WILLS

AND SUCCESSION DIGESTS (16-30)

SECTION 4D (2016-2017)
Vice Dean Marciano Delson

16. LABRADOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 83843-44; April 5, 1990
PARAS, J.

17. SEANGIO v. REYES

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: Melecio Labrador died with a holographic will leaving a parcel of

land and several heirs. During the probate of the will, some of the heirs
(Gaudencio and Jesus) filed an opposition stating that the will has been
revoked by implication since before the testators death, he had already sold
the parcel of land to the heir-oppositors who in turn sold the same to a third
person. One of the other heirs, Sagrado, then filed a petition against his
brothers to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale stating that the property in
question was already his by virtue of a devise under the holographic will
which was executed on March 17, 1968, years before the same property was
allegedly sold to the heir-oppositors.

FACTS: Private respondents Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the

settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio.
Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that Segundo left
a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo due to the latters maltreatment of
his father Segundo. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have
a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended
and replaced by the proceedings of the will. Private respondents moved
for the dismissal of the probate proceedings contending that the
alleged will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundos w i l l d o e s n o t
constitute
a universal heir or heirs to the
e x c l u s i o n o f o n e o r m o r e compulsory heirs. They argued that
the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.

The holographic will of the deceased was written in Ilocano and was
allegedly undated since the date was mentioned in the first paragraph of the
will and that the date referred to the partitioning and assigning of a fishpond
and not the date of the execution of the will. Therefore, what was signed was
not a will but rather, a mere agreement, which was allegedly done to the
prejudice of the other heirs
ISSUE: Is a holographic will considered dated within the purview of Art
810 of the Civil Code when the date appears in the middle of the
paragraph of the alleged will?

ISSUE: Was there preterition present in this case?

RULING: Yes, the law does not specify a particular location where the date
should be placed in a will.

There was no pretierition in this case. The Supreme Court held that,
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental
principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the law only requires that the will be dated and
executed in the hand of the testator. Furthermore, the fact that the words of
the testator provided for partitioning and assigning the said fishpond does
not mean that what was executed was not a will. In fact, the tenor of the
words used by the testator shows his unilateral act of executing a will and
partitioning his estate.
Hence, the holographic will executed by Labrador is valid, making Sagrado
lawfully entitled to possession of the property in question.

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Vice Dean Marciano Delson

succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect
to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills,
therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the
form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.1wphi1Considering that the questioned document is Segundos
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of
the will cannot be dispensed with.

possession of the lot, forcing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of

Possession and Payment of Back Rentals against petitioners.

18. Capitle vs. Elbambuena

G.R. No. 169193 November 30, 2006
Carpio Morales, J.

Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and
interest over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to
his estranged wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who
took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on
hereditary succession.

On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they have been in possession of the
lot since 1960 and presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein
he renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot.
Petitioners further claim that respondent Fortunata was already separated
from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from
Olar.
While Elbambuena and Olars petition was pending before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners Capitle filed before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) a petition for cancellation of the
CLOA issued to Olar, on the ground that they are the new farmerbeneficiaries. PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners Capitle. Elbambuena and
Olar appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Ajudication
Board. The DARAB set aside PARADs decision stating that Cristobal Olars
death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the subject
property to his legal heirs by operation of law. This is as it should,
considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of DARAB.

FACTS:
Cristobal Olar possessed a Certificate of Land Ownership Award covering a
parcel of land. Consequently, a TCT in his name was issued. When Cristobal
died, respondents Fortunata Elbambuena, the wife of Cristobal and
Rosalinda Olar, daughter-in law of the deceased
claimed that Olar
relinquished one-half of the lot in favour of Rosalinda which was witnessed
by petitioner Cirilo Capitle and the remaining portion of land was surrendered
to Fortunata.

ISSUE: Does an estranged wife have the right to inherit from her deceased
husband?
HELD: Yes. Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained
his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son.

