1

Case No. 1
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER
BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher
Bongcarawan yMacarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III
of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 2 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua,and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. cDAITS
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads,
thus: cEaSHC
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known
as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding
license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659." 3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V
Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the
vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected
one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of
the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at
the economy section. 4 The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The
accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2)
security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite
suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported
the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its

contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt.
Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De
Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag 6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white
crystalline substance. 7 When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that
he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's
brother in Iligan City. 8 The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast
guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano
Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters, 9 while the packs of
white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for
laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he
was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in
Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing
sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He
boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small
luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the
Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. 11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13,
1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned
himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There,
he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel
security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came
and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back
to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he
went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite
suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would
be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big
luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his
and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and
found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took
pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later
given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. 12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,
the
court
finds
the
accused
Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425as
amended by R.A. NO. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until
the present, the period of such preventive detention shall be credited in
full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.

2
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED." 13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG
CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT
OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti 15 is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. 16 Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. 17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between
invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and
seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by
the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, 18 "[i]n the
absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State." 19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the
police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and
order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge

any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and
other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may
be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of
the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits
that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the
crime charged. 21

We are not persuaded.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The first two elements were
sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, 23 this Court has ruled that to warrant
conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or
that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. 24 It has
been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession. 25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, selfserving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to
disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
will not be disturbed on appeal. 27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve
credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked
to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected. 28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase
allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains
unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its
contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he
brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and
even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. 31 To overcome
this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this
case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but
presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really
exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex
Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling
sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that
there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex

3
Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he
does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who
could testify and support the claim of the accused." 32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the
keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will
take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous
drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal
Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section
16, Article III of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant. IaHCAD
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Bongcarawan y Macarambon, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002)

4
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution
evidence established the following:
Case No. 2
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.

On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit
y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. 6

DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open
and entered the house. 7

This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
16 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.

After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. 8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint 9 having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11

Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28,
1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or
use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. aSECAD
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, 4 whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist
and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory,

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. 12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. 13 The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the
other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana. 14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated
by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave
their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about
20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof. 15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. 16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. 17

5
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accusedappellant was detained. 18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified
that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and
other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional;
and,

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of

the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third,
the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. 22 Nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH
NO. 160

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, REPUBLIC

ACT NO. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

For: Violation of RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254

grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for
disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is
hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of
Investigation pursuant to law.

GREETINGS:

SO ORDERED. 20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH
WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. No. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO
(2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN
USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

WARRANT

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under

oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1
EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that
ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the
properties to wit: TcIAHS
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the
day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus,
Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L.
ESPAOL
Judge

6
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.

Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do

you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is
void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the
same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court. 23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant
on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU,
NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned into a
monitoring or surveillance work?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for
monitoring or surveillance?
A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q Are you familiar with that place?
A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the
area and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias
Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias
Robert?
A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher
of shabu, sir.
Q Were you able to buy at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount
of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.

A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done
inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him
inside his cabinet.
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT
SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded
back to our office and reported the progress of my mission to
our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I
bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally
requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services,
NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for
shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification
of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that
anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to
transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A Yes, sir. 24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court, 25 the warrant properly
described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not
follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that
the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with
respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable
from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the

7
principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of
these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest
that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained
which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the
requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made
under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be
upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
totobecause the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence. 26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. 27 It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
"There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and
alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has
in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above."
Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The
search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso 29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of
"dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for
more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by
different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the

search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short,
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search
warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal
possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of
paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which
are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. 30
Similarly, in another case, 31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3
thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was
necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of
Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents which
identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for
search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was
located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon
City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as "a
house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City;
and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In
fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership
of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken
as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan
where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of
appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's
team is undeniably appellant's house and it was really appellant who was
the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant
that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their
operation. 32

8
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. 33For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a
building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there
was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by
a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass." 34 In this case, the location of
accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt
that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence,
Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence. 35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police. 36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no
longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been
explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits
the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. 37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search

incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control. 38 The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and
destroy it. AHDcCT
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet,
as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People v. Musa 39 in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic
bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask
the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming
then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object
in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer. 40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 41 In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the
seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view
doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window

9
of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and
competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times.
Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These
circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession
of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. TaCDIc
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Salanguit y Ko, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001)

10
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Case No. 3
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 82585. November 14, 1988.]
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K.
AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO
III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 82827. November 14, 1988.]

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila,
THE HON. LUIS VICTOR CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE
DISTRICT, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT
AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 83979. November 14, 1988.]

LUIS
D.
BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III,
THE FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, AND JUDGE
RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court, at Manila,respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V . Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
No. 82827 and 83979.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; RESPONDENT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE NEED NOT FILE HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS BEFORE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS DEEMED COMPLETED. Due process of law does not require that the

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES,

PAPERS AND EFFECTS; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST; PROBABLE CAUSE; THE
JUDGE HAS EXCLUSIVE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE
OF; THE PRESIDENT. This case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as
complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and prosecution
service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she
has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press
which would inevitably follow.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HARASSMENT INHERENT IN ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; SUPREME
COURT SHOULD DRAW THE DEMARCATION LINE WHERE HARASSMENT GOES BEYOND
USUAL DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY ANY ACCUSED. There is always bound to be
harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual
difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely
criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs,
this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF SPEECH; WHILE DEFAMATION
IS NOT AUTHORIZED, CRITICISM IS TO BE EXPECTED AND SHOULD BE BORNE FOR THE
COMMON GOOD. As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37
Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in
the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not
authorized, criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; LIBEL;
RULES THEREON SHOULD BE EXAMINED FROM VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES IF DIRECTED
AT A HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DRAW A FINE LINE
INSTEAD OF LEAVING IT TO A LOWER TRIBUNAL. In fact, the Court observed that high
official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges would
actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would seem that what would
ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various
perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this
fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
6. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; SAFEGUARDS IN THE NAME THEREOF SHOULD
BE FAITHFULLY APPLIED IN TRIAL OF LIBEL CASE. In the trial of the libel case against the
petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; COURT SHOULD NOT
HESITATE TO QUASH A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN INTEREST OF MORE ENLIGHTENED
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pao (134
SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest
of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an

11
accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of
governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
2. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; LIBEL; CASE NOT A SIMPLE PROSECUTION
THEREFOR WHERE COMPLAINANT IS THE PRESIDENT; JUDGE NOT REQUIRED TO
PERSONALLY EXAMINE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
3. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PRESIDENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; RATIONALE. The
rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE PERTAINS TO PRESIDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE OFFICE AND
MAY BE INVOKED ONLY BY HOLDER OF OFFICE. But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE IS SOLELY THE PRESIDENT'S
PREROGATIVE. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or
to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of

the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioner's contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding Closed", in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

12
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and
that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

||| (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 82827, 83979 (Resolution), November 14, 1988)

13
Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to
perform the witnessed activities using petitioners' products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set
aside the RTC's order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order
denying Maxicorp's motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion on 29 November 1999.
Case No. 4
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004.]
MICROSOFT
CORPORATION
and
LOTUS
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MAXICORP, INC., respondent.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary
examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence
that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:

DECISION

1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;

2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE
THE PETITION;

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 dated 23
December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The
Court of Appeals reversed the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"),
denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.'s ("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the
RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for
copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD
49") 4and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC"). 5
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI
Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a
preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued
Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against
Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorp's
premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there
was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general
warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied
Maxicorp's motion for reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent
Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante").
The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent

3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE

SEARCH WARRANTS;
4. WHETHER THE SEARCH
WARRANTS." IaECcH

WARRANTS

ARE

"GENERAL

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law. Maxicorp
insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact, which this Court should
not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they
presented in this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts are not in
dispute.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of
law. 6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal, 7 subject to exceptions as
when the findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court. 8
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists
when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of
fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation
seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.

14
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. 9 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 10 If the query requires a
re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. 11 Our ruling
inPaterno v. Paterno 12 is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or
not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and
adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions
of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed
and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party,
may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain
documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit
in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;
whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such
gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are
issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does not
automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must
meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the
nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only the first two qualify as
questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law
since it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this
issue would require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented
before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments requiring an
examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during the search warrant
proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the
situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to
raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court to
analyze or weigh evidence. 14 When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of
exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious
circumstances. 15
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals
conflict with the findings of the RTC. 16 Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings
of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition

Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper
party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the
People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this
case. 17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 18 that the
petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this
Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of
due process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in the
prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to
circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are
sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the
sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of
Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the
existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing
the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted
was defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the
sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from
Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners' other
witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's findings.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper." 19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. 20
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath
the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." 21 The applicant must have
personal knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient. 22 Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses. 23
The Court of Appeals' reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two
witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove conclusively that they
bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a
failure to prove the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place
searched.

15
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and
unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented
the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The
offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of
counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the
RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the
requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for
sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were
produced and packaged within Maxicorp's premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated
that he was certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers
without giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of
authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp
installed petitioners' software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw
the sale of petitioners' software within Maxicorp's premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp's
premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words
themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.
The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards
of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, 24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists. 25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation. 26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
RTC's findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano's purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale
of petitioners' software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent
Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which
computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners' software. 27 Sacriz, who was present when
NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased
the computer unit. 28 Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence
of petitioners' software on the same computer unit. 29 There was a comparison between
petitioners' genuine software and Maxicorp's software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI
Agent Sambiano purchased. 30 Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of
"Joel Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation,

there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals' ruling on Sacriz's testimony. The fact that Sacriz did
not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of
probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of
selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling,
packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear
and firm testimonies of petitioners' witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The
Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and
thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The
RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court. LibLex
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. 31For this
reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason. 32 Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal
any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge
examined thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is
unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it
were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized.
The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those
particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is
necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. 33
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall
issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is issued. 34 Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must
state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the
commission of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the
specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the
warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTC's Order
thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner's store
can be seized on the ground that it is "used or intended to be used" in the
illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents'
software and their manuals. 35
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the
search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly worded warrants,

16
all of which noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to be used," were previously
held void by this Court. 36 The disputed text of the search warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft
software bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION contained in CDROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft
instruction manuals and/or literature bearing the Microsoft
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing
the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals,
purchase orders and all other books of accounts and
documents used in the recording of the reproduction and/or
assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in
connection with fake or counterfeit products bearing the
Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;

e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard

disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and
diskettes, photocopying machines and other equipment or
paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and
unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and
their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit,
without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any
and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all
computer hard drives, data bases and other information
storage
devices
containing
unauthorized
Microsoft
software. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. 38 The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or
precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the
property or its character is a matter of concern. 39 Measured against this standard we find that
paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently
identified physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense
charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal
and unauthorized copying of petitioners' software. This language meets the test of specificity. 40

