Dual process theory

In psychology, a dual process theory provides an account of how a phenomenon can occur in two different ways, or as a result of two dierent processes.
Often, the two processes consist of an implicit (automatic), unconscious process and an explicit (controlled),
conscious process. Verbalized explicit processes or attitudes and actions may change with persuasion or education; though implicit process or attitudes usually take
a long amount of time to change with the forming of
new habits. Dual process theories can be found in social, personality, cognitive, and clinical psychology. It
has also been linked with economics via prospect theory
and behavioral economics.

which information is relevant to the current situation.

Relevant information is then processed further whereas
irrelevant information is not. Following the heuristic processes come analytic processes. During analytic processes, the relevant information that is chosen during the
heuristic processes is then used to make judgments about
the situation.[2]
Richard E. Petty and John Cacioppo proposed a dual process theory focused in the eld of social psychology in
1986. Their theory is called the Elaboration Likelihood
Model of Persuasion. In their theory, there are two different routes to persuasion in making decisions. The rst
route is known as the central route and this takes place
when a person is thinking carefully about a situation, elaborating on the information they are given, and creating an
argument. This route occurs when an individuals motivation and ability are high. The second route is known as
the peripheral route and this takes place when a person is
not thinking carefully about a situation and uses shortcuts
to make judgments. This route occurs when an individuals motivation and ability are low.[3]

History

The foundations of dual process theory likely comes from

William James. He believed that there were two dierent
kinds of thinking: associative and true reasoning. James
theorized that empirical thought was used for things like
art and design work. For James, images and thoughts
would come to mind of past experiences, providing ideas
of comparison or abstractions. He claimed that associative knowledge was only from past experiences describing
it as only reproductive. James believed that true reasoning was useful for unprecedented situations in which
using reasoning to overcome obstacles such as navigation
could be overcome with reasoning power of being able to
use a map.

Steven Sloman produced another interpretation on dual

processing in 1996. He believed that associative reasoning takes stimuli and divides it into logical clusters of information based on statistical regularity. He proposed
that how you associate is directly proportional to the similarity of past experiences, relying on temporal and similarity relations to determine reasoning rather than an underlying mechanical structure. The other reasoning process in Slomans opinion was of the Rule-based system.
The system functioned on logical structure and variables
based upon rule systems to come to conclusions dierent
from that of the associative system. He also believed that
the Rule-based system had control over the associative
system, though it could only suppress it.[4] This interpretation corresponds well to earlier work on computational
models of dual processes of reasoning.[5]

There are various dual process theories that were produced after William Jamess work. Dual process models
are very common in the study of social psychological variables, such as attitude change. Examples include Petty
and Cacioppos Elaboration Likelihood Model explained
briey below and Chaikens Heuristic Systematic Model.
According to these models, persuasion may occur after
either intense scrutiny or extremely supercial thinking.
In cognitive psychology, attention and working memory
have also been conceptualized as relying on two distinct
processes.[1] Whether the focus be on social psychology
or cognitive psychology, there are many examples of dual
process theories produced throughout the past. The following just show a glimpse into the variety that can be
found.

Daniel Kahneman provided further interpretation by differentiating the two styles of processing more, calling
them intuition and reasoning in 2003. Intuition (or system 1), similar to associative reasoning, was determined
to be fast and automatic, usually with strong emotional
bonds included in the reasoning process. Kahneman said
that this kind of reasoning was based on formed habits
and very dicult to change or manipulate. Reasoning
being
Jonathan Evans suggested dual process theory in 1975. (or system 2) was slower and much more volatile,
[6]
subject
to
conscious
judgments
and
attitudes.
In his theory, there are two distinct types of processes:
heuristic processes and analytic processes. He suggested Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch proposed another dual
that during heuristic processes, an individual chooses
1

3 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

process theory focused in the eld of social psychology in

2004. According to their model, there are two separate
systems: the reective system and the impulsive system.
In the reective system, decisions are made using knowledge and the information that is coming in from the situation is processed. On the other hand, in the impulsive
system, decisions are made using schemes and there is
little or no thought required.[7]

