Available online at www.sciencedirect.

com

International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Making a difference? Evaluating an innovative approach to the

project management Centre of Excellence in a
UK government department
Tim O’Leary *, Terry Williams
School of Management, Southampton University, Hants SO17 1BJ, UK

Received 13 May 2008; accepted 20 May 2008

Abstract

The UK Government has introduced measures in recent years aimed at improving project delivery capability in government depart-
ments, including the establishment of departmental Centres of Excellence (CoE) of Project and Programme Management (PPM) – ‘super
programme offices’ charged with ‘embedding best practice’.
This paper presents a case study of an innovative approach to the introduction of a CoE for IT-enabled change projects that includes
a central team of highly skilled, experienced managers to intervene directly as required in problematic projects. The positive impact of
this approach is compared with that of a previous conventional CoE focused mainly on ‘best practice’ process implementation, where no
direct impact could be seen.
Taken together with research literature from a number of disciplines, the case study supports the view that the conventional CoE
approach of embedding ‘best practice’ control processes may have little success in improving project delivery. It highlights the impor-
tance of direct intervention using experience-based, context-sensitive skills in improving project performance, and points to the essential
role of organisational power, politics and rhetoric in ‘making a difference’.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Project management; Centre of Excellence; Project success; Project intervention; Best practice

1. Project management Centres of Excellence
1.1. Background
A 2003 government report ‘Improving Project and Pro-
gramme Delivery: Increasing the Civil Service’s Capacity
and Capability to Deliver’ [1] highlighted the importance
of Project and Programme Management (PPM) in meeting
the Government’s objectives for improving public services.
A ‘pivotal’ recommendation was the introduction of Cen-
tres of Excellence for PPM (CoEs), ‘super programme
offices’ combining the role of departmental programme
management office with responsibility for building PPM
capability and capacity.
CoEs were seen as supporting top management in imple-
menting a programme management approach to delivery
throughout the organisation, and providing the informa-
tion for pro-active strategic management of the project
portfolio. They would improve project success by ‘embed-
ding best practice’ and providing support to projects
through:

 Processes and toolkits – providing standardised pro-

* cesses, including the standard project lifecycle, tools,
Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 7770 471939.
E-mail addresses: timoleary@btinternet.com (Tim O’Leary), t.williams checklists and structured guidance so that departments
@soton.ac.uk (Terry Williams). can manage their projects ‘‘with greater consistency and

0263-7863/$34.00 Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.05.013
 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
rigour”, drawing upon the central guidance of the Office of
Government Commerce (OGC), and the National Audit
Office (NAO)1;
 Developing skills – providing frameworks, based on the
above toolkits, and supported by professional accredita-
tion schemes, for the assessment, recruitment and devel-
opment of staff with the PPM skills required for different
delivery roles.
Detailed guidance issued by OGC in 2004 [2] makes it
clear that a CoE is seen as having an advisory and guiding
role in establishing PPM, particularly at the outset of pro-
jects. While monitoring progress and reporting issues to
senior management, it is not expected to actively intervene
in projects. Delivery accountability rests with the Senior
Responsible Owner (SRO – senior manager with project
sponsorship responsibilities) and the project manager.
1.2. Would we expect Centres of Excellence to work?
The Centres of Excellence approach is widely accepted
in government and elsewhere.2 However, the success of
the CoE3 approach in improving project and programme
delivery and building organisational delivery capability
relies on some problematic assumptions:
1. that the widespread and consistent adoption of ‘best
practice’ structured methods to management of all pro-
jects will lead to improvements in project outcomes;
2. that project teams will adopt ‘best practice’ structured
methods through a combination of organisational dictat
and improved knowledge and awareness of the tools and
techniques;
3. that the skills required for successful delivery will be
developed largely through training in ‘best practice’ pro-
cesses, and from expert support in the application of
those tools and techniques.
In examining these assumptions, we can turn to a body
of recent work challenging the assumptions and efficacy of
formal project management methods from a number of dif-
ferent perspectives. Some work takes a critical perspective
to challenge the philosophical assumptions and power
implications underlying mainstream project management
[3,4]. There are challenges to the use of structured method-
ological approaches or work rationalisation in principle [5–
1
The OGC and NAO guidance and ‘best practice’ referred to here is
closely aligned with, and based on the same philosophical and conceptual
assumptions as the various professional project management bodies’
‘bodies of knowledge’.
2
The 2003 paper drew on the KPMG Programme Management Survey
2002 of 134 private and public sector organisations to conclude that ‘‘there
is a strong correlation between Programme Office effectiveness/maturity
and project success”.
3
Throughout this paper, we are referring only to the OGC Centre of
Excellence, though clearly it may be possible to draw wider conclusions
about similar functions more generally.
557
7], as well as evidence of low rates of adoption in practice
[8–10]. The ritualistic uses of methodologies has been high-
lighted [11], and their role in providing psychological assur-
ance and symbols of control [9,12].
A repeated theme in recent research is the invalidity of
the underlying structured model in coping with the day-
to-day reality of projects [13]. Projects are in reality much
more complex and uncertain than is implied by the struc-
tured planning and control models underpinning main-
stream project management prescriptions, and flexible
approaches are required to accommodate this reality [14–
17]. Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects of projects need to be
managed, the latter needing different approaches [18]. All
this requires re-thinking the project management paradigm
and developing underlying theory [19–21].
The need to manage different types of project in different
ways has been recognised [22] and IT and business change
projects (the main focus of this research) are intrinsically
complex and uncertain, largely because of the organisa-
tional impacts. IT implementations are characterised by
‘‘a continuous stream of intervention, bricolage, improvisa-
tion, opportunism, interruption and mutual negotiation as
much as by regularity, progress milestones, planning and
management control” [9]. The importance of organisa-
tional, political and behavioural issues in the implementa-
tion of IT projects is a major theme of the IS research
literature [23–26], and recent work on enterprise systems
[27,28].