The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the
warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the
phrase "used or intended to be used." In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering
the seizure of "television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners . . ." were
found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. 41 The
mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the defendant's store does not mean that the
machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different.
Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge
Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records
pertaining to "all business transactions" of the defendant. 42 And in 20th Century Fox Film
Corp. v.Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles
to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the
legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes." 43
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c)
states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing
the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or
other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the
description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or
its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the
Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to
products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying
some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified
as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in
the warrant. 44 A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant. 45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III
of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under
paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized
under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are
ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
SO ORDERED. SAHIaD
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Quisumbing, J ., took no part. Close relation to Counsel.
||| (Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004)

17
The Supreme Court held that while their contention may be conceded, the trouble is that the
place described in the search warrant, which is the only place that may be legitimately searched
in virtue thereof, was not that which the police officers who applied for the search warrant had in
mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a
place other than that stated in the search warrant. It does not suffice for a search warrant to be
deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it
is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention
being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described. HcISTE

SYLLABUS

Case No. 5
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial
Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN,
MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and
MEHMOOD ALI,respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Manuel V. Mendoza for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A search warrant was served against Azfar Hussain which resulted in his arrest together with 3
other Pakistanis and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects, i.e.
dynamite sticks, plastic explosives, fragmentation grenade and high powered firearms and
ammunitions. Charged in court, they pleaded not guilty and submitted their "Extremely Urgent
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible" on the ground
that the place searched, in which the accused were then residing, was Apartment No. 1, a place
other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety
Store, the place stated in the search warrant. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General
now seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision alleging that the police officers had
satisfactorily established probable cause before the judge for the issuance of a search warrant.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; OFFICER EXECUTING

WARRANT COULD CONSULT THE RECORDS IN THE OFFICIAL COURT FILE TO CLEAR UP
EXTRINSIC AMBIGUITY. The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned
by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court
file. Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City," and the other at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the
execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This
was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it
was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place.
Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct
addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the second
warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical
error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; IT IS NEITHER FAIR NOR LICIT FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO
SEARCH A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT STATED IN THE WARRANT. The case at bar,
however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving
ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place
different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the
inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in
question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the

18
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. The place to be searched, as set
out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officer's own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such
a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter aliathe search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not
be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be
subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT DOES NOT SUFFICE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT TO BE DEEMED VALID;
IT IS ESSENTIAL TOO THAT IT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before
Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is,
to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only place
that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who
applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to searchand-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing. It does not suffice, for a
search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined
by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly described the place to be searched, the
manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to
invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9, 1996, 2 as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion
for reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996: LexLib

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION; POLICY GUIDELINES. Where a search

warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is
afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant ( or
to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion
may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is
pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of
the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third
policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit: "3. Where no
motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested
party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence
of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose.
Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to
quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum-shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent
or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and
issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to
said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the
warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion
to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed.
It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to
quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline
No. 3 abovequoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted
within its competence.
DECISION
NARVASA, C .J p:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I.

Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court
within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner
considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. "On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar
Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan."
2. "The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95)
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No.
1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of
four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of
shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including

19
cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00
(receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of
$5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the
court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece
of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search
warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol;
(c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for
explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions."
3. "On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and
effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no
showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search."
4. "On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged; . . ." and on the same date, submitted
their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to
Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ". . . According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition for certiorari . . .): 'On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30, 1996 . . . to wit:
"1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1
which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as '1207' found in the building
as it is correspondingly called only as 'Apartment No. 1, 2, 3
and 4;'
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety
Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its
own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the Court,
let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED." "
6. "On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge . . . issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant . . .;" 5
7. "On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss . . .;"

8. "On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan

filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant . . . ;"
9. "On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration . . . ;"
10. "On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge . . . issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration . . .; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss . . . ."
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack
of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: 6
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to
by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then
residing wasApartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from,
and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store,
the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted
the particular place to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not
signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search
Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead . . . directed
them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 . . . in the Order . . .
dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in the
Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995, requested by
P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability
of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission, during the
hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said
sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for search warrant . . .
(but)merely attached to the motion for reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.: 8
"(d) . . . it is very clear that the place searched is different from
the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason
why even P/SR. INSP. Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco

20
Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED,
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and
who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in TAGALOG with Honorable
Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words 'KATABI', or
"KADIKIT" or 'KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth
even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS 'RESIDE' or
'ADJACENT' or 'BEHIND' or 'NEXT' to ABIGAIL VARIETY
STORE, the place they are going to raid.' . . ."

2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence . . . to
the contrary;"

3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful

occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the
family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living
room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. 9

6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the

validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved
without informing petitioner thereof."

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days
or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court." 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or
branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search
warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant
proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to
rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained
(Nolasco & Sans cases)."

6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge,

in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court."
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil action of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict, ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;"

3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"

4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and

The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly
issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or
more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place
to be searched prior to the searched: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind
the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the
search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken
therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued the warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises
to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a
description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the
search warrant: " premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made
more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the
search be "limited only to the premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate
and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could
pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of
the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the
rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1). LibLex

21
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store
and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand
the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant
which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did
not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch
they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff , AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the
execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This
was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it
was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place.
Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct
addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the second
warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical
error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error"
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos,
the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants
in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's
finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however
shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the
police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies,
being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts
on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before
Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is,
to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only place
that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who
applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to searchand-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: 14
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be
seized."
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of
the complainant. and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought
into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation . . . (inter

22
alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be
made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be searched being plainly
marked was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among
others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the
return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence
which . . . (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or
(5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been
erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the
conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the
search warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of
their argument that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to
the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a
search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case,"
the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is
afterwards filed. 17 In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this
Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second guideline reads: 19
"2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original
or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they
shall be deemed waived."
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is
not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be
filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other,
and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against
forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
"3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved
by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said

purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are

involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing
of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to
suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court."
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for
the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been
presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action
had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence
was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September
11, 1996 which dismissed the People's petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders
of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal
Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. LLphil
Romero, Kapunan and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998)

23
the building, however, was illegal because it was not part of the place described to be searched
and it was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; REQUISITES FOR
VALIDITY. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e.: (1) it must be issued upon
"probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such
judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE IN THE NAME OF THE ACCUSED DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE
SEARCH WARRANT IF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED WAS PROPERLY DESCRIBED;
CASE AT BAR. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the
person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the
authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a "John
Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will
enable the officer to identify the accused. We have also held that a mistake in the identification
of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is
properly described. Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not
contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it
because the place to be searched was described properly. IATSHE

Case No. 6
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149878. July 1, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TIU WON CHUA
a.k.a. "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING y CHUA a.k.a. "Sun Tee Sy y
Chua", accused-appellant.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH ON THE CAR THAT WAS NOT PART OF THE PLACE DESCRIBED IN
THE WARRANT TO BE SEARCHED WAS ILLEGAL; CASE AT BAR. We affirm, however, the
illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the description
of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be
valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. Moreover, the search
of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be
limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish
him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In this case, appellants were arrested
inside the apartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Grajo T. Albano and Teresita Dizon Capulong for accused-appellants.

DECISION
PUNO, J p:

SYNOPSIS
Appellants were convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA
No. 7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest
conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction.
The Supreme Court held that even if the search warrant used by the police did not contain the
correct name of appellants Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it
because the place to be searched was described properly and the test buy operation conducted
before obtaining the search warrant showed that they have personal knowledge of the identity of
the persons and the place to be searched. The search conducted on the car parked away from

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27,
convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Paling y Chua a.k.a.
Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.
Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug, i.e.,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," in an information which reads:
The undersigned accuses TIU WON CHUA aka "Timothy Tiu" and QUI
YALING Y CHUA aka "Sun Tee Sy Y Chua" of violation of Section 16,
Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), Article I ofREPUBLIC ACT NO.

24
6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and as further amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1998, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by law to possess
or use any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and jointly have in their possession and under their custody
and control the following, to wit:
A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five (234.5)
grams of white crystalline substance;
Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point two
two four three (6.2243) grams of white crystalline substance;
Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty
point three six seven three (20.3673) grams of white crystalline
substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams, and;
An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance
known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law. 1
During arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered. Appellants, with the assistance of counsel,
and the prosecution stipulated on the following facts:
1. The authenticity of the following documents:
a. The letter of Police Senior Inspector Angelo Martin of
WPD, District Intelligence Division, United
Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, dated
October 12, 1998, to the Director of the NBI
requesting the latter to conduct a laboratory
examination of the specimen mentioned
therein;
b. The Certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loreto
Bravo of the NBI, dated October 13, 1998, to
the effect that the specimen mentioned and
enumerated therein gave positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit "B";
and
c. Dangerous Drug Report No. 98-1200 issued by
Forensic Chemist Bravo, dated October 13,
1998, to the effect that the specimen
mentioned therein gave positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride;

2. The existence of one plastic bag containing 234.5 grams of

methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit "D"; four (4) plastic
sachets also containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with
a total net weight of 6.2243 grams, Exhibits "E", "E-1", "E-2"
and "E-3"; additional 16 plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of
20.3673 grams, Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-15", and one
improvised tooter with a length of 8 inches more or less and
with a red plastic band, Exhibit "G";
3. Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo has no personal knowledge as to the
source of the regulated drug in question; and
4. Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua as stated in the information are
the true and correct names of the two accused. 2
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de Leon, PO2 Artemio
Santillan and PO3 Albert Amurao. Their testimonies show that the police authorities, acting on
an information that drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay
St., Binondo, Manila, surveyed the place on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1998. At about 10 p.m. of
October 6, they conducted a test-buy operation, together with a Chinese-speaking asset. They
were able to buy P2,000.00 worth of substance from appellants, which, upon examination by the
PNP crime laboratory, proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 3 Nonetheless, they
did not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL
Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their application to search the unit supposedly
owned by "Timothy Tiu" was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of
Manila on October 9. 4 Armed with the warrant, they proceeded to the place and learned that Tiu
Won was not inside the building. They waited outside but Tiu Won did not come. After several
stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant on October 12. Failing to get the cooperation
of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel Olarte,
and his wife, Joji, who acted as witnesses.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons inside the apartment,
namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and a housemaid. The search was conducted on the
sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the master's bedroom,
one (1) big pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black leather man's
handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing
20.3673 grams were found inside a lady's handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. Also
contained in the inventory were the following items: an improvised tooter, a weighing scale, an
improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper. 5 The authorities also searched a Honda Civic
car bearing Plate No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered in the name of the
wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing 6.2243 grams of shabu, which were
likewise confiscated. A gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject of a
separate criminal case.
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu
Won Chua are one and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove that
appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also
claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant, alleging that he is
married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila.
Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two

25
children. Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only
occupied one room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a certain Uy, occupied the other
rooms. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They
asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest were
made, the third person, whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain
Chin, who was there to look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied
that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won.

Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of her apartment on
October 12, the police authorities represented that they were electric bill collectors. She let them
in. She was surprised when upon opening the door, around ten (10) policemen barged inside her
unit. She, together with Tiu Won and Chin, was asked to remain seated in the sofa while the
men searched each room. Tiu Won alleged that after a fruitless search, some of the policemen
went out, but came back a few minutes later with another person. Afterwards, he was made to
sign a piece of paper. Appellants also claimed that the policemen took their bags which
contained money, the pieces of jewelry they were selling and even Qui Yaling's cell phone. They
both denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search. Appellants were
arrested and brought to the police station.
In a decision, dated August 15, 2001, the RTC found proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the appellants and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P500,000.00 each. 6
Thus, appellants interpose this appeal raising the following assignment of errors: EaICAD
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE LEGAL DEFECTS
OF THE SEARCH WARRANT USED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES
AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
EVIDENCES (sic) WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AND
DISREGARDED WHICH RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS
CONVICTION OF BOTH ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BOTH ACCUSED WERE SERIOUSLY
VIOLATED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES. 7

These issues can be trimmed down to two i.e., the legality of the search warrant and the search
and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction
imposed by the RTC.
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not
include appellant Qui Yaling, appellants contend that because of this defect, the search
conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence
presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
We beg to disagree. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued
upon "probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3)
such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 8 As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the
name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, 9 especially since in this
case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. In
fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. 10 We have also held that a
mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided
the place to be searched is properly described. 11
Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name
of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be
searched was described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy
operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They can
therefore be presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place
to be searched although they may not have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed
with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B was conducted.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was
not part of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory
that for the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the
warrant. 12 Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid,
such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping. 13 In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment, whereas the car was
parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants
were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2)
such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. 14 We also note that the crime under consideration
is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants
from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable
under the Dangerous Drugs Act. 15
In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found
inside Unit 4-B, HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Surveillance was
previously conducted. Though no arrest was made after the successful test-buy operation, this
does not destroy the fact that in a subsequent search, appellants were found in possession
of shabu. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are consistent in that after the test-buy

26
operation, they obtained a search warrant from Judge Makasiar, pursuant to which, they were
able to confiscate, among others, several packs of shabu from a man's handbag and a ladies'
handbag inside a room in the unit subject of the warrant. Furthermore, the seizure of the
regulated drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the "Receipt for Property Seized" 16 signed by SPO1
de Leon, the seizing officer, Noel, the building administrator, and Joji Olarte, his wife, who were
also present. De Leon attested to the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was not
contradicted by the defense.
Be that as it may, we cannot sustain the trial court's decision attributing to both appellants the
illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. We note that nowhere in the information is
conspiracy alleged. Neither had it been proven during the trial. As such, we need to look at the
individual amounts possessed by each appellant.
In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted ownership of the man's handbag where 234.5 grams
of shabu were found, viz:
Q: During those ten to 20 minutes, what were those policemen doing
inside that unit?
A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking the drawers and
everything. As a matter of fact, even handbags were searched
by them.
Q: Whose handbags were searched?
A: My bag, the one I was carrying that day, with jewelry and checks and
others were taken by them. 17 (italics supplied)
Qui Yaling, in her appellant's brief, denied owning the handbag where 20.3673 grams
of shabu were discovered. However, during her testimony, she admitted its ownership, viz:
Q: Now, the police testified before this court that you has (sic) a bag and
when they searched this bag, it yielded some sachets
of shabu(.) (W)hat can you say about that?
A: That is an absolute lie, sir. What they saw in my bag were my
cosmetics. 18 (italics supplied)
An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which may
be used in evidence against him. 19 These admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be
used against appellants because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is
their fault if they do not. 20
Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing ownership of the handbag to
her considering that there was another girl present at the apartment during the search. She
contends that since the prosecution was not able to establish the ownership of the bag, then
such could have also been owned by Chin.
We do not subscribe to this argument. The defense failed to bring Chin to court, although during
the course of the presentation of their evidence, they manifested their intention to present her
testimony. Furthermore, a visitor does not normally leave her bag lying anywhere, much more in
the master's bedroom. Being the occupant of the apartment, it is more logical to presume that
the handbag belongs to Qui Yaling. The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and proofs

that the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the bags, the license of Tiu Won
found inside the man's handbag and the passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies' handbag
are not illegal. Having no relation to the use or possession of shabu, the authorities could not
confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so since the warrant authorized them to
seize only articles in relation to the illegal possession ofshabu. 21 Not within their control, they
could not have been presented in court.
We now come to the penalties of the appellants. R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. NO. 7659,
applies. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were found inside the man's handbag, deemed to be
owned by Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui
Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20
thereof. Section 16, in connection with Section 20 (1st paragraph), provides the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos where the amount of shabu involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is
less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty ranging from prision
correctional to reclusion perpetua.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won
is affirmed, while that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in
accordance with Section 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by R.A. NO. 7659. Qui Yaling y Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision
correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Tiu Won Chua, G.R. No. 149878, July 01, 2003)

27
suffer imprisonment of Reclusion (P)erpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The marijuana subject matter of this case is confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turnover the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposal/destruction.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to transfer the
accused Priscilla del Norte to the Correccion (sic) Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City for the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED. 1
A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa, on August 1, 1997, by SPO1
Angel Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon, Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose, SPO3 Malapitan,
PO2 Buddy Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida.
As a result of the search, an information against appellant Priscilla del Norte was filed with the
trial court, viz:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PRISCILLA DEL
NORTE Y DIWA AND JANE DOE, true name, real identity and present
whereabouts of the last accused still unknown(,) of the crime of
VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II, R.A. (No.) 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of August 1997(,) in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic) one
another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control(,)
MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms. knowing the same to be a
prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitled law.

Case No. 7
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149462. March 31, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE
NORTE, appellant.

PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
PRISCILLA

DEL

DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
28, finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
Pricilla (sic) Del Norte (g)uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for
(sic) Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, R.A. 6425, and hereby sentences her to

28
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a search
warrant 3 against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425.
They were ordered to "forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu
and marijuana leaves." They coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house
pointed out to them by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a
woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the
door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant. 4 They informed her they had a search
warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by
the barangay officials that she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search.
They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the
room. 5 They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she had no means
of livelihood. 6 Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further investigation. Both
SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana 7 in
court.
Mrs. Grace Eustaquio, a forensic chemist testified that pursuant to a letter request 8 from the
Chief of the Caloocan City Police, she conducted an examination on a specimen consisting of
five bundles of suspected marijuana. She found that each of the bundles was positive for
marijuana. This finding was reduced to a Laboratory Report. 9 The report also contained a
finding on the supposed weight of each bundle in grams, i.e., (A) 973.45, (B) 1,840.31, (C)
472.99, (D) 1,678.8, and (E) 1,782.82. 10
SPO2 Florencio Ramirez, a police officer in the Intelligence Branch of the Caloocan Police
Station, testified that on August 1, 1997, the appellant was brought before him by SPO3 De
Leon and SPO1 Lumabas. They also submitted two weighing scales, five bricks of marijuana
leaves, and two bunches of marijuana leaves wrapped in an old newspaper. 11 He apprised
appellant of her constitutional rights before investigating her. After the laboratory test showed
that the evidence yielded was marijuana, he sent a referral slip 12 to Prosecutor Zaldy Quimpo
for inquest. cEaDTA
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She contended that she lived at
376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, 13 and that on August 1, 1997, she was
merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out
and she waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced
themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper and entered the house. She heard them
say "we already got Ising," and was surprised why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising,
her sister, at a house two steps away from the house where she was arrested. Despite her claim
that she was not Ising, the policemen brought her to the police station. 14
Appellant's daughter, Christine also took the witness stand. She testified that she is one of the
eight children of the appellant. Since June 1997, she recalled that they had lived at 376 Dama
de Noche St., Caloocan City, as proved by the address stated in her school identification
card, 15 and a receipt evidencing payment for the rental of their house at Dama de Noche St.
from July 18 to August 18, 1997. 16
The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the lone error that "the lower court
erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt." 17

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house where the
search was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not automatically make her
the owner of the marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant specified
the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is not
Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against
her. 18
The Solicitor General contends that "the totality of the evidence demonstrates appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt." 19 He cites the case of United States vs. Gan Lian Po, 20 that when
illegal drugs are found in the premises occupied by a certain person, such person is presumed
to be in possession of the prohibited articles. It then becomes the accused's burden to prove the
absence of animus possidendi. 21
We reverse the trial court's decision. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22
We first rule on the validity of the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (emphases supplied)
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible due to the
irregularity of the search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not
Priscilla del Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she claimed she saw
Ising nearby and pointed her to the authorities, but her efforts were futile the authorities
arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in
the name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the
place to be searched is properly described. In People v. Tiu Won Chua, 23 we upheld the validity
of the search warrant despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched. In the
cited case, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the
search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They had personal knowledge of the identity
of the persons and the place to be searched although they did not specifically know the names
of the accused.
The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The
authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They

29
did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented
the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials
informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same
person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based their
knowledge on pure hearsay.

Q: You said you found the accused Priscilla del Norte, where was she
when you found her?
A: Inside the sala, sir. 28
In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which were not in plain
view, viz:

On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses failed to establish appellant's
ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their bare
testimonies, no other proof was presented.

Atty. Yap to witness

This is in contrast to appellant's proof of her residence. The prosecution did not contest the
punong barangay's certification, 24 Christina's school ID 25 and the rental receipt, 26 all of
which show that appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche St. There being no
substantial contrary evidence offered, we conclude that appellant does not own the house
subject of the search.

Q: And you said further that it was inside the room?

The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited
articles at the time of her arrest. This is shown by the testimony of the prosecution's witness:

Q: You made mention about the bricks found?

A: Yes, Sir.

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, when you entered the room, was it locked?
A: No, Sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, there was no padlock of that room, is it correct?

Fiscal Lomadilla to Witness

A: I did not notice, sir, but it was open.

Q: What did you find in that house at No. 275?

Q: And this alleged marijuana was protruding under the bed?

