DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,VIZAG

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AND EASEMENT PROJECT

NAME: PRANJAL MAURYA

ROLL ID: 2014082
SEM: V SEMESTER
FACULTY: Mr. P JOGI NAIDU
TOPIC: RAM NIWAS VS. BANO

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take immense pleasure in thanking my constitutional law ii teacher for giving me this
opportunity to give a project on I thank my faculty Mr. P JOGI NAIDU for extending his
support in completion of this project finally, this project would be incomplete without thanking
the almighty who has showered his blessings.

PRANJAL MAURYA
2014082
V SEMESTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
SECTION 3 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
SECTION 19 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
SECTION 20 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
JUDGEMENT
CASE ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABSTRACT
AIM:
The aim of this project is to get better research on the case study of ram niwas vs bano.
RESEARCH QUESTION:
1. What is the applicability of sec 3 in deciding this case?
2. In what way sec 19and 20 of specific relief act are applied?
HYPOTHESIS:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
Research of my project is based on primary and secondary sources.

INTRODUCTIONProperty law is the area of law that governs the various forms of ownership and tenancy in
real property (land as distinct from personal or movable possessions) and in personal
property, within the common law legal system. In the civil law system, there is a division
between movable and immovable property. Movable property roughly corresponds to
personal property, while immovable property corresponds to real estate or real property, and
the associated rights and obligations thereon.1
The concept, idea or philosophy of property underlies all property law. In some jurisdictions,
historically all property was owned by the monarch and it devolved through feudal land
tenure or other feudal systems of loyalty and fealty.
Though the Napoleonic code was among the first government acts of modern times to
introduce the notion of absolute ownership into statute, protection of personal property rights
was present in medieval Islamic law and jurisprudence, and in more feudalist forms in the
common law courts of medieval and early modern England.
Property rights are rights over things enforceable against all other persons. By contrast,
contractual rights are rights enforceable against particular persons. Property rights may,
however, arise from a contract; the two systems of rights overlap. In relation to the sale of
land, for example, two sets of legal relationships exist alongside one another: the contractual
right to sue for damages, and the property right exercisable over the land. More minor
property rights may be created by contract, as in the case of easements, covenants, and
equitable servitudes.
A separate distinction is evident where the rights granted are insufficiently substantial to
confer on the nonowner a definable interest or right in the thing. The clearest example of
these rights is the license. In general, even if licenses are created by a binding contract, they
do not give rise to property interests.
Immovable property is an immovable object, an item of property that cannot be moved
without destroying or altering it - property that is fixed to the earth, such as land or a house.
In the United States it is also commercially and legally known as real estate and in Britain as
property. It is known by other terms in other countries of the world.

11eastern book company, vepa p. sarthi,law of transfer of propertty,fifth edition,2010

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Immovable property includes premises, property rights (for example, inheritable building
right), houses, land and associated goods, and chattels if they are located on, or below 2, or
have a fixed address. It is delimited by geographic coordinates or by reference to local
landmarks, depending on the jurisdiction.
In much of the world's civil law systems (based as they are on Romano-Germanic law, which
is also known as Civil law or Continental law), immovable property is the equivalent of "real
property"; it is land or any permanent feature or structure above or below the surface.
To describe it in more detail, immovable property includes land, buildings, hereditary
allowances, rights to way, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit which arises out of
land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to
the earth. It does not include standing timber, growing crops, nor grass. It includes the right to
collect rent, life interest in the income of the immovable property, a right of way, a fishery, or
a lease of land.
Other sources describe immovable property as "any land or any building or part of a building,
and includes, where any land or any building or part of a building is to be transferred together
with any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things, such machinery, plant, furniture,
fittings and other things also. Any rights in or with respect to any land or any building or part
of building (whether or not including any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things
therein) which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, accruing or arising from
any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member of, or acquiring shares in, a cooperative society, or other association of persons) or by way of any agreement or any
arrangement of whatever nature, not being a transaction by way of sale, exchange or lease of
such land, building or part of a building."
Immovable property cannot be altered or remodeled, added to, or reconstructed without
entering into an agreement with and getting permission from its owner. Construction,
alteration, and demolition may also be subject to government regulation, such as the need to
obey zoning laws and obtain building permits.
Also, a property or an object, which can be moved by destroying it would be considered a
"destructible property" rather than an "immovable property"

