Kokkotas - History of Science in Science Education

Adapting Historical Knowledge
Production to the Classroom
Adapting Historical Knowledge

Production to the Classroom
Edited by
P.V. Kokkotas, K.S Malamitsa and A.A. Rizaki

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface.................................................................................................................... vii
Section A: Theoretical Framework
1. Teaching the Philosophical and Worldview Components of Science:
Some Considerations ......................................................................................... 3
Michael R. Matthews
2. Is the History of Science the Wasteland of False Theories?............................ 17
Stathis Psillos
3. The History of Science and the Future of Science Education: A Typology
of Approaches to History of Science in Science Instruction ........................... 37
William F. McComas
4. Textbooks of the Physical Sciences and the History of Science:
Problematic Coexistence ................................................................................. 55
Kostas Gavroglu
5. Does History of Science Contribute to the Construction of Knowledge
in the Constructivist Environments of Learning? ............................................ 61
Panagiotis Kokkotas and Aikaterini Rizaki
6. On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching .......................... 85
Ricardo Lopes Coelho
7. Troublesome Droplets: Improving Students Experiences with the
Millikan Oil Drop Experiment ...................................................................... 103
Peter Heering and Stephen Klassen
8. The Antikythera Mechanism: A Mechanical Cosmos and an Eternal
Prototype for Modelling and Paradigm Study ............................................... 113
Xenophon Moussas
9. History of Science and Argumentation in Science Education:
Joining Forces?.............................................................................................. 129
Gbor . Zempln
10. Integration of Science Education and History of Science: The Catalan
Experience ..................................................................................................... 141
Antoni Roca-Rosell
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section B: Praxis
11. Teaching Modern Physics, using Selected Nobel Lectures ........................... 153
Arthur Stinner
12. Classroom Explorations with Pendulums, Mirrors, and
Galileos Drama ............................................................................................ 159
Elizabeth Cavicchi
13. Developing Greek Primary School Students Graph/Chart Interpretation
and Reading Comprehension as Critical Thinking Skills: Assessing
a Science Teaching Approach which Integrates Elements of
History of Science ......................................................................................... 181
Katerina Malamitsa, Michael Kasoutas and Panagiotis Kokkotas
14. Use of the History of Science in the Design of Research-informed NOS
Materials for Teacher Education ................................................................... 195
Agustn Adriz-Bravo
15. Which HPS do/should Textbooks Refer to? The Historical Debate on
the Nature of Electrical Fluids....................................................................... 205
Cibelle Celestino Silva
16. A wiki-course for Teacher Training in Science Education: Using History
of Science to Teach Electromagnetism.......................................................... 213
Vassilis Koulountzos and Fanny Seroglou
17. Could Scientific Controversies be used as a Tool for Teaching Science
in the Compulsory Education?: The Results of a Pilot Research Based
on the Galileo Del Monte Controversy about the Motion of the
Pendulum....................................................................................................... 229
Constantina Stefanidou and Ioannis Vlachos
18. Resolving Dilemmas in Acquiring Knowledge of Newtons First
Law: Is the History of Science Helpful? ....................................................... 249
Gyoungho Lee and Arie Leegwater
vi
PREFACE
Over the last decades an intensive interest has been developed related to the
incorporation of History and Philosophy of Science in science education curricula.
This fact is in direct relation to the organization of national and international scientific
conferences, workshops, meetings, summer schools for PhD students etc., the
publishing of proceedings, the publishing of the scientific journal Science &
Education and the creation of the International History, Philosophy Science Teaching
Group.
This group organizes every two years an International History, Philosophy Science
Education Conference in different places of the Planet and the year in between an
international workshop of experts is held at a different place in the World. In this
context the 7th International History, Philosophy Science Teaching Workshop of
Experts, which was entitled Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production
to the Classroom, was hosted in Athens 711 July 2008. The organization of this
workshop gave the opportunity to the experts in History and Philosophy of Science
as well as to science educators worldwide to sit together for fruitful discussions and
speculations. The result of this exchange of views was a collection of high quality
papers dealing with issues of both theoretical and practical interest, which focus
and contribute to the discussion and the promotion of the strategic incorporation of
History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching.
The aims of the workshop were:
the communication and the exchange of views about the introduction and the
utilization of History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching,
the osmosis of the views of the experts present at the discussion followed each
presentation and
the contribution to the reflections for the improvement of science teaching.
Product of the Athens workshop of Experts is the publication of the present book
which includes the papers presented and discussed there. Additionally, a number of
other papers, relevant to the theme of the conference, are included as they are of
interest to the theme of this book since they deal with the use of the History of Science
in science teaching. In this sense, the book is more extensive and wide ranging than
if it was just a collection of contributions of the workshop. The aims of this book
are: (1) to contribute to the improvement of the quality of science education at all
levels of education with the utilization of elements from History of Science
incorporated in science teaching and (2) to contribute to the debate about science
education at the international level in order to find new ways for further inquiry on
the issues that the book is dealing with.
The book is divided in two parts: The first expounds its philosophical and epistemological framework and the second combines theory and praxis, the theoretical
insights with their practical applications. The themes presented in it may attract the
interest of the members of the international scientific community specialized either
in History and Philosophy of Science or in science education (science teachers and
advisors, researchers in science teaching etc) especially those specialists interested
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PREFACE
in the use of History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching and its potential to
improve the quality of science education at all levels, for the benefit of all students
boys and girls worldwide.
More specifically, the reader of the book will find some contributions that deal
with and develop issues of great interest since all of the issues addressed remain
open for further analysis and inquiry or lead to dilemmas.
In the chapter Teaching the Philosophical and Worldview components of Science Some considerations, Michael Mathews discusses an important aspect of the contribution of science to culture, namely its role in the development of worldviews in
society. A case study of the adjustments to a central Roman Catholic doctrine
occasioned by the metaphysics of Atomism which was embraced at the Scientific
Revolution is presented.
In the chapter Is the History of Science the Wasteland of False Theories?, Stathis
Psillos uses the caloric theory of heat, as an example showing the non existence of
a completely falsifiable or verifiable theory. On the contrary, he states that, using the
example of the Laplaces caloric theory of heat, past science, although not completely
corroborated, is viewed historically a living part of contemporary science.
In the chapter The History of Science and the Future of Science Education - A
Typology of Approaches to History of Science in Science Instruction, William
McComas examines the role to be played in the incorporation of History of Science
approaches to the teaching of Nature of Science by discussing the rationales, reviewing prior strategies, considering examples with the ultimate goal of proposing a
taxonomy (typology) of History of Science instructional approaches to inform
practice, guide future research and provide shared definitions.
In the chapter Does History of Science contribute to the construction of knowledge
in the constructivist learning environments?, Panagiotis Kokkotas and Aikaterini
Rizaki describe the attempts made for the introduction of History of Science in
science teaching over the last century and research how from traditional theories of
learning we arrived in the modern ones, which are very well rooted in epistemology.
Modern theories of learning support the view that knowledge is constructed in
individual learning or appropriated in interactive learning environments. So, it is
neither transmittable nor discoverable. In constructivist learning environments the
use of History of Science is based in two epistemological presuppositions a) the
similarity between the conceptions of students and of scientists or philosophers
of the past, and b) the parallelism between the development of students understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in History of Science.
Furthermore, there are contributions that deal with issues regarding the writing
of contemporary science textbooks in which the position and the incorporation of
elements of History of Science in science teaching are addressed, and the extent to
which this incorporation contributes to the improvement of the quality of science
teaching.
In the chapter Textbooks of the physical sciences and the history of science problematic coexistence, Kostas Gavroglu tries to answer two questions. The
first is whether historically informed textbooks play any role in making students
understand what History of Science is. The second question is whether pedagogic
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PREFACE
expediency is always in tandem with the scholarship of History of Science. Finally, the
author wonders might it be the case that what one wants to achieve in pedagogic
terms may be in conflict with what one wants to convey in historical terms? and
he concludes that what, perhaps, we need to attempt is to encourage the writing of
historically informed textbooks.
In the chapter Which HPS do/should textbooks refer to? - The historical debate
on the nature of electrical fluids, Cibelle Celestino Silva asserts the importance of
Nature of Science in science teaching and presents Brazilian National Standards
which emphasize the social and cultural contextualization as necessary and point
some abilities to be developed in physics teaching, recognizing among others:
physics as a human endeavor, teaching aspects of its history and its relationship
with cultural, social, political and economic contexts, its role in the production
system etc.
There are some other contributions that deal with science teaching approaches
using History of Science, as they have been applied at the tertiary level of education,
creating a fruitful field of discussions. In these contributions, based on the experience
of the application, the results of the teaching procedures have been described.
In the chapter Teaching Modern Physics, using selected Nobel lectures, Arthur
Stinner describes the course and a rationale for prospective physics teachers at
the University of Manitoba, using a selected number of appropriate Nobel lectures.
He decided to give them some enthusiasm and self confidence for the teaching of
the ideas and the concepts of modern physics. Based on his prior experience, he
was convinced that the conventional approach revisiting the main ideas of modern
physics using a textbook would only lead to boredom. His contribution also
contains a shortened version of a handout produced by one of his students (in
consultation with the instructor) based on the work of J. J. Thomson, as reported in
his Nobel lecture.
In the chapter Classroom Explorations with Pendulums, Mirrors, and Galileos
Drama, Elizabeth Cavicchi presents classrooms explorations with Pendulums,
Mirrors, and Galileos Drama. In this context, while exploring materials, students
researched Galileo, his trial, and its aftermath. Questions and experiments evolved
continually, differing perspectives on science and authority were exchanged respectfully and students developed as critical explorers of the world.
In the chapter Use of the History of Science in the design of research-informed
NOS materials for teacher education, Agustin Aduriz Brabo recognizing the NOS
as a major component in science teacher education, argues that several programs and
materials have been issued, based on NOS research and aim at changing prospective
and in-service teachers ideas on what science is and how it works. In this study, he
describes one possible rationale for an integration, which uses the History of Science
as a set (in the theatrical sense) to learn key ideas from 20th century philosophy of
science. He also provided a brief overview of the process of derivation of historybased NOS materials using the idea of setting.
In the chapter A wiki-course for teacher training in science education: Using
History of Science to teach electromagnetism, Vassilis Koulountzos and Fanny
Seroglou present the design and development of the instructional e-material that
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PREFACE
has been inspired by History of Science for science teachers e-training. The teachers
have been introduced to a variety of activities such as: experiments, role-playing,
discussions, and debates. Wiki offers a dynamic environment for in-service teachers
to interact with each other, providing a Wiki-course as a promising flexible and
expanding character to teacher education.
In the chapter Developing Greek Primary School Students Graph/Chart Interpretation and Reading Comprehension as Critical Thinking Skills - Assessing
a Science Teaching Approach which Integrates Elements of History of Science,
Katerina Malamitsa, Michael Kasoutas and Panagiotis Kokkotas discuss the
development of sixth grade students graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills as critical thinking skills, relatively to the contribution of the integration
of aspects of History of Science into instruction. Towards this direction a project
on electromagnetism was designed and implemented aiming to engage primary school
students in a critical examination of knowledge by generating argumentation and
discussion in their classrooms. The results were supportive to the integration of
History of Science in science instruction.
In the chapter Could scientific controversies be used as a tool for teaching science
in the Compulsory Education? - The results of a pilot research, Constantina
Stefanidou and Ioannis Vlachos present the results of a pilot research which
aimed to introduce aspects of the Nature of Science in physics teaching, based on a
historical context. Taking into account that the study of the simple pendulum is
included in physics curriculum, they were inspired by the scientific and philosophical
controversy between Galileo and Del Monte about the pendulum motion. The
intervention was addressed to thirteen high school students and was assessed. The
results indicated that scientific controversies may be useful for teaching Nature of
Science.
The following three contributions refer to Spain, Greece and Slovacia respectively
and have their own distinguished contribution to this book.
In the chapter Integration of Science Education and History of Science: The
Catalan experience, Antoni Roca-Rosell signalizing that the role of History of
Science in education ought to provide an alternative view of science and technology
placing them in a human context, presents the efforts for the achievement this
objective in Barcelona. There are a number of groups working on this objective
with two main orientations: first, dissemination of historical content in science
education, highlighting the educational value of case studies and second, special
courses on history of science and technology at the university level.
In the chapter the Antikythera Mechanism - A Mechanical Cosmos and an
eternal prototype for Modelling and Paradigm Study, Xenophon Moussas argues
that the Mechanism of Antikythera is the oldest, the only and in fact the very best
known example of a complex astronomical device, a dedicated analogue astronomical
computer, possibly a planetarium, a device made with gears. We know that this type
of devices have been used as educational devices in schools. As we read in Cicero
and other ancient texts, great scientists and philosophers developed and used such
devices either for education, entertainment, or to impress ones visitors and guests,
including state persons during their state visits. The Mechanism is ideal for
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PREFACE
investigating interdisciplinarity in the sciences, as it covers many fields of traditional