Respondents alleged that petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to

pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, however, petitioners did not pay
rentals despite demand and neither did they heed the demand to return the

19. PEOPLE v. UMALI

G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991

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Medialdea, J.

facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the
absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v.
Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the
absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

FACTS:
Francisco Manalo (Manalo), who was a detention prisoner in Tiaong
Municipal Jail, served as a poseur buyer of marijuana for the Tiaong Police
Department. Manalo was instructed to purchase from sources known to him.
He was given marked money to be used for the purchase. Manalo was able
to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from defendant appellant Gloria Umali
(Gloria). Through an affidavit and the two (2) marijuana foils, the police was
able to secure a search warrant against Gloria. Glorias residence was
searched and illegal drugs were seized along with the marked money which
was previously used by Manalo in purchasing the two (2) marijuana foils from
Gloria.
Defendants-appellants Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged
for violation of Sec. 4, Art.1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial,
finds accused Gloria guilty beyond reasonable doubt, while her co-accused
Suzeth Umali remained at large. Gloria interposed the defense, among
others, that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
Manalo. She alleged that Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, she stressed that said witness has several charges in court and
because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to
tell falsehood.
ISSUE: Does the prohibition of Art. 821 of the Civil Code apply to Manalo
and thus disqualifying him to be a witness?
HELD: No. Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to
others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law"
takes into account Art. 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons
convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will" (Paras, RULES OF COURT
ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44).
Since the witness Manalo is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not
involve the probate of a will, the Court rules that the fact that said witness is

20. PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA vs LUCIA D. ABENA

G.R. No. 145545, 30 June 2008
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita
S. Mayores while Respondent, Lucia D. Abena was the decedents lifelong
companion since 1929. On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and
without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents
and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins, which
included Petitioner. Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and
Testament and left all her personal properties to Lucia D. Abena whom she
likewise designated as sole executor of her will. Petitioner filed a petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of
Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. Petitioner
appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC
ruling.
ISSUE:
Does the inclusion of the attestation in the number of pages of a notarial will
render the will, defective?
RULING:
NO. There is substantial compliance with the formalities prescribed by law.
The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal
interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: In the
absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the

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will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.

Yes. A holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.

Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3)
pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will,
the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion
that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause
is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the
will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement.

As a rule, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy
is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
Hence, a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved
by means of a photostatic copy.
22. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 106720 September 15, 1994
Puno, J.

21. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS vs AMPARO
ARANZA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982
Relova, J.

Facts:
Spouses Ajero instituted a special proceeding for allowance of the
holographic will of late Annie Sand who died on November 25, 1982. In the
will, spouses Ajero together with private respondents one Clemente Sand
and others were named as devisees. Private respondents however opposed
the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. A photostatic
copy of the will was presented in court. The petition was opposed by
respondents alleging among others that lost or destroyed holographic wills
cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss the probate of the will filed by
respondents.

Issue:
Should the holographic will be disallowed for failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law?

Issue:
Can a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found be proved by
means of a photostatic copy?

Ruling:
No.
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with

Held:

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the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the
necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4)
whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedents.

already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will,
the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. On appeal, the decision was
reversed.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement

that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
23. NEPOMUCENO v. CA
GR No. L-62952; October 9, 1985
Gutierrez Jr., J.

HELD:
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will
to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator
instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay
.Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic
provisions. The court invoked practical considerations in the case at hand.
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of
the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed
with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply

FACTS:
In the will of Martin Hugo, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly
stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but
since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had
been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last
Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will
was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner, that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was

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because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.

intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national

law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. It is evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of U.S.A.

24. Polly Cayetano vs. Hon. Tomas Leonidas, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila and Nenita Paguia,
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondents Nenita Paguia, et
al as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory
heir, he executed an affidavit adjudicating unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Several months thereafter, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in Pennsylvania United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time
of her death and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. that the
testatrix died in Manila and that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last
will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. and that
after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered in Philadelphia, U.S.A.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the reprobate of the will alleging that
its intrinsic provisions are null and void and that even if pertinent American
laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply because
they would work injustice and injury to him.
Respondent judge issued an order admitting said will and allowed
probate in the Philippines. Nenita Paguia was appointed administratrix.