2
2.1

Theories
Dual process learning model

Ron Sun proposed a dual process model of learning

(both implicit learning and explicit learning). The model
(named CLARION) re-interpreted voluminous behavioral data in psychological studies of implicit learning and
skill acquisition in general. The resulting theory is twolevel and interactive, based on the idea of the interaction
of one-shot explicit rule learning (i.e., explicit learning)
and gradual implicit tuning through reinforcement (i.e.
implicit learning), and it accounts for many previously
unexplained cognitive data and phenomena based on the
interaction of implicit and explicit learning.[8]

2.2

Dual coding

Using a somewhat dierent approach, Allan Paivio has

developed a dual-coding theory of information processing. According to this model, cognition involves the coordinated activity of two independent, but connected systems, a nonverbal system and a verbal system that is specialized to deal with language. The nonverbal system is
hypothesized to have developed earlier in evolution. Both
systems rely on dierent areas of the brain. Paivio has
reported evidence that nonverbal, visual images are processed more eciently and are approximately twice as
memorable. Additionally, the verbal and nonverbal systems are additive, so one can improve memory by using
both types of information during learning.[9]

2.3
2.3.1

Dual-process accounts of reasoning

Background

The dual-process accounts of reasoning posits that there

are two systems or minds in one brain. The theory of
two distinct kinds of reasoning has been around for as
long as documentations about theories of reasoning go.
The current theory is that there are two distinctively separate cognitive systems underlying thinking and reasoning
and that these dierent systems were developed through
evolution.[10] These systems are often referred to as implicit and explicit or by the more neutral System 1
and System 2, as coined by Stanovich and West.[11]

2.3.2 Systems
The systems have multiple names by which they can be
called, as well as many dierent properties.
Dierences between System 1 and System 2[12]
System 1 Bargh (1994) reconceptualized the notion of
an automatic process by breaking down the term automatic into four components: awareness, intentionality,
eciency, and controllability. One way for a process to
be labeled as automatic is for the person to be unaware
of it. There are three ways in which a person may be unaware of a mental process: they can be unaware of the
presence of the stimulus (subliminal), how the stimulus
is categorized or interpreted (unaware of the activation
of stereotype or trait constructs), or the eect the stimulus has on the persons judgments or actions (misattribution). Another way for a mental process to be labeled
as automatic is for it to be unintentional. Intentionality
refers to the conscious start up of a process. An automatic process may begin without the personal consciously
willing it to start. The third component of automaticity
is eciency. Eciency refers to the amount of cognitive resources required for a process. An automatic process is ecient because it requires few resources. The
fourth component is controllability, referring to the persons conscious ability to stop a process. An automatic
process is uncontrollable, meaning that the process will
run until completion and the person will not be able to
stop it. Bargh (1994) conceptualizes automaticity as a
component view (any combination awareness, intention,
eciency, and control) as opposed to the historical concept of automaticity as an all-or-none dichotomy.[13]
System 2 in humans System 2 is evolutionarily recent
and specic to humans. It is also known as the explicit
system, the rule-based system, the rational system,[10] or
the analytic system.[14] It performs the more slow and
sequential thinking. It is domain-general, performed in
the central working memory system. Because of this, it
has a limited capacity and is slower than System 1 which
correlates it with general intelligence. It is known as
the rational system because it reasons according to logical standards.[14] Some overall properties associated with
System 2 are that it is rule-based, analytic, controlled, demanding of cognitive capacity, and slow.[10]

3 Social psychology
The dual process has impact on social psychology in such
domains as stereotyping, categorization, and judgment.
Especially, the study of automaticity and of implicit in
dual process theories has the most inuence on a persons
perception. People usually perceive other peoples information and categorize them by age, gender, race, or role.

