NorbertDelatte,P.E.,Ph.D.,F.ACI,F.

ASCE
ProfessorandChair,DepartmentofCivilandEnvironmental
Engineering

y Anunacceptabledifferencebetweenexpectedand

observedperformance Leonards (1982)

y Nonconformitywithdesignexpectations Feld
(1964) ifso,therearemanyfailures

y Engineersdesign
y Simplifiedtwopartdefinitionofdesign
y Figureouteverythingthatcanpossiblygowrong
y Makesureitdoesnthappen

y Knowinghowsystemsperformandfail failure

literacy

y TheartandscienceofmoldingMaterialswedonot

fullyunderstand,intoShapeswecannotprecisely
analyze,toresistForceswecannotaccuratelypredict
insuchawaythatthesocietyatlargeisgivenno
reasontosuspecttheextentofourignorance.
y JamesAmrhein,onstructuralengineering,citedby
Carper(1989)

y Forensicengineeringistheapplicationofengineering

principlestotheinvestigationoffailuresorother
performanceproblems.
y Forensicengineeringalsoinvolvestestimonyonthe
findingsoftheseinvestigationsbeforeacourtoflawor
otherjudicialforum,whenrequired.
y Failuresarenotallcatastrophic,suchaswhena
buildingorbridgecollapses,butincludefacilitiesor
partsoffacilitiesthatdonotperformasintendedby
theowner,designprofessional,orconstructor.

y Developfailureliteracy identifykeyfailure

mechanisms
y Developtheory,refineandcalibratemodels
y Theoryshouldexplainthreecases
y Factorofsafety(FS)>1,stableconfiguration
y FS=1,impendingfailure
y FS<1,failure

y Pisatower
y LowerSanFernandoDamfailure
y Carsington Damfailure
y Kettleman HillsWasteLandfillslopefailure
y DesertViewDriveEmbankmentfailure
y LaConchita slide
y LandslideDamontheSaddleRiver(Alberta)
y Transcona GrainElevatorfailure
y BuffaloCreekDisaster,WestVirginia,and
y Vaiont DamLandslide,Italy

y TheTranscona andFargoGrainElevators,October1913

andJune1955
y TheVaiont DamLandslide,October9,1963
y HurricaneKatrinaLeveeFailures,August29,2005

October1913andJune1955
GreatPlainsofNorthAmerica

y NearWinnipeg,Manitoba
y Constructionstartedin1911
y StructurefinishedSeptember1913
y Fillingwithgrainbegan
y StartingOctober18,1913,about88%full,settlement

increasedtoabout1foot
y Structuretiltedabout27degreesfromvertical
y Theelevatorstayedintactandwasjackedback
upright,althoughnow14feetbelowgrade

y Toplayertanandgrayslickenslided clay,inorganic

y
y
y
y

highplasticityclay(CH) unconfinedcompressive
strength1.13tonspersquarefoot(tsf)
Lowerlayerweakergraysilty clay
Platebearingtestsbeforeconstructionindicated
capacityof45tsf
Totalestimatedpressureduetostructure3.3tsf
Washboringstakenimmediatelyafterfailure
determinedlayerthicknesses

qn

1
qu N e
2

sN e

y InvestigatedfourdecadesafterthefactbyRalphB.

Peck landmarkpaperbyPeckandBryant,1953
y Usedtoverifybearingcapacitytheory predicted
capacityagreedwithpresumedpressureonsoil

sN e N e 51 

B
D
1 

5L 5B

qn

1
qu N e
2

Ne

12
77
3.6
23.5

51 
1 
5.56
1 
51 
5 u 59.5 5 u 23.5 5 u 195 5 u 77

y Calculatedbearingcapacity2.57tsf
y Estimatedstressattimeoffailure2.24tsf
y Calculatedfactorofsafetyof1.09
y Thedevelopmentofsoilmechanicsafterthe

