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Submitted to:
City of Richmond
Contra Costa County Health Services
February 2013
Submitted by:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way
Richmond, CA 94802-0627
CUSA 2013
CUSA 2013
February 2013
Introduction
This Site Safety Plan (SSP) was prepared in accordance with the City of Richmond
Industrial Safety Ordinance 42-03 (RISO) approved on January 17, 2002, by the
Richmond City Council. The primary intent of this ordinance is to prevent and reduce
the probability of accidental releases of regulated substances that have the potential to
cause significant harm to the public health and increase the participation by industry and
the public to improve accident prevention. This SSP has been updated from the previous
version prepared in 2009 to reflect changes made to the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (CUSA)
Refinery in Richmond, California (Refinery) since that time, including changes resulting
from the Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Program (CCHMP) audit in 2011, and to
meet the RISO legal requirement to update the SSP once every three years.
The CUSA Richmond Refinery
The Refinery is owned and operated by CUSA and is located in the City of Richmond,
Contra Costa County, California. The Refinery is the largest refinery in the Bay Area,
with an approximate capacity of 245,000 barrels of crude oil per day. The Refinery
covers approximately 2,900 acres. There are approximately 1,200 employees at the
Refinery, routinely augmented by contractors.
The Refinery is located on a peninsula bordered by the San Francisco Bay to the north
and west, the San Pablo Bay to the northeast, the General Chemical Company to the east
and the City of Richmond to the east and south. Point Molate and the Quarry Products
Company are situated nearby on the western edge of the peninsula, the Parr-Richmond
Terminal Corporation is located on the northwestern tip, and the Point San Pablo Yacht
Harbor occupies a small section of the northern edge of the peninsula. The area
immediately surrounding the Refinery is nearly all industrial except for the
neighborhoods of Point Richmond to the south, Atchison Village to the southeast, North
Richmond to the northeast, and the Iron Triangle to the east.
The Refinerys primary business is to make transportation fuels from crude oil. The
transportation fuel products produced at the Refinery include gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel
fuel. The Refinery also produces lubricating oils and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
Several byproducts are produced by the Refinerys production processes, including sulfur
and anhydrous ammonia, which are recovered from sulfur and nitrogen contained in the
crude oil. Substances present at the refinery that are regulated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agencys (EPA) Risk Management Plan (RMP) regulations and the California
Accidental Release Prevention (Cal/ARP) regulations include flammable hydrocarbons,
hydrogen sulfide (H2S), ammonia (NH3), and sulfuric acid (H2SO4) mixed with
flammable hydrocarbons.
CUSA Operational Excellence
CUSA has built a culture of safety and environmental stewardship that strives to achieve
world-class performance and prevent all incidents. Our workforce believes that incidents
are preventable, and we have policies, processes, tools and behavioral expectations in
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February 2013
Another key aspect of CUSAs safety culture is stop-work authority. Every member of
CUSAs workforce whether employee or contractor has the authority and
responsibility to stop work any time they see a condition that may present a risk to people
or to the environment.
The corporate values embodied in CUSAs safety culture are the foundation of the
Refinerys Safety Program, a comprehensive description of which is provided in Section
3.2, Safety Program Management.
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2.0
The Refinery
2.1
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Table 2-1 Summary of Covered Processes
Maximum Quantity in Process (pounds)
Federal
& State
Cal/ARP
Program
Level
RISO
#4 Crude Unit
Yes
#5 NHT
Yes
#5 Rheniformer
Yes
LSFO K-900s
Covered Process
#4 Rheniformer
State
Only
No
Regulated
Substances **
Total
Flammable
Mixture
NH3 *^
H2S
H2SO4
Flammables, NH3
400,000
2,500
Flammables
100,000
2,500
Colocated w #5 NHT
Yes
Colocated w #5 NHT
No
N/A
N/A
Penhex-Isom
Yes
Flammables
560,000
DHT
Yes
Flammables
33,000
5 H2S
Yes
160,000
200,000
790
FCC
Yes
Flammables
1,200,000
7,800,000
5,800,000
Alky
Yes
Flammables, H2SO4
Butamer
Yes
Flammables
150,000
Yard DIB
Yes
Flammables
290,000
LPG Storage
Yes
Flammables
39,000,000
Alky/GRU
Yes
Flammables
210,000
SHU
Yes
Flammables
43,000
Railcar Storage
Yes
Flammables, NH3
52,000,000
1,600,000
Poly
Yes
Flammables
430,000
3 H2S/SWC
Yes
Flammables
49,000
H2S
2,900
SRU
Yes
NH3 Storage
Yes
NH3
680,000
TKC
Yes
Flammables, H2S
32,000
8,300
TKN/ISO
Yes
Flammables, H2S
210,000
4,900
SDA
Yes
Flammables
1,200,000
#8 Plant
Yes
34,000
29,000
1,100
LNC
Yes
Flammables
14,000
HNC
Yes
24,000
830
810
LNF
Yes
Flammables
31,000
GRU
Yes
Flammables, H2S
280,000
800
#18 Plant
Yes
150,000
27,000
750
Cogen
Yes
Flammables, NH3
12,000
800
T&B Crude
Yes
Flammables
1,100,000
T&B Refined
No
No
N/A
N/A
Long Wharf
No
No
N/A
N/A
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Covered Process
State
Only
JHT
GHT
Federal
& State
Cal/ARP
Program
Level
RISO
Yes
Yes
Regulated
Substances **
Flammable
Mixture
Flammables
210,000
Total
NH3 *^
Flammables
11,000
H2 Manufacturing
Yes
Flammables, NH3
9,700
1,200
Hydro Flares
Yes
Flammables, NH3
8,900
1,300
H2S
H2SO4
H2 Recovery
No
No
N/A
N/A
H2 Boosters
No
No
N/A
N/A
4H2S
No
No
N/A
N/A
HNF
Yes
Flammables
35,000
Gas Distribution
Yes
Flammables
54,000
No
N/A
N/A
Effluent Treating
#1 Power Plant
2.2
No
No
No
N/A
X
N/A
Flammables
=
regulated flammable hydrocarbon mixture (NFPA4)
=
hydrogen sulfide
H2S
=
sulfuric acid
H2SO4
=
ammonia
NH3
=
substance is not contained in process or is not held above threshold quantities
X
=
RISO covered process
* Federal threshold for anhydrous NH3 is 10,000 lbs; threshold for aqueous NH3 >20% is 20,000 lbs
^ State threshold for NH3 >1% is 500 lbs
** Regulated Substances in this table includes those substances held in quantities above the threshold level listed in either the RMP
regulations or the Cal/ARP regulations. Please refer to the Refinerys Hazardous Materials Business Plan for names and quantities of
substances held in quantities below these threshold levels, or for those substances covered only by RISO.
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Table 2-2 Properties of Anhydrous Ammonia
Property
Value
Comments
Odor Threshold
5.2 ppm
None.
ERPG-1
25 ppm
The concentration that nearly all individuals could be exposed to for one
hour without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or
perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
ERPG-2
200 ppm
ERPG-3
1,000 ppm
Vapor specific
gravity
0.6
NH3 vapor is lighter than air. When pressurized liquid NH3 is released, it
initially forms a denser-than-air, cold cloud of NH3 mist. From the
release point, a pool of NH3 liquid will form beneath the container from
which additional NH3 will evaporate.
Expansion ratio
850:1
For a given volume of NH3 liquid, it will expand to 850 times when
released to air.
Boiling point
-28.4F
Ignition temperature
1,204F
ERPG
ppm
None.
=
=
CUSA 2013
The NH3 storage area is equipped with a NH3 leak detection system that
activates alarms in the field and in the control room to alert the plant
operator if a leak develops.
The NH3 storage area is equipped with alarms, pressure relief devices,
excess flow valves, and emergency block valves to prevent or limit the
severity of a release.
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2.2.2
The drainage in the storage area is such that a release of liquid drains away
from the bullets and minimizes the surface area to reduce the amount of
evaporation.
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Table 2-3 Properties of Hydrogen Sulfide
Property
Value
Comments
Odor Threshold
0.003 to
0.02 ppm
The odor of H2S is distinct at 0.003 ppm, but at concentrations above 100
ppm olfactory fatigue occurs and no odor is detected.
ERPG-1
0.1 ppm
The concentration that nearly all individuals could be exposed to for one
hour without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or
perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
ERPG-2
30 ppm
ERPG-3
100 ppm
1.18
H2S vapors are heavier than air and would act as a dense gas. H2S mixed
with other gases or at higher temperatures may behave as a neutrally
buoyant gas.
Boiling point
-59.6F
None.
Ignition temperature
500F
None.
ERPG
ppm
=
=
CUSA 2013
The SRU is equipped with an emergency quench water system, which can
be operated automatically, to protect equipment in the event of a fire.
Each process that contains H2S is equipped with alarms, pressure relief
devices, and emergency block valves to prevent or limit the severity of a
release.
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2.2.3
The Refinery has H2S monitors located along the Refinerys perimeter to
alert Refinery personnel if H2S is detected.
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Table 2-4 Properties of Flammable Hydrocarbons
Property
Propane (C3)
Butane (C4)
LPG
Boiling point
-44F
-31F
-44 to +97F
Vapor density
1.6
2.0
1.9
2.1 9.5%
1.9 8.5%
2 10%
Autoignition temperature
--
--
842F
--
800 ppm
1,000 ppm
Flammability limits
Ppm
TLV
=
=
2.2.4
CUSA 2013
The LPG storage spheres are located away from the refinery perimeter to
minimize the effect on the public in the event of a release.