disciplines, without taking into account traditional boundaries between academic
subjects, so that it helps a pupil and a student, or an adult learner, to think in a way
that crosses the borders of established fields and have a holistic view.
In the chapter On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching,
Ricardo Lopes Coelho acknowledges that some physicists have pointed out that
we do not really know what energy is. He regards as a main aim of the present paper:
How to understand energy thanks to its history. For this purpose, he proposes that
historical topics which constitute the basis of modern approaches in textbooks will be
considered and how to interpret Joules experiment. The history of science teaches
us that energy was discovered in the 1840s. Mayer, Joule, Colding and Helmholtz
are generally considered the discoverers. They did not speak of conservation or transformation of energy but rather of force (Mayer, Colding or Helmholtz) or conversion
of mechanical power into heat and vice-versa.
Studies like the following deal exclusively with either the educational transformation of the science concepts and the construction of educational material or the
use of teaching strategies which incorporate History of Science in science teaching.
In the chapter On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching,
Ricardo Lopes Coelho acknowledges that some physicists have pointed out that
we do not really know what energy is. He regards as a main aim of the present
paper: How to understand energy thanks to its history. For this purpose, he
proposes that historical topics which constitute the basis of modern approaches in
textbooks will be considered and how to interpret Joules experiment.
In the chapter Troublesome droplets - Improving students experiences with the
Millikan oil drop experiment, Peter Heering and Stephen Klassen argue that the
Millikans oil drop experiment is among the classic experiments from modern
physics and one of the most beautiful experiments of all time. They acknowledge
that the educational existing concerns for the Millikans experiment contrast with
the laboratory experience of students and instructors in performing the experiment.
So, they started a research project on the Millikan experiment in order to improve
its educational potential. In this chapter, they describe the project and the measures
that they intend to take to improve the experience of students.
In the chapter History of science and argumentation in science education: Joining
forces?, Gbor Zempln presents an important aspect of any educational approach
that aims to incorporate History of Science to develop either knowledge and
skills on the Nature of Science, citizenship ideas (including socio-scientific issues
and public understanding of science), or reflective, critical thinking. Argumentation
appears to be a crucial aspect of science, and, as such, also for approaches incorporating history of science in curricula. In spite of this, at the moment mostly
desiderata are set in course and curriculum objectives, without providing the necessary
time for both history of science and argumentation in science classes, as a recent
study concludes. Furthermore, the author outlines a number of limitations and some of
the possibilities that research in argumentation in science education suggests in the
hope of showing the benefit of these considerations for the incorporation of History
of Science in science classrooms.
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PREFACE
In the chapter Resolving Dilemmas in Acquiring Knowledge of Newtons First

