1

Case No. 1
PP vs Bangcarawan
(for violation of Section 16, Art III of RA 6425)

1) THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG

CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.

FACTS:
That on March 13, 1999 in the City of Iligan, accused had in possession
of 8 packs of Methamphetamine HCL (shabu) weghing 400 grams w/o
corresponding prescription.

Accused claimed that RTC erred in holding that the drug confiscated is
admissible in evidence against him notwithstanding that the Samsonite
bag where said contraband was found was forcible opened and searched
without his consent. Hence, there wad a violation against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Narrative:
On March 11, 1999 MV Superferry V sailed from Manila to Iligan. The said
vessel was scheduled to dock on March 13, 1999. At Around 3:00 AM
said date, Mark Diesmo, a security officer at the Port of Iligan, received a
complaint from Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. She pointed to
Basher Bongcarawan, a co-passenger in cabin # 106, as the culprit.
Bongcarawan was informed of the complsint and was invited bavk at
cabin #106. With his consent, he was frisked but no jewelry was found.
He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the
accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to
be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the
ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
The accused in his very own version claimed that he voluntarily opened
the big luggage but refused to do the same as regards to the Samsonite
bag as it wasnt his, but is owned by his friend Alican Macapudi who
requested him to bring the suitcase to Iligan. The said Samsonite luggage
was allegedly secured by a secret combination lock prompting the
security personnel to open it forcibly despite his protestations.

2) THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE

APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
Accused contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and
had no knowledge or I tent to possess the dangerous drug.
HELD:
1.the right against unreasonable searches is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. Evidence obtained in violation of such right
is inadmissible I. Any proceeding. It should be noted, however, that said
protection is against transgression committed by the government or its
agents. The constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures operates as a restraint against the wide ranging power of
the government and its agencies clothed with such powers as the
enforcement of laws. Thus, it can only be invoked against the
government. In this case, the luggage was searched by a security
personnel of the Port. This is not the kind of search and seizure
contemplated in the said constitutional protection. The search and seizure
was done without the intervention of the government or its agents.
Moreover, there is no merit in the contention that since the search and
seizure was done by the ship personnel, the incident should be treated as
one conducted by the police. The vessel personnel does not discharge
any governmental function.

RTC Ruling
On December 27, 1999 accused was found guilty as charged and was
meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Php
500,000.00.
Accused elevated an appeal to the Supreme Court with the following
assignment of errors:

2. Accused is unable to controvert the presumption that the possessor is

the owner. He pointed to a certain Alecan Macapudi ad the owner of the
Samsonite luggage and dangerous drugs found thereon, but he failed to
adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the same. Alecan
Macapudi might very well be a mere figment of his fertile imagination.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice specially if it is the keystone of
his defense.

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Case No. 2
People of the Philippines vs Roberto Salanguit y Ko
This is an appeal from the decision dated Jan. 27, 1998 convicting
accused-appellant guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425.
FACTS:
Inspector Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence
of the accused appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as poseur-buyer, he was
able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from the accused appellant. The
sale took place in the latters room, and Badua saw that the shabu was
taken from a cabinet inside accused-appellants room. The application
was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Judge Dolores L.
Espanol.
At 10:30 pm, about 10 police officers proceeded to the residence of the
accused-appellant. They knocked on the door but nobody answered
despite hearing people inside the house. They then forced open the door
and entered.
After showing the search warrants to the occupants, police started
searching the house and found the following:
1. 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance
2. a paper clip box containing white crystalline substance
3. 2 bricks of dried leaves
A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused appellant
refused to sign it.
After subjecting the items to a laboratory examination, the white
crystalline substance was found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. On the other hand, the two
bricks of dried leaves were found to be marijuana.
The police officers, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him
with them to the NARCOM where he was detained.
After hearing, trial court found Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of the following:

a. Sec. 16, RA No. 6425 (with an indeterminate sentence of a

minimum of six months of arresto maor and a maximum of four
years and two months of prision correccional)
b. Sec. 8, RA No. 6425 (with sentence of reclusion perpetua plus a
fine of P700,000)
Accused-Appellants Contention:
That the court erred in declaring the search warrant valid

That the court a quo erred in convicting accused-appellant for

illegal possession of methamphetamine hydro-chloride(shabu)

That the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accusedappellant for violation of RA No. 6425

That the court a quo erred in admitting in evidence the two bricks
of marijuana

That the court a quo erred in not finding that the policemen used
excessive force in enforcing the search warrant

ISSUES:
1. WON recovered shabu is admissible as evidence on the ground
that the warrant used was invalid
2. WON recovered marijuana is admissible as evidence pursuant to
the plain-view doctrine
3. WON there was employment of unnecessary force by the police
in the execution of the warrant
HELD:
With respect to the seizure of shabu, the search warrant was
properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable
cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
information of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.

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seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
accordance with the plain view doctrine.

Existence of Probable Cause

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant issued is void because
no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug
paraphernalia.
The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application
for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. Therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense because possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of RA No. 6425.
The Court upheld the validity of the warrant stating that the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically
with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and
regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses
which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly issued
for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate
the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
The contention is without merit. The rule is that a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.

The marijuana is inadmissible as evidence against accusedappellant for failure of the prosecution to prove that the

Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply,
there must be:
(a) Prior Justification
(b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
(c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police
found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the searcg
warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items.
The police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure.
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured
by the Constitution.

Forcible entry into the house was justified as it is on the

apprehension that the execution of their mission would be
frustrated unless they do so.

Rule 126, Sec 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving
notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or

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anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any
person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof
to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is
unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn
statement of disinterested persons has been presented by accusedappellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
RULING:
SC affirmed the ruling of RTC finding accused guilty for violating Sec 16
RA No. 6425. However, he was acquitted as to the violation of Sec 8 of
RA No. 6425.
Case No. 3
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 82585. November 14, 1988.]
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES,
FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE
HON.
RAMON
P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, et. al
[G.R. No. 82827. November 14, 1988.]
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON
P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court, at Manila, et. al
[G.R. No. 83979. November 14, 1988.]
LUIS
D.
BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY
OF
JUSTICE
SEDFREY
ORDOEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE
BELLO III, THE FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, AND JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila,respondents.