There is also much of relevance in the huge body of
research on intentional organisational change, which there
is not scope in this paper to comprehensively review. Suffice
to say that the limitations of highly rational management
models of organisational change based on systems theory
have been long recognised [29–32]. Greater emphasis has
tended to be placed on the ‘people’ aspects, eg leadership,
team working, managing competing interests, and the emo-
tional and psychological response to change [33–36]. The
inherent unpredictability of interactions between human
beings in organisations is seen as limiting the usefulness
of the cybernetic control model of organisational change
at the heart of project management theory [37,38]. The gen-
eralisations essential in a structured management method-
ology, and the implications of predictability, are
problematic because outcomes of management actions
depend upon particular circumstances, context and history
[39], and may even be counter-productive where complex
interactions are not understood. Complexity theories have
recently been used to explore how complex organisational
change can be better managed [37,40,41].
Given this background, the ability to manage complex
projects successfully requires intuitive understanding of
both dynamic and behavioural complexity, including sens-
ing patterns, improvising and dealing with events as they
arise, and applying principles in local context [42–46] Effec-
tive management approaches in practice are ‘semi-struc-
tured’, combining some centralised ‘command and
control’ with a degree of local autonomy and improvisa-
558 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
tion. [42,47]. Effective project managers give priority to
managing key stakeholders, and have the political skills
to ‘play the turf game’ [48,49].
These ‘craft’ or ‘practical wisdom’ skills of the project
practitioner can only be built up through experience and
reflective practice [50–53]. They are learned through ‘com-
munities of practice’, developing an associated set of val-
ues, norms and mind-set through social processes [5,54].
Social processes of learning in local context also play a
key role in transfer of ‘best practice’; new management
knowledge is not simply acquired by codifying new proce-
dures [55,56].
We can see therefore that a considerable body of
research from different disciplines questions the three
assumptions set out above upon which the success of the
Centre of Excellence is predicated. There are doubts
whether ‘best practice’ structured models and procedures
are a good basis for achieving successful outcomes in com-
plex organisational change projects, not least because the
model is a poor fit to reality. Even if the model is the
way projects ‘ought’ to be, adoption of formal methodolo-
gies is often low in practice, and they usually need to be
modified extensively in the local context. The skills
required for success are built more through experience than
knowledge of techniques, are based on tacit knowledge
developed in context through practice, and are not
easily taught. Transfer of improved practice in organisa-
tions is by no means a straightforward process of intro-
ducing new procedures. All of this challenges the
assumptions underpinning the notion of the PPM Centre
of Excellence.
1.3. Measuring improvements in project performance
The aim of the CoE initiative is ‘increasing successful
delivery’ of projects in government, and OGC guidance
suggests that CoEs should seek to measure the ensuing
improvements in project and programme delivery. How-
ever, this is by no means straightforward. The notion of
project success is itself complex and ambiguous [57,58].
The mainstream view of the ‘iron triangle’ of cost-time-
quality has significant limitations, and many point to the
need for broader scorecards, particularly around stake-
holder satisfaction and achievement of business outcomes
[59–61]. Organisational perspectives can be strongly influ-
enced by history and context, with different perspectives
of success becoming more dominant according to the
power of the groups promoting them [62–64]. Further-
more, projects can be seen as moving from failure to suc-
cess and back again over time [65].
Many of these complexities are evident in our case
study. In particular, the dynamic nature of project success
is relevant, as we observe the effect of a number of ‘in-
flight’ interventions over time. The means of assessing pro-
ject performance used in this case is the change in ‘traffic
light’ status assigned to projects.
1.4. Traffic light reporting
CoEs use the familiar traffic light reporting system to
summarise project status and to highlight problematic pro-
jects. Typically projects are flagged as ‘Red’ when they
have serious problems which require immediate remedial
action, ‘Amber’ projects are giving cause for concern,
and ‘Green’ projects are running according to plan.
Departmental reporting to OGC of the most significant
projects (called ‘mission-critical’ projects), further sepa-
rates the Amber category into Amber/Red and Amber/
Green.
Traffic lights provide a subjective assessment of perfor-
mance, though that assessment may in part be based on
more quantitative measures of costs and timescales. Traffic
light status is usually arrived at through complex social and
political negotiations, which themselves merit closer exam-
ination; these indicators cannot be seen as an unproblem-
atic objective measure of performance. For instance, an
increase in projects at ‘Red’ status for a period, rather than
indicating a decline in performance may reflect a more hon-
est assessment, or be a political move to focus attention.
However, as a broad indicator of the perceived perfor-
mance of the portfolio over many months, and subject to
awareness of their limitations as an objective performance
measure, the traffic lights have provided in this study a use-
ful focus for analysis.
2. Case study
2.1. Background to the case study
The case study examines the development of two CoE
initiatives in a UK government department (‘the depart-
ment’) over a 3-year period from February 2004. The first
initiative (‘PPMCoE’) is a conventional implementation in
line with the central guidance; the second (‘ITCoE’)
focused on IT-enabled change projects only, takes a differ-
ent, more interventionist, approach. The research was car-
ried out during a period of direct involvement as a
consultant by one of the authors (‘the researcher’) from
September 2005, when the alternative approach was first
introduced, until March 2007. Events prior to that date
have been described on the basis of available documenta-
tion, including intranet pages, plans, status reports, review
reports and minutes of meetings, together with notes of dis-
cussions with relevant managers. The approach to the case
study from September 2005 onwards is a combination of
action research and participant observation. The informa-
tion analysed and interpreted is in much greater depth and
includes daily notes of meetings and conversations, internal
documents and emails retained over the period, analysis of
project status reports (summarised in the ‘traffic light’ sta-
tus), a survey of project managers, and interviews with
managers engaged in or directly affected by the initiative.