Each sphere is equipped with a firewater deluge system to cool the vessel
to prevent failure in the event of a fire.
The LPG storage area is equipped with alarms, pressure relief devices, and
emergency block valves to prevent or limit the severity of a release.
Each sphere is equipped with a fusible link valve, which is a check valve
that will automatically close during a fire and isolate the sphere from all
other systems.
The drainage near the spheres would cause released liquid to drain away
from the spheres and the rest of the refinery and would minimize the
surface area to reduce the amount of evaporation.
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pipeline from the General Chemical facility adjacent to the refinery. Spent
sulfuric acid is returned via pipeline to General Chemical for regeneration.
Properties of sulfuric acid are shown in Table 2-5.
H2SO4is very hazardous in case of skin contact, eye contact, ingestion or
inhalation. Liquid or spray mist may produce tissue damage particularly on eyes,
mouth and respiratory tract. Skin contact may produce burns. Inhalation of the
spray mist may produce severe irritation of respiratory tract. Severe overexposure can result in death.
Table 2-5 Properties of H2SO4
Property
ERPG-1
Value
2 mg/m3
ERPG-2
10 mg/m3
ERPG-3
120
mg/m3
Liquid specific
gravity
Boiling point
ERPG
mg/m3
1.84
590F
Comments
The concentration that nearly all individuals could be
exposed to for one hour without experiencing other than
mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly
defined objectionable odor.
The concentration below which it is believed that nearly
all individuals could be exposed to for one hour without
experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms which could impair an
individuals ability to take protective action.
The concentration below which it is believed that nearly
all individuals could be exposed to for one hour without
experiencing or developing life-threatening effects.
None.
Can yield toxic sulfur trioxide gas at temperatures greater
than 572F.
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2.3
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Gas Distribution
Gas Distribution is responsible for routing fuel to users throughout the refinery
and consists of four main systems: Fuel Gas, Process Gas, Natural Gas, and
Medium BTU (MBTU) Gas.
Fuel gas is supplied from fuel gas mix drums to various fuel users throughout the
refinery to use as combustion material. Process gas is off gas from various process
units in the refinery. It may be routed directly into a fuel gas mix drum or sent
through a H2S removal plant before being mixed into the fuel gas. Natural gas
supplements the refinery fuel gas system and H2 manufacturing and Cogen feed
stock, and is supplied by PG&E. MBTU gas is used as replacement for the natural
gas provided by PG&E, and as an alternative feed stock for Cogen.
The RMP-regulated substances in the Gas Distribution process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
2.3.2
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The FCC gas recovery section separates the fractionator overhead liquid and
vapor streams into the light-end products. This separation is accomplished by
the following series of distillation columns; deethanizer, depentanizer,
debutanizer, depropanizer, and a gasoline splitter.
The RMP-regulated substances in the FCC Plant are flammable hydrocarbons.
The majority of flammable hydrocarbons are contained in the gas recovery
section of the FCC.
#3 H2S Recovery/Sour Water Concentrator
The #3 H2S Plant is designed to purify the sour gas streams (those containing
H2S) generated in the Cracking area business unit. This is achieved by
absorbing H2S in aqueous diethanolamine (DEA) solution in the H2S
absorber. DEA rich in H2S is regenerated releasing the H2S in the reactivator.
Lean DEA is recirculated back to the H2S absorber. Once purified (or
sweetened), the gases are used as Refinery fuel gas. Recovered H2S gas is sent
to the SRU for conversion to sulfur.
The SWC uses steam to strip NH3 and H2S from sour water generated in the
FCC. The SWC consists of two main columns: the SWC column and the NH3
stripper. Each is dependent upon the other, and both are operated as one.
Stripped water is then routed to the effluent treatment system. Concentrate is
routed to the sour water tank for processing by the NH3-H2S recovery plants
(plants #8 and #18).
The RMP-regulated substances in this plant are flammable hydrocarbons.
LPG Section
Alkylation
The Alky process uses contactors and effluent refrigeration to cool the
contactors. In the process, olefins react with isobutane in the presence of a
sulfuric acid catalyst to form alkylate. The feed for the Alky Plant consists of
olefins and isobutane. These streams are blended, cooled, and freed of water
before going into the process. The alkylate product is a mixture of
hydrocarbons within the gasoline boiling range. Blending of this stream into
the Refinery gasoline pool increases the gasoline octane and reduces the olefin
content and vapor pressure of the gasoline. A portion of the alkylate feeds the
rerun column, which removes the heavier components. This provides a
rerun alkylate overhead product that is used in aviation gasoline.
The RMP-regulated substances in the Alky process are flammable
hydrocarbons and sulfuric acid mixed with flammable hydrocarbons.
Alky Gas Recovery Unit and Selective Hydrogenation Unit
The GRU saturates di-olefins to olefins in the SHU Plant and fractionates an
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alkylate stream into butane, mixed pentanes, and whole alkylate.
The RMP-regulated substances in the GRU and SHU process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
Butamer
The Butamer process converts normal butane into isobutane using a
specialized catalyst. The feed is a combination of the overhead streams from
two debutanizers, C-1020 and C-410. The butane feed is passed through a
drier to remove any moisture and sulfur, mixed with hydrogen, heated to
approximately 300F then passed over a platinum based catalyst. The
resulting mixture of unconverted feed and products are separated in a
stabilizer column. The isobutane product is used in the Alkylation process.
The RMP-regulated substances in the Butamer process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
Yard Deisobutanizer
The primary purpose of the Yard DIB is to recover isobutane for use in the
Alky process. The Yard DIB also produces pentane for gasoline blending,
recovers commercial grade butane, and separates process gas (ethane and
lighter) that is sent to the #3 H2S Recovery Plant.
The RMP-regulated substances in the Yard DIB process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage
The LPG storage area consists of 16 storage spheres, an LPG distribution
system, and loading racks. The LPG storage area buffers producers and
consumers of LPG by inventorying differences between production and
consumption rates in the LPG spheres. The unit imports and exports LPG
using both railcars and tank trucks. LPG is also routed within the unit to
various Refinery consumers.
The RMP-regulated substances in the LPG storage area are flammable
hydrocarbons.
Railcar Storage
The Railcar Storage area helps to maintain inventory differences of both LPG
and NH3 between production and consumption rates of the Refinery. The
Railcar Storage area includes all railcars of LPG and NH3 storage within the
control of the Refinery. The primary railcar storage areas are located in the
Santa Fe Rail Yard (across Castro Street), the Altamont Racks, and near the
lagoon at the Rod and Gun Club. All NH3 rail cars are stored within the
Refinery boundaries and in close proximity to the NH3 Storage area.
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in
Railcar
Storage
are
flammable
Polymer Process
The function of the Poly process is to convert propylene into topped polymer
using catalytic polymerization. The propylene feed stock comes from the C3
olefins produced by the FCC process. The polymerization reaction is carried
out using a bulk phosphoric acid process. The polymer is sold primarily as a
feed stock in the manufacture of lube oil additives and detergents.
The RMP-regulated substances in the Poly process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
Anhydrous Ammonia Storage
The NH3 storage area consists of three storage vessels, the NH3 off-plot
system, and loading racks. The NH3 storage area receives NH3 from the #8
and #18 Plants. The NH3 off-plot system consists of the overall NH3 piping
distribution system. NH3 is supplied to consumers throughout the Refinery,
including the FCC precipitator, low-NOx boilers in RLOP, Crude Unit
furnaces, the emergency scrubber in the #5 H2S Recovery Plant, the
Cogeneration facility and the railcar loading racks for exporting NH3 to other
consumers.
The RMP-regulated substance in the NH3 storage area is NH3.
Sulfur Recovery Section
Sulfur Recovery Unit
The SRU was designed to meet sulfur emission atmospheric standards by
converting H2S into elemental sulfur. H2S generated in several Refinery
processes is removed and sent to the SRU where it is converted to elemental
sulfur and sold at the Sulfur Loading Facility.
The SRU consists of the following sections: (1) the Bull Pen Area in which all
of the Refinerys H2S streams are brought together, (2) the Claus Unit where
all the H2S and sulfur dioxide (SO2) is converted to liquid sulfur, (3) the Tail
Gas Unit where the unreacted H2S is converted to SO2, (4) the SO2 Recovery
Plants where SO2 from rich sulfide solution is recovered and recycled back to
the Claus Unit, and (5) the Product Sulfur Area where the liquid sulfur is
stored and loaded in tank trucks and railcars for sale.
The SRU also has a SWC that operates in a similar manner to the SWC in the
#3 H2S Recovery Plant. This SWC receives dilute sour water from the
Distillation and Reforming area business unit.
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The RMP-regulated substance in the SRU is H2S.
2.3.3
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dioelfins to olefins. The second reactor is where the desulfurization reactions
occur.
The mixture then enters the separation section where the excess hydrogen is
separated and recycled back to the reactors. The desulfurized hydrocarbon and
H2S go on to the distillation section where the H2S and light ends are removed
from the final naphtha product. After the process is complete, the treated
gasoline is stored as a gasoline blend component.
The RMP-regulated substances in the GHT are flammable hydrocarbons.
#5 H2S Recovery Plant
The #5 H2S Recovery Plant is designed to purify the sour gas streams (those
containing H2S) generated in the Distillation and Reforming area business
unit. Once purified (or sweetened), the gases are used as Refinery fuel.