Lawn - Is the History of Science Helpful?, Gyoungho Lee and Arie Leegwater
explore a dilemmas episode of a physics teacher who is confronted by student
disbelief in Newtons First Law of Motion; there is the tension between students
common-sense knowledge and the formal knowledge of science. Furthermore, they
present the historical case of natural motion and its potential for resolving the
dilemmas of teaching Newtons First Law.
The Editors
Panagiotis Kokkotas, Katerina Malamitsa and Aikaterini Rizaki
xii
SECTION A: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS
1. TEACHING THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE
Some Considerations1
1. INTRODUCTION
A common feature of contemporary science education curricula is the expectation

that as well as learning science content and method, students will learn something
about science - its nature, its history, how it differs from non-scientific endeavours,
and its interactions with society and culture. Thus as well as disciplinary or
technical goals, contemporary science curricula rightly seek to contribute wider
educational goals. These have often been called humanistic, cultural or liberal
goals. The American Association for the Advancement of Science expressed its
commitment to cultural or humanistic outcomes of science education in its Project
2061 (AAAS, 1989) publication, and the following year in The Liberal Art of
Science:
The teaching of science must explore the interplay between science and the
intellectual and cultural traditions in which it is firmly embedded. Science
has a history that can demonstrate the relationship between science and the
wider world of ideas and can illuminate contemporary issues (AAAS, 1990,
p. xiv).
The unique contribution of the science programme to this more general problemsolving educational goal is the cultivation and refinement of specifically scientific
habits of mind. These are meant to spill over from the laboratory bench to the
home, workplace, community and nation. For the AAAS, the wider planetary
problems are not just scientific and technical, they are also social, cultural, and
ideological; and the conviction is that these problems can be, and perhaps only can
be, solved by application of a scientific habit of mind. The expectations of the
AAAS have found their way through to the US National Science Education Standards
where there is a separate content strand on History and Nature of Science Standards
(NRC, 1996) this strand is to be covered in science programmes from kindergarten
to year 12. Of this strand, the document says that:
Students should develop an understanding of what science is, what science is
not, what science can and cannot do, and how science contributes to culture
(NRC, 1996, p. 2).
P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production
to the Classroom, 316.
2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
MATTHEWS
And,
The standards for the history and nature of science recommend the use of
history in school science programs to clarify different aspects of scientific
inquiry, the human aspects of science, and the role that science has played in
the development of various cultures. (NRC, 1996, p. 107).
The liberal or cultural curricular views advanced by the AAAS and evidenced in
Norways Education Framework have a long history. The hope for a positive spillover effect from the learning of science to the improvement of society and culture
is a 21st century restatement of the central plank of the European Enlightenment of
the 18th century: The Enlightenment thinkers believed that the spread of science
would ameliorate many of the enormous physical, social and ideological problems
that then beset Europe - terrible religious wars, widespread and gross superstitions,
witch crazes, plagues, absolutist and authoritarian monarchical regimes, a domineering
and intrusive Roman Catholic Church, and equally domineering Protestant Churches
where they had the opportunity, the Inquisition, and so on. In these circumstances
it was not surprising that many thought that the method of the New Science that
was so manifestly fruitful in the achievements of Newton should be applied more
broadly and that it would have flow-on effects for the betterment of culture and
society.
These curricular statements and Framework pronouncements provide an open
cheque for the inclusion of history and philosophy of science in science teacher
education programmes, and for their utilisation in classrooms. Unfortunately this
open cheque is too often not cashed. This paper will discuss an important aspect of
the contribution of science to culture, namely its role in the development of
worldviews in society; and then how this interaction of science and worldviews can
be taught in school programmes.
2. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Science raises philosophical questions and requires philosophical commitments:

science and philosophy go hand-in-hand2. It is no accident that many of the major
physicists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote books on philosophy and
the engaging overlaps between science and philosophy - for instance Boltzmann,
von Helmholtz, Mach, Duhem, Eddington, Jeans, Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Born,
and Bohm3. Many less well known physicists also wrote such books; among the
better ones being: Bridgman, Campbell, Margenau, Bunge, Chandrasekhar, Holton,
Rabi, Shimony, Rohrlich, Cushing and Weinberg4. A good many chemists and
biologists have made contributions to this genre for instance Haldane (1928),
Polanyi (1958), Bernal (1939), Hull (1988), Mayr (1982), Gould (1999), Birch
(1990), Monod (1971), and Wilson (1998). One very recent contribution to the
genre is by Francis Collins, the geneticist and leader of the Human Genome Project
(Collins, 2007)5.
4
The Oxford philosopher, R. G. Collingwood in his landmark study The Idea of

Nature wrote on the history of mutual interdependence of science and philosophy
and commented that:
The detailed study of natural fact is commonly called natural science, or for
short simply science; the reflection on principles, whether those of natural
science or of any other department of thought or action, is commonly called
philosophy. but the two things are so closely related that natural science
cannot go on for long without philosophy beginning; and that philosophy
reacts on the science out of which it has grown by giving it in future a new
firmness and consistency arising out of the scientists new consciousness of
the principles on which he has been working (Collingwood, 1945, p. 2).
He goes on to write that:
For this reason it cannot be well that natural science should be assigned
exclusively to one class of persons called scientists and philosophy to another
class called philosophers. A man who has never reflected on the principles
of his work has not achieved a grown-up mans attitude towards it; a
scientist who has never philosophized about his science can never be more
than a second-hand, imitative, journeyman scientist (Collingwood, 1945,
p. 2).
What Collingwood says about the requirement of reflecting upon principles being
necessary for the practice of good science, can equally be said for the practice of
good science teaching. Liberal education promotes just such deeper reflection and
questioning of the basic laws or assumptions of any discipline being taught, including
science.
3. SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS
Science not only raises and is intertwined with the foregoing types of routine
philosophical questions, but these philosophical reflections lead inexorably to
metaphysical ones, and finally to questions about worldviews. The phenomena
and questions science investigates; the kinds of answers it entertains; the types of
entities it recognises as having causal influence; the boundaries, if any, it sets to the
domain of scientific investigation; and so on, all begin to touch upon or push
against larger metaphysical commitments of an epistemological, ontological, and
sometimes ethical kind.
Consider the Law of Inertia, the foundation stone of classical physics which is
taught to every science student in school. It is usually stated as: bodies either
remain at rest or continue travelling in a straight line at a constant velocity unless
acted upon by a force. In better schools it might be demonstrated by means
of sliding a puck on an air table. In a purely technical science education the law
is learnt by heart, and problems worked out using its associated formulae of
F = ma. Technical purposes might be satisfied with correct memorisation and
5
MATTHEWS
mastery of the quantitative skills - a force of X newtons acts on a mass of Y

kilograms, what acceleration is produced?- but the goals of liberal education
cannot be so easily satisfied. Just a little philosophical reflection and historical
investigation on this routine topic of inertia opens up whole new scientific and
educational vistas.
Apart from interesting and important history, basic matters of philosophy arise
in any good classroom treatment of the law of inertia:
epistemology - we never see force-free behaviour in nature, nor can it be experimentally induced, so what is the source and justification of our knowledge of
bodies acting without impressed forces? If force is measured by acceleration,
and if acceleration is a function of measures of time, then the magnitude of
a supposedly independent force depends upon our metric of time.
ontology - we do not see or experience force apart from its manifestation, so
does it have existence? What is mass? What is a measure of mass as distinct
from weight?
cosmology - does such an inertial object go on forever in an infinite void?
What happens at the limits of infinite space? Were bodies created with
movement?
These are the sorts of considerations that prompted Poincar to say: When
we say force is the cause of motion, we are talking metaphysics (Poincar,
1905/1952, p. 98). And as every physics class talks of force being the cause of
motion, then there is metaphysics lurking in every classroom, just waiting to be
exposed.
But as well as movement upwards from the study of nature (science) to
associated metaphysics, there is of course movement downwards. The study of nature
presupposes certain metaphysical and procedural or methodological commitments:
first the existence of an external world that is independent of the observer; second
the universality of causation in that world, if something happens there is a cause
that made it happen; and third the constancy of causation, if an event E has cause C
today, then it will have the same cause tomorrow and the same cause in other
places. To these three presuppositions might be added epistemological commitments
such as: our mind or reason is such that we can come to know the external world.
Some might add an additional epistemic presupposition of science: namely that
appraisal of alternative beliefs needs to be rational; science is an activity in which
evidence is of central relevance in deciding upon truth or falsity, it is thus different
from politics or business.
These presuppositions, postulates or principles might be labelled Realism,
Determinism, Lawfulness, Reason and Rationality. They are not self-evident; not all
people and cultures have believed them, some have argued that it was the Christian
worldview where God was removed from nature that, contra animism, allowed
science to flourish; and some of these principles are disputed by contemporary
philosophers of science. The principles are not directly proved by science rather
they are the default metaphysical positions for the conduct of Western science.
Duhem and Poincar, at the beginning of the twentieth century, called these
principles conventions. Poincar wrote that: while these laws are imposed on
6
our science, which otherwise could not exist, they are not imposed on Nature
(Poincar, 1905/1952, p. xxiii). And reassuringly for a Realist he added: Are
they then arbitrary? No; for if they were, they would not be fertile (ibid.). One
philosophical question here is how does fertility bear upon the truth of the
principles of the fertile research programme; another is how does such truth, if
truth it be, give grounds for believing in the invisible entities postulated by the
principles?
Clearly one important task for educators who are exhorted to teach something
about science, its impact on culture, and how it is distinguished from other ways of
knowing is to reflect on whether philosophy and metaphysics is separate from or a
part of science. Either way it is going to need to be taught. If metaphysics and
philosophical commitments are an integral part of science, then they clearly need to
be fleshed out, articulated and examined; if they are something separate from science,
then it will need to be shown just how they are separate.
4. SCIENCE AND WORLDVIEWS
This amalgam of ontological, metaphysics, epistemological and ethical commitments,

