9.

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VOLUME

PHILIPPINE
DEFENSE
COOPERATION:

WORKING WITH
SOUTHEAST

OCCASIONAL

PAPER

ASIA
octoBER 2016

OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

02

PHILIPPINE
DEFENSE
COOPERATION:

WORKING WITH
SOUTHEAST
THE PHILIPPINES AND ASEAN
With the AFP traditionally focused on limited engagements within Philippine borders,
the country's regional security engagement is closely entwined with its practice
of diplomacy. The Southeast Asian objective of a region free from great power
competition and conflict has primarily been expressed and
reaffirmed through ever-thicker diplomatic doctrine

As the Philippines enters a state of foreign

policy confusion, its most fundamental security
challenges have not held static. Over several
months, developments in the countrys external
and internal environments have heightened
the pressure on the defense establishment to
safeguard Filipino lives and to protect the national
patrimony. Today, the September marketplace
explosion in Davao City, the Filipino and foreign
civilians kidnapped and held hostage in the
Sulu-Sulawesi corridor, and the reported
exclusion of Filipinos from Scarborough

ASIA

Shoal have become vivid symbols of a defense

establishment pressed on many fronts.
The Philippines is in good company as it faces
the multitude of evolving challenges emanating
from within its border or stretching across
them into maritime and continental Asia. The
interconnected character of modern-day defense
problems requires even the most capable
states to work with others. In this context, the
Philippines can take advantage of its strategic
geographic position and its experience in
Image Credit: aseanup.com

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

03

counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations, as

well as peace negotiations, to be a strong contributor to
international defense cooperation. In the same vein,
the country also stands to gain from working
with and learning from others that have valuable
experiences and capabilities of their own.
Although the Department of National Defense and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are experienced
in international cooperation, changes in the national
governments priorities have resulted in a renewed call to
evaluate the benefits of military-to-military cooperation.
Possible changes in this domain, including the cancellation
of exercises or coordinated patrols, may have long-lasting
effects on the ability of AFP officers to work effectively with
their foreign counterparts toward national and regional goals.
This uncertainty comes amid newly launched and
continuing initiatives within Southeast Asia, to include
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, to work with the
Philippines and other partners from within and outside the
region. Many governments in Southeast Asia have growing
concerns over radical and more sophisticated armed
groups within their respective countries uniting across
borders to extend the reach of Islamic State (ISIL), to
conduct multi-million dollar kidnap-for-ransom campaigns,
and to hijack ships at sea. At present, inter-governmental
cooperation initiatives focus on coordinating sea or air
patrols and on enhancing each countrys ability to monitor
and control their respective waterways. As an archipelagic
country with porous sea borders, the Philippines

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

has an important opportunity to enhance its

own capacities in a critical domain.
This essay provides a tour of major defense cooperation
efforts in Southeast Asia, with the objective of better
understanding the types and levels of cooperation present.
Secondarily, it aims to add some depth to the Philippine
grasp of its strategic environment, which has been
dominated by discussion of the South China Sea. With a
stronger appreciation for other Southeast Asian countries
defense priorities and burgeoning partnerships, the
Philippines will be better placed to identify and seize
upon beneficial opportunities and to position itself in
the long run as a reliable contributor to regional stability.

Philippine Defense Cooperation in Brief Context

With the AFP traditionally focused on limited engagements
within Philippine borders, the countrys regional security
engagement is closely entwined with its practice of
diplomacy. The Southeast Asian objective of a region free
from great power competition and conflict has primarily been
expressed and reaffirmed through ever-thicker diplomatic
doctrine. Although the ASEAN meetings, specifically the
Defense Ministers Meeting, provide forums for operationallevel contact between Southeast Asian military commanders,
working-level relationships are still an afterthought for the
body and exist only between specific members.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) itself was