ISSUES
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING
Due Process
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case
against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of
Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioner's contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner
Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in
the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a
"Motion to Declare Proceeding Closed", in effect waiving
his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

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Due process of law does not require that the respondent
in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before
the preliminary investigation completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity
to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Warrant of Arrest
The constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants
of arrest reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers
and
effects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law", has
apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine
the
complainant
and
his
witnesses
determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the

existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously
adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein
provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has
deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Presidential Immunity from Suits

Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be
a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege
of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of

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the office-holder's
attention.

time,

also

demands

undivided

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded
by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he
could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to
the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of
the parties.

Case No. 4
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. MAXICORP, INC.,
FACTS:
- This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Court
of Appeals' Decision 2 dated 23 December 1998 and its
Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777.
-

Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for

Copyright Infringement (Sec. 29 of PD 49) and unfair competition
under Art. 189 of RPC. Respondent allegedly sold counterfeit
copies of petitioners products.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case

to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on
the point.

On July 25, 1996, NBI Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. filed

several applications for search warrants in the RTC against
Maxicorp. This was then granted by Judge William Bayhon on
July 25, 1996.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents,

through their separate acts, gravely abused their
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the
writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

NBI agents conducted a search in Maxicorps premises and

seized property fitting in the description stated in the warrants.

On September 2, 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the

search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause and
that the warrants are in the form of general warrants. RTC denied
this motion, and found probable cause to issue the search
warrants.

RTC examined NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz , and

computer technician Felixberto Pante. NBI Agent Samiano also
presented certifications from petitioners that they have not

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess

or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain status quo contained in the Resolution of
the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

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-

authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using

petitioners' products.
-

On July 24, 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp
produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented
as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in
the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

On the Legal Personality:

Maxicorp argues that petitioners dont have the legal

personality because this is a criminal case and the proper
party to do so is the SolGen, but the exception governs
this case. In Columbia Pictures Entertainment v. CA, the
SC held that that the petitioner-complainant in a petition
for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this
Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error
committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This
avoids a situation where a complainant who actively
participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly
find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to
circumstances beyond its control.
On the Probable Cause (the most important part )

Microsoft and Lotus Devt then brought this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:
- WHETHER OR NOT
QUESTIONS OF LAW;

THE

PETITION

RAISES

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL

PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE

TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;

WHETHER OR NOT THE

"GENERAL WARRANTS."

SEARCH

WARRANTS

ARE

HELD:
1 On Questions of Law:
-

Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to

raise questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the
arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact,
which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45 petition
for review.

The distinction between questions of law and questions of

fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Of the three main issues raised in this petition, only the

first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of
whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants is a question of fact. It is not the function of the
SC to analyze or weigh in evidence, unless in the
presence of extremely meritorious circumstances. This
case falls under one of the exceptions because the ruling
of the CA contradicts that of the RTC.

The petitioners argue that the CA erred in ruling that there

is no probable cause.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual

findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt
presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought
counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a
certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners' other
witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not
buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

However, the SC finds that CA erred in reversing the

RTCs findings.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts

and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the
belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting

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it are legally just and proper." Thus, probable cause for
a search warrant requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched.
-

The judge, in determining probable cause, must first

personally examine under oath the complainant &
witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
The sale of counterfeit products are overt acts of the
offenses charged against them. Samiano testified that
Maxicorp displayed and offered the sale of counterfeit
software in its premises (without giving the accompanying
ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates
of authenticity), and Sacriz saw counterfeit software
installed, produced, and packaged.
The sales receipt is not the only proof for determining the
probable cause. During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge
the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in
which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed
petitioners' software. Even if the sales receipt was
disregarded because it has the name of Samianos alias,
there are more evidence to establish probable cause for
the search warrant.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a

specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists. Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that

the judge examine personally and thoroughly the
applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine

probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the

requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and
findings of the judge who conducted the examination and
who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses.
4

On Whether the Search Warrants are in the nature of General

Warrants:
-

Petitioners argue that the warrants are too broad and lack
specificity.

A search warrant must state particularly the place to

be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident
purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to
be seized only to those particularly described in the
search warrant. This is a protection against potential
abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and
seizures be committed.

Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection
with one specific offense."

The SC found the following paragraph of the search

warrants lacking in particularity because it covers the
seizure of items that may have been legitimately bought
by Maxicorp or used for personal or other purposes.
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and
other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
-

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that

a warrant, partially defective in specifying some
items sought to be seized yet particular with

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respect to the other items, should be nullified as
a whole. A partially defective warrant remains
valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items
not sufficiently described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. The exclusionary
rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the
Constitution renders inadmissible in any
proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all
items seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e
or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal
possession of explosives.
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at
bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on
September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
The accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.
More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) Quashed a search warrant (No. 1068) issued by Judge Marciano I.
Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995,
2) Declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and
3) Directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court
within five days to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner
considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court,
are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar
Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.

Case No. 5
PEOPLE V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 126379 , June 26. 1998
*Rational and Essentials of a Valid Warrant*
FACTS
This is the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the
Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996

2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No.
1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of
four Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings,
papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, tshirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to
$3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which
were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was
however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on
respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of
dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one
fragmentation grenade.

