CASE 1: NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE

Facts:
Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project.
He then informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt, in which she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
When probed by the senate, Neri refuses to give some more information regarding
the alleged bribery going on behind the NBN Project. When asked further regarding
the conversation between Neri and President Arroyo on matters of the NBN project,
he calls for Executive Privilege.
Executive Privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress.
The Senate issued a contempt order against Neri and directed his arrest and
detention.
Petitioners claims:
The President is entitled to the confidentiality of her correspondences. This is
necessary for the protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
If the president is not protected by the confidentiality of conversations, it will hamper
her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities. It might also impair
our economic relations with China.
Senates defense:
1. This is a violation to the people's right to information.
2. The Congress has a need to investigate the matter as it is crucial in their
legislation of a potential bill.
3. They contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation are beyond the reach of this Court.
Rulings:
1. The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
2. Congress may only investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate
or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province
of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to
the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive.
3. The Courts exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there
appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent
Committees.
In summary:
The Legislative Committee asks the Judiciary and the Executive branches to heed to
their rules of investigation in the aid of their legislation. They contend that their
internal procedures and deliberations should be respected and cannot be inquried
into by this Court, supposedly, in accordance with the principle of co-equal branches
of government.

 The legislative should also respect the Executive's power of "Executive Privilege" and
the judiciary's power for "Judicial Review".
The Senate's order of Contempt issued against Neri is hereby set aside.

CASE 2: GUDANI v SENGA

Facts:

Sept 22 2005: Senator Biazon invites AFP officers to a hearing regarding the GMA
wiretapping issue. Among them are petitioners Brigadier General Francisco Gudani and
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan Yes, this was one of the points raised in Senate v
Exec Secretary

Sept 27, 2005: GMA prohibits AFP personnel from appearing in legislative hearings.
AFP Chief Senga receives this message, attempts to transmit it to Gudani and Balutan

Sengas message fails to reach petitioners. Impelled by the need to uphold the
publics constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern,
Gudani and Balutan appear at the Senate hearings.

Gudani and Balutan subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for violating the
Chain of Command by disobeying a legal order, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry
Ruling:
Petition denied.
instructions.

Gudani and Balutan should not have disregarded their superior officers (GMA)

GMAs ability to require military officers to secure prior consent doesnt come from
her executive privilege, but from her commander-in-chief powers as President

The Constitution gives the President, a civilian, final authority to the AFP to show that
it countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil
courts

As CIC, the President has absolute authority over the persons and actions of the AFP.
She can restrict their travel, movement and speech.

Kapunan v de Villa, regarding military discipline: individual rights may be curtailed,

because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a
large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be
followed, without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a
soldiers personal views on the matter.

Political belief is a potential source of discord among people, a military torn by political
strife is incapable of fulfilling its function as protectors of the people and the State.
o
Obeisance to a superior officers commands takes precedent over upholding the right
to information, especially political information.
o
As members of the military, Gudani and Balutan should have had the discipline to
obey their commander-in-chief before they attempted to uphold the publics right to
information.

o
President > Senate, because President = Commander in Chief. Senate Commander
in Chief. So even if the Senate compels them to attend, they must still answer to the
President.
o
If G&B really wanted to testify, they should have sought relief from the courts

Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust.

Probably useful dicta: The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate
branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons
summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between
the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their
various constitutional functions. The judiciary is the means by which one branch compels
the other to a particular action. Its the ultimate third wheel.

CASE 3: SENATE v ERMITA

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,
inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,
and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were
not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid
and
constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must
be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

CASE 4: GARCIA v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other
oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said
EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
RULING:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is
within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they
may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the resident, that they must be
enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix tariff rates and other duties or
imposts
The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
Sections 104 and401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

CASE 5: INTEGRATED BAR OF PHILIPPINES v ZAMORA

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for
a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP
filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void
and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed
forces
is
subject
to
judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian
character
of
the
PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the
armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the
3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition
fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there
exists
no
justification
for
calling
out
the
armed
forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times,
the
real
authority
belonging
to
the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of
a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

CASE 6: KURODA v JALANDONI

Facts:
1

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces covering 1943-1944 in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and
other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission
was establish under Executive Order 68.

Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the

military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds
that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes).

Issues:
1
2

Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional

Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

HELD:

Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try
Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art.
2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is
in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation
of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on
the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by
the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan).

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have
been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner
is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a
special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

CASE 7: RODRIGUEZ V MACAPAGAL

Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the
Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he
refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection
Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA
dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her
tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:

Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit.
Held:
No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes
the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that
presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The
term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore,
former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

CASE 8: RUFFY V CHIEF OF STAFF

Facts:
During the Japanese occupation, Ramon Ruffy, et al., petitioner, a provincial
commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy. He is organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as bolo combat
tea, or bolo area. The said Bolo area was a contingent of the 6thh military district, which has
been recognized and placed under the operational control of the US army in the South
pacific.
Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of command in the bolo area. Major
ruffy who was then acting as commanding officer for the Bolo area was relieved of his
position. Later on or on Oct 19, 1944. Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the
petitioners. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioners trial.

The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filled this instant petition with the
contention that he was not subject to military law at the time of the offense for which he
had been placed on trial was committed. Petitioners contended that by the enemy
occupation of the Philippines, the national defese act and all laws and regulations creation
the existence of the Philippine Army including the articles of war were suspended during
such occupation.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was
committed.
Held:
YES, petitioners were subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was
committed. The rule that laws of political in nature or affecting relations are considered
superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for governing of the
civil inhabitants of occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies
in arms (such as Philippine army).

CASE 9: DAVID V ARROYO

FACTS
On 17 January 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang of the Magdalo Group, involved in the Oakwood
mutiny, escaped from detention, and vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all
costs. They encouraged people to show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime.
Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by
wearing red bands on our left arms. On 17 February 2006, authorities discovered a plan
(Oplan Hackle 1) to bomb a PMA Alumni Homecoming and to kill the President. A bomb was

found the following morning. On 21 February 2006, Lt. San Juan was arrested in a
communist safehouse in Batangas with subversive documents and minutes of the meetings
between the Magdalo Group and the NPA. Prior to his arrest, he said that Magdalos DDay would be on February 24, 2006. On 23 February 2006, the President cancelled Edsa
celebrations, revoked rally permits. On 24 February 2006, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5. On the same day, protesters from Kilusang
Mayo Uno and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno were dispersed in
various parts of Metro Manila. The police along EDSA arrested Randolf David and Ronald
Llamas. On 25 February 2006, the PNP-CIDG raided the office of the Daily Tribune with only
the presence of the security guard on duty. On 3 March 2006, the President issued PP1021,
declaring that the state of emergency has ceased. 7 petitions were filed on the
constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO5. The Solicitor-General said that:

the petitions should be dismissed for being moot;

GR 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 17183 (KMU), 171485 (Escudero) and 171489
(Cadiz) have no legal standing;
it is not necessary for the petitioners to implead the President;
PP1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and
PPP1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression and redress
grievances.

ISSUES
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
HELD
PP 1017 is constitutional in terms of its call on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. It is unconstitutional, as it orders the AFP to enforce laws unrelated to the
lawless violence and to the decrees issued by the President. The declaration of emergency
powers is constitutional, but the it does not authorize the takeover of businesses without
the authorization of Congress.
G.O. No. 5 is constitutional, because it guides the AFP and PNP on the implementation of PP
1017. It is unconstitutional in terms of its use of acts of terrorism, which has not been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf David and Ronald Llamas and the search of the Daily
Tribune are unconstitutional, so are the dispersals and arrests on KMU protestors.
There is nothing about violation peoples rights were mentioned in PP 1017.

CASE 10: AQUINO VS MILITARY

FACTS:

Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, petitioner was arrested
on September 23, 1972, pursuant to General Order No. 2-A of the President for complicity
in a conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio in Rizal province


On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus 1 in which he
questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention.

This Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it, and required respondents
to file their respective answers, after which the case was heard. Thereafter, the parties
submitted their memoranda. Petitioner's last Reply memorandum was dated November 30,
1972. On September 17, 1974, this Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of
martial law and the arrest and detention of petitioner.
ISSUE
W/N the military commissions have jurisdiction to try him, alone or together with others,
for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the AntiSubversion Act and for murder
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
YES. The court opined that respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully
constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including
the petitioner. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law
(Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid
and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public
safety. In order to preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President
of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative
requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in General Order
No. 8 (September 27, 1972) the Court of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create
military tribunals to try and decide cases "of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them." In General Order No. 12 (September 30, 1972), the military
tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over
crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on
firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the
quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.
Schwartz: "The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in
areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal
processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in court."

11: WRIT OF AMPARO

Petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Who may file:
1. Aggrieved Party
2. Any qualified persons
a. any member of the immediate family
b. any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, if default of (a)
c. any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the
immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Where to file:
1. RTC of the place where threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred;
2. Sandiganbayan;
3. Court of Appeals; or
4. Supreme Court.
When writ is issued:
- Upon filing of the petition if on its face, the court, justice or judge ought to issue.
Contents of Petition:
1. Personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. Name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission,
or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
5. The action and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
6. Relief prayed for.
*petition may also include general prayer for other just and equitable relief
Return of the Writ:
Respondent is required within 72 hours after service of the writ to file a verified written return
together with supporting affidavits, which shall, among others, contain the following:
a.
Lawful defences to show that did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty
or security of another;
b.
The steps or actions taken by respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person/s responsible for the threat, act or omission;
c.
All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or
omission;

d.
If the respondent is a public official or employee, return shall further state the actions that
have been or will still be taken:
- To verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
- To recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible;
- To identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
- To determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as the
pattern or practice that may have been brought about the death or disappearance;
- To identify and apprehend the person/s involved in the death or disappearance; and
- To bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
Nature of the hearing on the petition:
Summary. However, court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify
the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admission from the parties.
Interim Reliefs reliefs that may be granted by the court, justice or judge upon filing of petition or
before final judgment
1. Temporary Protection Order An order upon motion or motu propio for the protection in a
government agency or accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing the
safety of petitioner or aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family
2. Inspection Order An order to any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying or photographing the
property or any relevant object or operation therein.
3. Production Order An order to any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things or objects in
digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying, photographing by or on behalf of the
movant.
4. Witness Protection Order The court, justice or judge may refer the witnesses to the Department
of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program.
Judgment must be rendered within 10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.
Reference: A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
Basis of the Rule on Writ of Amparo: Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
"Amparo" which originated in the political experience of Latin American countries, is derived from
"amparar" which means "to protect." As envisioned by our own Supreme Court, the writ of amparo
can be availed of "as protective tool and remedy for the greater protection of the constitutional
rights of the victims". Human rights groups welcomed the advent of amparo which they perceived as
"additional deterrence" to abuses committed by the military and police.
In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of rampant unsolved killings of leftist leaders and
members of progressive mass-based organizations, reminiscent of the martial law regime. Human
rights violations have escalated to such an alarming scale that even the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, as well as other foreign groups, took notice. Following a consultative summit and
acting upon the recommendations from various sectors and stakeholders in the justice system to tap
the Philippine judiciary's expanded rule-making power under the1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on September 25, 2007 (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC).
The writ specifically covers extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.

CASE 12: ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the
NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935,
the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On
Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the
EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ
of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

CASE 13: TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS:

VAT is levied on the sale, barter, and exchange of goods and services.
It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money.
RA7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the NIRC.
In turn, it would withdraw certain exemptions.
However, such withdrawal was not mentioned in the title of the Bill.