Transcona failureeventuallyprovidedabasisfor
computingtheultimatebearingcapacityofsoils.It
wassubsequentlyrealized,therefore,thatthe
Transcona failureservedasafullscalecheckofthe
validityofsuchcomputations.(ShepherdandFrost
1995,p.5).

y 42yearsafterTrascona,butsoilpartofthesame
y
y
y
y

ancientLakeAggassiz deposits
Fargoelevatorwasnarrowerandlongerthan
Transcona structure
FillingbeganApril1955
ReadingstakenstartingMay10,1955,showed
considerablesettlement
CollapsedandbrokeapartJune12,1955

Dateof
Observ
ation
May10
May18
May25
June1
June8

SettlementReadings,mm(in.)
BM1
0
(0.00)
15
(0.60)
49
(1.92)
125
(4.92)
241
(9.48)

BM2

BM3

0
0
(0.00) (0.00)
3(0.12) 18
(0.72)
27
52
(1.08) (2.04)
119
137
(4.68) (5.40)
222
265
(8.75) (10.42)

BM4

BM5

BM6

BM7

0
(0.00)
24
(0.96)
58
(2.28)
140
(5.52)
277
(10.92)

0
(0.00)
30
(1.20)
73
(2.88)
150
(5.89)
293
(11.52)

0
(0.00)
40
(1.56)
89
(3.49)
152
(6.00)
308
(12.13)

0
(0.00)
37
(1.44)
76
(3.00)
150
(5.89)
287
(11.30)

10

ViewofthecollapsedFargoGrainElevatoraftersubsurfacesoilfailurein
1955.(PhotofromtheInstituteforRegional
Studies,NDSU,Fargo).

y StratumA 35ft/0.91.5mblacktograymottledsilty

clay
y StratumB 811ft/2.63.4mgrayandtansilty clay
y StratumC 26ft/0.61.8mlayerofinterbedded sand,
silt,andclay,weakestshearstrength
y StratumD thickdepositofdarkgrayclaywith
occasionalpebbles

11

y Assumptionsinbearingcapacityequations
y TheratioD/Bshouldbelessthan2.5,
y Theshearstrengthshouldbeaveragedoveradepthof

2/3Bbelowtheraft inthiscase,adepthof10.6m(34.6
ft),whichincludesallfourstrata,
y Thefoundationshouldbeloadedconcentrically,
y Thesoilconsideredshouldbeentirelycohesive,and
y Theshearstrengthwithinthelayersconsideredshould
notvarybymorethan50%fromaverage
y CohesivesoilconditionnotsatisfiedinlayerC

y Calculatedaverageshearstrength0.77 1.22kipsper

squarefoot(ksf)
y MultiplyingbyNe =5.35,bearingcapacity4.11 6.52
ksf
y EstimatedFS=0.80to1.37

12

y classicexampleofafullscalebearingcapacityfailure.

Eventhemostunsophisticatedtestingprogramand
computationwouldhaverevealedthatanetworking
pressureof5ksf wascourtingfailure.Asoilinvestigation
limitedtounconfinedcompressiontestsonuntrimmed
sampleswouldhavebeenadequate.Usingthesetest
results,anetfailurepressureof4.11ksf wouldhavebeen
calculated.Theminimumfactorofsafetyis1.5sothata
maximumworkingpressureof2.74ksf wouldhavebeen
allowedasimpleplotofloadversussettlementforany
oneofthebenchmarkswouldhaveshowntheelevatorto
beinimminentdangerofcollapse.Promptunloading
wouldhavesavedit.Whythisdatawasnotanalyzedisa
mystery.(Nordlund andDeere,1970,p.605).

y Theseimpromptufullscalefieldtestsverifiedbearing

capacitytheory
y Needtoaccountforcomplexityoflayeredsoilsystems
andactualfoundationgeometry
y PromptunloadingwouldhavesavedtheFargoelevator
afterthesettlementwasobserved

13

y Peck,R.B.,andBryant,F.G.(1953).TheBearing

CapacityFailureoftheTranscona Elevator,
Geotechnique,3,201208.
y Nordlund,R.L,andDeere,D.U.(1970).Collapseof
FargoGrainElevator,J.SoilMech.andFound.Div.
96(2),585607.