only established in 2006, and the expanded meeting that
includes the regions official Dialogue Partners was only
established in 2010.1 The ADMM provides a formal venue
for ASEAN military and intelligence leaders to meet, with
the objectives of promoting practical cooperation, engaging
with Dialogue Partners in non-traditional and transnational
concerns, and, importantly for the Philippines today,
ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asian security.2
Despite the diplomatic processes prevalent in ASEAN,
the Philippines international defense cooperation efforts
have more deeply focused on its relationship with the
United States. As long-time treaty allies, the two countries
relationship has featured decades of continuously
coordinated efforts that were refreshed in 1999 with the
resumption of the Balikatan exercises and, afterward, with
Philippine participation in the US-led Global War on Terror.
Nevertheless, US-Philippines military ties did not
dominate the AFPs activities, which were defined by
homegrown counter-insurgency and -terror demands.
However, between 2012 and 2017, the Philippines
significantly increased its defense budget; military funds had
been the subject of decades of neglect from the national
government. During the Aquino administration (2010-16), the
expanded budget brought new life into shelved plans for the
modernization and reorientation of the armed forces toward
external threats. The shift came as the result of a perceived

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OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

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decrease in domestic threats owing to the on-target

Mindanao peace process and the increase in
Chinas activity in the South China Sea, negatively
affecting the Philippines territorial claims
and Exclusive Economic Zone.3
Unable to independently mount a credible
campaign to secure the Philippines Exclusive
Economic Zone and defend the Philippines
territorial claims in the renamed West Philippine Sea,
the Department of National Defense successfully
gained political support to begin a 15-year effort to
improve the militarys standing in 2012. The 2012
Revised AFP Modernization Act was timed to work
in tandem with an updated defense cooperation
agreement between the Philippines and the United
States. Signed in 2014, the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement promised to allow the US
rotational access to Philippine bases, improve the
infrastructure at these bases for the use of
both countries forces, and to preposition
arms and humanitarian supplies.4
By itself, defense modernization will be a generationlong project for the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The AFP has had to work at a steady pace to
advance its officers skillsets, adapt and develop
doctrine for new tools and challenges, and upgrade
its hardware. Defense cooperation has thus far been
an important factor in at least one of these goals:
hardware acquisitions. The Philippines turned toward
the United States, Japan, and Australia for support
in these upgrades (support that arrived), as well as

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Image Credit: media.philstar.com

for the regular inclusion in international training activities and

the sponsorship of officers to US-run training programs.
The value of equipment transfers from the United States in support
of the modernization process of the AFP was one way for the US
to demonstrate its support to the decades-long alliance. Between
2000 and 2015, the US waived 70% of the costs to the Philippines
in government to government arms sales.5 Through the Excess
Defense Articles program, the Philippine Navy received three
refurbished US Coast Guard cutters between 2011 and 2016.
At the end of October 2016, the country received the
second of two C-130 planes approved for transfer.6
Defense cooperation has not only been integral to the Philippines
hardware goals, but to training as well. Both the United States and
the Philippines worked on enhancing the abilities of the Philippine
Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, given the importance of the
South China Sea to their respective defense interests. Military

exercises and other training activities provided an opportunity for the

Philippine military to improve itself to work alone and together with its
ally. Regular interaction was important for solidifying the alliance;
without it, concepts like shared interests and mutual benefit
were needlessly reduced to unreliable political statements.
While the Philippine military grew closer to the United States in the
2010-2016 period, the newfound relationship had an impact on the
Philippines relations with the rest of Southeast Asia as well as
with China. The Philippines role in the US pivot to Asia threatened
to undermine the ASEAN objective of centrality while simultaneously
arousing the distrust of China. Although Philippine-ASEAN
relations remained positive throughout that period, the country
was unable to persuade ASEAN nations to support
bold positions on the South China Sea.
The change in administration in the Philippines has provided a new
challenge for the Department of National Defense and the Armed

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OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

05

Forces of the Philippines. Political distancing

from the United States provides an opportunity
for the Philippines to work more closely with
Southeast Asian partners and to help cement the
centrality of ASEAN to the final resolution of the
South China Sea disputes. At the same time,
the Philippines could revert to more quiet
levels of cooperation with the United States,
while retaining its resolve to independently
improve its military capacities. Balancing these
two demands while remaining on positive terms
with China will require skillful maneuver, but
will likely produce the greatest dividends.

execute attacks on home soil and the safety of

seagoing civilians from armed attacks at sea.
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq have encouraged
previously disparate armed groups to tighten
and strengthen their Southeast Asian networks,
giving longstanding security problems new fuel
to grow in sophistication and evade capture. For
Indonesia and Malaysia, the threat is immediate:
both countries have reported that ISIL-supporting
nationals have travelled to conflict zones in Syria
and, for Indonesia, groups have successfully
carried out attacks on home soil.7