A: We found marijuana.

A: No, sir but it was under the bed, "dulong-dulo."

Q: What is the quantity of the marijuana you found?

Q: Was it also the same plastic bag?

A: Five bunch (sic) or bricks of marijuana and two weighing scale(s), sir

A: No, Sir.

Q: Mr. Lumabas, you mentioned a search warrant issued by Judge

Rivera. What was the result of the execution of that search
warrant?

Q: Was it also already wrapped in newspaper?

A: We were able to find marijuana inside the house of Priscilla del Norte.

A: No, sir, only plastic tape. We were not able to notice that it was
marijuana because it is (sic) wrapped in a plastic tape.
Q: How long did you search?

Q: What is the quantity?

A: Half an hour, sir. 29

A: More or less six kilos.

Q: Was it arranged? How was it placed?
A: It was wrapped inside the plastic tape and it looks (sic) like in bricks
form. 27
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What part of the house did you discover these five bricks of
marijuana?
A: Inside the room, sir, under the bed.

The prosecution's weak evidence likewise shows from the following testimony:
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: Were you able to search the personal effects?
A: "Yung iba."
Q: Did you find any I.D. (of the persons) who occupy this room?
A: No, sir.

30
Q: In other words, your assumption is because Priscilla del Norte was
around so (sic) it follows that she was the possessor of that
illegal drugs?
A: Yes, sir because it is their house.
Q: Was there a picture or photograph taken inside the room of that
particular person?
A: None, sir.

Case No. 8
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.]

Q: So a family lived thereat?

A: None, sir.
Q: Was there a separate picture of Ising Gutierrez?
A: I did not see any.
Q: There was no incriminating evidence except this (sic) drugs taken by
Police Officer de Leon and the barangay tanod, no other
incriminating evidence?
A: None, sir. (emphases supplied)
In all criminal cases, it is appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 30 In the case at bar, we hold that the
prosecution's evidence treads on shaky ground. We detest drug addiction in our society.
However, we have the duty to protect appellant where the evidence presented show "insufficient
factual nexus" of her participation in the commission of the offense charged. 31 In People vs.
Laxa, 32 we held:
The government's drive against illegal drugs deserves everybody's
support. But it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of
constitutional rights. It is precisely when the government's purposes are
beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights.
As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, "the greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without
understanding."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is
reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt. SCHcaT
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA
O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL
V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990.]

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN.
RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO
and RAMON CASIPLE,petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO
S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/ SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

[G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY
A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner, vs. BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL., HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

||| (People v. Del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March 31, 2004)
[G.R. No. 85727. July 9, 1990.]

31
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL.
RICARDO REYES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 86332. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.
NAZARENO,
ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE
STATION
COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT.
LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO,respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons
named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. LexLib
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and
it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
their release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out inSection 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit en offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7."
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed
and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by
this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for
the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances."
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for
habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it
was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon,
is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong

32
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February
1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated
inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified. cdphil
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus,
insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case
who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural,it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the
said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the
Court in an earlier case:
"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they
were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in
fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are
all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein
detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting

armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail
if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continue cannot be less justified. . . ." 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or
on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and
sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the
trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early
case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
"In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the
fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the
law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was
read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error.
Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the
court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now
has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we
need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error."
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he
was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of
the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in
the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess. LLpr

33
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a
member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about
the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member
of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff member in charge of
finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a
safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and
on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District
(CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1 ) Colt M1 6A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK 8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transceiver SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1 ) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the
firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the
CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement,
although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a
ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra
arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he
went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constantino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka
Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from
him were the following:

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated
August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated
August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11,
1988.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo
St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the
military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the
place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and
after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted
a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place,
one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found
ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition
for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a
result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the
investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the
house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were
released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after
which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another
information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Accordingly,
the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of
Amelia Roque remains for resolution. LLjur

34
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and or
members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/ or
members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally
justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license
to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino,
they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for
which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August
1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military
agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be
loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with
one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "KaTed", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka
Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were
forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully
arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for
having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ,
the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there
was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit. The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo

and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when
they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void
for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance
of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail
as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule."
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed
against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
"This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no
preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not
made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is
reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed
against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified
under the Rules, since she had with her an unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The
record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation
of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino

35
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at
Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a car
driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal.
pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were
brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any
permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation
of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from
custody.

The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino

that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably
conducted a 'stake-out' operation whereby some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the
raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at
Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and
searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters.
They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not
only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.

On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya
and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained,
and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino
and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at
Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to
believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected
to visit Constantino's residence considering that Constantino's
information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it
unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents,
not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this
Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi
Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?.

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest
without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that
the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On
the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the
said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides,
the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for,
as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the
evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a
reward of P15,000.00 on each on their heads.' " 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less
than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
". . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure
conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
The raid at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing
expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military
surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the
underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive
results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.

As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to

effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra
had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number
of the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as
written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession?
Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason
so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted

reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in
question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners' arrest,
incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and
circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were
up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive
conspiracy.".
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised

36
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not
warranted.

pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo

na." 10 (emphasis supplied).

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid
and protection. cdll

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. 11

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was
sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he
went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant
of arrest arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their
owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule
113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal
where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of
arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of
the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November
23, 1988." 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but
he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and sympathizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali
sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang
gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang

VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission
of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this
case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye
II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof,
the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3
January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731. cdphil
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by
his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are based upon
the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of
Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo
Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12

37
"The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment
thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist
to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein."
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
"Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment." (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners' plea for the Court to re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its
pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after
an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce
and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out
that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack
of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed
before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be
able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as
an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State
action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express
provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with
a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before

whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or
order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs.
Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect
of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment
the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied ." This is
exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done
in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty
should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00
to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
||| (Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 84581-82, 84583-84, 83162, 85727, 86332, July 09, 1990)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81567. October 3, 1991.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA,
MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE,respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 84581-82. October 3, 1991.]

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN.
RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 84583-84. October 3, 1991.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T.

38
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE,petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL
V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO,
LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT.
ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

[G.R. No. 83162. October 3, 1991.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL.
HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 85727. October 3, 1991.]

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S.
LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 86332. October 3, 1991.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE
STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT.
ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO,respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G.R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CAN NOT BE SUPPRESSED BY THE
EXIGENCIES OF AN ARMED CONFLICT; GARCIA-PADILLA v ENRILE (121 SCRA 472)

CITED. The treatment of persons apprehended for the continuing offense of Rebellion
suggested in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 envisions an actual state of war and is
justified only when a recognition of belligerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the
rebels, resulting in the application of the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The
rebels are then considered alien enemies to be treated as prisoners of war when captured
and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in
such a situation that the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot
demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their
defiance of the government. But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the
legitimate government must treat the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and
entitled to all the rights provided thereunder, including and especially those guaranteed by the
Constitution. Principal among these in our country are those embodied in the Bill of Rights,
particularly those guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
allowing bail, and presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot
excuse the suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time
remains an internal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders or combatants is not justified in the
present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws.
Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are
by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious
capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest
"need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a
judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities
of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is
thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens
in a purely domestic matter.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST; PROBABLE
'CAUSE'; MUST BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE ISSUING THE WARRANT, NOT THE
ARRESTING OFFICER WHO SAYS IT IS NOT NECESSARY. In the case of Dural, the arrest
was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of undergoing medical
treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in his sickbed,
engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court
says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital,
which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the determination
of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant. Justice
Cruz's own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the
issuance of a warrant, not todispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by
the judge issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE THAT OFFENSE "HAS IN FACT JUST BEEN COMMITTED";
REQUIRES IMMEDIACY AFTER THE COMMISSION OF THE ACT. In the case of Espiritu,
the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly seditious remarks made
by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but
approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their effects
even to the following day. The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it
come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the considerable time lapse. It
was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
thanfourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the
day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the

39
validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but
from the time of the identification of the suspect. Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been committed." The
requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which, according to Webster, means
"a very short time ago." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon after these acts,
not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the
offense was committed.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
"WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No
costs."
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling and begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is a
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the
several petitions. Among these laws are those outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and similar organizations and penalizing membership therein (to be dealt with shortly). It
is elementary, in this connection, that if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of
the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people not the Court that
should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned
arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the
Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the
fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons
arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs.
Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the
persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not
comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and
academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the
special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if
detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwith released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention of petitioners was illegal or not, the
Court before rendering the decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, it would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests is also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without
warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
. . ." (emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest of Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567)
without warrant is justified as it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5(a), Rule
113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested, because Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership is
penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs.
Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
"The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart

40
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude . . ."
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of
the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: first, that the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man
in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom
mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information,

the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twentytwo (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member
("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed
reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual
facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows"
including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon"
was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the
records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect
that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending
doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore,
came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers who arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is, therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few days after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished from custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As
to Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra (G.R.
Nos.
84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found with unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few days after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition for habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

41
1. On 27 June 1988. the military agents received information imparted by
a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila
and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantino, located in
the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this
information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on
12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a
search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantino was
then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he
admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was
an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and
other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of
the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the
whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military
agent found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she
admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested
without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house
of Renato Constantino in the evening of said date; that when the agents
frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when
she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises of the house of one Benito
Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose
house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the
time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of
Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that
the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantino and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantino and
Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantino safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantino, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their

arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive

documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in
the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent man can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prose cute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are
met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke
at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
"Bukas tuloy ang welga
na." 27 (emphasis supplied).

natin

. hanggang

sa

magkagulo

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the
National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide
strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted
language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

42
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail
for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers
did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 8868385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to
know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had
to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant
of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
". . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant),
an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2)
others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,
even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel
Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution
denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Curt of Makati, Metro
Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied
the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him)."
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with the conditions
set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date (CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the constitutional requisites for the
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On
the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly in
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and stability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that every arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceedings. This Court will
promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as
elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if
such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but
must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least
delay, as warranted by the evidence.

43
A Final Word.
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
||| (In re Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 84581-82, 84583-84, 83162, 85727, 86332, October
03, 1991)

Case No. 9
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170233. February 22, 2007.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS NUEVAS y
GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO
y ABADEOS, appellants.

DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo City, Branch 75, with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II
ofREPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 2 as amended.