3.2

Terror management theory and the Dual process model

According to Neuberg and Fiske (1987) a perceiver who

receives a good amount of information about the target
person then will use their formal mental category (Unconscious) as a basis for judging the person. When the
perceiver is distracted, the perceiver has to pay more attention to target information (Conscious).[15] Categorization is the basic process of stereotyping in which people are categorized into social groups that have specic
stereotypes associated with them.[16] It is able to retrieve
peoples judgment automatically without subjective intention or eort. Attitude can also be activated spontaneously by the object. John Bargh's study oered an alternative view, holding that essentially all attitudes, even
weak ones are capable of automatic activation. Whether
the attitude is formed automatically or operates with effort and control, it can still bias further processing of
information about the object and direct the perceivers
actions with regard to the target. According to Shelly
Chaiken, heuristic processing is the activation and application of judgmental rules and heuristics are presumed
to be learned and stored in memory. It is used when
people are making accessible decisions such as experts
are always right (system 1) and systematic processing is
inactive when individuals make eortful scrutiny of all
the relevant information which requires cognitive thinking (system 2).[17] The heuristic and systematic processing then inuence the domain of attitude change and social inuence. Unconscious thought theory is the counterintuitive and contested view that the unconscious mind is
adapted to highly complex decision making. Where most
dual system models dene complex reasoning as the domain of eortful conscious thought, UTT argues complex
issues are best dealt with unconsciously.

3.1

Stereotyping

Dual process models of stereotyping propose that when

we perceive an individual, salient stereotypes pertaining to them are activated automatically. These activated
representations will then guide behavior if no other motivation or cognition take place. However, controlled
cognitive processes can inhibit the use of stereotypes
when there is motivation and cognitive resources to do
so. Devine (1989) provided evidence for the dual process theory of stereotyping in a series of three studies.
Study 1 linked found prejudice (according to the Modern Racism Scale) was unrelated to knowledge of cultural stereotypes of African Americans. Study 2 showed
that subjects used automatically-activated stereotypes in
judgments regardless of prejudice level (personal belief).
Participants were primed with stereotype relevant or nonrelevant words and then asked to give hostility ratings
of a target with an unspecied race who was performing ambiguously hostile behaviors. Regardless of prejudice level, participants who were primed with more
stereotype-relevant words gave higher hostility ratings to
the ambiguous target. Study 3 investigated whether peo-

ple can control stereotype use by activating personal beliefs. Low-prejudice participants asked to list African
Americans listed more positive examples than did those
high in prejudice.[18]

3.2 Terror management theory and the

Dual process model
According to psychologists Pyszczynski, Greenberg, &
Solomon, the Dual process model, in relation to Terror
management theory, identies two systems by which the
brain manages fear of death: distal and proximal. Distal defenses fall under the system 1 category because
it is unconscious whereas proximal defenses fall under
the system 2 category because it operates with conscious
thought.
[19]

3.3 Dual process and habituation

Habituation can be described as decreased response to a
repeated stimulus. According to Groves and Thompson,
the process of habituation also mimics a dual process.
The dual process theory of habituation relies on two processes; habituation and sensitization. Habituation weakens the intensity of a repeated stimulus over time subconsciously. As a result, a person will give the stimulus less
conscious attention over time. Conversely, sensitization
subconsciously strengthens a stimulus over time, giving
the stimulus more conscious attention. Though these two
systems are not both conscious, they interact to help people understand their surroundings by strengthening some
stimuli and diminishing others.[20]

3.4 Dual process and steering cognition

According to Walker, system 1 functions as a serial
cognitive steering processor for system 2, rather than
a parallel system. In large-scale repeated studies with
school students, Walker tested how students adjusted
their imagined self-operation in dierent curriculum subjects of maths, science and English. He showed that
students consistently adjust the biases of their heuristic self-representation to specic states for the dierent
curriculum subjects.[21] The model of cognitive steering
proposes that, in order to process epistemically varied
environmental data, a heuristic orientation system is required to align varied, incoming environmental data with
existing neural algorithmic processes. The brains associative simulation capacity, centered around the imagination, plays an integrator role to perform this function. Evidence for early-stage concept formation and
future self-operation within the hippocampus supports
the model,.[22][23] In the cognitive steering model, a conscious state emerges from eortful associative simulation,

4 EVIDENCE

required to align novel data accurately with remote memory, via later algorithmic processes. By contrast, fast unconscious automaticity is constituted by unregulated simulatory biases, which induce errors in subsequent algorithmic processes. The phrase rubbish in, rubbish out is
used to explain errorful heuristic processing: errors will
always occur if the accuracy of initial retrieval and location of data is poorly self-regulated.