2 www.advocatekhoj.com/.../bareacts/transferofproperty/
6

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant rented a shop situated at Katlara Bazar, Loharawali Gali, Merta City from the
respondant (the vendor). He was paying 35Rs per month. On January 25, 1978, he claims to
have entered into an agreement with the vendor to purchase the suit shop for a sum of
Rs.9200/- and paid a sum of Rs.3200/- in cash and undertook to pay remaining amount of
Rs.6000/- at the time of execution of sale deed. During the pendency of this appeal, he died
and the appellants were substituted as his legal representatives. The tenant and the vendor are
said to be closely related they are brothers as well as brothers-in-law. Another person (one of
the respondents) purchased the shop on July 24, 1978 for a sum of 20000. On October 12,
1978 the tenant filed the suit for specific performance against the vendor and the purchasers
and their respective husbands.The purchasers contested the suit denying genuineness of Ext.1
and taking the plea that they are bona fide purchasers of the suit shop.3
ISSUES FRAMED BY THE TRIAL COURT1- Had the defendant agreed to sell the disputed shop to the plaintiff on 25.1.78 and put the
plaintiff in possession as owner after taking Rs.3200/- in its lieu, and entrusted the tenancy
deed (letter) written by him and his father, dated Baisakhi Sudi 9 Samvat 2029, to the
plaintiff?
2- Have the defendants (no 2) purchased the disputed shop after paying full price and had
they no knowledge of the alleged agreement to sell?
The trial court found all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit.Dissatisfied
with the judgment and decree of the trial court, the purchasers filed appeal in the High Court
of judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur.
SECTION 3 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACTInterpretation clause.In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or
context, immoveable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass;
instrument means a non-testamentary instrument; attested, in relation to an instrument,
means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of
whom has seen the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other
4

person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has

received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the
3 www.britannica.comwww.britannica.com
4 www.advocatekhoj.com/.../bareacts/transferofproperty/
7

signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence
of the executant; but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have
been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary;]
registered means registered in [any part of the territories] to which this Act extends] under
the law4 for the time being in force regulating the registration of documents; attached to the
earth means
(a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;
(b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or
(c) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it
is attached; 5[actionable claim means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by
mortgage of immoveable property or by hypothecation or pledge of moveable property, or to
any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either actual or
constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief,
whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent;] [a
person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for
wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross
negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I.Where any transaction relating to
immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered
instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such
property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or,
where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument
has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908,
from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed
by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being
acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:]
Provided that5
(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed
by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder,
(2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in
books kept under section 51 of that Act, and6
5 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1272508/
6 -lawnotes.blogspot.com/2007/01/transfer-of-property.html
8

(3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been
correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act. Explanation II.Any
person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall
be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual
possession thereof. Explanation III.A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact
if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to
which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the
principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or
otherwise cognizant of the fraud.
SECTION 19 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACTRelief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.Except as
otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced
against
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except
a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original
contract;7
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the
plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant;
(d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with
another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;
(e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract
for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the
incorporation, the company: Provided that the company has accepted the contract and
communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract.
SECTION 20 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACTDiscretion as to decreeing specific performance.
(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound
to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not
arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by
a court of appeal.8
7 serialsjournals.com/serialjournalmanager/pdf/1332139475.pdf
8 www.legalindia.com/spes-successionis-as-an-exception-to-transferability
9

(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree
specific performance:
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the
contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that
the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant;
or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant
which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on
the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not
rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.
Explanation 1.Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is
onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an
unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause
(b). Explanation 2. The question whether the performance of a contract would involve
hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the
hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined
with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract.
(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case
where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract
capable of specific performance.
(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the
ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party.
JUDGEMENTAfter considering the evidence placed before it, the trial court found all the issues in favour of
the plaintiff and decreed the suit. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court,
the purchasers filed appeal (S.B. Civil First Appeal No.7/85) in the High Court of judicature
for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. By his judgment dated August 4, 1987, a learned Single Judge of
the High Court, on reappraisal of the evidence and after referring to Section 19(b) of the
Specific Relief Act, held that the contesting respondents were bona fide purchasers of the suit
shop and they paid consideration of Rs.20,000/- without having knowledge of the said
agreement (Ex.1). He held that the registered sale deed (Ext.4) in favour of the purchasers
could not be cancelled and the relief of specific performance could not be granted in favour
10

