Gulay Turkmen and Gorski

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Religion, Nationalism, and

Violence: An Integrated
Approach
Philip S. Gorski and Gulay

Turkmen-Dervis
oglu
Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520;

email: philip.gorski@yale.edu, gulay.turkmen@yale.edu
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013. 39:193210
Keywords
First published online as a Review in Advance on

May 24, 2013
religious violence, ethnic conict, terrorism, eld theory, rational

choice theory
The Annual Review of Sociology is online at

http://soc.annualreviews.org
This articles doi:
10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145641
c 2013 by Annual Reviews.
Copyright
All rights reserved
Abstract
Scholarly work on the nexus of religion, nationalism, and violence is
currently fragmented along disciplinary and theoretical lines. In sociology, history, and anthropology, a macro-culturalist approach reigns;
in political science, economics, and international relations, a microrationalist approach is dominant. Recent attempts at a synthesis ignore
religion or fold it into ethnicity. A coherent synthesis capable of adequately accounting for religious-nationalist violence must not only
integrate micro and macro, cultural and strategic approaches; it must
also include a meso level of elite conict and boundary maintenance
and treat the religious eld as potentially autonomous from the cultural
eld.
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INTRODUCTION

Adequately understanding religious-nationalist

violence is a pressing concern for social scientists and policy makers. Over the past two
decades, there has been a dramatic upsurge
in ethnic, nationalist, and religious civil wars.1
Moreover, from 1980 onward, religious nationalist ethnic groups were responsible for increasingly more violent conicts in comparison
to nonreligious nationalist groups (Fox 2004,
p. 715).
However, the relevant literatures remain
highly fragmented and theoretically one-sided.
For example, there is a small but rapidly
expanding literature on religious nationalism.
But, to the degree that it has concerned itself
with violence at all, it has typically tried to
account for religious-nationalist violence in
purely macro-cultural terms. And the correlation between violent rhetoric and violent
action is often tenuous. Although the macroculturalist approach dominates in sociology
and anthropology, a micro-rationalist approach
reigns in political science and economics. It
explains ethno-religious violence in terms
of greed, grievance, and guns. However, it
has difculty accounting for ethno-religious
cleavages and the symbolic dimension of
violence. Moreover, neither approach pays adequate attention to the meso level of intraelite
conicts and communal boundary work.
What is needed, then, we contend, is a
coherent synthesis of the macro-culturalist
and micro-rationalist approaches that also lls
in the meso level. Although there have been
several promising efforts in this direction, they
have not given the religious eld its proper
due. They have either ignored it or folded it
into the cultural eld, typically by subsuming
religion into ethnicity. In other words, they
1
Of the 225 armed conicts that occurred between 1946 and
2001, 115 took place in the 12-year period between 1989 and
2001 (Gleditsch et al. 2002), with the absolute number of
conicts peaking in the early 1990s, following the end of the
Cold War (Blattman & Miguel 2010). Post hoc ergo propter
hoc? That remains a matter of debate (Fearon & Laitin 2003,
Kalyvas & Balcells 2010).
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have tended to treat the relationship between

religion, culture, and ethnicity as a given rather
than as a variable.
The rest of the review is structured as follows. The rst section constructs the object of
analysis by reviewing recent work on religious
nationalisms. The second and third sections
compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of various culturalist and rationalist approaches to religion, nationalism, and violence.
And the fourth section examines two important
efforts at synthesis and identies key shortcomings. We conclude the review by drawing
attention to the need to focus on ethnoreligious conicts and to bring religion back
into the theories of ethno-nationalist conict.
RELIGION AND NATIONALISM:

CULTURALIST APPROACHES
For the purposes of this review, we dene religious nationalism as a social movement that
claims to speak in the name of the nation and
that denes the nation in terms of religion. It
occurs when people assert that their nation is
religiously based (Rieffer 2003) and when religion is central. . .to conceptions of what it
means to belong to the given nation (Barker
2009, p. 13).
Until fairly recently, religious nationalism
seemed a contradiction in terms. Most social
scientists and historians saw the emergence
of nationalism as part of modernization and
thus of secularization (Anderson 1991, Gellner
1983, Greenfeld 1996). Nationalism could
replace religion: It could be a political religion
(Smith 2000), a surrogate religion (SetonWatson 1977), or simply a religion (Hayes
1960). But it could not coexist with religion,
any more than tradition could be combined
with modernity.
This changed in the early 1990s, owing to
the worldwide revival of religious movements
and the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and Russia. A small trickle of work
on religious nationalism (Asad 1999, Tambiah
1992, Van der Veer 1994, Van der Veer &
Lehmann 1999) was followed by a veritable

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ood during the past decade, not just in