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SO ORDERED.
But without the items described in the search warrant are:
(a) three Ingram machine pistols;
(b) four gmm pistol;
(c) blasting caps;
(d) fuse;
(e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and
(f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and
effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was
no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged; ** and on the same date, submitted
their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated
comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular
inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge
and the following facts had been established as contained in the order
dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
a) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment
No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store;
b) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the
building as it is correspondingly called only Apartment No. 1, 2,
3, and 4;
c) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails
Variety Store;
d) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
e) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have
its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the
same be reduced on the records.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly

granting the motion to quash search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion
for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996
above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special
civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
The action did not prosper, however.
As earlier mentioned, the
Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on
September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions:
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to
by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then
residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from,
and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent to, Abigails Variety
Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted
the particular place to be searched -- was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not dated, not signed

11
by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant
by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead ** directed them to search
Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December
15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address given in the Application for
Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP.
Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader. The untenability of the claim
is made more patent by the Peoples admission, during the hearing of its
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth
not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely
attached to the motion for reconsideration.
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996,
viz.
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place
mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR.
INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D.
Santiago, who were all EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their
tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN
were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in TAGALOG with
Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words KATABI, or
KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin
namin or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they
were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH
WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid.**.

prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or
branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search
warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant
proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to
rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained
(Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge,
in light of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict
ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;
2) Sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to the
contrary;
3) Ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:

3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful

occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the
family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living
room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or
77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs.
Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the

4) Holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be

diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;
5) Hastily applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar
clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and
6) Depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove
the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly
resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
ISSUES

12
1

Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards

the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly,

Whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically

described in the warrant.

RULINGS
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon
City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of
said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be
searched prior to the search: this being the first of four separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same
police officers who eventually affected the search and seizure. They thus
had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place
they had in mind -- the first of four separate apartment units at the rear of
Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the
search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty
depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in
the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place
to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search
warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
And the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more
restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the warrant that the search be
limited only to the premises herein described.
At the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least
five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails
Variety Store, and four (4) separate and independent residential
apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through
which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others.
Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be

entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one of the
residential units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately
next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police
officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint
Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant -which directs that the search be limited only to the premises herein
described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding the
apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to
correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their
own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated,
according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge
Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization of
the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
Argument of the Solicitor General: that this assumption is sanctioned
by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, allegedly to the effect that the
executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant
is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
But However the Court says, Burgos is inapplicable. That case
concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately
disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case
was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places:
one at No. 19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784
Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2)
warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made
to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants
apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was
hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error
was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge
had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to
the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2)
distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening
paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this
was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the

13
second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by
the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the warrant could
consult the records in the official court file.
(Issue No. 1) THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS VALIDLY ISSUED AS
REGARDS THE APARTMENT IN WHICH PRIVATE WERE THEN
ACTUALLY RESIDING.
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an
obvious typographical error involving ambiguous descriptions of the
place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different
from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was
immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the
instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity
lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the
warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind.
This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the
claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant
and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the
context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
(Issue No. 2) THAT PARTICULAR APARTMENT WAS SPECIFICALLY
DESCRIBED IN THE WARRANT
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified
or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or
the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.
Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia
the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched
as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to
police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not
be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The

particularization of the description of the place to be searched may

properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review
of Judge Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate
court. A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge
Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards
the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. In Judge
Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record,
put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the
search warrant was founded.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
providing that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be serched, and the things to be
seized.,
It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be
based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe
the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that any evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia
of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

14
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such
other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as
whether or not
(1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential
apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly marked -- was in
fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or
(2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of
the place (herein petitioners), among others; or
(3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by
which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly
refused to receive evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or
(5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues
would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and
seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search
warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the
speciousness of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were
precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all
times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office
opines that where a search warrant has been issued by the court other
than the one trying the main criminal case, the proper recourse of
persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject
of the warrant is afterwards filed. In support, it cites the second of five
policy guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals[18] concerning possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for
the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case. Said second guideline reads:
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original
or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other they shall
be deemed waived.

The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is

issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the
search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a
motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may
be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the
first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the
criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to
the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is
clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved
by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to supress evidence are alternative and not cummulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appopriate higher court.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW:
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch
216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made
to said court.
On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives
subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the
return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could
have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever
filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the
Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was
submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above
quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have
acted within its competence.

15

DECISION OF THE COURT:

THE COURT DISMISSED THE PEOPLES PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
SEEKING NULLIFICATION OF THE ORDERS OF BRANCH 80 of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in the
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing
opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

accused were arrested by policemen with the strength of an arrest

warrant. In the ensuing search after serving of the warrant, a number of
packs which were conceived to be white crystalline substance, better
known as SHABU were found in the possession of the former.
During the serving of warrant to search, three individuals were present:
Tui Won Chua, Qui Yaling and a certain Chin, a housemaid. Tiu Won
Chua denied to be Timothy Tiu, the owner of the apartment unit as well as
denying the ownership of the seized illegal drugs found in his handbag.
Qui Yaling also denied ownership of the seized items found in her
handbag
ISSUES:
1
2

The legality of the search warrant used by the policemen in

effecting the search, as well as the arrest that followed thereat.
The correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the
RTC.

DEFENSE ARGUMENTS
They asserted that the search was illegal since the subject of the search,
Timothy Tiu and none of the respondents is Timothy Tiu. With the search
illegal, henceforth the subsequent confiscation and arrest was also illegal,
subscribing to the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree, wherein
evidences gathered from illegal search and seizures are deemed
inadmissible to court.
Case No. 6
PEOPLE V. TIU WON CHUA and QUI YALING
FACTS:
Respondents, Tiu Won Chua aka Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua aka
Sun Tee Sy y Chua appealed from a conviction verdict by the RTC Br. 27
of Manila for violating Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. As amended by RA 7659.
After a number of surveillance and a test-buy, policemen filed a search
warrant for Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Binondo St. Manila allegedly
owned by a certain Timothy Tiu. The search warrant was granted by
Judge Ramon Makasiar of RTC Br. 35, Manila. In October 3, 1998, the

Both accused denied that the subject of the search warrant, Timothy Tiu
and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. And even submitted
documents to prove his identity. He alleged that he resides in No. 864
Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. However, Qui Yaling admitted being the
occupant of one of the rooms and a certain Lim and Uy occupied other
rooms. Won Chua, admitted that Qui Yaling is his mistress with whom he
has two children. Both of them, denied having engaged in the business of
illegal drugs rather in the jewelry business. And also denied ownership of
the illegal drugs seized in the search as well as: an improvised tooter, a
weighing scale, an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper. A gun
was also confiscated in the possession of Won Chua.
RULING
Decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED, penalty of Qui Yaling was
MODIFIED to an indeterminate sentence.