The paper has also been discussed in detail with some of
 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
the key managers involved to check for accuracy, plausibil-
ity of the analysis, and interpretation.
2.2. The PPM Centre of Excellence – the conventional model
In response to the central guidance described earlier, in
February 2004 the department set up a central CoE (‘PPM-
CoE’) which was conspicuously launched through a num-
ber of communication events. These stressed that one of
the three key aims of the new unit (along with guidance
and support to staff, and assurance of project progress)
was ‘‘to enhance and support the use of appropriate PPM
techniques (largely through the provision of information
and training)”. A high-quality 200 page ring-bound docu-
ment and accompanying CD-ROM (‘‘PPM Toolkit Guid-
ance”) was issued to all senior managers and project
managers, providing a customized consolidation of OGC
guidance. Following the central guidance, the new unit
set up functions aimed at progress reporting, the develop-
ment of standard documentation templates to support
the processes, communications, advice and support on
PPM to projects, and training for senior and project
managers.
By the end of 2004, the unit comprised some 24 bright,
capable and enthusiastic staff, knowledgeable in PPM who
tackled the task in a very professional fashion. They were
subject to a series of independent reviews by the OGC,
all of which were positive about progress and approach.
In February 2005, the OGC review said the unit was ‘‘well
placed to contribute to the effective delivery of the top strate-
gic programmes and projects by providing varying levels of
help support and guidance as required on specific pro-
grammes”. This review lists 60 milestones on the set up
plan, with good progress reported in most areas. A subse-
quent report concluded in September 2005 that ‘‘The CoE
has reached maturity in the department”. In terms of imple-
menting the elements of the CoE as envisaged in the origi-
nal policy, it would seem that the department’s
implementation was a model of how it should be done.
The new unit was widely supported at senior manage-
ment level, with frequent reinforcement of its role and of
the value of ‘‘PPM” evident in senior management commu-
nications and submissions to ministers. The initiative pro-
voked much interest from staff who saw the development
of project skills and experience as an important contribu-
tion to their career development. Training courses and
communication events were well attended, as was initial
training for SROs.
2.3. Assessing the performance of PPMCoE
PPMCoE undoubtedly raised levels of awareness of
PPM across the organisation, drew attention to problems
and issues, and was a powerful symbol of the increased
concern with project delivery. However, despite the profes-
sional way in which the unit was established, and its dem-
onstration of successful introduction of the required
559
processes and activities, there is little to suggest that project
performance, or at least the perception of that perfor-
mance, improved over the period in which the CoE was
established. For example, a senior management report in
July 2004 indicated:
‘‘The department has a number of mission-critical pro-
grammes that have high-visibility at OGC and Cabinet
Office. There is growing concern at the continued report-
ing of RED status against these programmes.”
It is exactly these kinds of problems that the Centre of
Excellence was seen as addressing. However, a year later
the July 2005 quarterly report to the Management Board
paints a very similar picture, indicating that 8 of the 9 most
major ‘‘Mission Critical” projects within the department
were flagged at Red or Amber/Red. This was when the
PPMCoE had been in operation for 18 months and,
according to the independent progress reviews, close to
maturity.
In the period over which the PPMCoE had been estab-
lished, therefore, while awareness and visibility of the prob-
lems may have improved, there appeared to have been no
improvement in the department’s ability to deliver projects
and programmes successfully.
Nonetheless, by early 2006, the PPM rhetoric was as
powerful as ever. The Minister gave the keynote speech
at a PPMCoE event for departmental staff, and senior
management made frequent reference to the importance
of better project and programme management, associating
that implicitly with PPM. Establishment of PPMCoE was a
key action referred to in the report to the Minister to dem-
onstrate a credible improvement plan. Continuing prob-
lems in departmental project delivery, rather than
providing a challenge to the CoE approach, served to rein-
force its perceived importance.
But doubts were growing on the ground. Numerous
informal conversations (from September 2005 onwards)
with project managers and teams indicated concerns about
the real value added by PPMCoE. Projects repeatedly com-
plained about the reporting demands from the unit. They
claimed that little apparent use was made of the extensive
information required from them, and some (particularly
the larger projects) saw PPMCoE as a bureaucratic over-
head rather than a source of assistance in delivery. In Jan
2006, PPMCoE training workshops for SROs had to be
cancelled because of lack of attendance. However, the
PPM orthodoxy itself as represented by PPMCoE was
widely accepted as something that was not easily chal-
lenged. A senior programme director, on being asked the
impact of PPMCoE on the business, replied ‘‘Business
impact? (laughs) Well, I’ll have to be careful here. . .”.
In discussions some 2½ years after the unit was set up,
senior managers in PPMCoE saw the department’s contin-
uing project delivery problems as resulting from a failure to
adopt the PPM processes properly. They were exasperated
by a perceived lack of support from senior business manag-
560 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
ers and SROs, many of whom they saw as paying lip-ser-
vice to PPM, pointing to a culture of ‘robber barons’ and
general resistance to corporate standards. In looking at
continuing project delivery issues, they felt that they had
done what they could in repeatedly highlighting issues
and risks to the Board. It was clearly not their role to inter-
vene in projects, and they felt they did not have the remit,
the credibility or the resources to do so. It was the right to
intervene directly in projects that distinguished the subse-
quent CoE implementation for IT projects which is
described in what follows.
