,
83988, September 29, 1989

GR No.

Warrantless searches and seizures;

validity of checkpoints
Padilla, J.
Facts:
1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and
order. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela, MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the residents of Valenzuela
increased because Benjamin Parpon, the supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the military men manning the
checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and
for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic
searches and seizures made by the military authorities without search
warrant valid?

Held:
Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW
289), or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a
light therein (Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila may be
considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and
to thwart plots to destabilize the government. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPAs sparrow units, not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS
EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUALS
RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER
REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.
True, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL
INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE
CITIZEN, THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE
PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND
PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the military checkpoints
in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon
order of the NCRDC Chief.
Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:
The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the
ground of national security.
RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15,
1990

Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 15 June, 1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal
as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the
people. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are
in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further that the military
officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT
BODILY SEARCH.
Read
also
the
RESOLUTION
ON
THE
MOTION
RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665

FOR

Read also:
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a
NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains
marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. Here , there is a
probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on
drugs)
2.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant
was given by the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy marijuana
from the accused then return to the police headquarters with said article.
Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. The
arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu
and its paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead,
said gun is inadmissible in evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO)
l. Properties subject to seizure
Read:
1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as amended
2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558
m. Warrantless searches and arrests
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if the arrest
was illegal. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon
posting of the bond by the accused)
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.

The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of

what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accusedappellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed, the prosecution
admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that the
accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested
nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating
that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant
cannot be justified.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the
accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest.
IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE
ENTERS HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED.
THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS
RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES
UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant:
1.

The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

2.
The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by applicant or any other person;
3.
In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath
and affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
4.
The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Search
warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants
fail to meet the test of particularity, especially since the witness had furnished
the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. THE SEARCH
WARRANT IS SEPARABLE, AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE
WARRANT.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25

The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both

innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law
enforces.
The plain view doctrine, which may justify a search without
warrant, APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT
SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED, BUT
INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT.
Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the
Constitution. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is the
immunity of ones person, which includes his residence, papers and other
possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and
seizures, he need not be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or private
place.
PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute
waiver, IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS; THE PERSONS
INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of
the existence of such right. The third condition did not exist in the instant
case. Neither was the search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
(PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July 6, 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless
search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF,
CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS
CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE
CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.