October9,1963
Vaiont Gorge,Italy

14

y Extensivesystemofdams,reservoirs,and

hydroelectricpowerhousesinPiave RiverValley,high
inItalianAlps
y Thinconcretearchdam
y Damheldback169millioncubicmetersofwater
y June1957,ownerincreasedcapacityby30%

15

y March22,1959landslideatnearbyPontesei Reservoir

of3millioncubicmetersofrockkilledoneperson
y Concernaboutstabilityofsidesofreservoir
y YounggeologistEdoardo Semenza foundevidenceof
ancientlandslide,uncemented mylonitic zone
y Designersthoughtlandslideunlikely

16

y The1.5km(1mile)zoneofuncemented cataclasistes

alongthebaseoftheleftwallofthevalley,alongwith
solutioncavities,sinkholes,andsprings,
y Ancientlandslidemasseshadfilledthevalley,and
thenhadbeencutintotwobythenewVaiont stream,
y ThesouthernslopeofMt.Tochadachairlike
structureofbeddingplanes,dippingsteeplyatthetop
andmoreshallowlynearthebase,and
y Afaultseparatingtheinsiturockmassfromthe
ancientlandslide(Genevois andGhirotti 2005).

y In1960,ownerbeganfillingdamandmonitoringearth
y
y
y
y

movements
Movementsincreasedasdamfilled
Landslideof750,000cubicmetersintoreservoir,on
November4,1960
Ownerthoughtmovementcouldbecontrolledby
loweringwater
Boreholesdrilledtoreducewaterpressure

17

y October9,1963atabout10:41pm,270millioncubic
y
y
y
y

metersofrockfellintoreservoir
Landslidespeedupto25m/s
Wallofwaterwentoverthedam
DestroyedtownofLongarone,destroyedother
hamletsandvillages
2,043peoplekilled

18

From
http://www.uwsp.edu/geo/projects/geoweb/participants/Dutch/VTrips/Vaiont.HTM

From
http://www.cnsm.csulb.edu/departments/geology/people/bperry/Mass%20Wasting/VaiontDam.htm

19

y Scopeofinvestigation
y Whetherthehydrogeologicalexaminationofthedamarea

wasgivenproperconsiderationinplanningandconstruction,
andwhetherthepreviouslandslidesintheareaweretaken
seriously,
y Whetherthedamstestingwasstillcontinuingatthetime,
y Thelevelofthereservoirinthe10dayspriortothedisaster,
andwhethersafetyrecommendationsforthelevelwere
followed,and
y Whetherapreviouslandslideintheareaafewdaysbeforethe
disastershouldhavewarrantedanevacuationorder
downstream,andwhetherofficialsactedproperly(Ross1984
p.133).

20

y Blamedbureaucraticinefficiency,muddled

withholdingofalarminginformation,andbuck
passingamongtopofficials
y 11menchargedwithcrimesrangingfrom
manslaughtertonegligence
y Someservedshortjailsentences

y Thecreationofthelakebasin,aswellasthevariations
y
y
y
y
y

inthelevelofthereservoir,
Theclayseamalongthefailuresurface,
Theancientlandslide,
Thegeologicalstructure,
Seismicaction,and
Aconfinedaquiferbehindandbelowthefailure
surface(Semenza andGhirotti 2000).