25. Vda. de Molo v. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
In this appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the appellant Vda. de Molo is questioning the admission for probate of the
last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo executed on 1918.
The deceased, during his lifetime, executed two wills, one in 1918, and the
other in 1939. The latter contains a clause which expressly revokes the will
executed in 1918. Vda. de Molo filed for a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. Without any opposition therein, the will was admitted for probate.
However, upon a petition filed by the respondents, the previous order was
set aside and the case was reopened.
Petitioner contends that the 1918 was deliberately revoked by Molo himself
by executing the 1939 will which contains a revocation clause,
notwithstanding its disallowance. The respondents, on the other hand,
contend that there is no showing that the testator deliberately revoked that
1918 will, and since the 1939 will was defective, it cannot be given effect.

ISSUE:
Is the reprobation of the will invalid for it divested the father of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for the latter and the same would
work injustice and injury to him? NO.
RULING:
NO. Under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the

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entitled to the estate of Remedios, directing the administrator to deliver to the
said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed.
Private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of partition of 10
September 1973. In said motion, they ask the court to declare the
proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the
will, which they filed on 1 October 1979.
Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court in taking cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration considering that the probate judgment and the order
approving the Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings had long
become final and had in fact been executed.
ISSUE: Can the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration be treated as a petition
for relief from judgment ( a remedy which will allow private respondent to
impugn the probate decree)?
HELD: NO. Private respondents have lost their right to file a petition for relief
from judgment.
In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved
party to set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed
within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6)
months after such decision is entered;
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral
attack, assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code,
assuming that the decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 cannot
be applied.
It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a
petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for
reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twentytwo (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1)
month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order approving the
Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity
through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of petitioners
promise to present the original will constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of the
kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of
the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for annulment of judgment. It is
settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or

ISSUE: Can it 1939 will revoke the 1918 will notwithstanding its disallowance
for probate?
RULING: No. The 1939 will cannot revoke the 1918 will because it was
precisely disallowed for probate.
It is true that the law on the matter (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure)
provides that a will may be revoked by some will, codicil, or other writing
executed as provided in case of wills.
It cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within
the meaning of said word, but as other writing executed as provided in the
case of wills, simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be
regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is
authority holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot
have the effect of revocation.
Therefore, the 1918 will should be admitted to probate.
26. The Heirs of the Late Jesus Fran v. Salas
G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992
DAVIDE, JR. J:
FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died, leaving real and personal
properties. She executed a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed
to her collateral relatives all her properties.
On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition for the probate of the will. On 10
August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed
a manifestation alleging that they needed time to study the petition. Private
respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September
1972 a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will.
The petition thus became uncontested.
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to
probate the will. A Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the
will and signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis
Fran, Remedios Mejia and respondent Concepcion Espina, was submitted.
Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit
receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing,
and state that they had no objection to its approval. After the hearing on the
Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September
1973 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs

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collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which
resulted in such judgment.
Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack. The
probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any
attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court
below to annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the
will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive
with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on
any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceeding.

and the witnesses also signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
testator and of one another renders the will invalid?
Held: Yes.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
"Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is that act of the
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the
latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such,
and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication;
but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same
paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. An
attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to
the manner of the execution of the same.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein
assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states
as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on
the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously
refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand,
although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of
each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to
the witnesses, it must however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator
signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately
follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then
clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is
a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the

27. CANEDA VS. CA

G.R. No. 103554. May 28, 1993
REGALADO, J:
Facts:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children executed a last will and
testament before three attesting witnesses. The said testator was duly
assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty.
Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. In the attestation clause it
states: "We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and
postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do
hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO
CABALLERO, has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE
PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in
letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he
has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator
and in the presence of each and all of us.
Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No.
3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking
the probate of his last will and testament.
Petitioners asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the
reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Issue: Is the absence in the attestation clause of a statement to that effect
that instrumental witnesses were present when the testator signed the will

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application of the substantial compliance rule. It may thus be stated that the
rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions
which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Hence, the will is invalid.

by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this

case, Miguel and Erlindas union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the
latters de facto separation. Further, Erlinda was not able to sufficiently
establish that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland.
Considering that she was only 23 years old at the time, it is unrealistic to
conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price
of subject property. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis
to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the properties for
P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The transaction was properly a
donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article
739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly
provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies
to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Therefore, the subject properties rightfully belong to the conjugal estate of
Miguel and Carlina.

