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whether
the
courts
of
that
state
have
jurisdiction
to
enter
a
judgment.
In
this
case,
only
the
1st
phase
is
at
issue
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction,
however,
has
various
aspects.
For
a
court
to
validly
exercise
its
power
to
adjudicate
a
controversy,
it
must
have
jurisdiction
over
the
plaintiff/petitioner,
over
the
defendant/respondent,
over
the
subject
matter,
over
the
issues
of
the
case
and,
in
cases
involving
property,
over
the
res
or
the
thing
w/c
is
the
subject
of
the
litigation.In
assailing
the
trial
court's
jurisdiction
herein,
Nippon
is
actually
referring
to
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
in
a
judicial
proceeding
is
conferred
by
the
sovereign
authority
w/c
establishes
and
organizes
the
court.
It
is
given
only
by
law
and
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
law.
It
is
further
determined
by
the
allegations
of
the
complaint
irrespective
of
whether
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
all
or
some
of
the
claims
asserted
therein.
To
succeed
in
its
motion
for
the
dismissal
of
an
action
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
claim,
the
movant
must
show
that
the
court
or
tribunal
cannot
act
on
the
matter
submitted
to
it
because
no
law
grants
it
the
power
to
adjudicate
the
claims.
In
the
instant
case,
Nippon,
in
its
MTD,
does
not
claim
that
the
RTC
is
not
properly
vested
by
law
w/
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
subject
controversy
for
a
civil
case
for
specific
performance
&
damages
is
one
not
capable
of
pecuniary
estimation
&
is
properly
cognizable
by
the
RTC
of
Lipa
City.What
they
rather
raise
as
grounds
to
question
subject
matter
jurisdiction
are
the
principles
of
lex
loci
celebrationis
and
lex
contractus
,
and
the
state
of
the
most
significant
relationship
rule.
The
Court
finds
the
invocation
of
these
grounds
unsound.
Lex
loci
celebrationis
relates
to
the
law
of
the
place
of
the
ceremonyor
the
law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
made.
The
doctrine
of
lex
contractus
or
lex
loci
contractus
means
the
law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
executed
or
to
be
performed.
It
controls
the
nature,
construction,
and
validity
of
the
contract
and
it
may
pertain
to
the
law
voluntarily
agreed
upon
by
the
parties
or
the
law
intended
by
them
either
expressly
or
implicitly.
Under
the
state
of
the
most
significant
relationship
rule,
to
ascertain
what
state
law
to
apply
to
a
dispute,
the
court
should
determine
which
state
has
the
most
substantial
connection
to
the
occurrence
and
the
parties.
In
a
case
involving
a
contract,
the
court
should
consider
where
the
contract
was
made,
was
negotiated,
was
to
be
performed,
and
the
domicile,
place
of
business,
or
place
of
incorporation
of
the
parties.This
rule
takes
into
account
several
contacts
and
evaluates
them
according
to
their
relative
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue
to
be
resolved.
Since
these
3
principles
in
conflict
of
laws
make
reference
to
the
law
applicable
to
a
dispute,
they
are
rules
proper
for
the
2nd
phase,
the
choice
of
law.
They
determine
which
state's
law
is
to
be
applied
in
resolving
the
substantive
issues
of
a
conflicts
problem.
Necessarily,
as
the
only
issue
in
this
case
is
that
of
jurisdiction,
choice-of-law
rules
are
not
only
inapplicable
but
also
not
yet
called
for.
Further,
Nippons
premature
invocation
of
choice
-of-law
rules
is
exposed
by
the
fact
that
they
have
not
yet
pointed
out
any
conflict
between
the
laws
of
Japan
and
ours.
Before
determining
which
law
should
apply,
1st
there
should
exist
a
conflict
of
laws
situation
requiring
the
application
of
the
conflict
of
laws
rules.
Also,
when
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
is
invoked
to
provide
the
proper
rules
for
the
solution
of
a
case,
the
existence
of
such
law
must
be
pleaded
and
proved.
It
should
be
noted
that
when
a
conflicts
case,
one
involving
a
foreign
element,
is
brought
before
a
court
or
administrative
agency,
there
are
3
alternatives
open
to
the
latter
in
disposing
of
it:
(1)
dismiss
the
case,
either
because
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
or
refusal
to
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case;
(2)
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
and
apply
the
internal
law
of
the
forum;
or
(3)
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
and
take
into
account
or
apply
the
law
of
some
other
State
or
States.
The
courts
power
to
hear
cases
and
controversies
is
derived
from
the
Constitution
and
the
laws.
While
it
may
choose
to
recognize
laws
of
foreign
nations,
the
court
is
not
limited
by
foreign
sovereign
law
short
of
treaties
or
other
formal
agreements,
even
in
matters
regarding
rights
provided
by
foreign
sovereigns.
Neither
can
the
other
ground
raised,
forum
non
conveniens
,
be
used
to
deprive
the
RTC
of
its
jurisdiction.
1st,
it
is
not
a
proper
basis
for
a
motion
to
dismiss
because
Sec.
1,
Rule
16
of
the
Rules
of
Court
does
not
include
it
as
a
ground.
2nd,
whether
a
suit
should
be
entertained
or
dismissed
on
the
basis
of
the
said
doctrine
depends
largely
upon
the
facts
of
the
particular
case
and
is
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
RTC.
In
this
case,
the
RTC
decided
to
assume
jurisdiction.
3rd,
the
propriety
of
dismissing
a
case
based
on
this
principle
requires
a
factual
determination;
hence,
this
conflicts
principle
is
more
properly
considered
a
matter
of
defense
Saudi
Arabian
Airlines
vs
Court
of
Appeals
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and
some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a
hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were
arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila
office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer
in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was
interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly
violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her
conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince
absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia
Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for
other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a
motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the
court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts
jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of
Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the
Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court,
a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she
resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here
because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course,
again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element
involved, is the so called locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada
was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to
meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court
trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful
conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her
humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC
finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).
board the plane to Manila and instead ordered to take a later flight to
Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy. Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic.
They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer
and Allah but it was actually a notice for her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, assured
Morada that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to
her so she reported to Miniewy in Jeddah for further investigation. She
was brought to the Saudi court.
June 28, 1993: Saudi judge interrogated Morada through an interpreter
about the Jakarta incident for an hour and let her go. SAUDIA officers
forbidden her to take flight. She was told to go the Inflight Service
Office where her passport was taken and they told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
July 3, 1993: She was brought to court again and to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. The court tried her, together
with Thamer and Allah, and found her guilty of (1) adultery (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws and
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Failing to seek the assistance of her employer, SAUDIA, she asked the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on
appeal. She continued to workon the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while
Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Before her
return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without
her being informed of the cause.
November 23, 1993: Morada filed a Complaint for damages against
SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its country manager.
January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss on
following grounds: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against
SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest (3) that
the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.
After opposition to the motion to dismiss by Morada and reply by SAUDIA,
Morada filed an Amended Complaint dropping Al-Balawi. SAUDIA filed its
Manifestation, Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, subsequently
motion for reconsideration which were all denied.
SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
employer.
o Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful but injury or harm was inflicted
upon her person and reputation which must be compensated or redress for the
wrong doing
Complaint involving torts
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" - place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred = Philippines where SAUDIA
deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and working here.
"State of the most significant relationship" applied
o taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
v private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working here
v a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international
air carriage
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10%
of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney
C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the
written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as
Special Sales Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum
non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations
and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether
it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits
of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant
only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on
the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties
involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered
as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts
desistance.
Petitioners
filed
an
MR
arguing
that
the
LAs
recommendation
had
no
basis
in
law
and
in
fact,
however
it
was
denied.
Hence,
this
petition.
ISSUE:
Is
the
NLRC
a
proper
forum
to
decide
this
case?
HELD:
petition
granted;
the
orders
and
resolutions
of
the
NLRC
are
annulled.
NO
Forum
Non-Conveniens
The
NLRC
was
a
seriously
inconvenient
forum.
We
note
that
the
main
aspects
of
the
case
transpired
in
two
foreign
jurisdictions
and
the
case
involves
purely
foreign
elements.
The
only
link
that
the
Philippines
has
with
the
case
is
that
Santos
is
a
Filipino
citizen.
The
Palace
Hotel
and
MHICL
are
foreign
corporations.
Not
all
cases
involving
our
citizens
can
be
tried
here.
The
employment
contract.
Respondent
Santos
was
hired
directly
by
the
Palace
Hotel,
a
foreign
employer,
through
correspondence
sent
to
the
Sultanate
of
Oman,
where
respondent
Santos
was
then
employed.
He
was
hired
without
the
intervention
of
the
POEA
or
any
authorized
recruitment
agency
of
the
government.
Under
the
rule
of
forum
non
conveniens,
a
Philippine
court
or
agency
may
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
do
so
provided:
(1)
that
the
Philippine
court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to;
(2)
that
the
Philippine
court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts;
and
(3)
that
the
Philippine
court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
power
to
enforce
its
decision.
The
conditions
are
unavailing
in
the
case
at
bar.
Not
Convenient.
We
fail
to
see
how
the
NLRC
is
a
convenient
forum
given
that
all
the
incidents
of
the
case
from
the
time
of
recruitment,
to
employment
to
dismissal
occurred
outside
the
Philippines.
The
inconvenience
is
compounded
by
the
fact
that
the
proper
defendants,
the
Palace
Hotel
and
MHICL
are
not
nationals
of
the
Philippines.
Neither
.are
they
doing
business
in
the
Philippines.
Likewise,
the
main
witnesses,
Mr.
Shmidt
and
Mr.
Henk
are
non-residents
of
the
Philippines.
No
power
to
determine
applicable
law.
Neither
can
an
intelligent
decision
be
made
as
to
the
law
governing
the
employment
contract
as
such
was
perfected
in
foreign
soil.
This
calls
to
fore
the
application
of
the
principle
of
lex
loci
contractus
(the
law
of
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made).
The
employment
contract
was
not
perfected
in
the
Philippines.
Santos
signified
his
acceptance
by
writing
a
letter
while
he
was
in
the
Republic
of
Oman.
This
letter
was
sent
to
the
Palace
Hotel
in
the
Peoples
Republic
of
China.
No
power
to
determine
the
facts.
Neither
can
the
NLRC
determine
the
facts
surrounding
the
alleged
illegal
dismissal
as
all
acts
complained
of
took
place
in
Beijing,
Peoples
Republic
of
China.
The
NLRC
was
not
in
a
position
to
determine
whether
the
Tiannamen
Square
incident
truly
adversely
affected
operations
of
the
Palace
Hotel
as
to
justify
Santos
retrenchment.
Principle
of
effectiveness,
no
power
to
execute
decision.
Even
assuming
that
a
proper
decision
could
be
reached
by
the
NLRC,
such
would
not
have
any
binding
effect
against
the
employer,
the
Palace
Hotel.
The
Palace
Hotel
is
a
corporation
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
China
and
was
not
even
served
with
summons.
Jurisdiction
over
its
person
was
not
acquired.
This
is
not
to
say
that
Philippine
courts
and
agencies
have
no
power
to
solve
controversies
involving
foreign
employers.
Neither
are
we
saying
that
we
do
not
have
power
over
an
employment
contract
executed
in
a
foreign
country.
If
Santos
were
an
overseas
contract
worker,
a
Philippine
forum,
specifically
the
POEA,
not
the
NLRC,
would
protect
him.
He
is
not
an
overseas
contract
worker
a
fact
which
he
admits
with
conviction.
__
Even
assuming
that
the
NLRC
was
the
proper
forum,
even
on
the
merits,
the
NLRCs
decision
cannot
be
sustained.
II.
MHC
Not
Liable
Even
if
we
assume
two
things:
(1)
that
the
NLRC
had
jurisdiction
over
the
case,
and
(2)
that
MHICL
was
liable
for
Santos
retrenchment,
still
MHC,
as
a
separate
and
distinct
juridical
entity
cannot
be
held
liable.
True,
MHC
is
an
incorporator
of
MHICL
and
owns
50%
of
its
capital
stock.
However,
this
is
not
enough
to
pierce
the
veil
of
corporate
fiction
between
MHICL
and
MHC.
In
Traders
Royal
Bank
v.
CA,
we
held
that
the
mere
ownership
by
a
single
stockholder
or
by
another
corporation
of
all
or
nearly
all
of
the
capital
stock
of
a
corporation
is
not
of
itself
a
sufficient
reason
for
disregarding
the
fiction
of
separate
corporate
personalities.
It
is
basic
that
a
corporation
has
a
personality
separate
and
distinct
from
those
composing
it
as
well
as
from
that
of
any
other
legal
entity
to
which
it
may
be
related.
Clear
and
convincing
evidence
is
needed
to
pierce
the
veil
of
corporate
fiction.
In
this
case,
we
find
no
evidence
to
show
that
MHICL
and
MHC
are
one
and
the
same
entity.
III.
MHICL
not
Liable
Santos
predicates
MHICLs
liability
on
the
fact
that
MHICL
signed
his
employment
contract
with
the
Palace
Hotel.
This
fact
fails
to
persuade
us.
First,
we
note
that
the
Vice
President
(Operations
and
Development)
of
MHICL,
Cergueda
signed
the
employment
contract
as
a
mere
witness.
He
merely
signed
under
the
word
noted.
When
one
notes
a
contract,
one
is
not
expressing
his
agreement
or
approval,
as
a
party
would.
In
Sichangco
v.
Board
of
Commissioners
of
Immigration,
the
Court
recognized
that
the
term
noted
means
that
the
person
so
noting
has
merely
taken
cognizance
of
the
existence
of
an
act
or
declaration,
without
exercising
a
judicious
deliberation
or
rendering
a
decision
on
the
matter.
Second,
and
more
importantly,
there
was
no
existing
employer-employee
relationship
between
Santos
and
MHICL.
In
determining
the
existence
of
an
employer-employee
relationship,
the
following
elements
are
considered:
(1)
the
selection
and
engagement
of
the
employee;
(2)
the
payment
of
wages;
(3)
the
power
to
dismiss;
and
(4)
the
power
to
control
employees
conduct.
MHICL
did
not
have
and
did
not
exercise
any
of
the
aforementioned
powers.
It
did
not
select
respondent
Santos
as
an
employee
for
the
Palace
Hotel.
He
was
referred
to
the
Palace
Hotel
by
his
friend,
Buenio.
MHICL
did
not
engage
respondent
Santos
to
work.
The
terms
of
employment
were
negotiated
and
finalized
through
correspondence
between
Santos,
Mr.
Schmidt
and
Mr.
Henk,
who
were
officers
and
representatives
of
the
Palace
Hotel
and
not
MHICL.
Neither
did
Santos
adduce
any
proof
that
MHICL
had
the
power
to
control
his
conduct.
Finally,
it
was
the
Palace
Hotel,
through
Mr.