Radicalization and Transnational

Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Corridor

The Philippines has not reported numbers of

radicalized Filipino nationals traveling to Syria
or Iraq for the same purpose. Nevertheless,
President Duterte and the spokesmen for the
Department of National Defense have expressed
concerns that untracked Filipino, Indonesian, or
Malaysian nationals could return with the
intention of extending the reach of ISIL to
Southeast Asia; in the 1980s-90s, fighters
returning from Afghanistan effectively launched
insurgencies in the country. The president has
expressed his belief that returnee fighters
could pose significant problems to the country
within a three-to-seven-year timeframe.8

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have

interrelated concerns over the near-term
radicalization of their nationals, the ability
of ISIL-affiliated and other terror groups to

Even with more limited travel around Southeast

Asia, other reports have documented the efforts
of Philippine groups like the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) to
pledge allegiance to ISIL leadership. Indonesia

The change in administration also provides the

DND and the AFP an opportunity to demonstrate
the continuing value of modernization and the
external reorientation of the nations forces.
Nearly five years into the 15-year program, the
AFP must begin to show returns on national
investments via better outcomes on the ground.
Without that return, modernization could be
scuttled in favor of other pressing needs.

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Image Credit: news.abs-cbn.com

www.stratbase.ph

OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

06

has also reported that, rather than traveling to the Middle East,
its radicalized nationals have traveled or are traveling to the
Philippines to train and coordinate their efforts specific to the
region.9 Coordination among the armed groups is facilitated by
the barely monitored and porous sea borders between the three
countries, which civilians have long-used for small-scale trade.
Armed groups have used the same sea routes, however, to
bypass more heavily and easily guarded air routes to the
Philippines, thereby avoiding Indonesian or Malaysian
surveillance.10 A recent study argued that increasing
cooperation between Indonesian and Philippine groups
also increases the propensity for cross-border violence.11

Although the Philippines has a no-ransom policy for hostages,

their families and friends have paid large sums to the kidnappers
to ensure their loved ones safety. Such sums are reportedly
channeled to local charities as goodwill gestures and not
specifically ransoms as such. In the biggest development,
however, around 50 million USD was reportedly transferred
to the ASG for the release of Norwegian hostage Kjartan
Sekkingstad. Of that amount, 20 million USD allegedly
went to Moro National Liberation Front leader Nur Misuari,
reportedly a personal friend of President Duterte, for his role
in interceding for the hostage on an unofficial basis.13

These interlocking concerns are made more urgent to the

Philippines by the increasing practice of groups like the ASG
to hijack vessels, kidnap seafarers, and hold them hostage for
ransom. Although, by May, the publicized decapitation of two
ASG hostages, both Canadian nationals, helped draw renewed
Philippine attention to the ASG, these tactics continued well into
the new Duterte administration. For its part, the government
increased the level of military pressure on the group, deploying
up to 7,000 troops to surround ASG hideouts and conduct raids
in both urban and rural settings. The group continues to
hold Filipino, Malaysian, and Indonesian hostages.12

Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia Defense Cooperation

By the middle of the year, however, there were few indications,

beyond the pledge of allegiance, that the ASG had adopted
ISIL-like ideologies or had the intention of imposing these on
its peripheral communities. Its kidnap-for-ransom techniques
consistently prioritized financial over political or ideological returns.
Nevertheless, the possibility that the ASG may use its expanded
war chestnow estimated in the millions of dollarstoward
more sophisticated armed campaigns cannot be ruled out.

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

In light of the shared concerns between the Philippines, Malaysia,

and Indonesia, the three countries defense ministers increased
the frequency of their meetings after the first half of the year,
remarkably producing new cooperation agreements after only a
three-month period. Across multiple statements, the three ministers
have affirmed and reaffirmed their intentions to cooperate over
the Sulu-Sulawesi transit corridor. Although the three countries
had established the principles of cooperation during the Aquino
administration, the statements under the Duterte administration
are an important signal for the continuity of that effort and the
Philippine governments support for defense cooperation in
principle and in the Sulu-Sulawesi pathway in practice.
The ministers have defined their specific objective to ensure
that fighters and groups affiliated with ISIL would not be able to
succeed their intent to establish a caliphate or province thereof in
Southeast Asia.14 The persistent and maritime character of that