16
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of
Timothy Tiu, which did not include appellant Qui Yaling, appellants
contend that because of this defect, the search conducted and
consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the
evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
1

The issuance of the search warrant as well as the arrest was

LEGAL.
There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine
under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. As
correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name
of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant,
especially since in this case, the authorities had personal
knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a
John Doe warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it
contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to
identify the accused.[10] We have also held that a mistake in the
identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the
warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described.
Even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not
contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling,
that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched
was described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted
surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search
warrant and subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the
persons and the place to be searched although they may not
have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed with
the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B was conducted.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it
must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item
or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2)
such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants
were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the
drug.14 We also note that the crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not

exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a

regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
2

NO. The Supreme Court did not sustain the trial courts decision
attributing to both appellants the illegal possession of the same
amount of shabu. The court noted that nowhere in the information
is conspiracy alleged. Neither had it been proven during the trial.
As such, there is a need to look at the individual amounts
possessed by each appellant. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu
were found inside the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by
Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425, while Qui Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673
grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section
16, in connection with Section 20 (1 st paragraph), provides the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount
of shabu involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is
less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the
penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
The defense failed to bring Chin to court, although during the
course of the presentation of their evidence, they manifested their
intention to present her testimony. Furthermore, a visitor does not
normally leave her bag lying anywhere, much more in the
masters bedroom. Being the occupant of the apartment, it is
more logical to presume that the handbag belongs to Qui Yaling.
The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and proofs that
the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the bags,
the license of Tiu Won found inside the mans handbag and the
passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies handbag are not
illegal. Having no relation to the use or possession of shabu, the
authorities could not confiscate them for they did not have the
authority to do so since the warrant authorized them to seize only
articles in relation to the illegal possession of shabu. Not within
their control, they could not have been presented in court.

17
cried and said she had no means of livelihood; thus, she was brought to
the police headquarters for further investigation.
As a result of the said search, an information was filed against Priscilla
del Norte for violating Sec 8, Article 2 of RA 6425 as she was in
possession and custody and control of Marijuana weighing 6748.37 gms.
Appellants contention: The search warrant was invalid. Said, she was
merely visiting a friend, Marlyn to borrow money when suddenly,
policemen knocked at the door and introduced themselves. She heard
them saying, we already got Ising, and was surprised why she was
suddenly arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the
policemen still brought her to the police station.
RTC Convicted appellant
In an Appeal, the appellant contended that prosecution failed to establish
who owned the house where the search was conducted, and avers that
her mere presence did not automatically make her the owner of the
marijuana found therein. That, the search warrant specified the name of
Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house; that, she is not Ising; and that,
the lower court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs against her.
SolGens contention: totality of evidence demonstrates the guilt.
- When illegal drugs are found in the premises occupied by a
certain person, such person is presumed to be in possession
thereof and the accused has the burden to prove the absence of
animus possidendi.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellant and admitting the
confiscated drugs as evidence against her.

Case No. 7
People of the Philippines vs Priscilla Del Norte
FACTS:
August 1, 1997 a search warrant was served on Ising Gutierrez Diwa.
SPO1 Lumabas and his group was task to serve the search warrant. They
coordinated with the brgy officials and proceeded to the house. Upon
reaching the house, the door was opened by a woman. They informed her
about the search warrant but the woman suddenly closed and locked the
door. It was only upon constant prodding that she opened the door again,
enabling the authorities to conduct the search.
They found a bundle of Marijuana wrapped in Manila Paper under the bed
and inside the room. She was asked who owned the Marijuana but only

HELD:
YES because the prosecution failed to establish appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Accordingly, Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the
search is inadmissible due to the irregularity of the search warrant which
contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not Priscilla del Norte.

18
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only
the place to be searched, but also the persons to be arrested.
We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the name of the person
subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the
place to be searched is properly described. In People v. Tiu Won
Chua, 23 we upheld the validity of the search warrant despite the mistake
in the name of the persons to be searched. In the cited case, the
authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before
obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They had
personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be
searched although they did not specifically know the names of the
accused.
The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the irregularity of the
search warrant. The authorities did not have personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance
before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the
warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the
barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and
Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay
official was not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge
on pure hearsay.
In all criminal cases, it is appellant's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 30 In the
case at bar, we hold that the prosecution's evidence treads on shaky
ground. We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the
duty to protect appellant where the evidence presented show "insufficient
factual nexus" of her participation in the commission of the offense
charged.

Respondents contention: the writ of habeas corpus is not available as

petitioners were not illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty; also, they have been validly arrested and
detained by virtue of a valid information filed in court. Pursuant to Sec 5,
Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit en offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7."

Umil vs Ramos
FACTS:

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose
behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.

We have 8 petitions of habeas corpus filed before the court which was
consolidated as it has similar issues and asks for similar prayer to
produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further delay.
Petitioners contention: persons detained have been unlawfully arrested
because such was made without warrant and that no prelim investigation
was first conducted; thus, information filed against them is void.

Re: Umil vs Ramos

Rolando Dural was arrested after having been known to be confined in
the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, and having been
positively identified by eyewitness. Consequently, he was the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired
at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. He was charged
with Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.

Case No. 8

19
-

Rolandos contention: he was not arrested while in the act of

shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after
the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after
the shooting incident.

Courts Ruling: , Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member

of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he
was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof
or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

it is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed

conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution
of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Rolando was found guilty as charged.