Schmidt
and
not
MHICL
that
terminated
respondent
Santos
services.
Likewise,
there
is
no
evidence
to
show
that
the
Palace
Hotel
and
MHICL
are
one
and
the
same
entity.
The
fact
that
the
Palace
Hotel
is
a
member
of
the
Manila
Hotel
Group
is
not
enough
to
pierce
the
corporate
veil
between
MHICL
and
the
Palace
Hotel.
Considering
that
the
NLRC
was
forum
non-conveniens
and
considering
further
that
no
employer-
employee
relationship
existed
between
MHICL,
MHC
and
Santos,
the
LA
clearly
had
no
jurisdiction
over
respondents
claim
in
the
NLRC
case.
In
all
the
cases
under
the
exclusive
and
it.
And
the
doctrine
of
estoppel
to
deny
corporate
existence
applies
to
a
foreign
as
well
as
to
domestic
corporations.
One
who
has
dealt
with
a
corporation
of
foreign
origin
as
a
corporate
entity
is
estopped
to
deny
its
corporate
existence
and
capacity.
In
Antam
Consolidated
Inc.
vs.
CA
et
al.
we
expressed
our
chagrin
over
this
commonly
used
scheme
of
defaulting
local
companies
which
are
being
sued
by
unlicensed
foreign
companies
not
engaged
in
business
in
the
Philippines
to
invoke
the
lack
of
capacity
to
sue
of
such
foreign
companies.
Obviously,
the
same
ploy
is
resorted
to
by
ASPAC
to
prevent
the
injunctive
action
filed
by
ITEC
to
enjoin
petitioner
from
using
knowledge
possibly
acquired
in
violation
of
fiduciary
arrangements
between
the
parties.
2.
YES;
Petitioners
insistence
on
the
dismissal
of
this
action
due
to
the
application,
or
non
application,
of
the
private
international
law
rule
of
forum
non
conveniens
defies
well-settled
rules
of
fair
play.
According
to
petitioner,
the
Philippine
Court
has
no
venue
to
apply
its
discretion
whether
to
give
cognizance
or
not
to
the
present
action,
because
it
has
not
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
plaintiff
in
the
case,
the
latter
allegedly
having
no
personality
to
sue
before
Philippine
Courts.
This
argument
is
misplaced
because
the
court
has
already
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
plaintiff
in
the
suit,
by
virtue
of
his
filing
the
original
complaint.
And
as
we
have
already
observed,
petitioner
is
not
at
liberty
to
question
plaintiffs
standing
to
sue,
having
already
acceded
to
the
same
by
virtue
of
its
entry
into
the
Representative
Agreement
referred
to
earlier.
Thus,
having
acquired
jurisdiction,
it
is
now
for
the
Philippine
Court,
based
on
the
facts
of
the
case,
whether
to
give
due
course
to
the
suit
or
dismiss
it,
on
the
principle
of
forum
non
convenience.
Hence,
the
Philippine
Court
may
refuse
to
assume
jurisdiction
in
spite
of
its
having
acquired
jurisdiction.
Conversely,
the
court
may
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
do
so;
provided,
that
the
following
requisites
are
met:
1)
That
the
Philippine
Court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to;
2)
That
the
Philippine
Court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts;
and,
3)
That
the
Philippine
Court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
power
to
enforce
its
decision.
The
aforesaid
requirements
having
been
met,
and
in
view
of
the
courts
disposition
to
give
due
course
to
the
questioned
action,
the
matter
of
the
present
forum
not
being
the
most
convenient
as
a
ground
for
the
suits
dismissal,
deserves
scant
consideration.
PHILSEC
VS.
CA
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
PHILSEC
INVESTMENT
et
al
vs.CA
et
al
G.R.
No.
103493
June
19,
1997
FACTS:
Private
respondent
Ducat
obtained
separate
loans
from
petitioners
Ayala
International
Finance
Limited
(AYALA)
and
Philsec
Investment
Corp
(PHILSEC),
secured
by
shares
of
stock
owned
by
Ducat.
In
order
to
facilitate
the
payment
of
the
loans,
private
respondent
1488,
Inc.,
through
its
president,
private
respondent
Daic,
assumed
Ducats
obligation
under
an
Agreement,
whereby
1488,
Inc.
executed
a
Warranty
Deed
with
Vendors
Lien
by
which
it
sold
to
petitioner
Athona
Holdings,
N.V.
(ATHONA)
a
parcel
of
land
in
Texas,
U.S.A.,
while
PHILSEC
and
AYALA
extended
a
loan
to
ATHONA
as
initial
payment
of
the
purchase
price.
The
balance
was
to
be
paid
by
means
of
a
promissory
note
executed
by
ATHONA
in
favor
of
1488,
Inc.
Subsequently,
upon
their
receipt
of
the
money
from
1488,
Inc.,
PHILSEC
and
AYALA
released
Ducat
from
his
indebtedness
and
delivered
to
1488,
Inc.
all
the
shares
of
stock
in
their
possession
belonging
to
Ducat.
As
ATHONA
failed
to
pay
the
interest
on
the
balance,
the
entire
amount
covered
by
the
note
became
due
and
demandable.
Accordingly,
private
respondent
1488,
Inc.
sued
petitioners
PHILSEC,
AYALA,
and
ATHONA
in
the
United
States
for
payment
of
the
balance
and
for
damages
for
breach
of
contract
and
for
fraud
allegedly
perpetrated
by
petitioners
in
misrepresenting
the
marketability
of
the
shares
of
stock
delivered
to
1488,
Inc.
under
the
Agreement.
While
the
Civil
Case
was
pending
in
the
United
States,
petitioners
filed
a
complaint
For
Sum
of
Money
with
Damages
and
Writ
of
Preliminary
Attachment
against
private
respondents
in
the
RTC
Makati.
The
complaint
reiterated
the
allegation
of
petitioners
in
their
respective
counterclaims
in
the
Civil
Action
in
the
United
States
District
Court
of
Southern
Texas
that
private
respondents
committed
fraud
by
selling
the
property
at
a
price
400
percent
more
than
its
true
value.
Ducat
moved
to
dismiss
the
Civil
Case
in
the
RTC-Makati
on
the
grounds
of
(1)
litis
pendentia,
vis-
a-vis
the
Civil
Action
in
the
U.S.,
(2)
forum
non
conveniens,
and
(3)
failure
of
petitioners
PHILSEC
and
BPI-IFL
to
state
a
cause
of
action.
The
trial
court
granted
Ducats
MTD,
stating
that
the
evidentiary
requirements
of
the
controversy
may
be
more
suitably
tried
before
the
forum
of
the
litis
pendentia
in
the
U.S.,
under
the
principle
in
private
international
law
of
forum
non
conveniens,
even
as
it
noted
that
Ducat
was
not
a
party
in
the
U.S.
case.
Petitioners
appealed
to
the
CA,
arguing
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
applying
the
principle
of
litis
pendentia
and
forum
non
conveniens.
The
CA
affirmed
the
dismissal
of
Civil
Case
against
Ducat,
1488,
Inc.,
and
Daic
on
the
ground
of
litis
pendentia.
ISSUE:
is
the
Civil
Case
in
the
RTC-Makati
barred
by
the
judgment
of
the
U.S.
court?
HELD:
CA
reversed.
Case
remanded
to
RTC-Makati
NO
While
this
Court
has
given
the
effect
of
res
judicata
to
foreign
judgments
in
several
cases,
it
was
after
the
parties
opposed
to
the
judgment
had
been
given
ample
opportunity
to
repel
them
on
grounds
allowed
under
the
law.
This
is
because
in
this
jurisdiction,
with
respect
to
actions
in
personam,
as
distinguished
from
actions
in
rem,
a
foreign
judgment
merely
constitutes
prima
facie
evidence
of
the
justness
of
the
claim
of
a
party
and,
as
such,
is
subject
to
proof
to
the
contrary.
Rule
39,
50
provides:
Sec.
50.
Effect
of
foreign
judgments.
The
effect
of
a
judgment
of
a
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country,
having
jurisdiction
to
pronounce
the
judgment
is
as
follows:
(a)
In
case
of
a
judgment
upon
a
specific
thing,
the
judgment
is
conclusive
upon
the
title
to
the
thing;
(b)
In
case
of
a
judgment
against
a
person,
the
judgment
is
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
as
between
the
parties
and
their
successors
in
interest
by
a
subsequent
title;
but
the
judgment
may
be
repelled
by
evidence
of
a
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
In
the
case
at
bar,
it
cannot
be
said
that
petitioners
were
given
the
opportunity
to
challenge
the
judgment
of
the
U.S.
court
as
basis
for
declaring
it
res
judicata
or
conclusive
of
the
rights
of
private
respondents.
The
proceedings
in
the
trial
court
were
summary.
Neither
the
trial
court
nor
the
appellate
court
was
even
furnished
copies
of
the
pleadings
in
the
U.S.
court
or
apprised
of
the
evidence
presented
thereat,
to
assure
a
proper
determination
of
whether
the
issues
then
being
litigated
in
the
U.S.
court
were
exactly
the
issues
raised
in
this
case
such
that
the
judgment
that
might
be
rendered
would
constitute
res
judicata.
Second.
Nor
is
the
trial
courts
refusal
to
take
cognizance
of
the
case
justifiable
under
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens:
First,
a
MTD
is
limited
to
the
grounds
under
Rule
16,
sec.1,
which
does
not
include
forum
non
conveniens.
The
propriety
of
dismissing
a
case
based
on
this
principle
requires
a
factual
determination,
hence,
it
is
more
properly
considered
a
matter
of
defense.
Second,
while
it
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
trial
court
to
abstain
from
assuming
jurisdiction
on
this
ground,
it
should
do
so
only
after
vital
facts
are
established,
to
determine
whether
special
circumstances
require
the
courts
desistance.
HONGKONG
AND
SHANGHAI
BANKING
CORPORATION
(HSBC)
vs.
SHERMAN
et
al
G.R.
No.
72494
August
11,
1989
FACTS:
It
appears
that
sometime
in
1981,
Eastern
Book
Supply
Service
PTE,
Ltd.
(COMPANY),
a
company
incorporated
in
Singapore
applied
with
and
was
granted
by
HSBC
Singapore
branch
an
overdraft
facility
in
the
maximum
amount
of
Singapore
dollars
200,000
with
interest
at
3%
over
HSBC
prime
rate,
payable
monthly,
on
amounts
due
under
said
overdraft
facility.
As
a
security
for
the
repayment
by
the
COMPANY
of
sums
advanced
by
HSBC
to
it
through
the
aforesaid
overdraft
facility,
in
1982,
both
private
respondents
and
a
certain
Lowe,
all
of
whom
were
directors
of
the
COMPANY
at
such
time,
executed
a
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
in
favor
of
HSBC
whereby
private
respondents
and
Lowe
agreed
to
pay,
jointly
and
severally,
on
demand
all
sums
owed
by
the
COMPANY
to
petitioner
BANK
under
the
aforestated
overdraft
facility.
The
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
provides,
inter
alia,
that:
This
guarantee
and
all
rights,
obligations
and
liabilities
arising
hereunder
shall
be
construed
and
determined
under
and
may
be
enforced
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
Republic
of
Singapore.
We
hereby
agree
that
the
Courts
of
Singapore
shall
have
jurisdiction
over
all
disputes
arising
under
this
guarantee.
The
COMPANY
failed
to
pay
its
obligation.
Thus,
HSBC
demanded
payment
and
inasmuch
as
the
private
respondents
still
failed
to
pay,
HSBC
filed
A
complaint
for
collection
of
a
sum
of
money
against
private
respondents
Sherman
and
Reloj
before
RTC
of
Quezon
City.
Private
respondents
filed
an
MTD
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter.
The
trial
court
denied
the
motion.
They
then
filed
before
the
respondent
IAC
a
petition
for
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
and/or
prayer
for
a
restraining
order.
The
IAC
rendered
a
decision
enjoining
the
RTC
Quezon
City
from
taking
further
cognizance
of
the
case
and
to
dismiss
the
same
for
filing
with
the
proper
court
of
Singapore
which
is
the
proper
forum.
MR
denied,
hence
this
petition.
ISSUE:
Do
Philippine
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
the
suit,
vis-a-vis
the
Guarantee
stipulation
regarding
jurisdiction?
HELD:
YES
One
basic
principle
underlies
all
rules
of
jurisdiction
in
International
Law:
a
State
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
reasonable
basis
for
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem
quasi
in
rem
or
in
personam.
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
minimum
contacts
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice
The
defense
of
private
respondents
that
the
complaint
should
have
been
filed
in
Singapore
is
based
merely
on
technicality.
They
did
not
even
claim,
much
less
prove,
that
the
filing
of
the
action
here
will
cause
them
any
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
showing
that
petitioner
BANK
filed
the
action
here
just
to
harass
private
respondents.
**
In
the
case
of
Neville
Y.
Lamis
Ents.,
et
al.
v.
Lagamon,
etc.,
where
the
stipulation
was
[i]n
case
of
litigation,
jurisdiction
shall
be
vested
in
the
Court
of
Davao
City.
We
held:
Anent
the
claim
that
Davao
City
had
been
stipulated
as
the
venue,
suffice
it
to
say
that
a
stipulation
as
to
venue
does
not
preclude
the
filing
of
suits
in
the
residence
of
plaintiff
or
defendant
under
Section
2
(b),
Rule
4,
ROC,
in
the
absence
of
qualifying
or
restrictive
words
in
the
agreement
which
would
indicate
that
the
place
named
is
the
only
venue
agreed
upon
by
the
parties.
Applying
the
foregoing
to
the
case
at
bar,
the
parties
did
not
thereby
stipulate
that
only
the
courts
of
Singapore,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
the
rest,
has
jurisdiction.
Neither
did
the
clause
in
question
operate
to
divest
Philippine
courts
of
jurisdiction.
In
International
Law,
jurisdiction
is
often
defined
as
the
light
of
a
State
to
exercise
authority
over
persons
and
things
within
its
boundaries
subject
to
certain
exceptions.
Thus,
a
State
does
not
assume
jurisdiction
over
travelling
sovereigns,
ambassadors
and
diplomatic
representatives
of
other
States,
and
foreign
military
units
stationed
in
or
marching
through
State
territory
with
the
permission
of
the
latters
authorities.
This
authority,
which
finds
its
source
in
the
concept
of
sovereignty,
is
exclusive
within
and
throughout
the
domain
of
the
State.
A
State
is
competent
to
take
hold
of
any
judicial
matter
it
sees
fit
by
making
its
courts
and
agencies
assume
jurisdiction
over
all
kinds
of
cases
brought
before
them
NOTES:
The
respondent
IAC
likewise
ruled
that:
In
a
conflict
problem,
a
court
will
simply
refuse
to
entertain
the
case
if
it
is
not
authorized
by
law
to
exercise
jurisdiction.
