G.R NO.

115634
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT
of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
April 27, 2000
FACTS:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles
wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of
the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or
licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber.
Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer, then filed a criminal complaint
against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code).
Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted
recovery of possession to them via replevin.
Upon petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals denied
said petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle
pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68of P.D. No.
705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically
place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the
appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of
the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the
confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest
products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not
absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate
court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990,
is one such regulation, the appellate court said. Additionally,
respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe
the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of1990. They were unable to submit a report of the
seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings
and recommendation to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners
failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of1990, was confirmed

by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation

order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and
the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow
such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said motor vehicles are in custodial
legis pursuant to Section68 of PD 705?
RULING:
YES. Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while
being transported without pertinent documents that could
evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a
warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load
was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code. Note further that petitioners failure to observe the
procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not
submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the3rd
day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of
the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles
from the custody of the DENR. Then again when one of the
motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report
the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents
immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.
The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or
notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected
under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised
Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in
our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in
custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise.

G.R NO. 108619

EPIFANIO LALICAN vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA,
Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz,
Barangay Bacungan Puerto Princesa for violating Section 68
of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines. There was 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in
two(2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and dimension that
were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused were
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the
information filed against them contenting that, Section 68 of
PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the
law categorically specify timber to be collected as to
constitute the violation on the said law. He further contends
that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority
or legal documents required by existing forest law and
regulation.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the
ground that it is not the court to determine the wisdom of
the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He
further asserts that the word timber should include lumber
which is a product or derivative of a timber. The position of
the prosecution could result to the circumvention of the law,
for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to
become a lumber. On September 24, 1991, the lower court
construed the interpretation of the law against the State
thus the motion was granted.

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on

the order underscoring the fact that the accused presented
Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10,
1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin
indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from
Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were
not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added
to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber,
then the accused could have presented a certificate of
lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally
sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one
point to another. The motion was approved thus this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term lumber is included in the
concept of timber in order to constitute an offense as stated
in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines)?
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes
timber. The primary reason why the law was enacted is to
secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the
non-inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the
circumvention of law. Section 68 of the said law punishes
these acts namely (a)the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Be
that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of
lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed
reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order
No.277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts
penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law
itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing
of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to
afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms,
create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the
law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to
encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured
timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely
result in tautology.

G.R. No. 131270

PERFECTO PALLADA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
March 17, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in
Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being
delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged
in rice milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine
National Police, raided the company's warehouse in
Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and
found a large stock pile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a
chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the
lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued
by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated
March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however,
give credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero
Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended.
What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw

and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill

operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber
which, all in all, constituted 29, 299. 25 board feet, worth
P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29,1992,
the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring
1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard in Sumpong; Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure
order was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general
manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, raiding team returned for the
remaining lumber. Company President Francisco Tankiko and
a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a
lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable
them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed
with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5,
1992, the motion was denied. Accordingly, the remaining
lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber
in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however,
petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders
issued by the DENR officers.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes
lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and
their attachments should have been considered in
establishing the legality of the company's possession of the
lumber. In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our
ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
It is likewise argued that the irregularities in the
documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner
because the documents came from lumber dealers. In
addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary
Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the
presumption of regularity in their execution.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the certificate of timber origin was not
the proper document to justify petitioner's possession of the
squared timber or flitches?
II. Whether or not the presence of erasures in the
certificate of timber origin render them valueless as
evidence?

RULING:
First. The trial court acted correctly in not giving
credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by
petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be
covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin as stated in BFD
Circular No. 10-83where it expressly states that the issuance
of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in
order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for
shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof.
"The contention that the term timber includes lumber
has no, merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber
is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber"
embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's
ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other
forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705means that only those
who possess timber and forest products without the
documents required by law are criminally liable, while those
who possess lumber are not liable. Indeed, different
certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and nontimber forest products.
Second. Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber
Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber
Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified
in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous
irregularities and defects found in the documents presented
by the latter. These irregularities and discrepancies make the
documents in which they are found not only questionable but
invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no
credence to the same.
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary
exhibits should not be taken against petitioner. This
contention is untenable. What render these documents
without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on
their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility
for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the
corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber,
petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities,
and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He
cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is
concerned, the documents are regular and complete.
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the
presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the

DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by

petitioner applies only when the public accomplished,
documents are, on their faces, regular and properly
accomplished.

G.R No. 136142

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO DATOR et
al.
October 24, 2000
FACTS:
The crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber
bound to Maasin Southern Leyte, they were apprehended by
the police officer and seized pieces of lumber. As a result
SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one

(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one

(1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The
confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were
turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian
of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred
custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.
The accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut
from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose,
Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the
renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same
municipality. He further contends that he secured verbal
permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in
violation of PD 705 sentencing the accused to suffer the
indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2)
degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the
authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the
costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed to Telen the
accused is correct in violation of PD 705?
RULING:
NO. In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51)
pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified
by the CENRO officials as soft and therefore not premium
quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of
lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public
hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for
commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of
his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been
convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending
criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of
the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In
view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the
interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on
the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article
309paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,

pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the

appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on
the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.