28. AGAPAY v. PALANG

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997
ROMERO, J.
FACTS: In 1946, Miguel Palang married Carlina Vallesterol in Pangasinan,
with whom he had one child, Herminia. In 1973, the then 63-year-old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with 19-year-old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months before the marriage, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased, but the titles to the
properties were issued in Erlinda's name. Meanwhile, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement whereby
they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land
to Herminia.
In 1977, Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher. Two years later, Miguel
and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage.
Miguel died in 1981. Meanwhile, Carlina and Herminia filed an action to
recover the riceland and house and lot from Erlinda. For her part, Erlinda
averred that while the riceland was jointly registered in her and Miguel's
names, she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher.
She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the
same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from
claiming the properties since Carlina had already donated their conjugal
estate to Herminia.

29. Reyes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124099, October 30, 1997
Torres, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the CA decision which allowed the probate of
the will of Torcuato Reyes, Jr. (Reyes) and directed the issuance of Letters
Testamentary in favour of Petitioner Julio Vivares (Vivares) as executor.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,
Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape are the oppositors.

ISSUE: Can Erlinda claim a better right of ownership over the subject
properties?

Reyes executed his last will and testament where he bequeathed in favour of
his alleged wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes most of his properties.

HELD: NO. Erlinda cannot assert ownership of the properties she had
acquired during her union with Miguel.
With respect to the riceland, Article 148 of the Family Code is applicable.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned

After Reyes died on May 12, 1992 private respondent filed a petition for
probate of the will on May 21, 1992 before the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin.

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The petitioners filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the
last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in
accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle
exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never
married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to
be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle
who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus
Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes
was violative of public morals.

Here, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator
that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. Moreover, the CA correctly held that the trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still
married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The
testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to
the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of
Asuncion.

The RTC declared that the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. It, however, nullified the provisions involving
Asuncion Reyes on the ground that she is disqualified due to her illicit
relationship with the decedent. The CA likewise admitted the will but restored
the provisions nullified by the trial court. Aggrieved, the oppositors filed this
petition for review.

Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence,

documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning
Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a
pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred
in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations
are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to
overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.

ISSUE: Must the will be admitted to probate?

HELD:
Yes. The will must be admitted to probate.

30. ROLANDO SANCHEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108947; September 29, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Rosalia S. Lugod, being the only child, filed a petition for letters of
administration over the estate of her mother who died and the estate of her
father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility.Before the
administration proceedings could be terminated and Rosalias father, Juan
Sanchez, died. The private respondent as illegitimate child of the latter, filed
a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan C.
Sanchez, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and
petitioners (other illegitimate children) executed a compromise agreement
wherein they agreed to divide the properties of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
Nine years later, the petitioners filed, a motion to defer the approval of the
compromise agreement in which they prayed for the annulment of the
compromise agreement. Petitioners contended among other that the
compromise agreement is not valid
Issues:
1. Is judicial approval necessary if the compromise agreement was
executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings?

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only

upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court
merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the
formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of
the wills provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and
allowed.
Exceptionally, intrinsic can be first determined as in the following instances:
(a) when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the
will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid; or (b) where
the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate
court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will.

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2. Are the compromise agreements entered into by guardians and
parents in behalf of their wards or children in this case valid without
judicial authority?
Ruling:
1. No. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Being a consensual
contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial
approval is not required for its perfection. In this case, since the compromise
agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties
ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best
they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and
voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is
merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed
upon in good faith by the parties thereto.
2.YES. However, Supreme Court observed that although denominated a
compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of
partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that
[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires
the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2)
the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3)
the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds. The Court finds that all the foregoing requisites are
present in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the validity of the parties
compromise agreement/partition in this case.

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