21

y Engineersandgeologistsarenowgenerallyobligedto

examinetheslopesofproposedreservoirsfortheowners.
Whereunstableslopesareidentified,theirimpactonthe
projectmustbeexplained.Whentheunidentifiedslides
arelargeandtheeffectsontheprojectcouldbesignificant,
thereisanobligationtoexplainwhysuchslopesare
differentfromandsaferthantheVaiont slopesIfthe
engineerscannotgiveareasonablycompleteand
consistentexplanationoftheVaiont Slide,intermsofthe
currentlyavailablemethodsofstabilityanalyses,thenitis
difficulttoseehowtheycanfeelconfidentabouttheir
evaluationofotherreservoirslopes.Thedisturbingaspect
ofpreviousreviewsoftheVaiont Slideisthatthereare
grossinconsistencieswhenthefielddata,slidebehavior,
andtheresultsoftheanalysesarecompared(Hendron
andPatton,1985,pp.1 2).

y FrankPatton,aconsultingengineeringgeologist,and

hiscolleaguesbeganinvestigatingtheslidein1975and
visitedthefailureplane.Theyfoundalayerofplastic,
lowstrengthclay(alsoknownasfatclay)atthebaseof
theslide,between13and100mm(1/2and4inches)
thick.
y Considered
y Thethreedimensionalshapeoftheslidesurface,
y Actuallaboratoryshearstrengthsofmaterialfromthe

site,and
y Piezometric levelstakingintoaccountrainfalland
reservoirlevels(Hendron andPatton1985,p.2)

22

y Ithadbeenobservedthatmovementsincreasedasthe

reservoirlevelincreased,butthereservoirlevelalso
increasedwhenitrained.
y Therefore,twopossiblecausesfortheincreasedmovement
werehigherwaterpressuresduetohigherwaterlevels
withinthereservoir,orincreasedpressureswithinthe
mountainfromrainfallagainstthefatclay.
y Theerroneousassumptionwhichledtotheconclusions
wasthatallotherfactorswereremainingconstantandthe
reservoirlevelwasthemainvariablecontrollingthe
stabilityoftheslide.Infact,rainfallwassignificantand
wasnotremainingconstant(Hendron andPatton1985,p.
54).

y Sincethefailurehadoccurred,itwasnecessaryfor

stabilityanalysestodemonstrateafactorofsafetynear
1.0underthefailureconditions.
y Itwasalsonecessarytodemonstratefactorsofsafety
near1.0atthetimeswhensignificantmovementwas
observed,aswellassomewhatgreaterfortheperiods
wheremovementswereinsignificant.
y Theperiodsoftimewherethefactorofsafetyshould
benearonearetheprehistoriclandslide,themajor
movementofOctober1960whenthecracksformed,
andOctober9,1963.

23

24

y Thinlayerofweakclay providedalubricant
y Higherwaterpressuresbehindslideplane correlated

withhigherrainfallandhigherreservoirlevels
y Sinkholesinkarstic plainallowedwatertoinfiltrate
y Boreholesdidnotgodeepenough
y Ancientlandslideconfirmed

y Mt.Tocinlocaldialectmeanscrazy localswere

awareofgroundmovements
y Necessarytocarryoutreservoirslopestabilityanalyses
y Lowpermeabilityclaylayerprovideslubricantand
holdsinwaterpressure

25

Thedamremains
mostly
undamaged,but
unusablesince
thereservoiris
fullofrock

y Hendron,A.J.,andPatton,F.D.(1985).TheVaiont

Slide:AGeotechnicalAnalysisBasedonNew
GeologicalObservationsoftheFailureSurface,Vol.I,
MainText, TechnicalreportGL855,Department
oftheArmy,U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,U.S.
ArmyEngineerWaterwaysExperimentStation,
Vicksburg,Mississippi,June.
y Wearne,Phillip(2000),Collapse:WhenBuildings
FallDown,TVBooks,L.L.C.(www.tvbooks.com),
NewYork,N.Y.