sociology but also in neighboring elds such
as anthropology, history, political science,
and international relations (Eastwood 2010,
Friedland 2011, Juergensmeyer 2006).
Although these scholars agree that there
is a distinct form of religious nationalism,
they disagree about the timing and causes of
its emergence. Some portray it as a recent
phenomenon, variously tracing it to the failure
of secularism ( Juergensmeyer 1993), reactions
against colonialism ( Jaffrelot 2007), the disappointment of the masses in Western-style
secular democracies (Lee 1990), or the search
for ontological security in an unstable world
(Giddens 1991, Kinnvall 2004). Others suggest
that religion has had an uninterrupted inuence
on nation-states since their formation (Grosby
1991, Roshwald 2006). Most of this work
focuses on the Judeo-Christian discourse of
chosen peoples and elect nations as a cultural
template for Western nationalism (Gorski
2000, Grosby 2002, OBrien 1994, Smith
2003). Some scholars view the Protestant
Reformation as a crucial turning point, with
the breakup of Latin Christendom, the wars of
religion, and the creation of state churches setting the stage for the development of national
identities (Kohn 1944, Marx 2003). Other
scholars locate the origins of a Protestant-based
national identity in Britain somewhat later, in
the Anglo-French rivalries of the eighteenth
century (Colley 1992, Hutchison & Lehmann
1994, Newman 1987, Straughn & Feld 2010).
But some scholars trace the origins of nationalism back to antiquity. Grosby (1991), for
example, considers Ancient Israel an instance
of modern nationalism and not just a template
for it (see also Gat & Yakobson 2013).
Although in the New Testament Christianity turns away from this conception of any
earthly promised land (OBrien 1988, p. 3), it
too provided a narrative template for national
identity. Recent work on Eastern European
religious nationalisms suggests that motifs of
martyrdom and messianism may have been
more important than notions of chosen-ness
and election in this context ( Jakelic 2004,
Merdjanova 2000). Modern Polish nationalism, for example, has portrayed Poland as
the Christ of nations, whose death in the
partitions atoned for other nations sins, and
whose resurrection after communism paved
the way for other national rebirths (Zubrzycki
2006). Orthodox nationalist movements,
especially in Russia, have made extensive use of
the kindred discourse of translatio imperii that
presents Moscow as a Third Rome whose
mission is to redeem not only the Slavs but
all humanity (McLeod 2006). Contemporary
Serbian nationalists have painted themselves
as the crucied nation defeated by Turks at
the Battle of Kosovo back in 1389 (Ivekovic
2002) and through this suffering as having
saved the remaining Slavs (Perica 2002, Sells
2006). Similarly, in Spain, Basque and Catalan
nationalisms derive heavily from religious
symbols like Marian cults (Zuleika 1988) and
martyrdom (Dowling 2012, Dunstan 2008).
Religion has also played a considerable, and
perhaps even greater, role in the formation of
non-Western nationalist movements ( Jaffrelot
2007, Little & Swearer 2006, Von der Mehden
1968). Friedland (2001, p. 129) contends that
the national identities of Iran, Sri Lanka, India,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Palestine are
all suffused with religious narrative and myth,
symbolism and ritual. Van der Veer (1994) argues that nation-building in India has been dependent on religious antagonism between Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists since its beginnings
in the nineteenth century. Unlike the Christian
New Testament, the Torah and the Quran are
not only about the individuals relationship to
God but also about a politically organized community of believers. Thus, the religious roots
of some non-Western nationalisms go even
deeper than their Western counterparts.
Nonetheless, work on non-Western nationalisms is often inected by the secularization narrative in two more subtle ways, as
Willfried Spohn (2003) has recently shown.
Some scholars portray the Western nationstate model as a conveyor belt for Western
secular values that would help tame religious
conict (Breuilly 1993, Hefner 1998, Tibi
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1990). The diffusion of nationalism sparked

erce religious-national struggles throughout
the globe involving Islamists, Hindu nationalists, Latin American Pentecostals, and Messianic Jewish nationalistsin their respective
locations (Shenhav 2007, p. 7). In trying to explain this peculiar persistence, a second group
of Western scholars puts the blame on globalization. In this approach, religious nationalism is styled as a defensive reaction against the
globalizing forces of the secular-cultural world
system (Arnason 1987, Meyer 1999).
Another interpretation of religious nationalism is suggested by proponents of the
multiple modernities approach (Eisenstadt
1987, Spohn 2009). They view the recent
upsurge of ethno-religious movements as
a component of multiple constellations of
nation-state formation and democratization as
well as religious change and secularization in
different civilizations (Spohn 2003, p. 281).
However, by assigning regions and countries to
religious or political civilizations (e.g., Islamic,
Jewish, Indian, Confucian), this approach can
sometimes overstate the top-down impact of
cultural difference and understate the impact
of local histories and contexts. For example, although works on Iran (Aburaiya 2009), Turkey
(Haynes 2010), Palestine (Lybarger 2007), and
Daghestan (Gammer 2002) all focus on Islamic
nationalism, their analyses reveal quite different structures of religious nationalism in these
different countries: In Iran and Turkey, the
Islamic nationalist movement has developed
as a reaction against the top-down, forced
Westernization and secularization attempts;2
in Palestine, it was formed as a bastion against
Israels Jewish nationalism; and in Daghestan,
it came out of the alliance between state elites
and Su sheikhs against the more conservative
Wahhabi inuence. In Lebanon, by contrast, it
was the offspring of an Islamic fundamentalistturned-Islamic
nationalist
organization,
namely Hizbullah (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002).

