The Origins Op The United States' Involvement in Northern Tongkin (Xndg-China) and Southern Yunnan (China) From 1931 To 19 7

{
(851G.11/23-^69)
THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES" INVOLVEMENT IN

NORTHERN TONGKIN (INDO-CHINA) AND SOUTHERN YUNNAN
(CHINA) FROM 1931 TO 19**7)
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Political Science
Southern Connecticut State College
In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Social Science
w
Jeremy Horne
Sieola
April, 1969
Copyright 0
Abstract
t 1969 by Jeremy Hcrno
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THE ORIGINS OP THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN

NORTHERN TONGKIN (XNDG-CHINA) AND SOUTHERN YUNNAN
(CHINA) FROM 1931 TO 19^7
An Abstract
Presented to
In partial Fulfillment of the

lw
JoreiBy H o m o
April, 1969
Abstract
Viet-Nam has been in the forefront of the news due,
for- the most part,* because this country has 500,000 troops
in this region fighting a war which seems to have no hope
of ending in the near future.
Protests against the war have
mounted at an increasing rate, and there is increasing dis

cussion as to how the United States became involved. What
is probably of more importance is the nature of our involve
ment and how this bears on other geographical areas of United
States policy-making, that is, is what we did in Viet-Nam in
its earlier history as a French colony (Indo-China), the
same thing we did and are doing elsewhere in other areas of
the world?
A common belief seems to be that the United States
entered the war in 1950* while others do admit the existence
of limited United States intelligence activities in that
region in 19^5.
This paper will demonstrate that these dates
as being the ones of the earliest of United States entry are

incorrect.
What is more important, however, aside from historical
matters, is the question of the nature of United States foreign
policy-making, itself,
Indo-China seems to be a good example
of where a combination of wartime policies, designed for other

areas (and being implemented). were tried or considered, anu
where each failed.
"*
2
It seems that the basic United States interest in IndoChina was economic and that there were several alternatives
which were tried to make this region safe for economic markets
for the United States.
A chief cause for the failures lay in
the lack of recognition on the part of United States policy

makers of several important factors: 1) nationalist sentiment,
2) the results of a non-assertive and inconsistent foreign
policy, 3) the proper perspective of the Communist influence
and French attempts to use it to entice other allied powers in
supporting her re-occupation of her former colony.
The course of action that the United States took seems
to have obviated two alternative explanations as to how we be
came involved.
These two extreme views hold 1) that the United
States entered as a power genuinely interested in liberating

Viet-Nam and granting those people independence, and that the
United States naively didn't recognise the difficulties it was
going to encounter with the French, and 2) that the United States
was engaged in a diabolical plot to take over the country by
outright long-term occupation for its own gains, only.
The mere
fact that the United States didn't follow a consistent policy,

that there were a number of alternatives circulating about in
policy-making circles, and the fact that the United States
definitely had economic interests in the area precluded either
of the extreme explanations,
A major source of the material in this paper was from
United States sources, including the Department of State, There
were three source areas from which information for this paper
was taken; secondary, government primary, and individual pri
mary.
The secondary served as a survey of what had and has
been done on this subject; the individual primary sources re

flected microscopic views, that is, pinpointing specific
problem areas, and the governmental primary more or less
reflected official activities, more often than not, corrobora
ting what had been seen in the governmental material.
For indi
vidual primary sources, there were two groups of these written materials and individual interviews.
One individual,
in particular, deserves special mention for his great assis

tance in this respect - Major General Philipe Gallagher, who
was a major participant in the activities discussed in this
paper.
Through materials provided by him, many previously un
answered questions were resolved.
A bibliographic essay at the
end of the paper discusses in further detail the sources.
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Copyright .
1969 by Jeremy Horne
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partially or entirely, except with written per
mission from the author.
All rights are reserved
exclusively for the author.
(851g.il/23-fr69)
THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES* INVOLVEMENT IN

NORTHERN TONGKIN (INDO-CHINA) AND SOUTHERN YUNNAN
(CHINA) FROM 1931 TO 19&7
A Thesis
Presented to
In Partial Fulfillment of the

toy
Jeremy Horne
April, 1969
Thesis
33h5
m
TABLE OP CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION...............
.1
II. BACKGROUND FACTORS UNDERLYING UNITED STATES

INVOLVEMENT IN INDO-CHINA UNTIL THE END
OF WORLD.WAR TWO
French Imperialism in Indo-China Until

June* 1940,......... *...................
Frances Involvement in Indo-China from

September, 1940 to September, 19-45,
14
Chinese Involvement in Indo-China..........
29
United States Involvement in Indo-China

Before and During World War Two..........
38
III. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN INDO-CHINA

FROM SEPTEMBER, 1945 TO MARCH, 1946.......
86
IV. PKENCH-INDOCHINESE RELATIONS FROM MARCH,

TO DECEMBER, 1946..*...*......
V. CONCLUSION.......
127
BIBLIOGRAPHY........
APPENDIX......
115
136
...............
*
\
1^1
CHAPTBB 1
1BTR0DBCTX0!?
Tile subject of Viet-Sfam baa been the source for one
of the most bitter controversies in recent United States
history with few people content with the progress of United
States foreign and military policy in this area of the
world.
Vlet-Bam, in turn, has led to the formulation of many
questions, questions reflecting all degrees of the political

spectrum, such as: Why can*t we win this war? why are we
exploiting a helpless people? why does it cost so much?
why should we attempt to abort a true revolution? and, above
all, how did we get involved in a war whose casualties now
equal Korea, which has cost us well over sixty billion
dollars, and which seems to have no hope of ending, given
our self-imposed military limitations and Vtet-Cong and
Korth Vietnamese intransigeaoy?
The official and generalized histories seem to trace
our involvement back to 1950, when with the outbreak of war
in Korea we decided to covertly support the French effort
to retain her Indochinese colony an effort which, in turn,
dated back to commencement of revolutionary activities in
Do C5'uiunP, X9lj.6
By 1954* French efforts had failed and with the
signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954* France
1$
2
gave independence to four states: North. Viet-Nam, South
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia with North Viet-Nam, plus the
Laotion provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua emerging as
Communist-controlled territories and the United States
replacing Prance as the principal power in the area and a
supporter of the non-Communist nations.
Between 1959, and 196lfthe apparent Geneva settlement
had disintegrated with the International Commission for
Supervision and Control (established by the Geneva Accords)
no longer capable of controlling the now constant and open
violations of that settlement,
Cambodia, under Prince
Sihanouk, was eventually supporting China, then the United

^
States, and then following a course of Its own, in an appar

ent desire to protect itself against potential Chinese
control, United States control, as well as the control of
its two ancient enemies, xhailand on
w^*st and Vlet^Mum
on the east.
Laos had disintegrated as a viable nation-state between
August of 1959, and May of 1961, and was on the verge of a
complete Communist takeover by the latter date when the
united States changed policies from attempting to create a
strong anti-Communist nation to settling for a neutral
nation whose government would represent a coalition of
Anti-Communist, Neutral, and Pro-Communist elements.
^
was formalized in the Geneva settlement of May, 1962.
This
Since
that date, the Communists have controlled from k.0% to 65#

of eastern Laos and have used this territory as the princi
pal vehicle for infiltration both into South Viet-Nam and
into 'fhalland, where a future guerrilla war seems to be
developing.
Finally, in South Viet-Nam, failure to hold elections
in 1956, had led to the development in 1959, of open rebellion
by the newly-created National Liberation Front, popularly
known as the Vlet-Cong (short for Vietnamese Congaan or
Vietnamese Communist).
Although the United States-supported
South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem had enjoyed

success in consolidating this nations varied and incompat
ible peoples between 1955, and 1959, they now began to lose
ground to the Viet-Cong, leading to the United States decision
in December, I960 (the official beginning of United States
military involvement) to send military advisers and logistical
support to the South Vietnamese government.
By 1961f, the situation had become quite grave; the
assassination of the increasingly corrupt and despotic Ngo
Dinh Diem had led to anarchy in the nation where various
elected groups fought each other for control of the govern
ment while Catholic and Buddhist groups fought each other
on religio-polltical grounds.
In the meanwhile, Viet-Cong
and infiltrated North Vietnamese units began a drive to

complete their conquest of the nation.
The United States response to this situation was a

bombing ol* North Viet-Nam1s oil facilities on August k,
1961*. (in retaliation to attacks on the destroyers 0* Turner
Joy and Maddox), Congressional approval of the Presidents
actions in Viet-Nam, and lastly, the decision of February ?,
1965# (the official beginning of the major United States
military involvement) to commence the bombing of North VietNam on a regular basis and to allow for the tremendous
Increases in men and equipment sufficient to put the United
States
on
an all-out military basis in South Viet-Nam#
By the end of March, 1969, some four years after

this event, the United States is still involved in a selfimposed limited war, in a war of attrition with combat
deaths equal to the Korean War, with 550,000 troops directly
committed to South Viet-Nam, with an annual cost in excess
of thirty billion dollars per year and faced with an
intransigent and Adtcated enemy both in South Viet-Nam and
in the Paris Peace talks now almost one year old#
In
addition, we still failed to find a dedicated and charismatic

leadership which can unite South Viet-Nam*s diverse peoples
into a nation#
In reviewing this brief and capsuliaed account of
United States Involvement in Indo-China and, specifically,
VietNam, from 195$, to 1969, one can abstract certain points
which go to answer the basic questions of how we did get
involved in a costly and seemingly never-ending war.
One
can start with the apparent French unwillingness and inabil

ity to control what appears to be a Communist rebellion,
then, move on to a United States attempt to save the area
after the French departed, which became more difficult in
the nineteen fifties due to the resurgence of guerrilla
warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam and to the erratic
machinations of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia*
Then we can
continue and see that given an untenable position in Laos,

we settled for a mixed Coramunlst-non-Communist government
while patiently indulging Prince Sihanouk in his political
maneuvers*
In both instances we were apparently settling
on the basis of the premise that nhalf a loaf Is better

than none
In South Viet-Nam, on the other hand, we
apparently (hose to stand and fight, although it would appear

that, militarily, we have fought a limited war In a
conventional sense (that is, we have not adequately
interdicted Infiltration routes nor hit all military
targets) and, politically, we have not been successful
In finding and supporting uncorrupt and dedicated govern
ments (an absolute necessity in a war fought in part over
controlling ideological beliefs)*
Yet, despite the answers which seem to emerge from a
study of the 1950-1969 period of United States Involvement
In Indo-China and Viet-Nam, one finds upon reflection that
6
on still lacks a complete and thorough perspective, as it
would appeas* that certain answers or partial answers predate
the year 1950
Thus, for example, one might wonder from a
general pre-1950 historical survey what role the United

States played in Indo-China during World War Two*
role was played by the French?
What
Also, one might wonder about
the growth of nationalist and Communist movements in

Indo-China, which led to the outbreak of revolution against
the French in December of 19ij-6, some three and one-half years
before the United States apparently became involved in
Indo-China affairs in our modern 1950 to 1969 account.
Finally, one might wonder why is it that there was a fullfledged revolutionary war initiated against the French and
what our attitude was towards this war, not in 1950, but
back in 19M> and 19it-7, as we were vitally concerned with
French affairs as part of our concerted aim to rebuild a
devasted war-torn Europe.
It is with these questions in mind that the author
has decided to examine and analyze the earlier period of
United States involvement (that Is, from 1931 to 1 9 W ,
wspooialiy from 193b to 1 9 W
in Indo-China, in an attempt
to isolate and focus upon those factors which laid the

foundation for United States involvement from 1950 to the
present*
Towards this end. Chapter two will examine the

background until September, 191*5 (the end of the Pacific
War), against which this initial involvement of the United
States took place, especially the positions and inter*
relationships of the United States, Prance, China, Japan,
and the Vietnamese nationalists*
Chapter three will concentrate upon United States1
policies and actions from September, 19lf5* until March of
19l|.6, .including the roles played by the British, French,
Vietnamese nationalists, and the Chinese*
Chapter four will examine the deterioration of the
Indochinese situation from March of 19l|.6, until the
outbreak of revolutionary war in December, 19i|-6, and the
role now played by the United States in relation to the
French and Vietnamese nationalists*
Chapter five will be an attempt to extract
conclusions from the foregoing evidence In terms of setting
into clearer perspective some of the more basic reasons
underlying the United States* present involvement in
Viet-Ham**
Beyond the text, the author also provides two appen
dices for the benefit of the reader*
The first consists
of a map of Indo-China, while the second is a special

Bibliographic Essay designed to explain the nature of the
references and the problems involved something which is
0
quite necessary, given the fact that the author has tried,
where possible, to concentrate upon two groups of primary
sources interviews with present or post-governmental
officials and material from the official files of the United
States State Department, and the now defunct Office of
Strategic Services#
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND FACTORS UNDERLYING UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT
IN INDO-CHINA UNTIL THE END OP WORLD WAR TWO
I*
FRENCH IMPERIALISM IN INDO-CHINA UNTIL JUNE, 19^0

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the peoples of
Indo-China existed In one of the three main government forma:

as independent kingdoms; as autonomous states with a greater
Chinese empire; as outright satellites of China;
or of one
another (that is, Vietnamese-Cambodian, or Cambodla-Thailand).

The tendency for Indo-China to fall periodically under
Chinese sovereignty was prominent as this region, lying due
south of southwestern China, represented & natural area for
periodic Chinese expansion.
In fact, historically speaking,
it formed part of the outer or third circle for Chinese

imperialism (the first being east central and southern
China, the second being roughly what geographically consti
tutes modern-day China).
French Influence in this region did not manifest
itself until the early to mid-l600s and then remained
moderate for some two centuries (that is, represented by
scattered missionary groups and traders) However, given
the disintegration of the Manchu Dynasty In China after the
Opium War of 1839 to l8lj.2, and the consequent fact that
10
France*s major rival for this region was now weakening,

French encroachment continued overtly and covertly for some
forty years, culminating in the total conquest of the region
on June 6, 1881)., after severe struggles with both Indochinese
and Chinese groups*
After consolidating her control over Indo-China,
French policy took two forms: the first was the institution
of a brutal and hard imperialistic dictatorship over IndoChina which was to continue in one form or another down to
June, X91J.0? the second was the institution of a policy of
expansion from Indo-China northward to China proper
specifically to the border province of Yunnan*
Although a treaty was signed in June of 1885, which
fixed the border between Indo-China and Yunnan province,
French merchants and military forces continued to encroach
upon Yunnanese territory and successfully suppressed Chinese
resistance, often brutally.
Finally, in a series of treaties
between 1895 and 1898, France obtained commercial rights in

Yunnan province In addition to receiving official permission
from the Chinese government on June 12, 1897, to construct a
railroad from the Tongkin frontier (northern Indo-China) to
the city of Yunnan-Fou In Yunnan province.1
This was
^The Chinese government accords the French government,

or a French company that they /She French? will designate
the right to construct a railroad going from the Tongkin
frontier to Yunnan-Fou, the Chinese government not carrying
any burden except the furnishing of territory for the road
and Its outbuildings*
implemented on December 2j>, 1898* when the French Parliament

authorized the construction of a railroad from the city of
Haiphong into Yunnan province.
Construction was completed
later, thereby facilitating increased French economic

penetration of Yunnan province*
As further guarantees of their specialized status,
the French also obtained from the Chinese at this times
(1) a Chinese promise that they would not alienate Yunnan
and other provinces bordering Indo-China and southern China
(Kwangsiand Kwangtung) j (25 that if a postal department,
separate from the Maritime Customs were established, a
,fEuropean" would be appointed its director, France having
a right to nominate a candidate for the post*
Ihus it can be seen that against the international
political background of this time In eastern Asia, France
was following the pattern of some half dozen other imperialist
nations In taking advantage of the chaos and confusion
characterizing the disintegrating Manchu Dynasty by expanding
her influence into China* s southern-most province of Yunnan*
Having conquered Indo-China and dominated Yunnan
province, France now proceeded to exploit these regions in
a most oppressive manner from the turn of the twentieth
century into the 1930* s*
Resistance to her imperialism was confused and
disorganized in Yunnan where the effect of the 1911 revolution
and the virtual disintegrations of central Chinese control

after 1916 led to a flourishing of warlord!am and other forma
of divisiveneas in Chinese society* thus negating any
effective attempts at successful revolution, let alone
overthrow of French domination*
In Indo-China, however, where her control was
complete and definitive, Prance ironically confronted
increasing resistance and attempts of outright revolt
and hostilities several nationalist groups came into
being and prosecuted their struggle with Increasing fervor
and intensity, especially by the 1930*3 when low wages and
poor wording conditions led to a succession of strikes and
thus exacerbated native discontent*
It was during this time
that Ho Chi Minh rose to leadership not merely as a Communist,

but, more Importantly, in terms of his appeal as a fervent
and dedicated, nationalist who had even gone to Versailles
after World War I to try to gain more autonomy and freedom
for Indo-China*
The economic importance of Indo-China continued through
out the 1930s and was, in fact, increased in late 1938, when
f
/
the Chinese, on and off from this eastern coast as a result of
Japans meteoric pattern of conquest since 1937# found them
selves completely dependent upon the Haiphong-Vunnan railroad
as a source of outside supply from sea traffic.2
This
monopoly of transportation facilities enabled France to

profit handsomely from charges on goods and supplies sent
to China via Haiphong.
However, her monopoly proved to be
relatively short-lived, as Japan eyed Indo-China covetously

and began to apply pressure on France to grant her rights
in this region.
Although the French were naturally dis
inclined to favor the Japanese, Hitler* a forty-day march

through France, culminating in France *s surrender on
June 20, 19k.0f led to the end of a independent France, to
the creation of the puppet Vichy government, and to
Japanese expansion into Indo-China in a series of smoothly
effected iaps.
% h e Chinese armies were cut off from the main

seaports# fhey retained one thin rail connection with
the sea through French Indo-China and had lost the use of
the-Buema Hoad, offering an cutlet to the South, when the
British closed it to traffic In response to the Japanese
demand*
II,
PRAHCE* $ INVOLVEMENT IK INDO-CHINA FROM

SEPTEMBER, X9i|-0 TO SEPTEMBER, 19i*5
The fall of France on June 20, 19l*Q, ana the creation

of the puppet Vichy government led to a change in Prance*a
relationship to her Indochinese territory and also to her
designs on Yunnan province.
Immediately following Prance* s
surrender, General George Catroux, head of France*s Indo

chinese colony, was faced with a Japanese ultimatum calling
on the French to halt the supply of certain strategic goods
to China via the Haiphong-Yunnan railway and to permit
Japanese troops to he stationed In Indo-China,
faced with a dilemma;
Catroux was
on the one hand, refuse and thereby
go to war with Japan; on the other hand, satisfy Japanese

demands in hopes of arranging a modus vivendi whereby the
French would still retain some degree of sovereignty and
control over Indo-China and thus could once again take power
when and if Japan was defeated*3
If he chose the first alternative, he had nominally
a 00,000 man army with which to fight the Japanese and thus
could resist any attempt at military conquest*^
However,
this was not as simple as it appeared to be on paper, as;
%eorge Catroux, Deux Actes Du Drama (Paris: Librarie

Plon, 1959), p* 103*
% h e s e are estimates given In Department of State
Files of 191*2, series number 85lG*00*
1$
(1) the bulk of this anay consisted of native
Indochinese whose reliability could not be depended upon*
given growing Indochinese reaction against French
imperialism.
In other words, how strongly would they be
motivated to fight and die to preserve French rule (and a

severe rule, at that) especially when confronted with
Japan1a call for unity for all Asians to throw off
European imperialism and form with Japan, a Greater Bast
Asia Go-Frosperity Sphere.
(2) related to the first point was the growth of

nationalist groups, especially since 1930, who even more
than the colonial army could be expected to sabotage French
military efforts against the Japanese.
(3) the French colonial authorities could expect no
help from the motherland, as France was now a satellite of
Germany, an ally of Japan,
(!{.) United States aid to Indo-China was nominal at
best even before the fall of France given the fall of France,
the united States was quite loatheto the idea of supporting
a territory which could use such aid In support of Axis
efforts*5
In addition, although (as will be seen below in
Section 4) the United States had no clearly defined policy
^Bernard Fall, The Two Vlet-Kama (Second Revised

Edition? New Yorks FreSericF"A. Traeger, 1967), p. 5>Q*
towards Indo-China, she was not too enthusiastic about the

nature of previous French Imperialism, in that area.
Thus, with these four factors facing him, Catroux
decided that, in effect, discretion was the better part of
valor and that by choosing the second alternative, that Is,
accommodation with the Japanese, he could perhaps maintain
enough French Influence in Indo-China to enable France at
some future date to recapture the region and thus succeed
in once again converting It Into a fiefdom of French
A
Imperialism.0
Accommodation with the Japanese was thus Implemented
and on September 23, 19I4.O, Japanese troops entered northern
Indo-China, that is, north of the 16th parallel, and on
July 29, 19&i* stationed troops in the southern half of the
colony.
Isfhat emerged was the compromise decided by Catroux
and later by his Vichy successor, Admiral Jean Decoux,

namely, an arrangement, whereby French colonial official
and commercial interests continued to operate in Indo-China
as formerly^with the key exception being that instead of
reporting to their superiors in Paris, they were now
reporting to the Japanese, who were given extensive commercial,
^Catroux, loc. cit.
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
*7
industrial, and military rights over In&o-China*^
Thus, the
Japanese were able to use Indo-China as a source of natural

resources and as a military base, while being freed of the
necessity of fighting a local action and then tying down
hundreds of thousands of troops in occupation dutyj while the
French were able to maintain thoir domestic control over
the region and were able to use the Japanese as allies in
putting down indigenous Nationalist rebellions*
This somewhat strange form of two-tiered Imperialism,
with the French acting as a Junior partner, continued unaltered
until March 9* 19l**
The effects of this politico-economic
symbiosis were to lead to the following political arrangement
in and around Indo-China.