It is interesting to note in corroboration of what was
observed here that the National Audit Office [66] observed
(while recognising that the data were ‘‘difficult to interpret”
p. 47–48) that over the period of the introduction of CoEs,
the percentage of ‘mission-critical’ programmes and pro-
jects rated ‘Green’ had shown no improvement. This is
consistent with the conclusions from the research referred
to above and the findings of this case study.
2.4. The IT Centre of Excellence (ITCoE) – an alternative
approach
2.4.1. IT in the department
The department’s IT provision had been outsourced,
leaving the IT department playing the role of an internal
‘intelligent customer’ function to manage the contractual
and commercial processes with the supplier, and provide
a service management and delivery assurance function.
Within the ‘intelligent customer’ model, the expectation
was that delivery accountability for IT projects, as for all
of the department’s projects, would rest with the business
directors commissioning projects from the supplier rather
than the IT department.
From mid-2004 until September 2005, a small pro-
gramme office function within the IT department was
responsible for exercising the CoE function with respect
to IT projects, working as a ‘‘satellite” of PPMCoE.
In September 2005, a new IT director was appointed,
with a successful track record in operational management,
change management and IT project delivery. Forceful,
charismatic, and highly skilled politically, he was passion-
ate about public service, getting things done and ‘making
a difference’. From the outset he took an intense personal
interest in addressing the department’s project delivery
problems. As one of his early initiatives, he commissioned
the researcher as a consultant to set up with him new man-
agement arrangements to improve the department’s IT
project delivery capability.
2.4.2. ITCoE – design and rationale
One of the IT director’s first actions was to create in
effect a new Centre of Excellence for IT projects (‘ITCoE’).
The organisation design included a standard Programme
Office along the conventional CoE lines, responsible for
monitoring and reporting, and implementation of a struc-
tured IT project lifecycle methodology. As such, the unit
was set up with a full commitment to implement ‘best prac-
tice’ PPM processes, in effect ‘taking over’ the work of
PPMCoE with respect to IT projects. The significant
departure from the conventional model, however, was the
introduction of a central ‘hit team’ of around 12 ‘delivery
managers’ working directly with projects, brokering resolu-
tion of issues, and putting troubled projects back on track.
Team members were almost all external contractors, each
with 10–20 years successful project and programme
management experience, and essentially ‘hand-picked’
from personal experience of the IT director and researcher
on previous large projects. They were highly credible
individuals with impressive CVs and good interpersonal
skills.
2.4.3. ITCoE programme of work
The ITCoE was operational in early 2006 and engaged
on an improvement plan, in three main areas:
 Project reporting – building properly informed views of
the state of projects within the portfolio. In some cases,
this relied on delivery manager direct involvement rather
than on standard project reports, leading to some ten-
sion with projects about the correct status traffic light.
 Project recovery – developing, with agreement secured
from the Board following the political moves described
in Section 2.4.6, a support plan for recovery of red-light
projects, and assigning delivery managers as required.
This was a substantial departure from the IT depart-
ment’s previous role, and indeed the conventional role
of a CoE. This work began in late 2005, and was most
intense in the first quarter of 2006 leading up to a major
re-prioritisation of the whole IT portfolio as escalating
costs were identified in project reviews.
 Project standards – developing and implementing the ‘IT
project lifecycle’, providing a stage-gate framework
around which assurance and approval processes could
be built. It is important to note that this conventional
CoE activity was seen initially as at least as important
as the intervention activity. The Lifecycle remained the
‘flagship’ of the new function’s mission, and featured
prominently in management communications. Project
standards and the Lifecycle were the central theme of
a launch conference held by ITCoE in March 2006,
attended by around 60 of the department’s project man-
agers. A pilot was initiated, and a target set for all pro-
jects to be using the IT project lifecycle by September
2006.
2.4.4. Progress with the IT project lifecycle
According to internal management communications,
progress with introduction of the IT project lifecycle was
good. A Board paper in April 2006 reported:
‘‘The design of the lifecycle is now complete. . . It will be
adopted for new projects immediately, in full alignment with
the new Approvals process for IT projects.”
 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
A review of the function by internal audit as late as Feb-
ruary 2007 concluded ‘‘we recognise that significant pro-
gress has already been made, specifically with the
introduction of the project lifecycle”.
However, the situation on the ground was rather differ-
ent. In February 2007, when a second conference was held
for project managers, ITCoE was still presenting plans for
the imminent roll-out of the lifecycle almost a year after it
was declared as in use for all new projects (and 2½ years
after first being agreed to be necessary). Privately, ITCoE
managers accepted that the lifecycle was not being used
in any substantive sense, and it was clear from detailed
reviews of project documentation that it had little impact
on actual project work.
Nevertheless, a survey of the 35 project managers
attending the conference showed high levels of positive
awareness of the lifecycle, with a surprising 48% claiming
that they were already using it, although this was evidently
not the case from reviews of project documentation. Com-
mitment to ‘best practice’ processes appeared to have a
symbolic value and rhetorical force not just for senior man-
agement but for the project managers also.
2.4.5. Delivery management intervention
Involving delivery managers in troubled projects
required considerable political skill and sensitivity. They
needed to be introduced with the full support of the busi-
ness area’s senior management, usually following discus-
sions involving the IT director, and their precise activity
subsequently negotiated with the project team. This pro-
cess was significantly expedited by control of the IT budget,
and the IT director’s readiness to carry the costs initially.
The delivery managers’ role and accountability was often
seen as unclear, which was sometimes raised as an objec-
tion at the outset (and highlighted by an internal audit
report in February 2007). However, they were (in all but
one case) able to establish themselves as making a positive
contribution on the basis of their personal experience and
had the interpersonal skills to gain acceptance.
