1

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. CA and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA

G.R. No. 144412
November 18, 2003
Carpio, J.
FACTS:

Private respondent is an employee of petitioner, hired as an accountant-bookkeeper and eventually

promoted as an assistant manager which included his transfer to several branches nine times. His appointment
was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as one of the conditions of employment the
provision on petitioners right to transfer employees on as a regular appointment as the need arises in the interest
of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public.
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent
as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City. However, private
respondent refused to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter by reason of parental obligations, expenses, and
the anguish that would result if he is away from his family. He thereafter filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City
Branch, however, private respondent again refused. As a result, petitioner warned and required him to follow the
said orders; otherwise, he shall be penalized under the companys discipline policy. Furthermore, private
respondent was required to explain and defend himself. The latter replied stating that whether he be suspended
or dismissed, it would all the more establish and fortify his complaint pending before the NLRC and further
charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer. He further alleges that the
managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its
exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new
officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with management.
As a result, petitioner, through a Memo, informed private respondent that Allied Bank is terminating
him. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) continued refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for
additional vacation leave.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had abused its management prerogative in ordering private
respondents transfer and the refusal by the latter did not amount to insubordination. The NLRC likewise ruled
that: (1) petitioner terminated the private respondent without just cause considering family considerations; (2)
the transfer is a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a
regional office, and because the bank wanted him, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the
Tagbilaran branch; (3) the termination was illegal for lack of due process as no hearing appears to have been
conducted and that petitioner failed to send a termination notice and instead issued a Memo merely stating a
notice of termination would be issued, but petitioner did not issue any notice; and (4) petitioner dismissed
private respondent in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined the latters
right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws. The ruling of NLRC was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES:
1
WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2 WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS REFUSAL TO TRANSFER CONSTITUTES VIOLATIONS
OF COMPANY RULES WARRANTING THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3 WHETHER PETITIONER DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN
DIRECTING HIS TRANSFER.
4 WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TRANSFER CONSTITUTES A DEMOTION.
5 WHETHER PETITIONER IS COMMITTED ULP.
6 WHETHER ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS.
HELD:
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Yes. The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the
employers prerogatives. The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for
valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not
result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other
privileges. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer
is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.
Yes. Private respondent was well aware of petitioners policy of periodically transferring
personnel to different branches. The assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was
a condition of his employment and he consented to this condition when he signed the Notice
of Personnel Action.

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The Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers decision to
transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either
party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail.
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an
employer. Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules or orders that
they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or
improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. Therefore, private
respondents continued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders warrants just cause in his dismissal in
accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code and thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation
pay.
3
No. Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 showed that at least 14 accounting officers and
personnel from various branches, including private respondent, were transferred to other
branches. Allied Bank did not single him out. The same letter explained that he was second
in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. It
must be noted that none of the other transferees joined private respondents in his complaint
or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
4
No. No evidence was presented showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits,
or privileges. On the contrary, petitioners letter of 13 June 1994 assured private respondent
that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the transfer would involve
the same rank, duties and obligations.
5
No. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the
Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that private
respondent took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.
6
Yes. To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
Code:
i
A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of
termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side.
ii

A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge,present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
iii
A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required
private respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his refusal to comply
with the transfer orders. On the requirement of a hearing, the Court has held that the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard. An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters gave him an
opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a notice of
termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but
by its body and contents. Moreover, private respondent himself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination.
The Memo shows that it unequivocally informed private respondent of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him and
discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for the dismissal. In addition, the
Memo also refuted the charges of discrimination and demotion.
However, the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the Memo stated that termination was to be
effective as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, private
respondent only received a copy of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of
his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination must be served on the employee. Allied Bank could
not terminate him on 1 September 1994 because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks
decision to dismiss him. The dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo.
For this reason, private respondent is entitled to backwages for the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October
1994.
Fallo:
CA and NLRC affirmed. Case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computationof the backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to private respondent from 1 September 1994 until 4 October
1994.

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Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful
in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future (Dosch v. NLRC)
[G.R. No. L-33672. September 28, 1973.]
VICENTE MUOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON , respondent.
Topic:
Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquotes or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Facts:
1. Delia Sutton, a member of the Philippine bar, was the defense lawyer in the case Vicente Muoz vs PP and CA.
She was also connected to Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates law firm.
2. Supreme Court found out that the defense submitted an unbelievable version of the case, attributing to the CA
that its decision was made upon facts different from what actually transpired.
Defense Theory: Muozs boat was rammed out by the complainant.
Truth: Muozs boat hit the left frontal outrigger of the complainants boat where the complainant was seated,
thereby hitting him on the back and causing his death.
Muozs motorboat had suffered very little damage which would have been considerable had it been rammed by
the offended partys boat.
3. The Court resolved to deny the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of merit. Where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court.
(Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957)
4. SC set a hearing requiring all lawyers-partners in the firm to be present. Sutton appeared. While her demeanor
was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite.
5. Sutton was subjected to intensive questioning by several members of the Court, yet she was not budged from
such an untenable position. It was as if she was unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to which her
evasive answers gave rise.
6. Atty Sedfrey Ordoez (law firm partner) expressly acknowledged that what happened in the petition for
certiorari prepared by Sutton did misrepresent what is set forth in the CA decision and was reprehensible. He was
humble enough to make the necessary expression of regret.
7. Delia Sutton and Atty. Ordoez filed a Joint Apology to the Supreme Court, seeking to make amends.
Issue:
Whether or not Sutton must be held accountable in connect to a duty she owes to the Tribunal as a counsel.
Decision: YES, she must be held accountable.
1. While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking that frank admission that what was done by her
should not be characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a
greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate
misstatements.
2. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster
popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem
and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable
him to succeed in winning his client's cause." What is more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court,
for candor and honesty takes precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the
offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. Sutton.
3. WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured.

CASE: ADZ REALTY, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. BenjaminM. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a decision of theCourt of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a
favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.
He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of
the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter
formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found
guiltyconsidering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as
regional trial judge.
Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from
his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he
would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good
moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr.
Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center
for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian
College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTCBr. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br.
35, Quezon City
Issue: Should the disbarment be lifted?
Held: The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeemhimself and prove once
more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession.
Hisadmission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to
meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the
disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are
the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why
respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is
therefore allowed to resumethe practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective
immediately.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU

INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to
as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with
the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretarytreasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried
to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and
legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals, but
these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27,
1958 a notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently (in short,
nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate
on the matter of salary increases.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in

responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of the
strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1.

Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

2.

Take your meals within the office.

3.

Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where
comfortable cots have been prepared.

4.

Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.

5.

Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

6.

Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

7.

The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of
the Management.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
aforesaid letter

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management
men tried to break thru the Unions picket lines xxx succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in
front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strikebreakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscals Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal
charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this
date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except 3, were dismissed by the fiscals office and by the courts. These three cases involved slight
physical injuries against one striker and light coercion against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of
the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees
decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the
City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which
were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were
readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscals
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscals
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials
and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents, without however stating the specific
acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were
being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787,
while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal
notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise
of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike
and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

HELD: YES

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts
at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them
should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the
right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through
their collective bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees
bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging
the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed
activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an
activity to which they are entitled free from the employers molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable
cots, free coffee and occasional movies, overtime pay for work performed in excess of eight hours, and
arrangements for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strikebreaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break
a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a
union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations; respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these
employees to resign from their unions; respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M.
Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of
eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters
wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building.
This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers; respondents brought against the
picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors.
As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first
instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in,
of the Companies buildings.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield
the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism
within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from
the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the
first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.

It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination
in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a
committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking
employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first
secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the
required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient
basis for dismissal.