of the tenant. The appeal was thus allowed on August 4, 1987. Assailing that judgment of the
learned Single Judge, the tenant filed Special Appeal No.27 of 1987 before the High Court. A
Division Bench, having agreed with all the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge,
dismissed the appeal on January 29, 1990. The Division Bench, however, held that simply
because an enquiry from the tenant had not been made as to his real equitable interest in the
property, it could not be taken or presumed that the defendants vendees had knowledge of the
earlier transaction and pointed out that the vendor gave out that the tenant was his brother as
well as sister-in-laws husband and the documents were with him, which he would take back
and deliver to them so, there was no need to make further enquiry. It also held, the conduct of
the plaintiff has been elaborately dealt with by the learned Judge and on that basis, it has been
found that the version which the plaintiff has given is not trustworthy. Besides that we may
also state that the relief of specific performance is an equitable relief. It would not be proper
exercise of discretion in granting equitable relief of cancellation of the sale deed in the
circumstances of the case. Thus, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on January 29,
1990. From that judgment of the Division Bench arises the present appeal, at the instance of
the tenant, by special leave. Mr.Sanjeev K.Kapoor, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, invited our attention to Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act
and submitted that both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench erred in not
taking note of the said provision while holding that the purchasers are covered by clause (b)
of Section 19 of the Special Relief Act, 1963. There is nothing in the conduct of the tenant,
submitted the learned counsel, which would disentitle him to the relief of specific
performance of contract for sale. Ms.Madhurima Tatia, the learned counsel appearing for the
purchasers (contesting respondents), argued that both the vendor as well as the tenant were
close relations and the latter was in possession as a tenant of the former, and these facts were
known to the purchasers, so Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act would
have no application; in view of the close relationship between the vendor and the tenant and
the pleas taken by the purchasers, the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the
evidence himself and recorded a clear finding on issue No.1 instead of assuming the finding
in favour of the appellant and deciding the question of actual knowledge for purposes of
Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even otherwise also, she argued, both the
learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench declined to grant the discretionary relief
of specific performance having regard to the close relationship between the vendor and the
tenant, the price mentioned in Ext.1 and the price paid by the purchasers and the conduct of
the tenant so, this court need not interfere in the judgment under appeal. On the above
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contentions, the point that falls for consideration is : Whether the appellant (tenant) is entitled
to specific performance of Ext.1? The purchasers have acquired a legal right under sale deed
(Ext.4). The right of the tenant under Ext.1, if it is true and valid, though earlier in time, is
only an equitable right and it does not affect the purchasers if they are bona fide purchasers
for valuable consideration without notice of that equitable right. The foundation of the claim
of the tenant is the existence of an equitable right under Ext.1. We have referred to the
pleadings of the parties, the relevant issues and the findings of the courts on this facet. The
trial court found issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Single Judge having noted
the plea in the written statement that the purchasers denied execution of any agreement by the
vendor in favour of the tenant and stated that any such alleged agreement was forged,
observed : It may be mentioned that I have assumed the original contract because although
Smt.Bano and others have challenged it on the ground that it was fictitious and not genuine,
the finding of the lower court on this aspect of the case that there was agreement to sell
between Ram Narain and Satya Narain calls for no interference. It appears to us that he
assumed the finding of the trial court as correct and proceeded to decide the appeal
presumably because on issue No.10, he found that the purchasers did not have actual
knowledge of Ext.1. In our considered view, the learned Single Judge ought to have
considered the evidence and recorded his own positive finding on the question whether Ext.1
was a true and valid agreement. This feature of the case was not adverted to by the Division
Bench. Therefore, issue No.1 has to be considered afresh by the learned Single Judge. Both
the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High
Court dealt with the question whether the purchasers had actual knowledge of Ext.1, the
earlier contract, and on evidence found that the purchasers did not have any knowledge of it.
But they failed to notice the provisions of Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of
Property Act which is germane on the point of notice. Indeed, issue No.10 was not properly
framed. The word notice should have been used in issue No.10 instead of knowledge because
Section 19(b) uses the word notice. From the definition of the expression, a person is said to
have notice in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is plain that the word notice is of
wider import than the word knowledge. A person may not have actual knowledge of a fact but
he may have notice of it having regard to the aforementioned definition and Explanation II
thereto. If the purchasers have relied upon the assertion of the vendor or on their own
knowledge and abstained from making enquiry into the real nature of the possession of the
tenant, they cannot escape from the consequences of the deemed notice under Explanation II
to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. On this point, in the light of the above
12

discussion, we hold that the purchasers will be deemed to have notice of Ext.1, should it be
found to be true and valid. The last point, whether on the facts and circumstances of this case,
it will be just and proper to grant discretionary relief of the specific performance of the
contract in favour of the tenant or will it be inequitable to enforce Ext.1 against the
purchasers remains to be decided? The Division Bench in agreement with the learned Single
Judge took the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance of
Ext.1. As on the question of genuineness and validity of Ext.1, we are remanding the case to
the learned Single Judge. We do not propose to express any opinion on this point and leave it
to be decided afresh with reference to the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief
Act by the learned Single Judge after recording finding on issue No.1. For the above reasons,
we set aside the judgment and order of the Division Bench confirming the judgment of the
learned Single Judge and remand the case to the learned single Judge for his decision on (i)
issue No.1 and (ii) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief of specific
performance of a contract in the light of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act in
accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case
we make no order as to costs.

