Algiers Declaration of a

Palestinian State, 1988

What was the Algiers Declaration of a Palestinian State in
1988?

On November 15, 1988, a meeting of Palestine National Council

was held in Algiers where Yasser Arafat declared Palestine as a
state. Another such declaration was made in a meeting on
October 1, 1948 in Gaza during the 1948 War of Independence,
making the meeting of Algiers the second one for Palestine as a
state. At the time, Algiers Declaration received much attention;
however, both of these declarations stand quite irrelevant at
present.
Algiers Declaration was presented almost a year after intifadawas initiated
and it showed an effort on the part of PLO to let all the parties know of their
future intent. The declaration which was written by Mahmoud Darwish, a
Palestinian poet, was most of all significant for its information of an
independent Palestinian state. Moreover, the document stated its renunciation of
violence from Palestine and also of terrorism directed towards Palestine. It was
also a first time in Palestinian history to implicitly recognize Israel and
admittance to coexist with Israel as an independent Palestinian state.
Where Palestine called for an independent state in Algiers Declaration, it also
brought forward features benefiting Israel, contrary to the popular belief of
Palestinian intransigence formed by Israel. To achieve independence, (The
State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be) Palestine
was ready to go to any lengths of negotiations. And for that, all the resolutions
of United Nations concerning Israel-Palestine conflict were recognized in the
Declaration, the major ones being UN Resolution 242 and UN Resolution
338. Resolution 242 was put forward to make Israel withdraw occupation on
the territories it assumed in the Six Day War in 1967 and to make Palestine
recognize Israels right to exist while Resolution 338 required immediate
negotiations from both the parties for a just and durable peace in the Middle
East.

To further their acceptance of the two previous UN Resolutions, Algiers

Declaration showed:

An agreement which would bring the permanent members

of the Security Council and PLO to enter peace negotiations, to
be held at an international conference under the flagship of the
UN.

Establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with

clear acceptance of Israel as a state in the domain.

Declaring its renunciation and reprobation of violence in all

its forms.

Demanding a solution to the problem of Palestinian

refugees as the rules and practices of international law would
have it.
The presentation of Declaration called in a meeting of the United Nations
General Assembly where Yasser Arafat, Chairman of PLO, gave an address
supporting the Declaration. A resolution acknowledging the proclamation of
the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988,
was adopted at the UNGA conference, deciding further that the designation
Palestine should be used in place of the designation Palestine Liberation
Organization in the United Nations system. Votes of this resolution witnessed
one hundred and four states in favor of it, forty-four abstaining, while only
United States and Israel voting against it. UN decision regarding Palestine as an
independent state also included an arrangement asking the replacement of
Palestine Liberation Organization as Palestine for references in all UN
bodies.

Prof. Michael Gunter: We are back to square one in Turkish-Kurdish conflict

September 17, 2016

When the failed peace process between Kurdistan Workers Party and Turkish government was
announced in March 2013, Michael M. Gunter, professor of Political Science at Tennessee
Technological University and Secretary-General of EU Turkey Civic Commission, was one of the first
experts who said that the process would not hold. Because Turkey is not sincere in its approach to
Kurdish issue, he added.

For Prof. Michael M. Gunter, a leading experts on Kurds, Turkey and Middle East, the collapse of the
peace process was a result of the success pro-Kurdish HDP achieved in Turkeys June 7 elections,
which caused Islamist AKP to lose its majority in the parliament after 12 years.
KDN: Prof. Gunter, you have voiced on many occasions that you were not very optimistic about the
last Kurdish-Turkish peace deal which started in March 2013 and the time has proved you right. The
process collapsed as of July 24, 2015. Turkey blamed the PKK for the collapse of the two-year-old
cease-fire, following the death of two police officers in Ceylanpinar. Who do you think caused the
collapse of the peace process?
Prof. Gunter: Unfortunately the two sides could not agree on a compromise peace settlement.
However, even more the AKP lost its parliamentary majority in the June 7 election mainly because
the pro-Kurdish HDP won enough votes to enter parliament. So in a misguided attempt to regain its
lost majority the AKP tore up the peace process and began using force against the PKK hoping that
the renewed violence would lead to a rally-around-the-flag or wag-the-dog scenario that would paint
the PKK and peaceful HDP as terrorist and lead to the HDP losing its seats in parliament in the 1
November election. Therefore I mostly blame President Erdogan and his AKP for the collapse of the
cease-fire.
KDN: Cemil Bayik said in an interview that Turkeys move to break the cease-fire is related to the
results of June 7 elections, where Kurdish HDP crossed the 10 % threshold and the AKP lost its
majority? Do you share this idea?
Prof. Gunter: YES!!
KDN: Instead of building a coalition government, Erdogan called early elections and his AKP secured
a majority in the parliament. Do you think this will further encourage him implementing his plan for a
presidential system where he can have executive powers?
Prof. Gunter: Erdogans snap election of November 1 gave AKP back its lost majority in the short
run, but in the longer run by renewing the violence lead Turkey back to square one as far as solving
its debilitating Kurdish problem. As for a presidential system, I think it will take more than just winning
the 1 November election as amending the Turkish Constitution on this point requires super majorities
that have so far proved unattainable. Most Turks may support a supposed war against Terrorism,