And
even
if
it
is
so
authorized,
it
may
still
refuse
to
entertain
the
case
by
applying
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens.
However,
whether
a
suit
should
be
entertained
or
dismissed
on
the
basis
of
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
depends
largely
upon
the
facts
of
the
particular
case
and
is
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
Thus,
the
IAC
should
not
have
relied
on
such
principle
laid
down
of
resorting
to
the
law
of
the
domicile
in
the
determination
of
matters
with
foreign
element
involved
is
in
accord
with
the
general
principle
of
American
law
that
the
domiciliary
law
should
govern
in
most
matters
or
rights
which
follow
the
person
of
the
owner.
Appellees
argue
that
what
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
pointed
out
as
the
national
law
is
the
internal
law
of
California.
But
as
above
explained
the
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
It
is
argued
on
appellees
(Aznar
and
LUCY)
behalf
that
the
clause
if
there
is
no
law
to
the
contrary
in
the
place
where
the
property
is
situated
in
Sec.
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
refers
to
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
and
that
the
law
to
the
contrary
in
the
Philippines
is
the
provision
in
said
Article
16
that
the
national
law
of
the
deceased
should
govern.
This
contention
can
not
be
sustained.
As
explained
in
the
various
authorities
cited
above,
the
national
law
mentioned
in
Article
16
of
our
Civil
Code
is
the
law
on
conflict
of
laws
in
the
California
Civil
Code,
i.e.,
Article
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
the
question
to
the
law
of
the
testators
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
California,
Article
946,
Civil
Code,
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
is
not
domiciled
in
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile,
the
Philippines
in
the
case
at
bar.
The
court
of
the
domicile
can
not
and
should
not
refer
the
case
back
to
California;
such
action
would
leave
the
issue
incapable
of
determination
because
the
case
will
then
be
like
a
football,
tossed
back
and
forth
between
the
two
states,
between
the
country
of
which
the
decedent
was
a
citizen
and
the
country
of
his
domicile.
The
Philippine
court
must
apply
its
own
law
as
directed
in
the
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent,
if
the
question
has
to
be
decided,
especially
as
the
application
of
the
internal
law
of
California
provides
no
legitime
for
children
while
the
Philippine
law,
Arts.
887(4)
and
894,
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
makes
natural
children
legally
acknowledged
forced
heirs
of
the
parent
recognizing
them.
We
therefore
find
that
as
the
domicile
of
the
deceased
Edward,
a
citizen
of
California,
is
the
Philippines,
the
validity
of
the
provisions
of
his
will
depriving
his
acknowledged
natural
child,
the
appellant
HELEN,
should
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
Law,
the
domicile,
pursuant
to
Art.
946
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California,
not
by
the
internal
law
of
California..
NOTES:
There
is
no
single
American
law
governing
the
validity
of
testamentary
provisions
in
the
United
States,
each
state
of
the
Union
having
its
own
private
law
applicable
to
its
citizens
only
and
in
force
only
within
the
state.
The
national
law
indicated
in
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code
above
quoted
can
not,
therefore,
possibly
mean
or
apply
to
any
general
American
law.
So
it
can
refer
to
no
other
than
the
private
law
of
the
State
of
California.
INGENOHL
vs.
OLSEN
AND
COMPANY,
INC
G.R.
No.
L-22288
January
12,
1925
FACTS:
In
1919,
the
acting
Alien
Property
Custodian
of
the
United
States,
by
virtue
of
the
Trading
with
the
Enemy
Act
as
amended,
required
and
caused
to
be
conveyed
to
him
the
property
and
business
then
belonging
to
the
company
known
as
Syndicat
Oriente,
formed
under
the
laws
of
Belgium,
of
which
the
plaintiff
was
the
gestor,
and
an
enemy
as
defined
in
said
Act.
The
primary
purpose
of
the
proceeding
was
to
seize,
sell
and
convey
any
and
all
of
the
property
owned
and
held
by
the
company
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States,
as
a
war
measure,
upon
the
ground
that
they
were
alien
enemies
of
the
United
States.
During
the
public
sale,
defendant
corporation
was
the
highest
bidder.
The
said
Alien
Property
Custodian
of
the
United
States
having
thereafter
accepted
said
bid
and
received
from
the
defendant
corporation
in
cash
the
amount
of
said
bid,
did
execute
in
favor
of
the
defendant
corporation
a
deed
of
conveyance.
The
defendant
paid
in
good
faith,
and
took
over
the
property
and
assets
of
the
company,
including
its
trade-marks
and
trade
names
and
its
business
as
a
going
concern
After
obtaining
the
proceeds
from
the
sale,
the
plaintiff
in
violation
of
the
conveyance,
wrongfully
instituted
an
action
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Hongkong
against
the
defendant
in
which
the
plaintiff
claimed
to
be
the
sole
owner
of
the
trade-marks
for
the
exports
of
the
business.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Hongkong
ruled
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff,
allegedly
through
misrepresentation,
ordering
defendant
to
pay
the
former
for
costs
and
AF.
The
Court
ruled
that
the
deed
of
conveyance
limited
the
sale
of
the
business
to
the
trademarks
within
the
Philippines,
implying
that
the
plaintiff
is
still
entitled
to
the
sell
the
cigars
under
the
same
trademarks
through
exporting,
which
accounts
to
95%
of
the
total
sales
of
the
company.
(This
means
that
the
plaintiff
paid
the
cash
equivalent
of
the
whole
of
the
business
but
only
entitled
to
5%
of
the
such,
the
sales
within
the
Philippines)-
UNFAIR
TALAGA!
The
CFI
rendered
judgment
for
the
plaintiff
for
the
full
amount
of
his
claim,
with
interest,
from
which
the
defendant
appeals.
Defendant
company
alleges
that
when
he
purchased
the
property
and
business,
all
trademarks
are
included;
that
the
subject
of
the
sale
is
not
only
those
trademarks
for
sales
within
the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Should
the
judgment
rendered
by
the
Hongkong
court
be
enforced
by
Philippine
courts?
HELD:
NO;
we
do
not
hesitate
to
say
that
the
judgment
rendered
in
the
Hongkong
court
was
a
clear
mistake
of
both
law
and
fact,
and
that
it
ought
not
to
be
enforced
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
The
business
of
the
plaintiff
is
almost
exclusively
an
export
business,
and
that
the
transfer
of
the
goodwill
thereof
necessarily
carried
with
it
the
transfer
of
said
export
business
and
of
the
trade-
marks
and
trade
names
which
could
not
be
disconnected
therefrom
-
It
is
conceded
that
the
Hongkong
court
had
jurisdiction
and
that
the
defendant
appeared
in
the
action
and
contested
the
case
on
its
merits.
Hence,
there
was
no
collusion.
Neither
is
it
claimed
that
there
was
any
fraud,
but
it
is
vigorously
contended
that
the
Hongkong
judgment
was
a
clear
mistake
of
both
law
and
fact.
Exclusive
of
the
provisions
of
section
311
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
it
is
very
doubtful
whether
it
could
be
sustained
upon
the
ground
of
comity
or
the
Law
of
Nations.
As
between
allied
nations
and
under
the
law
of
comity,
their
mutual
policy
should
be
to
sustain
and
enforce
the
spirit
and
intention
with
which
the
seizure
and
sale
of
any
property
of
an
alien
enemy
was
made
rather
than
to
minimize,
destroy
or
defeat
them.
We
are
construing
a
deed
of
conveyance
from
the
United
States
to
the
defendant.
The
primary
purpose
of
the
whole
proceeding
was
to
seize
and
convey
all
of
the
property
of
the
plaintiff
or
his
company
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States,
including
trade
names
and
trade-marks
as
those
of
an
alien
enemy.
To
now
give
the
defendant
the
use
and
benefit
of
only
5
per
cent
of
such
trade
names
and
trade-marks,
and
to
permit
the
plaintiff
to
have
and
retain
the
other
95
per
cent
to
his
own
use
and
benefit
after
he
has
ratified
and
confirmed
the
sale,
would
impugn
the
honor
and
good
name
of
the
United
States
in
the
whole
proceeding
and
defeat
the
very
purpose
for
which
it
seized
and
sold
the
property
of
an
alien
enemy,
to
wipe
Ingenohl
and
his
company
out
of
existence
and
put
them
out
of
business
in
so
far
as
the
United
States
had
the
power
to
do
so
Be
that
as
it
may,
this
court
is
bound
be
section
311
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
That
law
was
enacted
by
the
Legislature
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
as
to
the
Philippine
Islands,
it
is
the
law
of
the
land.
In
the
absence
of
that
statute,
no
matter
how
wrongful
the
judgment
of
the
Hongkong
court
may
be,
there
would
be
strong
reasons
for
holding
that
it
should
be
enforced
by
this
court.
PILAPIL
VS
IBAY-SOMERA
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
PILAPIL
vs.
HON
IBAY-SOMERA,
VICTOR
AND
GEILING
et
al
G.R.
No.
80116
June
30,
1989
FACTS:
Petitioner
Imelda
Pilapil,
a
Filipino
citizen,
and
private
respondent
Erich
Geiling,
a
German
national,
were
married
in
Germany.
After
about
three
and
a
half
years
of
marriage,
such
connubial
disharmony
eventuated
in
Geiling
initiating
a
divorce
proceeding
against
Pilapil
in
Germany.
The
Local
Court,
Federal
Republic
of
Germany,
promulgated
a
decree
of
divorce
on
the
ground
of
failure
of
marriage
of
the
spouses.
More
than
five
months
after
the
issuance
of
the
divorce
decree,
Geiling
filed
two
complaints
for
adultery
before
the
City
Fiscal
of
Manila
alleging
in
one
that,
while
still
married
to
said
Geiling,
Pilapil
had
an
affair
with
a
certain
William
Chia.
The
Assistant
Fiscal,
after
the
corresponding
investigation,
recommended
the
dismissal
of
the
cases
on
the
ground
of
insufficiency
of
evidence.
However,
upon
review,
the
respondent
city
fiscal
Victor
approved
a
resolution
directing
the
filing
of
2
complaint
for
adultery
against
the
petitioner.
The
case
entitled
PP
Philippines
vs.
Pilapil
and
Chia
was
assigned
to
the
court
presided
by
the
respondent
judge
Ibay-Somera.
A
motion
to
quash
was
filed
in
the
same
case
which
was
denied
by
the
respondent.
Pilapil
filed
this
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
and
prohibition,
with
a
prayer
for
a
TRO,
seeking
the
annulment
of
the
order
of
the
lower
court
denying
her
motion
to
quash.
As
cogently
argued
by
Pilapil,
Article
344
of
the
RPC
thus
presupposes
that
the
marital
relationship
is
still
subsisting
at
the
time
of
the
institution
of
the
criminal
action
for
adultery.
ISSUE:
Did
Geiling
have
legal
capacity
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint
for
adultery,
considering
that
it
was
done
after
obtaining
a
divorce
decree?
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
the
questioned
order
denying
petitioners
MTQ
is
SET
ASIDE
and
another
one
entered
DISMISSING
the
complaint
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
The
TRO
issued
in
this
case
is
hereby
made
permanent.
NO
Under
Article
344
of
the
RPC,
the
crime
of
adultery
cannot
be
prosecuted
except
upon
a
sworn
written
complaint
filed
by
the
offended
spouse.
It
has
long
since
been
established,
with
unwavering
consistency,
that
compliance
with
this
rule
is
a
jurisdictional,
and
not
merely
a
formal,
requirement.
Corollary
to
such
exclusive
grant
of
power
to
the
offended
spouse
to
institute
the
action,
it
necessarily
follows
that
such
initiator
must
have
the
status,
capacity
or
legal
representation
to
do
so
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
criminal
action.
This
is
a
logical
consequence
since
the
raison
detre
of
said
provision
of
law
would
be
absent
where
the
supposed
offended
party
had
ceased
to
be
the
spouse
of
the
alleged
offender
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
criminal
case.
2.
services
in
the
armed
forces
of
the
allied
forces
in
World
War
II;
3.
service
in
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
United
States
at
any
other
time,
4.
marriage
of
a
Filipino
woman
to
an
alien;
and
5.
political
economic
necessity
Repatriation
results
in
the
recovery
of
the
original
nationality
This
means
that
a
naturalized
Filipino
who
lost
his
citizenship
will
be
restored
to
his
prior
status
as
a
naturalized
Filipino
citizen.
On
the
other
hand,
if
he
was
originally
a
natural-born
citizen
before
he
lost
his
Philippine
citizenship,
he
will
be
restored
to
his
former
status
as
a
natural-born
Filipino.
R.A.
No.
2630
provides:
Sec
1.
Any
person
who
had
lost
his
Philippine
citizenship
by
rendering
service
to,
or
accepting
commission
in,
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
United
States,
or
after
separation
from
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
United
States,
acquired
United
States
citizenship,
may
reacquire
Philippine
citizenship
by
taking
an
oath
of
allegiance
to
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
and
registering
the
same
with
Local
Civil
Registry
in
the
place
where
he
resides
or
last
resided
in
the
Philippines.
The
said
oath
of
allegiance
shall
contain
a
renunciation
of
any
other
citizenship.
Having
thus
taken
the
required
oath
of
allegiance
to
the
Republic
and
having
registered
the
same
in
the
Civil
Registry
of
Magantarem,
Pangasinan
in
accordance
with
the
aforecited
provision,
Cruz
is
deemed
to
have
recovered
his
original
status
as
a
natural-born
citizen,
a
status
which
he
acquired
at
birth
as
the
son
of
a
Filipino
father.
It
bears
stressing
that
the
act
of
repatriation
allows
him
to
recover,
or
return
to,
his
original
status
before
he
lost
his
Philippine
citizenship.
VAN
DORN
VS.
ROMILLO
AND
UPTON
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
VAN
DORN
vs.
HON.
ROMILLO
and
RICHARD
UPTON
G.R.
No.
L-68470
October
8,
1985
FACTS:
Petitioner
Alice
Van
Dorn
is
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
while
private
respondent
Richard
Upton
is
a
citizen
of
the
USA.
They
were
married
in
Hongkong
in
1972
and
begot
two
children.
The
parties
were
divorced
in
Nevada,
USA
in
1982.
Alice
has
then
re-married
also
in
Nevada,
this
time
to
Theodore
Van
Dorn.
In
1983,
Richard
filed
suit
against
Alice
in
the
RTC-Pasay,
stating
that
Alices
business
in
Ermita,
Manila
is
conjugal
property
of
the
parties,
and
asking
that
Alice
be
ordered
to
render
an
accounting
of
that
business,
and
that
Richard
be
declared
with
right
to
manage
the
conjugal
property.
Alice
moved
to
dismiss
the
case
on
the
ground
that
the
cause
of
action
is
barred
by
previous
judgment
in
the
divorce
proceedings
before
the
Nevada
Court
wherein
respondent
had
acknowledged
that
he
and
petitioner
had
no
community
property
as
of
June
11,
1982.