At one end of the spectrum wares
(1)
the Japanese who were able to use Indo-Ohina as
a military and economic base and concern themselves with

regional strategic and tactical matters, leaving the routine
and mundane operation of domestic affairs to the care of
their Junior partners, the French, although obviously under
their general supervision.
^First of the major agreements giving military rights

to Japan on September 22, 1940. The second major agreement
was on July 21, 191*1, breaking .way for full Japanese control
over FIS*
(2)
The Vichy French and their French supporters, that
is, the new constellation of French officials who wore

appointed by the Vichy French regime in Paris with approval
of the Japanese and who were under Admiral Decoux, were run
ning French Indochinese affairs for the joint benefit of
France and Japan.
Thsir supporters consisted of the bulk of
the French residents in Indochina who represented commercial

and military Interests in favor of accommodation over
obvious defeat.
In the middle of the spectrum were:
(1) the Free French who represented a minority of
the French residents in Indo-China who, while believing
France must continue to dominate Indo-China, were against
accommodation with the Japanese in Asia or with the Germans
In Europe*
They thus instituted a resistance movement of
sorts against the Japanese-Vichy French government, although

this movement was uneven in its effect and never served as
a real threat to either the Japanese or the Vichy French*
ft
(2) the Nationalist Chinese under Chlang Kai-Shek,

who had lost all the eastern Chinese coastal provinces to
the Japanese, who had regained complete control over Tunnan
province, eliminating French influence there, and who were
ft
Fall, oj>. cit.* pp
and 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
involved in a strange position of enacting deals with the
Japanese, while technically being at war with them, in add
ition to being at one and the same time friendly with the
French government, yet hopeful of the removal of French
Influence from Eastern Asia*
More will be said about China
In section:$JIb0low
At the other end of the spectrum wares
(1)
the various Indochinese nationalists groups
especially the Viet-Mlnh, headed by Ho Chi Minh, who were

dedicated to the complete removal of both French and
Japanese imperialism and who were the only effective
resistance group within Indo-China from September, 19if.0#
^
through March, 19k5*
In addition, being fervently
nationalistic, these Indochinese groups also feared China1a

role as a potential or future conqueror of the area, given,
Q
of course, previous Chinese involvement in this area*
One thus can see at a glance the Inherent confusion
characterizing the politieai*military affairs of this region
during World War II and the fact that the majority of French
officials and rank and file residents were far more inter
ested in TJHO pro W r y Viuivu ntld maintenance of French
^Vo Hguyen Giap, People*s War* People*a Army (Second

printing New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger,l965 7, p* lq.*
20
imperialism than they were in the issues generally thought
of as important to the Allies-Axis war*
It is interesting to note that several French
officials both during and after World War II blame the
United States for forcing the French to follow a policy
of accommodation with the Japanese as the United States
did not aid the French in Indo-China especially after June 20,
19lj.O, with the fall of France *
This view has been expressed
by General Catroux, his successor and Vichy official,

Admiral Decoux, General Sabattier (or General DeLoue),
General DeGaullo, head of the Free French forces, Colonel
Jacomy, a Free French supporter, H* Saiatenny, a Viehyite
supporter, and M* Paul Baudoin, another pro-Vichy supporter,
whose views were contained in a document in his files
discovered by OSS forces near the end of the war.-5-0
While United States involvement in Indo-Ohina before
and after the War will be covered in Section if, one can say
at this time that the strongly opinionated attacks of both
Vichy and Free French leaders against the United States was
a bit contrived and distorted, considering the factors
Involved at the time, especially two very Important facts,
**State Department records indicate that a file was

taken from Baudoin* s files and that this is a major source
of all French criticism for U. S* policies towards FIC.
21
namely the establishment of the Vichy government in Frame
after June 20, 19i|.Q* a puppet government of Germany* who in
turn was anally* albeSfc ;ateQly of Japan* and* secondly*
the strategic orientation of this government towards IndoOhina*
The first fact is obvious* namely, that Vichyite
France was in the Axis camp* whatever the pragmatic con
siderations which prompted certain French leaders to engage
in collaboration with the Germans in Europe and with the
Japanese in Indo-China,
Given the fact that the United
States was opposed to the Axis powers well before December ?,

19i|d, all other points being equal,11 she was not predisposed
to go out of her way to aid a government with Axis connections
and kies.
As to the second fact, namely, the strategic orientation

of the Vichy French regime towards Indo-China, it has already
been shown that the pre-Vichy {Catroux) and Vichy leaders
(Decoux) viewed Japan* s expansion la terms of what methods
were available to them to maintain French rule in Indo-Ohina,
Thus, the core of their framework of thinking consisted of
formulating plan? designed to restore the status quo ante
bellua, that is, complete and total French Imperialist
is evidenced by our Lend-Lease activities* Our

reasons for not entering the war were two: (1) the lack of
support from the American people; (2) as has been demonstrated
above* the U* S. was not militarily prepared*
22
control over Indo-China*
Sad they* for example* been
willing to promise the Indochinese a program leading to

independence, It is doubtful if they would have been forced
to compromise and collaborate with the Japanese for they
would have been in a position to wage an all-out struggle
which would, even in defeat, have rendered Japanese control
over the area a tenuous one at best*-^
Thus, given their somewhat obsessive attitude towards
maintaining their Indo-Chinese colony, it is logical that
they would eventually reach a modus vivendi with the
Japanese, given Japan*a overwhelming military and naval
strength In Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific relative
to any other major power, Including the United States,
The
United States in jn nf 19i|-0g was in no more a position to

successfully defend Indo-China against Japanese invasion
than it was in a position to send a man to the moon*
A simple proof can be seen in the fact that the
United States could not even hold her own colony, the
Philippines, in the beginning of 191|2, nor begin to dampen
Japanese military and naval strength until well into 19i|3
these events occurring after ahe went on all-out mobilization
as opposed to her pre-draft, pre-war, basically parade-ground
army footing In June of 1 9 M U
2-20atroux, loc, cit*
S3
Thus, It would seem that the contention that the
Americana could have prevented Japanese control over IndoOhina is basically fallacious, regardless of bther factors
occurring at that time, as no amount of available United
States aid could haves a) equalled the overall might of
Japanj and, b) compensated for the growing anti-French
movements in Indo-Ghina which obviously would have passively
or actively resisted the French, once the latter were
engaged in all-out hostilities with Japan, as the Nationalists
were opposed to French rule per se and certainly would not
defend France unless France would give them iron-clad
guarantees for independence something neither the Vichy
French nor the anti-Axis Free French were willing to do*
It is important to note here, as earlier in this section,
that taken as a whole, the Free French were basically as
imperialistic in their attitudes as the Vichy French the
only difference being that the Free French believed in
fighting the Axis to regain France and her Empire, while the
Vichy French believed in collaboration with the Axis as a
means of retaining enough control over France and her Empire
so that someday they would once again be able to regain it*^3
^^Roger Levy, LjIndochina Et Sea Traltes (Paris:

Centre d'Etudes de Politioue Etrangere, section dInformation,
publication no, 19), 19lf.?5 Bene Thomas set, LIndochina Bans
La Kyusspa, Revue Politique Et ?arlemeat at??e",TVo!"*"T H E , "57
5 5 ?7 I ^ " r a i I i F T 9li3 7 p. 3^ 5 ;------------- ----
Hk
Besides blaming the Americans for their being forced
into collaboration with the Japanese, the Vichy leaders
also indicated fears of Chinese invasion and conquest of their
Indochinese colony and thus additionally rationalised their
accommodation with Japan as a means of preventing said
invasion*
This view can be seen in terms of the comments
by Decoux and Sabattier, the former referring to "Chinese

hoards" descending from the North upon Indo-China, while the
latter specifically refers to Chiang Kai-shek
by name in
accusing the Chinese Nationalist leader of desiring to

conquer Indo-China through the excuse of combatting
Japan*^
Again, it would appear that the French were stretching
facta as: a) Chiang had lost his coastal provinces as well
as those provinces bordering the coastal provinces and was
objectively in no position to fight Japan in Indo-China;
b) Chiang Initially "sat out" the war from late 1938 to
1 9 ^ and concentrated on building up his strength to fight
Mao Tse Tung, while letting the United States defeat
Âdmiral Jean Decoux, A La Barre De L 1Indochina

(Paris: Librarie Plon, 191i9),
% "'SaneraTir5*llisSaf'tier.
Le Destine De L* Indochina (I9U1-1951) (Ancien Commandant
guperieur eb~eiegue General au Souvernment en Indochina,
Ancien Membra du Conaeil Superieur de la Guerre}-Ex-high
commander and Delegate General from the Indochinese govern
ment, Ex-member of the Supreme Council of War (Paris: Llbrarie
Plon, 1952), p. 33.
25
J a p a n a n d , c) aa will be seen in SectionsIHand iy, Chiang
was cool to a United States proposal that he Invade and hold
XndoChina against the Japanese and that he occupy it after
the war while its fate was being decided*
That the French leaders were oriented solely towards
the preservation of their Indochinese colony and that it
was this fact coupled with the realities of the situation in
Eastern Asia which prompted them to collaborate with Japan 9
can be seen as self-evident if one looks at their policies
until March,
While Japan used Indo-Ohina aa a military and economic
base, the Decoux regime concentrated on destroying the
rising Sationalist movements.
Although they failed to
eliminate* these groups, they did succeed in limiting any

large scale resistance to Japanese control over the region
and thus served as Japan1s agents or occupation forces is
Indo-China, leaving the Japanese largely free, to concentrate
on broader policies and problems
In the meanwhile, Vichy Fcench and Free French leaders
expressed concern throughout the war over the post-war
**>. Edmund Clubb, twentieth Century China (Hew York*

Columbia University Press, 1
Joseph
pp. 2
Stillwell, The Joseph Stillwell Papers (arranged by
Theodora H. White, New York: tfilli'aU Sloan Assoc*, 191(B)*
P. 129.
l6Fali, op* cit*. pp.
disposition of their Indochinese colony**'? As Axis strength

and power waned and faded, particularly In 19i|4> ltf
inevitable that the Allies would ultimately win and that the
United States and, to a lesser degree, Britain would play
key roles after the War.
She French, therefore, agitated
at an increasing and intensive pace for Allied guarantees

in regard to her continued control over Indo-China.
Her
anxiety was not only heightened by America* s lack of

communication on this subject and by an awareness of
Roosevelt* s anti-imperialistic attitude, but also by the
fact that America and Britain had forced France to grant
Independence to Syria and Lebanon in 19^3, as part of the
War effort*
By early 19k$ the situation was complicated by
Japan *s decision to seize total control over Indo-China
as a defensive measure against American advances in the
Pacific*
Knowing full well that the Free French government,
now established in Paris, would urge Frenchmen in Indo-China

to resist the Japanese and knowing that America was now in
a position to better guarantee French Imperialism In IndoChina than Japan, Japan formally seized control of IndoChina on March 9, 19h$f reducing the French to prisoners
^saintenny and Decoux repeatedly assert throughout

their works their concern over what was to happen to FIG*
Indeed, their whole course of action was out of concern for
the colony*
2?
of war and causing others to floe to Yunnan for safety*
It
is interesting to note that those Frenchmen who did flee to

Yunnan, although formally accepted by the government of Chinar
were subject to various forms of humiliation in payment no
doubt for their forty years of quasi-imperialist treatment
of the Yunnanese*^
From March 9, 19k& until August 16*
V$k$$ the -Japanese remained in control while Free French

and ex-Vichy French leaders and supporters continued to
pressure for t he resumption of French control over all of
Indo-China*
As for France* s role in Yunnan (which before the late
nineteen-thirties had been one of partial control along the
nineteenth and early twentieth century lines of spheres of

influence) It had begun to dissipate with Chiang* s entrance
into the province in the late 1930* s and totally ceased by
June 20, 19M>*. Shortly thereafter, the Halphong-Yunnan
railroad was closed down by the Chinese for fear that the
Japanese might use it*
It was not re-opened until 191|j6 * ^
^Jean Saintenny* Hlatoire d*Une Paix Manquee (19hf>1 M ) (Ancien Chef de la i E s E o T W E H i i C T r a ^ a O e e n *

Chlne, Ancien Commissalre de la Republique Francaise au
Tonkin et au Herd Anna*)-Ex-chief of the French military
mission in China, Ex-Commissioner from the French Reoublic
to Tonkin and Worth Annam (Pariss Amio-Bumont, 1953), PP#
b$~k7* General G. Sabattier, he Destine De Ulndochine (19hlI9gl) Ancien Commandant Superior et Delegue General du
Gouvernment on Indochine, Ancien Member du Conseil Superieur
de la Guerre)-Ex-high commander and Delegate General from
the Indochinese government, Ex-member of the Supreme Council
of War (Paris: Dibrarie Plon, 1952), pp* 2lj.?-268.
Înternational Military Tribunal for the Far East
( w a s h i n g t o n n r c r f m ^ n '
If.
--------
28
Given Chiang*s policies for uniting China and doing
away with the last vestiges of imperialism in China and given
United States support of Chiang and his policies, most French
leaders gave up any ideas they may have entertained in
regard to once again establishing their influence in Yunnan,
If anything, they now feared Chinese expansion into Indo~
China and a reversal of their earlier relationship with
China, especially if the United States were to support
China,20
^Levy, loo, cit.
III,
CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA
As has already been seen in Section A above, China

was opened to Imperialist expansion from all sides after the
Opium War of 1839 - 19^2# including French encroachment in
the i860* s and 1890* s*
Although the revolution of 1911 was
supposed to be China* a equivalent of the Meiji restoration

in Japan in 1868, in the sense that it would lead to a new
modern society free from foreign domination, it proved to be
a farce and led Instead to the dictatorship of Yuan Shlh-Kai
Yuan*s main goal was simply to install himself as a new
Emperor of China and given the overt nature of "his plans, to
0
seek power for Its own sake rather than as a tool for modern
ization, he succeeded in fomenting dissension rather than
unity*
Consequently, after Yuan* death in 1916, China
was plunged into a period of political disintegration as

local warlords vied with different political groups over
control of her many provinces and districts#2*1
The disintegration of China as a political unit led
eventually to two events*.
(1) the creation of a political
coalition in 1923, between Sun Yat Sen* a Kuomintang

(Nationalist) Party under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek
and the Communist Party; and (2) the continuation of
2*Clubb, loo, cit*s George McT, Kahin, Major

Governments of Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Hess7T^)7PPTT6-l},6.
30
Imperialist; exploitation of China with Japan emerging after
World War I as the maôr power In China and the whole of
East Asia*
The first event was brought about by Sun Tat Sen* s
admiration of the Bolshevik revolution and by Russian
willingness to aid and advise the nationalists in building
a new society under the leadership of the two parties most
oriented towards change and modernisation, l*e, the nation
alists and the newly-created Chinese Communist Party (193L).
The second event was a natural outcome of China* s
political, economic, and military inability to rid herself
of Imperialist nations after World War I and to Japan* a
continual drive towards a greater Empire on the Asian
mainland a drive which was facilitated by the destruction
of the German and Austrian Empires, by the Bolshevik revolu
tion, and by the exhaustion of Prance and England In 1918*
The Hationallst-Communiat coalition only lasted four
years until 1927, when in August of that year Chiang Kai-shek
attacked the Communists in a move to destroy them before they
would covertly, along with Russian help, take over the new
government.
This is turn led to a ten-year era of civil strife
as Chiang tried to eliminate the Communist Party, eliminate
all warlords, recapture the southern and western provinces
which were still independent of the central government, and
31
prepare China for both modernization and the eventual
overthrow of Imperialist spheres of Influence especially
along the Eastern Coast and southwest to Yunnan*
In reality, Chiang failed; (1) to rush the Communists
who escaped from his grasp in 1935* to settle in the Yenan
area beyond his influence; (2) to recapture all the lost
provisoes, although, he did succeed after 1935* In extending
his control from 28$ to over $0% of Chinese territory
Including Yunnan province; and, i3) failed to get China moving
along the road to democracy and modernization*
Chiang* s failure can be seen briefly from the following
2P
outline of key factors;
(1)
His Inability to turn his Party into an ideological
group which could appeal to the people;

{2} His Inability to effectively conquer the lost
territories, either Ideologically or militarily;
<3) Consequently, his need to arrange deals with
warlords and political factions along feudaliatic lines as
a means of expanding his area of control from roughly a quarter
to one-half of China;
(if.) The degeneracy of the moral and Ideological value
of his Party and movement as it came to consist of all kinds
22P* P* Loh (ed)* The Kuomintang Debacle of Hlneteen

Forty-ni ne-Conquest or ColX'^rse,l,l(S'ew llYoric;1
1Heath THarEESonTT
T9SB*
of political and military opportunists, more interested in

graft and corruption than in working towards a unified
modern Chins;
(5) The growing frustration and disillusionment of
the Chinese people with Chiang*s regime;
(6) The added factor of Japan*s seizure In 1931, of
Manchuria and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia which
Infuriated Chinese national pride and prompted an Increasing
number of them to call for the end of civil strife and a
union of all Chinese groups against the Japanese aggressors;
(75 The newly-reconstituted Communist Party under the
leadership of Mao Tse tung (since January, 1935) which called
for an end to civil War and a union with the Nationalists
against the Japanese an appeal which nicely dovetailed with
rank and file Chinese patriotism*
The mounting failure of Chiang*a regime, despite
superficial successes such as Increasing ita territorial
base, was brought to an end by a blzzare kidnapping of
Chiang by the Communists in late 1936, which forced him to
recreate the old Nationalist-Communist coalition, with the
Nationalists,however, as senior p a r t n e r s . T h i s new coalition
greatly moderated Chinese civil strife in 1937, and helped
unite China to some degree for the Japanese attack in August,
which formally inaugurated the Sino-Japanese War*
Never-
2%ahin, op* clt. p* lf.0#
33
theless, Japana overwhelming superiority crushed Chinese
resistance and by November, 1938# some 1$ months after the
war began, Japan had control over all the eastern coastal
provinces and over much of the provinces (north to south)
which bordered the eastern coastal provinces,
Chiang was
forced to flee to Szechuan province in Southwest China while

the Communists retired to their Tenan republic area in
Northcentrai China around Shensi province.
Foreign support for the embattled Chinese now came
from the United States to Chiang1s regime and from the Soviet
Union to Mao*s regime.
Both America and the Soviet Union
replaced Germany which had been Chiang*s major supporter from

the time of the Soviet Union*s departure in 1927 (after
Chiang split with the Communists) until the winter of
1937-1938# when alliance with Japan forced them to withdraw
support from Chiang,
After November, 1938# and until the middle of 191A#
Chiang* a policy was one of rebuilding his forces while
basically waiting out the war, trusting in the United States
to# in effect, defeat the Japanese from the first overt United
States support with Claire Chennault's volunteer flying Tigers
group to the MacArthur-Nimitz armada, which later swept
through the Pacific Island territories*
Chiang, as it turned out, was more Interested in
building up his strength to resume war against the Chinese
Communists and with this goal in mind, steadfastedly refused

United States efforts to conduct a full-fledged war against
the Japanese (causing a break with the United States advisor
General Stillwell)
Chiang also refused United States demands
that he modernize and reform his army with Its of ten-corrupt

senior staff and institute reforms in the territories still
under M s control*
Furthermore, Chiang* a obsession with a
future war with the Communists led him to take more than a
laissez-faire attitude towards the Japanese as is evidenced
from the covert trade, which elements under his control
established with the Japanese*
fhe best examples of this
peculiar situation can be seen in terms of the role played

by his brother-in-law *S V* Soong, who dealt with the
Japanese through the Bank of Indochina after 193?* and by
the activities of his secret police chief Tai hi* who also
had Japanese connections*2^
As for the French* Chiang* a major action was his
mitigation of their influence in Yunnan province after he
took it over in the late nineteen thirties, followed by his
removal of all French Influence after the fall of France on
June 20, 19i|.0*
Beyond this* Chiang approached the question
of Indochina with some caution as is evidenced by his lukewarm
^kJlubb* op, oit,, p, 226*

Ârthur Laurent, La Banque Be L*Indochina It La
Piastre (Seine: Deux Rives * 195577 pp# 62, 113*
reception to * tfnited States offo p in late 191?1, and early

19^-S, that he occupy Indochina (see Section ly below) and by
his assurances to General DeGaulle in October, 19l?lj., that he
had no designs on Indochina*
Finally, when China was
assigned occupation duty in northern Indochina above the

16th parallel as a result of the Potsdam conference in
July, 19l?5, and in fact occupied said territory in
September, 19^5, Chiang1s principal goal was to win back
for China those economic and cultural rights she had
formerly enjoyed In this region, prior to the French take**
over in 1881?., as well as formally Insuring total Chinese
sovereignty over Yunan province, a fait accompli since
9
19l?.0*26
As for the Chinese treatment of the French who fled
to Yunan in March, X9i*r, or their cavalier attitude towards
the French during their occupation of Northern Indochina
(see Chapter III), this would seem a result of a more
personal Chinese vendetta for previous French exploitations,
rather than an attempt to oust the French from Indochina*
Again one should note that Chiang* a major preoccupation
was the revival of civil war in China after the war with
Japan ended*
He therefore was logically reluctant to take
^%evy, loc* oit*
36
on the additional burden of digesting an Indochinese
empire, something that previous Chinese states had only
done at their peak of military and political prowess#
Although his brother-in-law T* V# Soorsg was involved
with the Bank of Indochina, It would appear that his role
dealt with Chiang* s attempt at establishing a modus vivendi
with the Japanese and had nothing to do with any attempt
a t taking over In d o e M n a *^
This doe3 not mean that Chiang supported the French
or specially their designs on Indochina and Yunnan province
but, simply, that given his particular framework, geared
towards the conquest of the Communists and eventually of all
of China from Shanghai to the Altai Mountains and from
Tibet to Manchuria, that any involvement in Indochina would
be foolish and even dangerous*
Beyond that, France's
subjugation by the Japanese negated her role temporarily in

Eastern Asia,while the growing Indochinese nationalists
groups promised future trouble for France even if she would
regain her colony after the war*
Thus, there appeared to be
no foreseeable threat from France, and Baited States desires

to break up the old European Empires (see SectionIV) would
seem to further Insure Chiang that France's future role in
Indochina would at best u a mitigated one*
Finally, if
^Laurent, loc* cit*
37
Chiang1a pattern from 1927 to 1937, or from 1937 to 19k$* la
Indicative of his attitudes In general, it would appear that
he instinctively set unity of the nation under his command
as a prior priority to the ouster of real or potential
foreign influence or threats to China.
Certainly his
Implacable desire to ignore the Japanese until 1937, would

seem to indicate this,as well as his equally strong desire
to combine a laissez-faire attitude and covert trade
relations with Japan from 1930 to 191*4, in spite of the
fact that he was technically at war with them.
Thus, despite the accusations of Frenchmen like
Decoux and Sabattler (former Vichy officials), there would
appear to have been no real threat to Indochina from Chiang
and his nationalists.
IV,
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMERT IN INDOCHINA BEFORE

AND DURING WORLD WAR II
The origins of United States involvement in IndoChina can be traced back to the years 1930 to 1931* when the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company sought the right to operate in
I n d o - C h i n a * P r e v i o u s to this time, the French colonial
government was loathe to allow foreign companies to own or
exploit Indo-Chinese resources for their own purposes*
The United States government* a role was one of trying to
open up such closed territories for the benefit of United
States corporations and industries*
In fact, historically
speaking, the whole crux of United States foreign policy

since the 1690* s, and symbolized by the famous Open Door
Policy towards China, was one of expanding the number of
territories available to United States business and Industry*
Given the fact that most of the non-European world consisted
of colonies (direct or indirect) of a handful of imperialist
regimes, the United States continually sought ways and means
*
of increasing her industries* freedom to exploit and

manufacture resources and commodities obtained from the
world market as well aa the economic freedom to trade and
compete with other Industrial countries where and whenever
possible*2
^ T h i s is indicated in State Department correspondence

of this period. See file number 65ig00.
pQ
CUA survey can be found in any Saigon directory of
manufacturers during this period*
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Aa Indo-China was a potential area for the economic

expansion of United States corporations, and as the French
had virtually sealed this territory off from the world, it
was only natural for the United States to attempt to open
up this area of Asia (as it had formerly attempted to open
up China) to United States business, commerce, and industry*
In terms of the period from 1931 to 1938# this policy
could be viewed as forming the basis for United States
Involvement in this area, and it was moderately successful
as Standard Vacuum Oil Company received a license to operate
in Indo-China, followed by the granting of licenses to
dozens of other companies, although it should be noted that
even here they were subjected to certain restrictions.^
The year 1938, however, brought a change In the
United States* orientation to Indo-China as a result of the
Sino-Japaneae War*
Given the invasion of China by Japan in
August, 1937# and the growing feeling in United States

government circles that Japan had to be stopped in her
pattern of territorial aggrandizement, the decision was
reached to support China as a means of stopping or slowing
down Japanese expansion*3 This decision was, in turn,
^ % e e State Department correspondence ofthis period.