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Sener Akturk (2009) challenges this view by suggesting that
Turkish nationalism, since the very beginning of its formation, has always rested on Islam.
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Moreover, whereas cases belonging to

one civilization canand dodiffer among
themselves, cases belonging to different civilizations canand doshare common aspects.
For example, although South Asian religious
nationalismswhich can be internally differentiated as Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, and Sikh
nationalisms and which are mostly reactions
against colonialismdiffer considerably from
the Japanese Shinto movements (Skya 2009), all
these movements share an anti-Western stance,
even though Japan was never colonialized.
Similarly, even though Israel is a non-Western
country, because it shares with Western
countries the teachings of the Hebrew Bible,
the same Biblical imagery can also be detected
in Israeli Jewish nationalism. Arguably, both
American and Israeli religious nationalism
have given rise to various episodes of violence.
But a constant does not adequately explain a
variable. Under what conditions does religiousnationalist mobilization lead to violence? It is to
that question that we now turn.
CULTURALIST THEORIES
OF VIOLENCE
One can distinguish two basic approaches to
conict and violence within the contemporary social sciences: culturalist and rationalist. Culturalist approaches dominate work not
only in sociology but also in anthropology, history, literature, and religious studies. These approaches can be further subdivided into three
main lineages: Humean, Durkheimian, and
Schmittian.
The seminal text in the Humean lineage
is The Natural History of Religion (Hume 1757
[2009]). The central argument of the book
widely accepted now, but highly controversial
at the timeis that polytheism preceded
monotheism. But its most provocative argument, at least today, is that polytheism naturally
leads to tolerance, whereas monotheism generally leads to persecution. This is so, Hume
contends, because polytheism admits the gods
of other sections and nations to a share of divinity, unlike monotheism, in which the worship

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of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious and thereby furnishes designing men with
a pretense for representing their adversaries as
profane (Hume 1757 [2009], p. 161).
In recent years, Humes argument has been
revived in a number of works, both popular and
scholarly. For example, Jonathan Kirsch contends that monotheism turned out to inspire
a ferocity and even a fanaticism that are mostly
absent from polytheism (Kirsch 1998, p. 2).
The theological roots of modern-day terrorism, he contends, are to be found in the Hebrew
Bible, not the Quran. Blending the Humean
thesis with the Schmittianwhich we discuss
more belowthe literary scholar Regina
Schwartz argues that the narratives in the
Hebrew Bible introduce a hitherto unknown
form of violent identity formation (Schwartz
1997). By drawing sharp and impermeable
boundaries between Gods people and the nations, she implies, the Old Testament created
the cultural preconditions for religious violence
(Schwartz 1997, p. x). In a series of books and articles that provoked a ery debate in Germany,
the renowned Egyptologist Jan Assmann advanced a slightly different version of Humes argument, inspired by Freuds speculations about
the Mosaic ancestry of monotheism (Assmann
1997). What seems crucial to me is not the
distinction between the One God and many
gods but the distinction between truth and
falsehood in religion, which he christens
the Mosaic distinction. In Judaism, violent
persecution remained an internal affair of
the Jewish people aimed at the Egyptians or
Canaanites who dwell among us (Assmann
2009, p. 17). In Christianity and Islam, on the
other hand, it was also externalized in violent
crusades and jihads.
Now, if the Humean thesis were correct,
we would expect (a) that the emergence of
monotheism would have been accompanied
by dramatic increases in religious violence and
(b) that the history of polytheistic societies
(e.g., in much of Asia or Africa) would be
relatively untouched by violence. Although the
historical record is likely too thin to permit
any denitive resolution of (a), there are good
reasons to doubt (b). Certainly, the hoary

stereotype of violent Western religions and
pacic Eastern ones that often stands behind it
must be rejected out of hand. The great Hindu
epics are rife with scenes of violence, and
Indian history with clashes of arms (indeed,
the most famous passage of the Bhagavad Gita
takes places on a battleeld). Buddhist history
of East Asia is full of warrior monks. South
Asia had its warrior ascetics as well. Its strong
strictures against violence notwithstanding,
the Buddhist tradition has its own theories of
just war and its own forms of sacred violence
( Jerryson & Juergensmeyer 2010).
Might religion in general be conducive to
violence? That has been one of the stock arguments advanced by the four horsemen of
the new atheismDawkins (2008), Dennett
(2007), Harris (2005), and Hitchens (2009).
Each author presents a narrative of world history that closely aligns violence and religion,
on the one hand, and tolerance and rationality, on the other. Alas, this moral reckoning requires some creative accounting. For example,
the totalitarian atrocities of the twentieth century (i.e., fascist and communist) must somehow be cleared from the atheist balance sheet.
Conversely, agents of peace who were people
of faith (e.g., Gandhi and King) must be recast as closet humanists. Not surprisingly, the
polemical overreach of the four horsemen provoked a number of sardonic counter-polemics
(Eagleton 2009, Hart 2009). We cannot summarize their critiques in any detail here, but the
theme of these exchanges is clear: The relationship between religion and violence is far more
complex and contingent than Hume and his
modern-day followers realized, and sweeping
distinctions between monotheism and polytheism or religion and reason give us little leverage
over the problem.
The roots of the Durkheimian tradition extend beyond The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life (Durkheim 1912 [2001]), through Hubert
& Mausss (1898 [1964]) essay on Sacrice
to Durkheims (1893 [1984]) own Division
of Labor. There, Durkheim had of course
argued that primitive societies were held
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together by a mechanical solidarity premised