The
Court
below
(presiding
judge:
Judge
Romillo)
denied
the
MTD
in
the
mentioned
case
on
the
ground
that
the
property
involved
is
located
in
the
Philippines
so
that
the
Divorce
Decree
has
no
bearing
in
the
case.
The
denial
is
now
the
subject
of
this
certiorari
proceeding.
ISSUE:
What
is
the
effect
of
the
foreign
divorce
on
the
parties
and
their
alleged
conjugal
property
in
the
Philippines?
HELD:
Petition
is
granted,
and
respondent
Judge
is
hereby
ordered
to
dismiss
the
Complaint
For
the
resolution
of
this
case,
it
is
not
necessary
to
determine
whether
the
property
relations
between
Alice
and
Richard,
after
their
marriage,
were
upon
absolute
or
relative
community
property,
upon
complete
separation
of
property,
or
upon
any
other
regime.
The
pivotal
fact
in
this
case
is
the
Nevada
divorce
of
the
parties.
The
Nevada
District
Court,
which
decreed
the
divorce,
had
obtained
jurisdiction
over
petitioner
who
appeared
in
person
before
the
Court
during
the
trial
of
the
case.
It
also
obtained
jurisdiction
over
private
respondent
who
authorized
his
attorneys
in
the
divorce
case
to
agree
to
the
divorce
on
the
ground
of
incompatibility
in
the
understanding
that
there
were
neither
community
property
nor
community
obligations.
As
explicitly
stated
in
the
Power
of
Attorney
he
executed
in
favor
of
the
law
firm
of
KARP
&
GRAD
LTD.
to
represent
him
in
the
divorce
proceedings:
xxx
xxx
xxx
You
are
hereby
authorized
to
accept
service
of
Summons,
to
file
an
Answer,
appear
on
my
behalf
and
do
all
things
necessary
and
proper
to
represent
me,
without
further
contesting,
subject
to
the
following:
1.
That
my
spouse
seeks
a
divorce
on
the
ground
of
incompatibility.
2.
That
there
is
no
community
of
property
to
be
adjudicated
by
the
Court.
3.
That
there
are
no
community
obligations
to
be
adjudicated
by
the
court.
xxx
xxx
xxx
There
can
be
no
question
as
to
the
validity
of
that
Nevada
divorce
in
any
of
the
States
of
the
United
States.
The
decree
is
binding
on
private
respondent
as
an
American
citizen.
What
he
is
contending
in
this
case
is
that
the
divorce
is
not
valid
and
binding
in
this
jurisdiction,
the
same
being
contrary
to
local
law
and
public
policy.
It
is
true
that
owing
to
the
nationality
principle
embodied
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code,
only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
absolute
divorces
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
police
and
morality.
However,
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
which
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
their
national
law.
In
this
case,
the
divorce
in
Nevada
released
private
respondent
from
the
marriage
from
the
standards
of
American
law,
under
which
divorce
dissolves
the
marriage.
Thus,
pursuant
to
his
national
law,
private
respondent
is
no
longer
the
husband
of
petitioner.
He
would
have
no
standing
to
sue
in
the
case
below
as
petitioners
husband
entitled
to
exercise
control
over
conjugal
assets.
As
he
is
bound
by
the
Decision
of
his
own
countrys
Court,
which
validly
exercised
jurisdiction
over
him,
and
whose
decision
he
does
not
repudiate,
he
is
estopped
by
his
own
representation
before
said
Court
from
asserting
his
right
over
the
alleged
conjugal
property.
GOVERNMENT
VS.
FRANK
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
THE
GOVT
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
vs.
FRANK
G.
R.
No.
2935
March
23,
1909
FACTS:
In
1903,
in
the
city
of
Chicago,
Illinois,
Frank
entered
into
a
contract
for
a
period
of
2
years
with
the
Plaintiff,
by
which
Frank
was
to
receive
a
salary
as
a
stenographer
in
the
service
of
the
said
Plaintiff,
and
in
addition
thereto
was
to
be
paid
in
advance
the
expenses
incurred
in
traveling
from
the
said
city
of
Chicago
to
Manila,
and
one-half
salary
during
said
period
of
travel.
Said
contract
contained
a
provision
that
in
case
of
a
violation
of
its
terms
on
the
part
of
Frank,
he
should
become
liable
to
the
Plaintiff
for
the
amount
expended
by
the
Government
by
way
of
expenses
incurred
in
traveling
from
Chicago
to
Manila
and
the
one-half
salary
paid
during
such
period.
Frank
entered
upon
the
performance
of
his
contract
and
was
paid
half-salary
from
the
date
until
the
date
of
his
arrival
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
Thereafter,
Frank
left
the
service
of
the
Plaintiff
and
refused
to
make
a
further
compliance
with
the
terms
of
the
contract.
The
Plaintiff
commenced
an
action
in
the
CFI-Manila
to
recover
from
Frank
the
sum
of
money,
which
amount
the
Plaintiff
claimed
had
been
paid
to
Frank
as
expenses
incurred
in
traveling
from
Chicago
to
Manila,
and
as
half-salary
for
the
period
consumed
in
travel.
It
was
expressly
agreed
between
the
parties
to
said
contract
that
Laws
No.
80
and
No.
224
should
constitute
a
part
of
said
contract.
The
Defendant
filed
a
general
denial
and
a
special
defense,
alleging
in
his
special
defense
that
(1)
the
Government
of
the
Philippine
Islands
had
amended
Laws
No.
80
and
No.
224
and
had
thereby
materially
altered
the
said
contract,
and
also
that
(2)
he
was
a
minor
at
the
time
the
contract
was
entered
into
and
was
therefore
not
responsible
under
the
law.
the
lower
court
rendered
a
judgment
against
Frank
and
in
favor
of
the
Plaintiff
for
the
sum
of
265.
90
dollars
ISSUE:
1.
Did
the
amendment
of
the
laws
altered
the
tenor
of
the
contract
entered
into
between
Plaintiff
and
Defendant?
2.
Can
the
defendant
allege
minority/infancy?
HELD:
the
judgment
of
the
lower
court
is
affirmed
1.
NO;
It
may
be
said
that
the
mere
fact
that
the
legislative
department
of
the
Government
of
the
Philippine
Islands
had
amended
said
Acts
No.
80
and
No.
224
by
Acts
No.
643
and
No.
1040
did
not
have
the
effect
of
changing
the
terms
of
the
contract
made
between
the
Plaintiff
and
the
Defendant.
The
legislative
department
of
the
Government
is
expressly
prohibited
by
section
5
of
the
Act
of
Congress
of
1902
from
altering
or
changing
the
terms
of
a
contract.
The
right
which
the
Defendant
had
acquired
by
virtue
of
Acts
No.
80
and
No.
224
had
not
been
changed
in
any
respect
by
the
fact
that
said
laws
had
been
amended.
These
acts,
constituting
the
terms
of
the
contract,
still
constituted
a
part
of
said
contract
and
were
enforceable
in
favor
of
the
Defendant.
2.
NO;
The
Defendant
alleged
in
his
special
defense
that
he
was
a
minor
and
therefore
the
contract
could
not
be
enforced
against
him.
The
record
discloses
that,
at
the
time
the
contract
was
entered
into
in
the
State
of
Illinois,
he
was
an
adult
under
the
laws
of
that
State
and
had
full
authority
to
contract.
Frank
claims
that,
by
reason
of
the
fact
that,
under
that
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands
at
the
time
the
contract
was
made,
made
persons
in
said
Islands
did
not
reach
their
majority
until
they
had
attained
the
age
of
23
years,
he
was
not
liable
under
said
contract,
contending
that
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands
governed.
It
is
not
disputed
upon
the
contrary
the
fact
is
admitted
that
at
the
time
and
place
of
the
making
of
the
contract
in
question
the
Defendant
had
full
capacity
to
make
the
same.
No
rule
is
better
settled
in
law
than
that
matters
bearing
upon
the
execution,
interpretation
and
validity
of
a
contract
are
determined
b
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
contract
is
made.
Matters
connected
with
its
performance
are
regulated
by
the
law
prevailing
at
the
place
of
performance.
Matters
respecting
a
remedy,
such
as
the
bringing
of
suit,
admissibility
of
evidence,
and
statutes
of
limitations,
depend
upon
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
suit
is
brought.
NORTHWEST
ORIENT
AIRLINES,
INC.
vs.
CA
and
C.F.
SHARP
&
COMPANY
INC.
G.R.
No.
112573
February
9,
1995
FACTS:
Petitioner
Northwest
Orient
Airlines,
Inc.
(NORTHWEST),
a
corporation
organized
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Minnesota,
U.S.A.,
sought
to
enforce
in
the
RTC-
Manila,
a
judgment
rendered
in
its
favor
by
a
Japanese
court
against
private
respondent
C.F.
Sharp
&
Company,
Inc.,
(SHARP),
a
corporation
incorporated
under
Philippine
laws.
factual
and
procedural
antecedents
of
this
controversy:
On
May
9,
1974,
Northwest
Airlines
and
Sharp,
through
its
Japan
branch,
entered
into
an
International
Passenger
Sales
Agency
Agreement,
whereby
the
former
authorized
the
latter
to
sell
its
air
transportation
tickets.
Unable
to
remit
the
proceeds
of
the
ticket
sales
made
by
defendant
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
under
the
said
agreement,
plaintiff
on
March
25,
1980
sued
defendant
in
Tokyo,
Japan,
for
collection
of
the
unremitted
proceeds
of
the
ticket
sales,
with
claim
for
damages.
On
April
11,
1980,
a
writ
of
summons
was
issued
by
the
36th
Civil
Department,
Tokyo
District
Court
of
Japan
against
defendant
at
its
office
at
the
Taiheiyo
Building,
3rd
floor,
132,
Yamashita-
cho,
Naka-ku,
Yokohoma,
Kanagawa
Prefecture.
The
attempt
to
serve
the
summons
was
unsuccessful
because
the
bailiff
was
advised
by
a
person
in
the
office
that
Mr.
Dinozo,
the
person
believed
to
be
authorized
to
receive
court
processes
was
in
Manila
and
would
be
back
on
April
24,
1980.
On
April
24,
1980,
bailiff
returned
to
the
defendants
office
to
serve
the
summons.
Mr.
Dinozo
refused
to
accept
the
same
claiming
that
he
was
no
longer
an
employee
of
the
defendant.
After
the
two
attempts
of
service
were
unsuccessful,
the
judge
of
the
Tokyo
District
Court
decided
to
have
the
complaint
and
the
writs
of
summons
served
at
the
head
office
of
the
defendant
in
Manila.
On
July
11,
1980,
the
Director
of
the
Tokyo
District
Court
requested
the
Supreme
Court
of
Japan
to
serve
the
summons
through
diplomatic
channels
upon
the
defendants
head
office
in
Manila.
On
August
28,
1980,
defendant
received
from
Deputy
Sheriff
Rolando
Balingit
the
writ
of
summons
(p.
276,
Records).
Despite
receipt
of
the
same,
defendant
failed
to
appear
at
the
scheduled
hearing.
Thus,
the
Tokyo
Court
proceeded
to
hear
the
plaintiffs
complaint
and
on
[January
29,
1981],
rendered
judgment
ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff
the
sum
of
83,158,195
Yen
and
damages
for
delay
at
the
rate
of
6%
per
annum
from
August
28,
1980
up
to
and
until
payment
is
completed
(pp.
12-14,
Records).
On
March
24,
1981,
defendant
received
from
Deputy
Sheriff
Balingit
copy
of
the
judgment.
Defendant
not
having
appealed
the
judgment,
the
same
became
final
and
executory.
Plaintiff
was
unable
to
execute
the
decision
in
Japan,
hence,
on
May
20,
1983,
a
suit
for
enforcement
of
the
judgment
was
filed
by
plaintiff
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Manila
Branch
54.
defendant
filed
its
answer
averring
that
the
judgment
of
the
Japanese
Court:
(1)
the
foreign
judgment
sought
to
be
enforced
is
null
and
void
for
want
of
jurisdiction
and
(2)
the
said
judgment
is
contrary
to
Philippine
law
and
public
policy
and
rendered
without
due
process
of
law.
In
its
decision,
the
Court
of
Appeals
sustained
the
trial
court.
It
agreed
with
the
latter
in
its
reliance
upon
Boudard
vs.
Tait
wherein
it
was
held
that
the
process
of
the
court
has
no
extraterritorial
effect
and
no
jurisdiction
is
acquired
over
the
person
of
the
defendant
by
serving
him
beyond
the
boundaries
of
the
state.
To
support
its
position,
the
Court
of
Appeals
further
stated:
In
an
action
strictly
in
personam,
such
as
the
instant
case,
personal
service
of
summons
within
the
forum
is
required
for
the
court
to
acquire
jurisdiction
over
the
defendant
(Magdalena
Estate
Inc.
vs.
Nieto,
125
SCRA
230).
To
confer
jurisdiction
on
the
court,
personal
or
substituted
service
of
summons
on
the
defendant
not
extraterritorial
service
is
necessary.
ISSUE:
whether
a
Japanese
court
can
acquire
jurisdiction
over
a
Philippine
corporation
doing
business
in
Japan
by
serving
summons
through
diplomatic
channels
on
the
Philippine
corporation
at
its
principal
office
in
Manila
after
prior
attempts
to
serve
summons
in
Japan
had
failed.
HELD:
YES
A
foreign
judgment
is
presumed
to
be
valid
and
binding
in
the
country
from
which
it
comes,
until
the
contrary
is
shown.
It
is
also
proper
to
presume
the
regularity
of
the
proceedings
and
the
giving
of
due
notice
therein.
6
The
judgment
may,
however,
be
assailed
by
evidence
of
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.(See
Sec.
50,
R
39)
Being
the
party
challenging
the
judgment
rendered
by
the
Japanese
court,
SHARP
had
the
duty
to
demonstrate
the
invalidity
of
such
judgment.
It
is
settled
that
matters
of
remedy
and
procedure
such
as
those
relating
to
the
service
of
process
upon
a
defendant
are
governed
by
the
lex
fori
or
the
internal
law
of
the
forum.
8
In
this
case,
it
is
the
procedural
law
of
Japan
where
the
judgment
was
rendered
that
determines
the
validity
of
the
extraterritorial
service
of
process
on
SHARP.
As
to
what
this
law
is
is
a
question
of
fact,
not
of
law.
It
was
then
incumbent
upon
SHARP
to
present
evidence
as
to
what
that
Japanese
procedural
law
is
and
to
show
that
under
it,
the
assailed
extraterritorial
service
is
invalid.
It
did
not.
Accordingly,
the
presumption
of
validity
and
regularity
of
the
service
of
summons
and
the
decision
thereafter
rendered
by
the
Japanese
court
must
stand.