3The details of Invitation to the Chinese to invade
Indo-China are discussed below in depth* (See Footnotes
and lj.6.5
facilitated by was wi thurnwal Ox COrjuMM support for tbs

Chiang regime and the consequent creation of a power vacuum
only partially filled by the Soviet Union*
United States aid took two basic forms; first of all,
the shipment of weapons, munitions, and other supplies to
the Chinese nationalists bases and, secondly, the creation
and support of a volunteer United States squadron under
Claire Ghennault known as the "Plying Tigers" and later
(after Pearl Harbor) to become the expanded Fourteenth Air
Force*
There was, however, one problem involved in trans
mitting this aid and this was the geopolitical fact that by
November, 1930# the entire Chinese eastern coast was in
Japanese hands, including territory ranging from 500 to 1000
miles inland*
Beyond the Burma Hoad, which was to be closed
by the Japanese, there remained only the Haiphong-Yunnan

railroad as a means of shipping goods and weapons to the
nationalists and to Ghennault* s Flying Tigers.
Thus, United States interests in Indo-China increased
from simple desires for economic opportunity to the more
critical level of military strategy where Indo-China* s
Înternational Military Tribunal For The Far Fast
(WashingtonpICT7r^9Wr7TpT^2B7B7I=^ ,F 7 2 *,^ ^ i1 ^ A H iIra l

Xatsuo states the importance of the route, saying that it
was the " . * , only supply route for Chiang via French
Indo-Ghina***
Importance now took on the following forms:

(1) it served as the only maritime overland link to
nationalist areas*
(2) militarily, it could be used as a barrier to
further Japanese expansion*^
(3) militarily, it was the source of many critical
resources from rice to rubber*
divan this new strategic appreciation of Indo-Ohina,
the United States attempted to supply China and to engage
French support for their anti-Japanese policies.
The French,
however, resented the United States support of China for the

following reasons:
(1) they resented their growing loss of control over
Yunnan province*
(2) thoy feared th long-run consequences of United
States support for China, which someday might lead to
Chinese expansion south to Indo-China*
(3) they wished the United States to aid them in
building their own defenses against Japan. 33
3 % t wasn* t used by the French effectively as a lever

to resist the Japanese*
^Tkes views sre summarised best in Celerler, Menaces
Sur he Vlet-Kam (Saigon, I.D.B.O., 190), in which hlsT&ole"'
book'Ts devoted to an attack upon the Chinese* The "threat,
of course, is China*
ka
(Ij.) there were those who, even In 193 end 1939*
realized that France would have to reach an accommodation
with Japan or lose her colonial empire in Indo-China*3k
Obviously, serving as a covert partner of United States
efforts to support China was not the route towards such an
accommodation*
The United States on its side, resented the stifling
and stultifying nature of French imperialism and, given its
economic approach to foreign policy, was not enamored with
the idea of fighting to retain this type of r e g i m e * Thus,
to begin with, the United States and the French operated
from different and opposing frameworks*
Beyond this factor,
the United States simply was not in a position to give allout aid to both the
Chinese nationalists and the French and
felt that, if a choice had to be made, China warranted what

aid it could provide over the French, ae the Japanese were,
in fact, at war with China and had already captured a signifi
cant amount of its territory#
^ T h i s element was represented by the collaborationist

Viehyite forces, mainly, Decoux and Sabattier#
35Ev en every standard scurce recognises Roosevelta
hatred of French Imperialism. For example, Bernard Fall,
The Two Viet-Nams (Second Revised Edition; H. Y*; Frederick A*
Fraeger,~T9'5T)TPP* M>-59.
3For a summary of financial aid to China during the
193? to 19h3 period# see The China White Paper# August, 19h9#
Vol. 1, pp. 31-33. Military aiH^ppV26-3157*
As a result of these factors* the French, on one hand,

continued to make appeals for aid while, on the other hand,
periodically harassed United States shipments to China before
June 20, 19lj.0*^
After this date and the establishment of a
pro-Japanese Vichy French regime, American shipments along

the Haiphong-Yunnan railroad were subjected to harassment and
theft and in the case of guns and munitions were banned; the
latter, especially after Japan's entrance into northern Indo
china in September, 19%#
The United States continued to ship materials to China
and to Chennault, while, at the same time, increasing its
economic weapons against Japan, culminating in the definitive
embargoes of July, 19lfl, and the freezing of Japanese and
Indochinese credits (as the Bank of Indo-China was now in
Japanese hands),39
The period from June 20, 19%0 until December ?, 19%1
thus witnessed a series of economic clashes and harassments
as the United States and Japan each pursued policies destined
to bring them to a collision course from which there would
be no return*^
^State Department correspondence of this period.

3Q
Gen# George Catroux, Deux Actes Du Drama Indochinois
(Paris: Librarie Plon, 1959)* p # 3 0 #
3%?he China White Paper, op# cit#, pp# 20*29#

%r
fhls was notably in Indo-China# International Military
Tribunal For the Far East, op. cit#, pp. 9,f?l, 5,77# The
Japanese TeareSTou3FaTcTTo UhianglCal-shek in 19%0 as Indicated
by a statement of bapt# Tataukichi (Commander, Operations Section
Il
;
IlT
In the meanwhile, the Vichy French continued to ask aid of

the Americans, despite their ties and accommodation with
Japan*
SChe United States, while desiring to help the French
as a means of limiting Franco-Japaneae harassment of United

States companies and citizens and thus, limiting harassment
of United States economic interests and of supplies to
Chlang, nevertheless, was faced with certain key facts of
life, such as:
(1) aid to the Vichy French was, in effect, aid to
the Japanese, which defeated the whole purpose behind the
United States increasing economic pressures upon Japan*
(2) at best, this aid would go to maintain French
Imperialism, which the United States disliked*
(3) given priorities in America, in China, and in
England, there wasnt that much aid material available*
(if.) given the nature of Vichy Frances accommodation
with Japan, It would be absurd to contemplate French use of

this aid to fight and overthrow Japanese rule, especially in
light of the fact that a decided majority of French residents
in Indo-China were for, or at least not against, collabora
tion*^3*
of the Japanese Navys General Staff* p 26,911)* Americas

concern over Japanese expanding Influence Is reflected on
pages 21},,693 and 2ij.,70l|. by Ambassador Grew to Japanese
authorities in July, 19)jl*
^Fali, oj>, cit*, p. 1|.9, indicates a state of relative
passiveness among French Indo-China residents, with only two
native uprisings.
Thus, the United States, while quite parsimonious with

aid to Indo-China before June 20, 1940, now virtually elimi
nated ail aid with the principal exception of its treatment
of the Rondon mission in 1941, which Involved an attempt by
the United States to support militarily free French forces
in Indo-China*
In this one Instance, the United States
unlocked over a million dollars in Indochinese frozen funds

to enable Jean Louis Rondon to purchase from the Harrington
and Richardson Arms Company about 4,000 Seising *30 caliber
rifles, five million rounds of ammunition, 100 HarleyDavidson motorcycles with sidecars and a few tanks*
However,
the motorcycles were seised by the Japanese off Manila, and

the rest of the supplies were never shipped#^
Finally, the Franco-Japanese accord which led to
Japanese entrance into Northern Indo-China in September,
1940, and into southern Indo-China in July, 1941, also
witnessed the steady strangulation of the Haiphong-Tunnan
railroad*s ability to ship goods to China and to its eventual
closure, thus forcing the United States to seek alternative
and more cumbersome routes of supply for both Ohiang and
Chennault*
In retrospect, one can now see that each of the chree
reasons for increased United States Involvement in Indo-China
^Confidential interview in Washington, D.C* of

February 12, 1969*
in 1938, had disappeared by mid-19i*l, let alone by December,

19^1.
France1a desire to retain her colony of Indo-China
above all else, her troubles with Indochinese nationalists,

and the fall of metropolitan France led to her accommodation
with the Japanese after June 20, 191*0, thus eliminating IndoChina as a barrier against Japanese expansion or at least as
a thorn In her
side*
This, in turn, set the
elimination of the Haiphong-Yunnan railroad
stage
as the
for the
key supplier
of China and Chennault in addition to limiting the availability

of Indochinese
resources,
due to various forms of economic
harassment between the Franco-Japanese

the Americans on the other side.
regime
on one side and
Thus, by the middle of 191*1,
and through the latter part of 191*1, United States interest

in Indo-China
in
the then immediate future
had fallen as other
priorities, particularly those Involving the European war,

took precedence, if not domination, over East Asian con
cerns .^-3 There was in fact nothing that could be done of any
major note in Indo-China at this time, while China, for the
moment, was relegated to the position of a holding action,
something that already had existed for three years since late
1938, when Chiang decided to withdraw in part from all-out war,
/^Thls Is Indicated by the apparent refusal by the

u. S. to fully aid France against the Japanese. This period
is related well in Fall1s The Two Vlet-Nama* pp. l*l-l*2. The
only other noticeable aid ihat the Hf. '&* gave was through
T. V. Soong, the Banque de 1*Indochina, and through Rondon*
k7
while the Japanese naval establishment succeeded In gaining
precedence for a Pacific and coastal policy of conquest over
the
desires to conquer the Asian mainland*^

Yet, although Indo-China had dropped on the list of United
States priorities and.although the Roosevelt administration

had never formulated a clear-cut foreign policy towards
Indo-China (beyond the standard American economic open-door
type of policy), both Roosevelt and his hey advisors would
continue to struggle over postwar policies towards IndoChina from late 19ijl, through late 19l|Jw and Into early
The first attempt of this type of policy formation

was a plan conceived in late 19lflf to invite the Chinese into
Indo-China as a means of both driving out the Japanese as
well as removing the underpinnings of the French colonial
r e g ime.Roosevelt, personally, and certain of his advisors
were against the type of Imperialism symbolized by the
^Chiang* a withdrawal and lack of cooperation is

reflected in Stillwell In The Joseph Stillwell Papers;
also, Clubb mentions this Inlêintieth Century China/
PP. 239-2M).
^ T h i s will be seen below in detail In letters
exchanged between the State Department and T.V, Soong about
any objections the U# S* might have to the Chinese Invading
Indo-China,
kÂ letter from the late Gen* Eisenhower to John J
McCloy on January 26, 19lf2 states that the U, S. would not
object to the Chinese entering French Indo-China*
48
Wrench, in Indo-China not only for moral and practical
economic reasons# but also in light of the troubles caused
by American support of China and# in a broader sense her
struggle with Japan- by French accommodation with the
Japanese in Indo-China .^7
The advantages of this plan were obvious, thus*
(1) Chinese invasion of Indo-China would, at best,
drive the Japanese out of Indo-China, at worst# tie them down
In terns of troops and supplies which could not be used
elsewhere.
(2) It would, in either case, enable the Chinese to
take over Indo-China at the end of the war and would effectively displace the French from the area.
(3) Given the United States support and control over
Chiang* a regime as opposed to the intransigent French, it
would enable the United States, working through China to
create in Indo-China a territory that would be free for
economic development and expansion,^-
(I*,) It would advance the cause of national self-deter
mination as It would be a step towards the eventual breakdown
^Vall, The Two Vlet-Kama, pp. 52-53* Roosevelt was

angered over French collaboration with the Japanese in IndoChina* As to the Chinese, Roosevelt admitted in a Press
conference of Feb. 23, 1945, as is related by Fall, that he
offered Indo-China to Chiang Kai-shek in 1943, but the latter
turned It down.
^ T h i s will be seen below. U, S, control over Chiang#
though not openly admitted by Walter Judd in an interview of
January 4, 1969 In Washington, B.C., was admitted tacitly* The
Chinese, he said# were so dependent upon U. S* aid and advice
for the continuation of military activities, that they were,
In effect, under the control of the U.S.
of 19th century imperialism, a phenomenon never particularly

appreciated by American policy makers for economic as well as
ideological reasons#
As to the continuation of imperialism
under China, this would be negligible given China*s overall

weakness and its dependency upon the United States#
This policy was formally formulated in a series of
letters in early 1942, from General Eisenhower to John J*
McOloy (January 26, 1942) from Secretary of State Cordell
Hull to Secretary of War Henry Stimson (February 6, 1942),
and from John J# McOloy to T, V* Soqqg (Chiang* a brother-inlaw and key advisor) on February 9, 19 4 2 # ^
The essence of these letters consisted of an invita
tion to the Chinese to invade Indo-China (that is, ** . * the
United States would base no objections to the Chinese invading
Indo-China), the placing of Indo-China under the command of
Chiang Kai-shek and not under the theaters of war to be
headed by Admiral Himitz and General MacArthur, respectively,
and the implication in the Eisenhower letter that French
private property was to be protected with no mention of
French interests, politically or economically*
Chiang, on
in Indo-China and
Idea*"^
his part, declined any territorial

tended to "throw
cold water
ambitions
on the
whole
Again as was Indicated In section III, above,
^ % r o m Department of
State, OSS files#
^Thls was
reflected by his refusal of
Indo-China asan
outright gift by Roosevelt told In the news conference of
Feb, 23, 1945* See note 47#
50
Chiang was not desirous of engaging the Japanese In fullfledged combat, as he wished to conserve and increase his
strength for a resumption of civil war with Kao after the
Japanese had been defeated.
For the same reason, Chiang
did not want to become so involved in Indo-China during and

after the Japanese war that this would over-extend or weaken
M s strength and thereby reduce his chances for victory over
Mao and consolidation of all of China under his control.
In
this same context, Chiang appreciated Indochinese suspicion

of Chinese imperialism and the problems this would present
to him, especially in light of the growth of Indochinese
nationalist groups since
prowess.^1
1930, and
their growing military
Lastly, and most objectively, Chiang1s army was
still poorly trained and equipped in
and M s resistance
of needed and long overdue reforms in his army (such as

promotion by merit and elimination on the part of hit senior
officers of flagrant acts of corruption) rendered that army
no match for the modern and crack Japanese forces as underscored
by the effectiveness of the Japanese blitzkrieg in Eastern
China between August, 1937, and November, 1938.
^ T h i s was, of course, manifested in the agreements

between the Chinese and French of February 28, 19^6, Insuring
a Chinese foothold In the area. Also, nationalist hatred of
Nationalist Chinese is told in Vo Nguyen Crlap, People* s War,
People*s Army (Second printing New Yorks Frederick'ITTraeger,
W ) , P.T5T
^%?he weaknesses of the Kuomlntang are summarized in
the Introduction to The Kuomlntang Debacle of 19k9*Conqueat
or Collapse (New York: "Neath {K a y t h e o h J T
Thus, the Chinese solution to a wartime and postwar

Indo-China was, in effect, aborted and United States policy
makers vacillated throughout 19&2, 19i*-3 and 191*4 over basic
ally four different courses of action in regard to a postwar
solution of the Indochinese problem.
Again, one must bear
in mind that relative to United States commitments over the

globe, Indo-China was rather low on the priority list and,
this In the main, contributed to the confusion, and Indecision
over Its rol after Japan*s defeat#^
In the meanwhile, there was a two-front war to fight
and the conduct of the war in Indo-China can be seen in the
following way.
First of all, until early 191*5, the United States was
not in a position to actively engage the Japanese in IndoChina.
What the United States could do was to build up
Chennault *a Flying Tiger group into the Fourteenth Air Force

and to use this unit plus other air elements to bomb Japanese
installations and other strategic points throughout the length
and breadth of Indo-China.
The use of air attacks naturally
increased with the development of the United States war machine,

such that by 191*1*. and 191*5, Indo-China could be used as a vast
bombing run for United States squadrons
Beyond air attacks,
5>3see Footnote 1*3*

^ O S S files for the period contain many pages relating
to the great extent of bombing raids over the area. These
raids started In 191*2 and continued at an increasing frequency
through the war*
the United States gradually began aiding anti-Japanese

elements within Indo-China by supplying them with infantry
and light artillery weapons (that is, rifles, pistols, hand
grenades, mortars, and necessary ammunition)^
Of these
anti-Japanese elements, by far and away the most efficient and

resourceful was Ho Chi Minhs Communist-nationalist group,
better known as the Yiet-Minh,
It was for this reason that
aid was given to Hos Yiet-Eiah and why, In part, as indicated

below, the United States was to seriouslyconsider, for a while,
supporting an independent Vlet-Nam under the nationalist
%"
groups,'3
In the meanwhile, during the 19i|.2-19lUl. period, Chiang,
although disinclined to overinvolvement In Indo-China (now
Included In the theater of war), began making contacts with
the plethora of different Indochinese nationalist groups with
--mr-i
"
the idea of using these groups to weaken French control after

the war a natural reaction to French imperialist policies
from the l880*s to 19i|.0,
The main theme of its policy was
to bring these different and disparate groups together in a

convention sponsored by the nationalist governor of Kwangsi
Province, General Chang Fa-Kuel, and from this convention to
dti
^ J u d d admits this, as did Joseph Buttinger in an
interview on November 27, 1968 in New York City,
^Buttinger stressed this in the Interview,
create the Bong Minh Hoi, or the League of Vietnamese

Revolutionary Parties and to use thia organization as the
hasis for forming a provisional government in exile,
Included in this conglomeration were the Viet-MInh,
or Communist nationalists, and the Vietnamese nationalist
Party (The V.H,Q,D.B,) which was modeled after the Chinese
nationalist or Kuomlntang Party and was consequently proChinese,^
Again, the Chinese plan was not an attempt to actively
pursue an anti-Japanese policy which would liberate IndoChina from Japanese control, but mainly a means of institu
tionalizing the native opposition to the French so that, at
a minimum, positive French imperialism would be weakened and,
hence, constitute no threat to Chiang and, at a maximum, It
might lead to the overthrow of French Imperialism and the
creation of a pro-Chinese Indochinese republic or republics.
However, it should be noted in this latter context that the
Chinese were not seriously supporting an attempt to overthrow
the French between 1942 and 191*4# as the situation in Asia
was too fluid* for Chiang to Involve himself in another area* s
revolutionary war.
In other words, Chiang would do what he
^Giap, loc, cit.