but not necessarily for a presidential system that would give Erdogan even more power. However,
never underestimate the cunning of Erdogan. He already has managed to amend the Turkish
Constitution to provide for the first time in Turkish history for the direct popular election of the Turkish
president. This new provision in the Turkish Constitution has clearly already moved Turkey toward a
Presidential system.
KDN: The polls were suggesting a decline in AKP votes and an increase in HDP votes despite
clashes in the Kurdish region ahead of November 1 elections. However, the results surprisingly
proved polls wrong.
Prof. Gunter: The current violence in Turkey prevented many Kurds living in southeastern
Anatolia from even voting in the November 1 elections. Furthermore, since Erdogan played well the
anti-terrorism card, he won the elections despite what the polls had seemed to show at that time.
On the other hand, if the AKP had lost votes even more it would have actually led to a quicker end to
the new violence as the voters would be saying that the AKP is largely to blame for the violence. But
this did not happen.
KDN: Around one thousand Turkish soldiers and police officers lost their lives in recent clashes with
Kurdistan Workers Party according to official accounts. This is a major blow to Turkish armed forces.
A lynch campaign against the Kurds and government critics has been going on since then. Can
Turkey overcome this culture of hatred so easily?
Prof. Gunter: The current struggle has been going on since August 1984, so how could this
culture of hatred end easily especially given the renewed violence?
KDN: How do you see the new developments in Syria?
Prof. Gunter: Syria has become a horrific real life example of Hobbes bellum omnium contra
omnes (war of all against all). The United Nations and Arab League should intervene and stop this
disgrace to humanity.
KDN: What would be the situation of the Kurds in Syria and Iraq at the end?
Prof. Gunter: What should or what would will probably be two different things. The KRG in Iraq is
well established and will probably soon become independent as Iraq is a failed state near collapse.
The Kurds in Syria will remain a semi-autonomous region as long as the current civil war continues.
Depending on how the Syrian civil war plays out will determine the outcome for the Kurds in Syria.
However, since Syria seems unlikely to be reconstituted as a single state again, the Kurds in Syria
might eventually either become a second Kurdish state (the KRG being the first) or if Turkey can
solve its many problems and become truly a democratic state that satisfies the Kurds living in Turkey,
then the Kurds in Syria might become loosely joined to Turkey. Only time will tell!
KDN: Could ISIS change the Kurds position in the Middle East?

Prof. Gunter: The existential threat ISIS presents the Kurds is most likely eventually to encourage
and lead them to greater unity and understanding. Already the ISIS threat has led to the PKK/PYD
cooperating more than before with the KRG to drive ISIS away from the Sinjar and Kobane.
KDN: Turkey has been known for its ties with ISIS and other Islamist groups in Syria who have been
fighting the Kurds. Do you consider Kurdish gains in northern Syria a rationale for Turkey to attack
the PKK?
Prof. Gunter: Kurdish gains in northern Syria are certainly the rationale for it to attack the
PKK/PYD. However, this does not mean Turkeys attacks are justified or even smart for the long-term
good of Turkey as these Turkish attacks have killed the peace process with the Kurds.
KDN: On September 22, 2015, State department spokesman John Kirby reiterated that the US would
continue working with the Kurdish YPG in Syria in the fight against ISIS. On one hand, working with
a group linked to the PKK. On the other hand, watching Turkey bombs the main actor behind the
fight against ISIL. You stated earlier that Turkeys attacks against the Kurds support ISIS. How can
the US administration trust Turkey in its fight against ISIS despite flagrant Turkish support for jihadist
organizations?
Prof. Gunter: That is exactly the point. Turkey is not fighting against ISIL, but instead is fighting
the PKK/PYD!
KDN: Do you think ISIS could change the balance of power in Iraq internally? How would it affect
Iraqs integrity?
Prof. Gunter: Yes ISIS already has. ISIS has contributed strongly to Iraq becoming a failed and
eventually former state.
KDN: What would be the possible repercussions of US-Turkey attacks on ISIS in Syria?
Prof. Gunter: Degrading ISIS without hurting the Kurds.
KDN: Do you think Turkey is still able to shape regional policy without resolving the Kurdish issue?
Prof. Gunter: Turkey has always been a very important actor in the Middle East, but it would be
able to help shape regional policy more successfully if it could solve its own internal Kurdish
problem.
KDN: How much of a role did the developments in Kobane played in where we are today with the
peace process?
Prof. Gunter: Turkeys failure to help defeat the ISIS siege of Kobane caused the collapse of the
peace process.