44
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise
charged 3 with the same crime, before the same court.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges. 4 As the
evidence in the cases was common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the
cases were consolidated. After a joint trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 dated 4
April 2002, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences them to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in
accordance with existing regulations.
SO ORDERED. 6
To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there
is need to recall the factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3
Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received
information that a certain male person, more or less 5'4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a
tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would
make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who
fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Nuevas, alight from a motor vehicle.
They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas
where he was going. Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and
Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the
possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas
voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana
dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas
disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing
more or less five (5) kilos. 7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo
City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be
located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway,
introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked,
Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection
found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." 8 After confiscating the
items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
proper documentation. 9 Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued
by Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused
were likewise physically examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates were
issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami
stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the
accused and the confiscation of the items. 10

On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all
three (3) accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one
who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all three to the
Fiscal's office where the latter were informed of the charges against them. 11
Cabling corroborated Fami's testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had
introduced themselves as police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the
marijuana dried leaves. 12
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from
Fami's informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of
persons under surveillance. Fami then relayed the tip to Cabling. 13 Cabling restated that
Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been
informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and
point to his other cohorts. 14 When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of
Nuevas's cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag
while Inocencio was looking into its contents. 15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the
plastic bag he was holding to the police officers. 16
For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking
along Perimeter Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him.
Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called
him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room where Fami
handcuffed Nuevas's hands, got Nuevas's wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami's)
wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before
leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it.
Subsequently, they boarded a red owner type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas
was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio. 17
Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 o'clock in the morning of 27 September 1997,
while his 'compare' Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman.
The two (2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately
handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their arrest and were told that the reason
will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan precinct where the
investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to
stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they
had their fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table. 18
Inocencio testified that he went to his 'compadre' Din's house in the morning of 27 September
1997 to sell his fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his driver's license. While there,
he and Din were arrested by two persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other
searched the house for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the
Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first came to know Nuevas. He denied
that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he only saw
such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was
taken of the three of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the
photograph was taken, they were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed
a receipt of property seized. Afterwards, they were brought to a detention cell. And when they
asked the police what they did wrong, the police replied that they will just explain it in court. 19

45
All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court
for automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to
withdraw appeal. 20 The Court granted Nuevas's withdrawal of appeal and considered the case
closed and terminated as to him, in a Resolution 21 dated 25 August 2003.
In a Resolution 22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42, 23 the cases
were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo. 24
Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1)
in finding them guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting
officers; and (2) in not finding that their constitutional rights have been violated. 25
The Court of Appeals in a Decision 26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed
the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal
is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 27
The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness,
the trial court's assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was
tainted with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling's version of how appellants were
apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was seen holding
a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencio's possession of the
marijuana leaves was established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the
plastic bag carried by Din. 28

With respect to appellants' claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate
court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial
warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily
surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the
instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 29
Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued
before the Court of Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary
Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006, appellants stated that all the arguments necessary to support
their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had submitted before the appellate
court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of the arguments
discussed in said brief. 31 The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing
a supplemental brief. 32
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and
seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof. TAScID

In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:
While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus
Nuevas was without a search warrant, it was not bereft of a probable
cause. The police team received informations [sic] from an asset that on
that day, a male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver
marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t]., Pag-asa,
Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs. They went to the said
area upon that information. Their waiting was fruitful because not long
afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle
carrying a bag and after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag
containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves. With respect to the
confiscation of 2 1/2 kilos of marijuana and the apprehension of accused
Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued
operation by the team which this time was led by accused Nuevas to get
some concession from the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the
apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable cause, in the same vein
was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and the
recovery from them [of] 2 1/2 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The
propriety of this conclusion is necessity [sic] because of the impossibility
of getting first a warrant in so short a time with such cumbersome
requirements before one can be issued. Before getting a warrant, the
culprits shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are not
distant to the case of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13
Feb. 1995) where we learned that expediency and practicality are some
of the justification[s] in the warrantless arrest. 33[Emphasis supplied]
Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection
of the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.34
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 35 The constitutional
proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity; HSATIC

46
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 36
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles procured. 37
The courts below anchor appellants' conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure
conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions
as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing
marijuana to the police officers. 38
We differ.
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first
exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 39 Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as
in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. 40
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." 41
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas's

case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue
cloth. 43 In Din's case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein." 44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view
which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 45
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas's case was made with
his consent. In Din's case, there was none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3)
whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given. 46
In Nuevas's case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating
bag to the police officers. Fami testified in this wise:
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D," 47 for your
part, what did you do?

A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according
to him, he acted arrogantly, sir.
Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you
confronted him did he resist?
A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are
policeman[?]"
Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?
A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?

47
A "Sir Fami[sic], don't charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to
Leyte. I was just earning enough money for my fare, sir."
xxx xxx xxx

Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag
belongs to him?
A I did not react, sir.

Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do
if you did anything?

Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with
it?

A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are
the other staffs[sic] sir. 48

A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed
in newspaper and wrapped therein, sir. 51 [Emphasis supplied.]

xxx xxx xxx

Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you
do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification,
sir. 49
Cabling likewise testified as follows:
Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he
got?
A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.
Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?
A Nobody ordered it, sir. 50
There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the
incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to
exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the
plastic bag and even revealed his 'associates,' offering himself as an informant. His actuations
were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others and save
oneself even at the cost of others' lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas's
conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. SIaHTD
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. Fami testified as follows:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the
plastic bag?
A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the
said plastic bag.
Q When you took this plastic bag from Din. . . .
Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?
A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.

Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:

FISCAL BELTRAN
Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in
your earlier testimony, what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and
pinpointed by Nuevas as the ones who kept suspected
prohibited drugs, sir.
Q After you approached these two people, what happened?
A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily
surrendered to Fami those marijuana dry leaves, sir. 52
The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they
got hold of the bag. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din's submission
of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver,
it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. 53
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into
surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Fami's and Cabling's testimonies do not
show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on Din's
composure whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time which fact we find necessary
to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by
the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to
search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented
search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof.
Neither can Din's silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People v. Burgos, 54 the Court aptly ruled:
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative
act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his

48
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. 55
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din's conviction cannot be sustained based on
the remaining evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. 56 As
such, Din deserves an acquittal.

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Nuevas y Garcia, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007)

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution's insistence that the appellants
have effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active
participation in the trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried
marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically,
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest. 57
Turning to Inocencio's case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime
charged. Inocencio's supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be
shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. 58 Taking a look at
an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as
taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is
insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the
same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of
the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and
unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Court's dated but nevertheless current
exhortation:
. . . In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no
right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the
full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may
still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the
methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones
law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the
more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the
efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate
care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly,
the end never justifies the means. 59
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 75, in Criminal Cases No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from
confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. ISTCHE

Case No. 10
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL
ROSARIO Y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

49
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Offices for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of
the victim. cdasia
Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit. He was
not aware of the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not
able to seek assistance because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to
inform the police authorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his
family. He claimed exemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted under the compulsion
of an irresistible force.
The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption sustained. He was
then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving
the crime scene during the commission of the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the
culprits escape after the commission of the crime. Further, Del Rosario's failure to disclose what
he knew about the incident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance
of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. Given his quite limited
means, Del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep
his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; WHERE PERSON ACTS UNDER
COMPULSION OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE; ELUCIDATED. A person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not
my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. TcHCDE
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by
fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as knives and
clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do,
nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could
not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the
safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. There is no doubt that the fear
entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent.

Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the
moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any
more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt
from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to
transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
3. ID.; CONSPIRACY; ELUCIDATED. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.
That must be their intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and
purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be shown by
"united and concerted action."
4. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED CONSPIRACY; HOW ESTABLISHED. Admittedly, direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it
can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of
minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If
it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.
Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. To convict the accused, the presence of
an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the fact that
del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to
show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. The only incriminating evidence
against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the
reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. No
complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly
participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the person who
robbed and killed the victim.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY FAILURE
TO DISCLOSE INCIDENT TO AUTHORITIES. That del Rosario did not disclose what he
knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or to the Barangay captain does not
affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of
judicial notice. Del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after.
Understandably he did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence.
Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; ELUCIDATED. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an

50
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This
concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by R.A. 7438 to include "the practice of
issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. Del Rosario was deprived of his rights
during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of
the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not
apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter was 'already' a suspect in the robbing and senseless
slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived
his right to remain silent his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his
actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided
by law and the Bill of Rights.
9. ID.; ID.; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; NOT LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. When a police
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of
Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his
view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante
delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is
obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following
the commission of the robbery with homicide. On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,
necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an
offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must
be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of
the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also
mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of
del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest
came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALITY WAIVED WHEN NOT OBJECTED BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT.
However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case. EcHaAC

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario
y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to
death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. 1
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos"
and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in
cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. 2
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe
alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only
Joselito del Rosario was tried. llcd
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver
Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his
tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women
flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a
tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a
woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed
with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher
kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought
to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man
then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away
Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the
driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. 4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the
afternoon he was hired for P120.00 5 by a certain "Boy" Santos, 6 his co-accused. Their original
agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. 7 However
despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to
fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded. 8 Marquez and Bisaya
boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. 9 Subsequently, he
was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas
and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to
help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos"
who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot
him. cdtai
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the
tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the
ground. After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun"
Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards
Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would

51
throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the
three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the
incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. 12 Del Rosario then went
home. 13Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle
nor to the barangay captain and the police. 14
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and
sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in:
(1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his coaccused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering
his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not
considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering
that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules
of Court. 15
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was
prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of
the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the
crime. 16

Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that
time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir . . .
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . .
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the
two men who grappled the same from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene
while the other man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to
the ground, sir. cdasia
Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the
woman who was then lying on the ground, sir . . .

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could
not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible
force because it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 17

Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?

We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal
liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An
act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as
to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and of such nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 18

Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the
tricycle which was at a distance of about one a half meter?

As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those
less powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably
do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del
Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to
help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his
personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first
time that day. 19
Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it
was "Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the
victim on the head, instantly killing her. 20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts
and records of the case, particularly the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself,
reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the victim's helper and fired at the victim.
Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination

A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.

A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . .

Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who
grappled for the possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else
happened?
A: They went away, sir . . .
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these
men sit in the tricycle?
A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the
driver while the other man entered the sidecar, sir. 21
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene
conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who
was then holding the gun fired at the victim?

52
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other
companion holding a gun chased the helper of the deceased
going towards Burgos Avenue, sir.

Q: Then what did you do?

A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?

Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?

A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.

A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying
down in this spot the man holding a gun shot the victim, sir. 22

Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?

A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: Yes, sir. LLphil

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the
bag of the victim.

Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.

Court:

Q: And after that what happened?

There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was
given.

A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes, sir.

Did you not see any shooting?

A: There was, sir.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the
person with the gun?

Q: Who was shot?

A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . .

A: Yes, sir. 23
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that
Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13,1996 you were the driver of the
tricycle as testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?

Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what
was transpiring was wrong and illegal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral
and the Nita's Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?

A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle

prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you
see?

A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by
the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.

Court:

A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and
one in the possession of Boy Santos . . .
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.

53
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and
when you tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos
threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your
family?

Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which
was loaded by your other three co-accused in this case, all of
them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the
victim going towards the public market along Burgos Street?

A: Yes, sir.

A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.

Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez
or Dodong Visaya?

Court:

A: Dodong Visaya, sir .

Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle
sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir. 24
On cross-examination, accused further stated
Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while
Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . .
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private
persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to
me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in
shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir . . .
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were
grappling for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . 25
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave
the area where the incident occurred is because a gun was
pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you
should not do anything against their will, they will kill you and
your family will be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.

Are you quite sure of that?

A: Yes, sir. 26
Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun
at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez
who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle. LLjur
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was
grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and
shot the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a
person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with
the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness
Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other
man," and that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos .who stayed inside the tricycle and to
whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that
"Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the
tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that there could
have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was
indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the
commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya
and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain inside the
tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not
escape and leave them behind. 27
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-) in front of the
tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events
that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del
Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted
by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at
him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy
Santos, making him for the moment an automation without a will of his own. In other words, in
effect, he could not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will.
He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was
compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's conviction on his participation
in the orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the
trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and
conspiracy between accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of
the bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia

54
Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine
of the motor was running;" 29 that the "accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and
under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither
did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away
from the scene of the crime." 30
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must
be their intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for
"common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be shown by "united and
concerted action." 31
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the
presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts
of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy. 32 Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy,
but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the
crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 33

In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the
driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by
asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since
he was not given any briefing thereof . He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed
destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was
ordered to help them escape. cdlex
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an
agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the
same." 34Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the
other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere
companionship does not establish conspiracy. 35 The only incriminating evidence against del
Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his
presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier,
he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he
would be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is
absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and
shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. 36

That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his
employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It must be recalled that del
Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del
Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence.
Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of
these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 38 As testified to by SPO4
Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who
investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to
Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of
the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name
and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del
Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On
the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and
lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found
and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15
armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the
house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun.
While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back
of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The
investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was
only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the
police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed
on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera. 39
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del
Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough
evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. 40
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. 41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to
include "the practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that

. . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in

his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and

55
understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer. cdll
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay
captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor
made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the
tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of
Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to
remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual
arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law
and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: 43
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the
place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro 44 we held that
when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on
the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in
flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del
Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the
day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense
was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between
the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the
sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the
crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as
earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not

immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed'' at the time the
accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present
and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. cda
However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case. 46
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and
property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused
Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless
victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly
act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved
beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in
the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His
immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In
this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. LLpr
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Del Rosario y Pascual, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999)

Case No. 11

56
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997.]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Raval and Lokin, Robert A. Padilla and Philip Jurado and R.A.V. Saguisag and Gina C.
Garcia for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; WARRANTLESS ARREST;
GROUNDS. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: "Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant ; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense., (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRESENCE OF ARRESTING OFFICER OR PRIVATE PERSON";
PRESENCE DOES NOT ONLY REQUIRE THE PERSON TO SEE THE OFFENSE BUT ALSO
WHEN HE "HEARS THE DISTURBANCE CREATED AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE
SCENE"; CASE AT BAR. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in
the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has
been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to
the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent
a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge
who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for
want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.
The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place
and the raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. The court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had
more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has
been engaged in criminal activity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. When caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed arm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16
magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing
another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of
a peace officer. Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner,
its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and
railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that, petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
accident. Verily their, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and
not on unreliable hearsay information.
5. ID; ID.; ID.; OBJECTION, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY MUST BE MADE BEFORE PLEA.
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information,
his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the
legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities
and defects.
6. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF PROPERTY; WHEN VALID. The
five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as
follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence. 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view,"
the elements of which are: (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b). the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c). the
evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search. 3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity. 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PLAINVIEW" DOCTRINE; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain
view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his
Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw
said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus, it has been held that: "(W)hen in pursuing
an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen
to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking
of the corpus delicti."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF FIREARM AND ASSORTED MAGAZINE,
WAIVER OF RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. With respect to the
Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered

57
them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect.
9. ID.; ID.; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO AN ARREST. Even assuming that the firearms and
ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and
vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected,
the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in
the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched
(vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not
excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as
in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to
the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM; REQUISITES. In crimes
involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license permit to possess.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms
and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances.
12. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF REPRESENTATIVE OR CERTIFICATION FROM PNP-FEO THAT
A PERSON IS NOT A LICENSEE OF ANY FIREARM, SUFFICIENT TO PROVE SECOND
ELEMENT. In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO)
attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated
that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license.

13. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY
ACCORDED RESPECT AND FINALITY ON APPEAL. The fact that petitioner does not have
the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification
may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm
higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms cannot be licensed to a civilian,
as in the case of petitioner. The Court entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction
especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the factual

findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court
with respect and finality.
14. CRIMINAL LAW, OFFENSES, COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY GOVERNING LAW AT
THE TIME OF COMMISSION OF OFFENSE. The trial court and the respondent court are
bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a
rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted
for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
15. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; BILL OF RIGHTS; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT; PENALTY FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, NOT EMBRACED
THEREIN. Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges fromreclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's
erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and
excessive. "It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other
terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and
plainly oppressive,' wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community.'" It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is
not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not,
cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not
cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.
16. ID.; ID.; LAWS ON ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, CONSTITUTIONAL. Every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court
declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary
to any provision of the Constitution. . ."
17. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT; NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM OR MORALITY OF
LAWS. Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be
addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That
question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief
Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to
interpret and apply the laws.
18. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; MINIMUM PENALTY. With
respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the
Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of
firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

58
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J p:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6)
live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and
one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
revolver." 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 2thru
the following Information: 3
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16
Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) 380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having
the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW." 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, 5 but granted his application for
bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived in
writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the
appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that the
conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel
petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed
respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, 14 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed

decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00
bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU
Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the
Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the
said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This
shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further
directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by
respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution, 18 copy of which was received by,
petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari with application for bail 19 followed by two "supplemental
petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition" 21 and an urgent
motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the SolicitorGeneral 22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a
Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's
motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to
file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail
(both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his
55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by
filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given
credence by respondent court, is as follows: 26
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique
Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa
Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter
from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had
interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along Mac Arthur
Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle,
a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to
remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the
inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid.) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka
bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid.). True
enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden
and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid.) followed by
a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid.). Danny
Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying
that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).

59
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the
vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt
to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council,
decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles
City (p. 10, ibid.). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid.).
By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave
the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p.
11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the
vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11, ibid.).
During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the
vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper
through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid.) reporting that a vehicle heading
north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident
(p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan,
upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all units of
PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid.).
One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its
Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7,
TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito
Miranda immediately boarded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and
positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it
was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid.). It took them
about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the
Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message
from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment
which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN,
March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and
SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid.). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3
Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with
plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured
in the hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the
MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo
church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12,
February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went
towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew
Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid.). When he reached the
Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23,
1993). He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and

run incident (p. 10, ibid.). Upon learning that the two police officers
already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came
from (pp. 10-11; ibid.). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant,
he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging
from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15,
1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore
the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid.) towards
the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of
Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was
about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers
boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and
strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid.). They cut
into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (p. 12, TSN,
February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number
PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid.). The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They
recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p.
13, ibid.). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At
that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his
motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda
told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was
wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that
when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on
the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15; TSN, February 23, 1993), its
butt protruding (p. 15, ibid.). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the
gun but appellant held the former' s hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid.). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that
if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown
in the office (p. 16, ibid.). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him
about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p.
17, ibid.). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid.).
SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets
inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO
Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 1112, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group,
SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was
being arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid.). He pointed out to
appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and
the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid.). Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja
with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid.).
Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p.

60
16, ibid.). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around
as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid.). Suspecting that appellant
could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by
opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid.). He saw a
baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's
seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic
mode (pp. 17-21, ibid.). He asked appellant for the papers covering the
rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 2627, ibid.). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by including as
its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28,ibid.). SPO Mercado then
read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake
Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid.) where appellant voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol(Exhibit 'L') with a single
round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid.) loaded with seven
(7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag
containing two additional long magazines and one short
magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid.) After appellant had
been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred
to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City
Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned
over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13,
1993) During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the
firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid.). He was not
able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the
three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by
Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of
the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an
M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 1312 80, a .357 caliber revolver Smith
and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid.). A second
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated
that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood
C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms
and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987
Constitution. cdtai

After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that
petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the SolicitorGeneral's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no
dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established
that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also
when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." 30 As
testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to
the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver After having sent a
radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge
who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen
who actually arrested him were not at, the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity
of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and
well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability,
could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through

61
this cooperation that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry
to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot
defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the
police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. 33 The exigent
circumstances of hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and
the raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since
they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16
magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing
another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence
of a peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified
under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening
event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's
report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its
dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident.
Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information,
his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail
the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects. 43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search
warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
property is valid, 44 are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 45 and by
prevailing jurisprudence; 46
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;

(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search. 48
3. Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities
stumbled upon petitioner s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised
his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the
M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has
been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti. 53
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant." 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver
of his right against the alleged search and seizure, 56 and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. 57
Even assuming. that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by
the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental
search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of
immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products
of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the

62
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of
violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry
the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order 64 and Memorandum
Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force
Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be

established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess. 65 The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the
subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police
officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate
that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and
executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26,
1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of
his authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the
preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given
him, present any proper document showing his authority. If he had, in
actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at
least during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his
counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and
carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission
Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could
have produced these documents to belie the charged against him.
Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his
possession of the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution
rested contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission
Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.

"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was
one James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent
Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but
was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until
the defense found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court
without subpoena on January 13, 1994" 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension.
Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes,
or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably
expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest
opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save
himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent
excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff,
is explicit in providing that: cdtai
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by
enforcement units/personnel such as PNP, Military Brigade and other
Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without
resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an
actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is
rendered inoperative in respect to such violation." 68
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were
ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his
signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize
anyone to sign in his behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to
issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of Mos,
MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy
commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order
covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City." 72 areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility
thereby needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case.
The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5,
1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms
without corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible
Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been
officially taken up in that unit's property book, and that report of such
action has been reported to higher AFP authority."