especially when extended to include religious or irreligious positions can loosely
be called a worldview. A worldview encompasses ideas of nature - its constitution,
origins and purposes if any; ideas of our place in nature and in the general scheme
of things; ideas of what entities exist in the world - matter?, spirits? minds? Angels?;
ideas about the powers and actions of such existing entities?; ideas of God and how
God may or may not interact with the world including answering prayers, performing
miracles, making Revelations, and anointing prophets or messengers; ideas of the
Sacred; ideas of how knowledge is acquired and tested; ideas of the goodness or
badness of human nature; and so on.
In the seventeenth century, the new science (natural philosophy) of Galileo,
Descartes, Huygens, Boyle and Newton caused a massive change not just in
science, but in European philosophy that had enduring repercussions for religion,
ethics, politics and culture. All the major natural philosophers of the time rejected
Aristotelianism in their scientific practice and in their enunciated philosophy.
Overwhelmingly the new philosophy to which they turned was corpuscularian,
mechanical and realist - it has rightly been called the Mechanical World View6. In
this new world view, there was simply no place for the entities that Aristotelianism
utilised to explain events in the world: hylomorphism, immaterial substances, natures,
substantial forms, and final causes were all banished from the philosophical
firmament.
Galileo reached back to pre-Socratic atomistic sources, and to more recent
medieval nominalist sources, for his account of matter. As a student he had read
Democritus, Lucretius, and possibly other early atomists such as Leucippus the
teacher of Democritus. For them colour and taste were opinions, mere names; what
existed in the world was atoms and the void, and atoms had neither colour nor
taste. They held a material monist position - all matter was an aggregate of invisible
and indivisible atoms each of which was made of the same material, and differing
7
MATTHEWS
among themselves only in size and shape. It was the particular aggregate of atoms
that gave bodies their tangible properties; a bodys properties were not produced or
caused by its Form. When new substances are created from different materials,
their immutable atoms are just rearranged in different ways; there is no change
of Form, because there was no Form to change. This atomistic ontology was so
comprehensively rejected by Aristotle in this Physics and his Metaphysics that it
disappeared from the philosophical firmament for over a thousand years until it
was revived by some thinkers on the margins of medieval philosophy such as
William of Ockham and Nicholas of Autrecourt.
Galileo makes explicit his atomism, or corpuscularianism, when he says:
Those materials which produce heat in us and make us feel warmth, which
are known by the general name of fire, would then be a multitude of minute
particles having certain shapes and moving with certain velocities. Meeting
with our bodies, they penetrate by means of their extreme subtlety, and their
touch as felt by us when they pass through our substance is the sensation we
call heat. I do not believe that in addition to shape, number, motion,
penetration, and touch there is any other quality in fire corresponding to
heat. (ibid)
Galileos ontology was simply inconsistent with Scholastic metaphysics and thus
with the medieval world view built upon it. Galileos distinction between primary
and secondary qualities was the beginning of the unravelling of this Medieval
Synthesis and its replacement by the Mechanical World View and ultimately the
Scientific World View.
Newton, the greatest of all seventeenth-century scientists, was also a champion
of the New Philosophy7. Beginning in his student days, Newton embraced Galileos
mathematical methods, his Copernicanism, his experimentalism, his rejection
of Aristotles physics, his rejection of Scholastic philosophy, and his embryonic
atomism8. In the Preface of the Principia Newton identifies himself with the
moderns, rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities and endeavours to
subject the phenomena of nature to the laws of mathematics (Newton, 1729/1934,
p. xvii).
Much can be said about Atomism and its role in the Scientific Revolution, but
for current purposes it is suffice to repeat Dilworths judgement that:
The metaphysics underlying the Scientific Revolution was that of early
Greek atomism. It is with atomism that one obtains the notion of a
physical reality underlying the phenomena, a reality in which uniform causal
relations obtain. What made the Scientific Revolution truly distinct, and
Galileo its father, was that for the first time this empirical methodology
[of Archimedes] was given an ontological underpinning (Dilworth, 2006,
p. 201).
Whenever atomism was entertained in the medieval and renaissance period it
provoked intense theological and religious attention, if not outrage; atomism was a
8
red-flag to proponents of the established, church-endorsed, philosophical orthodoxy.

Peter Gassendi adopted Epicurean atomism in the early seventeenth century, but
bent it to the dictates of the Catholic Church in which he was a priest. Thus he said,
contra Epicurus that the atoms are not eternal in time, they are not infinite in
number, and their initial motion was not sui generis, but rather they were moved by
God.
The Islamic tradition also decried the new scientific worldview, and its
Enlightenment champions. A representative Islamic reaction to the Scientific
Revolution can be seen when one contemporary scholar writes that the new
science of Galileo and Newton had tragic consequences for the West because it
marked:
The first occasion in human history when a human collectivity completely
replaced the religious understanding of the order of nature for one that was
not only nonreligious but that also challenged some of the most basic tenets
of the religious perspective (Nasr, 1996, p. 130).
Nasr repeats Western religious and romantic laments about the new science when
he writes:
Henceforth as long as only the quantitative face of nature was considered as
real, and the new science was seen as the only science of nature, the religious
meaning of the order of nature was irrelevant, at best an emotional and poetic
response to matter in motion (Nasr, 1996, p. 143).
5. THE ATOMISTIC HERESY
Just as science is associated with one or more worldviews, so too is religion; and
both history and contemporary times bear witness to the fact that the worldviews
of science and of religion do not always sit easily with each other. Worldview
conflicts occasioned by disputes about Creation, Creationism, Teleology, Miracles,
the existence of individual souls or spirits, and so on, have been comprehensively
written upon, with just the past few years seeing bestsellers devoted to these
conflicts (Dennett, 1995; Dawkins, 2006; Hitchens, 2007).
A less written upon, but very illustrative, example of debate about compatibility
of scientific and religious worldviews concerns atomism, the central ontological
plank of the Scientific Revolution. Among the numerous Christian positions that
atomism seemingly threatened, the most basic and important one was the revered
Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Eastern Uniate teaching on Christs presence in
the Eucharist; the doctrine of Transubstantiation. The Eucharist was the sacramental heart of the Catholic Mass, and the Mass was the devotional heart of
the Church. Belief in the Real Presence of Christ, brought into being by the
priests consecration of the communion host, underwrote devotional practice and
doctrinal authority. Denial of the Real Presence was a capital offence. It was a
litmus test in the Inquisition, where failure the belief meant a horrible death at
the stake.
9
MATTHEWS
Scholastic philosophy, with its Aristotelian categories of substance, accidents