What delivery managers actually did varied from project
to project. In some cases, they effectively replaced the pro-
ject manager. In others they carried out a brief review, and
identified a series of actions for the project to put in hand.
In others, they focused on a particular problematic issue,
such as agreeing the scope between stakeholders, develop-
ing a revised plan, or challenging supplier costs. It is evi-
dent from their regular reports that they were not
concerned with the introduction of ‘best practice’ pro-
cesses, focusing far more on resolution of the immediately
pressing issues. There is not scope in this paper to examine
this in detail, but an in-depth review of one of the projects
suggested that progress was achieved not so much by tak-
ing different kinds of actions from those already taken
(reviews, escalation, renegotiation, etc.) but by the persis-
tence and intensity with which the action was taken.
The intention of the organisational model described in
ITCoE plans was that delivery managers would work with
561
projects for a short period to address particular issues and
then move on to other projects, thereby sustaining a central
intervention capability. In practice, this did not happen:
once they had become involved, most delivery managers
were not subsequently released by the projects, rather being
drawn into ongoing roles within projects. Furthermore,
budget pressures from April 2006 onwards meant that
ITCoE found it difficult to retain the budget cover for
the pool of resources, which were increasingly covered
out of projects’ own budgets. This in effect led to a gradual
attrition of ITCoE’s intervention capability, so that by
October 2006, ITCoE had a much-reduced capability to
assign highly skilled resources to projects in the way it
had done in late 2005 and early 2006.
2.4.6. The politics of intervention
The IT director’s role with respect to IT project delivery,
and the role of the delivery managers were both problem-
atic with respect to existing governance and accountability
arrangements. While the IT director did have some kind of
overarching responsibility for IT delivery (including
accounting to Ministers for problems and progress), this
was hitherto exercised indirectly through reporting, advice
and guidance, and through management of the outsourced
supplier. Delivery responsibility for projects lay with the
business sponsors, not with the IT director, who therefore
had no remit to intervene except on invitation. The effective
set up and functioning of the ITCoE therefore required
intense political maneuvering. Key factors in the success
of this political activity were:
 administrative control of the department’s IT budget (as
part of responsibility for commercial management of the
outsourced IT supplier);
 the personal charismatic leadership and delivery skills of
the IT director;
 exploitation of the dominant rhetoric of PPM, and the
department’s history of delivery failure, to overcome
objections;
 the quality, experience and political skills of the delivery
managers.
One example of political tactics was the way in which
the IT director moved quickly to intervene personally in
some problematic projects, commissioning a review of
one, and, after intensive lobbying with senior stakeholders,
announcing that it was to be cancelled. Another important
signal was the introduction of a weekly project issues
group, chaired personally by the IT director, replacing
the previous far more junior monthly project progress
meeting. In this way, the IT director and his newly acquired
team injected very visible pace and urgency, highlighting
project issues, initiating and driving through corrective
actions.
The IT director also offered his personal support directly
at the most senior levels, e.g. dealing forcefully with under-
performing suppliers with an aggressive style untypical of
562 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
civil service managers. He also freely provided expert
Delivery Management resource to the business managers,
initially paid for from the IT budget.
A powerful weapon in the political maneuvering was
exploitation of the PPM rhetoric, already promoted by
PPMCoE. While progress on the IT Lifecycle methodology
on the ground was minimal as we have seen, its alignment
with PPM was important in legitimising the overall role of
ITCoE, including the novel right of intervention. For
example, objections to the ITCoE proposals raised by a
Board member were responded to as follows:
‘‘What is proposed here is accepted good practice in
project management, in line with central government and
[PPMCoE] guidance, and formed the core of our
response last September to [Minister] on improving deliv-
ery of IT in [department]. I judged that [Board] would
not wish to have detailed chapter and verse on exactly
how these principles are to be applied in [department]
before supporting them.”
Through a number of these opportunistic and politically
skillful organisational tactics, the IT director was widely
seen as ‘beginning to make a difference’. Objections in prin-
ciple to central interference and unclear accountability con-
tinued but had little impact. Through a combination of
personal charisma and effectiveness, conviction and deter-
mination, a compelling story, use of the PPM rhetoric,
and lack of concerted opposition, the IT director gained
legitimacy for a new interventionist remit for the ITCoE.
This created the opportunity for skilled and experienced
project and programme managers to directly influence
actions in projects, rather than relying on the promotion
of ‘best practice’ processes.
2.4.7. Assessing the impact of ITCoE
As a means of assessing the impact of the ITCoE’s work,
traffic light status for more significant projects (‘Tier 1’) of
the project portfolio were tracked. Fig. 1 shows the trend in
traffic light reporting for January 2006–February 2007.4
This clearly shows that the proportion of projects flagged
as Red or Amber/Red (%R–A/R) declined from April
onwards, coinciding with the period of intervention, and
then began slowly to increase again, coinciding as discussed
with a decline in the intensity of the intervention. The chart
also illustrates the reduction in the number of Tier 1 pro-
jects. This resulted from a prioritisation process to main-
tain the programme within the available departmental
budget once the true costs of completion of projects had
been identified through more direct intervention.
This trend was reinforced by observations of organisa-
tional perceptions of impact at the time. Private conversa-
4
The first four data points are from quarterly reports, subsequent data
are monthly.