Recovered H2S gas is sent to the SRU for conversion to sulfur. Sour gas
purification is achieved by absorbing H2S in an aqueous DEA solution in the
H2S absorber. DEA rich in H2S is regenerated and the H2S is routed to the
SRU. Lean DEA (without H2S) is recirculated back to the H2S absorber.
The Refinery has an emergency scrubber that is used for events such as loss of
the SRU. When the SRU is shut down, the H2S streams are routed to the
emergency scrubber by the process control operator. Aqua ammonia stored in
a tank is circulated to the emergency scrubber for H2S absorption. The
H2S/NH3 stream from the emergency scrubber is sent to the sour water tank
for processing by #8 and #18 Plants.
The RMP-regulated substances in #5 H2S Plant are H2S, NH3, and flammable
hydrocarbons.
West Side
Jet Hydrotreater
The primary purpose of the JHT is to remove sulfur and nitrogen from the Jet
draw from the atmospheric column of the #4 Crude Unit. The JHT then
separates it into a naphtha stream that goes to #5NHT, and into jet which goes
directly to finished jet products.
The RMP-regulated substances in the JHT are flammable hydrocarbons.
#5 Naphtha Hydrotreater Plant
The primary purpose of the #5 NHT is to desulfurize and denitrify naphtha
from the bottom of the stabilizer in the #4 Crude Unit. The #5 NHT then
separates it into light and heavy naphtha, which are fed to the Penhex unit and
the Naphtha Splitter, respectively.
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This RMP-covered process also contains the #5 Rheniformer Plant and the
LSFO K-900 Plant based on co-location of equipment.
#5 Rheniformer Plant
This Plant upgrades gasoline to higher-octane gasoline. The process
consists of passing a mixture of vaporized hydrocarbons and hydrogen
over a catalyst at a controlled temperature and pressure. Naphtha from the
NHT/Naphtha Splitter is fed to the plant where it contacts a platinumrhenium
catalyst.
Here,
dehydrogenation,
dehydrocyclization,
hydrocracking and isomerization take place. These reactions result in the
conversion of saturated feed components into aromatic hydrocarbons,
which are high-octane gasoline components.
LSFO K-900 Plant
This plant compresses the hydrogen byproduct of the Rheniformers to be
used by hydrotreating.
The RMP-regulated substances in the #5 NHT, #5 Rheniformer & LSFO K900 process are flammable hydrocarbons and NH3.
Penhex-Isomerization
The Penhex-Isomerization (Penhex-Isom) process consists of four plants: the
Naphtha Splitter, the Reformate Splitter, the Penhex unit, and the Caustic
Scrubber.
The Naphtha Splitter separates NHT heavy naphtha into two different streams:
bottoms (heavy components) and light ends (light components). The streams
are then sent to different plants to be further refined. The heptane and heavier
components are sent to #5 Rheniformer. The hexane and lighter components
are sent to the Penhex unit.
The Reformate Splitter reduces the benzene content of rheniformer gasoline
by stripping benzene out of the reformate before it gets blended into gasoline.
The Penhex unit upgrades the octane by isomerization of the feeds coming
from the Naphtha Splitter, Reformate Splitter, and #5 NHT. The Penhex unit
also saturates benzene to meet the U.S. EPA and California Air Resources
Board (CARB) new specifications for cleaner burning gasoline.
The Caustic Scrubber removes hydrogen chloride (HCl) from the offgas
generated at the Penhex unit. HCl reacts with water to form hydrochloric acid,
which can shorten the life of downstream piping and equipment. HCl also can
react with NH3 and ammonium salts that can plug downstream valves,
instruments, and furnace burners.
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The RMP-regulated substances in the Penhex-Isom process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
2.3.4
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and ISOMAX sections into sour offgas, LPG products, gasoline blending
components, and reformer feed.
The RMP-regulated substances in the TKN/ISO process are flammable
hydrocarbons and H2S.
South Isomax Section
H2 Manufacturing Plant
The H2 Plant consist of two parallel H2 Trains which utilize steam methane
reforming to convert natural gas into molecular H2 which is used in the North
Isomax and RLOP hydroprocessing units. Natural gas feed is first treated to
remove sulfur, mixed with steam and then routed into the catalyst-containing
reforming furnace where H2, CO, and CO2 are produced from the natural gas
and steam. The hot syngas is then cooled and sent through a series of shift
reactors which convert steam and CO into CO2 and additional H2. CO2 is
removed using MEA solvent, leaving a nearly pure H2 stream that then
undergoes methanation to convert trace levels of CO and CO2 into CH4. Heat
is recovered from hot process and flue gas streams and used to generate
medium pressure steam. To minimize NOx emissions, one of the two units
injects anhydrous ammonia into the flue gas stream over a selective catalytic
reduction catalyst, reducing NOx by over 90%.
The RMP regulated substance in the H2 plant is NH3.
Solvent Deasphalting Plant
The SDA plant uses a pentane solvent to convert crude residuum to
deasphalted oil. The deasphalted oil produced is fed to the TKC to be
hydrocracked and hydrotreated. The asphalt produced is cut with cycle oils
and used for residual fuel blending.
The RMP-regulated substances in the SDA process are flammable
hydrocarbons.
#8 Plant
Sour water is produced when water is contacted with hydrocarbon streams
containing NH3 and H2S. The NH3 and H2S dissolve in the water to form a
salt, ammonium bisulfide. All of the sour water produced in the Refinery is
processed by two NH3-H2S plants, which is a wastewater treatment process.
These plants process sour water to produce water that is reused in upstream
process units or sent to the effluent water treatment facilities. In addition to
purifying water, the plant produces separate streams of H2S and NH3. H2S is
sent to the SRU where the sulfur is recovered and sold. NH3 is sent to the NH3
storage area. The #8 Plant is one of the two NH3-H2S plants in the Refinery.
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The RMP-regulated substances in the #8 Plant are H2S, NH3 and flammable
hydrocarbons.
RLOP Section
Light Neutral Hydrocracker
The LNC is a single-stage, once-through unit designed to produce high
viscosity waxy lube oil feedstocks from a blend of vacuum gas oils from the
#4 Crude Unit. The waxy oils are dewaxed and hydrofinished in the LNF to
make high viscosity lube oils.
In the LNC, the feed is cracked and partially saturated by reacting it with
hydrogen at high temperatures and pressure over a catalyst in the reactor. The
viscosity is improved as the lower viscosity components of the feed are
cracked to form light products. The reactor products are fractionated in the
atmospheric and vacuum columns.
The #5 side cuts and bottoms from the vacuum column are sent to the LNF to
make 100 Neutral and 240 Neutral lube oils, respectively. Several light
products are produced by cracking the feed in the reactor. Jet Fuel is separated
by boiling range in the atmospheric column. Diesel is drawn from the vacuum
column along with the waxy 100N and 240N oils.
The RMP-regulated substances in the LNC are flammable hydrocarbons.
Heavy Neutral Hydrocracker
The HNC is a single-stage, once-through unit designed to produce high
viscosity waxy oil feedstocks from a blend of vacuum gas oil from the #4
Crude Unit. The high viscosity waxy oils are dewaxed and hydrofinished in
the LNF to make high viscosity lube oils.
In the HNC, the feed is cracked and partially saturated by reacting it with
hydrogen at high temperatures and pressure in the presence of catalyst in the
reactors. The viscosity is improved as the low viscosity components of the
feed are reacted to form light products. The reactor products are fractionated
in the atmospheric and vacuum columns.
The RMP-regulated substances in the HNC are flammable hydrocarbons,
NH3, and H2S.
Light Neutral Hydrofinisher
The LNF is designed to dewax and hydrofinish light and medium lube oils in
blocked or staggered operation. The products are lube base stocks. The feed to
the LNF is waxy oil from the LNC and the HNC. The oil is dewaxed and
hydrofinished by two reactors. In these reactors, the oil is reacted with
hydrogen over a catalyst at high pressure. In the first reactor, waxes are
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reformed into lube oil molecules to improve the product pour point. In the
second reactor, the product is hydrofinished to improve product stability.
Hydrogen-rich gas is separated from the oil product and recycled back to the
reactor inlet. The product lube oil is then separated from light oil and gases in
the low-pressure separator, atmospheric column, and vacuum column.
The RMP-regulated substances in the LNF are flammable hydrocarbons.
Heavy Neutral Hydrofinisher
The HNF is designed to dewax and hydrofinish medium and heavy lube oils
in blocked or staggered operation. The products are lube base stocks. The feed
to the HNF is waxy oil from the LNC and the HNC. The oil is dewaxed and
hydrofinished by two reactors. In these reactors, the oil is reacted with
hydrogen over a catalyst at high pressure. In the first reactor, waxes are
reformed into lube oil molecules to improve the product pour point. In the
second reactor, the product is hydrofinished to improve product stability.
Hydrogen-rich gas is separated from the oil product and recycled back to the
reactor inlet. The product lube oil is then separated from light oil and gases in
the low pressure separator, atmospheric column, and vacuum column.
The RMP-regulated substances in the HNF are flammables.
Gas Recovery Unit
The RLOP GRU was designed to process light end vapor and liquid produced
in hydrocracking and hydrofinishing operations. The feed to this unit comes
from the LNC, HNC, LNF, HNF, TKC, Hydrogen Recovery Unit, and the
Refinery mixed LPG tank. The GRU separates these streams into sour offgas,
LPG products, gasoline blending components, and reformer feed.
The RMP-regulated substances in the GRU are H2S and flammable
hydrocarbons.