RA7716 validity has been challenged in various Certiorari and Prohibition

cases.
Among which was in relation to its origin in the Senate and the withdrawal of
exemptions.

ISSUE: Whether RA7716 was in conformity with the Constitution with regard to its
passage and the presence of a rider because provisions were not mentioned in
the title of the bill?

RULING:

As a house bill transmitted to Senate, it was not by Senate but merely consolidated
with the Senate Version of the Bill. Our Constitution provides that: All
appropriation, revenue, tariff bills, etc. shall originate at the House of
Representatives. The Senate may propose or concur with amendments. It is clear
that the what is required that should originate from the House of Representatives is
the BILL not the LAW. Furthermore, the Senate may propose changes to the same.

In the case at bar, the Senate prepared the bill but waited for the House Bill before
considering it. Consolidation of the 2 Bills was made in a Conference Committee so
the differences may be reconciled, amendments may still be made even if not
originally proposed by the House, provided that they are germane to the intent of
the law. Besides, it is still subject to the approval of both the Senate and the House.

In the issue regarding the title, the court said that to mention it in the title would be
to insist that the title must be a complete index of its contents. Such would interfere
with the enactment of legislation. As long as it is germane to the subject embrace
generally in the title, which is to broaden the tax base and generate further income,
it cannot be considered a rider.

CASE 14: ESTRADA V SCRITOR

Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes
Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes
referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of
the allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his
allegation in the proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and
Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the
conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for disgraceful and
immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that
his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with
another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow
since 1998. She admitted that shes been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the
benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as
a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed
a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation
who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly
with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation,
therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.

Ruling:

Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality

approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state
interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota
of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that
the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly
failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances,
Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving
criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from
the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state.

CASE 15: Arnault v Nazareno

FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment
to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5
million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as
agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave
the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment
until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a
member for contempt.
RULING:
The Petition is Denied.
YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a

witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel
a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a
witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and
not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

CASE 16: PASCUAL v SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

COMMUNICATIONS

FACTS:

A law was enacted in 1953 containing a provision for the construction,

reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals
within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta. Zulueta donated
said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of the law, on
the condition that if the Government violates such condition the lands would revert
to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the
validity of the donation and the Constitutionality of the particular provision, it being
an appropriation not for a public purpose.

ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid?

Held:

No. The appropriation of amount for the construction on a land owned by private
individual is invalid imposition since it results in the promotion of private enterprise,
it benefits the property of a particular individual. The provision that the land
thereafter be donated to the government does not cure this defect. The rule is that
if the public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in the promotion of a
particular enterprise, such defect shall render the law invalid. On the other hand, if
what is incidental is the promotion of a private enterprise, the tax law shall be
deemed for public purpose.
Government is Tax-exempt.

CASE 17: Estrada vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor
Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
November 13, 2000, HouseSpeaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,
2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against theopening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government.
Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their
posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also
appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he
was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President; (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only
temporarily unable to act as President
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As
long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and
after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state
of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily
Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already
about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservationabout its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into
office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona
as Vice-President. Both housesof Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim
of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

CASE 18: SARMIENTO v MISON

FACTS:
The appointments of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and
Guillermo Carague as Sec. of the Dept. of Budget were questioned by the
petitioners on the basis of lack of approval of the Commission on Appointments.
Paragraph 1, Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution provides as follows:
1st Sentence: The Pres shall nominate & with the consent of the Com. on
Appointments, appoint heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public
ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution.

2nd Sentence: He shall appoint all other offices of the Govt whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law, & those he may be authorized by law to appoint.
3rd Sentence: Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other lower officers in
the President alone, in the courts, heads of depts., agencies, commissions, or
boards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President acted within her constitutional authority in appointing
Mison as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs even without the approval of
the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Only those
appointees listed in the 1st Sentence require consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The appointments of Mison and Carague fall under the 2nd
Sentence; hence no approval is necessary from the Commission on Appointments.