3.5

Application of dual process theory in

economic behavior

According to Alos-Ferrer and Strack the dual-process

theory has relevance in economic decision-making
through the multiple-selves model, in which one persons
self-concept is composed of multiple selves depending on
the context. An example of this is someone who as a student is hard working and intelligent, but as a sibling is
caring and supportive. Decision-making involves the use
of both automatic and controlled processes, but also depends on the person and situation, and given a persons experiences and current situation the decision process may
dier. Given that there are two decision processes with
diering goals one is more likely to be more useful in
particular situations. For example, a person is presented
with a decision involving a selsh but rational motive and
a social motive. Depending on the individual one of the
motives will be more appealing than the other, but depending on the situation the preference for one motive
or the other may change. Using the dual-process theory
it is important to consider whether one motive is more
automatic than the other, and in this particular case the
automaticity would depend on the individual and their experiences. A selsh person may choose the selsh motive with more automaticity than a non-selsh person, and
yet a controlled process may still outweigh this based on
external factors such as the situation, monetary gains, or
societal pressure. Although there is likely to be a stable
preference for which motive one will select based on the
individual it is important to remember that external factors will inuence the decision. Dual process theory also
provides a dierent source of behavioral heterogeneity
in economics. It is mostly assumed within economics
that this heterogeneity comes from dierences in taste
and rationality, while dual process theory indicates necessary considerations of which processes are automated
and how these dierent processes may interact within decision making.[24]

4
4.1

Some evidence suggests that this bias results from competition between logical (System 2) and belief-based (System 1) processes during evaluation of arguments.
Studies on belief-bias eect were rst designed by
Jonathan Evans to create a conict between logical reasoning and prior knowledge about the truth of conclusions. Participants are asked to evaluate syllogisms that
are: valid arguments with believable conclusions, valid
arguments with unbelievable conclusions, invalid arguments with believable conclusions, and invalid arguments
with unbelievable conclusions.[10] Participants are told to
only agree with conclusions that logically follow from the
premises given. The results suggest when the conclusion
is believable, people erroneously accept invalid conclusions as valid more often than invalid arguments are accepted which support unpalatable conclusions. This is
taken to suggest that System 1 beliefs are interfering with
the logic of System 2.[10]

4.2 Tests with working memory

De Neys[26] conducted a study that manipulated working
memory capacity while answering syllogistic problems.
This was done by burdening executive processes with secondary tasks. Results showed that when System 1 triggered the correct response, the distractor task had no effect on the production of a correct answer which supports the fact that System 1 is automatic and works independently of working memory, but when belief-bias
was present (System 1 belief-based response was different from the logically correct System 2 response) the
participants performance was impeded by the decreased
availability of working memory. This falls in accordance
with the knowledge about System 1 and System 2 of the
dual-process accounts of reasoning because System 1 was
shown to work independent of working memory, and System 2 was impeded due to a lack of working memory
space so System 1 took over which resulted in a beliefbias.[26]

4.3 fMRI studies

Evidence
Belief bias eect

Researcher conducting Functional magnetic resonance imaging

test.

A belief bias is the tendency to judge the strength of

arguments based on the plausibility of their conclusion Vinod Goel produced neuropsychological evidence for
rather than how strongly they support that conclusion.[25] dual-process accounts of reasoning using fMRI[27] stud-