on social similarity and enforced conformity,
whereas modern societies were bound up via
an organic solidarity based on social difference
and functional interdependency. This gave rise
to the rather counterintuitiveand therefore
interestingargument that the real function
of criminal punishment, perhaps even of social
conict tout court, was actually to strengthen
social solidarity, an argument also advanced by
Simmel (1903) and elaborated by Coser (1964).
According to Hubert & Mausss interpretation, rituals of sacrice serve a similar purpose:
They restore and purify the community.
In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim (1912
[2001]) generalizes this basic argument to
religious ritual as such. He argues that ritually
induced states of collective effervescence
are the experiential foundation of religious
community and indeed of social life. However,
sacricial rituals play only a marginal role in
Durkheims account, and violence none at all.
For Girard (1995), by contrast, the primary
function of sacricial rites is not so much to
produce solidarity as to diffuse aggression. The
desire, not simply to have what another person has, but to be what that person iswhat
Girard calls mimetic desiregenerates intensive, zero-sum rivalries in all human groups.
By displacing their envy and hostility onto a
third party, a scapegoat, the community restores harmony. Girard argues that the sacricial rituals typical of archaic religions are
archetypal rituals that originate in real events,
which mark the passage from the animal to the
human. In later work, he also contends that the
scapegoat must have certain characteristics (Girard 1986, 2011). First, she or he must resemble, or be made to resemble, the rival. Second,
the scapegoat must be a marginal person whose
sacrice will not elicit reprisals.
Girards approach allows us to read the how
and the who of ritual violence in primitive
societies. Eriksons (1966) Wayward Puritans
showed that the Durkheimian framework could
be extended to modern episodes of sacricial violence, such as the New England witch craze.
Seminal work on modern moral panics showed

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that the Durkheimian framework could also be

fruitfully applied to secular boundary crises as
well (Cohen 2002). And Daviss (1973) famous
essay on Protestant iconoclasm demonstrated
that violence against material objects could
also be rendered legible. More recently, Pape
(2005) has used Durkheims (1897 [1951)]) theory of altruistic suicide to explain the social
logic of suicide bombing, and Kramer (1991)
has argued that self-martyrdom operations in
Lebanon were driven by mimetic rivalries between Islamist movements. In this vein, Marvin
& Ingle (1999) contend that American national
identity involves rituals of blood sacrice.
During the 1990s, sociologists working on
religious violence took a narrative turn. In
doing so, they were following a number of inuential third wave (Adams et al. 2005) historical sociologists who had become interested
in narrative, not just as a mode of representation, but also as a template for action (Sewell
1992, Somers 1994, Steinmetz 1992). And they,
in turn, were partly inspired by the work of
prominent philosophers and critics on the nexus
between narrativity and identity (Ricur 1990,
Taylor 1989). The pioneering work on narrativity and national identity was done by literary scholars (Bhabha 1990), but social scientists
soon followed (Calhoun 1994). Culturalist research on religious violence has focused mostly
on apocalyptic narratives.
Millenarian movements and ideologies had
already been well studied by medieval and
early modern historians (Cohn 1957). But the
interest within sociology in apocalypticism
emerged from work on the violent cults of the
1980s, such as those in Jamestown and Waco
(Bromley & Melton 2002, Hall et al. 2000).
One common denominator in such groups,
scholars discovered, was a vision of cosmic
war, a nal battle between the forces of good
and evil, that cult members sought to catalyze
through violent confrontations or to escape by
taking their own lives. Apocalyptic narratives
also proved to be a common feature of many
violent forms of religious nationalism as well as
of terrorist organizations ( Jewett & Lawrence
2003, Juergensmeyer 1993).

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How much causal weight should we give

them? Proponents of the strong program in
cultural sociology have sometimes argued that
narrative frames have considerable power to
steer or even determine the course of individual or collective action; in this sense, they are
analogous to scripts or playbooks (Smith 2005).
However, close studies of particular movements
have generally come to somewhat more qualied conclusions. The basic problem is that
violent rhetoric is much more common than
violent action (Melton & Bromley 2002). As
far as millenarian cults are concerned, violent
outcomes typically involve intervening factors.
Some may be exogenous, such as hostile media
attention or prolonged standoffs with law enforcement. Others may be endogenous, such as
the use of powerful commitment mechanisms
and impermeable social boundaries that make a
peaceful exit from the group or movement more
difcult. This suggests the need for greater
attention to meso-level processes in work on
religious-nationalist violence.
The Schmittian approach to religious violence is of a much more recent vintage. Even
more than Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt was
an outspoken supporter of the Nazi regime and
remained stubbornly unrepentant after World
War II. His intellectual rehabilitation began
around the time of his death in 1985not on
the right for his support of authoritarianism, but
rather on the left for his critique of liberalism
(Agamben 1998, Mouffe 1999). With the advent of Americas war on terror, the scandal over
the use of torture at Abu Ghraib, and the conict surrounding the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo, Schmitts arguments
about the true underpinnings of liberal democracy suddenly seemed relevant (Agamben 1998,
2005; Kahn 2008; Scheuerman 2006). For example, George W. Bushs declaration in 2001
that either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists recalls Schmitts insistence that
true politics is premised on the friend/enemy
distinction (Schmitt 2007). The gruesome photographs of naked prisoners at Abu Ghraib and
reports of enhanced interrogations at Guantanamo Bay prison evoke Agambens (1998) no-
tions of bare life and homo sacer, of the political outcast whose existence afrms political
boundaries (Schmitt 2005). And the Bush administrations claims of an extraterritorial status
for Guantanamo that put enemy combatants
beyond the reach of American law resonate with
Schmitts famous dictum that the sovereign is
the one who can proclaim a state of emergency
or state of exception (Ausnahmezustand ).
What few people have noticed, however, are
the striking parallels between the Schmittian
and Durkheimian approaches to religious
violence, especially as articulated by Agamben
and Girard (but see Hussain & Ptacek 2000,
Palaver 1992)between homo sacer and the
sacricial victim, for example, and between
the acts of sovereignty that re/found a state
and the acts of violence that re/constitute a
group. Viewed through this lens, one might
see the Schmittian approach as an extension of
the Durkheimian, from the primitive totemic
horde to the modern liberal state (Datta 2006).
Both point toward a symbolic and emotional
logic that underlies ritualized acts of religious
and political violence that otherwise seem
senseless and irrational. They shed light on
the targets and procedures of these rituals in
a way that a purely rationalist account simply
cannot. However, they also leave us in the dark
regarding both why such violent acts of this
sort remain infrequent and the material and
relational congurations that trigger them.
This is the strength of the rationalist approach.
RATIONALIST THEORIES
OF VIOLENCE
The rationalist approach is the dominant one in
economics, political science, and international
relations today. It was formed by the conuence of two separate streams of work. The rst
and earlier stream is the rational-choice version
of comparative-historical political economy
initially developed during the 1970s, mainly
by a small group of interdisciplinary scholars
centered at the University of Washington,
most of whom worked on Europe. Their initial
ambition was to explain collective action (e.g.,
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ethnic and nationalist mobilization) and social