KDN: The conflict in Turkey spiraled into an all-out war.

Prof. Gunter: Yes once violence commences it becomes very hard to halt. The promising peace
process has been ended and we are back to square one in violence.
KDN: Can Turkey and the US still cooperate in fight against ISIS in the region?
Prof. Gunter: Turkey and the United States have basic differences concerning the civil war in
Syria. Turkey has always seen the main enemy as the Assad regime and the PYD/Kurds, while the
United States has seen the main enemy being ISIS. This makes it very difficult for the two longtime
NATO allies successfully to fight against ISIS and terrorism in the region.

Middle East Policy Council

Book Review

The Kurds: A Modern History

Michael M. Gunter

Reviewed by:
Ahmet Serdar Akturk, assistant professor of history, Georgia Southern University

Fall 2016, Volume XXIII, Number 3

Michael Gunter, a veteran of Kurdish studies, in The Kurds: A Modern History, revisits their continuing struggle for
recognition and statehood. The Arab Spring, the ensuing civil war in Syria, and the sudden rise of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have made the Kurds and their plight more visible in the Western media. Kurds have gained
unprecedented sympathy as a result of their fighting against ISIS, an entity that poses a serious threat to global
security. The major argument in Professor Gunter's book is that the rise of the Kurds and ISIS clearly demonstrates
the failure of the state system in the Middle East created by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. This same state
system turned the Kurds into the largest nation without their own nation-state. The Kurds' unrealized desire for
independence since the end of World War I created the "Kurdish question" for Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Michael
Gunter traces the history of this question and of the development of the Kurdish national movements from the
nineteenth century to today, when Kurds seem closer than ever before to their dream of statehood and self-rule.
The book consists of an introduction and seven chapters. The first chapter, "Early History," is an overview of Kurdish
history until the end of the Ottoman era. Gunter examines the theories regarding the origins of the Kurds that explain