Hydro Flares
The Hydro Flares (33 Plant) are used to safely combust relief gases from the
Heavy Neutral Cracker, Light Neutral Cracker, Light Neutral Finisher, Heavy
Neutral Finisher, and the Gas Recovery Unit. 33 Plant also houses the liquid
ammonia storage drum (V-3396) that supplies the ammonia injection to the
RLOP DeNOx units.
The RMP-regulated substance in 33 Plant is NH3.
#18 Plant
The #18 Plant is the other of two NH3-H2S plants in the Refinery, and was
designed to remove H2S and NH3 from wastewater streams stored in the sour
water tank. The plant processes sour water to produce water that is reused in
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upstream process units or sent to the effluent water treatment facilities. In
addition to purifying water, the plant produces separate streams of H2S and
NH3. H2S is sent to the SRU where sulfur is produced. NH3 is sent to the NH3
Storage area.
The RMP-regulated substances in the #18 Plant are H2S, NH3 and flammable
hydrocarbons.
2.4
Definitions
Human Error
Human
Factors
Richmond
Refinery
Human
Factors
Threshold
Inherently
Safer Systems
Latent
Conditions
Latent conditions are human factor issues that have not been resolved. These
types of conditions may exist in areas of a refinery and may lie unrecognized
until combining with active failures (an appropriate or inappropriate action) to
result in an incident.
MCAR
Major Chemical Accident or Release means an incident that meets the definition
of a Level 3 or Level 2 Incident in the Community Warning System incident
level classification system defined in the December 14, 2004, Contra Costa
County guideline for the Community Warning System as determined by the
Department; or results in the release including, but not limited to, air, water, or
soil of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the following criteria:
(1)
(2)
(3)
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estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by
Health Services, or
(4)
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3.1
Introduction
The intent of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA)
PSM program is to prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases of
toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. Specifically, the PSM regulations are
intended to eliminate, to a substantial degree, the risks to which workers and the public
are exposed from the operation of petroleum refineries, chemical plants, and other
industrial facilities. The Refinery applies the PSM program to the entire facility, not just
to processes that are covered by EPAs RMP or Californias Cal/ARP regulations.
The foundation of the Refinerys Safety Program is CUSAs safety culture and corporate
OE vision, as discussed in Section 1.0, Introduction. Management of the Refinerys
Safety Program builds on this foundation to establish a disciplined system for managing
process safety work processes.
3.2
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Ensure that they and the entire Refinery workforce comply with OE
requirements.
Through personal example, the Refinerys leaders demonstrate that zero whether
related to process safety, personal safety, health, environmental, reliability, or efficiency
incidents is attainable.
OE Expectations & Policies
OE Expectations are CUSA-specific requirements for the management of safety, health,
environmental performance, reliability and efficiency. The expectations include
compliance with all government laws and regulations. Refinery Instructions (RI) are the
primary method of setting and communicating expectations for the process safety and
human factors program elements at the Refinery. These instructions are available on the
Refinery Information Server, which is the Refinerys internal web page with pertinent
information accessible to all personnel. Each RI is owned and maintained by an
appropriate organization within the Refinery. The manager of each organization dedicates
subject matter experts to periodically review and update the RIs. Each RI is reviewed and
approved by that manager and forwarded to senior managers for approval before taking
effect. Senior managers are often directly involved in the development and revision of
RIs. Refinery employees responsible for RI modifications must communicate those
changes to all affected employees.
Prior to changing a process safety or human factors program element, the originator of
the change solicits input from the other element owners. This is done to ensure changes to
one element do not inadvertently affect other elements.
Management System Process
The Management System Process begins with defining a vision of success and setting
objectives. The vison and objectives drive the Refinerys Business Plan. The Refinerys
Vision is to achieve and sustain world-class, operationally excellent performance. There
is no measure of the Refinerys performance with a higher priority than operating safely,
reliably, and with concern for the health and well-being of the workforce, surrounding
communities and the environment.
The Refinerys Vision is to systematically manage OE to:
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The Refinerys metrics and targets are communicated to employees each year. The OE
metrics are:
These OE metrics and targets are updated throughout the year, and are communicated and
reviewed during team meetings, through the Refinerys web page, business plan roll-out
meetings, and management communications.
In addition to tracking actual events, the Refinery tracks and reports leading indicators or
proactive metrics. Leading indicators are predictive indicators that may be used to
identify a weakness that can be corrected before an actual event occurs. Examples of
process safety leading indicators include the following: overdue process hazard analysis
(PHA) recommendations, days exceeding alarm limits, and overdue pressure relief device
tests.
Senior management and employees are held accountable for meeting the Refinerys OE
metric targets. Leading metrics are visible to all employees on the Refinerys web page
and are updated daily. The CUSA Incentive Plan rewards all employees for meeting
safety and environmental goals. Additionally, the Refinery has monthly process safety
metric targets for individuals, and awards employees who meet those targets.
Continuous Management Commitment
Managers focus on directing the Refinerys OEMS for continual improvement and
integrating OE into its business plans. They prioritize OE plans to focus on the highestimpact items in alignment with the Refinerys Vision and objectives discussed above.
They also provide resources and monitor progress on plans until a successful conclusion
is reached. Managers must:
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OE element sustainability and improvement reviews take place throughout the Refinery
to ensure progress towards meeting program goals and to discuss process improvement
opportunities. All compliance-required records relating to the program elements are
maintained for at least five years. The entire program is audited internally for compliance
once every three years. Action items resulting from this audit are resolved in a timely
fashion. Metrics are reviewed by the subject matter experts and the management sponsors
to discuss their effectiveness on the applicable OE element. These reviews provide the
forum to look back, share lessons learned and make recommendations to improve the
program. The Refinerys management system activities are further discussed below:
Controlling Management and the subject matter experts responsible for each
process safety prevention program element periodically conduct internal reviews
or audits against the goals and objectives of the element. The procedures are
reviewed, revised, and approved to ensure that they remain accurate and reflect
the current practices.
Verifying and Improving CUSA and Refinery senior management verify and
improve the Refinerys OE programs through:
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Annual OE assessments;
Field audits of high-risk process safety activities;
Verification and validation of audit findings;
Field audits of completed solutions from loss and near-loss investigations;
Reviews of significant process safety incidents to ensure the quality of
investigations and implementation of appropriate solutions to prevent
reoccurrence;
Participation in joint management-employee committees on health, personal
safety and process safety so that representatives from organizations
throughout the Refinery have an opportunity to communicate their safety
concerns and discuss progress on critical safety initiatives;
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Resources
Necessary expertise to support the Refinerys work processes is provided
through dedicated safety, technical and inspection groups. These groups
possess a combination of technical training and practical hands-on experience
which is necessary to not only solve problems and implement solutions, but to
effectively communicate and enforce the need to implement the various
elements of the Safety Plan. When a special situation requires outside
expertise, necessary resources are assembled from other CUSA refineries,
operating companies, or contract specialists.
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Material safety data sheets (MSDS) are maintained for each regulated substance
and includes the following information: toxicity information, permissible
exposure limits, physical data, reactivity data, corrosivity data, and thermal and
chemical stability data; and
Safe upper and lower operating limits and an evaluation of the consequences of
deviations from those limits (included in Operating Manuals and Safety
Instruction Sheets).
Materials of Construction;
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3.4
Safety Systems;
Operating Procedures
Clearly written safe work practices and operating procedures, especially for high-risk
critical tasks, are critical to the safe operation of the Refinery and to reduce the likelihood
of a release of hazardous chemicals or energy that could impact employees, the
community or the environment. Applied together, RI-102, Procedures for Instructions,
Standards, and Manuals, the Electronic Operating Manual (EOM) Guidebook, and RI374, Safe Work Practices, ensure that operating procedures and safe work practices are
consistent and accurate. These practices and procedures were developed in accordance
with Section 2760.3 of the Cal/ARP regulations.
Safe Work Practices include, but are not limited to:
and
Electronic copies of operating procedures are available to all employees. Paper copies of
emergency operating procedures are available in the control room of each process unit.
The Refinerys operating manuals include the following sections and appendices:
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Process description;
Normal operations, including start-up and shutdown;
Emergency procedures, including shutdown;
Routine duties;
A Consequences of Deviation (COD) table which identifies safe operating limits
and the consequences of operating outside those limits. The COD tables explain
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the steps to correct or avoid the consequences of deviating outside the identified
operating limits, including initiation of emergency shutdown;
A health and safety section which provides a brief description of the chemicals
and the associated hazards (including special or unique hazards) and engineering
and administrative safeguards (i.e., ventilation, personal protective equipment
(PPE) used to prevent exposures, etc.); and
A description of all safety systems (i.e., alarms, interlocks, shutdowns), their
functions, and their set points.
Experienced plant operators are trained on the manual writing process and are utilized to
create and maintain those procedures.
The Refinerys Electronic Manual Management System (EMMS) ensures that operations
and maintenance procedures and manuals are both current and accurate. The EMMS
database allows employees to review and update documents according to a regular
schedule. Operations procedures and manuals are reviewed at least every three years,
maintenance procedures every five years.
The Refinerys MOC process is required for all non-cosmetic changes to procedures and
manuals. Any revised documents are routed through the RBU for review and approval.
In addition, at the end of each calendar year, each RBU Manager is required to certify
that the operating procedures for their area are current and accurate as part of the
Refinerys annual compliance certification process.
A description of the steps taken to include human factors into the Refinerys operating
procedures is available in Section 4.6.