threat motivated an agreement in August that laid the foundation

for increased working-level contact and operation coordination
among the three militaries. The August agreement provides the
framework for the three countries to monitor and chase pirates,
if needed, into Philippine waters. During President Dutertes trip to
Jakarta, he indicated to Indonesian President Joko Widodo that
Indonesian forces chasing armed groups could take matters into
their own hands: They can do ahead and blast them away.15
The three countries moved quickly, signing a document in
September on the standard operating procedures for their Navies
cooperation along that corridor. The DND said the decision
to move ahead was driven by the need to address the rising
incidents of armed robbery at sea, kidnapping and piracy in the
three countries areas of common concern.16 In October, the
defense ministers met to discuss their progress within the context
of the United States-ASEAN meeting on maritime security; the
discussion focused on the countries concerns over terrorism,
natural disasters, and managing tensions at sea.17 There, the
ministers discussed the importance of establishing and managing
platforms to anticipate and defuse problems before they occur.18
Finally, the three countries have announced their intention
to conduct coordinated patrols along the corridor, specifically
to target the ASG in the Sulu area. Only a month after
agreeing to immediately begin sea patrols to fight maritime
crime, the three countries announced that their cooperation
would be further extended to coordinated air patrols over
the same areas to enhance their surveillance of
maritime areas of common concern.19

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OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

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Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Malacca Strait

The trilateral patrols set up along the Sulu-Sulawesi corridor are
not the first examples of inter-governmental defense cooperation in
ASEAN. In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore first organized
trilateral sea patrols to protect transit along the Malacca Strait further
east, in a program that will likely become the template for the SuluSulawesi patrols to follow. In 2005, the Malacca patrols added an
aerial dimension to surveillance through the launch of the Eyes in the
Sky program; Thailand also joined, turning the aerial portion of the
patrols and the intelligence-sharing scheme into a quadrilateral effort.20
The speed at which the Philippines-Indonesia-Malaysia program
has progressed from principle to sea and air patrols indicates that
the program is largely patterned after Malacca patrols, which have
been successful at reducing the rates of crimes at sea. After 2004,
the number of piracy incidents in the strait fell steadily; by 2009,
Southeast Asia accounted for only 11% of global incidents, its lowest
share of worldwide incidents since 1994.21 As participants in the
Malacca patrols, both Indonesia and Malaysia would be familiar
and comfortable enough with the program to proceed quickly
when given the green light from the Philippine government.
More than simply reflecting domestic concerns, however, the
Malacca Strait patrols were also designed and operationalized
to the specific exclusion of any major power, whether the United
States or China, despite offers to participate. Their success after
operationalization provided Southeast Asia a basis for greater
confidence in a homegrown, independent ability to cooperate over
and successfully manage security challenges without the
interference or assistance of parties like the United States.22
Without the direct participation of its treaty ally, the Philippine
experience from coordinated patrols in the Sulu-Sulawesi area could

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

build greater confidence in its own abilities and a greater

propensity to ensure ASEAN centrality in defense as well as diplomatic
matters. While this would be a significant change of mindset in the
Philippines, it would also be encouraged by President Dutertes
new political priorities, which include greater Asian integration and
lesser dependence on the United States. Once a marginal defense
cooperation effort, the Sulu-Sulawesi patrols could eventually become
a platform for further defense entwinement among Southeast Asian
states, albeit presently outside the ambit of ASEAN proper.

Upstream and Downstream Effects of Defense Cooperation

While the Malacca and Sulu patrols are intended to combat
organized crime and, the proliferation of radical armed groups in
Sulu, inter-governmental defense forums have also been used to
discussed the international angles to domestic maritime concerns
as well as other facets of naval cooperation. As one example, the
possible extension of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
to other public vessels and to private ships would be an important
development to have been raised by and discussed in ASEAN and
larger events. The US-ASEAN defense meet, for example, has been a
venue to discuss the possibility of a US-ASEAN joint military exercise
designed to improve regional surveillance over the maritime space.23
Southeast Asian defense cooperation has grown in prominence
over the last decade, but at present, the trend appears unlikely to
upset established defense links between some ASEAN members
and great powers. The Philippines and Thailand, as United States
treaty allies, and Singapore, as a strategic partner, have not taken
serious steps to sever their relationships with the United States;
on the contrary, both Singapore and the Philippines, excluding
the present administration, have welcomed the increased
presence of the United States in the Southeast Asian region.