G.R No. 161798

PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO,
Presiding Judge October 20, 2004
FACTS:

PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) petitioner owns and

operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing
facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds governmentissued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No.
47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No.
35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage
and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest
land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), through its officers, rendered three Memoranda,
dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001
designating the petitioner as DENR depository and
custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances
within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the
CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA
provided, among others, that field validation/verification of
applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership
(CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local
government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to
these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were
deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools,
equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal
logging and the forest products removed and possessed by
the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid
Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel,
had on numerous occasions apprehended within its
concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut
forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs
impounding area. A class suit was initiated among the
members of UFAB asking for preliminary mandatory
Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the
memoranda null and void and sought to restrain the DENR
and those who are participants from enforcing the said
memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall,
withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed
Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and
desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to
release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the
owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the
Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the
administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to retain the
seized confiscated products by the virtue of MOA regarding
the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of
Private Tree Plantation?
RULING:
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the
confiscated forest products and conveyances. Petitioners
compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated
logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it
claimed that some of the confiscated forest products may
have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted that
the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be
determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig
or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del
Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in the confiscated forest
products was merely contingent and cannot be material as
contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Petitioner contends that private respondents intrusion
was in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35.
These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right
to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized
petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the
concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely
defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to
these license agreements.
It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to
protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances.
It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its
licensing agreements, which need to be protected by
annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court.
Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being
designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the
assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely
holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody
for the DENR while the administrative or criminal
proceedings regarding said products are pending.

GR 79538
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVESECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
and TWIN PEAKSDEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION
October 18, 1990
FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber
license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut,
collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a
specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920
hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30,
1990.However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo
Cortes, issued a memorandum orders topping all logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement
was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions
to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its
logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his
letter; barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of
the area formerly covered by petitioners TLA was reawarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009,
while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986,

petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of
the President, and another letter dated April 2,1986 to
Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources
[MNR],seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the
Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No.
356which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of
an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request
was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating,
among others, its request that the timber license agreement
issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The
MNR however denied this motion.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the
MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the
President acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari,
with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the
nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber
license agreement and the granting of TLA to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively?
RULING:
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for
certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the
petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of
laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has
either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to
enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the
circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the

laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon
their rights.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three
years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in
1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the
period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to
seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at
the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable
neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of
a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public
respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a
private logging company are pitted against that of the public
at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.

GR 152160
VIRGILIO BON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were
charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended [,]
together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of January or February,
1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather
and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one
(1)cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an
approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at
approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and
without having first obtained from proper authorities the
necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government
and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.

Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, petitioner Virgilio

Bon, Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of
Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the
case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan
[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza,
Barangay Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and]
Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other
hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon
and Virgilio Bon.
The evidence for the prosecution was synthesized by
the trial court, as follows: Prosecutions evidence was
supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander
Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nesto Labayane and Teresita
Dangalan-Mendoza which shows that Teresita DangalanMendoza owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666
located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by
Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land
were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her
administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel
Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990,
Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain
Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the
barangay tanods, Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate
Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas complaint of Illegal Cutting of
Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano,
Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and
Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita DangalanMendoza. During their investigation, the group discovered
six (6) stumps of trees: four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao
tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the
stumps. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the
cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez
testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees
into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.;
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza for Illegal Cutting of Trees
repaired to theland on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps
of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the
lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board
feet, with a value of P25, 376.00.
In their defense, all the three accused took the witness
stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:

All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon,

the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge. He said that he
was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to
Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose
of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the
land.
Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and was instituted as such] by
Teresitas father. He developed the land, planting coconuts,
abaca and fruit trees. Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza wanted to
eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have]
an agrarian case. Since Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza refused
to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited
the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza. He denied cutting and
gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita
Dangalan-Mendoza as the one who ordered the trees [to be
cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita DangalanMendoza upon being confronted about the cutting of trees,
ignored his complaint.
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied
that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar
Narvaez indicted him of the crime because theformer had a
grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he happened to box
Oscar Narvaez, after [which he] heard [the latter threaten
him with] revenge.
On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its
decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro
Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon
was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, petitioner,
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed an appeal
to the CA.
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre
questioned the prosecution witnesses credibility and the
sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony allegedly made to
potential prosecution witnesses who are not police
operatives or media representatives is admissible in
evidence against the author?
RULING:

The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and

conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of
having observed their demeanour as they testified. Equally
established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, as
in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs
findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. We
have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the
lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence. Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,[30]
provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber,
or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punishable under the above provision are the following
acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other
forest products without the legal documents. Petitioner was
charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the

prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering

or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented.
This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from
which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of
guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence,
as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary
that the following elements concur: 1.There is more than one
circumstance.2. The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven.3. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786

Chu vs. Judge Tamin
August 28, 2003

FACTS:
Chu filed administrative complaint for gross ignorance
of the law, serious misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion
against Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur.
Judge Tamin issued search warrant against Chu for
possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation
of PD 705 as applied or by Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer Michael dela Cruz (CENRO dela
Cruz). On the strength of the warrant, 576 pieces of pagtapat
lumber (mangrove specie) was seized from Chu. Chu
assailed the validity of the warrant for violating Sec. 5,
Rule126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure because
the certified copies he obtained from the court did not
contain any transcript of the judges examination of Cenro
dela Cruz or his witness Cuaresma. Judge Tamins contention
is that the certified copies of the records obtained by
complainant did not include the transcript of his examination
because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the
certified copies inadvertently failed to do so.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)s findings: Judge
Tamin is liable for gross ignorance of the law. Respondent
judge apparently believes that searching questions need not
be in writing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tamin properly issued the search
warrant against Chu?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Judge Tamin is grossly
ignorant of the law and ordered to pay P5,000.00 fine.
Art. III, Sec. 2 of Constitution and Rule 126, Sec. 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure implements the
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated the
requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search
warrants, which judges must strictly observe, as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search
warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x
x x In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under

oath and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in

the form of searching questions and answers.

GR 101083

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,

all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIOS.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO
U.ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66
July 30, 1993
FACTS:
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by
44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring
the case in the name of their generation as well as those
generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was
filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the
timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber
license agreements. The children invoked their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's
refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was
"contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court,
invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children have the legal standing to file
the case?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled
that the children had the legal standing to file the case
based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried
with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the
succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal
standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the
Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must
give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in
the interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. L-46772

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF
FIRSTINSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII),
GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES
February 13, 1992
FACTS:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the
CFI of Quezon dismissing the information filed therein. The
private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified
theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which
read: On March 23, 1 977 the named accused filed a motion
to quash the inform ation on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that
the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on
the grounds invoked and the reconsideration sought was
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information charged an offense?
RULING:
YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the
information substantially alleged all the elements of the
crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of
P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not
precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was
"without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said
information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut,
gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the
consent of said owner and without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60)logs
of different species since only the state can grant the lease,
license agreement or permit for utilization of forest
resources, including timber, then the allegation in the
information that the transportation of the logs was
without any authority under a license agreement, lease,

license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of

the logs was without the consent of the state.

G.R. No. 120365

PEOPLE V. QUE
December 17, 1996
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his
conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. The facts
show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an
information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said
information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on
patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There
were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson
Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed
person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it
contained coconut slabs, but inserted therein where sewn
lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show
a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D.
705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which
penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the
particular documents necessary to make the possession
legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did
not exist at the time of the enactment of said Executive
Order?
RULING:
Yes. Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest
laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations
which were already in effect at the time of the enactment

of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and

would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should
not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the
time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59series of 1993 specifies the
documents required for the transport of timber and other
forest products. Thus Ques possession of the subject lumber
without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense
under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Also, the court rejected Ques argument that the law
only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that
the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the
cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal .There are 2 distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a
defence the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the
cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime.
Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.

G.R. No.152989
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.
September 4, 2002
FACTS:
Madrona is an owner of a parcel of land that is about
60,000 square meters. In 2009, Madrona applied for a
Private land transfer permit for him to be able to create a
road and a poultry farm in his property. He was then
informed that he can proceed with the cutting of the trees
even while his application was still pending.
After 3 weeks, representatives of CENRO raided his
property without a search warrant and the woods were
confiscated and were turned over to a barangay kagawad.
After a few days, CENRO returned with a search warrant and
confiscated the logs. Petitioner filed a case against CENRO,
however, he was then prosecuted for finding a probable
cause for violation of PD 705 Section68.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the owner of a private property can be
prosecuted for violating Sec 68 of PD705 for cutting trees
within his own property?
RULING:
Yes, the owner of a private property can be prosecuted
for violating Sec 68 of PD705 for cutting trees within his own
property. Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who

shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code .
The law did not distinguish whether or not the person
who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned
law is the owner of the property, for what is material in
determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the
person or entity involved or charged with its violation
possesses the required permit, license or authorization from
DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or
other forest products.

DENR et al. VS. YAP et al.

G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued
Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their

predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was
not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained
that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island
had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004,
the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again,
the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in
the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and
other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. On

November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of

the two petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private claimants have a right to secure
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay?
HELD:
No. Petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior
to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are
not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing
prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification
modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands
may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on

the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.