Re: Roque vs Villa

The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is
also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in
Marikina
Heights,
Marikina,
Metro
Manila,
Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.
As officers and/ or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without
warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-avis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally
justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess them.
Re: Anonueva vs Ramos

Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC

and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a
bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and
ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully
arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without
merit. The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when
they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against
them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation Rules. Sec.
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a
warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by
the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule
and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised

20
Penal Code, as amended Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary
investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court.
Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
Re: Ocaya vs Aguirre
Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto,as she had with her an
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested;thus, her arrest without a
warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because
she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Re: Ocaya, and groups claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession
were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
According to the SolGen: It was a result of an in-depth military
surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the
underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive
results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances,
from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister
plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy
Re: Espiritu vs Lim
He was arrested for violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code,
Inciting to Sedition, when he gathered all drivers and operators urging
them to go in a nationwide strike . The day after he was seen in the
gathering of drivers and sympathizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd,
and Valencia St. Sta Mesa, Manila, he was thereafter arrested.
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the
petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we
find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we
reduce it to P10,000.00 only.

Re: Nazareno vs Station Commander

The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant
pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities.

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal

charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.

The petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.

85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is
hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the
questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113
(Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2.
That
the
doctrine
laid
down
in Garcia vs.
Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by
the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines New People's Army, and their ownership
of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive
documents found in their possession at the time of arrest,
inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of
facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed
moot and academic.

21
As reviewed from the foregoing facts, the court ruled that no prudent man
can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have
acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the
peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to
place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation
of law and to prose cute and secure the punishment therefor. An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming
public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in
accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court
determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt,
but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public
order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law
requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later
found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable.
But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting
officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and/or for other
administrative sanctions.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested
persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership
of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their
possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records,
strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the
arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon
which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining
the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in

a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs.
Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this
time to disturb the same, particularly in the light of prevailing conditions
where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that
every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus
proceedings. This Court will promptly look into and all other
appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest
without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of
Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, the detainee shall
forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the
detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be
promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence
Finally, to reiterate the mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without
warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned
arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated
suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
Thus, MR was denied
Case No. 9
People v. Nuevas y Garcia
FACTS:
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia was charged before the RTC of Olongapo City,
Branch 75, with illegal possession of marijuana, in violation of Sec. 8,
Article II of RA 6425.
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos were
likewise charged with the same.
The three pleaded not guilty to the charges.

22
Since the evidence in the cases was common, the cases were
consolidated. They were found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
charged with a penalty of reclusion perpetua and each to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
PO3 Teofilo Fami testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he
and SPO3 Cesar Cabling conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay
Pag-asa, Olongapo City upon receiving information that a male, more or
less 5'4'', 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand,
and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of
marijuana dried leaves. While stationed there, they saw a man who fit the
description (Nuevas), carrying a plastic bag, alight from a motor vehicle.
They accosted Nuevas informing him they were police officers. Nuevas
answered the questions of the police officers in an arrogant manner.
Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained dried marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue
cloth. Then, in a bid to escape criminal charges, Nuevas informed them
that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, and
associate, and two other male persons.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12,
Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where his
two companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. They introduced
themselves as police officers to Din and Inocencio, and saw Din carrying
a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the beg belonged
to Nuevas. Fami took the bag and upon inspection saw marijuana packed
in newspaper. The police officers then took the three (Nuevas, Din and
Inocencio), to the police office at Purok III for proper documentation.
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that both Nuevas and Din
voluntarily submitted the plastic bags they were holding.
For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of the 27 September
1997, that while walking home, Fami had called him. When he asked why
he was called, Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside
the room of his house, where he was handcuffed and Fami had taken
Nuevas' wallet and took out P1,500.00 and put it in his own wallet, while
he was confronting Nuevas about shabu use. Before leaving the house,
Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. He was then
put in jail, and he further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio.
In his defense, Din stated that at about 10 o'clock in the morning of 27
September 1997, while his 'compare' Inocencio was visiting, two men
entered the house looking for a woman. The two introduced themselves
as police officers, and Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed
without being informed the reason for their arrest and were told that the
reason would just be explained to them in court. They were taken to

Station B where they were ordered to stand and be photographed with

Nuevas, who Din first met in jail.
Inocencio testified that he went to his 'compare' Din's house on the
morning of 27 September 1997 to sell his fighting cocks since he needed
the money to redeem his driver's license. He and Din were arrested by
two persons, one who pointed a gun at them, while the other searched for
a lady named Vangie. They were brought to the police station, where he
first came to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing
marijuana was recovered from them and he claimed he only saw such
evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also mentions that he did
not recall signing a receipt of property seized, and when he asked the
police what he did wrong, the police replied that they will just explain it in
court.
All three were found guilty, and the judgment was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. In 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation then a motion to
withdraw appeal which the Court granted and considered the case closed
and terminated as to Nuevas.
The cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the
Court's ruling in People v. Efren Mateo. Before the CA, Din and Inocencio
argued that the trail court erred: (1) In finding them guilty of the crime
charged on the basis of the testimonies of the erring officers, and (2) In
not finding that their constitutional rights have been violated.
The CA affirmed the Trial Court's decision, restating that when the issue
involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court's assessment is entitled
to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling's testimony to
categorical and clear.
With regards to the argument of the appellant's claims that their
constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate court stated that the
search is exempted from the requirements of judicial warrant as
appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, since Din voluntarily surrendered the bag and appellants
never presented proof to rebut the same.
The acquittal or conviction of the appellants rests validly on the
warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers and he
admissibility of the evidence obtained.
The trial court ruled in holding the warrantless search and seizure as valid
is that due to the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a time
with such cumbersome requirements before one can be issued. In the
case of People v. Jean Balingan, expediency and practicality are some of
the justifications in the warrantless arrest.