order (e.g., the formation of markets and
states). Let us call them the Seattle School.
The second and later inow was a more
game-theoretic version of political economy
that was rst elaborated in the late 1980s by
a small international group of development
economists. Their principal goal was to explain
collective violence and social disorder (e.g., civil
wars and failed states). Most of them worked
on Africa. The rst group had some inuence
on political sociology. But comparative politics
was fundamentally reshaped by the second
group. Let us call them the African School.
The Seattle School was itself the product
of a theoretical conuence, in this case between two different approaches to economic
history: the Olsonian and the Northian. Olson
(1965) had argued that individual self-interest
creates formidable barriers to group mobilization due to free riding and related dynamics,
meaning that successful collective action generally requires the provision of selective incentives. Building on Coases (1990) seminal
work on the rm, Douglass North and others (Alchian & Benjamin 2006, North 1990,
Williamson et al. 1991) elaborated a theory of
transaction costs, such as the cost of gathering information and protecting property rights.
Coase had argued that the raison detre of the
rm was to lower these costs. North and colleagues simply extended this argument to the
state.
Other members of the Seattle School then
applied Olsons and Norths models to problems of group mobilization and state formation
(Kiser & Schneider 1994, Levi 1989). For example, Hechter and colleagues (1982, Hechter
& Levi 1979) analyzed ethno-nationalist mobilization as a collective action problem. Bucking the conventional wisdom, Hechter insisted
that successful mobilizations were individually
rational (i.e., they brought net benets to individual actors). In his view, this is true even of
collective violence: Individuals will engage in it
if and when it is in their self-interest to do so
(i.e., if it is the most efcient means of accessing
money and power).

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But is it really this simple? Collinss (2009)

recent work on the microdynamics of collective
violence suggests not. One reasoncertainly
not the only oneis that physical violence involves certain skills and technologies. In economic language, it requires human and physical capital. A key contribution of the African
School has been to incorporate these capital
requirements into the production function for
collective violence.
The African School arose out of the intersection of two intellectual movements: the
Chicago School and game theory. Beginning
in the late 1950s, Gary Becker and others began applying economic theory to noneconomic
problems such as race relations and family
lifeproblems that had belonged to sociology
(Becker 1976). By the early 1980s, Jon Elster
and others (then) at the University of Chicago
were applying economic theoryincluding
game theoryto problems that belonged to
political science. The relevant form of game
theorythe equilibrium theory of noncooperative gameswas rst developed during World
War II (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944).
It had an enormous inuence on military planners and strategists at the RAND Corporation
and the Defense Department during the Cold
War years (Boulding 1962, Schelling 1960). In
the 1990s, some development economists began applying game theory to civil war.
The lead architect for the African approach
was economist Jack Hirshleifer. Tellingly, Hirshleifer had worked at RAND (19491955) and
the University of Chicago (19551960) before
moving to UCLA. His fundamental premise
is that [i]ndividuals and groups can compete
by employing the technology of conict as an
alternative to the technologies of production
and exchange (Collier et al. 2009; Grossman
1991; Hirshleifer 1991, p. 133). It actually contains two subpremises: Rulers choose between
taxation and predation, and technology inuences the relative prices of these two strategies.
Subsequent elaborations of Hirshleifers basic
model would also incorporate the calculation
that returns to violence increase depending on
(a) the availability of human capital (i.e., the

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market price for skilled soldiers versus skilled

producers) and (b) the presence of lootable resources (e.g., oil or diamonds). In contrast to the
Seattle School, the African School recognized
that an economic model of violent conict
must incorporate physical and human capital.
Hirshleifers model did not address the
central concern of the Seattle School, namely,
why rational individuals would ever engage
in collective action in the rst place, much
less in collective violence. One solution to
this problema Northian onetreats ethnic groups as the functional equivalents of
nation-states, capable of lowering transaction
costs by enforcing property rights, providing
physical security, redistributing wealth, and
so on (Wintrobe 1995)not an unreasonable
assumption in the African context.
If so, a new question arises: When will
ethnic groups and their leaders choose to
cooperate with the state and its rulers? In an
inuential series of papers, the French development economist Jean-Pierre Azam argued that
the answer to this question hinges on a variety
of circumstances, including the capacity of the
state to (a) perform its basic functions (i.e.,
securing property and persons) and (b) make
credible commitments to redistribute resources among ethnic groups in an equitable
way (Azam 1995, Azam & Mesnard 2003).
Rationalist approaches provide a useful
corrective to two common tendencies in the nationalism literature: (a) the hypostasization of
national collectivities and (b) the imputation of
irrational motives to nationalists. The African
School also calls our attention to another: (c) the
naturalization of physical violence. But havent
the rationalists overcorrected for these mistakes? Arent social groups really real in
some sense and in some instances? Dont nonmaterial motives (e.g., emotions) and symbolic
ends (e.g., honor) often play a central role
in intergroup conict? Is collective violence
really just a function of means and motives?
Rationalist approaches have several basic
defects. First, a dogmatic commitment to
methodological individualism compels them
to exogenize the social (Arrow 1994). In this
context, that means treating ethnic, national,