CASE 19: MATIBAG v BENIPAYO

Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "ActingDirector
IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O.
Demetriourenewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a
"Temporary" capacity.On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on

February 2, 2008.In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a

Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID
and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. On April 16, 2001,
petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and
her reassignment to the Law Department. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000.Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration
to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.during the
pendency of which, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment
and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. In the meantime,
on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as
Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on February 2,
2008.
Issue:
Whether or not an ad interim appointment is temporary.
Held:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution provides as follows: "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. "Thus, the ad
interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear
that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.

CASE 20: DE CASTRO v JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL

Facts
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. This dilemma is
rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term,
except when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section
4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who
should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of
screening candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a
mandamus lie to compel the submission of JBCs nominees to the president? This
issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot
of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We limit
our discussion with GR191002 for brevity.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.
(2)Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.
Held:
The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar Council has
until May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Puno. The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of
the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The question
raised before the court is in fact of transcendental importance. The court dispels all
doubt to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issues
quarely presented. Standing is a peculiar concept to constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. The court dismissed the
petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR 191002 and GR 191149 and the
petition for mandamus in GR no. 191057 for being premature; dismissal of the
petitions for prohibition in GR 191032and GR 191342 for lack of merit; and grants
the in AM No. 10-2-5-SC and accordingly directs the JBC to: resume proceedings for
the nomination of candidates, prepare short list of nominees for the said position,
submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees, and to continue
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary
and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.

CASE 21: TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE

PHIL v MANALANG-DEMIGILLO

CASE 22: ARANETA v GATMAITAN

Facts:
The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the banning of
trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl operators
questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive orders in question are null and void.
Held:
Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl fishing,
the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over from him such
authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The Presidents power of
control means that if a cabinet secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue
rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power not only to
modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another set entirely
different from those issued by his subordinate.

CASE 23: SAGUISAG v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (EDCA CASE)

FACTS:
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement
that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine
military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment
there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with
China over the West Philippine Sea.
The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April
2014. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not
submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should
have been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement. The Senate
issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA
to be valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation
and concurrence.
ISSUE: WON the
constitutional

EDCA

between

the

Philippines

and

the

U.S.

is

HELD:
The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence.
As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties
that it purports to implement.
Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by
Senate. They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:

Sec. 21, Art. VII: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the
Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII: xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate xxx

The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements are
defined as international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements
of a more or less temporary nature. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of twothirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements

without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by

long usage. The Visiting Forces Agreement - a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 - already
allowed the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to
executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals
with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction.
CASE 24: BAYAN MUNA v ROMULO
Facts:
The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute was established with
"the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. On May 9, 2003, the Philippines entered into a Non-Surrender
Agreement with United States of America (USA) which aims to protect what it refers
to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Issue:
WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the nonsurrender agreement, and the International Criminal Court.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or
undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each
other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the International Criminal Court. As
aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court is to "be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions [of the signatory states]."
Note:
Under the premise of complementarity, the primary jurisdiction for any case lies
first with the states national judicial systems. A state is given a chance to exercise
complementarity by informing the International Criminal Court of its choice to
investigate and prosecute its own nationals through its own domestic courts. Thus,
the State has the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute its own nationals
in its custody who may have committed the grave international crimes specified in
the Rome Statute.

CASE 25: MACALINTAL v PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

CASE 26: PIMENTEL v AGUIRRE

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
ISSUE: WON the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering LGUs to
reduce their costs by 25% as a violation of LGUs fiscal autonomy.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy
does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The
AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local
Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of
the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues;
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution
and the law.

CASE 27: LAUREL v GARCIA

FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines
from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the
Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai
property. It was decided that the properties would be available to sale or
disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the
Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.
HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through
reparationagreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the
Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so. As property
of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the
social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object
of appropriation. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
Doctrine:
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

CASE 28: MIRASOL v CA

CASE 29: DEMETRIA v ALBA

FACTS:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD.
This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or off ice included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately

transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void. But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one
department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the
interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.