60% 35
%R-A/R 30
50%
No of projects
25
40%
20
30%
15
20%
10
10% 5
0% 0
Jan- Mar- Jun- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb-
06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 07 07
Fig. 1. Trends in project performance during period of intervention.
tions, reinforced by comments in the IT department’s
customer survey in April 2006, indicated that senior man-
agers felt the IT director and ITCoE was ‘making a differ-
ence’, comparing it favourably with PPMCoE (focused
now on non-IT projects). At a senior management plan-
ning workshop in June 2006, one Board member remarked
that PPMCoE should look to what ITCoE were doing as
‘‘ITCoE seem to be doing the right sorts of things”.
2.4.8. Interpreting the trend in traffic light status
Judged on the basis of the traffic light reports, the intro-
duction of ITCoE with its drive to improve project delivery
can be seen as ‘making a difference’ over the period
observed. This contrasts with the earlier implementation
of the conventional CoE model, where despite high-quality
implementation and expressed top management support,
no improvement in project performance was evident over
a 2-year period or more.
Both implementations included the introduction of ‘best
practice’ PPM processes. The substantive difference
between the two implementations was the central provision
of highly skilled, experienced managers to intervene in
troubled projects ie to contribute directly to the actions
taken to manage the projects. The impact observed in the
case of ITCoE would seem most plausibly to come from
this direct intervention rather than from the introduction
of ‘best practice’ processes in the form of the IT project life-
cycle. Even if the Lifecycle methodology was beginning to
be used as claimed by October 2006 (and we have seen that
this was not substantively the case) the improvement trend
in traffic light status had already flattened out. It can also
be noted that the greatest impact was observed following
a period in late 2005/early 2006 which involved the most
intensive intervention activity led personally by the IT
director. As the distinctive ITCoE intervention capability
was gradually eroded for a variety of reasons, the trend
in improvement declined and even began to reverse. This
also coincided with (a) a reduction in the attention directed
to projects by the IT director personally once he was satis-
fied that the situation was under better control, and (b)
withdrawal of key consultancy resources from ITCoE.
 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
The above interpretation of the story is reinforced by
interviews in May 2007 with several business stakeholders
on their perceptions of the impact of ITCoE throughout
2006. These all saw the function as having an impact early
on but saw little direct benefit on their projects from the IT
project lifecycle methodology. Each identified the most
direct impact they had felt from the set up of ITCoE as
being the IT director’s personal assistance, and the provi-
sion of high-quality resource (the delivery managers) in
support.
2.4.9. Some cautionary reflections
The case study demonstrates that this is a highly com-
plex environment where conclusions about cause and effect
must be tentative and subject to a number of different
interpretations.
The measure of outcome used (traffic light status) is itself
subjective and determined through a complex social negoti-
ation process between the projects and ITCoE, and was
therefore not an independent measure of ITCoE impact
on project performance. The improvement trend was
broadly confirmed by the views of business stakeholders
referred to above – but it may be that we observed a change
in organisational perceptions of ‘making a difference’ rather
than actual improvement, based on interpretations of some
symbolic gestures, and demonstration of ‘doing the right
kinds of things’. Here the researcher’s own stake as a con-
sultant in demonstrating a successful outcome for the
organisational change needs to be acknowledged.
It may also be that changes in perceived performance
were generated by independent changes in the context
and were partly coincidental. The funding shortfall, which
provided the imperative opportunity to make the project
portfolio more manageable, was very significant. This fac-
tor arguably may have been enough on its own to generate
the observed improvement in project performance (though
it is worth noting that the scale of the shortfall was influ-
enced by a clearer view gained through more active inter-
vention). Funding issues can also plausibly be seen as the
cause of the increase in the proportion of ‘Red’ lights
towards the end of the 2006 financial year, as projects
became concerned about funding availability and more
ready to accept ‘Red’ status.
History and timing were also important. The organisa-
tional narrative of a long history of project failure made
certain actions more acceptable in 2006 than they were in
2004. And while the PPMCoE did not appear to drive
improvements in project performance directly, it was an
important agent in the promotion of the PPM rhetoric,
and thereby supported the eventual more direct interven-
tions. Another crucial factor was access to resources. The
centralisation of IT budgets that was agreed in 2005 for
an entirely different purpose as part of the IT supply agree-
ment, provided the IT director almost accidentally with a
lever and symbol of legitimate authority, and with the abil-
ity, at least for a while, to buy in the skills required for the
delivery manager role.
563
These are only some of the specific contextual and his-
torical factors which may affect our interpretation of what
has been observed in this case, and consideration of the
extent to which this experience is relevant to other organi-
sations, or indeed this organisation at a different time.
3. Conclusion
What we have been able to observe in this case study is
the marked difference in impact between two different
implementations of a project and programme management
(PPM) Centre of Excellence in the same organisation. The
first implementation (PPMCoE) was well-implemented in
line with central government guidance, and its design relied
predominantly on the introduction of, and training in, ‘best
practice’ structured PPM processes to achieve improve-
ments in project delivery. The second implementation
(ITCoE), while sharing similar objectives of introducing
‘best practice’ processes (the IT project lifecycle), involved
also the introduction of a central team of highly skilled,
experienced project managers (‘delivery managers’) to
assess status and to intervene directly as required in prob-
lematic projects.
On the basis of traffic light reports of the project portfo-
lio, it seems that the first implementation, with no remit or
capability to intervene directly in projects, had no observa-
ble impact on project delivery performance over a 2-year
period. The later intervention-oriented approach showed
a clear impact on project performance within a few
months, which reduced as the intervention activity reduced.
In both cases, it appeared that the apparent organisational
commitment to, and promotion of, ‘best practice’ PPM
processes led to few substantive changes in the way project
activity was actually conducted or to any improvement in
the capability of project teams.
