Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

160261
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional

HELD:
To determine the merits on this issue the court mention the Court must necessarily turn to the
well-settled principle of constitutional construction as stated apply verba legis that is whenever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have a common use.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
According to the Supreme Court the resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the
term "initiate" resorts to statutory construction. The Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution
itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. It is thus clear that the
framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. The sponsor of the provision of
Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file." Also in Commissioner Maambongs amicus curiae`,he explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third
of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution."

Thus the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.