63
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present
the corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel
of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of
Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a
fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then
PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the
same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement
and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is
rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a
special law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special
project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional
Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP,
INP and-NBI, or at higher levels of command." 75
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as
follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed
service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of
the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving
regular compensation for the service they are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of
the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are
not licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did
you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C Padilla is a licensed registered owner of
one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT
8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is
registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the
caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the
same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or
registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.

"A. Yes, sir. 77

xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5 November 28, 1992
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City
is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with
serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this
Office per verification from available records on file this Office as of this
date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number
35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San
Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

(Sgd.)

"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin
C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with
Serial No. TCT 8214?

JOSE MARIO
M. ESPINO

"A. Yes, sir.

Sr. Inspector,
PNP

"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in
the names of the accused in this case?

Chief, Records
Branch" 78

64
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the. PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such certification is
sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact
that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the
prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence 81 that an
M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms,
cannot be licensed to a civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner The Court, therefore, entertains
no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason and none
was presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court
which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in
a democratic ambience (sic) and a non subversive context" and adds that respondent court
should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the
reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. 84 He stresses that the
penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel
and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission
of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is
the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal,
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same
cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly
and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as
the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within
statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving
the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not
convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In
fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just recently, the
Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary

to any provision of the Constitution. . . " 92 Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the
courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent
court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case
of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty
imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years
(12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1 ) day
to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following
explanation by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been
alleged or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws
explained in People v. Simon, 94although Presidential Decree No.
1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised
Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or
determining the proper period should be applied
Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1,
that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance
with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription
under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any
period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty MODIFIED to "ten
(10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day, as maximum. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
||| (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997)

65
replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case. Furthermore, it cannot
be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. It was clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to
sight because they were placed in sacks and covered by kakawati leaves. The police officers
even have to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. Moreover, it was not established by
clear and positive proof that the petitioner consented to the search or intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable search. Thus, the articles seized from petitioner could not be
used as evidence against him. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt, the Court acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged.

Case No. 12
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002.]
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

De Jesus Orioste & Lim for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna convicted petitioner Rudy Caballes of the crime
of theft for stealing aluminum cable conductors worth P55,244.45 belonging to the National
Power Corporation. Accordingly, it sentenced petitioner to a prison term and ordered him to
indemnify private complainant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction but deleted the award of damages and modified the penalty imposed.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner questioned the validity of the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof.
The searches without warrant of moving vehicles is allowed provided such searches are made
at borders or 'constructive borders', like checkpoints. The mere mobility of these vehicles,
however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court
held that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to
be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause'' as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities did not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle, which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; EXCLUSIONARY RULE; BARS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT; EXCEPTIONS. Enshrined in our Constitution is
the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
REASONABLENESS OR UNREASONABLENESS OF SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS PURELY A
JUDICIAL QUESTION; CASE AT BAR. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the
exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when
the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
3. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES; ALLOWED PROVIDED THE
SAME WAS MADE AT CONSTRUCTIVE BORDERS. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over
the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the
basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place,
things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge

66
a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might
add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is
also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided
such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary
lines of the State. ACaDTH
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT
DETERMINED BY FIXED FORMULA BUT IS RESOLVED ACCORDING TO THE FACTS OF
EACH CASE. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the
interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in
such a case. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;
or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT POLICE CHECKPOINTS; NOT ILLEGAL PER SE;
ROUTINE INSPECTIONS; NOT VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES; LIMITATIONS; CASE AT BAR. One such form of search of moving vehicles is
the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared
to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine
inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area. None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar.
The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein
petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENSIVE CHECK OF VEHICLE, WHEN PERMISSIBLE. In the case
of United States vs. Pierre, the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the body of an
agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit: "The
Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a physical
intrusion into the vehicle . . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a
search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and

to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle . . . In doing so, his inspection
went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either
inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth
amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a home." On
the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had
emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics
Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential
report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; (5) the accused
who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity ofmarijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT VEHICLE LOOKS SUSPICIOUS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual
and uncommon. We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as
would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIPPED INFORMATION; A SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO EFFECT WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. In People vs. Chua Ho San, we held that the fact that the
watercraft used by the accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused
when he attempted to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable
cause. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; OBJECT ITSELF IS PLAINLY EXPOSED TO SIGHT;
CASE AT BAR. It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle
were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. Jurisprudence is to the effect that an

67
object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. It is clear from
the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately
apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the
leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his
vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENTED WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; CONSENT MUST
BE VOLUNTARY AND MUST BE SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE;
BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE STATE. Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent
is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to
search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no
room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the
accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature
and consequences of such request.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES UPHOLDING VALIDITY THEREOF, CITED. In Asuncion
vs. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search the
car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said search.
In People vs. Lacerna, the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen
who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the
validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in
mannerism and speech expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon, the accused admitted that
they signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage
by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla, it was held
that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag

without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear
waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could
see the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are
only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered
"you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search.ScAaHE
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST OBTRUSIVE
SEARCHES; REQUISITES; CONSENT GIVEN UNDER COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES IS NO
CONSENT WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE AT BAR. In case of
consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In the case at bar, the evidence
is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them
to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down,
Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police
officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein
petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT OF ACCUSED TO BE SEARCHED MUST BE ESTABLISHED
BY CLEAR AND POSITIVE PROOF. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity
of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain
terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the
police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look
inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted
because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the
vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he
told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought.
Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when
they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never
testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO OBJECT NOT CONSTRUED AS IMPLIED
ACQUIESCENCE TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH. Neither can petitioner's passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People
vs. Barros, appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two
policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When
asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the
search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused
is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to
object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos, to wit: "As the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizens in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but

68
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa
Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of theft, and the resolution 2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
In an Information 3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27,450.00, belonging to
and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in
the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat.
Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant.
When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he
appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor
wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked
appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they
came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took

pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were
turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a
driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent
since January, 1988 although his identification card (ID) has already
expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a
passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who
requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in
Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip for
the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt.
Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised
him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act
as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in
Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although
Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were
loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading
was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for
the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they
discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the cables were
loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his
explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where he
was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
locked him up in jail for a week." 4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Theft of property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4)
MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant National Power Corporation in the amount of P55,244.45,
and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty
imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and penalized under
Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and

69
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and
no costs." 6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when
the police officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein
without a search warrant and when samples of the wires and references
to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's
defense that he was engaged in an entrapment operation and in
indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome
the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search
and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality
of the search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was
issued to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the
case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has
been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds
of practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case
of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on
Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant
upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. . . . To
hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz,
191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made
even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under
the circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also
under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant." 7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute

probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the
findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express
or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article
III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 9 (3) search of moving vehicles; 10 (4)
consented warrantless search; 11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); 12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 13

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in
the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. 14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at
bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 15 Thus,
the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be

70
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of
a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. 16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at
borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. 17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause. 18 Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a
case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. 19 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military
or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, 21 for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order 22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. 23 A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds; 24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle; 25 (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; 26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; 27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; 28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area." 29

had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent[s] . . . physical

intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell
from outside the vehicle . . . In doing so, his inspection went beyond that
portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by
either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area
protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his
head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. 31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom
agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; 32 (5) the accused who
were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country. 33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.

"ATTY. SANTOS

In the case of United States vs. Pierre, 30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of
the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment,
to wit:

A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were
conducting patrol in the said place when we spotted a
suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched
the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor
wires.

"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The
agent thus effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle . . . [W]e are
aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a search when
he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect

Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident
while you were performing your duty?

Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you
became suspicious, why did you become suspicious?

71
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the
load what did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle
should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San, 36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused
was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee
from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following
details are suggestive of probable cause persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft
differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise
over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines . . .,
CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the
police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to
and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause."
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent
odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or
positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the
time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by
this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case.
There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question.
CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark
him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. . . .." (italics supplied)

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise
have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information
has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure. 37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. 38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks 39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with
the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He
claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there
was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 42 The question whether a
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances. 43 Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; 44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found; 45 (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. 46 It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 47

72
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual
incident on said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy
Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum
wires, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle
should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said
vehicle and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic),
so I told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep,
what did you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those
came from the Cavinti area, sir." 48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was
orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter
fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the

request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such
request. 49
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna, 51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants
readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to
the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs.
Cuizon, 52 the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely
consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying
shabu. In People vs. Montilla, 53 it was held that the accused spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs.
Omaweng, 54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to
which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The
Court said there was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained
the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look
at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that
by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing,
nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for
his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is
doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja
was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he
answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only
after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect
the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was
asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his
consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner
for permission to conduct the search. 56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search. In People vs. Barros, 57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,

73
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and
failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos, 58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. EDATSI
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
||| (Caballes y Taio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)
Case No. 13
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA
LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.

AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Molintas & Molintas Law Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City finding appellant
and her co-accused guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The appellant argued that her arrest was unlawful and

capitalized on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contended that at the time she was
apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a
tricycle. She also impugned the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was not done
without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible.
Consequently, she claimed that the evidence obtained therein were inadmissible against
her. HDITCS
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant. According to the Court, the general
rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant
validly issued by a judge as provided in the Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee
is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures. The warrantless search in this
case is not bereft of a probable cause. It was also clear that at the time she was apprehended,
she was committing a criminal offense, transporting prohibited drugs. Against the credible
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi could
not stand.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
UNREASONABLE UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY A VALIDLY ISSUED SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST, AS A RULE. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by
law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in
Article III, Section 2 of the1987 Constitution, thus: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The constitutional
guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus,
the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons
and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. HIACEa
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION;
RATIONALE. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior
to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions
to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of
moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

74
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The warrantless search in the case at
bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the
information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in
big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later,
riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs
in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy.
Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant's bag was not
illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal
offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is
permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught
committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WHEN PRESENTATION THEREOF EVEN WITHOUT
FORMAL OFFER MAY ESTABLISH THE PROSECUTION'S CASE; CASE AT BAR. Evidence
not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified
by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves, been incorporated in the records of the
case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented
and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer,
therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified
those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant's counsel had crossexamined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
5. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON
MINOR DETAILS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The alleged inconsistencies she
mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of
the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana.
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence. The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly
immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of
witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different
persons may have different recollections of the same incident.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDENCE MAY BE PROPERLY ACCORDED TO TESTIMONIES OF POLICE
OFFICERS WHO EXHIBITED NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO ARREST THE APPELLANT. To
be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are
law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts
are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest
any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in attesting the appellant. ATSIED
7. ID.; ID.; DENIAL AND ALIBI, AS DEFENSE; CANNOT STAND AGAINST CREDIBLE
POSITIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS. Against the credible positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi cannot stand.
The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of

denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the
affiant.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga
guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 o'clock dawn, in the
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, without being
lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a
transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in
violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence
operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting
surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that
a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal
drugs once a month in big bulks.