26

April5,1987
SchoharieCreek,NewYorkState

y SchoharieCreekBridgecollapsedafterthreedecades

ofservice,April5,1987
y Nearrecordflood
y Fivevehiclesfellintoriver,tenoccupantsdied
y Overtime,scourprotectionforbridgepiershadbeen
compromised

27

y Fivesimplysupportedspansacrossriver
y Spanssupportedbyconcretepierframes
y Columnsonlightlyreinforcedplinth,onshallow

spreadfooting
y Spreadfootingtobeprotectedbydryriprap

y ContractawardedFebruary11,1953,bridgeopened

summeron1954
y 100yearfloodoccurredthenextyear
y Bridgesurvived,butdamagemayhavehadbearing
onlatercollapse
y Asbuiltplansshowedthatsheetpilinghadbeen
leftaroundpiers,butithadbeenremoved

28

y Plinthsformedcracksshortlyaftercompletion,1/8to

3/16inchwide
y Hightensilestressintopofplinth similarto
uniformlyloadedbeamupsidedown
y Tensionreinforcementaddedtotopofpier,butnot
extendedintocolumns
y Otherproblemsnoted

112.5'
27.75'

57'

27.75'

Symmetrical about
C
L

Deck

Stringer at
8'-6" o.c.

Floor Beam at
approx. 20' o.c.

Knee Brace

Main Girder

Cantilever Floor
Beam Ends

Bearing
7'-0" sq Column
5'-0" wide X10'-0" deep
Tie Beam

Column

Plinth Reinforcement

Plinth

Footing
Figure 1 - Pier Section ( after "Collapse," 1987 )

29

Column Forces
Plinth Tensile
Reinforcement

Soil Pressure

Sloped
Embankment

NORTH
Riprap
Sloped
Embankment
East
Abutment

West Abutment
Flow
PIER 1

100'
SPAN1

PIER 2

110'
SPAN2

PIER 4

PIER 3

120'
SPAN3

110'
SPAN4

100'
SPAN5

Figure 2 - Schematic plan of bridge ( after "Collapse," 1987 )

30

y April5,1987,6inchrainfallplussnowmelt,

estimated50yearflood
y Pierthreetoppled,andspansthreeandfourfell
intocreek
y Onecarandsemionbridge,threedroveoffinto
gap 9bodiesfound,oneneverrecovered
y Piertwoandspantwofell90minuteslater

Photo by Sid Brown of the

Schenectady Gazette

31

32

y Twoteamsinvestigatedandcooperated
y Wiss,Janney,Elstner(WJE)Associates,forNewYork

StateThruwayAuthority
y Thornton Tomasetti,P.C.,forNewYorkStateDisaster
PreparednessCommission
y Cofferdamconstructedaroundfailedpiers,site

dewateredandexcavated
y Scouridentifiedascause

33

y Shallowfootings
y Erodiblesoilunderfootings layersofgravel,sand,

silt,interbeddedwithtill
y Insufficientbackfill
y Riprapprotection,inspection,maintenance
inadequate

34

y After1955flood,bermsconstructedupstream would

increasevelocity
y Upstreamendofpier3fellinto9footdeephole,25to
30feetundermined
y Sheetpileshadnotbeenleftinplace
y Ripraptoolight wasabout300lb.,shouldhavebeen
1,000to1,500lb.

y LevyandSalvadori,1992
y inthecontractissuedin1980formaintenancework,

allreferencetonewstoneripraphadbeendeletedbya
nonengineerstateemployeewhodecided,after
viewingthesitefromshore,thatitwasunnecessary.

35

y Floodgreaterthananticipatedbydesigners,riprap
y
y
y
y
y

alreadydisturbed
Curveupstreamdirectwatertopier3
Debrisdirectedwatertobaseofpier3
Bermsdirectedwaterunderbridge
Embankmentincreasedvelocities
Damupstreamsetforwinterconditions

y Bridgebearingsallowedspanstoliftorslide
y Simplespansnotredundant
y Concretepiersdidnothaveenoughsteelforductile

frameaction
y Plinthreinforcementkeptplinthfromsettlinggently,
brokesuddenly

36

y 3scourmechanisms
y Longtermaggredation/degradation longtermchange

inlevel
y Contractionscour Q=Av,ifAsmaller,vincreases
y Localscouratpierorabutment
y Countermeasuresincluderiprap,pilesunderpiers,

andcofferdams

y Bridgedesignmustconsiderstructural,hydraulic,and

geotechnicalfactors
y Pierswereshallow,notprotectedbyriprap
y Bridgeinspectionscritical,includingunderwater
y Ifriprapmoves,replacewithbiggerrocks

37

y 494bridgesfailedbetween1951and1988dueto

scour
y Needtopredictcriticalstorm
y Needregularinspectionsofsuperstructure,
substructure,andunderwaterfeatures
y Erosionprotectionnecessaryaroundpiersand
abutmentssubjecttoscour

y NationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB).