3.5
Employee Participation
The Refinery relies on the expertise of CUSA employees and contractors at all levels and
disciplines to ensure personal safety, process safety and reliable operations. This is
achieved by consulting with all Refinery workers to ensure consideration of their
knowledge and experience in all applicable areas of the SSP. The Refinery has developed
a written plan of action regarding employee participation in all aspects of the SSP. This
written plan, which was developed in accordance with Section 2760.1 of the Cal/ARP
regulations, is documented in RI-361, Employee Participation Plan. The Employee
Participation Plan fosters ongoing engagement between management, employees and
contractors. It encourages active participation in the design, development,
implementation and continual improvement of process safety activities and systems.
Worker involvement will help ensure that all perspectives are considered and that the best
ideas are implemented.
The Employee Participation Plan and Refinery policies ensure that:
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A description of the steps taken to include human factors into the Employee Participation
Element is set forth in Section 4.1.
3.6
Training
The Refinery training program ensures employees have necessary skills and knowledge
in order to perform their jobs in an incident-free manner, and in compliance with all
applicable laws, regulations, and policies.
One of the purposes of the Refinerys written training plan is to provide affected
personnel with an understanding of the types and causes of potential incidents or
deviations within the process and the hazards associated with the process.
The operator training plan is outlined in the Operations Training Process Manual.
Maintenance personnel training is listed in RI-368, Mechanical Integrity, and
contractor training is addressed in RI-366, Contractors. The training program was
developed in accordance with Section 2670.4 of the CalARP regulations and is
comprised of the following:
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Fundamentals training;
Plant or equipment specific formal training;
Training provided as a result of the MOC program, which includes training on
updated or new procedures;
Refresher training; and
Training documentation.
All operators receive initial training in safe work practices and basic operating principles
prior to assignment. The operators receive training specific to the operations of each
process once they are assigned to a process unit. The training criteria are documented in
job dimension documents that list the knowledge required (e.g., safe operating limits,
safety system set points) and skills to be demonstrated (e.g., emergency shutdown,
lockout/tagout procedures). Various means are used to verify competency, including
written and oral examinations, demonstrations, and on-the-job training. Documentation of
the training is forwarded to the Development Department for filing and tracking.
Refresher training on specific operating procedures (e.g., normal operations, start-up,
shutdown), critical, seldom-done tasks, emergency procedures, MOC reviews, safe work
practices (e.g., limiting contractor access, lockout/tagout), and company-wide practices is
provided and includes the following:
The Refinerys current training schedule was developed with employee consultation and
allows refresher training to be conducted at a minimum of every three years. Training
documentation is tracked in the training database or crew turnover logs.
Training may also be required as a result of the MOC process. The type of training is
determined according to the complexity of the change (e.g., email notification, hands
on/simulator training, classroom training). Training records are forwarded to and
maintained by the Learning & Development (L&D) Department. The RBU is responsible
for ensuring that the necessary training is conducted prior to implementation of a change.
This training was developed in accordance with the MOC program requirements of
Section 2760.6 of the Cal/ARP regulations. A description of the steps taken to include
human factors into the Training Element is set forth in Section 4.2.
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Mechanical Integrity
The Refinery has developed a mechanical integrity program pursuant to Section 2760.5
of the Cal/ARP regulations. Proper design and maintenance of equipment and safety
systems is essential to prevent releases of hazardous materials.
The mechanical integrity program applies to fixed equipment, rotating equipment,
instrumentation, and electrical systems. This includes pressure vessels, storage tanks,
piping systems (including piping components such as valves), compressors, pumps,
pressure relief devices, and vent systems, all of which are inspected following API
guidelines. The mechanical integrity program also applies to emergency shutdown
systems and process controls, including monitoring devices, sensors, alarms, and
interlocks.
RI-368, Mechanical Integrity, describes the Refinerys policy and standards for the
mechanical integrity program, which consists of the following:
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The Refinerys EMMS ensures that maintenance procedures and manuals are both
current and accurate. The EMMS database provides employees a method to review
and update documents according to a regular schedule. Maintenance procedures are
reviewed every five years.
Inspection and testing procedures for critical equipment Inspection and testing
procedures and frequency of testing for each piece of critical equipment are
developed and documented by the Equipment Reliability group. These procedures
and their frequency are based on jurisdictional requirements, manufacturers
recommendations, recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices,
operating history, and failure prediction and prevention. Completed inspection and
test documents include the inspectors name, date of the inspection or test,
identification of the equipment, inspection and test procedures, and the results of the
inspection or test are retained by the Maintenance and Reliability Department.
Equipment inspectors or reliability analysts review the results of each inspection or
test to ascertain whether the equipment is within the acceptable limits and to
determine if the frequency of the inspections should be adjusted. Equipment outside
of the engineering standards is removed, repaired, or replaced unless temporary
protective measures can be put in place until the deficiencies are corrected. Inspection
and test results are maintained for the life of the equipment. Some examples of
inspections and tests include internal and external inspections, thickness monitoring,
ultrasonic/radiography inspection, hydrotesting and infra-red scans. Instrumentation
and control systems are also tested to ensure they will function as intended.
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All buildings within the Refinery were evaluated in 1999 using the API
Recommended Practice 752. Each building was screened for hazards, function and
occupancy levels. Consequence modeling was performed for each building that met
the occupancy conditions. The results of the modeling generated an action plan to
ensure that each building meeting the occupancy conditions have mitigations in-place
to reduce the risk associated with the surrounding hazards. All buildings have
completed mitigation plans.
Area inspectors perform visual reviews of structures within their respective areas on a
routine basis. A licensed civil engineer is available to assess potential concerns. If
warranted, a maintenance work request is generated to resolve the concern. In
addition, the structural systems are inspected after any event (i.e., fire, explosion,
earthquake) that could have resulted in structural damage. Any abnormalities in the
structural systems observed by Refinery personnel during their regular duties are
entered into our maintenance work management system for repairs.
3.8
Management of Change
Changes within a refinery are sometimes necessary to address safety, environmental, and
operational concerns. A change made in one part of the process may have unintended
effects on other parts of the process, or other processes, because the Refinery is an
integrated system. These changes are therefore appropriately scrutinized to avoid adverse
effects to work and public safety and to the environment.
The Refinery has implemented a written MOC procedure, documented in RI-370,
Management of Change, which was developed in accordance with Section 2760.6 of
the Cal/ARP regulations. This MOC procedure ensures that all changes to the following
are properly managed:
MOC does not apply to a replacement in kind, which is defined as a replacement that
satisfies the design specifications for the equipment being replaced.
Refinery personnel verify that the Refinerys process equipment complies with
recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. Designated personnel also
verify that all equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe
manner. All new designs follow the CUSA Engineering Standards (CES). Exceptions to
this practice are managed through a documented waiver process that includes appropriate
reviews and approvals. Other methods to ensure compliance with CES include Lead
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Subject matter experts or other employees with technical expertise are involved in
making, reviewing or approving the change;
Equipment is fabricated and installed in accordance with the design
specifications;
Employees whose job tasks are affected by the change are trained prior to the
startup of the process;
Process safety information is updated as necessary; and
Operating procedures are updated as necessary in accordance with the change
being made, and reviewed by a subject matter expert; the MOC cannot be closed
until the procedure update is verified as posted to the Refinery EOM.
Most changes are relatively simple and require only communication of the change taking
place. Each person affected by that change is sent a notification of change before the
change is put into service. For more complex changes, a training package is developed
and delivered to the affected employees, either on shift for minor changes, or in a
classroom setting for major changes.
The person that authorizes the start-up of a change is typically an Operating Assistant.
That person is responsible for determining that the assigned individuals have completed
all required tasks and reviews identified on the MOC form before the change is put into
service.
If it is considered necessary to use marked-up copies of P&IDs temporarily to expedite
start-up, the MOC tracking system is used to verify completion of the update process.
The individual that authorizes the start-up of any change is responsible for ensuring that
all PSI, including P&IDs, are updated prior to start-up of the change. The P&ID update
process is described in RI-362 Process Safety Information.
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The MOC records are tracked according to the assigned tracking number. The MOC
records and documentation of completion of the tasks and reviews are maintained for the
life of the process plus 30 years.
A description of how the Refinery complies with the requirement to manage
organizational change is set forth in Section 4.7.
3.9
All required signatures must be obtained and any exceptions documented prior to startup.
PSSR exceptions are outstanding items that may or may not be required for safe startup.
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Compliance Audits
Trained personnel perform internal compliance audits at least every three years to review
and evaluate the written documentation/records and implementation of the Cal/ARP and
RISO programs. The compliance audit program, documented in RI-373, Compliance
Audit, was developed in accordance with Section 2760.8 of the Cal/ARP regulations.
Audits help verify compliance with established standards/regulations and identify any
gaps that exist to ensure that process safety systems function in a manner that protects the
community, employees and the environment from accidental releases of hazardous
chemicals.
The OE Audit Group assigns an Audit Team Lead. This person is responsible for leading
the audit team and ensuring all of the goals and objectives of the audit are fulfilled. The
balance of the audit team is comprised of qualified personnel knowledgeable in the
process. A Refinery Audit Liaison ensures adequate notifications are made, and interview
schedules and meeting locations are defined. The OE/PSM Manager assists in the
removal of barriers which may impede the teams ability to succeed and works with the
other resource owners to ensure that findings requiring mitigation have adequate
resources committed to resolve issues in a timely fashion.