and religious identities as external to the model,
as given or subjective (Cramer 2002). Second,
the a priori assumption of individual rationality
blinds old school rationalists to the hardwired
heuristics of human cognition (Brubaker
et al. 2004). In truth, peoples categorizations
and allegiances are not so much irrational as
prerational. Finally, there are good reasons
to believe that most human beings are deeply
averse to within-species killing (Grossman
1995). Getting them to kill takes more
than capital; it involves denaturalizing their
dispositions and demonizing their victims.
These difculties are not just metatheoretical either; rather, they lead to persistent
perplexities in empirical applications of the
rationalist approach, as in ongoing attempts
to naturalize and thereby desocialize ethnicity,
typically via an objective index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Not surprisingly,
this theoretical campaign has been an empirical
failure (Cederman & Girardin 2007). Another
is the dogged effort to preserve the rationality
assumption by insisting that nationalist leaders
are behaving rationally (i.e., cynically and
instrumentally), even if their followers are not
(Hechter 2000). The case study evidence generally suggests a mix of material and symbolic
motives among both leaders and followers.
Culturalist approaches provide some corrections to these overcorrections. For example, because they insist on the reality of the collective
(Durkheim) and the symbolic (Geertz), they can
help us theorize about the content of ethnic,
national, and religious identities. Similarly, because they insist on the importance of meaning
and narrative in social life, they can help us understand the role of honor and values in human
action. As a result, they provide greater leverage
over certain features of nationalist violence. For
example, they explain why violence might be directed against symbolic targets whose destruction does not materially degrade the enemy
(Hassner 2009). Similarly, they explain why certain forms of ritual desecration might trigger
violence, even when material interests are not
at stake (Kaplan 2007).
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However, while the two approaches are indeed complementary in some ways, a simple
synthesis still would not yield an adequate theory. To begin with, the resulting theory would
not be ontologically coherent because the two
approaches are fundamentally at odds regarding the reality of the social and the symbolic.
Moreover, even a coherent synthesis of the two
approaches would still be ontologically incomplete because neither fully theorizes the meso
level of social reality. The culturalist approach
mostly looks at how macro-level culture shapes
and guides micro-level meanings via ritual and
identity. It has little to say about formal institutions and power hierarchies. The rationalist
approach looks at how micro-level interactions
underpin and constrain macro-level institutions
via collective actions and formal hierarchies.
However, it has little to say about ritual and
identity. What is needed, then, is a coherent
synthesis of these three analytically distinct levels of social reality in both their material and
symbolic moments.

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At present, we see two promising efforts at

synthesis.3 The rst is inspired by Bourdieus
political economy of practice. Its chief
architects have been Rogers Brubaker, Andreas
Wimmer, and their students at UCLA. Let us
call this the Los Angeles School. The second
combines rational-choice political economy
with Lipset/Rokkan-style political sociology.
Its master builder has been Stathis Kalyvas and
his students and collaborators in the Order,
Conict, and Violence program at Yale University. We will call this the Yale School. Both
have well-developed theories of meso-level
mechanisms. However, neither has adequately
incorporated religion into its theory.
Bourdieus theory is built around three
master conceptseld, capital, and habitus
and two momentsobjective and subjective

(Gorski 2013, Swartz 1997). Thus, a social
eld is an objective space of positions but
also a subjective competition for positions. It
is analogous to a magnetic eld, but also to
a playing eld. The various forms of capital
(e.g., economic, cultural, and social) all have
an objective existence (e.g., in physical capital,
academic certicates, or network structures)
but a subjective one as well (e.g., in personal
property, embodied skills, or emotional
cathexes). The same holds for the habitus. It is
objective insofar as it is a set of dispositions that
are stored in human bodies, but also subjective
insofar as it is a set of cognitive schema employed by human minds. In short, Bourdieus
theory implies a tri-level social ontology and
a bi-dimensional social phenomenology. One
way of using these conceptsnot the only
one, to be sure, but generally the most useful
one for present purposesis to conceptualize
nation and state as elds of power, the groups
and institutions of civil society in terms of
elds and their specic capitals, and individual
actors and interactions in terms of the bodily
habitus and cognitive schema.4
The greatest contribution of the Los
Angeles School has been a more coherent and
complete accounting of ethnic and nationalist
identity and mobilization, one that avoids the
holism and idealism of the culturalists while
also eschewing the reductionism and materialism of the rationalists (Brubaker 1996, 2004;
Wimmer 2002, 2008). Collective identities,
they argue, do not simply emanate from a
(putatively) shared culture, but neither are they
somehow given by some (supposedly) objective
nature. Rather, they emerge and dissolve or,
better, strengthen and weaken, in the course of
ongoing and irresoluble social struggles about
the relative salience of competing identity
categories or, in Bourdieus terminology, of
classication struggles over the dominant
3
The contentious politics approach developed by Charles
Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Jack Goldstone is a third, but its
proponents have not devoted a great deal of attention to ethnicity, nationalism, or religion.
4
One can also scale these distinctions up, by conceptualizing
the international system of states as a eld of power, or one
can scale them down, conceptualizing a particular group or
institution as a eld of power.
SYNTHETIC APPROACHES
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principles of vision and di-vision. Whether