23
Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and
inspection as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.
The Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through
or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search or seizure becomes
"unreasonable" and any evidence obtained is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The exceptions to this sure are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) Plain view doctrine. It's elements are (a) prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
pursuit of their official duties; (b) evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) evidence must
be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure without
further search;
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless searches;
(5) Customs search
(6) Stop and frisk;
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
In instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose and manner of the search and seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the place searched and
character of the article procured.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure fall under any of the exemptions of
a warrantless arrest in so far as Din and Inocencio are concerned?
HELD:
SC held that the search and seizure conducted does not fall under the
first exception, warrantless searches incidental to warrantless arrest,
since the arrest must precede the search; but a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. In the case
at bar, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of
the officers. The search of the bag cannot be merely incidental to the
lawful arrest because reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Sec. 5 of Rule 113. The rule requires a person
perform an overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
SC held that it does not fall under the 2nd exception either since the
object seized were inside a closed package, therefore not in plain view

and cannot be seized without a warrant. But if the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
In the case of Nuevas, the search conducted falls under the 4th
exception, where the search was made with his consent, while in Din's
case there was none.
Constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right and may be waived. But must be voluntary in order to
validate illegal detention and search, and such consent must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The question whether consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined by a totality of
the circumstances. The following characteristics of a person giving
consent and the place where consent is given are also relevant to the
determination. These characteristics being:
(1) age of the defendant;
(2) whether he was in public or secluded location;
(3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
(7) nature of the police questioning;
(8) environment in which the questioning took place;
(9) possibly vulnerable state of the person consenting.
The State has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony that
the necessary consent was not obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given.
Based on the testimonies of the police officers, there is reason to believe
that Nuevas willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating
contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt
to exculpate himself from criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the
police, gave them his plastic bag and even revealed his 'associates',
offering himself as an informant.
In the case of Din, the Court found no such consent had actually been
given. The police officers gave inconsistent and dissimilar testimonies
regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic bag. In case of
consented searches or waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) said person had an actual intention to
relinquish such right.
Prosecution failed to show clearly that Din intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches. Fami and Cabling did not testify on
Din's composure, which the Court find's necessary to provide basis for the
surrender of the bag. No mention or permission made by police officers to

24
get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to
search it. In cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented
search, police authorities expressly asked in no uncertain terms for the
consent of the accused to be searched, which could be established by
clear and positive proof.
Din's silence at the time cannot also be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. "Peaceful submission to search
and seizure is not a consent or an invitation, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of law." (People v. Burgos)
Without the dried marijuana leaves, Din's conviction cannot be sustained
based on the remaining evidence. "The conviction of the accused must
not rest on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution."
Acquittal is warranted despite the insistence of the prosecution that they
waived any defect of their arrest by entering a plea. The dried marijuana
leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against appellants, since they
were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
The Court also finds that Inocencio was wrongfully convicted of the crime
charged. Inocencio's supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves
was sought to be through his act of looking into the plastic bag carried by
Din. Taking a look at the object is not the same as taking possession
thereof. To behold is not to hold. The act attributed to Inocencio is
insufficient to establish illegal possession of drugs or even conspiracy to
illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing
evidence that Inocencio knew the contents of the bag and conspired with
Din to possess the illegal items.
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are herby
acquitted.

Case 10
People v. Del Rosario Y Pascual
FACTS:
This case is an automatic review in the decision of the trial court finding
accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the
heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000 as actual damages and
P100,000 as moral exemplary damages.

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio

Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged
with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66 year old businesswoman, of P200,000 in
cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.
Accused, del Rosario pleaded not guilty. Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John
Doe "Dodong" remianed at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only del Rosario was tried.
The facts were established from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver
Paul Vincent Alonzo. On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore.
General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him.
Parked at a distance of about 1 1/2 meters in front of him was a tricycle
driven by the accused, del Rosario. Alonzo saw 2 men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag, one of the
two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help
the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman, sending her to
the ground. While the woman was still on the ground, the armed man
returned and shot her on the head. The bag was brought to the tricycle of
del Rosario, where someone inside received the bag. The armed man sat
behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. The tricycle
sped away but Alonzo was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He
then went to the nearest police headquarters to report the incident.
Accused del Rosario gave his own version of the incident. At around 5:30
in the afternoon, he was hired for P120 by a certain "Boy" Santos. Their
original agreement was he drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward
Coliseum.. Despite their earlier arrangement, Boy Santos directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya.
Marquez and Bisaya proceeded to board the tricycle in front of the
parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. And then was asked
to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where
Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. Bisaya then accosted
the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her
bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Bisaya. Accused del
Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Santos who stayed in the tricycle
prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying
prone on the ground. After the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the
sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and
ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside
his tricycle del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would
throw the bag at Zulueta St., where there were cogon grasses. Upon

25
arriving at Dicarma, the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to
inform the authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would
be harmed. Del Rosario went home and because of the threat did not
report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the authorities.
The court found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and
sentenced him to death. He contends that the court erred in: (1) Not
finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by
his co-accused Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not
considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among the
co-accused; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights
as an accused; and (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in ruling del Rosario guilty.
HELD: YES.
Del Rosario's claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par.
5, RPC as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be
sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he
was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime
scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only
forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.
The trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and
remote and could not be considered uncontrollable . The gun pointed at
him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test
required by law and jurisprudence.
SC disagrees. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, like one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. Del Rosario could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk
his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would
be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the
safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
Trial court also erred in saying that it was "Boy" Santos who left the
tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on
the head. A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records
of the case, particularly the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario
himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the victim's
helper and fired at the victim.
Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that
the latter pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to
escape. And from the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario, the

person who shot the lady was Jun Marquez. This conclusion gives
credence to the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos stayed in the tricycle
precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing;
that there could have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to
stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that "Boy"
Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of
the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong"
Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos
opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of
threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave
them behind.
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the
gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered
him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him a mere
instrument acting involuntarily and against his will.
The trial court also erred in anchoring del Rosario's conviction on the
issue of conspiracy, wherein his participation in the orchestrated acts of
his co-accused. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the
escape of the others from the crime scene and conspiracy between
accused and his passengers was evident because the robbery/shooting
was happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle
and the engine of the motor was running and the accused did not deny
that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used
by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his
failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing
away from the scene of the crime.
SC disagrees once again. Mere knowledge or approval of the fact, without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one
party to a conspiracy, but there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of common design and purpose.
The trial court stated that there is no evidence that the accused came to
an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to
commit the same, so in order to convict, the presence of an implied
conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The fact
that del Rosario was with the other accused at the time the crime was
committed is insufficient proof. Mere companionship does not establish
conspiracy. Del Rosario feared for his safety and security because of the
threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout for
help. There is no showing that the accused directly participated in the
overt act of robbing and shooting.
Del Rosario's non disclosure to the authorities does not affect his
credibility, because of the threats made by his co-accused should he tell.
It is natural to hesitate in getting involved in a criminal case.