Alternatively
in
the
light
of
the
absence
of
proof
regarding
Japanese
law,
the
presumption
of
identity
or
similarity
or
the
so-called
processual
presumption
may
be
invoked.
Applying
it,
the
Japanese
law
on
the
matter
is
presumed
to
be
similar
with
the
Philippine
law
on
service
of
summons
on
a
private
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines.
Section
14,
Rule
14
of
the
Rules
of
Court
provides
that
if
the
defendant
is
a
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines,
service
may
be
made:
(1)
on
its
resident
agent
designated
in
accordance
with
law
for
that
purpose,
or,
(2)
if
there
is
no
such
resident
agent,
on
the
government
official
designated
by
law
to
that
effect;
or
(3)
on
any
of
its
officers
or
agents
within
the
Philippines.
Where
the
corporation
has
no
such
agent,
service
shall
be
made
on
the
government
official
designated
by
law,
to
wit:
(a)
the
Insurance
Commissioner
in
the
case
of
a
foreign
insurance
company;
(b)
the
Superintendent
of
Banks,
in
the
case
of
a
foreign
banking
corporation;
and
(c)
the
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission,
in
the
case
of
other
foreign
corporations
duly
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines.
Nowhere
in
its
pleadings
did
SHARP
profess
to
having
had
a
resident
agent
authorized
to
receive
court
processes
in
Japan.
While
it
may
be
true
that
service
could
have
been
made
upon
any
of
the
officers
or
agents
of
SHARP
at
its
three
other
branches
in
Japan,
the
availability
of
such
a
recourse
would
not
preclude
service
upon
the
proper
government
official,
as
stated
above.
As
found
by
the
respondent
court,
two
attempts
at
service
were
made
at
SHARPs
Yokohama
branch.
Both
were
unsuccessful.
The
Tokyo
District
Court
requested
the
Supreme
Court
of
Japan
to
cause
the
delivery
of
the
summons
and
other
legal
documents
to
the
Philippines.
Acting
on
that
request,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Japan
sent
the
summons
together
with
the
other
legal
documents
to
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
Japan
which,
in
turn,
forwarded
the
same
to
the
Japanese
Embassy
in
Manila
.
Thereafter,
the
court
processes
were
delivered
to
the
Ministry
(now
Department)
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
the
Philippines,
then
to
the
Executive
Judge
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
(now
Regional
Trial
Court)
of
Manila,
who
forthwith
ordered
Deputy
Sheriff
Rolando
Balingit
to
serve
the
same
on
SHARP
at
its
principal
office
in
Manila.
This
service
is
equivalent
to
service
on
the
proper
government
official
under
Section
14,
Rule
14
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
in
relation
to
Section
128
of
the
Corporation
Code.
Hence,
SHARPs
contention
that
such
manner
of
service
is
not
valid
under
Philippine
laws
holds
no
water.
We
find
NORTHWESTs
claim
for
attorneys
fees,
litigation
expenses,
and
exemplary
damages
to
be
without
merit.
We
find
no
evidence
that
would
justify
an
award
for
attorneys
fees
and
litigation
expenses
under
Article
2208
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines.
Nor
is
an
award
for
exemplary
damages
warranted.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
partly
GRANTED,
and
the
challenged
decision
is
AFFIRMED
insofar
as
it
denied
NORTHWESTs
claims
for
attorneys
fees,
litigation
expenses,
and
exemplary
damages
but
REVERSED
insofar
as
in
sustained
the
trial
courts
dismissal
of
NORTHWESTs
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
83-17637
of
Branch
54
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Manila,
and
another
in
its
stead
is
hereby
rendered
ORDERING
private
respondent
C.F.
SHARP
L
COMPANY,
INC.
to
pay
to
NORTHWEST
the
amounts
adjudged
in
the
foreign
judgment
subject
of
said
case,
with
interest
thereon
at
the
legal
rate
from
the
filing
of
the
complaint
therein
until
the
said
foreign
judgment
is
fully
satisfied.
BOUDARD
VS.
TAIT
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
G.R.
No.
L-45193
April
5,
1939
EMILIE
ELMIRA
RENEE,
RAYMOND
ANTONIN,
GINETTE
ROSE
ADELAIDE
and
MONIQUE
VICTOIRE,
ALL
SURNAMED
BOUDARD
vs.
STEWART
EDDIE
TAIT
FACTS:
The
appellant
Emilie
Boudard,
in
her
capacity
as
widow
of
Marie
Theodore
Boudard
and
as
guardian
of
her
coappellants,
her
children
born
during
her
marriage
with
the
deceased,
obtained
a
judgment
in
their
favor
from
the
civil
division
of
the
CFI
of
Hanoi,
French
Indo-China
for
a
sum,
plus
interest.
The
judgment
was
rendered
against
Stewart
Tait
who
had
been
declared
in
default
for
his
failure
to
appear
at
the
trial
before
said
court.
The
judgment,
was
based
on
the
fact
that
Marie
Theodore
Boudard,
who
was
an
employee
of
Stewart
Eddie
Tait,
was
killed
in
Hanoi
by
other
employees
of
said
Tait,
although
outside
of
the
fulfillment
of
a
duty.
Trial
court
(in
the
Philippines)
dismissed
the
action
for
enforcement
of
the
Hanoi
decision
based
principally
on
the
lack
of
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
Hanoi
to
render
the
judgment
in
question,
for
the
execution
of
which
this
action
was
instituted
in
this
jurisdiction.
The
lack
of
jurisdiction
was
discovered
in
the
decision
itself
of
the
Court
of
Hanoi
which
states
that
the
appellee
was
not
a
resident
of,
nor
had
a
known
domicile
in,
that
country.
The
evidence
adduced
at
the
trial
conclusively
proves
that
neither
the
appellee
nor
his
agent
or
employees
were
ever
in
Hanoi,
French
Indo-China;
and
that
the
deceased
Marie
Theodore
Boudard
had
never,
at
any
time,
been
his
employee.
The
appellees
first
intimation
of
his
having
been
sued
and
sentenced
to
pay
a
huge
sum
by
the
civil
division
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Hanoi
was
when
he
was
served
with
summons
in
the
present
case.
ISSUE:
WON
the
decision
in
Hanoi
can
be
executed
here.
HELD:
NO
The
appellants
failed
to
show
that
the
proceedings
against
the
appellee
in
the
Court
of
Hanoi
were
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
France
then
in
force;
and
as
to
the
second
point,
it
appears
that
said
documents
are
not
of
the
nature
mentioned
in
sections
304
and
305
of
Act
No.
190.
They
are
not
copies
of
the
judicial
record
of
the
proceedings
against
the
appellee
in
the
Court
of
Hanoi,
duly
certified
by
the
proper
authorities
there,
whose
signatures
should
be
authenticated
by
the
Consul
or
some
consular
agent
of
the
United
States
in
said
country.
Moreover,
the
evidence
of
record
shows
that
the
appellee
was
not
in
Hanoi
during
the
time
mentioned
in
the
complaint
of
the
appellants,
nor
were
his
employees
or
representatives.
The
rule
in
matters
of
this
nature
is
that
judicial
proceedings
in
a
foreign
country,
regarding
payment
of
money,
are
only
effective
against
a
party
if
summons
is
duly
served
on
him
within
such
foreign
country
before
the
proceedings.
It
can
not
be
said
that
the
decision
rendered
by
the
Court
of
Hanoi
should
be
conclusive
to
such
an
extent
that
it
cannot
be
contested,
for
it
merely
constitutes,
from
the
viewpoint
of
our
laws,
prima
facie
evidence
of
the
justness
of
appellants
claim,
and,
as
such,
naturally
admits
proof
to
the
contrary.
FROM
ATTY.
RENES^^
(b)
In
case
of
a
judgment
or
final
order
against
a
person,
the
judgment
or
final
order
is
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
as
between
the
parties
and
their
successors
in
interest
by
a
subsequent
title.
In
either
case,
the
judgment
or
final
order
may
be
repelled
by
evidence
of
a
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
To
our
mind,
direct
involvement
or
being
the
subject
of
the
foreign
judgment
is
sufficient
to
clothe
a
party
with
the
requisite
interest
to
institute
an
action
before
our
courts
for
the
recognition
of
the
foreign
judgment.
In
a
divorce
situation,
we
have
declared,
no
less,
that
the
divorce
obtained
by
an
alien
abroad
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
the
divorce
is
valid
according
to
his
or
her
national
law.
The
starting
point
in
any
recognition
of
a
foreign
divorce
judgment
is
the
acknowledgment
that
our
courts
do
not
take
judicial
notice
of
foreign
judgments
and
laws.
Justice
Herrera
explained
that,
as
a
rule,
no
sovereign
is
bound
to
give
effect
within
its
dominion
to
a
judgment
rendered
by
a
tribunal
of
another
country.
This
means
that
the
foreign
judgment
and
its
authenticity
must
be
proven
as
facts
under
our
rules
on
evidence,
together
with
the
aliens
applicable
national
law
to
show
the
effect
of
the
judgment
on
the
alien
himself
or
herself.
The
recognition
may
be
made
in
an
action
instituted
specifically
for
the
purpose
or
in
another
action
where
a
party
invokes
the
foreign
decree
as
an
integral
aspect
of
his
claim
or
defense.
In
Gerberts
case,
since
both
the
foreign
divorce
decree
and
the
national
law
of
the
alien,
recognizing
his
or
her
capacity
to
obtain
a
divorce,
purport
to
be
official
acts
of
a
sovereign
authority,
Section
24,
Rule
132
of
the
Rules
of
Court
comes
into
play.
This
Section
requires
proof,
either
by
(1)
official
publications
or
(2)
copies
attested
by
the
officer
having
legal
custody
of
the
documents.
If
the
copies
of
official
records
are
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
these
must
be
(a)
accompanied
by
a
certificate
issued
by
the
proper
diplomatic
or
consular
officer
in
the
Philippine
foreign
service
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept
and
(b)
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
The
records
show
that
Gerbert
attached
to
his
petition
a
copy
of
the
divorce
decree,
as
well
as
the
required
certificates
proving
its
authenticity,
but
failed
to
include
a
copy
of
the
Canadian
law
on
divorce.
Under
this
situation,
we
can,
at
this
point,
simply
dismiss
the
petition
for
insufficiency
of
supporting
evidence,
unless
we
deem
it
more
appropriate
to
remand
the
case
to
the
RTC
to
determine
whether
the
divorce
decree
is
consistent
with
the
Canadian
divorce
law.
We
deem
it
more
appropriate
to
take
this
latter
course
of
action,
given
the
Article
26
interests
that
will
be
served
and
the
Filipina
wifes
(Daisylyns)
obvious
conformity
with
the
petition.
A
remand,
at
the
same
time,
will
allow
other
interested
parties
to
oppose
the
foreign
judgment
and
overcome
a
petitioners
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
by
proving
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
a
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
Needless
to
state,
every
precaution
must
be
taken
to
ensure
conformity
with
our
laws
before
a
recognition
is
made,
as
the
foreign
judgment,
once
recognized,
shall
have
the
effect
of
res
judicata
between
the
parties,
as
provided
in
Section
48,
Rule
39
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
In
fact,
more
than
the
principle
of
comity
that
is
served
by
the
practice
of
reciprocal
recognition
of
foreign
judgments
between
nations,
the
res
judicata
effect
of
the
foreign
judgments
of
divorce
serves
as
the
deeper
basis
for
extending
judicial
recognition
and
for
considering
the
alien
spouse
bound
by
its
terms.
This
same
effect,
as
discussed
above,
will
not
obtain
for
the
Filipino
spouse
were
it
not
for
the
substantive
rule
that
the
second
paragraph
of
Article
26
of
the
Family
Code
provides.
Considerations
beyond
the
recognition
of
the
foreign
divorce
decree.
judgments
of
foreign
courts
of
competent
jurisdiction
are
reciprocally
respected
and
rendered
efficacious
under
certain
conditions
that
may
vary
in
different
countries.
In
this
jurisdiction,
a
valid
judgment
rendered
by
a
foreign
tribunal
may
be
recognized
insofar
as
the
immediate
parties
and
the
underlying
cause
of
action
are
concerned
so
long
as
it
is
convincingly
shown
that
there
has
been
an
opportunity
for
a
full
and
fair
hearing
before
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction;
that
the
trial
upon
regular
proceedings
has
been
conducted,
following
due
citation
or
voluntary
appearance
of
the
defendant
and
under
a
system
of
jurisprudence
likely
to
secure
an
impartial
administration
of
justice;
and
that
there
is
nothing
to
indicate
either
a
prejudice
in
court
and
in
the
system
of
laws
under
which
it
is
sitting
or
fraud
in
procuring
the
judgment.
A
foreign
judgment
is
presumed
to
be
valid
and
binding
in
the
country
from
which
it
comes,
until
a
contrary
showing,
on
the
basis
of
a
presumption
of
regularity
of
proceedings
and
the
giving
of
due
notice
in
the
foreign
forum
Under
Section
50(b),
Rule
39
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
which
was
the
governing
law
at
the
time
the
instant
case
was
decided
by
the
trial
court
and
respondent
appellate
court,
a
judgment,
against
a
person,
of
a
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country
having
jurisdiction
to
pronounce
the
same
is
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
as
between
the
parties
and
their
successors
in
interest
by
a
subsequent
title.
The
judgment
may,
however,
be
assailed
by
evidence
of
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
In
addition,
under
Section
3(n),
Rule
131
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
a
court,
whether
in
the
Philippines
or
elsewhere,
enjoys
the
presumption
that
it
was
acting
in
the
lawful
exercise
of
its
jurisdiction.
Hence,
once
the
authenticity
of
the
foreign
judgment
is
proved,
the
party
attacking
a
foreign
judgment,
is
tasked
with
the
burden
of
overcoming
its
presumptive
validity.
In
the
instant
case,
petitioner
sufficiently
established
the
existence
of
the
money
judgment
of
the
High
Court
of
Malaya
by
the
evidence
it
offered.
Petitioners
sole
witness,
testified
to
the
effect
that
he
is
in
active
practice
of
the
law
profession
in
Malaysia;
that
he
was
connected
with
Skrine
and
Company
as
Legal
Assistant
up
to
1981;
that
private
respondent,
then
known
as
Construction
and
Development
Corporation
of
the
Philippines,
was
sued
by
his
client,
Asiavest
Merchant
Bankers
(M)
Berhad,
in
Kuala
Lumpur;
that
the
writ
of
summons
were
served
on
March
17,
1983
at
the
registered
office
of
private
respondent
and
on
March
21,
1983
on
Cora
S.
Deala,
a
financial
planning
officer
of
private
respondent
for
Southeast
Asia
operations;
that
upon
the
filing
of
the
case,
Messrs.