The audit team utilizes a field assessment and audit checklist to perform the following:
The audit team members formulate findings for improvement. The results of the
compliance audit are communicated to the Refinery Leadership Team during a closing
meeting and in an audit report. The appropriate PSM element owners are responsible for
reviewing the findings, determining appropriate resolutions, assigning responsibility for
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Incident Investigation
The Refinerys incident investigation procedure, documented in RI-371, Near Loss,
Event Reporting and Incident Investigation, was developed in accordance with Section
2760.9 of the Cal/ARP regulations. RI-371 establishes procedures for investigating each
incident that results in, or could reasonably have resulted in, an accidental release of a
regulated substance causing injuries or property damage.
Incident investigations provide the Refinery with the means to identify root causes or
systemic factors and implement solutions to prevent future incidents.
Business Unit Managers are responsible for ensuring that personnel in his/her area
promptly report any incident or near miss, including those with potential for catastrophic
release. All incidents are reported into the Refinerys Incident database. Personnel trained
in the methodology to be used (includes 5 Why, Triangle of Prevention (TOP), and
TapRoot) are assigned as investigation team leader and/or investigation team facilitator.
All Refinery employees are trained in TOP awareness. The experience and number of the
other team members are dependent upon the nature of the incident. Typically, the
incident investigation teams are comprised of a team leader, and other employees
(including contract employees) knowledgeable in the operation, design, and maintenance
of the process. Significant incidents (Level 3 severity classification) require the use of the
TapRoot methodology (root cause analysis), which incorporates human factors in the
investigation process.
The incident investigation team leader is responsible for initiating the investigation as
soon as possible, but definitely within 48 hours of the time of the incident or near miss.
The team lead selects team members for Level 1 & 2 investigations, and coordinates and
supervises investigation team activities. Team members, with team leader/facilitator
guidance, collect and analyze facts, identify root causes, develop appropriate solutions in
order to avoid a repeat occurrence, and prepare the initial investigation report. The
Management Sponsor has overall accountability for the investigation and its
documentation, confirms team leader and members, assigns team members for Level 3
investigations, ensures needed resources are available, and reviews and approves the final
investigation report.
The investigation report findings and recommendations are promptly addressed and
resolved in a timely manner. The functional work group manager is responsible to ensure
the recommendations are completed in accordance with RI-371.
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The analysis upon which the recommendation is based contains material factual
errors;
The recommendation is not necessary to protect the health and safety of the
employers own employees, or the employees of contractors;
An alternative measure would provide a sufficient level of protection; and
The recommendation is infeasible.
Recommendation resolutions are tracked and managed in the PHA Database. The
database is the permanent record for each recommendation. The database includes the
original team findings, the plan to resolve the potential hazard, when the action is to be
completed and the work performed to resolve the recommendation. The database also
records the person and department responsible for completing the recommendation.
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Current PSI and procedures are utilized and referenced throughout the revalidation
process.
As of September 1, 2012 the Refinery has 126 open action items from PHA
studies and associated activities:
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Each PHA for an existing facility conducts an ISS review using an ISS Checklist.
The review is completed by the PHA team and may include input from subject
matter experts and persons with technical expertise. Recommendations can be
made by the team to address any questions raised or gaps identified.
Seismic Studies
The Refinery conducted a seismic review for each process at the Refinery in 1991. The
primary performance objective of the seismic assessment program is to provide
reasonable assurance that structural components and equipment maintain structural
integrity and position in the event of a seismic event to reduce the likelihood of loss of
containment of hazardous substances and minimize the impact on employees, the
community and the environment. Six major geotechnical, seismic hazards were
evaluated:
Ground acceleration;
Fault rupture;
Liquefaction;
Subsidence;
Landslide; and
Tsunami.
The nearest major fault to the Refinery is the Hayward fault, located approximately three
miles away from the Refinery at its nearest point. Due to the soil type and location of the
Refinery, the only site-specific seismic hazard of concern is ground acceleration. The
seismic review was followed by an evaluation of the process area equipment relative to
these identified hazards. The review was based on a 475-year return period earthquake
which corresponds to a 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, which corresponds to
an estimated magnitude of 7.0 to 7.5.
Seismic walkthroughs are performed on each process unit to inspect and assess the
structural integrity of the structural components, following the guidance developed by
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3.14
The source of ignition may be safely used RI-341 requires that only an approved
apparatus be used and that personnel performing the hot work (including
contractors) be informed of the hazards and properly trained. Also, the flammable
gas or vapor content in the air must be less than 10% of the lowest content that is
flammable or explosive;
Combustible materials in areas that will be exposed during hot work are protected
or relocated;
Proper fire extinguishing equipment is available to employees performing hot
work; and
Personnel in the control room are notified prior to initiation of the hot work to
make them aware of the ignition source. This awareness allows personnel in the
control room to quickly contact the fire watch and personnel performing hot work
if continued use of the source of ignition becomes hazardous.
Contractors
The Refinerys contractor program is documented in RI-366, Contractors, which was
developed in accordance with Section 2760.12 of the Cal/ARP regulations. The
contractor program ensures that safety issues are addressed during contractor selection
and that CUSA and the contract company share responsibility for the safety of all
CUSA 2013
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February 2013
3-25
February 2013
The Refinery works closely with local emergency responders (primarily the
Richmond Fire Department) in preparing for emergencies; and
There are procedures for notifying the public and local emergency response
agencies about accidental releases.
The Refinery emergency response program is discussed in more detail in the following
subsections.
Emergency Response Plan
The ERP addresses all aspects of emergency response, including proper first aid and
medical treatment for exposures, evacuation plans and accounting for personnel after an
evacuation, notification of local emergency response agencies and the public if a release
does occur, and post-incident cleanup and decontamination requirements. The ERP is
documented in a series of Refinery Instructions, and is available to all employees. Hard
copies of the ERP, and manuals of emergency plans and procedures, are also maintained
throughout the Refinery.
The ERP is reviewed annually by the Manager of the Refinery Fire Department and
updated to ensure that it remains accurate and current. Every employee receives training
in these procedures as necessary to perform their specific emergency response duties.
The ERP includes the chemical-specific emergency response procedures for releases of
regulated chemicals. The chemical-specific emergency response plans identify the
CUSA 2013
3-26
February 2013
CUSA 2013
3-27
February 2013
CUSA 2013
3-28
February 2013
Sirens. Initially, four sirens may be activated by the Refinery to provide a loud
audible signal throughout the cities of Richmond and San Pablo. A total of 20
sirens are available and can be activated by CCHMP. See Figure 3-2. Upon
hearing the sirens, residents are advised to proceed indoors to shelter-in-place and
turn on their TV or radio to obtain further instructions or more information about
the incident;
CUSA 2013
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February 2013
Chevron 2012
3-30
February 2013
4.0
4.1
Employee Participation;
Training;
Process Hazards Analysis;
Operating Procedures;
Management of Organizational Changes;
Root Cause Analysis, and
Latent Conditions.
Employee Participation
This section describes several examples of employee participation in the development
and implementation of the Refinerys Human Factors Program.
Development
A multi-discipline team was formed to ensure compliance with the RISO human factors
requirements, including members from Operations, Engineering, Learning &
Development, Projects, and a union HES representative. Due to the complexity of the
human factors elements, sub-teams were created and leaders assigned to manage the
development of the specific elements prescribed by the ordinance. The Refinerys PSM
Coordinator participated on all sub-teams to ensure consistency in program development.
Other employees participated based upon their subject matter expertise.
Some team members had prior training in human factors issues. Individuals assigned to
serve as human factors trainers attended a two-day Train-the-Trainer course presented by
the Labor Occupational Health Program (LOHP). LOHP assisted in the development of
both Human Factors Basic Awareness and CUSA-specific Human Factors Program
training.
Initially, over 1,350 employees and 100 contractors completed the Human Factors
Overview Training. Afterwards, participants were asked to assist in the development of
the Refinerys Human Factors Program by completing an anonymous on-line survey. The
purpose of the survey was two-fold: (1) provide the opportunity for each individual to
identify their top four latent condition concerns in their work area, e.g.,
Staffing/Overtime, Climate & Culture, Worker Selection, etc., and (2) identify specific
CUSA 2013
4-1
February 2013
latent conditions in their work areas that could result in incidents with significant human
consequences and/or a significant off-site impact.
All input into the development of the Human Factors Program was documented and
responses were communicated via various methods such as e-mail, web sites and face-to
face meetings. An internal web-site was also created to facilitate the communication of
additional concerns and submit comments or questions to the PSM Coordinator.
Questions were reviewed and responded to via the web-site. System-wide concerns and
comments were reviewed with and responded to by the appropriate employee and
management representatives.
Human Factors Committee - Ongoing Implementation
To ensure the on-going goals and objectives of the Human Factors Program are met and
sustained, a Human Factors Committee was developed. The Committee consists of
management, employees and their representatives who meet periodically and discuss
emerging human factor issues, suggest improvements, and verify program effectiveness.
All employees are encouraged to discuss their human factor concerns with any of the
Committee members, who will present those concerns to the full Committee and provide
individuals/groups with timely feedback. The Committees meeting minutes are retained
and available on the Refinerys shared file server.
The Human Factors Program is evaluated every two years by the process owner to
identify deficiencies and improvement opportunities. Proposed improvement plans will
be submitted to the Refinerys Health and Safety and Process Safety Management
Steering Committees for approval. In addition, the OE/PSM Manager will select
members of management and employees to annually review the work process to ensure
adequate support is given to sustain a successful program.
Employee participation in the implementation of Human Factors in other RISO elements
can be found in sections 4.2 to 4.7.