(1988).CollapseofNewYorkThruway(190)
BridgeovertheSchoharieCreek,nearAmsterdam,
NewYork,April5,1987.HighwayAccidentReport:
NTSB/HAR88/02,Washington,D.C.

38

y ThorntonTomasetti, P. C. (1987) Overview

Report Investigation of the New York State

Thruway Schoharie Creek Bridge Collapse.
Prepared for: New York State Disaster
Preparedness Commission, December.
y Wiss,Janney,ElstnerAssociates,Inc.,and
MueserRutledgeConsultingEngineers(1987)
CollapseofThruwayBridgeatSchoharie
Creek,FinalReport,Prepared
for:NewYork
StateThruwayAuthority,November.

39

August29,2005
NewOrleans,Louisiana

y Massivefailureoftheleveesystem
y Deathsandpropertydamage
y NeardestructionofamajorAmericancity
y Seriesofmajorbreaches

40

y Failedat6:30am,450ft/137msectionofIwall
y Failedwhenwater5ft/1.5mbelowtopofwall
y FloodedLakeviewneighborhood
y Wallbuiltonorganicmarshsoiloveralayerofsoft

clay,shearstrengthlowandvariable
y Waterfilledgapnexttowall

41

y Waterpusheswallback
y Gapformsandfillswithwater,presseswall
y Failureplaneforms

y Failedaround6to7am,wateralsobelowtopofwall
y Soilbelowmarshherewassand,notclay
y Waterseepingthroughhighlypermeablesandlifted

(floated)thelevee

42

y Failedaround7or8am
y Leveerestedonmarshoverathicksandlayer,but

looserandweakerthanLACanalSouthlevee
y FailuremodeprobablysimilartoLACanalSouthlevee

y Multiplebreachesstartingaround5am
y Soilherewasmarshoversoftclayoversand
y Probablyslidingfailures,exacerbatedbywaterfilled

gaps
y SomeIwallsovertopped scourerodedsoilfromland
side

43

y Pumpswerenotpartofhurricaneprotectionsystem
y Fewstationsworked,manyoperatorshadevacuated
y Electricalpowerfailed
y Pumpstationsflooded
y Manypumpsdischargedintocanalsandwaterways

thathadbeenbreached justrecirculated thewater

y Lackofappreciationofrisk
y Piecemealconstructionofhurricaneprotectionsystem
y Systemunderdesigned standardprojecthurricane
y
y
y
y

only101110mph/162177kph
Manyleveesnothighenough
Nosingleentityincharge
Noexternalpeerreview
Nostablefunding

44

y Understandriskandembracesafety
y Reevaluateandfixthehurricaneprotectionsystem
y Revampthemanagementofthehurricaneprotection

system
y Demandengineeringquality

y https://ipet.wes.army.mil/
y Ignorethesecuritycertificatewarning
y SeealsoAmericanSocietyofCivilEngineers.(ASCE).

(2007).TheNewOrleansHurricaneProtectionSystem:
WhatWentWrongandWhy,ReportbyHurricane
KatrinaExternalReviewPanel,ASCE,Reston,Va.

45

y Thoroughforensicinvestigationsareimportantto

understandbehaviorofengineeredsystems
y Forensicobservationsareimportanttoverifytheory
andcalibrateandadjustmodels
y Failuresareoftencomplex,sobewareofsimple
answers Thereisalwaysaneasysolutiontoevery
humanproblem neat,plausible,andwrong.H.L.
Mencken

46