Allen
and
Gledhill,
Advocates
and
Solicitors,
with
address
at
24th
Floor,
UMBC
Building,
Jalan
Sulaiman,
Kuala
Lumpur,
entered
their
conditional
appearance
for
private
respondent
questioning
the
regularity
of
the
service
of
the
writ
of
summons
but
subsequently
withdrew
the
same
when
it
realized
that
the
writ
was
properly
served;
that
because
private
respondent
failed
to
file
a
statement
of
defense
within
two
(2)
weeks,
petitioner
filed
an
application
for
summary
judgment
and
submitted
affidavits
and
documentary
evidence
in
support
of
its
claim;
that
the
matter
was
then
heard
before
the
High
Court
of
Kuala
Lumpur
in
a
series
of
dates
where
private
respondent
was
represented
by
counsel;
and
that
the
end
result
of
all
these
proceedings
is
the
judgment
sought
to
be
enforced.
In
addition
to
the
said
testimonial
evidence,
petitioner
also
offered
the
documentary
evidence
to
support
their
claim.
Having
thus
proven,
through
the
foregoing
evidence,
the
existence
and
authenticity
of
the
foreign
judgment,
said
foreign
judgment
enjoys
presumptive
validity
and
the
burden
then
fell
upon
the
party
who
disputes
its
validity,
herein
private
respondent,
to
prove
otherwise.
However,
private
respondent
failed
to
sufficiently
discharge
the
burden
that
fell
upon
it
to
prove
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
the
grounds
which
it
relied
upon
to
prevent
enforcement
of
the
Malaysian
High
Court
judgment.
FROM
ATTY.
DOBLADA^^
LEVITON
VS.
SALVADOR
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
LEVITON
INDUSTRIES,
NENA
DE
LA
CRUZ
LIM,
DOMINGO
GO,
and
LIM
KIAT
vs.
HON.
SERAFIN
SALVADOR,
Judge,
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Rizal,
Caloocan
City,
Branch
XIV
and
LEVITON
MANUFACTURING
CO.,
INC.
G.R.
No.
L-40163
June
19,
1982
Facts:
Private
respondent
Leviton
Manufacturing
Co.
Inc.
filed
a
complaint
for
unfair
competition
against
petitioners
Leviton
Industries
before
the
CFI
of
Rizal
(RTC),
presided
by
respondent
Judge
Serafin
Salvador.
The
complaint
substantially
alleges
that
plaintiff
(Leviton
Manufacturing)
is
a
foreign
corporation
organized
and
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
New
York,
United
States
of
America
with
office
located
at
236
Greenpoint
Avenue,
Brooklyn
City,
State
of
New
York,
U.S.A.
That
defendant
Leviton
Industries
is
a
partnership
organized
and
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippines
with
principal
office
at
382
10th
Avenue,
Grace
Park,
Caloocan
City;
while
defendants
Nena
de
la
Cruz
Lim,
Domingo
Go
and
Lim
Kiat
are
the
partners,
with
defendant
Domingo
Go
acting
as
General
Manager
of
defendant
Leviton
Industries.
That
plaintiff,
founded
in
1906
by
Isidor
Leviton,
is
the
largest
manufacturer
of
electrical
wiring
devices
in
the
United
States
under
the
trademark
Leviton,
which
various
electrical
wiring
devices
bearing
the
trademark
Leviton
and
trade
name
Leviton
Manufacturing
Co.,
Inc.
had
been
exported
to
the
Philippines
since
1954;
that
due
to
the
superior
quality
and
widespread
use
of
its
products
by
the
public,
the
same
are
well
known
to
Filipino
consumers
under
the
trade
name
Leviton
Manufacturing
Co.,
Inc.
and
trademark
Leviton;
that
long
subsequent
to
the
use
of
plaintiffs
trademark
and
trade
name
in
the
Philippines,
defendants
(Leviton
Industries)
began
manufacturing
and
selling
electrical
ballast,
fuse
and
oval
buzzer
under
the
trademark
Leviton
and
trade
name
Leviton
Industries
Co.
That
Domingo
Go,
partner
and
general
manager
of
defendant
partnership,
had
registered
with
the
Philippine
Patent
Office
the
trademarks
Leviton
Label
and
Leviton
with
respect
to
ballast
and
fuse
under
Certificate
of
Registration
Nos.
SR-1132
and
15517,
respectively,
which
registration
was
contrary
to
paragraphs
(d)
and
(e)
of
Section
4
of
RA
166,
as
amended,
and
violative
of
plaintiffs
right
over
the
trademark
Leviton;
that
defendants
not
only
used
the
trademark
Leviton
but
likewise
copied
the
design
used
by
plaintiff
in
distinguishing
its
trademark;
and
that
the
use
thereof
by
defendants
of
its
products
would
cause
confusion
in
the
minds
of
the
consumers
and
likely
to
deceive
them
as
to
the
source
of
origin,
thereby
enabling
defendants
to
pass
off
their
products
as
those
of
plaintiffs.
Invoking
the
provisions
of
Section
21-A
of
Republic
Act
No.
166,
plaintiff
prayed
for
damages.
It
also
sought
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
injunction
to
prohibit
defendants
from
using
the
trade
name
Leviton
Industries,
Co.
and
the
trademark
Leviton.
Defendants
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
for
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action,
drawing
attention
to
the
plaintiffs
failure
to
allege
therein
its
capacity
to
sue
under
Section
21-A
of
Republic
Act
No.
166,
as
amended.
After
the
filing
of
the
plaintiffs
opposition
and
the
defendants
reply,
the
respondent
judge
denied
the
motion
on
the
ground
that
the
same
did
not
appear
to
be
indubitable.
The
motion
for
reconsideration
having
likewise
been
denied,
defendants
instituted
the
instant
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition,
charging
respondent
judge
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
denying
their
motion
to
dismiss.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
plaintiff
(Leviton
Manufacturing)
herein
respondents,
failed
to
allege
the
essential
facts
bearing
its
capacity
to
sue
before
Philippine
courts.
Ruling:
Yes.
We
agree
with
petitioners
that
respondent
Leviton
Marketing
Co.,
Inc.
had
failed
to
allege
the
essential
facts
bearing
upon
its
capacity
to
sue
before
Philippine
courts.
Private
respondents
action
is
squarely
founded
on
Section
21-A
of
Republic
Act
No.
166,
as
amended,
which
we
quote:
Sec.
21-A.
Any
foreign
corporation
or
juristic
person
to
which
a
mark
or
tradename
has
been
registered
or
assigned
under
this
Act
may
bring
an
action
hereunder
for
infringement,
for
unfair
competition,
or
false
designation
of
origin
and
false
description,
whether
or
not
it
has
been
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines
under
Act
numbered
Fourteen
Hundred
and
Fifty-Nine,
as
amended,
otherwise
known
as
the
Corporation
Law,
at
the
time
it
brings
the
complaint;
Provided,
That
the
country
of
which
the
said
foreign
corporation
or
juristic
person
is
a
citizen,
or
in
which
it
is
domiciled,
by
treaty,
convention
or
law,
grants
a
similar
privilege
to
corporate
or
juristic
persons
of
the
Philippines.
(As
amended
by
R.A.
No.
638)
Undoubtedly,
the
foregoing
section
grants
to
a
foreign
corporation,
whether
or
not
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines,
the
right
to
seek
redress
for
unfair
competition
before
Philippine
courts.
But
the
said
law
is
not
without
qualifications.
Its
literal
tenor
indicates
as
a
condition
sine
qua
non
the
registration
of
the
trade
mark
of
the
suing
foreign
corporation
with
the
Philippine
Patent
Office
or,
in
the
least,
that
it
be
an
asignee
of
such
registered
trademark.
The
said
section
further
requires
that
the
country,
of
which
the
plaintiff
foreign
corporation
or
juristic
person
is
a
citizen
or
domicilliary,
grants
to
Filipino
corporations
or
juristic
entities
the
same
reciprocal
treatment,
either
thru
treaty,
convention
or
law,
All
that
is
alleged
in
private
respondents
complaint
is
that
it
is
a
foreign
corporation.
Such
bare
averment
not
only
fails
to
comply
with
the
requirements
imposed
by
the
aforesaid
Section
21-A
but
violates
as
well
the
directive
of
Section
4,
Rule
8
of
the
Rules
of
Court
that
facts
showing
the
capacity
of
a
party
to
sue
or
be
sued
or
the
authority
of
a
party
to
sue
or
be
sued
in
a
representative
capacity
or
the
legal
existence
of
an
organized
association
of
persons
that
is
made
a
party,
must
be
averred
In
the
case
at
bar,
private
respondent
has
chosen
to
anchor
its
action
under
the
Trademark
Law
of
the
Philippines,
a
law
which,
as
pointed
out,
explicitly
sets
down
the
conditions
precedent
for
the
successful
prosecution
thereof.
It
is
therefore
incumbent
upon
private
respondent
to
comply
with
these
requirements
or
aver
its
exemption
therefrom,
if
such
be
the
case.
It
may
be
that
private
respondent
has
the
right
to
sue
before
Philippine
courts,
but
our
rules
on
pleadings
require
that
the
necessary
qualifying
circumstances
which
clothe
it
with
such
right
be
affirmatively
pleaded.
And
the
reason
therefor,
as
enunciated
in
Atlantic
Mutual
Insurance
Co.,
et
al.
versus
Cebu
Stevedoring
Co.,
Inc.
4
is
that
these
are
matters
peculiarly
within
the
knowledge
of
appellants
alone,
and
it
would
be
unfair
to
impose
upon
appellees
the
burden
of
asserting
and
proving
the
contrary.
It
is
enough
that
foreign
corporations
are
allowed
by
law
to
seek
redress
in
our
courts
under
certain
conditions:
the
interpretation
of
the
law
should
not
go
so
far
as
to
include,
in
effect,
an
inference
that
those
conditions
had
been
met
from
the
mere
fact
that
the
party
sued
is
a
foreign
corporation.
It
was
indeed
in
the
light
of
this
and
other
considerations
that
this
Court
has
seen
fit
to
amend
the
former
rule
by
requiring
in
the
revised
rules
(Section
4,
Rule
8)
that
facts
showing
the
capacity
committed
shall
come
after
the
commission
thereof.
Had
this
offense
been
committed
upon
a
ship
carrying
a
Philippine
registry,
there
could
have
been
no
doubt
of
the
Jurisdiction
of
the
court,
because
it
is
expressly
conferred,
and
the
Act
is
in
accordance
with
well
recognized
and
established
public
law.
But
the
Standard
was
a
Norwegian
vessel,
and
it
is
conceded
that
it
was
not
registered
or
licensed
in
the
Philippine
Islands
under
the
laws
thereof.
We
have
then
the
question
whether
the
court
had
jurisdiction
over
an
offense
of
this
character,
committed
on
board
a
foreign
ship
by
the
master
thereof,
when
the
neglect
and
omission
which
constitutes
the
offense
continued
during
the
time
the
ship
was
within
the
territorial
waters
of
the
United
States.
No
court
of
the
Philippine
Islands
had
jurisdiction
over
an
offenses
or
crime
committed
on
the
high
seas
or
within
the
territorial
waters
of
any
other
country,
but
when
she
came
within
3
miles
of
a
line
drawn
from
the
headlines
which
embrace
the
entrance
to
Manila
Bay,
she
was
within
territorial
waters,
and
a
new
set
of
principles
became
applicable.
The
ship
and
her
crew
were
then
subject
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
territorial
sovereign
subject
through
the
proper
political
agency.
This
offense
was
committed
within
territorial
waters.
From
the
line
which
determines
these
waters
the
Standard
must
have
traveled
at
least
25
miles
before
she
came
to
anchor.
During
that
part
of
her
voyage
the
violation
of
the
statue
continued,
and
as
far
as
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
is
concerned,
it
is
immaterial
that
the
same
conditions
may
have
existed
while
the
vessel
was
on
the
high
seas.
The
offense,
assuming
that
it
originated
at
the
port
of
departure
in
Formosa,
was
a
continuing
one,
and
every
element
necessary
to
constitute
it
existed
during
the
voyage
across
the
territorial
waters.
The
completed
forbidden
act
was
done
within
American
waters,
and
the
court
therefore
had
jurisdiction
over
the
subject-matter
of
the
offense
and
the
person
of
the
offender.
The
offense
then
was
thus
committed
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
but
the
objection
to
the
jurisdiction
raises
the
further
question
whether
that
jurisdiction
is
restricted
by
the
fact
of
the
nationality
of
the
ship.
Every
state
has
complete
control
and
jurisdiction
over
its
territorial
waters.
According
to
strict
legal
right,
even
public
vessels
may
not
enter
the
ports
of
a
friendly
power
without
permission,
but
it
is
now
conceded
that
in
the
absence
of
a
prohibition
such
ports
are
considered
as
open
to
the
public
ship
of
all
friendly
powers.
The
exemption
of
such
vessels
from
local
jurisdiction
while
within
such
waters
was
not
established
until
within
comparatively
recent
times.
Such
vessels
are
therefore
permitted
during
times
of
peace
to
come
and
go
freely.
Local
official
exercise
but
little
control
over
their
actions,
and
offenses
committed
by
their
crew
are
justiciable
by
their
own
officers
acting
under
the
laws
to
which
they
primarily
owe
allegiance.
This
limitation
upon
the
general
principle
of
territorial
sovereignty
is
based
entirely
upon
comity
and
convenience,
and
finds
its
justification
in
the
fact
that
experience
shows
that
such
vessels
are
generally
careful
to
respect
local
laws
and
regulation
which
are
essential
to
the
health,
order,
and
well-being
of
the
port.
But
comity
and
convenience
does
not
require
the
extension
of
the
same
degree
of
exemption
to
merchant
vessels.
There
are
two
well-defined
theories
as
to
extent
of
the
immunities
ordinarily
granted
to
them,
According
to
the
French
theory
and
practice,
matters
happening
on
board
a
merchant
ship
which
do
not
concern
the
tranquillity
of
the
port
or
persons
foreign
to
the
crew,
are
justiciable
only
by
the
court
of
the
country
to
which
the
vessel
belongs.
The
French
courts
therefore
claim
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
crimes
committed
on
board
French
merchant
vessels
in
foreign
ports
by
one
member
of
the
crew
against
another.
Moreover,
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
has
recently
said
that
the
merchant
vessels
of
one
country
visiting
the
ports
of
another
for
the
purpose
of
trade,
subject
themselves
to
the
laws
which
govern
the
ports
they
visit,
so
long
as
they
remain;
and
this
as
well
in
war
as
in
peace,
unless
otherwise
provided
by
treaty.
(U.
S.
vs.
Diekelman,
92
U.
S.,
520-525.)
The
treaty
does
not
therefore
deprive
the
local
courts
of
jurisdiction
over
offenses
committed
on
board
a
merchant
vessel
by
one
member
of
the
crew
against
another
which
amount
to
a
disturbance
of
the
order
or
tranquility
of
the
country,
and
a
fair
and
reasonable
construction
of
the
language
requires
us
to
hold
that
any
violation
of
criminal
laws
disturbs
the
order
or
tranquility
of
the
country.