4.2
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4-2
February 2013
Trainers are selected based on their subject matter expertise in the specific PSM areas or
Latent Conditions Checklist. They are trained to develop and deliver specialized training
to ensure that all employees can fulfill their specific responsibilities for implementing the
Human Factors Program. The expectations of trainers are as follows:
4.2.1
CUSA 2013
4-3
February 2013
4.2.2
Specialized Training
Employees receiving specialized training as part of the Human Factors Program
are those whose job responsibilities include:
4.2.3
Refresher Training
Refresher training for the employees who have already received Human Factors
Basic Awareness Training is delivered on a three-year cycle or more often, if
needed. Refresher training is an extension of the material provided in the initial
basic awareness training curriculum. It includes identifying latent conditions and
information the site-specific Human Factors Program. Final program elements
will be determined by consulting with the affected personnel and RISO core team
members to determine content. The current method of delivery is computer-based
training and compliance will be documented in the Refinerys training database.
Refresher training for employees who have received specialized training in human
factors will be provided on an as-needed basis. For those who have specific
responsibilities for implementing the Human Factors Program, there will be
refresher training available prior to each human factor activity (e.g., completion of
the Latent Conditions Checklist, incident investigation team members).
CUSA 2013
4-4
February 2013
4.3
Latent Conditions
Latent conditions are human factor issues that have not been resolved. These types of
conditions may exist in various areas of the Refinery and may lie unrecognized until
combining with active failures (an appropriate or inappropriate action) to result in an
incident. RI-384, Latent Conditions has been developed to define the latent condition
review process within the Refinery.
Latent conditions typically fall into four categories, which may involve the following
factors:
When establishing the Human Factors Program, a list of 250 potential latent condition
questions prescribed by the CCHMP Guidance Document was reviewed by the Human
Factors Committee to determine how the questions should be applied. The results of this
activity generated the following three independent checklists used to address human
factors:
Following several years of application of the latent condition checklists, the Human
Factors Committee initiated an effort to re-evaluate the checklist questions to ensure the
questions were still appropriate for their application and effective in identifying latent
conditions. In 2012, with the endorsement of Refinery leadership the latent condition
checklists were revised. Additionally, a fourth checklist was created to address human
factors at the Refinery business unit level. The following latent condition checklists have
been in effect since mid-year 2012:
CUSA 2013
4-5
February 2013
The PSM Team Lead will ensure that Latent Conditions Checklists are reviewed every
three years to ensure the questions reflect the practices of the Refinery.
Latent Conditions are incorporated into the various human factors elements as described
in sections 4.4 through 4.7.
4.4
CUSA 2013
4-6
February 2013
4.5
Direct causes These causes are the immediate events or conditions that caused
the incident. The direct cause addresses what happened;
Contributing causes These causes address how and why an incident happened.
Contributing causes are causal factors that are events or conditions that
collectively with other causes increase the likelihood of an incident but that
individually did not cause the incident; and
Root causes These causes answer the question of why an incident happened.
Root causes are the causal factors that, if corrected, would prevent recurrence of
the incident.
CUSA 2013
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February 2013
thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. The entire team is provided an overview
of the investigation methodology during the first team meeting.
The leader and the team are responsible to develop a final report containing the root
cause analysis, recommendations to be implemented to prevent the release or incident
from reoccurring, if any, and a schedule for completion of the resulting
recommendations. Report content may vary due to the severity and complexity of the
event. The following items are included in a report to the extent consistent with the
severity and complexity of an incident:
4.6
Table of contents;
Description of the incident, including on-site and off-site effects;
Brief description of the process involved;
Facts, including a time line of events;
Casual factor analysis, concluding with citing of the direct cause, contributing
causes and root causes;
Recommendations/corrective actions;
Schedule for implementing recommendations/corrective actions; and
Glossary, recognizing that the document will be in the public domain with nontechnical people reading it.
Operating Procedures
The Refinery EOM guidebook is the basis for all operating work instructions
(procedures, checklists and job aids) currently used in the Refinery. For each task,
identification is characterized and measured by the criticality of the task and the
frequency or complexity of performing the task. The final step of the front end analysis
phase was to develop written work instructions for the following:
To reduce the potential for human error, consistent formats were defined and applied to
written procedures within the Refinery. Employees responsible for developing and
maintaining the procedures are made aware of the principles for writing effective
operating procedures, which are detailed in the EOM Guidebook that is available on the
Refinery intranet. Each procedure is written to a level of detail suitable for a trained
operator responsible for performing the task. In addition all procedure writers have been
trained in Human Factors and Latent Conditions, including the use of a latent conditions
checklist.
CUSA 2013
4-8
February 2013
Work instruction formats are carefully structured to provide a trained operator the
information needed to do the job. The standard formats intentionally avoid including
unnecessary descriptive information within the work instruction.
Emergency procedures contain the approved procedures for responding to emergency
situations. These procedures are organized into standard groupings to take into account
the various types of emergency situations. Two separate procedure formats are used: a
summary procedure format and a detailed step format. The summary format appears as
the first page of each procedure, and the detailed steps immediately follow. For both
formats, the Emergency Procedure is divided into the following three parts:
Immediate actions;
Stabilizing actions, and
Exit actions.
Emergency procedures are color-coded to help identify who is responsible for performing
each task. EOM Guidebook describes in detail how to use the writing style and formats to
create Emergency Procedures.
Warnings and cautions identify the effects of procedural errors. Warnings state the hazard
and consequences of incorrect performance of a procedural step (or steps) where the
consequence may cause potential personnel injury. Cautions state the hazard and
consequences of incorrect performance of a procedural step (or steps) where the
consequence may cause potential equipment damage.
Additionally, the Consequence of Deviation Tables outline what will happen if plant
processes deviate outside their normal operating range. These tables include the probable
causes of such deviations and appropriate corrective actions.
The procedures are indexed and located on the Refinery intranet so they are easy to find
when needed. Having the procedures on the Refinery intranet ensures personnel have
access to current and approved versions of the procedures. Additionally, paper copies of
the Emergency Procedures are kept in the control rooms for easy reference in case of a
power outage.
Employees are trained in the importance of maintaining current and accurate procedures.
They also are trained that procedures are essential work documents and represent an
approved method for performing work. The procedures are written in such a manner so
the effects of procedural errors are highlighted, both in the steps required to perform a
task, and in the precautionary information included to show the consequences of
deviating from the procedure.
The Refinery makes use of the principles of good operating procedures and human
factors considerations during the review and revision of all procedures. In addition to the
EOM Guidebook, sources of guidance include the AIChE CCPS Guidelines for Writing
CUSA 2013
4-9
February 2013
Effective Operating and Maintenance Procedures (1996) and the CCHMP Human
Factors Program Guidance Document (1999). As part of its preparation for
implementation of the RISO, the Refinery conducted an assessment of its operating
procedures and prepared a work plan to correct deficiencies.
Procedures are updated on a continual, as needed, basis through the Refinery MOC
process. To ensure the most recent document is being updated, documents must be
checked out through a Document Administrator. There is a revision record at the end of
each document. The intent of the revision record is to track all changes that have been
made to a document. The revision record shows the date of the revision, section, MOC
number, and a brief narrative describing the change. Operating procedures are certified as
current and accurate on an annual basis.
As part of the initial implementation of the RISO, a procedures team performed a review
to specifically examine any differences between the RISO requirements and the
Refinerys operating procedures. Each plant operating manual was examined. The
decision was made to concentrate on start-up, shutdown, and emergency operating
procedures, since incorrect performance or inaccuracies of these types of procedures is
most likely to result in a MCAR. Of the procedures available, a representative sample of
5%, or approximately 200 procedures were reviewed in detail.
The review team employees have had extensive operating experience and experience
with the development of Refinerys current generation of operating manuals and
procedures. The group broke up into two sub teams to facilitate their work and examined
operating procedures using questions from the RISO audit protocol as a guidance
checklist. The audit protocol (in combination with the EOM Guidebook standards) was
found to be equivalent to using the CCHMP Latent Conditions Checklist. Each procedure
examined, and any deficiencies found, was recorded. Following this process, the review
team met to discuss their findings and made recommendations to the Refinerys RISO
core team. The team developed and executed a plan to meet all requirements for all
operating procedures for covered processes.
The Refinery is currently completing a reassessment of all operating job tasks as part of a
multi-year project to ensure that the written instructions contain the appropriate level of
detail based on the criticality, complexity and frequency of the task.
4.7
CUSA 2013
4-10
February 2013
CUSA 2013
4-11
February 2013
Once this process is completed, the OE/PSM Manager (or delegate) and the MOOC
Facilitator meets with senior management of the organization(s) to be affected by the
proposed change to discuss the findings and recommended action items resulting from
the MOOC Review process. Senior management determines which action items are
necessary to ensure process safety continues to be sustained.
Before the proposed change is implemented, the MOOC Facilitator reviews and signs off
that required action items have been completed, (including any procedures - operations,
maintenance, HES - that need updating as a result of the change), the Change Manager
conducts a preimplementation review and verifies action items are complete, and a
member of senior management of the organization(s) to be affected by the proposed
change authorizes implementation of the change.
Employees trained in the change are given instructions for providing feedback to the
MOOC team on any issues, concerns or recommendations pertaining to the change
(including impacts of the change). The Change Manager is responsible for reviewing this
employee feedback, and for periodically discussing it with senior management who will
determine what additional action items, if any, are to be completed.
After the change has been implemented, the Change Manager consults with employees of
the affected work group(s)/organization(s) to identify any outstanding issues or concerns
relative to safe work practices and emergency response and their recommended action
items. This consultation also includes determining if the change has created any
additional issues, concerns, or recommendations. The Change Manager is responsible for
discussing this feedback with OE/PSM management who will determine what additional
action items, if any, are to be completed. Feedback is provided to the employees who
suggested changes, including communicating the disposition of their recommendations.