4.6

Evolution

ies. They provided evidence that anatomically distinct as a System 1 heuristic that competes with the logical
parts of the brain were responsible for the two dier- System 2.[29]
ent kinds of reasoning. They found that content-based
reasoning caused left temporal hemisphere activation
whereas abstract formal problem reasoning activated the
parietal system. They concluded that dierent kinds of
reasoning, depending on the semantic content, activated
one of two dierent systems in the brain.[27]
A similar study incorporated fMRI during a belief-bias
test.[28] They found that dierent mental processes were
competing for control of the response to the problems
given in the belief-bias test. The prefrontal cortex was
critical in detecting and resolving conicts, which are
characteristic of System 2, and had already been associated with that System 2. The ventral medial prefrontal
cortex, known to be associated with the more intuitive or
heuristic responses of System 1, was the area in competition with the prefrontal cortex.[28]

4.4

Near-infrared spectroscopy

Tsujii and Watanabe[14] did a follow-up study to Goel and

Dolans[28] fMRI experiment. They examined the neural correlates on the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activity
in belief-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy
(NIRS). Subjects performed a syllogistic reasoning task,
using congruent and incongruent syllogisms, while attending to an attention-demanding secondary task. The
interest of the researchers was in how the secondary-tasks
changed the activity of the IFC during congruent and incongruent reasoning processes. The results showed that
the participants performed better in the congruent test
than in the incongruent test (evidence for belief bias);
the high demand secondary test impaired the incongruent reasoning more than it impaired the congruent reasoning. NIRS results showed that the right IFC was activated more during incongruent trials. Participants with
enhanced right IFC activity performed better on the incongruent reasoning than those with decreased right IFC
activity. This study provided some evidence to enhance
the fMRI results that the right IFC, specically, is critical in resolving conicting reasoning, but that it is also
attention-demanding; its eectiveness decreases with loss
of attention. The loss of eectiveness in System 2 following loss of attention makes the automatic heuristic System
1 take over, which results in belief bias.[14]

4.5

Matching bias

Example of the Wason selection task.

The Wason selection task provides evidence for the

matching bias.[10] The test is designed as a measure of
a persons logical thinking ability.[30] Performance on the
Wason Selection Task is sensitive to the content and context with which it is presented. If you introduce a negative
component into the conditional statement of the Wason
Selection Task, e.g. 'If there is an A one side of the card
then there is not a 3 on the other side', there is a strong tendency to choose cards that match the items in the negative
condition to test, regardless of their logical status. Changing the test to be a test of following rules rather than truth
and falsity is another condition where the participants will
ignore the logic because they will simply follow the rule,
e.g. changing the test to be a test of a police ocer looking for underaged drinkers.[29] The original task is more
dicult because it requires explicit and abstract logical
thought from System 2, and the police ocer test is cued
by relevant prior knowledge from System 1.[10]
Studies have shown that you can train people to inhibit
matching bias which provides neuropsychological evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning.[10] When
you compare trials before and after the training there
is evidence for a forward shift in activated brain area.
Pre-test results showed activation in locations along the
ventral pathway and post-test results showed activation
around the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and anterior
cingulate.[31] Matching bias has also been shown to generalise to syllogistic reasoning.[32]

4.6 Evolution
Dual-process theorists claim that System 2, a general purpose reasoning system, evolved late and worked alongside
the older autonomous sub-systems of System 1.[33] The
success of Homo Sapiens Sapiens lends evidence to their
higher cognitive abilities above other hominids. Mithen
theorizes that the increase in cognitive ability occurred
50,000 years ago when representational art, imagery, and
the design of tools and artefacts are rst documented. She
hypothesizes that this change was due to the adaptation of
System 2.[33]

Matching bias is a non-logical heuristic.[29] The matching

bias is described as a tendency to use lexical content
matching of the statement about which one is reasoning,
to be seen as relevant information and do the opposite as
well, ignore relevant information that doesn't match. It
mostly aects problems with abstract content. It doesn't Most evolutionary psychologists do not agree with dualinvolve prior knowledge and beliefs but it is still seen process theorists. They claim that the mind is modular,

and domain-specic, thus they disagree with the theory

of the general reasoning ability of System 2. They have
diculty agreeing that there are two distinct ways of reasoning and that one is evolutionarily old, and the other is
new.[10] To ease this discomfort, the theory is that once
System 2 evolved, it became a 'long leash' system without much genetic control which allowed humans to pursue
their individual goals.[11]