Our interpretation is that the observed improvement in
performance was achieved through the active involvement
of experienced project managers directly influencing day-
to-day project activities, under the direct leadership of a
personally powerful and highly committed individual (the
IT director), skillfully exploiting a specific organisational
context. We see the attempts in each case to introduce ‘best
practice’ processes having no observable impact on project
outcomes. However, we observe that the PPM rhetoric was
very dominant, and maintained even when those promot-
ing it were evidently not following PPM in practice. This
tends to obscure the lack of impact of the introduction of
PPM processes on project outcomes. For instance, the rhet-
oric was used in the ITCoE case as a powerful lever in gain-
ing legitimacy for effective interventions that might
otherwise not have been possible.
We see our findings as consistent with the findings from
previous research across a range of different disciplines. As
discussed in Section 1.2 of this paper, this research chal-
lenges the assumptions upon which the conventional Cen-
tre of Excellence approach is based; in particular, the
universal validity of the ‘best practice’ process control
564 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
model of projects, and the development of improved prac-
tice through structured process methodologies based on
that model. The relative success of the ITCoE intervention-
ist approach in this case, and the obvious importance of
organisational power, history and context in achieving
the improved project performance, emphasise the widely
acknowledged importance of interpersonal, experience-
based skills and tacit knowledge applied in the specific con-
text, rather than the introduction of standardised control
processes.
Recognising the limits of generalisability from this case
study, this research, taken with the findings from the liter-
ature, nonetheless seems to us to point to a number of
conclusions:
 the widespread introduction of PPM Centres of Excel-
lence with their current remit, one of the central planks
of the UK Government’s drive to improve project deliv-
ery, may well have little direct impact on outcomes;
 improvement in an organisation’s project delivery per-
formance is possible, but more likely to be achieved
through focused intervention by experienced and skilled
project managers, than through the promotion of ‘best
practice’ processes and techniques;
 such an approach is at odds with the current orthodoxy
and is likely to meet political resistance; its success is
likely to be highly dependent on the local situation,
and require strong leadership and adequate resources.
Looking to future research, it is clear that if we are to
develop effective approaches to improve organisational
project performance we need to understand better (a) what
successful project managers and teams actually do in the
day-to-day organisational interactions that resolve issues
and drive projects to successful outcomes and (b) how
those experience-based skills can be most effectively devel-
oped and transferred, by means other than process
codification.
References
[1] Office of Public Services Reform, Improving Project and Programme
Delivery: Increasing the Civil Service’s Capacity and Capability to
Deliver, Cabinet Office. The Stationery Office; 2003.
[2] Office of Government Commerce. Centres of Excellence for Project
and Programme Management: CoE Information Pack V3.1; 2004
[cited 21/06/07]. Available from: <www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/
Centre_of_Excellence_pack_v3.1.pdf>.
[3] Hodgson D. Disciplining the professional: the case of project
management. J Manage Studies 2002;39(6):803–21.
[4] Hodgson D, Cicmil S, editors. Making projects critical. Management
work and organisations. London: Palgrave; 2006.
[5] Brown JS, Duguid P. Organizational learning and communities-of-
practice: toward a unified view of working, learning and innovation.
Organ Sci 1991;2(1):40–57.
[6] Introna LD, Whitley EA. Against method-ism: exploring the limits of
method. Inform Technol People 1997;10(1):31–45.
[7] Truex D, Baskerville R, Travis J. Amethodical systems development:
the deferred meaning of systems development methods. Account
Manage Inform Technol 2000;10:53–79.
[8] Fitzgerald B. The use of systems development methodologies in
practice: a field study. Inform Syst J 1997;7:201–12.
[9] Nandhakumar J, Avison D. The fiction of methodological develop-
ment: a field study of information systems development. Inform
Technol People 1999;12(2):176–91.
[10] White D, Fortune J. Current practice in project management – an
empirical study. Int J Project Manage 2002;20(1):11.
[11] Robey D, Markus ML. Rituals in information system design. MIS
Quarter 1984;8(1):5–15.
[12] Wastell DG. The fetish of technique: methodology as a social defence.
Inform Syst J 1996;6(1):25–40.
[13] Cicmil S et al. Rethinking project management: researching the
actuality of projects. Int J Project Manage 2006:24.
[14] Williams T. Assessing and moving on from the dominant project
management discourse in the light of project overruns. IEEE Transact
Eng Manage 2005;52(4):497–508.
[15] Atkinson R, Crawford L, Ward S. Fundamental uncertainties in
projects and the scope of project management. Int J Project Manage
2006;24(8):687–98.
[16] Meyer AD, Loch CH, Rich MT. Managing project uncertainty: from
variation to Chaos. MIT Sloan Manage Rev 2002;43(2):60–7.
[17] Thomas JL, Tjader J. On learning and control – competing paradigms
or co-existing requirements for managing projects in ambiguous
situations?, in IRNOP, Sydney, Australia; 2000.
[18] Crawford L, Pollock J, Costello K. Hard and soft projects in the
NSW public sector in 11th annual ANZSYS conference: managing
the complex V, Christchurch, New Zealand; 2005.
[19] Koskela L, Howell G. The underlying theory of project management
is obsolete. In: PMI research conference, Seattle, WA; 2002.
[20] Pollack J. The changing paradigms of project management. Int J
Project Manage 2007;25(3):266–74.
[21] Soderlund J. Building theories of project management: past
research, questions for the future. Int J Project Manage
2004;22(3):183–91.
[22] Shenhar AJ. One size does not fit all projects: exploring classical
contingency domains. Manage Sci 2001;47(3):394–414.
[23] Currie WL, Galliers R, editors. Rethinking management information
systems: an interdisciplinary perspective. Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press; 1999.
[24] Doherty NF, King M. The importance of organisational issues in
systems development. Inform Technol People 1998;11(2):104–23.