^Bernard Fall, The Political Development of Viet-Ham V-J Day To Geneva Cease^FTre Anri Arbor, Unlverally Microfilms
(3CK)ctoraT^llieais 'ai Syracuse University, 1955)# from page 96 on.
A
could to make the French position tenuous at best, but at
little risk to himself or M s
regttm*
Similarly, he would
not attempt to use the Dong Mlnh Hoi against the Japanese,
except for intelligence operations and even in this area
its use was ineffective, except for the work of the Viet
Minh or Communist-Nationalist membership,
Although the Free French were in existence since the
fall of France on June 20, 19M), they did not play an active
role in Indo-China*s resistance until October, 19kh when the
BeSaulle regime, now in control of Prance, ordered an
acceleration in Free-Preneh anti-Japanese activity, including
the landing of special command teams,
M s
sudden increase
in anti-Japanese activity was not simply part of the general

anti-Axis operations of the Free French but, rather, it was
indicative of their fears that Indo-Ghina would be lost to
France after the war and, consequently, that the best means for
insuring French imperialism would be for the Free French to
use anti-Japanese activity as a means of once again making
France the de facto head of Indo-China, especially if the
Americans and Chinese might invade this area at some future
tfe
date in the war against Japan,-'7 These fears were, of course,
genuine, as neither Chiang nor Hoosevelt was especially
enamored of French imperialism, and had the war dragged on
^%*all, The Two Vlet-Nams, pp. 6?-70*
$$
until 19l|i> or 191}.?, as was expected in 19kb$ then. In all

likelihood, Chinese and/or United States forces would hare
seized the
area
and deprived France of her colony
as
can be
surmised from events described later in this section* 60
Increase
Japanese fears that
The
resistance, coupled with

collaborationist Vichy French would
in Free French
the
switch to the Free French and the Americans as a way of

preserving
French imperialism,
led
to
Japan*a
takeover
of
Indo-China from the French on March 9, 19kS and to a

general purge of French residents and officials, Then, in
an attempt to win over the Indochinese to their cause and to
play on their fears of a reconstituted French imperial regime,
the Japanese installed 3ao Dai as their puppot Emperor of
Tongkin and Annam, while retaining control over Gochinchina,
Laos and Cambodia.
(Tongkin represented the northern quarter
of Viet-Nam, Annam the middle half, and Gochinchina the

southern quarter.
Today* s North Viet-Nam consists of Tongkin
plus northern Annan, while South Viet-Nam consists of southern

Annan and Gochinchina Laos and Gambodia correspond to the
same countries today with the addition of a few districts
that
had been ceded to Thailand during the War).
Âdmiral William h, Leahy, I Was There (New York;

Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Go,, l95'0) P* i|4*
56
Japans now attempt at collaboration failed as Ho
Obi Mind and bis Viet-Mlnh wore successful in capturing
Tongkin andthen, playing on Indochinese resentment over
Japans failure to relieve them of a famine, In uniting
many of the diverse nationalist groups under his control In
July and August, 1945, such that he could now demand the
ouster of Bao Gal and his puppet regime,^3*
Hos progress
in August, 1945 can fee seen as follows
(1) On August 7, 1945, Immediately after Hiroshima, he

convened a Party Congress which elevated his guerrilla force
to the status of a liberation Army, broke ties with the pro
visional government of the Dong Mlnh Hoi, sponsored by
Chiang, and announced plans for the formation of a Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam (B.R.V,)*
(2) on August 13, 1945, he called for a general

Insurrection and ordered the Japanese to surrender to the
Viet-Mlnh*
By this maneuver, he attempted to establish a
Viet-Minh-dlrected coalition government over all of Viet-Nam
An account, albeit a:
to Ho* but nevertheless
inters a
_ .................... ,... ____ __ ___ ___
Souvenirs Sur Ho C M Minh, Editions en Dengues Etrangres,
(Hanois ForelgHTianguage# Publishing House, 1962); Pham Van
Dong, Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi; Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1965)*
*
6% a i l , The Political Development of Viet-Nam V-J Day to Geneva Cease-Fire, p, % onwarctT 'iShese events are
je m c te ^ lB T ae ta iX :------- :----- p
(that is, Eastern Indo-China) before the expected Allied

arrival, especially the French arrival,
(3) On August 16, 1945, Ho convened a special Congress
for all nationalists and classes designed to galvanize into
being a Vlet-Minh-directed coalition government#
(4) On August 25, 1945, Bao Dai abdicated M s throne
and turned over his government to Ho,
(5) On September 2, 191*5, (the end of the War with
Japan, or "V-J Daytt), Ho formally proclaimed the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Ham as a reality and headed by his VietMinh-sponsored provisional government#
In the meanwhile, in accordance with the provisions
handed down at Potsdam in July, 191*5, the British, after
August 16, 191*5, began moving Into Indo-China south of the
16th parallel (that is, todays Cambodia, South Vlet-Ham,
and the southern 10$ of Laos) while the Chinese at the same
time began moving into Indo-China north of the 16th parallel
(thatis, todays Horth Vlet-Ham and the northern 90$ of Laos).
Given British support of French imperialism (for
reasons to be explained below), Britain immediately turned
over its share to French control and chose to play a symbolic
rather than actual role as occupier of southern Indo-China#^
^ T h i s xa shown by the ability of the French to estab

lish the basis for a provisional government la the South In
June of 191*6# For a chronical of events, see the appendix
to Roger Levy, L Indochina ft Sea Traitea# Centre d*Etudes de
Politique Etrangere, section dTInfo5aBon, publication no# 19
(Paris, 191*?)I A Chronical of Principal Events Relatin* to the
In d o -C h in a C h ie s ^ o r T T O ir im r i t f ^ a a n r T u E lls E e T W ----------BEIEcHeETChihshlh (World "Culture), Peking, 1954, P* it#
58
However, the French were unable to exert total control over
the area, as It included the southern half of Annam, which
was now part of Hos Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as Ho
had replaced Bao Dai as ruler over Tongkin and Annam or, in
other words, the northern three quarters of Viet-Nam*
Tech
nically, Ho could have had Cochinchina, as Vietnamese pressure

in July, 19l|5, caused the Japanese to give it to their new
puppet Bao Dai, but French influence in this region was more
powerful than Viet-Mlnh and the French easily established
themselves In Gochinchina
and
its capital, Saigon, in
addition to Cambodia and the southern sliver of Laos*

In the north, however, things were different as the
Chinese did not intend to surrender northern Indo-China to
France without concessions designed to secure Yunnan as a
permanent part of China and to re-establish Chinese economic
and cultural influence in Indo-China as it had been before
1881)..
In addition, the Chinese had hopes of perhaps estab
lishing the Bong Minh Hoi as an autonomous government under

French rule, thereby weakening French imperialism, or even
as an Independent pro-Chinese republic(s) (plural in terms of
the creation of a few to several regimes as, for example,
Laos, Cambodia, Tongkin, Annan, and Cochinchina or other
combination^ Lastly, the Chinese hoped to exploit the
^ S e e Levy, loc* cit*, for the text of the Accord of

February 28, 19lp*
65
C*ap* loc* cit. He states that the Dong Minh Hoi was
trying to
* * overthrow peoples* power.n
$9
region for what it was worth in the short run, if for no other
reason than to do to the French what they had formerly done
to the Chinese#^
Beyond this, the Chinese were still not interested in
any involvement that would overly extend or weaken Chiang* s
attempts to re-unite China under his control#
Thus, France was effectively deprived of northern
Indo-China by V-J Bay on September 2, 19k$* and for several
months thereafter#
However, China1s control over the north
and her attempts to establish her privately-sponsored nation

alist response (the Bong Minh Hoi) failed due to the fact
that Ho* s Viet-Minh-aponsored provisional government controlled
a
Tongkin and Annam or, in other words, the eastern half of

southern Indo-China.
This fact, in the long run, did not
upset the Chinese, as their main strategy was to weaken France*

even if Ho*a Viet-Mlnh did awaken thoughts of another Mao#
However, at the time, given the broad political and cultural
spectrum of nationalist groups, plus the French and the
British and indirectly the Americans, all involved In IndoChina, Ho did not appear to pose that great a threat to
Chiang and he thus concentrated on weakening and exploiting
France* a position with a minimum of effort and cost.^
^ S e e Footnote 61$.#
^This was still done under the guise of accepting
surrender from the Japanese and then occupying the country
according to previous agreements among the Allies, excepting,
of course, France*
60
Finally, in concluding the military phase of the 19k2
to 19k# period, we can see that America* s military involve
ment beyond what was earlier mentioned, consisted of the
landing of several Q*S.S. battalions in Indo-China from around
March to August, I9k5, whose role was that of guerrilla or
commando forces designed both to harass Japanese installations
and to unite Free French and Indochinese Nationalist resist/g
ance against the Japanese occupation,
Ihus, the United
States never did actually invade and conquer Indo-China, as
it had done earlier with the Gilberts, Marshall, Mariana,
Philippinei Bonin and Byukyu island groups, but rather con
fined its action to an harassing and covert (that Is,
intelligence-gathering)level.
Diplomatically, however, United States efforts were
not as obscure or peripheral, as can be seen by an investiga
tion of United States policy making attempts of formalizing
plans for a postwar Indo-China, during the 19k2-19kf> period.
We have seen earlier that by late 19kl> the United
States government had considered a plan whereby China would
invade Indo-China and thus take over responsibility for its
administration during and after the war,
ffiiis plan, whose
advantages were already discussed, actually constituted the

first of four different plans which Hooaevelt and his advisors
^This is confirmed in official OSS files, although

there was intelligence activity before this*
were to formulate during the period from late 19ijl to early

although a final choice was never made*
After Chiang disavowed any interest in the 19ifl plan*
choosing instead the safer course of organizing and sponsor
ing the Dong Minh Hoi and its "paper provisional government,
Roosevelt conceived of a second plan for postwar Indo-China,
namely, the trusteeship Plan*
the motivation for this policy was an attempt to find
some solution to Indo-China, givent
(1) the desire to see French colonialism ended?
(2) the unwillingness of the Chinese to take over
responsibilities for Indo-China;
(3) the feelings that the Indochinese people were too
diverse and their nationalist organizations too varied and
weak to provide an Independent government after the war for
one or more states in this area*^
Although the Trusteeship Plan was never definitely
worked up, it obviously envisioned the United States, Britain,
China, and the Chiba of Soviet Socialist Republics providing
a commission or other agency which would unite Indo-China
after the war, as preparation for Its transition Into a
sovereign nation-state or states*
There were variations on
this plan, but, basically, it provided for one or all of
^ % h e details of this plan may be found in the Roosevelt

news conference of Feb. 23, 19i| to which Fall alluded. See
Footnote lj.7*
these powers
go
serve in the capacity of a caretaker govern
ment for an area which, was in no position to rule itself and

for reasons earlier stated should be liberated from France.
It is Interesting to note in this context that France was the
only member of the Big Five whose name was not mentioned as
a participant in this plan.
Although trusteeship for Indo-China was mentioned at
the Teheran Conference, it never was fully developed nor
seriously considered not only by the other three powers but
even by various groups within the State and War Depart
ments^0 who felt that it was unworkable, given the attitudes
o the other nations, the problems of this region, and the
fact that the United States might end up being responsible

for running Indo-China, a burden no one wanted, given the
problems involved in rebuilding a war-torn Europe.
hater, a third plan evolved which, following the
precepts of Wilsonian principles of self-determination,
envisioned the transfer of power from the French to the
Indochinese nationalists*^
In theory, this plan was the
most ideal, as it would:
^Represented by William Langdon, among others, whose

activities will be discussed below.
73-a Chronical of Principal Events Relating to the
Indo-China Cluestlon~(T9Effi^5jOiT~p. 15* entry for 'Sept. liu
(1) be in line with Amerle&* s long-term ideological

opposition to old-fashioned 19th century imperialism;
(2) more specifically, it would remove from IndoChina the stifling effects of French imperialism;
(3) it would open Indo-China to international trade
and investment and thus permit United States firms to expand
into Indo-China without severe forms of restriction*
In practice, however, there did not appear to be a
political group within Indo-China who was capable of control
ling this area and of developing It, free from international
discussion or from French or even Chinese attempts to
subvert It*
Given the kaleidoscope uf nationalities, relig
ions, cultures, age-old hostilities (as, for example, between

Cambodians and Vietnamese), and political groups, even the
possible creation of several new nations out of Indo-China
failed to satisfy what was felt to be the basic political,
economic, and cultural prerequisites for nationhood*
Oddly enough, from today* s perspective, the continua
tion of this plan as a possible option was based upon the
successes of Ho Chi Minh* a Viet-Mlnh organization which not
only proved to be the key anti-Japanese resistance force In
this area, until late 19l|4, but also seemed to possess an
increasingly greater potential for governing at least the
Viet-Nam portion of Indo-China, as the war reached its final
outcome*
The various merits and limitations of each of these

three plans tended to be debated over the years 19i|2, 19k3p
and 191&, with the growing realization by 19l|4* that their
respective deficiencies were such as to require a new and
fresh approach*
Even
in the
case of Plan
over, there were
many
more policymakers dubious of this plan,
Ts Chinese
take
not only because of Chiang* s recalcitrance but also by

19l|ij.* because of a growing dislike for Chiang* s personal
rule, the corruption of M s
regime, and his conduct of the
war (or more accurately, lack of conduct of the war).

It was with this in mind, that certain junior State
Department officials conceived of
to Indo-China.
new or fourth approach
This plan favored a re-establishment of
French control over Indo-China but under different conditions

from those which characterized pre-19i|-0 French rule or, in
other words, under conditions which would greatly moderate
and liberalize the nature and quality of French imperialism
such that the Indochinese people would be able to grow
towards self-determination and the region of Indo-China
would be in fact open to foreign investment and trade.
The reasons for this policy were perhaps best articu
lated by William B. Langdon, Counsel General In Kunming,
China, in a letter to the State Department on August 23,
19l|4.72
72
1 Files from the Department of State, file series

number 851G.00.
65
hangdon*s argument for the restoration of French rule
can he summarized aa follows:
(1) the Indochinase lack the necessary political
?.nd
economic prerequisites for self-leadership as independent

sovereign nations*
(2) heyond this fact, they might he absorbed by
migration of Chinese peoples to the
as
south
and
thus
end up
part of a greater China*

(3) International trusteeship would not work as it
would in varying ways most certainly be obstructed by France,

Britain, and China*
Clj.) consequently, a period of dependence and protection
seems to be the only logical proposition for Indo-China and
the question resolves itself as to which power should exer
cise this temporary dominion*
(5)
obviously, this power must be France for practical
reasons as:
a) replacement of France by another nation would
seriously damage united Statea-Fronch relations.
b) France already has a functioning colonial government*
c) another power would have to create its own colonial
government which would be more alien to Indo-China
than the French government given the latter* s
sixty-year tenure*
d) the Indochinese are, when all is said and done,
accustomed to the French and are even partially
assimilated into French culture and speak the
language*
It is Interesting to note that although hangdon does

not specifically respect the Chinese plan, it Is Implied In
point two*
Having stated his case for the resumption of French
rule, Langdon then proceeds to state specifically the ways
in which this rule is to be moderated, especially in regard
to
opening up Indo-China to foreign Investment and trade*
He proposes that a special Franco-American convention be

held relating to Indo-China In which the following American
rights be incorporated to Insure a competitive American
position in the country.
They would Include:
(1) the same rights to land and real property as French

W)
citizens;
(2) the right to import American goods into Indo-China
upon payment of the same duty as is applicable to French
goods and the right to export Indochinese goods to the United
States on equal terms with exportation of such goods to
France,
(3) the right to engage in agricultural enterprises
(plantations) on the same basis as French citizens*
(ip) the right to engage in mining enterprises and to
acquire mining rights on the same basis as French citizens*
() the right of free transit through Indo-China of
American goods destined for China and of Chinese goods
destined for the United States*
6?
(6) exemption of American and Chinese goods in transit
through Indo-China to or from the United States and China
from discriminatory railroad freight rates, namely: railroad
rates over Indo-China lines on such goods to he on a mileage
basis no higher than that applicable to French and domestic
goods hauled within the country*
(7) provision for the establishment of a free port of
Haiphong for goods in transit to and from China*
(8) equality with French citizens of investment enter
prise and of commercial enterprise (namely, no activity to
be reserved exclusively for French citizens such as forward
ing business, hotel, and newspaper operations, etc* as at
present)*
(9) equality with the French in all tax matters*
(10) freedom from burdensome and discriminatory require
ments for company incorporation, such as majority French
ownership of stock, majority of French citizens on board of
directors, etc*
(11) equality with French citizens of shipping and
aviation rights (except inland and coastwise navigation)
(12) equality with French citizens of cultural enter
prises such as schools, missions, etc*
Langdon then concludes with the statement that;
It is hardly necessary to point out how a convention
of the kind outlined above would benefit the trade and
enterprises of all nations, which would claim mostfavored nation treatment, and particularly the import
and export trade and industries of China* s landlocked
southwest*
On September 27, 19l{4,
Howland Shaw, speaking for
Secretary of State Cordell Hull# formally commended Langdon

and called his letter on the Indo-China Question, "an
example of alertness in following and anticipating political
developments*^^
m s , u n ite d States foreign policymakers had now
completed the cycle to the reinstitution of French rule in
Indo-China, albeit under modified and liberalized conditions*
However, while this fourth and final plan became increasingly
popular among personnel involved with Indo-China, no firm
commitment was given to any of these four plans during the
balance of Roosevelt* s life, (that is, until April 12, 19k$)
due to a combination of several factors, including the
following:7^
(1)
Relative to the whole panorama of decision making
and problems governing the late 19VJ-# and early 19i|5 period
(especially the creation and implementation of programs to
restore and rehabilitate a shattered Europe and to create
a new world order based in large part upon the effectiveness
of Big Four power negotiations, particularly those involving
*
73Ibid* , p. 6k.
^Reflected in letters In Department of State files
of November 21, 19i|ij. to George C. Marshall from the State
Department, of November 16, 19ljlj. from William Leahy to
Marshall* As late as September 3, 19l|5, a dispatch was sent
from the India-Burma Theater to the American commanders in
Paris that there waan* t yet a policy on Indo-China*
69
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Indochina*s future

status was, as
low
it
had been for some three years, relatively
on the priority
list,
(2) Consequently, from this perspective, there was

not enough time and personnel available for a final resolution
of this problem at this time,
(3) State and War Department personnel involved in
Indo-China policy-making were still divided over which plan
or even combination of plans would be best,
ffihis ambivalency
was also complicated by personality factors within the

Departments,
(k) A principal personality factor was the
division
which separated Roosevelt and certain of M s advisors from

more
junior
personnel in the sense that Roosevelt was loathe
to restore the French in Indo-China, yet ambivalent over *foich

of the three other plans was best and how to specifically
force the French put of their Southeast Asian colony*
(liven the passions which Roosevelt tended to evoke either
for him or against him, this advocacy for a French-free
Indo-China tended to evoke arguments of a personal or
subjective nature, especially as symbolized by the discussions
7%hese disputes are shown in detail In Interviews and

correspondence with several of those involved*
70
over the Trusteeship plan*
This was viewed as being
Roosevelt1s pet project in the sense that "he clung to

it" despite its poor prognosis (given the lack of support
from the big power allies the key factor for successful
implementation)
Beyond this, Roosevelts opponents stressed the not
inconsiderable factor of French reaction to being forced
out of Xndo-OMna especially in light of her reaction to being
forced out of Syria and Lebanon in I9k3* and the notoriously
poor relationship between Roosevelt and BeGaulle, the leader
of France for the present (19l|lt-X9ii5) and for the foreseeable
future (again from the vantage point of late X9l?4 to early
191*5) J 6
($) Given Roosevelt*a key role (objective and sub
jective) in making the final decision on Indochinese policy,
there were the complications brought about by his rapidly
declining health and its obvious effect upon his ability to
quickly and clearly reach and Implement decision? which,
viewed against the background of the above four factors,
further delayed any decision on Indo-China*
(6)
A final factor and one which basically underlaid
the previous ones was the point that the United States never
really had developed in the past a clearly-formulated policy
76pall, The Two Viet-Nama, p* $2*
i
71
towards Indo-China such that there was now no developed
formulation for postwar policies.^
This is easily seen from
the information presented in the beginning of this section,

when the United States initial approach to Indo-China, as it
had been thirty years earlier to China, was essentially a
pragmatic economic policy, simply oriented towards enabling
private corporations and merchants to more freely trade and
Invest in Indo-China and, to view all other variables,
whether social, political, economic, or cultural, in terms
of how it would effect United States corporate interests.
Thus, the United States was not prepared to come to grips with
more sophisticated problems of foreign policy until the
^
Sino-Japanese War led to various attempts to control the

situation from 1938 to 19l|l, and our disappointments with
the French, led from late 191*1 onwards, to different attempts
at postwar plans or policies.
Yet, these plans or policies
were not based on any clear set of precedents developed from

a previous long-standing overall foreign policy strategy or
framework towards the world in general or towards Indo-China
in particular,78
*^See Footnote l|.*

78
If there was a clear-cut strategy, such as the British
had, there would not have been the multi-sided conflict within
the confines of the State and War Departments as to what to do
about Indo-China*
Consequently, United States attempts to formulate

policies for a postwar Indo-China were impeded or slowed
down toy the necessity of having to create a mature and
sophisticated policy from scratch, while simultaneously
engaged in a host of other and more complicated programs
and policy formulations.
Franklin Roosevelt's death on April 12, 19^5* and
the end of the war in Europe (V.B. Day) on May 8, 19^5,
led in turn to a galvinization of United States policy
towards Indo-China and with it, a partial resolution of
United States ambivalency,
This is seen, first of all, from the fact that with
the demise of Roosevelt, all serious support for the Trustee
ship Plan dissolved, as he was its only chief proponent,
and the case of the opposition was, by this time, quite
strong.
In addition, Roosevelt*s death removed from the
councils of government the principle opponent of French

colonialism, including a moderate version or versions of
French rule.
Although Roosevelt supporters remained in the
government, they lacked any leader(s) who could cope with

the growing support for a restoration of French rule, albeit
a modified
This factor assumes greater importance when
one views the nature and background of Roosevelts successor,