4.7

FUZZY-TRACE THEORY

processing.[37]
Another ne-grained division is as follows: implicit
action-centered processes, implicit non-action-centered
processes, explicit action-centered processes, and explicit
non-action-centered processes (that is, a four-way division reecting both the implicit-explicit distinction and
the procedural-declarative distinction). [38]

In response to the question as to whether there are dichotomous processing types, many have instead proposed
a continIssues with the dual-process account of a single-system framework which incorporates
uum between implicit and explicit processes.[36]

reasoning

The dual-process account of reasoning is an old theory,

as noted above. But according to Evans[34] it has adapted 5 Alternative model
itself from the old, logicist paradigm, to the new theories
that apply to other kinds of reasoning as well. And the The dynamic graded continuum (DGC), originally protheory seems more inuential now than in the past which posed by Cleeremans and Jimnez is an alternative sinis questionable. Evans outlined 5 fallacies":
gle system framework to the dual-process account of reasoning. It has not been accepted as better than the dual1. All dual-process theories are essentially the same. process theory; it is instead usually used as a comparison
There is a tendency to assume all theories that pro- with which one can evaluate the dual-process model. The
pose two modes or styles of thinking are related and DGC proposes that dierences in representation generate
so they end up all lumped under the umbrella term variation in forms of reasoning without assuming a multiple system framework. It describes how graded propof dual-process theories.
erties of the representations that are generated while rea2. There are just two systems underlying System 1 soning result in the dierent types of reasoning. It sepaand System 2 processing. There are clearly more rates terms like implicit and automatic processing where
than just two cognitive systems underlying peoples the dual-process model uses the terms interchangeably to
performance on dual-processing tasks. Hence the refer to the whole of System 1. Instead the DGC uses a
change to theorizing that processing is done in two continuum of reasoning that moves from implicit, to exminds that have dierent evolutionary histories and plicit, to automatic.[36]
that each have multiple sub-systems.
3. System 1 processes are responsible for cognitive biases; System 2 processes are responsible for norma- 6 Fuzzy-trace theory
tively correct responding. Both System 1 and System 2 processing can lead to normative answers and According to Charles Brainerd and Valerie Reynas
Fuzzy-trace theory of memory and reasoning, people
both can involve cognitive biases.
have two memory representations: verbatim and gist.
4. System 1 processing is contextualised while Sys- Verbatim is memory for surface information (e.g. the
tem 2 processing is abstract.[34] Recent research has words in this sentence) whereas gist is memory for sefound that beliefs and context can inuence System mantic information (e.g. the meaning of this sentence).
2 processing as well as System 1.[35]
This dual process theory posits that we encode, store, re5. Fast processing indicates the use of System 1 rather trieve, and forget the information in these two traces of
than System 2 processes. Just because a processing memory separately and completely independent of each
is fast does not mean it is done by System 1. Expe- other. Furthermore, the two memory traces decay at
rience and dierent heuristics can inuence System dierent rates: verbatim decays quickly, while gist lasts
longer.
2 processing to go faster.[34]
Another argument against dual-process accounts for reasoning which was outlined by Osman is that the proposed
dichotomy of System 1 and System 2 does not adequately
accommodate the range of processes accomplished.[36]
Moshman proposed that there should be four possible
types of processing as opposed to two. They would be
implicit heuristic processing, implicit rule-based processing, explicit heuristic processing, and explicit rule-based

In terms of reasoning, Fuzzy-trace theory posits that as

we mature, we increasingly rely more on gist information over verbatim information. Evidence for this lies
in framing experiments where framing eects become
stronger when verbatim information (percentages) are replaced with gist descriptions.[39] Other experiments rule
out predictions of prospect theory (extended and original)
as well as other current theories of judgment and decision
making.[40][41]

See also
Automatic and Controlled Processes (ACP)
Cognitive inhibition
Elaboration Likelihood Model
Fuzzy-trace theory
Opponent-process theory
Steering Cognition

External links
Laboratory for Rational Decision Making

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