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CASE ANALYSIS
FAKI IBRAHIM VS. FAKI MOHINDIN60 Ind Cas 986
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASEThe plaintiff sued to get a sale-deed of the plaint-property executed, alleging that the
defendant No. 1 had agreed to pass a sale-deed in his name on the 4th Marsh 1917, but
afterwards refused to convey the plaint property to the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant relied
upon a sale-deed executed by the 1st defendant in his favour on the 19th January 1918. It is
admitted that the plaintiff was in possession, and that the 2nd defendant knew that the
plaintiff was in possession, and made no inquiry as to the circumstances in which the plaintiff
was in possession. The Trial Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the 2nd defendant
had no notice, actual or constructive, of the contract between the 1st defendant and the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had been in possession since 1914, and admittedly was a mortgagee.
The learned Trial Judge seemed to think that, although defendant No. 2 might be fixed with
notice of the plaintiff's possession as mortgagee, be could not be fixed with the notion of the
agreement to sell. In appeal, this decision was confirmed. The same distinction was made by
the learned Appellate Judge, namely, that the constructive notice would only be of the
plaintiff's holding as mortgagee and nut as a person having an agreement to sell from the 1st
defendant.9
ISSUES RAISEDWhether the plaint property bought by both defendant 2 and plaintiff belonged to whom?
JUDGEMENTIt appears to be the result of the Bombay decisions that no purchaser can protest himself
merely by registering his document of title, against the title of a person in possession of the
subject-matter, and if he ignores that possession and fails to make inquiry into its nature and
origin, he will be affected by all the equities which the person in possession is proved to
have. This being the cast, I think that, when the plaintiff found that the property of which he
bought the equity (of redemption) was in the possession of the defendants, it was for him to

9 www.indiankanoon.org
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inquire into the nature of his vendor's title and the extent of the liabilities to which he was
subject.
The result, therefore, must be that the 2nd defendant having knowledge of the plaintiff being
in possession, and having made no inquiry why the plaintiff was in possession, must be taken
to have had constructive notice of all the equities in favour of the plaintiff. It would have
been a different matter if he had made inquiries and had been told that the plaintiff was only
in possession as mortgagee, but if he chooses to make an inquiries at all, then he is liable to
all the risks that might result from the discovery that the person in possession was entitled to
equities against the vendor. The result, therefore, must be that the appeal must be allowed.
The plaintiff will be entitled to conveyance of the suit property from the 2nd defendant who
has a registered sale-deed from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff will be entitled to his costs
throughout.
TILOKE CHAND SURANA And Anr. vs J.B. BEATTIE And Co. on 13 March, 1925 94
Ind Cas 538
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASEThe plaintiffs brought a suit against the defendant, who was sued as J. B. Beattie & Co., to
recover possession of a portion of certain premises, which was occupied by the defendant.
The portion in question was part of the first floor of premises Nos. 3 and 3-1, Mangoe Lane,
Calcutta. There was a prayer for Rs. 3,160 in respect of rent up to the 31st of August 1923.
There was a further prayer for damages at the rate of Rs. 600 per month from the 1st of
September 1923 until delivery of vacant possession by reason of the alleged wrongful
possession of the defendant after the 1st of September 1923.10
The defence shortly stated was that the defendant had been a tenant of these premises for a
long time, and that in 1920 the defendant was requested by his landlords, Messrs. Hyam and
Jones, to advance money in order that such money might be applied in repairing and
improving the premises generally. It was alleged that it was verbally agreed that the
defendant would advance Messrs. Hyam and Jones money to be spent on repairs, and that the
money so advanced would be accepted as rent of the premises paid in advance and that the
defendant would be entitled to remain in possession as tenant of the premises until rent of the