The
offense
with
which
the
appellant
is
charged
had
nothing
to
so
with
any
difference
between
the
captain
and
the
crew.
It
was
a
violation
by
the
master
of
the
criminal
law
of
the
country
into
whose
port
he
came.
We
thus
find
that
neither
by
reason
of
the
nationality
of
the
vessel,
the
place
of
the
commission
of
the
offense,
or
the
prohibitions
of
any
treaty
or
general
principle
of
public
law,
are
the
court
of
the
Philippine
Islands
deprived
of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged
in
the
information
in
this
case.
It
is
further
contended
that
the
complaint
is
defective
because
it
does
not
allege
that
the
animals
were
disembarked
at
the
port
of
Manila,
an
allegation
which
it
is
claimed
is
essential
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
sitting
at
that
port.
To
hold
with
the
appellant
upon
this
issue
would
be
to
construe
the
language
of
the
complaint
very
strictly
against
the
Government.
The
disembarkation
of
the
animals
is
not
necessary
in
order
to
constitute
the
completed
offense,
and
a
reasonable
construction
of
the
language
of
the
statute
confers
jurisdiction
upon
the
court
sitting
at
the
port
into
which
the
animals
are
bought.
They
are
then
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
and
the
mere
fact
of
their
disembarkation
is
immaterial
so
far
as
jurisdiction
is
concerned.
This
might
be
different
if
the
disembarkation
of
the
animals
constituted
a
constitutional
element
in
the
offense,
but
it
does
not.
The
evidence
shows
not
only
that
the
defendants
acts
were
knowingly
done,
but
his
defense
rests
upon
the
assertion
that
according
to
his
experience,
the
system
of
carrying
cattle
loose
upon
the
decks
and
in
the
hold
is
preferable
and
more
secure
to
the
life
and
comfort
of
the
animals.
It
was
conclusively
proven
that
what
was
done
was
done
knowingly
and
intentionally.
2.
Whether
a
certain
method
of
handling
cattle
is
suitable
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act
cannot
be
left
to
the
judgment
of
the
master
of
the
ship.
It
is
a
question
which
must
be
determined
by
the
court
from
the
evidence.
On
December
2,
1908,
the
defendant
Bull
brought
into
and
disembarked
in
the
port
and
city
of
Manila
certain
cattle,
which
came
from
the
port
of
Ampieng,
Formosa,
without
providing
suitable
means
for
securing
said
animals
while
in
transit,
so
as
to
avoid
cruelty
and
unnecessary
suffering
to
said
animals,
contrary
to
the
provisions
of
section
1
of
Act
No.
55,
as
amended
by
section
1
of
Act
No.
275.
The
trial
court
found
the
abovementioned
facts
true
and
all
of
which
are
fully
sustained
by
the
evidence.
The
defendant
was
found
guilty,
and
sentenced
to
pay
a
fine
of
two
hundred
and
fifty
pesos,
with
subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency,
and
to
pay
the
costs.
The
sentence
and
judgment
is
affirmed.
So
ordered.
Notes:
Section
1
of
Act
No.
55,
which
went
into
effect
January
1,
1901,
provides
that
The
owners
or
masters
of
steam,
sailing,
or
other
vessels,
carrying
or
transporting
cattle,
sheep,
swine,
or
other
animals,
from
one
port
in
the
Philippine
Islands
to
another,
or
from
any
foreign
port
to
any
port
within
the
Philippine
Islands,
shall
carry
with
them,
upon
the
vessels
carrying
such
animals,
sufficient
forage
and
fresh
water
to
provide
for
the
suitable
sustenance
of
such
animals
during
the
ordinary
period
occupied
by
the
vessel
in
passage
from
the
port
of
shipment
to
the
port
of
debarkation,
and
shall
cause
such
animals
to
be
provided
with
adequate
forage
and
fresh
water
at
least
once
in
every
twenty-four
hours
from
the
time
that
the
animals
are
embarked
to
the
time
of
their
final
debarkation.
By
Act
No.
275,
enacted
October
23,
1901,
Act
No.
55
was
amended
by
adding
to
section
1
thereof
the
following:
The
owners
or
masters
of
steam,
sailing,
or
other
vessels,
carrying
or
transporting
cattle,
sheep,
swine,
or
other
animals
from
one
port
in
the
Philippine
Islands
to
another,
or
from
any
foreign
port
to
any
port
within
the
Philippine
Islands,
shall
provide
suitable
means
for
securing
such
animals
while
in
transit
so
as
to
avoid
all
cruelty
and
unnecessary
suffering
to
the
animals,
and
suitable
and
proper
facilities
for
loading
and
unloading
cattle
or
other
animals
upon
or
from
vessels
upon
which
they
are
transported,
without
cruelty
or
unnecessary
suffering.
It
is
hereby
made
unlawful
to
load
or
unload
cattle
upon
or
from
vessels
by
swinging
them
over
the
side
by
means
of
ropes
or
chains
attached
to
the
thorns.
Section
3
of
Act
No.
55
provides
that
Any
owner
or
master
of
a
vessel,
or
custodian
of
such
animals,
who
knowingly
and
willfully
fails
to
comply
with
the
provisions
of
section
one,
shall,
for
every
such
failure,
be
liable
to
pay
a
penalty
of
not
less
that
one
hundred
dollars
nor
more
that
five
hundred
dollars,
United
States
money,
for
each
offense.
Prosecution
under
this
Act
may
be
instituted
in
any
Court
of
First
Instance
or
any
provost
court
organized
in
the
province
or
port
in
which
such
animals
are
disembarked.
FROM
ATTY.
DOBLADA^^
SPOUSES
ZALAMEA
VS.
CA
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
SPOUSES
ZALAMEA
and
LIANA
ZALAMEA
vs.
CA
and
TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES,
INC.
G.R.
No.
104235
November
18,
1993
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses
Cesar
Zalamea
and
Suthira
Zalamea,
and
their
daughter,
Liana
purchased
3
airline
tickets
from
the
Manila
agent
of
respondent
TransWorld
Airlines,
Inc.
for
a
flight
to
New
York
to
Los
Angeles.
The
tickets
of
petitioners-spouses
were
purchased
at
a
discount
of
75%
while
that
of
their
daughter
was
a
full
fare
ticket.
All
three
tickets
represented
confirmed
reservations.
On
the
appointed
date,
however,
petitioners
checked
in
but
were
placed
on
the
wait-list
because
the
number
of
passengers
who
had
checked
in
before
them
had
already
taken
all
the
seats
available
on
the
flight.
Out
of
the
42
names
on
the
wait
list,
the
first
22
names
were
eventually
allowed
to
board
the
flight
to
Los
Angeles,
including
petitioner
Cesar
Zalamea.
The
two
others
were
not
able
to
fly.
Those
holding
full-fare
tickets
were
given
first
priority
among
the
wait-listed
passengers.
Mr.
Zalamea,
who
was
holding
the
full-fare
ticket
of
his
daughter,
was
allowed
to
board
the
plane;
while
his
wife
and
daughter,
who
presented
the
discounted
tickets
were
denied
boarding.
Even
in
the
next
TWA
flight
to
Los
Angeles
Mrs.
Zalamea
and
her
daughter,
could
not
be
accommodated
because
it
was
also
fully
booked.
Thus,
they
were
constrained
to
book
in
another
flight
and
purchased
two
tickets
from
American
Airlines.
Upon
their
arrival
in
the
Philippines,
petitioners
filed
an
action
for
damages
based
on
breach
of
contract
of
air
carriage
before
the
RTC-
Makati.
The
lower
court
ruled
in
favor
of
petitioners
.
CA
held
that
moral
damages
are
recoverable
in
a
damage
suit
predicated
upon
a
breach
of
contract
of
carriage
only
where
there
is
fraud
or
bad
faith.
Since
it
is
a
matter
of
record
that
overbooking
of
flights
is
a
common
and
accepted
practice
of
airlines
in
the
United
States
and
is
specifically
allowed
under
the
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
by
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Board,
no
fraud
nor
bad
faith
could
be
imputed
on
respondent
TransWorld
Airlines.
Thus
petitioners
raised
the
case
on
petition
for
review
on
certiorari.
ISSUE;
WON
TWZ
acted
with
bad
faith
and
would
entitle
Zalameas
to
Moral
and
Examplary
damages.
RULING:
The
U.S.
law
or
regulation
allegedly
authorizing
overbooking
has
never
been
proved.
Foreign
laws
do
not
prove
themselves
nor
can
the
courts
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
Like
any
other
fact,
they
must
be
alleged
and
proved.
Written
law
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
has
custody.
The
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
an
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice-consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
Respondent
TWA
relied
solely
on
the
statement
of
Ms.
Gwendolyn
Lather,
its
customer
service
agent,
in
her
deposition
that
the
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
of
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Board
allows
overbooking.
No
official
publication
of
said
code
was
presented
as
evidence.
Thus,
respondent
courts
finding
that
overbooking
is
specifically
allowed
by
the
US
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
has
no
basis
in
fact.
Even
if
the
claimed
U.S.
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
does
exist,
the
same
is
not
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
in
accordance
with
the
principle
of
lex
loci
contractus
which
require
that
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
airline
ticket
was
issued
should
be
applied
by
the
court
where
the
passengers
are
residents
and
nationals
of
the
forum
and
the
ticket
is
issued
in
such
State
by
the
defendant
airline.
Since
the
tickets
were
sold
and
issued
in
the
Philippines,
the
applicable
law
in
this
case
would
be
Philippine
law.
Existing
jurisprudence
explicitly
states
that
overbooking
amounts
to
bad
faith,
entitling
the
passengers
concerned
to
an
award
of
moral
damages.
In
Alitalia
Airways
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
where
passengers
with
confirmed
bookings
were
refused
carriage
on
the
last
minute,
this
Court
held
that
when
an
airline
issues
a
ticket
to
a
passenger
confirmed
on
a
particular
flight,
on
a
certain
date,
a
contract
of
carriage
arises,
and
the
passenger
has
every
right
to
expect
that
he
would
fly
on
that
flight
and
on
that
date.
If
he
does
not,
then
the
carrier
opens
itself
to
a
suit
for
breach
of
contract
of
carriage.
Where
an
airline
had
deliberately
overbooked,
it
took
the
risk
of
having
to
deprive
some
passengers
of
their
seats
in
case
all
of
them
would
show
up
for
the
check
in.
For
the
indignity
and
inconvenience
of
being
refused
a
confirmed
seat
on
the
last
minute,
said
passenger
is
entitled
to
an
award
of
moral
damages.
For
a
contract
of
carriage
generates
a
relation
attended
with
public
duty
a
duty
to
provide
public
service
and
convenience
to
its
passengers
which
must
be
paramount
to
self-interest
or
enrichment.
Respondent
TWA
is
still
guilty
of
bad
faith
in
not
informing
its
passengers
beforehand
that
it
could
breach
the
contract
of
carriage
even
if
they
have
confirmed
tickets
if
there
was
overbooking.
Respondent
TWA
should
have
incorporated
stipulations
on
overbooking
on
the
tickets
issued
or
to
properly
inform
its
passengers
about
these
policies
so
that
the
latter
would
be
prepared
for
such
eventuality
or
would
have
the
choice
to
ride
with
another
airline.
Respondent
TWA
was
also
guilty
of
not
informing
its
passengers
of
its
alleged
policy
of
giving
less
priority
to
discounted
tickets.
Neither
did
it
present
any
argument
of
substance
to
show
that
petitioners
were
duly
apprised
of
the
overbooked
condition
of
the
flight
or
that
there
is
a
hierarchy
of
boarding
priorities
in
booking
passengers.
It
is
evident
that
petitioners
had
the
right
to
rely
upon
the
assurance
of
respondent
TWA,
thru
its
agent
in
Manila,
then
in
New
York,
that
their
tickets
represented
confirmed
seats
without
any
qualification.
The
failure
of
respondent
TWA
to
so
inform
them
when
it
could
easily
have
done
so
thereby
enabling
respondent
to
hold
on
to
them
as
passengers
up
to
the
last
minute
amounts
to
bad
faith.
Evidently,
respondent
TWA
placed
its
self-interest
over
the
rights
of
petitioners
under
their
contracts
of
carriage.
Such
conscious
disregard
of
petitioners
rights
makes
respondent
TWA
liable
for
moral
damages.
To
deter
breach
of
contracts
by
respondent
TWA
in
similar
fashion
in
the
future,
we
adjudge
respondent
TWA
liable
for
exemplary
damages,
as
well.
In
the
case
of
Alitalia
Airways
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
this
Court
explicitly
held
that
a
passenger
is
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
for
the
cost
of
the
tickets
he
had
to
buy
for
a
flight
to
another
airline.
Thus,
instead
of
simply
being
refunded
for
the
cost
of
the
unused
TWA
tickets,
petitioners
should
be
awarded
the
actual
cost
of
their
flight
from
New
York
to
Los
Angeles.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
GRANTED
and
the
decision
of
the
respondent
Court
of
Appeals
is
hereby
MODIFIED
FROM
ATTY.
DAAN^^
RAMIREZ
MARCAIDA
VS.
AGLUBAT
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
JOSEFINA
JUANA
DE
DIOS
RAMIREZ
MARCAIDA
vs.
LEONCIO
V.
AGLUBAT,
in
his
capacity
as
Deputy
Local
Civil
Registrar
of
Manila,
respondent-appellee.
G.R.
No.
L-24006,
November
25,
1967
FACTS:
Prior
to
October
21,
1958,
proceedings
for
adoption
were
started
before
the
CFI-
Madrid,
Spain
by
Maria
Garnier
Garreau,
then
84
years
of
age,
adopting
Josefina
Juana
de
Dios
Ramirez
Marcaida,
55
years,
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines.
Both
were
residents
of
Madrid,
Spain.
The
court
granted
the
application
for
adoption
and
gave
the
necessary
judicial
authority,
once
the
judgment
becomes
final,
to
execute
the
corresponding
adoption
document.
On
November
29,
1958,
the
notarial
document
of
adoption
which
embodies
the
court
order
of
adoption
whereunder
Maria
Garnier
Garreau
formally
adopted
petitioner,
was
executed
before
Notary
Public
Braulio
Velasco
Carrasquedo
of
Madrid.
In
that
document,
Maria
Gernier
Garreau
instituted
petitioner,
amongst
other
conditions
as
here
unica
y
universal
heredera
de
todos
sus
bienes,
derechos
y
acciones,
presentes
y
futuros.
In
conformity
with
our
law,
this
escritura
de
adopcion
(deed
of
adoption)
was,
on
December
10,
1953,
authenticated
by
Emilio
S.
Martinez,
Philippine
Vice
Consul,
Philippine
Embassy,
Madrid,
who
issued
the
corresponding
certificate
of
authentication.