and qualities could bring a modicum of intelligibility to this central mystery of
faith -at consecration the substance of bread changed to the substance of Christs
body, but the accidents remained that of bread. So Christ became truly present,
even though there was no sensible change apparent. Thomas Aquinas formulated
the orthodox doctrine as:
All the substance of the bread is transmuted into the body of Christ
therefore, this is not a formal conversion but a substantial one. Nor does it
belong to the species of natural mutations; but, with its own definition, it is
called transubstantiation (Summa Theologica III, q.75, a.4, in Redondi, 1988,
p. 212).
This Thomist formulation, along with the Aristotelian philosophical apparatus
required for its interpretation, was affirmed as defining Catholic orthodoxy at the
Council of Trent in 1551.
Although Galileo was, in 1615, warned not to hold or teach the Copernican
doctrine of a moving earth, it was only after The Assayer and its endorsement of
atomism, was published in 1623 that he faced serious theological charges. The
charge of Atomism against Galileo with its direct implications of heresy, was
publicly made by Father Grassi, a prominent Jesuit professor of mathematics and
astronomy at the Collegio Romano. In a book published in Paris in 1626 he
wrote:
I must now reply to the digression on heat in which Galileo openly declares
himself a follower of the school of Democritus and Epicurus.
I cannot avoid giving vent to certain scruples that preoccupy me. They
come from what we have regarded as incontestable on the basis of the
precepts of the Fathers, the Councils, and the entire Church.
They are the qualities by virtue of which, although the substance of the bread
and wine disappear, thanks to omnipotent words, nonetheless their sensible
species persist; that is, their color, taste, warmth, or coldness. Only by the
divine will are these species maintained, and in miraculous fashion, as they
tell me.
Instead, Galileo expressly declares that heat, color, taste, and everything else
of this kind are outside [inside?] of him who feels them, and therefore in the
bread and wine, just simple names. Hence, when the substance of the bread
and wine disappears, only the names of the qualities will remain.
In the host, it is commonly affirmed, the sensible species (heat, taste, and so
on) persist. Galileo, on the contrary, says that heat and taste, outside of him
who perceives them, and hence also in the host, are simple names; that is,
they are nothing. One must therefore infer, from what Galileo says, that heat
10
and taste do not subsist in the host. The soul experiences horror at the very
thought (Redondi, 1987, p. 336).
Underlining the gravity of this charge against Galileo, Father Grassi adds that
Transubstantiation constitutes the essential point of faith or contains all other
essential points (Redondi, 1987, p. 336). Descartes matter theory was likewise
condemned in 1671 because its categories did not allow an intelligent rendering of
the doctrine of Transubstantiation.
John Hedley Brooke, an historian sympathetic to claims about the positive
contribution of religion to science, recognized the problem that atomism posed
especially for the Roman Catholic Church, which took a distinctive view of the
presence of Christ at the celebration of the Eucharist (Brooke, 1991, p. 141). He
writes:
With an Aristotelian theory of matter and form, it was possible to understand
how the bread and wine could retain their sensible properties while their
substance was miraculously turned into the body and blood of Christ. .But
if, as the mechanical philosophers argued, the sensible properties were
dependent on an ulterior configuration of particles, then any alteration to that
internal structure would have discernible effects. The bread and wine would
no longer appear as bread and wine if a real change had occurred (Brooke,
1991, p. 142).
On the face of it the whole influential tradition of Roman Catholic Thomistic and
Scholastic teaching, which had enormous cultural and personal impact in Catholic
Europe, Latin America, the Philippines, and elsewhere, was in flat contradiction to
the worldview of science. Adjustments had to be made on one side or the other.
This is a rich, fertile and engaging example of the impact of science on culture, and
of cultures responses and reactions to such impact.
6. OPTIONS FOR RECONCILING WORLDVIEWS
Examination of the Atomism heresy might seem arcane, but there are benefits to be
derived; some issues, relationships and tensions are more obvious when viewed in
the calmer light of history than in the often partisan glare of the present. The
Atomism versus specifically Roman Catholic and Orthodox religious debate of the
seventeenth century brings into focus a number of enduring philosophical, religious
and cultural issues, among which are at least the following:
1. Does the Christian religion, make metaphysical claims? And are such claims
best expressed in any particular philosophical system?
2. Is there a need for religious claims to be made intelligible or reasonable?
3. How adequate is Scholastic Thomism for the interpretation of Christian doctrine?
4. Should philosophical systems be judged by their theological adequacy or
compatibility?
5. Does the Church have the authority to proscribe philosophical systems?
11
MATTHEWS
These issues were argued within the Christian churches; they were debated in the
Enlightenment; and are still debated9. For example, the author of one work titled
Christian Metaphysics straightforwardly argues that:
The thesis which I submit to the critical examination of the reader is that there
is one Christian philosophy and one only. I maintain, in other words, that
Christianity calls for a metaphysical structure which is not any structure, that
Christianity is an original metaphysic. ...[it is] a body of very precise and
very well-defined theses which are properly metaphysical (Tresmontant,
1965, pp. 1920).
Such a position might be labelled privileged in as much as the metaphysics
comes from outside of science, not from within. This was the situation mentioned
above when Gassendi modified the atomism of Epicurus to have it accord with
Christian belief. Privilege for such metaphysical positions is usually is derived
from Revelation, Theology, Philosophy, Intuition or perhaps Politics. Such privileged
metaphysical views can be found enunciated by advocates of Judaic, Islamic,
Hindu, Buddhist and a host of lesser religions; as well as of indigenous belief
systems. These traditions would formulate the above five issues in their own
terms. And if Marxism-Leninism is substituted for Thomism, and The Central
Committee is substituted for Church then the above list of issues is applicable
to the situation that pertained in the Soviet Union and its satellites; with the
Lysenko case being the most public and scandalous reminder of how enduring
are the issues10.
Where there is such incompatibility between scientific and religious metaphysics
and worldviews - as in the case of Atomism developed above - the options usually
taken to reconcile the differences are to claim that:
1. Science really has no metaphysics; that it makes no metaphysical claims. This is
the option made famous by the Catholic positivist Pierre Duhem.
2. The metaphysics of science is false; at least any such purported metaphysics that
is inconsistent with religious beliefs. This is the option advocated by the
Scholastic tradition discussed above; by Tresmontant and Nasr who are quoted
above; and by philosophical theologians such as Plantinga (2000), Mascall (1956),
and numerous others.
3. There can be parallel, equally valid, metaphysics. This is an old option given
recent prominence by Stephen Gould in his NOMA formulation (Gould,
1999).
All these options have their problems, but this is not the place to elaborate
them; they are fully elaborated by contributors to the Science & Education
special issue devoted to Science, Worldviews and Education (Vol. 18, Nos. 67,
2009). As far as education is concerned, the important thing is to have students
first recognise what are the options, and second carefully examine them and
their implications and ideally take up a personal, if provisional, position on the
matter.
12
7. CONCLUSION
Science has contributed immensely to our philosophical and cultural tradition, this
is part of the flesh of science; too often, unfortunately, science teaching presents just
the bare bones of science this is one reason why, notoriously, advanced technical
science is so often associated with religious and ideological fundamentalism and
bigotry. The cultural flesh needs to be part of any serious science programme, and
indeed this is now required in many contemporary curriculum statements. These
requirements present an open cheque for historical and philosophical studies in
science education; but for the cheque to be cashed teachers need the relevant
knowledge, interest and enthusiasm for such studies. Unfortunately they are poorly
covered in teacher education programmes.
In a good liberal education students will learn about the philosophical dimensions
of science, beginning with the routine matters listed early in this paper - matters
of conceptual analysis, epistemology, ethics and so on. They will also learn
about the metaphysical, especially ontological, dimensions of science, some of
which have been discussed above. They should also be introduced to, and hopefully
make decisions about the constitution and applicability of the scientific outlook,
habit of mind or the scientific temper - is a scientific outlook required for the
solution of social and ideological problems? And finally students should engage
with the questions of science and worldviews, and study options for reconciling
seeming conflicts in this area. All of this makes science classes more intellectually
engaging, it promotes minds-on science learning, and it might help inoculate
students against snake-oil merchants who peddle various metaphysical schemes
and wonders if students have all ready engaged with serious metaphysical
questions and debates, and have been exposed to genuine wonders about the
world and sciences coming to know something about it they might be less
likely to fall for whatever passing fantasies are doing the internet and television
rounds.
In these three areas philosophy, metaphysics and worldviews teachers will need
to guide and inform students, provide them with materials, and structure discussion
and debate. These educational goals should not just be the responsibility of the
science teacher; they should be realised by informed and competent curricula coordination across the subjects of science, philosophy and history. But it does not mean
that students should learn the correct options, or that teachers should give them
correct answers. Immanuel Kant famously said that the motto of the Enlightenment
was Have courage to use your own reason! (Kant, 1784/2003, p. 54). A century
earlier, John Locke expressed this motif as a principle for liberal education in his
1689 Enlightenment classic, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he
said:
The floating of other mens opinions in our brains makes us not one jot more
knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science is in us
but opiniatertry, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do
not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which
gave them reputation.
13
MATTHEWS
And then proceeded memorably to say:

Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it be gold in the hand from
which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use (Locke,
1689/1924, p. 40).
The same advice is applicable today.
NOTES
1
8
9
10
This paper is based on a longer version that is to appear in Science & Education, vol.18, nos. 56,
2009. The special issue is devoted to Science, Worldviews and Education.
Some useful studies on the philosophical dimension of science are Smart (1968), Wartofsky (1968),
Buchdahl (1969), Amsterdamski (1975), Trusted (1991), and Dilworth (2006).
See for instance: Boltzmann, Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems (1905/1974), Helmholtzs
Science & Culture (1995), Machs The Science of Mechanics (1893/1960), Duhems The Aim and
Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954), Plancks Where is Science Going? (1932), Eddingtons The
Philosophy of Physical Science (1939), Jeans Physics and Philosophy (1943/1981), Bohr Atomic
Physics and Human Knowledge (1958), Heisenberg Physics and Philosophy (1962), Schrdinger
My View of the World (1964), Born My Life & My Views (1968), and Bohm Wholeness and the
Implicate Order (1980).
See for instance: Bridgman Reflections of a Physicist (1950), Margenau The Nature of Physical Reality
(1950), Rabi Science the Centre of Culture (Rabi, 1967), Bunge Philosophy of Science (Bunge, 1998),
Chandrasekhar Truth and Beauty (Chandrasekhar, 1987), Campbell What Is Science? (Campbell,
1921/1952), Holton Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought (Holton, 1973), Cushing Philosophical
Concepts in Physics (Cushing, 1998), Rohrlich From Paradox to Reality (Rohrlich, 1987), Shimony
Search for a Naturalistic World View (Shimony, 1993) and Weinberg Facing Up: Science and Its
Cultural Adversaries (Weinberg, 2001).
Beyond the substantial and careful writers listed above it needs to be acknowledged that there is
a veritable legion of insubstantial and careless writers whose books are nevertheless best sellers.
These authors simply muddy the waters, and bring discredit to the programme of understanding the
overlap of science and philosophy.
For historical and philosophical elaboration of the mechanical world view see Dijksterhuis (1961/
1986), Harr (1964), and Westfall (1971).
Numerous works are available on Newtons philosophy and metaphysics, among them are McMullin
(1978), Stein (2002), McGuire (1995) and Hughes (1990). Although an atomist, Newton distanced
himself from Descartes interpretation of the theory.
For Newtons early scientific and philosophical formation see Herivel (1965).
For representative literature on this topic of Christian Philosophy see Trethowan (1954) and
Tresmontant (1965). For discussion of the suitability of Thomism as a vehicle for the interpretation
of Christian doctrine, see McInerny (1966) and Weisheipl (1968).
See Graham (1973), Joravsky (1970), Lecourt (1977), and Soyfer (1994).
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Michael R. Matthews
School of Education, University of New South Wales, Australia
e-mail: m.matthews@unsw.edu.au
16
STATHIS PSILLOS
2. IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE

WASTELAND OF FALSE THEORIES?
1. INTRODUCTION
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors of Imagine you live
in 1823 and you are about to design an advanced course on the theory of heat.
About fifty years ago, Lavoisier and Laplace had posited caloric as a material
substance an indestructible fluid of fine particles which was taken to be the
cause of heat and in particular, the cause of the rise of temperature of a body, by
being absorbed by the body. No doubt, you rely on the best available theory, which
is the caloric theory. In particular, meticulous and knowledgeable as you are, you
rely on the best of the best: Laplaces advanced account of the caloric theory of
heat, with all its sophistication, detail and predictive might. You really believe that
the best science teaching should be based on the best theories that are available.
But you also believe that the best theory that is available is not really the best
unless it has a claim to truth (or truthlikeness, or partial truth and the like). For
what is the point of teaching a theory about the deep structure of the world unless it
does say something or other about this deep structure?
The course goes really well. Your notes are impressive. They are soon turned
into a textbook with lots of explanatory detail and fancy calculations. Alas! The
world does not co-operate. There are no calorific particles among the things there
are in it. Heat is destroyed when work is produced. The advanced theory is challenged
by alternative theories, anomalies and failed predictions. There is agony, but in your
lifetime, the caloric theory gets superseded and is left discredited in the wasteland
of false theories. Decades come by. You are not around anymore. Your grandchildren go to school and then to the university; they follow some new-fangled
courses on the history of science. And there it is. The once powerful caloric theory
of heat is now only a chapter in the history of science textbook.
Why is this not the fate of all (or most) of the theories we come up with?
Why arent current theories, despite their explanatory and predictive successes, just
chapters in the hitherto unwritten history of science books? Why is science
education not just future history of science education plus some problem-solvers?
This might well be a fate we have to live with. Or, we might be able to say
something different, viz., that science is a mixture of continuity and change and
that there is reason to believe that parts of current scientific theories, like parts of
past scientific theories, will survive radical theory-change and form (and keep on
forming) a stable network of theoretical principles and explanatory hypotheses that
PSILLOS
constitute the backbone of our evolving, but by and large true, scientific image of
the world.
The aim of this paper is to motivate this alternative, especially in connection
with issues related to science education. It is an appeal to render science education
sensitive to the philosophical issues that can be drawn from a close look at the
history of science. Section 2 is a brief outline of the caloric theory of heat. Section 3
is a little note on a methodological principle by means of which theories are judged
use-novelty. Section 4 offers a rather detailed exploration of Laplaces advanced
caloric theory of heat and explains its shortcoming in light of the foregoing
methodological principle. Section 5 shows that this kind of criticism of Laplaces
theory has had an actual historical actor the self-taught physicist John Herapath
and is not, therefore, available only by hindsight. Section 6 raises the question:
where is the caloric theory now?; to which it offers the simple but painful answer:
in the history books. It then paves the way for the discussion of the Pessimistic
Meta-Induction, whose proper analysis and significance are given in Section 7.
Section 8 draws on the material presented above to raise another important
question: what is wrong with science education? To which it offers the answer that
science education seems blind to the fact of theory-change in science and this
obscures the importance of change as well as of continuity. History and philosophy
of science can certainly help science education to avoid this blindness.
2. THE CALORIC THEORY OF HEAT
In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, French scientists, most notably Pierre
Simon Laplace and Antoine Lavoisier posited caloric as a material substance
an indestructible fluid of fine particles which was taken to be the cause of
heat (Lavoisier, 1789, p. 12). Despite the theorys success in giving qualitative
explanations of several heat phenomena1, the caloric theory faced important
experimental anomalies, most notably that caloric seemed to have no weight, and
the generation of heat by friction, which contradicted the fundamental assumption
of the caloric model, viz., that caloric is an indestructible fluid and that heat per se
is a conservative quantity (cf. Davy, 1799, p. 923; Thompson (Count Rumford),
1798).
Moreover, the caloric theory was not the one and only theory of heat available.
According to the proponents of the rival dynamical theory most notably
Humphry Davy and Count Rumford the cause of heat was not a material fluid
but rather, the very motion of the molecules that constitute a substance. In this
sense, heat was nothing over and above the motion of the constituents of a body.
In fact the dynamical conception of heat was able to explain both major foregoing anomalies that the caloric theory faced (cf. Thompson (Count Rumford),
1799).
The caloric theory could cope with these anomalies for instance, by positing
that the calorific particles were superfine and weightless. But as Joseph Black
a Scott advocate of the caloric theory pointed out, all these attempts were rather
ad hoc: their only justification was that they could save the caloric theory from
18
IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND
refutation. In fact, Black (1803, p. 46) gave one of the first elegant accounts of ad
hocness in his following remark:
Many have been the speculations and views of ingenious men about this
union of bodies with heat. But, as they are all hypothetical, and as the hypothesis is of the most complicated nature, being in fact a hypothetical application
of another hypothesis, I cannot hope for much useful information by attending
to it. A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost any hypothesis agree
with the phenomena. This will please the imagination, but does not advance
our knowledge (emphasis added).
In his lectures, Black presented both then available theories of heat and, although
he stressed that the supposition that heat is a material fluid appeared the most
probable, he (1803, p. 44) added that:
neither of these suppositions [i.e. the material and the dynamical] has been
fully and accurately considered by their authors, or applied to explain the whole
facts and phenomena related to heat. They have not, therefore, supplied us
with a proper theory or explication of the nature of heat.
Interestingly enough, Lavoisier and Laplace had an attitude similar to Blacks.
After presenting both current theories of heat, they suggested that the theory of
experimental calorimetry was independent of both theoretical considerations
concerning the nature of heat. They noted:
We will not decide at all between the two foregoing hypotheses [i.e. material
vs. dynamical theory of heat]. Several phenomena seem favourable to the
second, [i.e. the mechanical theory] such as the heat produced by the friction
of two solid bodies, for example; but there are others which are explained
more simply by the other [i.e. material theory of heat] perhaps they both
hold at the same time. So, (...) one must admit their common principles: that
is to say, in either of those, the quantity of free heat remains always the same
in simple mixtures of bodies. (...) The conservation of the free heat, in simple
mixtures of bodies, is, then, independent of those hypotheses about the nature
of heat; this is generally admitted by the physicists, and we shall adopt it in
the following researches (1780, p. 152153).
3. A NOTE ON AD HOCNESS
Recall what Black said above: A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost
any hypothesis agree with the phenomena. This will please the imagination, but does
not advance our knowledge. This, for all practical purposes, can be taken to be
what makes a theory (or a modification of a theory) ad hoc vis--vis a set of phenomena that theory is meant to explain. The charge of ad hocness is an epistemic
charge. It is meant to illustrate a cognitive shortcoming of a theory what Black
captures by saying that an ad hoc theory does not advance our knowledge. An
ad hoc theory is not a well-supported theory despite the fact that it may entail the
laws that it is meant to explain.
19
PSILLOS
Clearly, there are two ways in which a known fact E can be accommodated in a
scientific theory T.
(1) Information about E is used in the construction of a theory T and T predicts E.
(2) A phenomenon E is known the time that a theory T is proposed, T predicts E,
but no information about E is used in the construction of T.
Although the Lakatosian school has produced a fine-grained distinction between
levels of ad hocness, (cf. Lakatos, 1970, p. 175; Zahar, 1973, p. 101), I shall concentrate on the most general case, namely:
Conditions of ad hocness: A theory T is ad hoc with respect to phenomenon E if
and only if either of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(a) A body of background knowledge B entails the existence of E. Information
about E is used in the construction of a theory T and T accommodates E.
(b) A body of background knowledge B entails the existence of E. A certain
already available theory T does not predict/explain E. T is modified into theory
T so that T predicts E, but the only reason for this modification is the prediction/
explanation of E. In particular T has no other excess theoretical and empirical
content over T.
The key point here is that though theories do get support by explaining already
known and established empirical laws, this support is a function of the way the
theory is constructed and of the way it is related to the known laws. Simply put,
if a known phenomenon E is accommodated within T in the way suggested by
(1) above, E does not support T, whilst if it is accommodated in the way suggested
by (2) above, E does support T. Following Earman (1992, chapter 4, section 8) we
can speak of use novelty, where, simply put, a prediction P of a known fact E is
use novel relative to a theory T, if no information about E was used in the
construction of the theory which predicted it. So use-novelty is sharply distinguished
from, and contrasted to, ad hoc accommodation.
4. ENTER LAPLACE
From the early 1780s until his death in 1827, Laplace was the dominant figure in
theoretical physics in France. His programme, inspired and guided by Newtons work,
was the provision of a theoretical account of all natural phenomena in terms of
attractive and repulsive (central) forces exerted between the particles (cf. Fox, 1974).
In early 1820s Laplace was embroiled in a research project, aiming to give a
theoretical basis and a quantitative explanation of the empirical laws of gases
within the caloric theory of heat. This was a fine test for the caloric theory. Until
then, the caloric theory had not been fully articulated mathematically and had not
offered quantitative derivations and explanations of the empirical laws of heat. Not
only did Laplaces attempts aimed to show that Newtonianism could conquer one
more territory the thermal phenomena but also to establish that the caloric
theory of heat could offer adequate theoretical explanations of heat phenomena.
Laplace first presented his mathematical theory before the French Academy of
Sciences in September 1821 and came back to it in December 1822. He then
20
published his researches in two articles in the Connaissance des Temps and reproduced
them (with minor revisions) in the 12th book of his Traite de Mcanique Cleste in
the early 1820s.
The central assumption of Laplaces account was that the so-called repulsive
power of heat the power of heat in virtue of which a gas expands when heated is
due to repulsive forces among the particles of caloric. In particular, each molecule
of ordinary matter attracts particles of caloric that form a caloric atmosphere
around it. Yet, these caloric atmospheres repel one another. These repulsive forces
tend to detach some quantity of caloric from each molecule and to create radiant
caloric, which generates the repulsive power of heat (cf. 1823, p. 111112)2. Contrary
to these repulsive forces act the attractive forces between the molecules of matter,
which are inversely proportional to the distance between two molecules. However,
as we are about to see, Laplace took it that these attractive forces are insensible in
gases and vapours.
Using these central assumptions Laplace suggested that the force law between
two molecules of a gas is
H c2 (r)
where c is the quantity of caloric retained by each molecule, H is a gas-specific
constant depending on the repulsive force of heat and (r) is the attractive force
exerted between the two molecules, where (r) v 1/r (1821, p. 278). He then
calculated the repulsive force exerted on an envelope of a gas and equated it with
the pressure P exerted by this envelope on surrounding layers of the gas. He found
that
P=2HK2c2
(1)
where 2HK is a constant and is the density of the gas (op.cit., p. 280).
Laplace had thereby managed to correlate the quantity of caloric contained in a
gas with the macroscopic parameter of pressure and hence to provide a potential
mechanism that connects variations in the macroscopic quantity of pressure with
variations in the microscopic structure of heat and matter.
The next problem was to specify a connection between the quantity of caloric
contained in a gas with the macroscopic parameter of temperature (op.cit., p. 281).
Laplace suggested that the quantity of caloric rays received at a surface, at a given
instance, is solely a function of the temperature of the gas, and independent of the
nature of surrounding bodies. Call this function (T). The quantity of radiant
caloric detached from a molecule m due to the repulsive forces between the caloric c
of the molecule m and the caloric atmospheres of neighbouring molecules is c2,
that is, it is proportional to the quantity c of the caloric of surrounding molecules
and the quantity c of the caloric retained by molecule m. Since at any given
moment, there is thermal equilibrium in the gas, it follows that
q(T) = c2
(2)
21
PSILLOS
where q is a proportionality constant depending on the molecules of the gas.