Harry S. Truman.
Truman, whatever his abilities and apti
tudes, was not prepared by training or experience to be the
i
79
leader of the major power in world politics.
Furthermore,
Roosevelt had not bothered to prepare and equip Truman for

the presidency as is blatently exemplified by the fact that
Truman only learned about the now famous Manhattan Project
(the development of the Atomic Bomb) on the day of Roosevelt's
death.
Given Truman's total lack of knowledge or experience
in foreign affairs and foreign policy-making, it was only

logical that he avail himself of the opinions of the experts
and specialists in the State and War Departments.
Given their
growing orientation (as a group) sines mid-19^ towards a

restoration of French rule.in Indo-China, It was again only
logical that he accept their views,
As to the end of the war in Europe, this obviously
meant that United States policy-makers were now in a position
to devote greater time and energies to the Japanese war and,
with it, to formulating plans which would decide the post-
war fate of eastern Asia and the Western Pacific area.
This,
in turn, meant that it was now possible to finally resolve

certain of the problems which had characterized that area,
problems whose resolution had been postponed, in part, because
of the higher priority, accorded the European Theater of War.
^Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vlet-Nams. p. 66.
&
?k
Yet, the trend towards a restoration of modified French
rule and the effect of V.E. Day did not lead* in turn, either
to a simple resolution of United States ambivalency towards
Indo-China nor to a complete elimination of each of the other
three plans, although the Trusteeship Plan was soon eliminated
8(3
as an alternative,
The principal difficulty involved in the
resolution of the Indochinese problems was the question of
implementing the modified French restoration plan in the face
of the obvious fact that the French, once in Indo-China, would
be free to do as they wished, and there was no sign or indica
tion of any sincere or serious French desire to willingly
81
modify their colonial policies.
This now meant that the
United States must structure a policy which would compel the
French to create a modified colony program, yet compel them
in a subtle and discreet manner so as to mitigate any disrup
tion of French sensibilities,
At the same time, the United
States should continue to hold options to follow other courses

of action in the event of a possible French reaction along
recalcitrant or intransigent lines.
In other words, although
the Trusteeship Plan was to be eliminated as impractical or

impossible, the Chinese and Nationalist Plans should be retained
in some version or other for possible implementation.
BOfhis was borne out by the fact that none of the major
powers wanted Indo-China, hence, culminating In the February
28, 19^6 Accords (reflecting the Langdon proposals of 1 9 ^ ) as
a result of Chinese occupation a la Potsdam,
*Thomasset, loo, cit.
we have already seen reference to the plan which the

United States finally created and which was sanctioned at
Potsdam in July, 19^5*
Yet, the subtitles inherent in this
plan and the reasons behind its creation, have not been ade
quately explained and this author shall now attempt to do.
On the basis of the available facts before April,
19^5 during the period from April to September, 19^5 and
from September, 19^5 to March, 19^6, it is possible to con
struct inductively,the probable reasons for the course of
action which the United States followed in an attempt to
create or structure a policy which would compel the French to
implement a modified form of colonial government.
A final alternative would have been to let the French
reoccupy Indo-China at the end of the Japanese war on the
condition that they promise to create a modified form of im
perial control.
This alternative obviously had serious flaws
in it, as;a) the French would resent United States interference

in what for them was a domestic problem and, therefore, not
subject to international control,
In other words, a United
States attempt to place conditions on French re-entry into

Indo-China would be viewed as a blatent infringement of French
sovereignty? and, b) even if the French would agree to such
conditions, they would be free, once they would be re-estab
lished in Indo-China, to do as they wished.
Given France's
past record in regards to imperialist policies, the probability
would be high that they would attempt to re-instate their

former strict imperialist policies.
The net result of this approach would be the worsening
of United States-French relations and the reinstitution of
authoritarian French rule, the very factor which the United
States wanted to prevent, unless, of course, the United States
wished to employ strong measures*which would be unthinkable,
given the desire to preserve our alliance with France, in
addition to the fact that this would make the United States
appear as imperialistic as France.
Thus, it would be absurd to allow direct French re
occupation of Indo-China as a means of instituting a modified
^
form of French colonial government.
It would then seem neces
sary to provide for an Indirect method by which French rule,

along modified lines, could be implemented, that is, occupa
tion of this land by one or more other powers as a means of
laying the foundation for a moderate re-institution of French
rule.
This indirect method would delay French re-entry until
certain pis-conditions for the re-institution of French rule

along moderate lines had been met.
Among these pre-conditions
would bes
1) the signing of trade and other agreements between
France and interested powers concerning the latter*s commercial
and industrial rights in this region, and,
2) the creation of governmental bodies among the in-
77
digenous peoples of Indo-China, which would give them a degree
of autonomy in local government and, thus, structurally limit
French control to the region as a whole, that is, to such mat
ters as formulating the defense and foreign policies of the
region and providing for postal service and currency.
In
other words, an attempt would be made to institutionalise

native control over local affairs as a means of forcing the
French to accept, before re-entry, a de facto dominion or
quasai-dominion-level colony, which, by virtue of its organi
sation and nationalist sentiment, would help to guarantee a
modified form of French rule.
Accepting the logic behind this indirect approach to
French re-occupation, the problem now was to determine which
power or powers should act as the temporary occupiers of this
region.
A quick view of the world in the Spring of 19^5, would
show that the remaining members of the "Big Five would be the
only logical candidates for this duty, that is, the United
States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic^ Great Britain,
and China,
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republic}?, however, would be immediately railed out.
If the
United States would occupy a part or all of this area, it would

lead to a direct and politically explosive confrontation be
tween the United States and France and would be as dangerous,
78
if not more so, than the earlier-cited approach of direct
French re-occupation.
Again, one must bear in mind that an
integral argument for the modified French plan was the neces
sity for maintaining the Franeo-Ameriean alliance, an alliance
which already had been strained by the political and personality
difference between Roosevelt and DeGaulle.
Given French sensi
bilities and her traditional intransigent approach to colonial

matters, United States occupation of Indo-China would spell the
death knoll of this alliance*
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be ruled
out for such obvious reasons ass
1) the fact that this would disrupt the postwar balance
of power by allowing the U.S.S.R. to extend her influence into
Southeast Asia, an area never previously considered part of
her sphere of influence as opposed to eastern Europe, Manchuria,
or North Korea (the areas "granted to the U.S.S.R, as a result
of the Yalta Conference in February, 19^5).
2) Incumbent to this indirect approach was the obvious
fact that United States policy would be implemented.
This,
in turn, implied influence over the potential occupiers* which,

in the U.S.S.R.*s case, was nonexistent,
3) it was unlikely that, once ensconced in Indo-China, the
U.S.S.R. would eventually surrender the area to France,
4) Beyond any or all of the above-mentioned points, the
possibility was that the U.S.S.R. would not be interested in
79
playing the role of occupier of part or all of this region and
certainly of acting as the United States * agent.
The elimination of the United States and the U.S.S.H.
would leave only Great Britain and China.
Britain, however,
was not favorably disposed towards interfering in Prances

colonial policies, not for any Francophile reasons, but quite
pragmatically, because this could set a precedent for outside
interference in her own gigantic empire, an ' empire which she
was still desireous of maintains, or at least of de-controlling
on her own terms and in her own time.
82
Thus, Britain would
be predisposed to act as an occupier in name only, while, in

fact, returning the French as de facto occupiers without prior
French agreement to any set of conditions.
In other words,
British occupation would be simply a disguised version of French

direct occupation.
China, on the other hand, would not be so generous with
the French, but once ensconced in Indo-China, might be loath*to
accepting French re-entry, not so much because she would now
desire to directly colonize Indo-China, but rather because she
might wish to institute one or more pro-Chinese republics,
such that she would have indirect control over the area.
Again,
China was never enthusiastic about involving herself actively

in French Indochinese affairs during the war, but if allowed
into Indo-China with no cost to herself, she might try to re
structure the area along her own needs and desires, especially
ftp
This was shown by her actions in Coehinchina in turning

it over to the French.
80
since she sponsored the Dong Minh Hoi group, which could be
88
used to form pro-Chinese republics, J She would not wish to
take direct control of the region, as herown domestic pro
blems, coupled with rising Indochinese nationalism, would
make this impractical, if not ruinous, for the Ghiang regime.
On the other hand, if she could keep the French out altogether
with the help of Indochinese nationalists in the Dong Minh
Hoi, it would be silly for her to permit the re-entry of the
French, not only (for emotional reasons) because she had been
victimized by the French in the past, but also (for political
reasons) because it made good geopolitical sense to have her
southeastern boundary bordered by a few or several weak and
pro-Chinese Indochinese governments than by a French-supported
regime. Since China would not have to overinvolve or commit
herself in Indo-China, given rising Indochinese nationalism,
she could rather easily use the Indochinese through the Dong
Minh Hoi to keep the French out,
Beyond these factors, there was also the growing dis
pleasure in United States government cicrcles for the Chiang
regime, not only for the corruption and inefficiency, but
also for Ghiang* s Intransigence and reluctant attitude towards
following United States advice, oven though the United States
was the only political, and especially economic supporter of
his government.
2An excellent account of the Dong Minh Hoi and its

activities may be found in Bernard Fall, The Political Develop
ment of Viet-Nam from V-J Day to Geneva Cease-Fire, pp. 9 - 17.
81
Interview by author with Walter Judd in Washington,
D.C., January 4, 19^*
* *
Thus, there was, for these various reasons, a dis

inclination for permitting China to occupy the of whole of
Indo-China or, in other words, for instituting what, in effect,
would have been the old China Plan formulated back in late
19^1*
Given the impossibility of using the United States
and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as occupiers of IndoChina, and given the extremes of the British and Chinese views
towards Indo-China, the only feasible answer would appear to
be a compromise, whereby the British and Chinese would serve
as joint occupiers of the region with Britain occupying the
southern half of Indo-China, that is, south of the sixteenth
parallel, and China occupying the northern half of Indo-China,
that is, north of the sixteenth parallel.
The advantages of this compromise, beyond the fact that
nothing else could, in theory, implement a modified French
government, were the following.
1)
By permitting the Chinese to occupy the northern half
of Indo-China, the United States would have the lever necessary

to establish the earlier-mentioned pre-conditions for French
re-entry.
In other words, the Chinese would not willingly
leave, unless France agreed to certain concessions for China

in Indo-China (thus opening the way for concessions and agree
ments with other interested powers),
In addition, the Chinese,
through the Dong Minh Hoi, which had already established a

provisional government in exile, would be able to set up the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
institutional base for local Indochinese governments, thus

effectuating the political and social organisations neces
sary to limit French control over this region.
2} By permitting the British to occupy southern IndoChina, the United States would, in effect, allow the French
to enter "through the back door", since Britain would turn
over de facto control to the French. This would be good, as it
would enable the French to play a role in the immediate post
war occupation and, thus, mitigate the French feeling about
being compelled to institute a moderate colonial government.
The French would now be both in and out of Indo-China in the
sense that they would have de facto control over the southern
half, while jig. .lure control would rest with the British, and
the Chinese would have both de facto and de jure control over
the northern half.
Thus, the French would not be forced to
wait by the sidelines while another power or powers occupied

Indo-China and remained, until France agreed to the conditions
for her re-entry along moderate imperial lines.
In this
fashion, she would, from the start, at least feel that she was
partially involved in her old colonial territory,
35 The
south
de facto re-instatement of the French in the
(through the device of British occupation) would have the
advantage of containing any desire on the part of Chiang to

prevent the French from returning in any form or manner,
^Chiang would, naturally, refrain from risking open

conflict with British forces in the south, a move which would
jeopardise postwar alliances and would, at the same time, sap
China's already shaky military position at home,
83
4)
The desire on the part of the French to re-establish
their old colonial rule would be countered by their need to

accept the pre-conditions for their return to the north, that
is, the signing of trade agreements and concessions with China
and other interested powers and the acceptance of indigenouslycontrolled local governments,
55 Finally, the establishment of locally-controlled
native governments in the north would compel the French to
permit the creation of similar governments in the south.
In this fashion, it would appear that United States
policy towards a postwar Indo-China was finally formulated.
As can be seen, the principal strategy to be followed was the
modified French Flan, while diluted versions of the Chinese
Plan and the Nationalist Plan were employed as a means of
tactically implementing and, hopefully, guaranteeing the modi
fied French plan.
International acceptance and the formal implementation
of this plan was achieved at the Potsdam Conference in July,
19^5? when the Great Powers agreed that China should occupy
the northern half of Indo-China, while Britain should occupy
its southern half.
There was to be, however, "one fly in the ointment",
and that was the growth in power and popularity of Ho Chi Mirtffs
Viet-Minh and the actions taken by Ho from August 7, 19^5* until
his proclamation of a Viet-Minh-sponsored provisional govern
ment on September 2, 194-5, the same day as the Japanese surren-
As has already been seen, Ho succeeded in creating
his own provisional government over the whole of Tongkln

and Arm am, and on paper, over Gochinehina as well- (in other
words, in fact, over the northern three-quarters of Ylet-Mam
and, in theory, over the southern one-quarter, ergo, over

most of the eastern half ef Xndo-China), In addition* Ho had
broken with the Dong Minh Hoi provisional government sponsored
by Ghiango
Thus, on J Day, Ho was in control of roughly half
of the territory assigned t China and roughly one-quarter

of the territory assigned to Britain*
Furthermore, he was
neither favorably disponed to the French, for obvious nationalist

reasons, nor to the Chinese, for difficulties he had encountered
with Chiemg during the war when he and Ills YIet-Minh were part
of the Dong Minh Hoi federation of Vietnamese nationalist
groups. 87
Thus, a new element was injected into the situation as
Ho*s Yiet-Minh-sponsored provisional government took its place
along side of China and Prance (Britain) as one of the con
tending powers in postwar Indo-China,
The effect on United States policy making was to cause

the United States to continue with her original plan, for Indo-
China, on the one hand, while on the other hand, thinking of
^Bernard Fall, The P_Qii.Al.nal u&vni.npmra'iA of 3Lis,-Sam

from Y-J Day to Genova Cease-Fire, pp. 9 - 38,
^General Vo Nguyen Oiap, People *e Wav, ?eonie*5 Army
(New Torks Frederick A, Praoger, publishers, 19o2Tf"rp.r !
contingencies which would allow a greater role for indigenous

political participation, perhaps even for a compromise between
the modified French Plan and the Nationalist Plan.
In other
words, postwar United States policy for Indo-China was now,

once again, in a fluid state and, thus, President Truman could
honestly state to his European commander on September 3 19^5#
(one day after V-J Day and Hofs Proclamation) that United
States policy towards Indo-China was still unsettled.
HI,
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN INDO-CHINA

FROM SEPTEMBER, 19^5 TO MACRH, 19^6
British troops arrived in southern Indo-China on

September 13 19^5# to find the area contested by various
nationalist factions.
The principal cause for the conflict
was the feeling among those nationalists belonging to the

United National Front (which had ruled Cochinchina for Bao
Dai) that the Viet-Minh's Committee for the South under
Tran Van Giau was overly conciliatory to the French and had
betrayed Vietnamese interests,- when it surpressed an antiFrench revolt on September 2, 19^5 using Japanese prisoners
^
of war as its police.

The British, under General Gracey, quickly restored
order in Saigon by arming interned French soldiers and then
driving both factions from the city.
General LeClere ar
rived and proceeded to re-establish French control over the

main delta cities.
By February, 19*1-6, all Japanese forces
had been disarmed, the British had evacuated southern IndoChina, and the French colonial bureaucracy, minus the top
Vichy collaborators, was once again functioning in southern
Indo-China,
However, parts of the countryside, esp#ci&lly
in southern Annam, were still controlled by dissident nationa'

list groups. Thus, France was once again established in at
least the southern half of Indo-China, although her control
87
was limited, due to the culmulative strength of the various
nationalist groups*
By mid-September, 19^5* the Chinese had completed
their occupation of northern Indo-China, with the 185*000
soldiers of the First Chinese Army Group under the command
of General lu Han.
Unlike the British, the Chinese had no
intention of permitting the French easy access to their old

colony.
In fact, just the opposite was the ease, as the
Chinese proceeded to harass the French in various ways.
This
QO
can be seen from the following examples.

1) General Lu Han refused to let French nationals
attend the Japanese surrender ceremonies and, further, refused
to fly the French flag at the ceremonies,
2) The Chinese were not fundementally inclined to
help or physically aid the French military or civilian popu
lation (including women and children who were' resident^ andhad
to be persuaded to this task by their senior United States
military advisor. General Philips Gallagher.
3) They refused to deal with DeGaulle *s special emi
ssary, Major Saintenny, and also to have meetings with Gene
rals Alessanderi and Sabattier.
This was later changed, again,
by the personal intervention of the senior United States

military advisor, General Gallagher, who acted as an inter
mediary between the Chinese and the French.
General Gallagher
GO
Letter from Maj. Gen. Philipe B, Gallagher to Gen.

Sari Wheeler, March 13, 1965* Gallagher Papers (MSS in the
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, Washington, B.C.)
also played an active part in initiating and running the

Franco-Chinese economic meeting held between November 29,
89
and December **, 19^5*
The Chinese proceeded to disarm French as well as
Japanese troops, while permitting Indochinese nationalists,
including the Viet-Minh forces, to retain their armies,
5)
Chinese attitudes and behavior towards all French
men, regardless of rank, position, or military or civilian

status, was one of open and direct hostility during the first
few months of their occupation, until United States pressure
and persuasion modified their actions,^0
While downgrading or denigrating the French position
in northern Indo-China, the Chinese attempted to influence
and, If possible, to structure the local governing elements
within their occupied territory.
Given Ho's fait accompli
in creating a Viet-Minh-sponsored government in fongkin and

Annam (thus denying Ghiang the opportunity to inaugurate his
Dong Minh Hoi provisional government) and latent Indochinese
fears of Chinese imperialism, Ghiang*s policies were to accept
the Viet-Minh as rulers of the Democratic Republic of Viet
nam (the D,R.V,), while encouraging the Vietnamese Nationalist
Party, the V.N.Q.B.D. (the Vietnamese equivalent of the Chinese
Kuomintang), and the Dong Minh Hoi federation (from which the
^Gallagher, loc. cit.
90
Gallagher Paper, Memo of January 30, 19^6.
89
V.N.Q.D.D. had recently split) to seize territories in northern

Indo-China, while simultaneously demanding a role in the D.R.V.
government.^
This pressure, plus the fact that Ho could not ade
quately control the various non-Viet-Minh nationalist groups,
forced Ho to grant them a greater say in the D.R.V. and also the
freedom to dominate geographical regions within its boundaries.
Finally, it forced them, despite his partys success in the
January, 19*1*6, elections for a national assembly, to increase
Dong Minh Hoi and V.N.Q.D.D, representation in his government
as well as to permit the head of the Dong Minh Hoi to become
vice-president and other non-Viet-Minh nationalists to re
place Viet-Minh in certain ministries.
Thus, the Chinese were succeeding through their support
of the Dong Minh Hoi nationalist federation and the V.N.Q.D.D.,
in limiting Viet-Minh expansionism while, simultaneously,
through harassment and the pressure of their 185,000 man
army group, in preventing the reêstablishment of French
rule. Beyond this, their active support of Indochinese
nationalism in the north and their ability to deny French
entry into this region, also, had the effect of encouraging
the hopes and aspirations of the various nationalist groups
in the south, especially given the latters relatively strong
positions in parts of the countryside of that area.
91
Bernard Fall, The Political Development of Viet-Nam

from V-J Day to Geneva Cease-Fire. loc. cit.
The Viet-Minh, although limited by the Chinese oc

cupation, took steps to disarm and weaken the nationalist
opposition wherever and whenever possible.
Thus, as part
of* their policy to de-emphasize their affiliation with the

Communist movement, both to ameliorate GhiangTs feelings and
those of certain anti-Communist Indochinese nationalists,
they officially dissolved the Indochinese Communist Party
in November, 19^5* and created in its place a Marxist Study
Association.
Beyond this, they scheduled elections for a
nationalist assembly for January, 19^6, and promised seventy

free seats to the Dong Minh Hoi and V.N.Q.D.D. groups.
Finally
they tried to offer something to each of the various segments

of the population within the D.R.V, as a universial political
device for broadening one's political base.
Thus, their in
terior minister, Vo Nguyen Giap, shortened working hours,

abolished unpopular taxes, instituted a literacy program, and
proclaimed respect for all religions.
However, while they were using their superior position
in the D.R.V. government to broaden their popular support, the
Viet-Minh ware also consolidating their control, direct or
indirect, over Tongkin and Annam by replacing the old colonial
bureaucracy at all levels with People's Councils designed both
to neutralize future French attempts to re-establish themselves
in the D.R.V. territory as well as to neutralize the political
power of the anti-Communist traditional oligarchies, who had

dominated this area in the past either as independent rulers
or as puppets of the French and, near the end of the war,
of the Japanese.
The net effect of these institutional changes in
governmental organization was to divide local control be
tween the 'Viet-Minh and the Dong Minh Hoi and the V.N.Q.D.D.
groups or, in other words, to divide control among the
various nationalists said anti-colonialists.
Again, it
should be noted that the Viet-Minh could not take over this
region in its entirity, due to the size and nature of the
other nationalist groups and, especially, to the support
the latter received from the Chinese.
Nevertheless, the
Viet-Minh had succeeded in consolidating their position

within Tongkin and Annam and of structurally removing much
of the basis for French and Indochinese traditionalist rule,
by its popular front tactics of influencing the anti-colo
nialist, anti-feudalist forces.
Their popular front and consolidation policies were
rewarded in the elections for a nationalist assembly in
January, 19^6, when the Viet-Minh received a comfortable
majority, despite the fact that all parties and factions
received representation (due, in part, to the Viet-Minh
guarantee of free seats to the opposition).
However, a3
noted earlier, the Chinese were not pleas&d by this growth
92
in Viet-Minh influence and thus forced Ho to grant greater
representation to the Dong Minh Hoi and the V.N.Q.D.D.
While Ho acceded to these requests# in terms of surrendering
the Vice-Presidency to the Dong Minh Hoi leader as well as
certain ministries to other non-Viet-Minh leaders, he co
vertly attempted to restore the balance of political power#
both by re-shuffling ministerial powers to favor those
ministries controlled by the Viet-Minh as well as by an
increase in propaganda and, when possible, the harassment
of non-Viet-Minh groups, including the periodic use of ter
rorist tactics.
The non-Viet-Minh nationalists retaliated
and, thus, the situation remained somewhat unstable through

