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Performanceand
Differentials in
Hockey
Salary
the
National
League*
Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques, XVIII:4:470-475 1992 Printed in Canada/lmprim6 au Canada
Table 1
Averageattributes and lifetime performanceby position and origin, National HockeyLeagueplayers, 1989-90
Position
Forwards
Number of players
Percentage
Age (years)
Height (feet)
Weight (pounds)
Draft choice*
Anglophone
Canadian
Francophone
Canadian
American
181
60.1
26.4
6.03
194.2
36
12.0
26.1
6.01
193.6
53
17.6
26.4
6.01
190.0^ ^
31
10.3
27.7^ ^
6.00
190.4^
55.1
45.0
72.8 ^ ^
117.0^ ^
Seasons
Penalty min./game
Points/game
6.17
1.43
0.598
6.17
1.33
0.706 ^ ^
Defensemen
Number of players
Percentage
Age (years)
Height (feet)
Weight (pounds)
Draft choice*
Seasons
Penalty min./game
Points/game
93
58.5
26.7
6.12
200.3
54.6
6.62
1.61
0.352
19
11.9
26.1
6.04 ^ ^
198.4
33.0 ^
6.26
1.16^ ^
0.364
26
16.4
26.4
6.10
199.1
63.3
5.58 ^
1.54
0.452 ^ ^
Goaltenders
Number of players
Percentage
Age (years)
Height (feet)
Weight (pounds)
Draft choice*
Games played
Goals against average
36
72.0
27.6
5.90
179.6
76.1
217.6
3.67
8
16.0
27.4
5.81
174.3
66.3
169.5
3.43 ^ ^
6
12.0
26.5
5.89
177.0
48.0 ^170.0
3.41^ ^
4.79^ ^
1.16^
0.556
European
4.45^^"
0.57^ ^
0.678 ^
21
13.2
26.8
6.17^ ^
202.4
91.7^ ^
4.00 ^ ^
1.10^ ^
0.396
II Performance
Differential
1.03, 1.18 and 1.07. LGC argue that their results suggest hiring discrimination because
the average Francophone defenseman or
forward outperforms the average Anglophone, implying that team output could be
increased by hiring a new Francophone to
replace a poorly-performing Anglophone.
The 1989-90 data are still consistent with
this hypothesis although the performance
differential is now small except for forwards.2
LGC also use a regression approach to
study hiring discrimination for defensemen
and forwards and we re-estimate their
equations on the 1989-90 data. Table 1 provides the 1989-90 averages of the variables
used in these regressions. The values for
Anglophone and Francophone players are
typically similar. One difference is that Anglophone players are drafted later on average, which is consistent with the LGC hypothesis. The Francophone/Anglophone
differences are smaller than those reported
by LGC for 1983-84, however.
In order to determine whether there is
evidence of discrimination after the draft
(i.e. discrimination conditional on draft
position), for forwards and defensemen
LGC regress players' lifetime points per
game (POINTS) on the draft choice number (DRAFT) as well as DRAFT2 (DRAFT
squared) and dummy variables for position
(DEFENSE) and origin (FREN). Estimating the equation on the 1989-90 data yields:
POINTS = 0.733 - 0.00411 DRAFT + 0.0000167 DRAFT2
(3.16)
(4.28)
+ 0.064 FREN
- 0.270 DEFENSE
(7.78)
(1.43)
N = 288
R2 = 0.234
In this and all subsequent reported regressions, absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.
This regression yielded results generally
similar to those obtained by LGC. However,
controlling for draft choice, it is now estimated from the FREN coefficient that
Francophones score about .064 points per
game or five points per season more than
Anglophones compared to the nine point
per season differential estimated by LGC.
Also the LGC estimate was statistically significant at the 5 per cent level while our
estimate is not.
While the above regression and the one
run by LGC used only Canadian players, we
added non-Canadian players plus origin
dummies AMER for American and EURO
for European and obtained:
POINTS = - 0.698 0.00298 DRAFT + 0.0000102 DRAFT2
(2.95)
(4.21)
+ 0.066 FREN
- 0.239 DEFENSE
(1.52)
(8.39)
+ 0.050 AMER
+ 0.094 EURO
(2.09)
(1.29)
N = 401
R2 = 0.199
One can see that the results are very similar to those found using Canadian players
exclusively. It is interesting to note that the
coefficients on AMER and EURO suggest
that both the Americans and foreign players may outperform Anglophone Canadians, and in the case of EURO, the difference
is significant at the 5 per cent level.
