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Fall 2009
Historical sociologist, Michael Mann, seeks to explain the fallacies of the so called “new
imperialism.” He approaches the twenty-first century United States as a falling global empire in
attempts to convince his audience that the United States has an exaggerated power. While the
premise may seem cliché, Mann’s comparative approach to the twenty-first century world and its
major powers does create new series of questions. Throughout the monograph, Mann argues that
while the United States may have the fundamentals of an empire, the state itself is incoherent by
definition because of its over extensions, contradictory foreign policy, and economic practices.
The book is written in and about contemporary events post 11 September 2001. As such,
Tony Blair and George W. Bush and their respective administration officials are often mentioned.
Mann begins his study explaining the differences between the United States at the end of the
Cold War to the post-9-11 entity. Ideologies have shifted drastically in less than a decade; H.W.
Bush called for an age of global peace composed of humanitarian efforts while his son
established the principles of preemptive strikes. According to Mann, the staggering shift in
direction has been a direct result of Bill Clinton’s failure to control zealous personnel and
outspoken activists during his successive administrations, the scattered election of George W.
Bush, neoconservative Christian chicken-hawks in power places, and of course the events of
9-11. Because of these triggers after the fall of the Soviet Union, new imperialism became a
realism; Mann points out that the United States had an empire and the policy makers believed
Every great empire has enjoyed a potent military. For the United States, military
supremacy has been an understatement. Mann goes so far as to argue by 2001 that the United
States was the sole military superpower, and even before that turn of the century no power save
the Soviet Union early stood near equal. The U.S. military is giant, but Mann questions whether
it could create his definition of an empire. The requirements, according to Mann, for military
resources in an empire are secure defense or deterrence against attacks, offensive strike power,
ability to conquer territories and peoples, and the ability to pacify them afterwards. Mann uses
many examples of failures to achieve all four requirements from communist countries to
arsenal of the United States cannot be used. Thus, the responsibility for exerting American will
falls to conventional forces which are substantial, but not as staggering as the unconventional
capabilities.
However, Mann is quick to point out that the United States has a global deployment
adeptness unmatched by any power in history. This matched with superior fire power among
land, air, and sea positions helps make the lacking conventional troop numbers efficient at their
assignments. Nevertheless, as seen in the panicked withdrawals of the latter decades of the
twentieth century, America can not stand to see casualties and this is a grounding, limiting force
to empire. Furthermore, Mann points out that the U.S. superiority is being checked by the
evolving world of rogue states who are more than capable and willing to proliferate
unconventional warfare items and use them as their needs dictate. Because technology is quickly
adapted (or stolen), and because of the policies that limit use of unconventional arsenals, rogue
Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! Fall 2009
states and organizations have a vast advantage that levels the battlefield between the United
Mann challenges the assertions by U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, nine days
after 9-11, “Economic strength at home and abroad is the foundation of America’s hard and soft
power. Earlier enemies learned that America is the arsenal of democracy; today’s enemies will
learn that America is the economic engine for freedom, opportunity and development.”
However, as most know such great economic prominence faded quickly throughout the 1950s as
war-torn Europe and Asia rebuilt at the mercy of the United States. The Vietnam War ended
American the period of U.S. economic preeminence. In 2002, Russia was trading substantially
more with the commonly associated allies of the United States in Europe that European states
were with the United States. Billions of dollars have gone into funding regimes that contradict
the image of America. Unfortunately, even more (especially in the southern hemisphere) would
not be granted American financial aid in the twenty-first century, thus far. The American
economy is weakening still, and even if countries are indebted to us, we are even more indebted
to the new economic giants such as China. Since the United States can no longer direct policies
of foreign investors or economies, the United States has become what Mann calls a “back-seat
driver.” Seeming benevolent economic imperialism is a myth according to Mann and has only
accelerated a shift in economic dominance from the United States to new powers.
International politics also limit an American empire. According to Mann, in 2003 there
were 190 self-styled nation states, “that is states claiming sovereignty over their territories in the
name of the nation or people.” However, Mann notes that not all of these states are effective. At
the same time, the United States or any other policing power cannot interfere with internal affairs
Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! Fall 2009
of other states because it would go against the UN Charter. Mann expounds on the Multilateral
and unilateral geopolitics. He points out the hypocrisy of multilateralists in the UN where
inequality of states is exacerbated by the existing structure, especially in the security council.
The UN is looked to in order to invade another power because of violations. Thereby, the United
States is held in check to an extent which in turns help limit war funding. Furthermore, Mann
points out that the reality of the situation is that interventions go better for the United States
when they are multilaterally sanctioned. Because of the multipolar world, American concerns
have focused on the Middle East and North East Asia where rogue states exist and cannot
supported by the majority of power states, and as such unilateral approaches harken deflation.
Additionally, the United States has failed to create an effective regime. Thereby, it is
essentially stuck in zones where it intervenes. The bottom line is that the United States cannot
exact a regime change; it can neither afford it financially nor militarily. Classic empires did not
have to attempt nation building. The era, thus, has influence in limiting an American empire.
What can be created is client states with weak leadership. However, even these succumb to
disorder and fail. The United State here exaggerates its ability to exact a nation state.
Ultimately, Mann argues that American political power is schizophrenic in that, “International
politics are large, but oscillating unsteadily between multilateralism and unilateralism.” The
world is different than it was for previous empires, the existence of sovereign nation states limits
Mann argues that American ideologies are in flux. The neoimperialists are self righteous
and hold sway over the majority of the population, according to Mann. We push forth the image
of tranquility and equality, but the United States is hardly equal. Mann points out members of
Congress have to raise millions of dollars just to be considered for election. Furthermore, Mann
believes the public is being mislead by the media. He believes talk radio hosts, especially,
worked to incite hatred and violence against Iraqis and Muslims as the United States invaded
Iraq. The American desire has historically been to extend democracy, human rights and equality
to other nations, but Mann believes such ideology is being exploited in hopes of advancing a new
imperialism.
The majority of the monograph goes into great detail relating contemporary, post-9-11
events to historical examples in hopes of proving that what Mann calls neoimperialism is
unattainable for the United States. In his eyes, America is leading an incoherent empire
unwittingly. One walks away from the book convinced that the current state of affairs is
questionable at best, but Mann does little for advancing what he thinks should be done. His
preface explains one of his points in writing the monograph was to convince his audience of
imperial fallacies, but the abrupt end after demeaning the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions leaves
the reader adrift. The work was published by a historical sociologist, so perhaps comparisons are
exactly what Mann sought out to reveal and use those as bases for the disjointed existence of an
American empire.