[25] Galliers RD, Baets WRJ, editors. Information technology and
organizational transformation innovation: for the 21st century
organization Wiley series in information systems. Chichester,
England: Wiley; 1998.
[26] Walsham G. Interpreting information systems in organizations. New
York, NY, USA: John & Sons, Inc.; 1993.
[27] Markus ML, Tanis C. The enterprise systems experience – from
adoption to success, in Framing the domains of IT research:
glimpsing the future through the past, R.W. Zmud, editor. Pinnaflex
Educational Resources; 2000. p. 173–207.
[28] Ward J, Hemingway C, Daniel E. A framework for addressing the
organisational issues of enterprise systems implementation. J Strateg
Inform Syst 2005;14(2):97–119.
[29] Mintzberg H, Westley F. Decision making: it’s not what you think.
MIT Sloan Manage Rev 2001;42(3):89–93.
[30] Zey M. Decision making: alternatives to rational choice models.
Springer; 1992.
[31] March JG. Decisions and organizations. New York, NY: Blackwell;
1988.
[32] Bryman A. Organization studies and the concept of rationality. J
Manage Studies 1984;21(4):391–408.
[33] Bresnen M. Conflicting and conflated discourses? Project man-
agement, organisational change and learning. In: Hodgson D,
Cicmil S, editors. Making projects critical. London: Palgrave;
2006.
[34] Burnes B. Managing change: a strategic approach to organisational
dynamics. 4th ed. Prentice Hall; 2004.
 Tim O’Leary, Terry Williams / International Journal of Project Management 26 (2008) 556–565
[35] Kanter RM, Stein BA, Jick TD. The challenge of organizational
change: how companies experience it and leaders guide it. Maxwell
Macmillan International; 1992.
[36] Kotter JP. Leading Change: why transformation efforts fail. In:
Harvard Business Review on Change. Boston, USA: Harvard
Business School Press; 1995.
[37] Stacey R. Strategic management and organisational dynamics: the
challenge of complexity. 2002.
[38] Weick KE. Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage; 1995.
[39] Dawson P. Organizational change: a processual approach. Paul
Chapman; 1994.
[40] Burnes B. Complexity theories and organizational change. Int J
Manage Rev 2005;7(2):73–90.
[41] Morel B, Ramanujam R. Through the looking glass of complexity:
the dynamics of organizations as adaptive and evolving systems.
Organ Sci 1999;10(3):278–93.
[42] Brown SL, Eisenhardt KM. The art of continuous change: linking
complexity theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting
organizations. Administrat Sci Quarter 1997;42(1):1–34.
[43] Ciborra C. A theory of information system based on improvisation.
In: Curry WL, Galliers R, editors. Rethinking management infor-
mation systems an interdisciplinary perspective. Oxford University
Press; 1999.
[44] Lewis M et al. Product development tensions: exploring contrasting
styles of project management. Acad Manage J 2002;3.
[45] Orlikowski W. Improvising organizational transformation over time:
a situated change perspective. Inform Syst Res 1996;7(1):63–92.
[46] Weick KE. Improvisation as a mindset for organizational analysis.
Organ Sci 1998;9(5).
[47] Ivory C, Alderman N. Can project management learn anything from
studies of failure in complex systems? Project Manage J
2005;36(3):5–16.
[48] Buchanan D, Badham R. Power, politics, and organizational change:
winning the turf game. SAGE Publications Ltd.; 1999.
[49] Introna LD. Management, information, and power. Macmillan Press;
1997.
565
[50] Boddy D, Buchanan D. Take the lead: interpersonal skills for project
managers. London: Prentice-Hall; 1992.
[51] Cicmil S. Understanding project management practice through
interpretative and critical research perspectives. Project Manage J
2006;37(2):27–37.
[52] Crawford L et al. Practitioner development: from trained technicians
to reflective practitioners. Int J Project Manage 2006;24(8):722–33.
[53] Schön DA. The reflective practitioner. Basic Books; 1983.
[54] Lave J, Wenger E. Situated learning: legitimate peripheral participa-
tion. Cambridge University Press; 1991.
[55] Newell S et al. ‘Best practice’ development and transfer in the NHS:
the importance of process as well as product knowledge. Health Serv
Manage Res 2003;16:1–12.
[56] Sturdy A. The adoption of management ideas and practices:
theoretical perspectives and possibilities. Manage Learn
2004;35(2):155–79.
[57] Jugdev K, Muller R. A retrospective look at our evolving under-
standing of project success. Project Manage J 2005;36(4):19–31.
[58] Lim CS, Mohamed MZ. Criteria of project success: an exploratory re-
examination. Int J Project Manage 1999;17(4):243–8.
[59] Cooke-Davies T. The ‘‘real” success factors on projects. Int J Project
Manage 2002;20(3):185–90.
[60] Sauer C. Why information systems fail: a case study approach.
Inform Syst Series. Blackwell Science Ltd.; 1993.
[61] Wateridge J. How can IS/IT projects be measured for success? Int J
Project Manage 1998;16(1):59–63.
[62] Boddy D, Paton R. Responding to competing narratives: lessons for
project managers. Int J Project Manage 2004;22(3):225–33.
[63] Engwall M. No project is an island: linking projects to history and
context. Res Policy 2003;32(5):789–808.
[64] Fincham R. Narratives of success and failure in systems development.
Br J Manage 2002;13:1–14.
[65] Wilson M, Howcroft D. Re-conceptualising failure: social shaping
meets IS research. Europe J Inform Sys 2002;11(4).
[66] National Audit Office, Delivering successful IT-enabled business
change. London: The Stationery Office; 2006.