January and February of 19^6# although the Viet-Minh con
tinued to dominate the D.R.V. government.
In the meanwhile, American involvement in Indo-China
during this period was more subtle and indirect, though it
did exist and was instrumental in bringing about the reso
lution of this phase of Indochinese history by March 6, 19^6.
Although America* s presence was mors or less absent from
southern Indo-China, where the French had quickly re-estab
lished their influence, it was present in two forms in
northern Indo-China.
The first and overt manifestation of the American
presence was the United States Military Advisory Group
under the command of Brigadier General (later fSaôr General)
93
Philipe Gallagher, which was attached to Lu Hans First

Chinese Army Group, the occupying force in northern IndoChina,
On the hasis of material generously provided the
author by General Gallagher, it would appear that the primary

92
functions of this advisory group were the followings
1) to assist and advise the Chinese in planning for
and effecting their movement into, and occupation of, and
the establishment of martial law in French Indo-China north
of the sixteenth parallel,
2) to assist in preliminary negotiations and effecting

the final surrender of the Japanese forces,
3) to assist in every way possible in accepting the
surrender, disarming of enemy forces, and their disposition,
to advise and assist the Chinese in the adminis
tration of civil affairs,
5)
to assist in the liberation and re-habilitation
of allied internees and prisoners of war and to render

United States medical assistance in emergency care to those
individuals in Japanese hands.
The Gallagher group was quite successful in fulfilling
these duties, especially its role of protector of French
military and civilian personnel, whose fate at the hands of
the Chinese and Indochinese nationalists would have been
disasterous had it not been for General Gallaghers personal
intervention.
This was symbolized by the letter of thanks
92
Most of the material below is taken from a memo
dated lb September 19^5 - 12 December 19^5* entitled
"French Indo-China", The Gallagher Papers.
94
sent to General Gallagher by Major -Jean Saintenny, whose
family had been terrorised by the Indochinese nationalists
and had been rescued from further harassment by General
Gallagher*s action on their behalf.
The Gallagher mission
also enlisted the aid of both Ho and Lu Han in providing

protection for French nationals, in reducing a boycott
against the French, designed to deny them food and general
merchandise, and in re-opening a French military hospital
to provide care and treatment for French patients, many of
whom were ill and undernourished and had been without medi
cine and adequate medical care.
However, beyond the mercy duties performed in behalf
of French nationals, who were facing the combined Chinese

and Indochinese reaction to eight years of severe domination,
the Gallagher group also played a key role in bringing the
Chinese and the French to the negotiation table and thus,
in setting the stage for the eventual removal of Chinese
troops, their replacement by the French and the institution
of a new and moderate form of French colonial government
along the lines of the British concept of Dominions,
This
can be easily seen from the material in tho Gallagher files,

where the Chinese and, in particular, Lu Han, displayed no
interest whatsoever in having any dealings with the French
and where General Gallagher and his group spent over ms month
painstakingly setting up and supervising negotiations.
93lbid, , p. 3.
93
It
95
was, in turn, from these preliminary meetings and discussions
that the Chinese were to eventually agree to leave Indo-China
in return for French agreement to their demands, Thus,
although General Gallagher was to personally leave IndoChina on December 12, 19^5 > a primary role played by his
advisory group, was to act as the catalyst necessary to
bring the Chinese and French together and subsequently, to
hammer out agreements which would both remove the Chinese
from Indo-China and. re-establish French rule along clearly
prescribed and limited lines (that is, make it difficult
for them to once, again, re-impose total and complete con
trol over the area),
Without the presence and actions of
the Gallagher advisory group, it would not only have been

impossible for the French nationals to preserve life and limb
in northern Indo-China, but, also, it would have been equally
impossible for the French to return to northern Indo-China,
given the combined might of the Chinese, the Viet-Minh
and. the other nationalist groups? the fact that all three
factions were politically and militarily institutionalised
in this area? and the fact that postwar France lacked the
independent men and material necessary to dislodge them
forcibly and then to pacify the area*
Furthermore, it
could be said that France's tenuous control over parts of

southern Indo-China, combined with the size and strength
of various nationalists in this region and with the strongly
96
anti-French
attitudes of the three main groups in the
north, would probably have lead to the eventual removal

of French rule over the south and, hence, over the whole
of Indo-China.
Thus, beyond the official duties and the mercy mission
of
the
Gallagher
group,rit
would appear that they played a
hey role, if not the key role, in the restoration of a
modified
form of
French rule.
regard to
Viet-Minh,
In
group8s dealings with Ho and the
the
Gallagher
it would appear
that these were largely confined to mundane matters incum
with the occupation and with the protection

citizens. However, Gallagher points out several
bent
of
French
times in
his material that during the first few weeks after the
arrival of his group in northern Indo-China (especially
from September 1^ to September 27, 19*1-5) that Ho and the
Viet-Minh viewed them as a full-blown allied 'Commision*
empowered to accomplish far more than the disarming of Japanese
9^
troops."
Consequently, the Gallagher group was, in effect,
wined and dined by Ho*s emissaries and treated in a most

cordial fashion.
By the end of September, 19^5, and through October,
19b$t Ho realized that he could not effectively deal with
Gallagher and his group interms of national and international
matters (that is, above mundane occupation matters), as
Gallagher pointed out that
oh
Ibid.. p.
he
was not empowered to negotiate
3.
9?
with H o . ^ Nevertheless* although Ho and the Viet-Minh
subsequently cooled to the Americans, Ho did ask General
Gallagher to forward a message from him to President Truman.
Gallagher refused to send it, through special channels, but
did. accept a sealed letter or communication addressed to
The President of the United States** and sent it through
regular channels.
Finally, General Gallagher states that
he never heard whether or not Ho ever received a reply.

This question of the United States * dealing with H
in the immediate postwar months, now leads us to a con
sideration of the second manifestation of a United States
presence in northern Indo-China, and one which is still
shrouded in secrecy, namely, the role of the Q.S.S, (Office
of Strategic Services) and, especially, the highly secret
and controversial Donovan Mission.
First of all, it should be carefully noted that the
author's information on the Donovan mission is of a frag
mentary character, as he was not permitted access to the
files dealing with this mission, nor was he able to obtain
that much information from his series of interviews, in
cluding disccussions with former O.S.S. personnel*
What,
then, follows Is a crude approximation of the 0,3,3,'s role

in Indo-China,
Although this presentation is not definitive,
it is germane to this study and, hence, is included in an

95
Ibid.. p. if.
98
attempt to present a more complete and accurate work.
97
It would appear that the 0,8.S., a eom&nation com

mando and espionage organisation and the forebearer, of
sorts, of the modern G.l.A, {Central Intelligence Agency), had
operated in Indo-China to a minor degree before March, 19^5*
and to an Increasingly signifigant degree after this date,
Ac earlier noted, larch, 19^5 was the time when the Japanese
ended their collaboration with the Vichy French and treated
all Frenchmen as the enemy.
Wow, as a commando and espionage organisation, the
primary role of the O.S.S, In Indo-China was to harass
Japanese installations and to-provide United States military
and naval forces with information obtained from espionage
operations, as for example, troop movements, location and
quantity of supplies, available transporation, etc.
In
addition, the O.S.S. mission involved laisgjpn with and, when

possible, support of indigenous opposition to the Japanese.
In as much as the most efficient and effective guerrilla
and intelligence force lit Indo-China WL0
VXcrij**Minh,
despite the proliferation of non-Viet-Minh nationalists,

and the growth of Free French forces after October, 19^,
and especially after March, 19^5* it was only natural and
logical that the O.S.S, should establish and maintain con
tact and relations with the Viet-Minh.
Furthermore, given
the military proficiency of the Viet-Minh and the fact that

97
Taken from contiguous, unclassified O.S.S. flioc

of the period.
sine 19^0 they had served as the principal source of

harassment of the Japanese military* it was* again*
only natural and logical that the members of the Office
of Strategic Services grew to respect and admire the
Viet-Minh as true nationalists and patriots as opposed
to the French* who appeared to be too self-serving
and
narcissistic* let alone stained by the taint of
collaboration.
Thus* by the end of the war and the con
current establishment of Ho5s Democratic Republic of

Viet-Nam* there were individual Office of Strategic
Services members who did not view such a republic as
a bad thing and who * personally, believed that the United
States should support the establishment of native re
publics like the Democratic Republic Republic of Viet
nam in Indo-China and should support the Viet-Minh,
given the fact that they had earned the right to govern
as a result of their unstinting and heroic effort
against the Japanese.
98
Letter from General Gallagher to General Robert
B. McClure on September 27, 19^5* However, it had become
clear that the United States was going to help the French
in some way. He states in the letter, "There has been a
noticable change in the attitude of the Annamites towards
the Americans here in Hanoi since they became aware of the
fact that we were not going to interfere and would probably
help the French." Also, in a letter to General McClure on
October 16, 19^5 General Gallagher states, "They (the
French) have no desire to have the Chinese resist their
efforts /Tn North Viet-Nam7 because it would be tantamount
to bucking the Supreme allied policy,", the Gallagher Papers.
In manifesting these opinions based on their own

experience in the field, the OSS members also were viewing
their experiences against the background of their knowledge
of United States interest In the self-determination of all
peoples and the discussion they had been privy to concerning
the eventual liberation of all the southern Asian peoples
from Burma to the United States 1 own Philippines.
More
specifically, they were thinking of the policies and programs

generally bantered about and discussed by the Roosevelt admini
stration and advocated especially by Roosevelt, himself, who,
in turn, had been Influenced by his period of tutelage under
Wilson.
Now, it would appear that not only did certain field
personnel of the OSS In Indo-China share Roosevelt* a orienta
tion towards self-determination in terms of supporting or
favoring the Trusteeship Plan or the Nationalist Plan, but
that similar orientations were manifest among higher ranking
OSS personnel, Including the commander, General William
Donovan, who was a close associate of Roosevelt and was a
strong supporter of his policies for self-determination,
including the alternatives of the Trusteeship Plan and the
Nationalist Plan.^
However, there apparently were other
^Confidential Interview on December 30 , 1968,

Washington, D* C*
high-ranking OSS officials who disagreed with this philosophy

and instead agreed with those personnel in other decision
making bodies of the government who favored implementation of
the modified French Flan*
As pointed out in the concluding pages of Section IV,
above, Roosevelt1s death and the growth in political Influence
of the supporters of the modified French plan led, In fact,
to the
implementation
of said plan* ^ 0
In addition, one of
the strongest arguments for this plan was the unfeasibility

of the trusteeship Plan and the growing jaundiced view of
Chiangs government, policies, and practices*
The national
ist plan, in part, was discounted, due to the fractional!zation of the nationalist parties and of
the
people of
Indo=
China in particular (that ls^ no one was strong enough to

maintain and protect this area*)
Now, while the argument
against the nationalist plan appeared to at least be more

valid than not, Ho 1a "meteoric rise in August, 19k$, changed
the nature and content of this argument, for not only did he
create the Provisional Government of the DRV, but, also, he
showed signs of being a notch above the run-of-the-mill
nationalist leader.
In this same context, his five-year
struggle against the Japanese and the French now took on a

greater significance, as
he had sueceo&ed
in creating a
^ % e t t e r from General Gallagher to General McClure

dated October 16, 19k$ V* 21*
government and a state despite the persistence of Indochinese

internecine bickering and with virtually no outside support.
The rise of Ho and the Viet-Minh by September 2, 19k$*
now led to a new fluidity In Halted States
policy
pointed out at the conclusion of Section IV.
as previously
Fart of this
new fluidity or willingness to consider the new variable of

the Viet-Minh was manifested in the desire of certain old
Roosevelt supporters to revive in earnest the Rationalist
Flan.
While
agreeing that the Trusteeship Plan was a dead
and moribund item, they felt that perhaps the Nationalist

Plan could be Implemented In some way or other.
A compromise of sorts was
apparently worked out
between supporters of the Nationalist Plan and the modified

French Plan, whereby an attempt would be made to meet with
Ho and to gain his support for a program which would at first
enable the French to resume regional control over the whole
of Indo-China, including the DRV, and then provide for a
phaasd-out withdrawal of tha French over a period of years,
leading ultimately to the creation of three independent
states, the DRV (including Cochlnchina), Laos, and Cambodia.^01
It was apparently with this in mind that General
Donovan, a member of the Roosevelt School and leader of the
OSS, headed a mission which met secretly with Ho, on or
101Ibid*f p. 20.
about January of 194^6 Although details are not available,

Ho apparently agreed to bring the DRV into a proposed French
Union (roughly to be similar to the British Commonwealth)
and then in steps to have his nation elevated from autonomous
status to independent status#
Another view, and one related to the thesis of
Pierre-
Maurice Desslnges in his article in he Monde of April IT*

191}.? entitled "hes Intrigues Internationales en Indochina,
states that the real purpose of the Donovan mission
was
to
get Ho to agree to give the United States economic con

cessions in the DRV in return for United States support for
Independence of his nation#
United
States
Ho# in turn, refused and the
then abandoned him to
the
French# ^ 2
This thesis, however, would appear to go against the

pattern of facts which are available and further would seem
to negate the process by which United States policymakers
^02It should be noted that Desslnges confuses the

history of this period by alleging that after Ho refused,
Gallagher then led Chinese troops across the northern IndoChina border. First of all, Gallagher did not lead the
Chinese troops, but was their military advisor, which implies
a more subtle and subordinate role than actual command#
Secondly, Gallagher had left Indo-China before Donovan
arrived Gallagher having been In Indo-China from September 1^,
19l|5 to December 12, 19k$, while Donovan arrived In January
of 19i}.6. In other words, Gallagher and the Chinese arrived
in Indo-China some four months before Donovan did# Thus, in
addition to the case against this view stated in the text,
one can also add the probable confusion of Dessinges in relat
ing the episode of Donovan* s mission given his confusion over
other and more readily provable facts#
dealt with the modified French plan in the Spring of 191*3#

as well as the unofficial behavior of the Gallagher group# which
was not basically involved with Ho# as opposed to its efforts
to effectuate a Chinese-French modus vivendi*
In other words# ~
given the available facts, it does not seem logical or

probable that the Halted States should suddenly decide to
arrange a deal with Ho on the quid pro quo basis of VietMinh economic concessions in return for a United States
guarantee of Vietnamese independence.
It is obvious that the
holder of this view fails to consider the fact that although

the United States was obviously interested in expanding its
economic interests in Indo-China#*1-0^ that Indo-China was not
exactly the gold mine1* of Asia (despite its economic potential)
such that the United States would so blatantly and abruptly
offend French interests.
One might ask the question, if the
United States-French alliance meant nothing, why did the

United States implement its modified French plan?
As for
United States economic interests, they would be served by the

Implementation of the modified French Plan.
Thus# again# why
should the United States abruptly offend the French by

permitting their entry into part of Indo-China only to turn
around after four months and desert them for Ho and the
Viet-Minh?
^Letter from General Gallagher to General McClure

dated October 16# 191*5# p. 20*
105
It would seem far more probable on the basis of the
available facts that realizing (a) the new and significant
variable of Ho*a recently established Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam} (b) the growing importance of the arguments for
the nationalist plan by the Roosevelt self-determination
school led in part by Donovan and certain other OSS personnel}
and (c) the need to maintain the United States-French alliance,
that the United States policymakers decided to effectuate a
compromise between the Rationalist Plan and the modified
French Plan by providing for a program which, though initially
placing all of Indo-China into a French union as autonomous
republics, would eventually lead to their elevation to fully
Independent status*
What was needed was the agreement of Ho
to this plan, given his strength relative to the other

nationalist factions.
As Donovan and certain OSS personnel
had supported the Rationalist Flan and given the contacts

and rapport that existed between the OSS and Ho from the
war period, it was logical to assign to Donovan and his
mission the responsibility for getting Ho* a agreement to this
compromise*
Thus, it would seem in retrospect, that the Gallagher
advisory group concentrated on obtaining Chinese agreement
to the modified re-institution of French rule and French
agreement to the implementation of a modified colonial
government, while the Donovan-OSS group concentrated on
obtaining Viet-Minh agreement to short-run autonomy under a

French Union and eventual Independence in the long run#
One
point
might be worthy of comment at this time and
that is the probable question on the part of some readers as

to why the United States did not appear to be disturbed by
Ho *s
and the Viet-Minh* a Gommunist affiliation.
felt#
as sincere a
explanation for this la that it was

Ho*s background# that
was a Communist.
he
was
The principal
given the whole of

nationalist
as
he
In other words, to use post-19^8 parlance,
he was a Tito-type of Communist who would control his own

affairs and never quite be a puppet#
To those who would
dismiss
this as typical of our war
time naivete, they should consider a few facts established

over the past twenty-four years j
(1) Ho has tried to steer an Independent course,
as
exemplified by his delicate handling of Chinese support from

19if9 to 195k, by his handling of Chinese support since I960,
and especially since 1965, and by his delicate balancing act
right up through early 1969, between the Chinese and the
Soviets in their now ten-year-old struggle, or even schism#
(2) The fact that all of the Communist bloc mavericks
have been nations whose parties have brought themselves to
power and who had an indigenous power and leadership base
^^Confidential interview on December 30, 1968 in

Washington, D* C#
107
vtehat is, who were not a group of puppets superimposed on a
nation by the Soviet Bed Army,
Albania, China,
Examples: Yugoslavia,
Moderate example: Cuba, whose potentially
rebellious leadership is held in check by the Soviets because

of total economic dependence upon the Soviets and fears of
possible United States intervention if the Soviets deserted
them,
Thus,
that United
in
retrospective sense, it would
not
appear
States policymakers concerned with Xndo-Ghina
were Hcut from
the
same cloth as Polyanna in their
appraisal of Ho's and the Viet-Minh* a nationalistic

attitudes neutralizing to some degree
their
Communist
affiliation.
By January, 191$, the French clearly realized that
their only chance for maintaining their rule in Indo-China
was to agree to the creation of a modified form of colonial
government,
Towards this end, they now had to appease both
the Chinese and the nationalists, especially Ho and the

Viet-Minh.
As earlier indicated, negotiations with the Chinese
had been in progress since November, 19i|5, and these were
now intensified through January and February of 191$, finally
leading to the Sino-French accords of February 28, 19lj.6,
whose principal provisions included the following items
108
concerning first Chinese rights In Indo*China*10
(1)
Freedom for Chinese inhabitants in Indo-China to
create and maintain their own schools*

{2} Navigation rights for Chinese vessels in Indo
chinese waters#
(3) he right of the Chinese to own and operate
businesses#
(Ij.) The right of the Chinese to equal status with the
Indochinese with regard to commercial rights and taxation*
(j?) The right of Chinese to participate in the legal
and administrative processes*
(6) The right of Chinese to use Haiphong Harbor*
(7) The right of Chinese to ship good along the
Haiphong-Tunnan railroad tax free*
(8) The conferral upon China of the right to enjoy
"most favored nation" treatment in Indo-China in all
commercial exchanges*
The net result of these provisions was to return to
China all of the privileges she had enjoyed in Indo-China prior
to the French period of conquest before l88i^*
A less obvious,
but equally important result of these provisions was that the

precedent was now formally established for the opening up of
Indo-China to foreign commercial and industrial enterprise*
^^Levy, Indochine Et Sea Traitea,
109
Specifically, this meant that the way was now open fop the
expansion of United States economic investment and commence
in Indo-China along the lines proposed by the Langdon memo
randum*
Thus, the United States 55open door policy towards
Indo-China, a goal since its early contacts in 1930-1931*

was now in the process of being actually Implemented.
The February 28, 19i|i>, accords additionally restored
to China complete sovereignty over the province of Yunnan.
This, of course, was a formality designed to legalize what
had been a fait accompli for some eight years.
The principal provisions pertaining to Yunnan were:

(1) That the Franco-Chineae accords concerning the
railroad from Indo-China to Yunnan (that is, Haiphong to
Yunnanfu) and French right in Yunnan, concluded on October 29,
1903, will end on the date of the signing of the present*

accord (that is, February 28, 19ij.6) *
(2) France agrees to relinquish all rights to the
Haiphong-Yunnan railroad*
(3) France may use the Haiphong-Yunnan railroad but
not without first paying an indemnity to the Chinese, which
would be fixed by a mixed Franco-Chineae commission*
Thus, Chinese goals towards Indo-China were now com
pletely fulfilled.
As for the resumption of French control
over northern Indo-China, this did not bother her, as the

postwar French regime promised to be quite weak, given the
nature of the French concessions to the nationalists (see

below) and the strength and diversity of the various nation
alist groups*
In other words, although China's desire to
thwart France*s return was denied, her overall strategic

desire to have her southeastern boundary bordered by one or
more weak states, appeared to have been satisfied*
Beyond these points, the resumption of the nationalistCommunist Civil war in China was entering its early stages
and Chiang*a Interest, then as formerly, was to concentrate
on its successful resolution.
This, of course, militated
against involvement in foreign affairs and territories.
Thus,
with his principal objectives fulfilled, Chiang now began a

troop withdrawal from his northern Indochinese positions,
which was completed In September, 19^6.
In turning to the nationalists and the problems
Involved in reconstructing a government in Indo-China,
France realized that even a moderate form of colonial govern
ment was impossible, if for no other reason than the existence
of the DRV and the strength and desires of Ho and the VietMinh.
The only feasible approach, in light of these conditions,
was to create a form of government along the lines of a protec

torate, or,
more
accurately, along the lines of the British
Commonwealth with its concepts of Dominions.
In other words,
for any semblance of French control to remain, it would be

necessary to grant to the Indochinese as much autonomy as
possible, short of all-out independence,
Otherwise, Ho and
the other nationalists would rebel.