26
Del Rosario contends that there was a violation in his right to remain
silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
During the testimony of SPO4 Geronimo de Leon, upon finding the name
of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to the house of the barangay
captain where the owner of the tricycle was summonsed and who in turn
revealed the driver's name and was invited for an interview. Accused then
voluntarily informed them of the bag and location and the place where the
hold-uppers may be found. After lunch they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
wherein a shoot-out occurred, killing Marquez during the incident.
After the incident at Dicarma, Del Rosario was handcuffed by the police
because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against
him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA
7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that- "Any public
officer acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel
by the investigating officer."

Sec. 5, par. (b), Rulle 113 provides for 2 requirements before a

warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. If there
was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. The arrest of del
Rosario does not comply with these requirements since the arrest came a
day after consummation, not immediately much after; and the arrested
had committed the offense since they were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
SC reversed and set aside the RTC decision and the accused is acquitted
of the crime charged.

It is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation, starting from the time he was invited for questioning, but he
was not made aware by the investigating officers Since prosecution failed
to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his
verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual
arrest were inadmissible against him, as provided by law and the Bill of
Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no
warrant therefore Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
him since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the
crime.

Case No. 11
Robin Padilla v. CA

Facts:

A criminal case was filed against the accused for violation of P.D. No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms. The trial court and CA then

27
convicted accused and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua
and cancelled his bail bond.

Accused appealed to SC the decision of CA and asked SC for bail or

temporary release for an X-ray and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
at St. Luke's Hospital

Issue:

Whether or not accused is entitled to bail

Ruling:

Accused is not entitled to bail. The petition for bail is dismissed. However,
he, is allowed for temporary release for an X-ray and Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital

Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when

the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. 2 On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. 3

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)

years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of

discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances 4 under

paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of
guilt strong, bail shall be denied, 5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter
of right

In this case, be that as it may, we are willing to accommodate his request

for an X-ray and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's
Hospital as follow-up examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It
has been said that while justice is the first virtue of the court, yet
admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the
badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid
Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief
Officer, deserves attention. We recall that way back in 1946, we allowed
in Dela Rama v. People's Court, 9 a precedent on which appellant now
anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his
continued detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however,
has changed with the development of times. Besides, appellant's situation
is not akin to Dela Rama's factual milieu. While appellant now shall be
denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his medical needs.
And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely performing its
supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among others, their
proper accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.

Thus, Accused is not entitled to bail. The petition for bail is dismissed.
However, he, is allowed for temporary release for an X-ray and Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital

28
evidence as basis for his conviction. He also argued that the flagging
down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely
on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He
insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the
appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his
right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.

Issue:
Case No. 12
Caballes v. CA

Whether or not Petitioners constitutional right was violated so as to acquit

him of the crime of theft

Facts:
Ruling:
A criminal case was filed against Petitioner for theft. Petitioner with intent
of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of
Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to
the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp. It was
found out when Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep of Petitioner unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves
and searched it. The trial court and CA then promulgated a decision
convicting Petitioner.

Petitioner then appealed to SC the decision of CA. He argued that his

constitutional right was violated when the police officers searched his
vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and
when samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in

Petitioners constitutional right was violated. He is acquitted. The appeal

is granted

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented
warrantless search;11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13

29
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in
this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle; 25 (3) flashes a light
therein without opening the car's doors; 26 (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; 27 (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; 28 and (6) where
the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.29

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations
where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of
marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from
informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along
the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had
received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; 32 (5)
the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into
the country.33

Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object

itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its

contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 38

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches

and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must
be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 41 Hence, consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.42 The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 46 It
is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.47

In this case, none of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case

at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped

30
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not
exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks 39 and covered with
leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to
the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask
petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held
that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure
of the articles without further search.40

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he

checked the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to
prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there is no
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged
"consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere
passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.

Thus, Petitioners constitutional right was violated. He is acquitted. The

appeal is granted

Case No. 13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y
VALENCIA, accused.

AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Molintas & Molintas Law Office for accused-appellant.

Facts synopsis
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
City finding appellant and her co-accused guilty of violating Article II,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in
August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation
on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that
a certain woman and a companion from Baguio City were transporting
illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.

31
Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in
connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers,
riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later,
the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to
apprehend the suspects.

Allowable Searches and seizures - WON the Honorable Regional

Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that
the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and
search was violated by the police officers who arrested both
accused.

At the following day, the police flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two
female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the
appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. In front of
them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two's uneasy
behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited
them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same barangay. They
brought with them the black bag.

Rights in Custodial Investigation - WON the Honorable Court

failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of
the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by
the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the
accused.

Upon reaching the center, PO3Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy

Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two
women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3
Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag
was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and
personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed
in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected
to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio
interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the
appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they
were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any
counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the
course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were
present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy
P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that
the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. They were
convicted an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Issues:

Ruling:
Allowable searches and seizures, in flagrante delictoIn arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the
absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she
was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she
impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done
without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search
is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is
inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant
validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a
rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the
search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand
the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest.
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained
prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are
certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of

32
moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of
the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 11 When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
Examples of the SC in allowable Searches and Seizures without a
judicial warrant:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag
carried by the accused; 13(b) where an informer positively identified the
accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; 14 (c) where the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a quantity of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; 16 (f) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belong that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into
the country; 17 (g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential
information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was
established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona
Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; 18 (h) where police officers
received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspiciouslooking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to
Manila; 19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of
the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20

Probable cause - The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been

conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The
surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her
co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. xxx the police
received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a
tricycle. Xxx riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag,
which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who
owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant's bag was
not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing
a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited
drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules
of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing
a crime in flagrante delicto..
Custodial investigation:
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a
lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was
not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent
counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or
admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in
evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of
the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then
presided by Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused
Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by
both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible because they were
not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue,

33
this court finds the postulate to rest on good authority and will
therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial
confession extracted from both accused as evidence of their
guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by
both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in
their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to
be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the
prosecution's evidence, both accused can be convicted."