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OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

08

Moreover, the security cooperation between the Philippines and the United States and the
Philippines and Australia over naval assets, and between the Philippines and Japan over
Coast Guard assets, will have a positive downstream effect on the Philippines ability to
contribute to sub-regional patrols and attend to domestic maritime concerns. In contrast,
the Philippines coordinated experience with Malaysia and Indonesia is also likely
to enhance its own abilities to combat radicalized groups at home and extend
the reach of its surveillance to the benefit of its international partners.
Beyond the Philippines, the maritime space is important to a majority of the region,
most of whose economies are reliant on sea-based trade. Above and beyond the
Philippines-China tiffs over the South China Sea, individual Southeast Asian countries
have launched maritime build-ups or otherwise prioritized the maritime space. In
Indonesia, President Joko Widodo has been clear about his maritime vision,
which views Indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum for world trade.
With the United States, for example, Indonesia has made improvements to its patrol
capacity, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance abilities, and maintenance capacity.24
Beyond the United States, Indonesia has also begun to cooperate with France over
their first bilateral maritime cooperation forum.25 The Indonesian example
demonstrates how non-aligned politics still permit countries to benefit
from the interdependence of interests and abilities available.
This year, Singapore and Indonesia also discussed ways to enhance bilateral defense
cooperation, which have been a long-time feature of their relations. The two countries
are said to interact regularly through exercises, visits, professional exchanges, and
cross-attendance of course.26 India and Indonesia also began their second coordinated
patrol and bilateral maritime exercise (17 days long) in the Andaman Sea. The two
countries ties are said to demonstrate Indias commitment to its ties with
Indonesia and to maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.27

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Image Credit: theglobeandmail.com

www.stratbase.ph

OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

09

Conclusion
The Duterte administration has shown greater interest in non-Western defense cooperation than
his predecessors, making the coming year a rich opportunity for the Philippines to channel its
cooperative efforts with other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The burgeoning Sulu-Sulawesi air and sea patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia provide
an important platform for the country to deepen its defense relationship with other
Southeast Asians and to help promote ASEAN centrality in matters of regional stability
and shared security. For ASEAN, the Philippine turn, while surprising, could also be an
opportunity to draw the region further together and to reassert regional primacy.
At the same time, the Philippines ties with the United States, Australia and Japan need not
wither on the vine. Each of these countries has contributed to the Philippines growing maritime
abilities, and this increase in capacity should be expected to have downstream effects to
benefit others in the region. More importantly, the Philippines itself does not stand
to gain from an abrupt severance or separation of ties, which will have a profound
impact on important economic and people-to-people relationships.
The Philippines can learn from the example of countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,
that have benefited from defense cooperation with extra-regional states despite their non-aligned
status. It will be a delicate balancing act for the Philippines, but one that it must master if it is
interested in safeguarding its people, protecting the national patrimony, and
contributing to the continued stability of the Southeast Asian region.

IImage Credit: globalnation.inquirer.net

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

www.stratbase.ph

OCCASIONAL PAPER OCTOBER 2016

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endnotes

ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Retrieved from: http://asean.org/asean-political-security-community/asean-defence-ministers-meeting-admm/

Carlyle Thayer. Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. September 2010. Retrieved from: https://www.aspi.org.
au/publications/southeast-asia-patterns-of-security-cooperation/Southeast_Asia_patterns_security.pdf

Angelica Mangahas. Funding the Force: The Philippine Militarys Path to

Modernization. Stratbase-ADR Institute. March 2016.
3

4
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Official Gazette of the Philippines. Retrieved from: http://www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-enhanced-defensecooperation-agreement/
5
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, US Department of Defense. Retrieved from:
http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_september_2015.pdf
6
Angelica Mangahas, Gambling with Trust in the US-Philippines Alliance,
The Philippine Star, 14 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/14/1633548/analysis-gambling-trust-philippines-us-military-alliance

15
Marguerite Afra Sapiie, RI drafts code of conduct on maritime cooperation
with Malaysia, Philippines. Jakarta Post. 14 September 2016. Retrieved from: http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/14/ri-drafts-code-of-conduct-on-maritimecooperation-with-malaysia-philippines.html
16

laysia.