Beyond this factor, the French realised that as the
DR? was a quasi-independent state {that is, independent
within the confines of the Chinese occupation), it would be
necessary to negotiate with the DRV directly and to establish
accords with their agreement, as a means of establishing a
new form of French government in Indo-China,
Furthermore, as
the DRV represented most Indochinese nationalists elements,

and as it was the only nationalist state in Indo-China, accords
signed with that government would apply to and govern the
whole of Indo-China.
In other words, it would not be necess
ary to negotiate with other sections of Indo-China, but simply

use a Franco-DRV agreement as the means for formalizing the
new French regime,
Given this orientation and apparently aided by the
catalystlc efforts of the Donovan Mission, the French entered
Into negotiations with Ho and the DRV and ultimately hammered
out an agreement formalized in the accords of March 6 , 191$,
whose principal provisions included!
(1) The creation of an Indochinese federation of nations
within a French Union.
(2) The Federation was to consist of Laos, Cambodia,
the Democratic Republic of Vlet-Ham (Tongkin and Annam) and
Cochinchina, although provision was made for the eventual
10^Levy,
union of Cochinchina with the DRV (that Is, Tongkin and

Annam) by means of a referendum to be held in the near
future*
(3)
The DRV waa specifically singled out as being
recognized by the French as a free state, having its own

government and, as such, forming a part of the Indochinese
Federation within the
French Union*
(ij.) Daos and Cambodia* s role

defined at this time, but
provision
was
not specifically
for their elevation to
the level of the DRV was established*

() Agreement was effected between the French and
Vietnamese (DRV) governments to take all measures necessary
to cease acts of hostilities (reference here to skirmishes
between French and nationalists over the past six months),
to maintain troops in their present positions, and to work
towards creating an atmosphere favorable for the immediate
opening of frank and amiable negotiations as of the signing
of the accords (that is, March 6, 19i}-6)*
(6 )
The proposed negotiations would take place either
In Hanoi, Saigon, or Paris and deal with the diplomatic

relations of the DRV, the future status of French Indo-China
(that is, the question of independence) and the cultural and
economic interests of the French in Viet-Nam (DRV) *
Beyond these principal provisions applying to IndoChina as a whole, there were also several specific provisions
relating to military matters between the French and the
Vietnamese
(DRV)
Among them were the followings
(1 ) Provision for the replacement of Chinese troops

by l*QOO French troops, who, along with 10,000 Vietnamese
troops would perform the military duties of the DRV*
(2) Although the Supreme Commander of these forces
would be a Frenchman, the assistant commander would be a
Vietnamese and for the duration of the stay of the French
troops on Vietnamese soil (DRV), they would be severely
regulated*
(3) That the increases, location, and use of troops
would be later defined by a conference of states*
(l|,)That part of the duties of the French troops would
be the guarding and repatriation of Japanese prisoners of
war*
(5) That the French would not use the Japanese in any
military or police capacity (a reference to the use of
Japanese P*0*W*fs by Tran Van Siau in protecting the French
after September 2, 19lj-5, in Saigon)*
(6 ) That all Japanese would be repatriated within ten
months time and that these French troops involved in guarding
the Japanese would also be repatriated at this time*
(7) That the remainder of French troops involved in
maintaining law, order, and security in Vietnamese territory
(DRV) would be relieved by fifths each year by the Vietnamese
army, such that all French troops will have evacuated

Vietnamese (DRV) territory within five years* time*
Thus, the signing of the March 6, 1946, French-DRV
accords, immediately following the signing of the FrenchChines accords of February 28, 1946, witnessed the formal
culmination of the modified French and nationalist
the United States and the beginning of
It
their
plans
of
implementation.
would now appear that nearly five years of periodic policy-
planning by the United
States, in an attempt to restructure
Indo-Ghina* a political and economic role, was
a definitive
success.
CHAPTER 1?
PRENCH-INDOCHINESE RELATIONS PROM MARCH,TO DECEMBER, 19A6

The apparent settlement of the Indochinese situation
led to a disengagement of United States involvement in this
area with the French, Viet-Minh, and other nationalist groups
now being left to implement the March 6th Accords.
However,
a resurgence of French imperialism, coupled with the actions

of dissident nationalist groups, soon led to a degeneration
of efforts to implement the solutions embodied in the Marsh
6th Accords.
First of all, in turning to the French, it is evident
that they accepted the March 6th Accords most reluctantly

and did so, only because they were forced to, as seen above
in Chapter 111,
Now that they were free to do as they wished
France's imperialists soon set out to re-establish French

domination over the area.
This was manifested by the actions of France's High
Commissioner in Indo-China, Admiral d'Argenlieu, a deGaullo10?
appointee of imperialist eomvictions,
1 His apparent
strategy contained a two-pronged approach*
First establish
French-dominated puppet governments in Laos and Cambodia sand,

thus, secure control over western Indo-China.
This was ac
complished in the Spring of 19^6 through the device of sup

porting indigenous feudalistic leaders such as King Sisa
vanvong of Laos, who v/ere quite willing to work for the French
-^Most of the material below is taken from Shihehioh

ChShshih {World Culture) (ed,), A Chronical of Principal t
;-vents delating to the Indn-Chaoa Question {19^0-195^5 Peking*
''K
i* : * 1
./*,*+,
116
in return for French support for their rule.
The device
was an old tactic used, before 19^0, by the French in IndoChina (only on a more local basis) as well as by the British
and other imperialists for scores of years,
Superficially,
a nominally independent p ro te c to ra te would be established

(in these cases, kingdoms) but, in reality, the imperialist
country would exercise as much political and economic con
t r o l , as if the area was a colony.

The second prong o f d'Argenlieu's s tra te g y was to
create a puppet government in Cochinehina (the southern
quarter of Viet-Nam) and then to prevent the holding of a re
ferendum to decide whether Cochinehina would wish to unite
with the r e s t of Viet-Nam, that is, w ith Hos Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam (fongkin and Annam).
T his l a t t e r
element was in direct violation of the March 6th Accords,

which clearly and specifically called for this referendum
to be held in the near future.
In implementing his policy towards Cochinehina,
d'Argenlieu followed a "divide and conquer" program which
attempted to take advantage of the Viet-Minh's lack of
support in the area, by seeking out moderate nationalists,
who, in effect, were led to believe that cooperation with
the French would lead to not only the eventual independence
of Cochinehina, but also to freedom from Ho*s Viet-Minh.
Acting quickly, d'Argenlieu instituted consultative councils
11?
between the French and selected Cochinchinese Vietnamese

from March 26, 1946, through May ?, 1946.
These consul
tative councils led to the election of Dr. Nguyen van Thanh,

as President of the Provisional Government of Cochinchina
and fixed his powers.
It also empowered him to sign accords
delineating the powers of a Free Republic of Cochinchina and

establishing relations with France.
On June 3 1946, further
powers were spelled out. Among the principal features wares
1) The President of the Provisional Government would

be elected by the Consultative Council.
2) A Commisioner of France in Cochinchina would have
the power to call in French troops to restore order, if
necessary.
3) Further transfer of powers from France to the Pro
visional Government would be clarified in a later accord.
4) The present convention has a provisionary (tem
porary) character and, therefore, will be capable of modi
fication by an intervening accord between the Commissioner
of the Republic of France in Cochinchina and the Provisional
Government under reservation of the approbation of the High
Commisioner of France for Indo-China (that is, d'Argenlieu).
109
Thus, it can be seen that the French were institutions-

lizing the area of Cochinchina not as an autonomous or even an
independent republic, but as a protectorate with its own provisonal government, which would serve as a sophisticated de-
^Ji0vy, op. cit.. to . 48-54,
10Îbid. p. 54, art. VII,
118
vice for controlling the expansion of Ho's D.R.V., as well

as a means for re-establishing effective French control
over most of Indo-China (taken in conjunction with her efforts
in Laos and Cambodia).
The second and fourth points clearly
show the degree of direct French control over the area* the
first point shows the more subtle control of the government
and its oligarchial nature, while the third point shows French
postponement of a delegation of a greater and more autonomous
powers to an unspecified future date.
Finally, d'Argenlieu
set up a separate administration for the primitive Montagnards

of Central Annam (a part of the D.R.V.), thus attempting to
weaken Viet-Minh control over the area.
^
In the meanwhile, dissident groups of non-Viet-Minh

nationalists viewed Ho's signing of the March 6, 19^6 accords
as a betrayal to the nationalist cause and began riots and
demonstrations against Ho and the French, thus negating the
truce feature of the March 6th Accords.
Ho, on his part,
tried to organise the Iien=Vist, or Rationalist Allied Front,

but the dissident nationalists were not mollified and the con
flict continued.
The situation worsened after the May ?th announce
ment of the Free Republic of Cochinchina and led to a deterio
ration of Ho's relationship with the French as well as an
excacerbation of inter-Vietnamese conflict.
Ho now went
to Paris on June 1, 19^6, to negotiate with the French over
119
Goehinchinese referendum and the fu tu re s ta tu s

f Viet-Nam and the whole o f Indo-China, However, th e ne
gotiations were dampened by the news of the June 3rd Frenehthe proposed
Cochinchinese agreements and the obvious fa c t that France was

neither interested in permitting a referendum to decide Cochinehina':s future, nor it would seem, interested in fostering
the autonomy and independence of Indo-China. This, in turn,
caused certain of Ho*s delegation to leave for home as a
reaction to French duplicity. Ho, apparently was persuaded to
retain his patience by French Communist Party officials, wh
felt that a worsening of Viet-Minh-French delations might
their chances in the coining election,
While Ho was in Paris, the Indochinese situation,
especially in the D.R.V. and Cochinchina, deteriorated with
h u rt
the
French actually, at times, joining the Viet-Minh in at
tacks on dissident nationalist groups.
However, Ho, upon his
return to the D.R.V., feeling unsatisfied with the Paris

talks, fearing further French machinations, and disturbed
by the role of the dissident nationalists, launched a purge
of these groups in an attempt to consolidate his control
over the D.R.V., while waiting for the next French move.
This, in turn, led to the removal of the Dong Minh Hoi
Vice-President and to a doubling of Viet-Minh re p re s e n ta tiv e s
in the D.R.V. government.
The f i n a l
phase of this purge, at
^%arold Isaacs, Ho Peace In A sia (Hew Yorks 19^8)

pp. 173-17&.
120
least in terms of ridding his government of dissident factions,

occurred with the convening of the second session of the National
Constituent Assembly on October 28, 1946, which saw the VietMinh assume total control of the government, in addition to
issueing a proposed democratic constitution and the calling for
elections to implement the new government.
The latter, however,
tvere not held for sixteen years due to the coming war.
In the meanwhile, negotiations with the French con
tinued, finally leading to the signing of a modus vivendi on
September 14, 1946, between the D.R.V. and the French at Fontainbleu, which provided for a cease-fire pending further
talks to be held in January, 194?, talks which would deal
with the Cochinchina issueandvdthindependence, among other
things.
However, the modus vivendi
shortly went the way of
the March 6th accords as the French attempted to encroach

upon the D.R.V. 's semi-autonomous states in addition to
tightening contol over Cochinchina,
So bad did the situation
get in Cochinchina that the President of the nominal re

public of Cochinchina, realizing that he was simply being
used by the French, committed suicide.
French arbitrary
tax collectors and seizure of customs collections in Haiphong

cut off funds to the D.R.V. and caused the Viet-Minh to re
taliate with armed resistance in and around the Chinese
sector of Haiphong,
This, in turn, led to a reaction on
121
the part of the French commander of forces in Haiphong, who

ordered the Viet-Minh out of the Chinese sector of the city.
Then followed the infamous Haiphong Incident when the
French heavy cruiser Suffem, seeing a mob of people
opened
fire directly on the people, killing an estimated 6,000 to

2 0 , 0 0 0 chiefly unarmed men, women and children.
This action,
in turn, rallied the remaining nationalists around the D.R.V.

government and, in effect, ended hopes for peace.
French re
calcitrance mounted and although socialist Leon Blum, a critic

of French colonialism, became premier of France on December
16, 19^6, war broke out three days later when a French order
to disband the Viet-Minh militia (in opposition to the March
6th Accords) caused the Viet-Minh to attack the French in

Hanoi.
The French quackly seized the city and the D.R.V.
leadership fled to the hills.
Any hope for peace was finally
obliterated when a mission sent by Premier Blum, asserted that

a military decision must precede negotiations.
Thus, on December 19, 19^6, the Indochinese war formally
was inaugurated with the D.R.V., led by Ho and the Viet-Minh
and allied with sympathetic nationalists grouped against the
French and those willing to fight for the retention of
French control.
Despite the Viet-Minh link with Communism, the
basic issue was independence, as sponsored by the Viet-Minh

controlled D.R.V., or the re-institution of French imperialism,
as indicated by the
March
6,
whole
pattern of French behavior from
19^6 to December 19, 19^6, and clearly manifested by
122
French attempts to establish protectorates in Laos, Cam
bodia, and Cochinchina and by her steadfast refusal to
permit a referendum to determine Cochinchina's fate.
The effects of this war, of course, were far reaching,
as the struggle lasted for seven and one-half yearsj as
America was enlisted to aid the French in 1950* and, in
effect, to replace the French in mid-195^ and as Laos,
Cambodia, North Viet-Nam (the truncated D.R.V,, consisting of
Tongkin and northern Annam) and South Viet-Nam (Cochinchina,
plus southern Annam) received formal independence in July
of 195^ with the signing of the Geneva Accords,
Thus, American efforts to structure a new and more
liberal form of government in Indo-China, which seemed to have
finally borne fruition with the signing of the March 6, 19^6
accords, now disintegrated into a seven and one-half year war
of attrition.
While there is no single reason to explain America's
apparaent lack of involvement after the March 6th Accords, the
following factors viewed' in a culmulative fashion would seem
to explain American behavior*
1)
the feeling, given successful agreement by the majo
parties to the March 6th Accords, that they would be able to

operate together, as each side depended on the other side for
support and stability - the French for political reasons, the
D.R.V. for economic reasons.
123
2)
an underestimation of the unrelenting, intransigent
appraoch of the French towards imperialism, such that des

pite United States efforts to structure the French in a modi
fied dominion-like situation, they would risk everything in
an attempt to retrieve their former colonyo
3)
the feeling in United States policy-making circles
that the United States must concentrate on the re-building

of Europe, as it had earlier concentrated on the European
Theater of War and, consequently, the need for the United
States to disengage from the Asian mainland, including not
only Indo-China (whose problems now appeared solved) tout,
also, toy 19^7 to 19^8, from China and the disintegrating
Chiang regime.
k) the emergence and growth of the Cold War as a
new factor in World Politics, beginning with Churchill*s
famous iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri in February,
19^ 6, and continuing at a worsening pace throughout the

year and afterwards.
5)
Consequent to the emergence of the Cold War was the
development of a new framework for foreign policy-mat king,

which viewed the world in bi-polar terms, that is the United
States and the West versus the Societ Union and the newlyformed Communist Bloc.
Through this new perspective,
every
thing came to be seen as either aiding the Western cause or

aiding Communism's cause with no allowance made for "grey
areas" in between, at least until the emergence of the ex
colonial and underdeveloned "Bloc in the late fifties.
124
6) Given this emphasis on rebuilding an exhausted
Europe and the emergence of a Cold War ideological framework,
the Franco-American alliance increased in importance as the
need to rebuild France as part of Western Europe was coupled
with the fear that France's large Communist Party (accounting
for upwards of thirty per cent of the vote) might succeed in
attaching France to the Soviet-dominated Communist empire.
7) The seeming precariousness of .
not only was to
France's position
lead to massive economic aid, but also to
political efforts to strengthen France's political, cultural,

and social ties with the United States and within the Western
World.
^
8) These political efforts, in turn, necessitated a

cautious approach to France's actions in Indo-China, given the
apparent sensitivity of the French to th is area (as already
exemplified by attacks on the United States for upsetting
the Indochinese situation) and the somewhat pathological
approach she took towards colonialism.
Thus, although the
United States would continue to foster independence and auto

nomy for many colonial areas, France's peculiar position
in Europe and her imperialistic fixation necessitated
caution on the part of the United States.
9)
The fact that the Viet-Minh and its government
of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam happened to be at

one and the same time, the only effective nationalist op-
position to the re-institution of French imperialist rule,

and Communists, or in other words, ideological relatives
of the Soviet Union and her Communist Bloc,
10)
The fact that the French would, in their attempt
to rationalise the restoration of their imperialist rule,

use the Communist affiliation of the Viet-Minh as a con
venient whipping boy and, thus, gradually negate the very
real factor of the nationalistic orientation of both Ho and
the Viet-Minh, an orientation which was similar to Tito's
in Yugoslavia,
In other words, the French were not attemp
ting to stifle a nationalist revolt, but v/ere merely fighting

the attempts of Moscow to subvert Indo-China.
11) The fact that French intransigence and duplicity

tended to radicalise Ho and the Viet-Minh and, thus, tended
to set up the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophesy,
although Ho still would follow a nationalistic course both
within Viet-Nam and in his later-relations with Moscow and
Peking.
12) The fact that although the United States could
see through this example of French rationalization initially,
she would, as time went on and the Cold War framework for
viewing the world hardened, tote more seriously France's
emphasis on the Communist nature of the Viet-Minh and, thus,
view a French victory, in later years, as part of the overall
strategy to contain Communism,
By the end of 194*6, the United
126
States still hadnt hardened its attitude in this dir

ection hut was, conservatively speaking* leaning in this
direction.
Thus, given the various factors affecting American
foreign policy-makers, coupled with Frances obsessive
attitudes towards imperialism and the Viet-Minh *s and other
nationalist groups, growing frustration with France
and consequent growing obsession for independence, the stage
was now set for the re-emergence of the United States as an
involved participant in Indo-China, although she would not
manifest her presence until late 1950.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A number of views have been presented on our origi
nal involvement in Viet-Nam by advocates of our present
actions there, by opponents, and by those who have mixed
views on the subject.
All three of these groups of indi
viduals seem to have views based on the following reasons

as to why we became involved.
1)
There is the view that the United States recog
nised the plight of Viet-Nam as an underdeveloped nation

struggling to achieve a political system at least closely
approximating democracy.
As in many other cases of these
types of nations in other parts of the world, it was only

expected that the United States, a leader in the ranks of
industrialized countries and one having the highest stan
dard of living, should offer aid in an attempt to create
an atmosphere of security in this region*
Ours was an in
volvement resulting from naivite in that it was founded on

basically altruistic reasons.
Two basic periods from which the United States be
gan to assist the Vietnamese seem to be mentioned by this
groups a) the period from 19^5# onward, a time during which
these supporters of the self-determination view recognized
the operations of at least a minimal
amount of activity
128
on the part of the Office of Strategic Services, and, es

pecially, b) the period beginning in 1950# when the United
States began massive military and economic aid to the French.
2)
There is the view held by certain opponents of the
United States' present involvement that the United States

engaged in a calculated, methodical, and diabolical plan to
annex Indo-China as a de facto (as opposed to de Jure) colony
after the French lost it as a result of World War Two.
The
holders of this other extreme position see the United ''

States as*at least behind the scenesîn manipulating the
chaotic situation after the war in order to crush all move
ments for independenceinanattempt to annex Indo-China,
One
might make a crude approximation to a Marxian view in which

the United States, in its last stages of capitalism, frantically
grasps for a colony in order to keep its economy going.
However, even those asserting this view do not seem to
date the original entry by the United States before 19^5
As
to the first view, one of naivite, the United States appeared

to know what it was doing (as amply illustrated in Chapter II,
section IV, and Chapter III, above).
On the other hand, there
did not seem to be any clear-cut direction for several reasons $

1) the uncertainty of the Chinese *s actions at the out
set of the war.
It was only towards the end that this issue
was resolved.
2) There was the adamancs of Roosevelt in advocating
trusteeship, and in opposing French rule.
This, coupled with
the Presidents failing health, added t the uncertainty

of direction.
After his death, the centralizing force
of foreign policy-making was removed, and those policyplanners who looked to Roosevelt for guidance were cut
astray.
In his place, came individuals who appeared to be
more sure of their goals.

3)
Those individuals who succeeded Roosevelt in
policy-making
positions held a number of
vieivs
on
what
should be done in Indo-China, and each view, at least for

a while,
had an equal chance of succeeding
as
the chosen
alternative.
There appeared to be a lack of understanding on
the part of the United States policy-makers in most cir
cles as to the nature of the indigenous anti-French move
ments within Indo-Ghdna,
France, on the other hand, was
a natural ally on the United States and, thus, was in a

better position to lure the United States into accepting
its view that the'nationalist movements in Indo-China
were of a Communist nature.
5)
The anti-Communist stigma was another uncertain

element, when viewed in light of the whole postwar situation.
The United States was not sure what to do all over the
world, given Trumans lack of training and seeming inaptness on foreign policy matters and the vajyirfg views
within
policy-making
circles.
130
6)
The uncertainty was present in terms of how to
deal with Prance

Indo-China,
iris
a vis her intransigence in giving up
Roosevelt had announced to the world that Indo-
China was to be eventually freed after passing through a

period of trusteeship#
Now,
the problem
was
presented as
to maintain,
alliance#
to how to reconcile this with the need

strengthen, the Franco-American
and even
?) The uncertainty was also present in the power

itself#
How was the United States to integrate all
vacuum,
the
de
sires of the Chinese, nationalists, and the French when each
views as to what should be the solution?