Appreciation of Evidence:
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into
account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite
the latter's failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she
argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as
they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they
have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. 23 All the
documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. 24 Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution
can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those
exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellant's
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on
the exhibits. 26
Other contentions of the accused:
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the
testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio
who opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2
Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open when he arrived at
the Kabayan Center.

She then focuses on the police officers' failure to remember the family
name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming
that this is improbable and contrary to human experience.
The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and
not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are
inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were
transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate
each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence. 27
The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the
guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of
witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some
aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the
same incident.
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to
note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it
was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was
in complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of
the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have
no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to
suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in
arresting the appellant
On appelants plea of not guilty
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellant's defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of
denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for
it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It
has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 31 The sole
proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of

34
denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on
the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
Decision:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
trial court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. NO.
7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED. EcATDH
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 14
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN
CANTON, appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee..

package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt
like rice granules. 4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
packages in front of SUSAN's genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN
to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: "Money, money
only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes,
her supervisor on duty. 5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna
Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies' room, Mylene touched
something in front of SUSAN's sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove
her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna
discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray
colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. 6 The
first was taken from SUSAN's abdominal area; the second, from in front of
her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene turned over
the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes. 8 The latter forthwith informed his
superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident.
Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs
examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white
crystalline substances 9 which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for shabu, a regulated drug

SYNOPSIS
Appellant was charge with violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425). At the trial,
the prosecution established that at the time of the commission of the
crime, appellant was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted.
Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National
Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me ma'am, can I
search you?" 3
Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal
area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the

For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First

Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever
conducted on SUSAN. 11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the
following articles seized from her. He said that he informed SUSAN of her
constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when
she signed the receipt. 13 Yet he told her that she had the option to sign
or not to sign the receipt.
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a
decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violation of Section 16 of Article III of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.

35
After due proceedings, the trial court found her guilty as charged. Hence,
this appeal.
In affirming the conviction of appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that the
search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. This constitutes
another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. In the said provision, passengers are subject to search for
prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport
security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home, and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society. Thus, the strip search in the
ladies' room was justified under the circumstances.
The search conducted on appellant resulted in the discovery and recovery
of three packages containing shabu. Such warrantless search and seizure
was legal. Armed with the knowledge that appellant was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were dutybound to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified,
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto.

SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, was denied
Issues: in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the
alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was
caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker(Mylene)
went beyond the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine;

RulinG:
Warrantless search and seizures, in flagrante delicto-

SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies' room
was constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest."
The arrest could not be said to have been made before the search
because at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could not
have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body,
which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they
could not have determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a
crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition.
Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that
the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to
a lawful arrest.
When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it,
the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former.
In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's abdomen. The strip
search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSAN's body. If ever at the time SUSAN was
deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an
arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies'
room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were
hidden on SUSAN's body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime
was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery
by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the
packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested.
The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a
lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process
cannot be reversed. 26
Transgressed the doctrine of stop and frisk from Terry v. Ohio
case and Start of Custodial investigation
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 21 such stop and frisk search should have

36
been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine
whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the
security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker
Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the
contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search
in the ladies' room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel,
which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.

II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security

procedure is not confined only to search for
weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could
validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the
airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among
others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute
a part of the contract between the passenger and the
air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to

weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials

or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be
frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was
too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the
discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled
by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the
packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that
SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No.
6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the
action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into
the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to
the detriment of society." 28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was
justified under the circumstances.
Others cases appellant cited for her case- Guys giapil lang nako ni kay
apilon unya ni serr
Lastly,
SUSAN
questions
the
application
of People
v.
Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement allowing searches and
seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the
safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should
have been Katz v. United States, 23 which upholds the Fourth
Amendment of the United States of America that "protects people and not
places."

III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the

instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues,
finds application to the present case. That case involves accusedappellant Lelia Johnson, who was also a departing passenger bound for
the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was

37
then the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers,
employees and crew to check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila, the former
felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila
explained that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior, who then
directed her to take Leila to the nearest women's room for inspection. In
the comfort room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her
girdle." She acceded and brought out three plastic packs which contained
a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This
Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized
during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence
against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her personflagrante delicto. The Court held in this
wise:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and

seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted
to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations

associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are

often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.

SUSAN's reliance on Katz v. U.S. 29 is misplaced. The facts and

circumstances of that case are entirely different from the case at bar. In
that case, the accused was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information
by telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the
accused's objection, to introduce evidence of accused's end of telephone
conversations, which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States of America reversed the decision,
ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the
instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic
surveillance involved. It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence
to precedents and mandates not to unsettle things which are established.
When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 30 There being a
disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we
cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.

38
Warrantless arrest, SC explanation:
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully
arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of
Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section.
The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery
of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon
examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were
legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the
airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest

her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a

warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
Custodial investigation:
The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial
investigation" or is "in custody interrogation." 31 Custodial investigation
refers to the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 32 This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying
to elicit information or a confession from him. 33And the right to counsel
attaches upon the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to
prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights. 35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2
Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN's
arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from
her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or
not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied
upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was
taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against
her. 36 Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to
stand on. AIDSTE
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the
admission of the medical report on the physical and medical examination
conducted upon appellant's request, which contained the following:
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned
document was erroneous because it was not properly identified.
Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant's conviction

39
will stand, as the court's finding of guilt was not based on that
document.

VII. SUSAN's conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.

trial court's imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the
range prescribed by law.

VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to
her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.
The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8,
and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities:

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means

of committing an offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN's passport, plane tickets, and girdles
exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to
be returned to her. 37

xxx xxx xxx

3. 200

grams
or
more
of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride . . .

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper

penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the
range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the

Ruling:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding
appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant's
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to
her. DaESI