Since 2009, new MOOC records have been tracked electronically.
CUSA 2013
4-12
February 2013
5.0
Accident History
Since 1992 seventeen (17) incidents have been reported to CCHMP that meet the
definition of a Level 2 CWS, Level 3 CWS, or Major Chemical Accident or Release.
Included is a brief description of these events using the available documentation.
All corrective actions from each event have been fully implemented unless indicated
otherwise.
The following is the required reporting accident history for the Refinery:
6/23/92: The refinery had limited steam available to do planned work on the steam
system. The boiler feedwater pump to the CO Boiler tripped resulting in a low drum level
in the Boiler. The Boiler was shut down to prevent major equipment damage; this
resulted in an additional loss of steam production. Loss of steam pressure caused the
(steam driven) main air compressor to shutdown. Once the main air compressor stopped,
it began to rotate backwards, which resulted in low air pressure. The low air pressure
caused the FCC feed valve to close (normal condition on loss of air). The subsequent
restart of equipment led to the stack producing visible un-burnt hydrocarbons and odors.
Shelter in place was issued to the community and several areas of the refinery. There
were approximately 50 calls from residents and the event received media attention.
All of the appropriate agencies were notified in a timely fashion. Wind direction was out
of the northwest at 112 at approximately 12 mph (away from residences). There were no
reports of on site or off-site illness or injury associated with this event.
2/10/94: A breaker in the electrical system opened up due to a raccoon coming in contact
with two phases of the 12kV system. Many areas of the Refinery were affected with
emergency flares and stand-by equipment being activated. Wind direction was primarily
from the south west at 216 at approximately 10 mph. A H2S excess and SO2 release
occurred. This event raised community and a neighboring business concerns.
10/20/95: While evacuating a line of sulfuric acid, a flange was spread to let it drain into
a drip bucket. When a bleeder was opened, acid shot out of the top part of flange,
spraying an employee down the neck, in between his acid suit and hard hat.
As a result of this incident, there was one recordable injury to an employee involving a
regulated substance.
8/10/96: A western states power outage occurred on the PG&E electrical system. The low
frequency of the system caused the Refinery to separate from the normal utility provider.
The Refinery system could not meet the electrical demands of the Refinery, ultimately
resulting in a refinery-wide shutdown and heavy black smoke from the refinery
emergency relief flares. Wind direction was from the South east at 169 at 15 mph.
CUSA 2013
5-1
February 2013
CUSA 2013
5-2
February 2013
The Refinery reported the release of 1,147 pounds of SO2 to BAAQMD, and all other
appropriate agencies were notified in a timely fashion.
Wind direction was west-southwest between 2:00 AM and 7:00 AM on the day of the
incident. Wind speed averaged approximately 10 mph.
CUSA 2013
5-3
February 2013
CUSA 2013
5-4
February 2013
1,006 pounds
79,340 pounds
238.4 pounds
CUSA 2013
5-5
February 2013
8/9/03: K-600 shut down on low lube oil pressure. The main lube oil pump, TP-603A,
shutdown and would not restart due to a seized bushing. Operators attempted several
restarts of K-600 but were unsuccessful. Agency notifications were made for the
shutdown of K-600 beginning at 2:37 p.m. K-600 was restarted at 6:00 p.m., and at 6:45
p.m. operators shut down K-600 due to an inability to maintain seal oil flow. Operators
then began to de-pressure the system to reduce reactor bed temperatures. Bed
temperatures remained high, and at 7:11 p.m., operators opened the emergency depressure valves and North Isomax was taken off of Flare Gas Recovery. Due to flare
activity with visible smoke, operators maximized steam flow to the flare. At this time, the
flare was unstable with incomplete combustion. After approximately 10 minutes, the flare
operation stabilized.
Agency notifications were made for the flaring associated with the reactor
depressurization beginning at 7:16 p.m. Community impact was first observed at 7:37
CUSA 2013
5-6
February 2013
NO
0
SO2
1
H2S
0
791
CUSA 2013
5-7
February 2013
Wash oil is basically diesel fuel that is used to remove heavier crude oil residue from the internals of
equipment in preparation for equipment clean-up and maintenance.
CUSA 2013
5-8
February 2013
CUSA 2013
5-9
February 2013
CUSA 2013
Quantity Released
377 pounds
34 pounds
6 pounds
2 pounds
5-10
CAS Number
7446-09-5
10102-43-9
7664-93-9
7783-06-4
MSDS Number
CVX - 584
CVX -11185
GC-V01011
CVX - 301
February 2013
8 MPH
75 (E
to W)
None
43
E
Plant Operators activated deluge system in the Crude Unit and applied water
from fixed ground fire water monitors.
A total of five (5) alarms were dispatched in response to this event and the
Community Warning System was activated at Level 3.
Off-Site Emergency Response: Four (4) CUSA employees were immediately deployed
outside of the refinery to manually take air monitoring samples at various locations
downwind of the fire using direct-reading instrumentation. The manual monitoring
continued throughout the incident.
On-Site Impact: Non-essential personnel were evacuated from the D&R area then
sheltered-in-place. A Refinery-wide and Energy Technology Center shelter in place also
occurred. One employee was treated for minor burns by the Refinery Fire Department
and an outside hospital. That employee was released to return to work on the same day.
Another employee received on-site treatment for a minor skin irritation and returned to
work on the same day.
Off-Site Impact:
1.
The Richmond Refinery activated a Level 2 and Level 3 notifications via the
Contra Costa County Community Warning System.
2.
On the day of the incident, CUSA received eleven (11) calls from the public.
3.
Fence line monitoring:
The Refinery utilized the BAAQMD required continuous monitoring data from
instrumentation located at the Refinerys High Hill, Office Hill and Gertrude Street
CUSA 2013
5-11
February 2013
Office Hill
Gertrude
Street
H2S
4 ppb @ 05:18
2 ppb@ 05:18
H2S
56 ppb @ 06:39
SO2
3.5 ppb @
07:30
Non-detectable
- <1 ppb
1 ppb @
05:18
2 ppb @
07:37
Nondetectable <1 ppb
OSHA 8
hour limit
(PEL)
10,000 ppb
Chronic
REL
10,000 ppb
400 ppb
2,000 ppb
4 ppb
400 ppb
Note: The Cal/OSHA 8 hour PEL for SO2 is 2,000 ppb (2 ppm) averaged over an 8-hour
period. The Cal/OSHA PEL for H2S is 10,000 ppb (10 ppm) averaged over an 8-hour
period.
Sampling data and community monitoring results:
All air samples taken during the incident indicate there was no evidence of adverse air
quality, and hence, we would not expect adverse health impacts to have resulted from the
incident. All sulfur and VOC compound analytical results were below: (1) Reportable
release thresholds, (2) Cal/OSHAs Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) 1, and (3)
California OEHHA/ARB chronic inhalation Reference Exposure Levels (RELs) 2.
Therefore, emissions from the incident were well under both worker and community
health exposure limits.
All 31 direct-reading samples showed non-detectable concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide
(H2S), < 0.1 ppm. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), < 0.1 ppm, and benzene < 0.1 ppm.
Testing for sulfur was performed using ASTMD-5504 method testing for 20 sulfur
compounds. Only one compound, Carbonyl Sulfide was found above the detection limit2.
The lab indicated interference from the Tedlar bags may contribute, in whole or in part,
to the positive results of Carbonyl Sulfide. Testing for Volatile Organic Compounds
(VOCs) was performed using EPA method TO-14A GC/MS Full Scan for 62 VOC
compounds. Only five (5) compounds were detected above the detection limits.
NOTES:
The detection limit refers to the minimum level which the testing instrument is capable of reading.
CUSA 2013
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February 2013
OSHA sets enforceable permissible exposure limits (PELs) to protect workers against
the health effects of exposure to hazardous substances. PELs are regulatory limits on the
amount or concentration of a substance in the air.
2
CUSA 2013
5-13
February 2013
CUSA 2013
11.5MPH
134(SE)
None
75
5-14
February 2013
7.0
Appendices
Simplified Process Flow Diagrams for Covered Processes
CUSA 2013
Covered processes
#4 Crude Unit
#5 NHT
#5 Rheniformer
Penhex-Isom
DHT
5 H2S
FCC
Alky
Alky/GRU
SHU
Butamer
Yard DIB
LPG Storage
Railcar Storage
Poly
3 H2S/SWC
SRU
NH3 Storage
TKC
TKN/ISO
SDA
#8 Plant
LNC
HNC
LNF
GRU
#18 Plant
Cogen
T&B Crude
JHT
GHT
H2 Manufacturing
Hydro Flares
HNF
Gas Distribution
7-1
February 2013
Generator
Exhaust Gas
Air
Duct
Burners
Combustion
Turbine
Steam
Heat
Recovery
Steam
Generator
S
C
R
Diesel Fuel
850# Steam
LPG
Natural Gas
Refinery Fuel Gas
Ammonia
Boiler Feed Water
THIS
IS
AN
AUTOCAD
DRAWING.
DO
NOT
REVISE
MANUALLY.
SCALE
NONE
ENGR.
OPR'G
DEPT.
DR.
DOGR
ENGR.
DEPT.
SIMPLIFIED
BWBB
10/04/2011
REV
RMP
FLOW
COVERED
DIAGRAM
PROCESS
COGENERATION
PLANT
S.O.
A-344591-0