Yet, despite all of these variables, the United States
were poles apart on
did indicate that her interest in the area was economic, similar
to the "Open Door policies which had been in operation
earlier in China. Gallagher, as has been seen, mentions this
several times, stating that United States business interests
will find Indo-China a welcome area for investment. This,
in addition to United States pre-war activities with the
French, and the extensive protests lodged against the Japanese
at the war's outset (which, by the way, indicated the quan
tity of trade that the United States was engaged in Indo-China)
seemed to bear strong economic attachments
colony.
to
the former
How to achieve stability in the region appeared to
be a major problem.
Our attitudes,
then, did not simply hinge on naive
or
cause for involvement,
considerations,
alone, al
131
though there appeared to be shades of these views in the

debate over policy.
General Donovan, for example, as well
as President Roosevelt, were the two strongest representatives

of self-determination, both representing classic Wilsonian
idealism.
If the United States considerations had simply
been only those of granting independence to the Vietnamese,

with extensive aid to follow, as our aid to Ho on the surface
might seem to indicate, then, it would be difficult to recon
cile our dealings with the Chinese through the course of the
war, as well as the issuance of policy guidelines on the readmission of the French.
Given the long period of oppressive
rule in Indo-China, it could be argued that re-admission of the

French, even on a modified basis, and the granting of full
self-determination (or independence) were mutually exclusive.
Therefore, there seemed to be other factors involved other than
simple independence and idealistic naivite.
As to the diabolical plot, it has been shown above that
the United States, perhaps by a matter of circumstance more
than not, could not find any cohesive direction before the
Spring of 19^5 although there were a number of alternatives
being discussed*
In addition, as mentioned at the end of
Chapter IV , it was removed for a variety of reasons, from an

active role in Indo-China after March 6, 19^6.
If our methods
were entirely diabolical or strictly Machiavellian, then, it

would have been a relatively simple matter to enter Indo-China,
132
even in a covert fashion, and literally exterminate or have
exterminated the opposition#
In addition, massive aid, through
intermediaries, could have been channeled through proper

sources.
Furthermore, it is almost inconceivable that if
a diabolical plot had existed and been executed by such a de

veloped nation as the United States, that the Indo-Chinese war
would have lasted through 195^#
At that time, It must be kept
in mind, the Vietnamese guerrilla forces were not as well de

veloped as they are now.
If a diabolical plot didn't seem to exist because of
the lack of direction and the exertion of full United States
capabilities, and if the United States didn't appear to be in
Indo-China simply to assist the Vietnamese people, then
what could we have wanted?
had economic interests.
It has been shown above that we
In addition, there seems to have
been a hint of ignorance as to the mode of the general situation

in Indo-China relative to the political and social situation.
If we had been fully cognizant of the fact that there was a
feeling of mistrust between Ho and the Chinese (including the
Communist Chinese at a later date), due to historical con
siderations , alone, then, the United States might have ex
ploited this area.
Ho, as it was, appeared to be willing
to fully cooperate with the United States.
In fact, his forces
aided downed flyers extensively throughout the warand provided

United States intelligence forces with vital information.
133
However# the United States eventually turned
to
the explana
tion (as a result of the reaeons cited at the end of Chapter
) that Ho# by virtue of the fact that he was a Communist#

albeit an independent one, was not deserving of our support.
11/
After the March 6, 19^6 Accords, this seemed to become more

obvious. The French# quite angry at Ho's activities, used
the explanation of Ho9s Communist background to jaundice any
future possibilities of our seeking a rapproaehment with him,
the chief reason being thaisuch a rapproaehment would have
nurtured another obstacle to France's attempt to re-establish
her colonial rule in Indo-China in the form of competition for
leadership.
Ours, then, appeared to be a search for stability for
the simple reason that this country did not enthusiastically
support any one faction. We supported only in a fractional
way, all factions, though some muoh more than others. Each
had its advantages and it was those advantages that we sought.
By supporting stability, one turns
to
those leaders, who seem
to have the most control over a nation - that is, the authori
tarians. A nationalist or attempted democrat would throw a
note of instability into the situation.
he appeared
to
be
advocating
a program in
would have some say. The outcome of

then, was uncertain.
not permit the United
Perhaps
States
Ho was a nationalist?
which the
people
the political situation,
the Viet-Minh, as a whole, would

in Indo-China, The langdon Memo
seemed to reflect this motivation for security in that it

repeatedly stressed a guaranteed position for the United
States,
The French were the traditional element, and although
they ruled the country with brutality, they provided at least

some stability.
Minus the excesses of that system as per the
Langdon Plan, the United States could hope to institute some

reasonable degree of stability.
Thus, we have, here, con
siderations which are not tied to the best means for executing
se3f-deterraination of a people; neither does one find an out
right attempt by the United States to directly annex the country.
Rather, it is an attempt to stabilize the region, with an eye
to keeping the door open for economic activity.
Once the
power vacuum was left open by Japan, the gyrations by this

country were centered around filling it with the maximum amount
of stability.
One then, after examining the above, can translate this
in terms of Latin America and other countries, where the United
States had consistently supported authoritarian regimes,
This
support can be correlated closely with the amount of economic

activity carried on by United States firms,
Indo-China seems to have been an instance where our
policy of supporting authoritarianism as a stability doctrine
for an economic "open door failed, despite its effectiveness
in Latin America before Castro.
Because of the factors out
lined at the end of Chanter IV, especially the inability to
cope with the French after the March accords, it blundered, and
led to the present predicament through gradual increases in
involvement in an attempt to further mitigate that failure.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A.
1*
PRIMARY SOURCES
Books
Catroux# General George, Penx Actea Du Drama Indochinola.

Paris: Librarie Plon# T959#
Decoux# Amiral Jean, A La Barra De L*Indochina.
Librarie Plon# 1 9 W *
Dong# Pham Van, Ho C M Minh,
Publishing Heuse7^955*
Paris:
Hanoi: Foreign Languages
deGaulle, Charles, War Memolres# !Ehe Call To Honour (19k019^2), Hew YorkTTiking Press# 1955*
deGaulle. Charles. War Memolres# Salvation (19iilt.-19lii>).
Hew York: Simon S'eliuster, T 9 6 0
4ft
Giap# Vo Hguyen. People*s War# People* s A m y * Second

printing* Hew York: Frederick A. ^raeger, 1965*
Ho Chi Minh.
3.967,
On Revolution,
Hew York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Hull# Cordell, Memolres of Cordell Hull.

Macmillan Company# X9p>.
Hew York:
Laurent, Arthur. La Banque De L*Indochlne Et La Piastre.

Seims Deux R l v e a T w E ,
1 *
9
Leahy# Admiral William D. I Was T h e m * Hew York: Whittlesey
House, McGraw-Hill Book""CoT7 19507
Levy# Roger, L*Indochina Et Sea Uraltea. Paris: Centre
d*Etudes de Politique EErangere, section d*Information#
publication no, 19# 19^7
Havarre# Henri. Agonle De L*Indochine (1953-195h?*
Librarie Ploh# 195b.
Paris:
137
Lefevre, Raymond* Lea Chemlna De Per De Penetration Sana

La Chine Meridionale * fhese pour Te doetorat^ Hniveraite
le Paris, Parts,' i'j Mai 1902*
Marchand, Gen* Jean. Le Drarae Indoohinoiae*
J, Peyronnet & CieT^Bditeura, 1953.... .
Paine, Lauran.
Salmon, Mai com.
Vlet-Uam.
Paris:
London: Robert Hale, publisher, 1965
Fooua on Indo-China*
Hanoi: FLPH, 1961.
Saurel, Louis. La Guerre D fIndochine. Editions Rouff,

8 Garlend deEangraid. Parlay 1966.
2.
Journals and Other Periodicala
Rosinger, Lawrence IC* Prance and the Future of Indo-China.

Foreign Policy ReporW^ T o l .1XXI, Ho. 5 T5> Eay~I9EF7~
Thamasset, Rene* L fIndochine Dans La Mouaaon, Revue
Politique Et Parlementaire* Yol* i W , Ho. 3k7 10 Juillet
v m : --------~ ~
3.
Microfilm
Pall,
Bernard. The Political Development of Tiet-Ham V-J Day To GenevlTlêaae-Fire , 'Ann ArSor* University
Slerofilma, (Doctoral fhesis at Syracuse University,
1955).
It*
Rewspapera and Magazines
L*Aurora, Paris, XVip.*

Bulletin Pea Reseignmenta, Paris, 1938-19ij-7*
Le Monde, Paris, April, 19i|-7*
The
Hew
5.
Other
York Times,
Hew
York
City,
19ij.l-19i}.5*
Shihchieh Chihahih (World Culture) (ed.). A Chronical of

PrinoipalÊventa Relating To The Indo-China "'^Sostaon
Loh, P. P. (ed.). The Kuomintang Debacle of nineteen Fortynlne - Conquest or Collapse . ''Hew""York: Heath (Raytheon),
T955.
138
Sabattier, General G. (Ancien Commandant Superleur et
Delegue General da Gouvernment en Indochine, Anaien
Membre du Donsrtil Superleur de la Guerre)-Ex-high,
commander and Delegate General from the Indochinese
government, Ex-member of the Supreme Council of War#
Le Destine De L*Indochine (19Il.l-195l) Paris: Librarie
T h a T & & < r m ------------------------
Saintenny, Jean* (Anoien Chef de la Mission Milltaire

Francaise en Chine, Ancien Commissalre de la Republique
Prancaise au Tonkin et au lord Annam), Ex-chief of the
French military mission in China, Ex-Commissioner from
the French Republic to Tonkin and North Annam* Histoire
D*tJne Paix Manquee (19il5**19l4-7) Paris: Amiot-Dumon,
!R5IT
Stettlnius, Edward Jr* Roosevelt and the Russians*
York: Double day and Company, Inc *
New
Stillwell, Joseph, The Joseph Stillwell Papers. Arranged

by Theodore H, White, New York: William Sloane Assoc*,
19lj-8*
Wedemeyer, Albert, Wedemeyer Reportsi

-Holt, Co,, 1958,
2,
New York: Henry
United States Government
Background Information Relating To Southeast Asia And

jSecond'rovTsod1
1cditToRi ""89'thr Congress, 2nd
session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington: March, 1966.
The China White Paper. August, 19if-9 Vbls. I and II, origThally issued as United States Relations With China,
Department of State Publication '357.3* Far Eastern
Series 30, reprinted by the Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California, 1967, (Used as background
material in assessing U, S, aid to Chiang Kai Shek.
Though not used heavily in this report.)
Department of State,
Unpublished diplomatic correspondence:
file categories 35lG,OG, 651G.OO, 851G.OO, 893.00,

711,00, from 1938 to 1 9 % . Washington, D, C.
Department of State files. Unpublished records of the Office

of Strategic Services from 19i|.0 to 191l5, inclusive,
Washington, D, C,
139
Department of State Bulletin, Washington, D*C,

/
Events Leading Bp To World War XI, Chronological History
Xf3l-I'91|^7 7th congress, 2nH session, House Doc, Ho*
5fcU Washington, 191&*
Foreign Relations of the Bnited Statess She Conferences At
âltir^Sd Yalta
I9kK* ISepariitent "oFSfate,^^'
Washington*
Bnited States Army In World War II, China-Burma-India
T E e a t e r * Time Huns Out IBTaST, hy Charles F, Romanus
and Riley Sunderland* Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, Washington, D*C,, 1959<
B*
1,
SECONDARY SOURCES
Books
Abad, Angel, Vietnam, Xndependencia, Guerra Civil,

Confllcto Intehhacional* ilitorialôvo Terra,
Barcelona,11Espand," T966 *
Buttinger. Joseph* Viet-Nam, A Dragon ikbattled*
New Yorks Freder I'cF'T;Traeger7^677----Cellerier,
Menaces Sur Le Viet-Nam*
2 vola*
Saigon, I*D.E*Q. 1950*
Clubb, 0* Edmund* Twentieth Century China* Hew York!

Columbia University Pres s', I96ij.*
Devillers, Philippe. Hlatoire Du Viet-Nam De 19h0 A 1952*
Editions du Seuil, Paris, !95>2*
~
Fall, Bernard* The Two Viet-Naaa. Second revised edition*
New Yorks FreHerTcE A, Praeger, 1967*
Hoai Thanh, Thanh Tinh, et al* Souvenirs Sur Ho Chi Minh*
Editions en Langues Et range a, tFor eigh'Language s Publishing House)* Hanoi! 1962*
Kahin, George McT* Ha .lor governments of Asia,
Cornell University Press, 1956*
Ithaca, N, Y*:
Kent, Percy Horace* Railway Enterprise In China.

Impression, London: Edward Arnold^ THUS.
Second
Lancaster, Donald* The Emancipation of French Indo-China*

Issued under the auspices of Ee HHyal Institute of
International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
j>.
Other.. continued
International Military Tribunal for the Far Fast . (Washington,

D, C .t 19^6).
6.
Interviews
Buttinger, Joseph, New' torIt, New-York, November 28, 1968.

Gallagher, Major General Philips E ,, by correspondence from
Columbus, Georgia. Also, papers, (MSS located in the
Office, Chief of Modern Military History, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C.)
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C s, Rockville, Maryland, August 28,
1968.
APPENDIX I
l^fl
COLONIAL BOUNDARIES. Pre-Sentember. I9*H
Lao Kay
N d teth
Hanoi*'
o To no k ino
Haiphong
TfVientiane
Demarcation Line
kde
Da Nang-
Annam
out
V ie t-N a m
Dalat*-**i.
Colonial
Boundaries -
hnom Penh
V i'ei- W a j i K .
National^
Capital
Railroad -h <m it-n
Miles
?o no
!
L>
Saigcffl^SXochi n th lft#
* * t a>>,
142
APPENDIX II
OCCUPATION ZONES FROM SEPTEMBER 2. 1945 TO MARCH 6. 1946
Lao Kay
V ie t
Hanoi*'
Toogkinq
Haiphong
Vientiane
Territory Occupied by
Laos
the Chinese9 September 2,

1945 to March 6S 1946,
Demarcation Line
Hue
Da-Nang
hrtam
Territory
out
Viet-Warn
Dalai;
National^
Capital ^
Railroad 44^44^4#.
vL
,^by the
British
jPhnom Penh
Colonial
Boundaries
Occupied
(French),
Cochincliina
September 2,
1945 to
March 6* 1946
it 40
fO
110
|1W
. Miles
APPENDIX III
1^3
PRESENT-DAY VIET-NAM
Lao Kay
N & rth
Viet
Hanoi*?
Tooqkino
o
Haiphong
1*Vientiane
.Demarcation Line
Hue
Da Nang.
Ahnam
Ploiku
out
Viet-Mam
Colonial
Boundaries
DaXat*Phnom Penh
V ie t-A /a
,_Saigo
National^
Capital *
Railroad
4 90 1*0
Miles
m j rti
It* n w i n
Appendix IV
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
There are three main divisions of materials that
were used for this projects primary, secondary, and
interviews.
The primary sources are by those who were
actually involved in Indo-Chlna controversy, that is,

the participants.
Official United States releases to the
public and unpublished United States Governmental records

comprise the other primary sources*
For work on the unpublished records, security
clearance was obtained from the Department of State and
the Department of Defense, giving access to material from
"restricted11 to "secret" up to and including the 19M4
period, and for the whole period during which the Office
of Strategic Services was in existence*
With regard to the secondary sources, these Indicated
what has been done in terms of general background on IndoChlna.
After reviewing these sources, one might conclude
that they are not very enlightening, except as mere back

ground materials covering only general history*
This
criticism Is especially more meaningful In light of the

unpublished documents, for there
is much scholarly work to
be done*
Because of the volume of material reviewed, and what
Is left to be reviewed, it will, therefore, be necessary to
consider this paper as only a preliminary paper for later
work it is, then, essentially, a definition of a larger

problem.
Hence, one will not find an elucidation of solutions -
only a description of the range of activities, and not a

specific activity, at that.
Individuals Interviewed were not grouped according
to primary or secondary sources, for two reasons: (1) the
sometimes Indeterminate factor of background of the
individual! () the others,whose backgrounds are known,
are currently Involved In intelligence activity,
Furthermore,
as a part of this continuing research, it will be the task

to not only research background, but to correlate their
present positions.
Primary Sources. Primary sources may be grouped
into several categories one is the list of those who were
there and want to "tell everybody."
Often, these accounts
are very emotional and without substantiation, or are very

humdrum, often quoting unaubstantlable sources, and omitting
vital facts.
Another subdivision of primary sources is the
unpublished sources, which are often more revealing and give

a more complete picture.
Although much of the material is
still classified, the same Information can be obtained from

other sources, such as organizations and individuals.
These
include missionaries, corporations, and individuals.
A third
category of primary sources includes the official United
146
States records of policy positions, which are not very
useful, except to show contrast between what the government
considers public, and what really was happening*
These,
of course, are very useful in demonstrating incomplete areas

of knowledge in the public sphere*
Among the prime sources which are emotional accounts
are George Catroux, Admiral Jean Decoux, Pham Van Bong,
Charles DeGaulle, Vo Hguyen Giap, Ho Chi Mlnh, Arthur
Laurent, Henri Havarre, Gen* G. Sabattier, Jean Saintenny,
Joseph Stillwell, and Albert Wedemeyer*
Among the "official
ized versions are those of Cordell Hull, Admiral Leahy,

John Stettinius*
So official was Stettinius* s account that
the Department of State*s published foreign relations records

constantly refers to his papers for documents*
The Preach writers appear to give a very emotional
account in general and with many anti-United States overtones*
However, there are interesting clues which provide a basis
for research in unpublished documents.
For example, Laurent
gives a greal deal of information on the Banque de I1Indochine

that was in an unpublished report by the Justice Department
in 19141*
Although there is less emphasi 3 cn vlis Japanese in
Laurent *s book, there is a great amount of overlap.
The
difficulty for the researcher is knowing whether the

undocumented account that Laurent gives of the activities
of the Bank is the version recognized by officials, such as
1H-?
those in the Justice Department, as well as United States
Military Intelligence.
Although the accounts by Decoux, Sahattier, Saintenny,
and Catroux are fraught with emotionalism, these persona
reflect attitudes which, in themselves, reflect the activities
of their antagonists.
One can learn a great deal about what
the United States was doing ;just by the general tone of these
writers, even though the facts, themselves, may be distorted.
The Communist sources contain a great deal of antiUnited States propaganda, but are useful, also, for the
clues they give to what was happening vis a vis the United
States.
Ho Chi Minh, though, does provide a more factual
account as well as Vo Nguyen Giap.
All, however, leave out
the essential information contained in the Department of State

records.
One could only speculate at this stage of the
research perhaps the Communists were so heavily involved in

attempting to court favor with the United States OSS that
they would be embarrassed about it, now that they are so
violently anti-United States.
Indeed, records Indicate that
there was a close relationship.

Finally, the Gallagher papers revealed a great deal
concerning the activities of the United States Army Intelllgency (Military Intelligence Division or G-2).
These records
Indicate the nature of the interrelationships of the

personages there.
In addition, much was explained about
14-8
power struggles and how individuals fought over policies
regarding the future of Indo-Ohina*
Secondary Sources* There was little that can be said

of the secondary sources, except to say that some were more
complete than others, but by no means were any fully complete
in terns of the whole history of Indo-China.
Fall and
Buttinger are the most complete, and both the Political

Development of Viet-Nam from V-J Day to Geneva Cease-Fire
and Viet-Nam* a Dragon Etabattled were used as the bases
for the introduction of this paper*
None of the authors discuss satisfactorily the
Donovan mission, and the ones like Devilllers cite only
the Dessinges article as source material.
Each faction of
authors, as might be expected, emphasizes his own group, such

as the French appealing to anti-United States readers*
Although a number of these individuals are critical of the
United States, none cover the United States Involvement
back to 1931*
Interviews*
This is an extremely complex area in
terms of assessing the reliability of information, as three

fourths of these persons interviewed are still involved in
intelligence, mostly with the Central Intelligence Agency*
At many points, the answers were curt and only Indicated the
sensitivity of the topic, even when proper credentials were
displayed*
149
Nevertheless, a comparative study of their respec
tive answers to a set of similar questions did clari
fy certain problems even though none of them, taken
separately, provided that much information to any one
answer, and most expressed a lack of knowledge or other
inability to answer,man average of five of the ;fourteen
questions which were asked, though not the same five
questions in each case.
The principal benefit derived from these eighteen
interviews, can be seen as a means of supplementing in
formation derived from primary sources as their answers
viewed individually were often fragmentary but, in cer
tain instances, they helped eliminate and focus into
clearer perspective, events and policies described in the
material derived from other sources.
In this sense, they
enabled the author to gain a more definitive understanding

of his subject and, thus, could be regarded as valuable.

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{

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES" INVOLVEMENT IN

In Partial Fulfillment of the

t 1969 by Jeremy Hcrno

Mono of tho foixowing material m y he reproduced partially

THE ORIGINS OP THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN

In partial Fulfillment of the

Protests against the war have

mounted at an increasing rate, and there is increasing dis

This paper will demonstrate that these dates

as being the ones of the earliest of United States entry are

Indo-China seems to be a good example

of where a combination of wartime policies, designed for other

A chief cause for the failures lay in

the lack of recognition on the part of United States policy

These two extreme views hold 1) that the United

States entered as a power genuinely interested in liberating

fact that the United States didn't follow a consistent policy,

The secondary served as a survey of what had and has

been done on this subject; the individual primary sources re

in particular, deserves special mention for his great assis

Through materials provided by him, many previously un

answered questions were resolved.

A bibliographic essay at the

end of the paper discusses in further detail the sources.

1969 by Jeremy Horne

None of the following material may fee reproduced

All rights are reserved

exclusively for the author.

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES* INVOLVEMENT IN

In Partial Fulfillment of the

II. BACKGROUND FACTORS UNDERLYING UNITED STATES

French Imperialism in Indo-China Until

Frances Involvement in Indo-China from

Chinese Involvement in Indo-China..........

United States Involvement in Indo-China

III. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN INDO-CHINA

IV. PKENCH-INDOCHINESE RELATIONS FROM MARCH,

Vlet-Bam, in turn, has led to the formulation of many

questions, questions reflecting all degrees of the political

Cambodia, under Prince

Sihanouk, was eventually supporting China, then the United

States, and then following a course of Its own, in an appar

w^*st and Vlet^Mum

was formalized in the Geneva settlement of May, 1962.

that date, the Communists have controlled from k.0% to 65#

Although the United States-supported

South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem had enjoyed

In the meanwhile, Viet-Cong

and infiltrated North Vietnamese units began a drive to

The United States response to this situation was a

an all-out military basis in South Viet-Nam#

By the end of March, 1969, some four years after

addition, we still failed to find a dedicated and charismatic

involved in a costly and seemingly never-ending war.

can start with the apparent French unwillingness and inabil

continue and see that given an untenable position in Laos,

In both instances we were apparently settling

on the basis of the premise that nhalf a loaf Is better

In South Viet-Nam, on the other hand, we

apparently (hose to stand and fight, although it would appear

Thus, for example, one might wonder from a

general pre-1950 historical survey what role the United

^Vo Hguyen Giap, Peoples War People*a Army (Second