The
document
of
adoption
was
filed
in
the
Office
of
the
Local
Civil
Registrar
of
Manila.
The
Registrar
refused
to
register
it
on
the
ground
that
under
Philippine
law,
adoption
can
only
be
had
through
judicial
proceeding.
And
since
the
notarial
document
of
adoption
is
not
a
judicial
proceeding,
it
is
not
entitled
to
registration.
Petitioner
went
to
CFI-
Manila
on
mandamus.
The
lower
court
dismissed
said
petition
and
decided
that
what
is
registrable
is
only
adoption
obtained
through
a
judgment
rendered
by
a
Philippine
court.
Solicitor
General
argues
that
petitioners
case
does
not
come
within
the
purview
of
Article
409
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
states
that:
In
cases
of
legal
separation,
adoption,
naturalization
and
other
judicial
orders
mentioned
in
the
preceding
article
it
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
clerk
of
the
court
which
issued
the
decree
to
ascertain
whether
the
same
has
been
registered,
and
if
this
has
not
been
done,
to
send
a
copy
of
said
decree
to
the
civil
registry
of
the
city
or
municipality
where
the
court
is
functioning,
and
Section
11
of
Act
3753,
which
reads:
Duties
of
clerks
of
court
to
register
certain
decisions.
In
cases
of
legitimation,
acknowledgment,
adoption,
naturalization,
and
change
of
given
or
family
name,
or
both,
upon
the
decree
of
the
court
becoming
final,
it
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
clerk
of
the
court
which
issued
the
decree
to
ascertain
whether
the
same
has
been
registered,
and
if
this
has
not
been
done,
to
have
said
decree
recorded
in
the
office
of
the
civil
registrar
of
the
municipality
where
the
court
is
functioning.:
ISSUE:
WON
the
order
of
adoption
issued
by
the
CFI-
Madrid
can
be
registered
in
the
Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
The
cited
provisions
refer
to
adoptions
effected
in
the
Philippines.Article
409
of
the
Civil
Code
and
Section
10
of
the
Registry
Law
speak
of
adoption
which
shall
be
registered
in
the
municipality
or
city
where
the
court
issuing
the
adoption
decree
is
functioning.
We
perceive
that
Article
409
and
Section
10
aforesaid
were
incorporated
into
the
statute
books
merely
to
give
effect
to
our
law
which
required
judicial
proceedings
for
adoption.
Limitation
of
registration
of
adoptions
to
those
granted
by
Philippine
courts
is
a
misconception
which
a
broader
view
allows
us
now
to
correct.
For,
if
registration
is
to
be
narrowed
down
to
local
adoptions,
it
is
the
function
of
Congress,
not
of
this
Court,
to
spell
out
such
limitation.
We
cannot
carve
out
a
prohibition
where
the
law
does
not
so
state.
Excessive
rigidity
serves
no
purpose.
And,
by
Articles
407
and
408
of
our
Civil
Code,
the
disputed
document
of
adoption
is
registrable.
No
suggestion
there
is
in
the
record
that
prejudice
to
State
and
adoptee,
or
any
other
person
for
that
matter,
would
ensue
from
the
adoption
here
involved.
The
validity
thereof
is
not
under
attack.
At
any
rate,
whatever
may
be
the
effect
of
adoption,
the
rights
of
the
State
and
adoptee
and
other
persons
interested
are
fully
safeguarded
by
Article
15
of
our
Civil
Code
which,
in
terms
explicit,
provides
that:
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines
even
though
living
abroad.
Private
international
law
offers
no
obstacle
to
recognition
of
foreign
adoption.
This
rests
on
the
principle
that
the
status
of
adoption,
created
by
the
law
of
a
State
having
jurisdiction
to
create
it,
will
be
given
the
same
effect
in
another
state
as
is
given
by
the
latter
state
to
the
status
of
adoption
when
created
by
its
own
law.
It
is
quite
obvious
then
that
the
status
of
adoption,
once
created
under
the
proper
foreign
law,
will
be
recognized
in
this
country,
except
where
public
policy
or
the
interests
of
its
inhabitants
forbid
its
enforcement
and
demand
the
substitution
of
the
lex
fori.
Indeed,
implicit
in
Article
15
of
our
Civil
Code
just
quoted,
is
that
the
exercise
of
incidents
to
foreign
adoption
remains
subject
to
local
law.
We
hold
that
an
adoption
created
under
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
is
entitled
to
registration
in
the
corresponding
civil
register
of
the
Philippines.
It
is
to
be
understood,
however,
that
the
effects
of
such
adoption
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
this
country.
The
lower
courts
decision
is
hereby
reversed;
and
the
Local
Civil
Registrar
of
Manila
is
hereby
directed
to
register
the
deed
of
adoption
(Escritura
de
Adopcion)
by
Maria
Garnier
Garreau
in
favor
of
petitioner
Josefina
de
Dios
Ramirez
Marcaida.
FROM
ATTY.
DAAN^^
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
VS.
WONG
CHENG
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
vs.WONG
CHENG
(alias
WONG
CHUN)
G.R.
No.
L-18924,
October
19,
1922
FACTS:
Appellee
is
accused
of
having
illegally
smoked
opium,
aboard
the
merchant
vessel
Changsa
of
English
nationality
while
said
vessel
was
anchored
in
Manila
Bay
two
and
a
half
miles
from
the
shores
of
the
city.
The
demurrer
filed
by
said
appellee
alleged
lack
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
the
lower
court,
which
so
held
and
dismissed
the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
courts
of
the
Philippines
have
jurisdiction
over
crime,
like
the
one
herein
involved,
committed
aboard
merchant
vessels
anchored
in
our
jurisdiction
waters.
HELD:
There
are
two
fundamental
rules
on
this
particular
matter
in
connection
with
International
Law;
to
wit,
the
French
rule,
according
to
which
crimes
committed
aboard
a
foreign
merchant
vessels
should
not
be
prosecuted
in
the
courts
of
the
country
within
whose
territorial
jurisdiction
they
were
committed,
unless
their
commission
affects
the
peace
and
security
of
the
territory;
and
the
English
rule,
based
on
the
territorial
principle
and
followed
in
the
United
States,
according
to
which,
crimes
perpetrated
under
such
circumstances
are
in
general
triable
in
the
courts
of
the
country
within
territory
they
were
committed.
Of
this
two
rules,
it
is
the
last
one
that
obtains
in
this
jurisdiction,
because
at
present
the
theories
and
jurisprudence
prevailing
in
the
United
States
on
this
matter
are
authority
in
the
Philippines
which
is
now
a
territory
of
the
United
States
(we
were
still
a
US
territory
when
this
was
decided
in
1922).
We
have
seen
that
the
mere
possession
of
opium
aboard
a
foreign
vessel
in
transit
was
held
by
this
court
not
triable
by
or
courts,
because
it
being
the
primary
object
of
our
Opium
Law
to
protect
the
inhabitants
of
the
Philippines
against
the
disastrous
effects
entailed
by
the
use
of
this
drug,
its
mere
possession
in
such
a
ship,
without
being
used
in
our
territory,
does
not
being
about
in
the
said
territory
those
effects
that
our
statute
contemplates
avoiding.
Hence
such
a
mere
possession
is
not
considered
a
disturbance
of
the
public
order.
But
to
smoke
opium
within
our
territorial
limits,
even
though
aboard
a
foreign
merchant
ship,
is
certainly
a
breach
of
the
public
order
here
established,
because
it
causes
such
drug
to
produce
its
pernicious
effects
within
our
territory.
It
seriously
contravenes
the
purpose
that
our
Legislature
has
in
mind
in
enacting
the
aforesaid
repressive
statute.
Remanded
to
the
lower
court
for
further
proceedings
in
accordance
with
law.
FROM
ATTY.
RENES^^
HOLY
SEE
VS.
ROSARIO
MARCH
28,
2013
~
VBDIAZ
.entry-meta
.entry-header
THE
HOLY
SEE
vs.
THE
HON.
ERIBERTO
U.
ROSARIO,
JR.,
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Makati,
Branch
61
and
STARBRIGHT
SALES
ENTERPRISES,
INC.
G.R.
No.
101949
December
1,
1994
FACTS:
Petitioner
is
the
Holy
See
who
exercises
sovereignty
over
the
Vatican
City
in
Rome,
Italy,
and
is
represented
in
the
Philippines
by
the
Papal
Nuncio;
Private
respondent,
Starbright
Sales
Enterprises,
Inc.,
is
a
domestic
corporation
engaged
in
the
real
estate
business.
This
petition
arose
from
a
controversy
over
a
parcel
of
land
consisting
of
6,000
square
meters
located
in
the
Municipality
of
Paranaque
registered
in
the
name
of
petitioner.
Said
lot
was
contiguous
with
two
other
lots
registered
in
the
name
of
the
Philippine
Realty
Corporation
(PRC).
The
three
lots
were
sold
to
Ramon
Licup,
through
Msgr.
Domingo
A.
Cirilos,
Jr.,
acting
as
agent
to
the
sellers.
Later,
Licup
assigned
his
rights
to
the
sale
to
private
respondent.
In
view
of
the
refusal
of
the
squatters
to
vacate
the
lots
sold
to
private
respondent,
a
dispute
arose
as
to
who
of
the
parties
has
the
responsibility
of
evicting
and
clearing
the
land
of
squatters.
Complicating
the
relations
of
the
parties
was
the
sale
by
petitioner
of
Lot
5-A
to
Tropicana
Properties
and
Development
Corporation
(Tropicana).
private
respondent
filed
a
complaint
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
61,
Makati,
Metro
Manila
for
annulment
of
the
sale
of
the
three
parcels
of
land,
and
specific
performance
and
damages
against
petitioner,
represented
by
the
Papal
Nuncio,
and
three
other
defendants:
namely,
Msgr.
Domingo
A.
Cirilos,
Jr.,
the
PRC
and
Tropicana
petitioner
and
Msgr.
Cirilos
separately
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
petitioner
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
based
on
sovereign
immunity
from
suit,
and
Msgr.
Cirilos
for
being
an
improper
party.
An
opposition
to
the
motion
was
filed
by
private
respondent.
the
trial
court
issued
an
order
denying,
among
others,
petitioners
motion
to
dismiss
after
finding
that
petitioner
shed
off
[its]
sovereign
immunity
by
entering
into
the
business
contract
in
question
Petitioner
forthwith
elevated
the
matter
to
us.
In
its
petition,
petitioner
invokes
the
privilege
of
sovereign
immunity
only
on
its
own
behalf
and
on
behalf
of
its
official
representative,
the
Papal
Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
Holy
See
is
immune
from
suit
insofar
as
its
business
relations
regarding
selling
a
lot
to
a
private
entity
RULING:
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
has
accorded
the
Holy
See
the
status
of
a
foreign
sovereign.
The
Holy
See,
through
its
Ambassador,
the
Papal
Nuncio,
has
had
diplomatic
representations
with
the
Philippine
government
since
1957
(Rollo,
p.
87).
This
appears
to
be
the
universal
practice
in
international
relations.
There
are
two
conflicting
concepts
of
sovereign
immunity,
each
widely
held
and
firmly
established.
According
to
the
classical
or
absolute
theory,
a
sovereign
cannot,
without
its
consent,
be
made
a
respondent
in
the
courts
of
another
sovereign.
According
to
the
newer
or
restrictive
theory,
the
immunity
of
the
sovereign
is
recognized
only
with
regard
to
public
acts
or
acts
jure
imperii
of
a
state,
but
not
with
regard
to
private
acts
or
acts
jure
gestionis
If
the
act
is
in
pursuit
of
a
sovereign
activity,
or
an
incident
thereof,
then
it
is
an
act
jure
imperii,
especially
when
it
is
not
undertaken
for
gain
or
profit.
In
the
case
at
bench,
if
petitioner
has
bought
and
sold
lands
in
the
ordinary
course
of
a
real
estate
business,
surely
the
said
transaction
can
be
categorized
as
an
act
jure
gestionis.
However,
petitioner
has
denied
that
the
acquisition
and
subsequent
disposal
of
Lot
5-A
were
made
for
profit
but
claimed
that
it
acquired
said
property
for
the
site
of
its
mission
or
the
Apostolic
Nunciature
in
the
Philippines.
Private
respondent
failed
to
dispute
said
claim.
Lot
5-A
was
acquired
by
petitioner
as
a
donation
from
the
Archdiocese
of
Manila.
The
donation
was
made
not
for
commercial
purpose,
but
for
the
use
of
petitioner
to
construct
thereon
the
official
place
of
residence
of
the
Papal
Nuncio.
The
right
of
a
foreign
sovereign
to
acquire
property,
real
or
personal,
in
a
receiving
state,
necessary
for
the
creation
and
maintenance
of
its
diplomatic
mission,
is
recognized
in
the
1961
Vienna
Convention
on
Diplomatic
Relations
(Arts.
20-22).
This
treaty
was
concurred
in
by
the
Philippine
Senate
and
entered
into
force
in
the
Philippines
on
November
15,
1965.
The
decision
to
transfer
the
property
and
the
subsequent
disposal
thereof
are
likewise
clothed
with
a
governmental
character.
Petitioner
did
not
sell
Lot
5-A
for
profit
or
gain.
It
merely
wanted
to
dispose
off
the
same
because
the
squatters
living
thereon
made
it
almost
impossible
for
petitioner
to
use
it
for
the
purpose
of
the
donation.
The
fact
that
squatters
have
occupied
and
are
still
occupying
the
lot,
and
that
they
stubbornly
refuse
to
leave
the
premises,
has
been
admitted
by
private
respondent
in
its
complaint
Private
respondent
is
not
left
without
any
legal
remedy
for
the
redress
of
its
grievances.
Under
both
Public
International
Law
and
Transnational
Law,
a
person
who
feels
aggrieved
by
the
acts
of
a
foreign
sovereign
can
ask
his
own
government
to
espouse
his
cause
through
diplomatic
channels.
Private
respondent
can
ask
the
Philippine
government,
through
the
Foreign
Office,
to
espouse
its
claims
against
the
Holy
See.
Its
first
task
is
to
persuade
the
Philippine
government
to
take
up
with
the
Holy
See
the
validity
of
its
claims.
Of
course,
the
Foreign
Office
shall
first
make
a
determination
of
the
impact
of
its
espousal
on
the
relations
between
the
Philippine
government
and
the
Holy
See
(Young,
Remedies
of
Private
Claimants
Against
Foreign
States,
Selected
Readings
on
Protection
by
Law
of
Private
Foreign
Investments
905,
919
[1964]).
Once
the
Philippine
government
decides
to
espouse
the
claim,
the
latter
ceases
to
be
a
private
cause.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
for
certiorari
is
GRANTED
and
the
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
90-183
against
petitioner
is
DISMISSED.
FROM
ATTY.
BAYANI^^