their role in Muslim history. He emphasizes the richness of literary tradition in different parts of Kurdistan but also
explains the cultural disunity caused by the existence of mutually unintelligible dialects. Kurdistan was ruled by the
Ottoman Empire and the dynasties that governed Persia from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. But autonomous
Kurdish emirates ruled Ottoman Kurdistan until their suppression as a result of the Westernizing Ottoman reforms in
the nineteenth century. The author explains how the suppression of the powerful Kurdish emirs like Bedir Khan of the
Botan Emirate led to the rise of Sufi religious leaders. He mentions Shaykh Ubaydullah, who made use of the term
"Kurdish nation" for the first time during his uprising in the 1880s. The author indicates, however, that, in addition to
their tribal loyalties and linguistic disunity, the Kurds' religious connection with the Ottoman Turks prevented the
rise of anything similar to the modern concept of nationalism until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World
War I.
That war changed the whole Middle East. The new state system, first planned by the British and French in their
Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, was put into practice after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish
territories were divided among four states, namely Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Gunter examines the Kurdish
experience in each state in separate chapters. Unlike the multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire, the new
nation-states would deny Kurdish identity as a threat to their territorial integrity. In Turkey, Kurds actually had
supported the War of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). Despite his emphasis on the religious fraternity
of Kurds and Turks, Mustafa Kemal adopted a more secular and Turkish-nationalist approach after the foundation of
the Turkish Republic in 1923. Gunter indicates that the new Turkish state denied Kurdish identity and identified the
Kurds' struggle for recognition as a security issue. He explains the Kurdish revolts during the early decades of the
republic and the founding of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 1978 as a reaction to the Turkish state's denial of
Kurdish identity and rights. Since 1984, the PKK-led insurgency has cost about 40,000 lives.
Gunter then examines the attempts by two Turkish leaders to find a solution to the Kurdish question. President
Turgut zal's initiative in the late 1980s achieved cultural and linguistic rights for Kurds, but the military conflict
resumed shortly afterward. A more recent attempt by former prime minister (2003-14) and current president Recep
Tayyip Erdogan is called the "Kurdish Opening." Though his governments initiated important reforms regarding
Kurdish rights, hopes for a permanent cease-fire emerged only in 2013. However, the peace process came to an end
after less than two years, and Erdogan has more recently adopted a security approach toward the PKK. Gunter
believes the peace process failed because the Turkish government did not meet PKK expectations regarding Kurdish
rights in Turkey or the fate of Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader. The Syrian civil war and the PKKaffiliated PYD's gaining ground on the Turkish border are other factors. Erdogan turned toward Masud Barzani, the
president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, to marginalize the PKK and Ocalan. Gunter believes
that Turkey's close relations with the KRG would not mean much for the Kurdish question in Turkey, since the main
Kurdish party in Turkey is the PKK.
The next chapter presents the historical development of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq after the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, when the British mandate replaced Ottoman rule in the former provinces of Mosul, Baghdad
and Basra. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq revolved around two iconic leaders, Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji
and Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Since independence in 1932, the Kurds had suffered from an Arab nationalism that
viewed Iraq as an exclusively Arab country and Gunter indicates that Kurdish nationalism developed in reaction to it.
Arab nationalism then evolved into Baathism, eventually represented by Saddam Hussein between 1979 and 2003.
The first Gulf War in 1991 and the creation of a no-fly zone in 1992 paved the way for the creation of the KRG, which
Gunter describes as the most successful Kurdish state-building effort in modern times.
Despite conflicts that have seriously threatened Kurdish unity in Iraq, Masoud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) played major roles in building the KRG, which was
officially recognized in the Iraqi Constitution in 2003. Gunter notes the dramatic improvement in relations between
the KRG led by Masoud Barzani and Turkey under Erdogan's leadership Turkey does not even oppose the idea of
the KRG's independence from Iraq. Despite the fact that the KRG seems close to independence, the author also
explains the material and institutional challenges the Iraqi Kurds need to overcome.
The next chapter focuses on the Syrian Kurds. Under the French mandate after World War I, Syria became an
important center for Kurdish political and cultural activism until its independence in 1946. In addition to the Kurds in