ethnicity trumps class or vice versa, which
ethnic categories are central and which are
peripheral are not xed or given but continually
up for grabs. On this account, ethnicity and
nationalism are not structures but processes,
not entities but relations, not things but events.
Collective action, moreover, is not simply a
function of some presocial form of rationality or
interest, any more than it is a mere performance
of a free-oating script or narrative. Interests
can also be positional and symbolic and are,
in this sense, irreducibly social, but the constraints of culture also leave considerable room
for creativity and improvisation. Thus, ethnic
mobilization and conict often have as much
to do with symbolic exclusions as material deprivations. And although collective rituals may
regenerate solidarity, they also mark and legitimate ethnic boundaries and hierarchies as well.
On this account, the crucial mechanisms of ethnic and nationalist mobilization and conict are
not to be found in the autonomous structures
of culture, nor in the self-interests of individual
actors, but in between the macro and micro
levels.
The principal contribution of the Yale approach has been to illuminate the crucial
mechanisms and normal dynamics of violent,
ethno-nationalist conicts (Kalyvas 2003, 2006;
Wilkinson 2004). It crystallized out of a sustained engagement with the phenomenon of
civil wars, but also of a growing disenchantment with rationalist approaches to collective
violence. The rationalist or Hobbesian approach suggests that civil wars can be understood as a simple aggregation of local conicts.
When central authority breaks down, so the
Hobbesian argument goes, the war of all against
all that prevails in the state of nature is unleashed. On this account, a civil war is just an
aggregation of local feuds. A culturalist version
of a Schmittian approach suggests that civil wars
can be understood in terms of a master cleavage
that emanates down from the sovereign center.
In this account, local-level violence simply enacts a domestic friend/enemy distinction. Both
of these theories are only partially correct. On
the one hand, it is true that on-the-ground violence typically has a local logic. Civil wars can
provide a political pretext for settling private
scores. However, the violence tends to be selective, and not indiscriminate, as the Hobbesian
account implies. Moreover, the violence often
needs to be legitimated in terms of the master cleavage; although the motive may be private, the justication must still be public. On
the other hand, it is true that political polarization around a master cleavage of some kind
ideological, ethnic, religious, etc.frequently
precedes the outbreak of civil wars; what is
more, post hoc interpretations of civil wars generally appeal to this master cleavage, thereby
giving it a durable salience. Thus, an adequate
account of the logic of political violence must
explicitly theorize the meso-level mechanisms
that mediate between center and periphery and
elites and masses. These typically reside in intracommunity conicts at the local or regional
level.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, there was still widespread
agreement that modern nationalism was an
inherently secular phenomenon (Anderson
1991, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992). That is
no longer the case. There is now a recognition
among leading scholars of the discipline that
(a) modern nationalism may have a religious
lineage (e.g., in narratives of chosen-ness);
(b) national identities have often formed along
religious cleavages (e.g., between Protestants and Catholics, Hindus and Muslims);
(c) nationalist rhetoric and ritual often borrow
from religion; and (d ) religious nationalism
may be a distinctly modern type of nationalism
(Brubaker 2012).
Nonetheless, the incorporation of the religious factor into the scholarly literature is far
from complete. There are at least four reasons
for this: (a) The initial work on religious
nationalism was mostly done from a culturalist
perspective, which often (and mistakenly)
treated apocalyptic narratives as a sufcient
cause of religious violence; (b) although
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ne-grained case studies of violence by new

religious movements (cults) and religiousnationalist movements repeatedly revealed
the importance of intracommunity dynamics, political context, and historical
contingencies, these ndings were not well
incorporated into the nationalism literature
in sociology; (c) the mainstream literature
on nationalism in sociology and political
science continues to fold religion into ethnicity, where it does not altogether ignore it;
(d ) rationalist approaches to ethnic conict
developed in economics are premised on a
narrowly instrumental and materialist understanding of violence that ignores the role of the
sacred and the symbolic as triggers and targets
for violence.
Although the synthetic approaches to ethnic
conict just discussed generally ignore religion
as well, they are better equipped to accommodate it than are previous approaches owing
to their three-storied and bi-dimensional
architectures. In the Bourdieusian model of
the Los Angeles School, religion would gure
as (a) an autonomous eld within national and
transnational elds of power; (b) a eld-specic
form of capital (i.e., religious capital) that
could be accumulated and exchanged by social
actors; and (c) a component of the individual
habitus, shaped via familial and scholastic
socialization, and activated within certain
contexts. Religious nationalism could then be
understood as a synchronization of principles
of vision and di-vision across the religious
and nonreligious elds, such that the religious
and national principles became more salient and
more closely aligned. Such alignments would
be the result of strategic alliances between elite
groupings across the relevant elds. The main
advantage of this approach is that it allows for an
interpretively rich and historically contingent
analysis of religious-nationalist mobilization.