On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac
Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug
pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert
Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the
checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer
flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them
was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two's uneasy behavior when asked about
its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the
same barangay. They brought with them the black bag.

75
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the
opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the
investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black
bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center.
Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper.
The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita
Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation.
Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel,
as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not
even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando,
Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory
examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight
kilos. 4
For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in
the evening of October 19, 1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy
near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by
abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where
she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the
Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing
eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She
also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passenger's seat inside the tricycle, although she
admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The
latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security
guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at
about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain
woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the company's logbook.
Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit
was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA
7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED." 5
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the
following errors:
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention
of the defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted

arrest and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both
accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense
that the right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately
violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the
accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses which
inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and
version of the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated
and considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution
not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law." 6
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her
arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not
committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the
search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under
circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained
therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided inArticle
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized." 7
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures
are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is
that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed
with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. 8
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying
out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one
of which relates to search of moving vehicles. 9 Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. 10 Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks

76
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 11 When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. 12
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where
the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; 13(b)
where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting
suspiciously; 14 (c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a
quantity of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; 16 (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated
in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 17 (g) where the arresting officers had
received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was
established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably
carrying shabu with him; 18 (h) where police officers received an information that the accused,
who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to
Manila; 19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was
carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area.
The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip
that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted
three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly
contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both
became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant's
bag was not illegal. EaSCAH

It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense.
She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4
of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to
carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime
in flagrante delicto, thus:
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx." 21 (italics supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to
have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission
obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her
custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial
court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by
Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that
the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is
inadmissible because they were not assisted by a counsel. Confronted
with this same issue, this court finds the postulate to rest on good
authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession
extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it
needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the
police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore,
the only issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the
prosecution's
evidence,
both
accused
can
be
convicted." 22 (italics supplied).
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and
documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter's failure to formally offer them.
Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as
long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves
been incorporated in the records of the case. 23 All the documentary and object evidence in this
case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. 24 Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the
case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are
recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellant's counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses
who testified on the exhibits. 26
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first
cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was
SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio,

77
who declared that the bag was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then
focuses on the police officers' failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle
where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellant's arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to
minor details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are
inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the
established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence. 27 The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to
the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding
the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have
different recollections of the same incident. 28
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember
the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was
not shown that the driver was in complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the
commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who
are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused,
courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. 29 In this case, no evidence has been presented
to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of
denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the
courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It has to be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 31 The sole proof presented in the lower court
by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not
even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6425 in relation to R.A. NO. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED. EcATDH
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Libnao y Kitten, G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003)

78
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through metal detector
booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, the frisker on duty frisked and searched
appellant. The frisker felt something bulging at appellant's abdominal area so she was brought to
a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. It was discovered that appellant was
carrying packages containing shabu. After due proceedings, the trial court found her guilty as
charged. Hence, this appeal. aCITEH
In affirming the conviction of appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that the search was made
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6235. This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures. In the said provision, passengers are subject to search for prohibited materials or
substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into
the aircraft and sending her home, and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be
to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. Thus,
the strip search in the ladies' room was justified under the circumstances.
The search conducted on appellant resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages
containing shabu. Such warrantless search and seizure was legal. Armed with the knowledge
that appellant was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were
duty-bound to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.

SYLLABUS

Case No. 14
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002.]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
CANTON, appellant.

PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

SUSAN

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Perlas, De Guzman, Antonio, Venturanza, Quizon-Venturanza & Herbosa Law Firm, Sandoval &
Ozamiz for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
Appellant was charge with violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425). At the trial, the prosecution established that at the time of the
commission of the crime, appellant was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THE CONSTITUTION BARS STATE
INTRUSIONS TO A PERSON'S BODY, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE EXCEPT
THRU A VALID SEARCH WARRANT. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
in any particular case is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS TO RULE. The interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence
are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST; THE LAW
REQUIRES THAT THERE BE FIRST A LAWFUL ARREST BEFORE A SEARCH CAN BE
MADE. SUSAN's arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while
SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the
former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's abdomen. The strip search that
followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the packages concealed on SUSAN's
body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not
amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

79
as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense." As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip
search in the ladies' room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were
hidden on SUSAN's body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It
was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested.
The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.

warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense"; . . . The present case falls under
paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the
discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon
examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed
earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN
was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to
arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified,
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STOP AND FRISK SITUATIONS OR TERRY SEARCH, DEFINED.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

8. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION, DEFINED; RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFFORDED AN ACCUSED UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. The rights provided in
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial
investigation" or is "in custody interrogation." Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a
confession from him. And the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. The
objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights. In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN's arrest. She affixed her signature to the
receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the
option to sign or not to sign. it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon
by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her
detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel
has no leg to stand on.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH MADE PURSUANT TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY
PROCEDURE; SEARCH OF PROHIBITED MATERIALS OR SUBSTANCES; CASE AT BAR.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which
is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows: "SEC. 9. Every ticket
issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: 'Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject
to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,' which shall constitute a part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier." This constitutes another exception to the proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief,
the afore-quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security
checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in
the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances. . . . To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply
refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search
without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the
ladies' room was justified under the circumstances. TAIcaD
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE; WHEN THE
COURT HAS ONCE LAID DOWN A PRINCIPLE OF LAW AS APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN
STATE OF FACTS, IT MUST ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE AND APPLY IT TO ALL FUTURE
CASES WHERE THE FACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME. The maxim stare
decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle
things which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
the facts are substantially the same.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT, WHEN
LAWFUL; CASE AT BAR. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a

9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; HEARSAY RULE; A

MEDICAL REPORT WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE. SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of
the medical report on the physical and medical examination conducted upon appellant's request,
. . . The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not properly
identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant's conviction will stand, as the
court's finding of guilt was not based on that document. TEcCHD
10. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972);
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended, provides: "SEC. 16. Possession or
Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof . . . . SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities: . . . 3.
200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride." There being no aggravating

80
nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from
P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in
the possession of SUSAN, the trial court's imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well
within the range prescribed by law.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; PERSONAL
PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED; PROPERTIES NOT INCLUDED THEREIN SHALL BE
RETURNED TO ACCUSED. Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following: "SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.
A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject
of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used
or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN's
passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision. They,
therefore, have to be returned to her. SaIACT
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended, under an Information 1 whose accusatory portion
reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or
license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker
Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution
witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN
take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m.,
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger
bound for Saigon, Vietnam. 2 When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping
sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action
Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her

attention, saying "Excuse me ma'am, can I search you?" 3 Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt
something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN,
pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice
granules. 4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN's genital
area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said:
"Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her
supervisor on duty. 5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN
to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies' room,
Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN's sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her
skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages
individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed
to them. 6 The first was taken from SUSAN's abdominal area; the second, from in front of her
genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De
los Reyes. 8 The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel
Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the
customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances 9 which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. 10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office,
testified that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. 11 However, SUSAN signed a
receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number
700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077;
and (4) two panty girdles. 12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but
admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. 13 Yet he told her that
she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. 14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances
surrounding the arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on
her person. 15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision 16 finding
SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III
ofREPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial
judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is
therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (3) making
statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and
(4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also
assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized
items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial
judge, SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial. 18

81
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellant's Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court
issued an order 19 on 26 November 2001 denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1)
he explained to SUSAN's counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but the
latter chose to magnify the judge's statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN's conviction
was not based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was no violation
of SUSAN's constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention
without counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the
airport and were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to
the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on
the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went
beyond the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial
investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the
medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v.
Johnson. 20

For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the
ladies' room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search,
the arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her
body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have
determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore
nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante
delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio, 21 such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer
garments in order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to
the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at
her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
submit her to a strip search in the ladies' room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical
report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor
offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson 22 because of its sweeping
statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the
gravity of the safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have
been Katz v. United States, 23 which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of
America that "protects people and not places."

In its Appellant's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was
found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus,
the case falls squarely within the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she
allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport
security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from
SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG
argues that SUSAN's conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on
the fact that she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being
authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSAN's conviction but recommends the reduction
of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSAN's conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as
well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3 . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined
in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this
case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSAN's arrest did not precede the search. When the

82
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSAN's body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies' room, the airport security
personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN's body; hence, they did not
know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which
they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to
have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. 26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined
only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which
is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which
shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted
provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the
departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search,
is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or
substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in
the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled
by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only
money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be
repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit

the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society." 28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was justified under the
circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to the
present case. That case involves accused-appellant Lelia Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then
the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked
Leila, the former felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila
explained that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as
a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to
her superior, who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest women's room for inspection. In
the comfort room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and
brought out three plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. This Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride"
seized during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery
and recovery of shabu in her personflagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSAN's reliance on Katz v. U.S. 29 is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case are
entirely different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United

83
States District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information
by telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the accused's objection, to
introduce evidence of accused's end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of
America reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given
in the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved. It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or
office, is not a subject the Fourth Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and
mandates not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply
it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 30 There being a disparity in the
factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling
in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of
Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted
on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline
substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal.
Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel
and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her

subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation." 31 Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." 32 This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a
crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. 33And the
right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. 35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN's arrest. She affixed her signature to the
receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the
option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon
by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her
detention and used in evidence against her. 36 Hence, her claim of violation of her right to
counsel has no leg to stand on. AIDSTE
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical
report on the physical and medical examination conducted upon appellant's request, which
contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative.
She related that she was an illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in
1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was
young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost
control, I want my money back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all
the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the
money." She denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual
disturbances. (Italics supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous
because it was not properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report,
appellant's conviction will stand, as the court's finding of guilt was not based on that
document.
VII. SUSAN's conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do not
hesitate to rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425), as amended, provides:

84
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be

issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses
under Section 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and
16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved
[are] in any of the following quantities:

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an

offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN's passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the
afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her. 37

xxx xxx xxx

3. 200

grams or more of shabu or

hydrochloride . . .

methylamphetamine

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For
possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million.
In view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN,
the trial court's imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed
by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of
the following:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appellant's passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be
returned to her. DaESIC
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002)