major urban centers and Kurdish enclaves in northern Syria, Kurdish refugees also arrived from Turkey. A Kurdish
nationalist organization, Khoybun, operated in Syria and Lebanon and spearheaded the Ararat Rebellion (1928-31)
against Turkey. Exiled Kurdish nationalists from Turkey played a major role in Syria and Lebanon. The Jaladet,
Sureya and Kamuran brothers from the princely Bedirkhan family, for example, led a Kurdish cultural movement.
The end of the French mandate and the eventual rise of the Baath regime in Syria created a serious backlash for the
Kurds. Gunter indicates that the Baath regime came to view Kurds as a foreign threat to the Arab nation, and it
repressed them after the early 1960s. Kurds in Syria, as a result, came to be less known in the West, as compared to
their compatriots in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Some Kurds were stripped of their citizenship in 1962 on the grounds that
they supposedly all came from Turkey. Moreover, the state tried to Arabize the Kurdish territories in northern Syria.
Gunter adds that the fractured Kurdish political-party system is another reason for the invisibility of the Syrian Kurds
until the early 2000s.
It is important to note that, although Syrian Kurds were harshly treated, Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad hosted the
PKK and its leader, Ocalan, until 1998 in order to gain leverage against Turkey. The beginning of the civil war in
March 2011 made the Kurds of Syria visible to the international community. The most powerful Kurdish party in Syria
is now the PKK-affiliated PYD, which intimidates other Kurdish parties in Syria with its military forces and
cooperation with Bashar al-Assad's regime. The Kurds declared autonomy in July 2012, and the PYD's fight against
ISIS has increased their legitimacy despite the fact that Turkey views them as a terrorist organization for their
affiliation with the PKK. The author believes that "the longer the Syrian civil war takes, the more likely Kurdish
autonomy will become regularized and institutionalized."
Finally, the author traces the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran, an exceptional case due to the ethnic
affinity between Persians and Kurds. Gunter indicates that the Iranian state, in fact, has used this affinity to moderate
Kurdish national demands. Shaikh Ubaydullah and Simko emerged as prominent traditional Kurdish leaders,
operating between Persia and the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most
significant Kurdish political experience in Iran was the creation of the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in 1946. It
lasted for a year and ended with the Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran. Its founder, Qadi Muhammad, also the
leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), was executed by the Iranian state after the collapse of the
Mahabad Republic. This short-lived state had pan-Kurdish tendencies; in fact, Mullah Mustafa Barzani from Iraqi
Kurdistan served as the chief of its army. But Gunter indicates that the Islamic Revolution and the ensuing war
between Iran and Iraq (1980-88) effectively internationalized the Kurdish question in Iran. The Islamic regime
continued the Pahlavi Dynasty's stance toward the Kurdish national movement and assassinated the popular Kurdish
leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou during negotiations in Vienna in 1992. The creation of the PKK-affiliated PJAK in
2004 created a new challenge for Iran. Gunter indicates that, even though both Turkey and Iran try to prevent the
creation of a Kurdish state, they have involved themselves in conflicts between the Kurdish parties to increase their
own regional influence.
The chapter entitled "The United States and the Kurds" examines the evolution of American policy toward the Kurds,
starting with President Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination after World War I. The second
"stage" of U.S.-Kurdish relations is also called the Mullah Mustafa Barzani stage, since the United States supported
his rebellion against the Iraqi central government during the early 1970s. The third stage starts with the first Gulf
War, which paved the way for the creation of the KRG in 1992. The fourth is the beginning of a de facto alliance with
the KRG in 1993, when the Untied States decided to topple Saddam Hussein. The KRG gained official status in the
new Iraqi constitution at this time. Gunter indicates that the United States is very popular among the Iraqi Kurds,
since the KRG owes its very existence to the United States. He adds, however, that the Kurds are also very cautious;
the United States has abandoned them twice in 1975 and 1992 after initially encouraging them to rise up against
the central government. The fifth is the PKK stage. Gunter indicates that the Iraqi Kurds are the "good Kurds" from
the point of view of American foreign policy, in contrast to "the bad Kurds" of the PKK, officially branded by
Washington as a terrorist organization. This is not only because the PKK kills noncombatants and engages in illegal
activities, but because it poses a threat to Turkey, a NATO member and U.S. strategic ally. The United States played a
major role in the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1998.
The sixth stage of U.S. policy toward the Kurds starts with the Syrian civil war. The author believes the United States
should not bomb Syria to bring down the Assad regime; this action would escalate the war and empower militant

groups like ISIS. Instead, Gunter recommends that the United States resist Turkish pressure and refrain from
denouncing the PKK-affiliated PYD, the strongest Kurdish party currently battling ISIS. This chapter demonstrates
that "the United States has come to affect the Kurdish situation perhaps more than any other state" and that "the
United States does not have a ground strategy toward the Kurds since they live in four separate states."
The last chapter is on ISIS and the Kurds, the two non-state actors that, the author believes, mark the end of the
traditional state system in the Middle East. The rise of ISIS in Iraq and its sudden capture of Mosul in June 2014 has
shown the weakness of the Iraqi government and revealed its lack of legitimacy. These events initially empowered the
KRG vis--vis the Iraqi central government, but eventually created a major threat when ISIS attacked the KRG in
August 2014 and drew perilously close to its capital. Ultimately, American military aid helped the KRG stop ISIS.
Gunter lists strategic, historical and religious reasons why ISIS chose to attack the Kurds, but ISIS gained strength in
Syria, too. As such, the author indicates that the PYD has proven itself to be the most unified and secular opposition
group fighting against ISIS in Syria. Neighboring Turkey, however, favors other opposition groups and equates
backing the PYD with supporting the PKK. Thus, the PYD has been excluded from the peace talks. The author believes
that both Turkey and the United States have not been able to effectively adapt to the changing geopolitical realities in
which Kurds play a prominent role. Instead, they remain committed to preserving "the former Iraq and Syria."
In The Kurds: A Modern History, Michael Gunter clarifies a complex web of relations among Kurdish political
groups, Middle Eastern states, and Western powers. His active engagement in Kurdish issues for the last few decade
includes meeting with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus in 1995, attending the Kurdish Democratic Party
congress in 1993, and meeting with the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, Mostafa Hejri, in Iraqi
Kurdistan in 2012. It is great reading for students, scholars and anyone else interested in understanding the Kurds'
rising influence in the Middle East. The book might also be useful for policy makers in Washington, Ankara, Tehran,
Baghdad and Damascus.