4th Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting among PH, Indonesia, and Ma-

17
Asean, US to step up maritime security cooperation. The Straits Times. 1
October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-us-tostep-up-maritime-security-cooperation
18
Asean, US to step up maritime security cooperation. The Straits Times. 1
October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-us-tostep-up-maritime-security-cooperation
19
4th Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting among PH, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Press Release. Department of National Defense. 1 October 2016. Retrieved
from:
http://www.dnd.gov.ph/PDF%202016/Press%20-%204th%20Trilateral%20
Defense%20Ministerial%20Meeting%20among%20PH,%20Indonesia%20and%20
Malaysia.pdf
20

Bill Tarrant, Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait. Reuters. 7 March

Joseph Chinyong Liow. ISIS reaches Indonesia: The terrorist groups

prospects in Southeast Asia. Brookings Institution. 8 February 2016. Retrieved from:
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/isis-reaches-indonesia-the-terrorist-groupsprospects-in-southeast-asia/

2010.

8
Pia Ranada. Duterte to terrorists: I will eat you alive. Rappler. 6 September 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.rappler.com/nation/145392-duterte-terroristsisis-eat-alive

22
Yeoh En-Lai, Nations rejecting US help in policing Malacca Straits. Associated Press. 4 June 2004.

Kanupriya Kapoor and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, Some Indonesians joining pro-Islamic State Groups in the Philippines, Reuters, 25 October 2016. Retrieved
from:http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-philippines-idUSKCN12P1C4
9

Pro-ISIS groups in Mindanao and their relationship to Indonesia and Malaysia. Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict. 25 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://
www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/56/Pro-ISIS-Groups-in-Mindanaoand-Their-Links-to-Indonesia-and-Malaysia
10

11
Some Indonesians joining pro-Islamic State groups in Philippines. Reuters.
25 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-philippines-idUSKCN12P1C4
12
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia to explore joint air patrols. The Straits
Times. 4 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/
philippines-malaysia-indonesia-to-explore-joint-air-patrols
13

Politika (Third Quarter 2016). Stratbase-ADR Institute. September 2016.

14
Marguerite Afra Sapiie, RI drafts code of conduct on maritime cooperation
with Malaysia, Philippines. Jakarta Post. 14 September 2016. Retrieved from: http://

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/14/ri-drafts-code-of-conduct-on-maritimecooperation-with-malaysia-philippines.html

21
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/southeast-asia-patterns-of-security-cooperation/Southeast_Asia_patterns_security.pdf

23
U.S., ASEAN navies to hold joint exercise in hopes of improving surveillance capacity. Japan Times. 2 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2016/10/02/asia-pacific/u-s-asean-navies-hold-joint-exercise-hopes-improving-surveillance-capacity/#.WBGeSZN95_U
24
Why Indonesia matters in a season of change. The Diplomat. 23 October
2016. Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/why-indonesia-matters-in-aseason-of-change/
25
Indonesia invites France for Maritime Security Cooperation. Tempo. 28 September 2016. Retrieved from: http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/09/28/055807885/
Indonesia-Invites-France-for-Maritime-Security-Cooperation
26
Singapore and Indonesia to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and security issues. The Online Citizen. 12 October 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2016/10/12/singapore-and-indonesia-to-enhance-bilateral-defencecooperation-and-security-issues/
27
India-Indonesia hold bilateral maritime exercise. The Economic Times. 10
October 2016. Retrieved from: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
india-indonesia-hold-bilateral-maritime-exercise/articleshow/54779965.cms

www.stratbase.ph

9.10
VOLUME

ABOUT
Angelica Mangahas
is Stratbase ADR Institutes Deputy Executive Director for Research. Her
research focuses on issues concerning Philippine security and regional
stability. While at ADRi, she has written papers on Philippine defense
modernization and on the geography of political violence in Mindanao.
Immediately prior to joining ADRi, Angelica spent two years in
Washington, DC, where she completed her Masters in Security
Studies and a Certificate in Asian Studies, both at Georgetown
University. Her writing and advocacy experience spans multiple
international humanitarian and diplomatic organizations.

Stratbases Albert Del Rosario Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Philippines 1200
V 8921751
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