SO39CH10-Gorski
In the neoclassical political sociology of the

Yale School, on the other hand, religion would
gure as (a) a master cleavage in the national
or international landscape, (b) a set of local
and regional elites and institutions, and (c) a
source of individual identity and honor. From
this perspective, religious nationalism would
typically involve an alliance connecting a religious master cleavage (i.e., religious/religious
or religious/secular) to individual identities via
intracommunity rivalries. Such alliances would
be the result of a (partial) synchronization
of individual interests and motives at various
levels of social life along a religious fault line.
One strength of this approach is that it allows
considerable room for strategic deception, not
only of the masses by the elites, but also the
reverse.
Although both of these frameworks would
be strengthened by a fuller incorporation of
religionof religious institutions, elites, and
identitiesit is equally true that current work
on religious nationalism would be strengthened
by a more comprehensive theoretical framework. To be sure, there is now a great deal of
recent work that draws attention to the role of
meso-level mechanisms in triggering religiousnationalist violence. Scholars in this area have
begun to analyze elites and ideology (FukaseIndergaard & Indergaard 2008, Hassner
2011), the impact of local religious leaders
(Azegami 2012), alliances between political
and religious elites (De Juan 2008, Dowling
2012, Fleming 2010, Gammer 2002, Hasenclever & Rittberger 2000, Miner 2003, Perica
2002, Verkhovsky 2002), and confrontations over sacred spaces (Bacchetta 2010;
Friedland & Hecht 1998; Gorenberg 2000;
Hansen 1999; Hassner 2003, 2009). But only
via theory can the results of these studies
be conceptually integrated and empirically
generalized.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any afliations, memberships, funding, or nancial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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Contents
Annual Review
of Sociology
Volume 39, 2013
Frontispiece
Charles Tilly p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p xiv
Prefatory Chapter
Formations and Formalisms: Charles Tilly and the Paradox
of the Actor
John Krinsky and Ann Mische p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Theory and Methods
The Principles of Experimental Design and Their Application
in Sociology
Michelle Jackson and D.R. Cox p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p27
The New Sociology of Morality
Steven Hitlin and Stephen Vaisey p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p51
Social Processes
Social Scientic Inquiry Into Genocide and Mass Killing:
From Unitary Outcome to Complex Processes
Peter B. Owens, Yang Su, and David A. Snow p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p69
Interest-Oriented Action
Lyn Spillman and Michael Strand p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p85
Drugs, Violence, and the State
Bryan R. Roberts and Yu Chen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 105
Healthcare Systems in Comparative Perspective: Classication,
Convergence, Institutions, Inequalities, and Five Missed Turns
Jason Beckeld, Sigrun Olafsdottir, and Benjamin Sosnaud p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 127
Institutions and Culture
Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field
in Cross-National Comparison
Ruud Koopmans p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 147
Sociology of Fashion: Order and Change
Patrik Aspers and Frederic Godart p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 171
v
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Religion, Nationalism, and Violence: An Integrated Approach

Philip S. Gorski and Gulay
Turkmen-Dervi
soglu p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 193
Formal Organizations
Race, Religious Organizations, and Integration
Korie L. Edwards, Brad Christerson, and Michael O. Emerson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 211
Political and Economic Sociology
An Environmental Sociology for the Twenty-First Century
David N. Pellow and Hollie Nyseth Brehm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 229
Economic Institutions and the State: Insights from Economic History

Henning Hillmann p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 251
Differentiation and Stratification
Demographic Change and Parent-Child Relationships in Adulthood
Judith A. Seltzer and Suzanne M. Bianchi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 275
Individual and Society
Gender and Crime
Candace Kruttschnitt p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 291
White-Collar Crime: A Review of Recent Developments and
Promising Directions for Future Research
Sally S. Simpson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 309
From Social Structure to Gene Regulation, and Back: A Critical
Introduction to Environmental Epigenetics for Sociology
Hannah Landecker and Aaron Panofsky p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 333
Racial Formation in Perspective: Connecting Individuals, Institutions,
and Power Relations
Aliya Saperstein, Andrew M. Penner, and Ryan Light p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 359
The Critical Sociology of Race and Sport: The First Fifty Years
Ben Carrington p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 379
Demography
The Causal Effects of Father Absence
Sara McLanahan, Laura Tach, and Daniel Schneider p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 399
International Migration and Familial Change in Communities
of Origin: Transformation and Resistance
Patricia Arias p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 429
Trends and Variation in Assortative Mating: Causes and Consequences
Christine R. Schwartz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 451
vi
Contents
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Gender and International Migration: Contributions and

Cross-Fertilizations
Gioconda Herrera p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 471
LGBT Sexuality and Families at the Start of the Twenty-First Century
Mignon R. Moore and Michael Stambolis-Ruhstorfer p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 491
Urban and Rural Community Sociology

Housing: Commodity versus Right

Mary Pattillo p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 509
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 3039 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 533
Cumulative Index of Article Titles, Volumes 3039 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 537
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found at
http://soc.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml
Contents
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Religion, Nationalism, and

Philip S. Gorski and Gulay

Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520;

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013. 39:193210

First published online as a Review in Advance on

religious violence, ethnic conict, terrorism, eld theory, rational

The Annual Review of Sociology is online at

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Adequately understanding religious-nationalist

have tended to treat the relationship between

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM:

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

ood during the past decade, not just in

1990). The diffusion of nationalism sparked

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Moreover, whereas cases belonging to

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

reasons to doubt (b). Certainly, the hoary

together by a mechanical solidarity premised

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that the Durkheimian framework could also be

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

How much causal weight should we give

ethnic and nationalist mobilization) and social

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But is it really this simple? Collinss (2009)

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market price for skilled soldiers versus skilled

context, that means treating ethnic, national,

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At present, we see two promising efforts at

and two momentsobjective and subjective

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principles of vision and di-vision. Whether

ne-grained case studies of violence by new

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In the neoclassical political sociology of the

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Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Religion, Nationalism, and Violence: An Integrated Approach

Economic Institutions and the State: Insights from Economic History

Gender and International Migration: Contributions and

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:193-210. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

Housing: Commodity versus Right

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