Table 1 also indicates that Francophone
players average fewer lifetime penalty
minutes per game than Anglophone players
(although the tendency is less pronounced
(0.57)
N = 460
(0.45)
R2 = 0.305
Table 2
Salary averages (standarddeviations)by position and origin, National Hockey League, 1990-91
Anglophone
Canadians
Francophone
Canadians
Americans
Europeans
Total
257940
(262950)
230770
(138970)
301560
(321660)
243950
(215090)
198510
(79910)
262230
(137800)
232940
(111120)
234520
(115350)
250120
(238230)
237990
(146080)
Goalies
251670
(106370)
201250
(134580)
247500
(119320)
Total
249060
(217850)
271440
(274370)
221460
(106520)
Forwards
Defense
(---)
(---)
242550
(110590)
233580
(111720)
245650
(195460)
SOURCE:
The HockeyNews (1991).
[2.98]
- 0.00265 AGE2
(1.94)
(1.96)
[1.53]
[1.46]
+ 0.515HEIGHT + 0.000353 ROUGH
(3.03)
(2.62)
[2.95]
[4.43]
+ 0.00591RPLUSMINUS
(4.99)
[3.00]
+ 0.0694 FREN
+ 0.0274 AMER
(0.94)
(0.42)
[1.39]
[0.38]
+ 0.0390 EURO
(0.53)
N = 159
[0.40]
level.
Point production and age both tend to increase salary. As expected, height also
benefits the defenseman financially. The
ROUGH coefficient is positive, presumably
because penalty minutes is a proxy for
physical play, and the RPLUSMINUS
coefficient is positive. The coefficients of
the Francophone Canadian dummy variable and the other origin dummies are not
significant at the 5 per cent level.
Some of the regressors in the defensemen equation seem potentially less important for forwards, and when the forward
data are used, their coefficients have either
[0.06]
(2.21)
[2.50]
- 0.124 EURO
(2.05)
11.74]
N = 301 R2 = 0.6355 RESET (2,3,4) = (4.10, 2.23, 1.50)
- 0.0051 AMER
(0.04)
[0.04]
N = 50 R2 = 0.4938 RESET (2,3,4) = (.18, .39, .92)
cient of the Francophonedummyis not significant at the 5 per cent level, this may be
lack of statistical power because of the
smaller sample of goaltenders; the coefficient itself is large and negative.
As discussed, in all of the above cases we
attempted a wide variety of specifications.
The above were chosen for presentation because they were reasonably parsimonious
yet we judged the goodness-of-fit to be satisfactory. In no case did we find a statistically
significant negative coefficient on the
FREN dummy. Lavoie and Grenier (1991)
use 1989-90 data with more complex specifications yet find the same conclusion.
There appears to be little evidence of salary
discrimination
against Francophone
Canadians in the NHL.
To summarize, no evidence has been
found of discrimination against Franco-
phone Canadianswhen it comes to compensation for performance. As mentioned earlier, this result is consistent with those
found in previous studies of salary discrimination in team sports.
IV Conclusion
Considering the National Hockey League
as a labour market, one can test for the existence of discrimination. The empirical
findings of Lavoie, Grenier, and Coulombe
(1987), using data up to 1983-84 which may
be interpreted as suggesting hiring discrimination, are confirmed for the 1989-90
data. However, the differentials appear to
have fallen and are seldom statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. This change
may be due to market pressure given the
return to winning and/or it may be associated with an increased number of Francophone coaches and general managers, as
suggested by Lavoie and Grenier (1991). In
addition, a similar method and newly-available data are used to test for salary discrimination, but little evidence of this is
found.
Notes
*
4
5
References
The Hockey News (1991) 'Bottom Line On Salaries,' The Hockey News, 44:21:46-47.
Jones, J.C.H. and William D. Walsh (1988)
in the National
'Salary Determination
Hockey League The Effects of Skills, Franchise Characteristics, and Discrimination,'