10www.indiankanoon.org
15

said premises at 'the rate of Rs. 200 per month should have accrued to an amount equivalent
to the rent so paid in advance.
It was alleged that the defendant advanced in June 1920 Rs. 7,800 that on the 20th of October
1921 he made a further advance of Rs. 1,500, and that on the 29th of December 1921 he
again advanced a sum of money, this time the sum being Rs. 2,500; that the money was spent
by the landlords upon repairs and improvements of the premises in accordance with the
arrangement and that consequently the defendant was entitled to remain in possession up to
some date in 1926.
ISSUES RAISEDWhether the rent claimed by the plaintiff should be given to the plaintiffs accordingly or not?
JUDGEMENTIn this case there was a tenant upon the property and his open possession is notice not only of
the immediate terms of his tenancy but of collateral agreements as well, in the absence of all
enquiry by the transferees. Under the doctrine, therefore, illustrated by Daniels v. Davison
(1809) 16 Ves. Jun. 249 : 33 E.R. 978 : 10 R.R. 171., the mortgagees in this case, who made
no enquiry, are not entitled to say that they were purchasers for value without notice.
Therefore, the transfer of the reversion 'to them by the equitable mortgage of the 12th of July
1921 is not a transfer free from the rights of the respondent under the arrangement of the 7th
of June 1920.
In these circumstances the learned Counsel for the appellant says that in view of fact that he
in March 1923 became the auction-purchaser of the property subject to his own mortgage as
has been already detailed, he can obtain a better right and a right to override the arrangement
of June 1920 by the doctrine of lis pendents. I do not understand him to argue that he could
obtain a better right than Messrs. Sassoons, the mortgagees, by the doctrine of subrogation,
but he says that as he ultimately became the auction-purchaser he obtained a better right by
the doctrine of lis pendens. To my mind, that doctrine has no application to this case, not
because I am prepared to hold that an auction-purchaser is necessarily outsides. 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, but because it seems to me that where the Court is by its Receiver
managing property for a series of years in a mortgage suit the person who takes the property
after that management cannot under this section go back and rip up such transactions of the
Receiver and question their formal propriety. The doctrine is intended to prevent one party to
a suit making an assignment inconsistent with the right which may be established in the suit
and which might require a further party to be impleaded in order to make effectual the Court's
decree. Court thinks that the arrangement is one which binds the appellant. The respondent
16

being prima facie monthly tenant, was given on 30th July 1923 a month's notice to leave after
August 1923, and it is for him to show what this arrangement of June 1920 was, and to show
that it prevented the owners of the reversion from giving him a valid notice to quit as they
purported to do. The arrangement was on the 7th of June 1920. There is no evidence or
suggestion that the rent of the respondent was payable monthly in advance. The arrangement
was according to the written document simply this: "For the purpose of making an additional
room on the roof of the one-storied godown in the above premises, to be deducted out of the
monthly rents payable, viz., Rs. 200 per month." I have no doubt that the intention was that
on the 1st of July the rent for June should be taken to be Rs. 200 and Rs. 200 should be
cancelled accordingly. The learned Judge taking, rather at the foot of the letter, two passages
in the evidence appears to have thought that the arrangement was that the rent should be
increased only as and when the repairs were finished. That, I think, is not the meaning of the
receipt: and, so far as I can gather, the computation of the defendant in para. 5 of the written
statement was not based upon anything of the sort. There is no evidence as to when the
repairs were finished; and the burden lies entirely upon the defendant. In para. 5 of the
written statement the computation is made as if the increased rent first applied to the month
of July 1920, that is to say, the rent payable on the 1st of August, assuming it to be payable in
arrear in respect of July 192011. In my judgment, the evidence does not show that: and I think,
therefore, that there was a good notice to quit determining the respondent's status as a
monthly tenant, Thereafter his right to continue in occupation rested solely on the Rent Act.
The writ was issued on the 7th of November at a time when the rent for September had not
been paid to the proper person, and, as the tenant had no further right to notice, there is no
answer to the suit under the Calcutta Rent Act as a matter of ejectment. He cannot, however,
be charged more than Rs. 200 for September 1923.

11 law of transfer of property by Vepa P. Sarathi

17

18

CONCLUSIONWhere any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been
effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or
share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from
the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where
the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of
such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any
part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is
being acquired, is situated:
(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed
by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder,
(2) the instrument of memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in
books kept under section 51 of that Act, and
(3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been
correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
Explanation II : Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any
such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the
time being in actual possession thereof.
Explanation III: A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires
notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is
material:
if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice
thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.

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BIBLIOGRAPHYWEBSITES WWW.INDIANKANOON.ORG
WWW.WESTLAW.COM
WWW.LEXIXNEXIS.COM
WWW.MANUPATRA.COM
WWW.ADVOCATEKHOJ.COM
BOOKS EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, VEPA P. SARTHI,LAW OF TRANSFER OF
PROPERTTY,FIFTH EDITION,2010

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