Incidentally, in arriving at this equation, Laplace neglected the quantity of free
caloric emanated by surrounding bodies, since as he noted, its extreme velocity
renders it insensible (1821, p. 281). Be that as it may, by means of (2) Laplace had
managed to connect the macroscopic parameter of temperature with the microscopic
structure of caloric.
Given that temperature and pressure determine the macroscopic behaviour of
gases, Laplace could now show how the observable behaviour of gases is caused
by the micro-structure of caloric. Using (1) and (2), Laplace was ready to derive
within the framework of the caloric theory of heat the laws of gases and in
particular the Boyle-Marriottes law, Gay-Lussacs law and the equation of the state.
So far, so good. But there is a catch, which is relevant to the philosophical
conclusions we might draw from this case. The catch is that there are certain respects
in which Laplaces derivation was ad hoc. Let us see why.
Laplaces derivation of the laws of gases rested on two explicit assumptions:
First, the attractive force between two molecules of a gas located at insensible
distances from each other is very small; in fact, negligible. Second, the only operative
force is the repulsive force between the caloric atmospheres of the molecules of the
gas (cf. 1821, p. 285). The first assumption enabled Laplace to get rid of the factor
(r) and hence to derive equation (1) with no problem. This assumption is relatively
uncontroversial. The second assumption however is by no means innocent.
According to Laplaces theory, the action between two molecules of a gas is
actually the product of the following four forces:
1. The mutual repulsion of the quantities of caloric contained in caloric atmospheres
around each and every molecule.
2. The attraction between the caloric atmosphere of the second molecule and the
first molecule.
3. The attraction between the caloric atmosphere of the first molecule and the
second molecule.
4. The mutual attraction between the two molecules.
Yet, the derivation (and explanation) of the laws of gases rested only on the first
force. Even though neglecting the attractive force between molecules may have
been reasonable, excluding the other two forces (two and three above) was not
obvious. Laplace (1821, p. 185) admitted this when he said:
Yet, I do not dare assure that the second and third forces are insensible,
especially concerning vapours, when a light compression reduces them to the
liquid state.
To make his model more realistic, Laplace went on to take into account the attractive
forces exerted between the caloric atmosphere of a molecule m and the surrounding
molecules of the gas, or vapour. However, here is the point where the ad hocness
of Laplaces attempts becomes rather transparent.
Imagine, Laplace said, a cylindrical vase with indefinite height, containing a gas
(1821, p. 285286). Suppose also that the gas is pressed by a weight W put on the
superior surface of the cylinder. Take, then, an infinitely thin horizontal plane A, at
22
a distance from the superior surface of the cylinder, and suppose that the molecules
of the gas are situated above this plane, at fixed positions. Let m be such a
molecule, r its distance from the horizontal plane A, f its distance from another
molecule m situated underneath the plane A at distance R from it, and s the
distance between the points at which the perpendiculars from the two molecules
cross plane A (cf. Figure 1).
Weight
m
r
a f
s
A
R
m'
Figure 1. Laplaces model of caloric.
It is then evident that f = (R+r)2 + s2. Generally, Laplace said, the repulsive
action between the quantities of caloric retained by the two molecules m and m is
H(f), while the attractive action between the caloric atmosphere of m and molecule
m is N(f). The y-component of the total action between the two molecules will
then be
(Hc2 Nc) (f) [(R+r)/f]
where (R+r)/f is cos(a). Laplace was then able to calculate the repulsive action of
the whole gas situated under the plane A on the molecule m and, moreover, the
whole action of the gas above plane A on the superior surface of the cylinder.
23
PSILLOS
This action is counterbalanced by the pressure P of the weight placed on top of the
superior surface. Hence, he derived
P=22(Hc2 Nc)K
(1)
which is similar to (1) above, except that it also takes into account the attractive
forces between the caloric atmosphere of a molecule m and the surrounding
molecules.
Laplace then invented an analogous equation for temperature. Take, he said, the
action between two molecules m and m at a distance r. If all forces are taken into
account, this action will be Hc(r)N(r). Suppose that the calorific radiation of
molecule m is proportional to the number of surrounding molecules, their forces
except the negligible (r) and the quantities of caloric contained in each
molecule. Then, this radiation will be proportional to
Hc2 Nc
(A)
In a state of thermal equilibrium quantity (A) will be equal to the quantity of

caloric received at a surface; that is,
(Hc2 Nc) = q(T)
(2)
This is similar to (2), except that it also takes into account the attractive forces
exerted between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding
molecules. Then, by means of (1) and (2), Laplace was able to derive the laws of
gases in the more realistic case where the attractive forces exerted between the
caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules are taken into
account.
The similarity between equations (1) and (1) and (2) and (2) seems to suggest
that the attractive forces between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the
surrounding molecules could be safely neglected as very weak compared to the
repulsive forces between caloric atmospheres.
However, two points are worth making:
1. In the derivation of (1), Laplace used the assumption that the attractive forces
between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules
are very weak. As we have seen, he took it that the total force that the molecule m
is subjected to when the attractive force between the caloric of m and the
molecule m is taken into account is repulsive. This means that the attractive
forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules are very
weak, and in fact negligible compared to the repulsive forces between caloric
atmospheres hence, practically they do nothing to modify or weaken these
repulsive forces.
2. In arriving at equation (1) Laplace neglected without any reason the effect
on the pressure P of the molecules under plane A. As we shall are about to see,
Laplace admitted this in his 1822 article. In fact, the only reason for formulating
24
the equation of pressure as he did seems to be that (1) could yield, together with
equation (2), the laws of gases only if it had this particular form.
Laplaces attempt to derive the laws of gases from the more realistic set of
assumptions that both the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and
the surrounding molecules are operative were ad hoc, and with no independent
justification: the very fact that the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule
and the surrounding molecules must be negligible in order for the derivation to go
through was used in showing that these forces were weak and negligible; and the
very fact that the law of pressure must have a specific mathematical form if the
laws of gases were to be derived, was used in the construction of this law.
As noted already, Laplace returned to his theory a year later (cf. 1822). There,
he explained again how equations (1) and (2) are constructed and, therefore, how
the laws of gases can be derived within the caloric theory. But he made it clear that
the derivation works only on the assumption that the repulsive forces due to the
caloric atmospheres are the only forces that operate (1822, p. 291). More interestingly, he remarked that in his own derivation of the laws of gases when the attractive
forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules are taken
into account, he neglected the action of the molecules under the plane A and hence
his equation (1) of the pressure P of the gas was not correct (1822, p. 296). He
stressed that if the correct law of pressure is formulated, i.e. the one that, unlike (1),
takes also into account the pressure of the molecules under the plane A, then the
three laws of gases cannot be derived (ibid.).
How were, if at all, the laws of gases to be derived within the caloric theory?
Laplace admitted that the only way to carry out the derivation was to admit beforehand that the attraction of each molecule of a gas on other molecules and their
caloric is insensible (ibid.). Therefore, Laplaces conclusion was, in effect, that
unless the theory is modified in an ad hoc way, so that some forces are rendered
negligible beforehand, the laws of gases could not be proved and explained within
the caloric theory.
5. HERAPATHS CRITICISM
The foregoing observation that Laplaces constructions were ad hoc is not one
merely drawn by hindsight. John Herapath (17901868)3, a then unknown physicist
and self-taught schoolmaster from Bristol, in a paper that appeared in Philosophical
Magazine in 1823, examined in detail Laplaces constructions, argued against their
fundamental assumptions, and criticised them, explicitly, for being ad hoc. In this
paper, Herapath gave one of the first clear-cut formulations of what it is for a theory
to be ad hoc with respect to a set of laws, as it is clear from his following statement:
(...) the equations [Laplace] has produced are more the offspring of a previous
knowledge of what they should be from the phenomena, than of that sound
reason which his other works usual manifest (1823, p. 65).
Herapath noted that Laplaces equation (2) which connects the quantity of caloric
emanated from each molecule with the macroscopic quantity of temperature, is not
correct. Laplace, as we have seen, took it that the calorific radiation of a molecule
25
PSILLOS
is c2 Yet, Herapath observed, in calculating the calorific radiation of a

molecule one must also take into account the intensity of the repulsion of the
surrounding caloric. Therefore, the calorific radiation of a molecule must be
c2v(r), where (r) is a function of the intensity of repulsion of a particle of
caloric, depending on the distance between the molecules4. In particular, the
intensity of calorific radiation in a spherical envelope of radius r surrounding the
radiating molecule will be 3(/), where is a constant.
Then, instead of Laplaces equation (2), Herapath suggested that the correct
equation should have been
q(t)=c2 3(/)
(2)
It is obvious that (1) and (2) cannot yield the laws of gases, and hence the latter
cannot be derived nor be explained within the caloric theory of heat, unless
some important assumptions are dropped, in an unjustified way. Herapath stressed
that Laplace was not justified in neglecting the intensity of calorific radiation
3(/). In Laplaces theory the calorific radiation is due to the repulsive forces
between the caloric atmospheres of neighbouring molecules. Then, it is obvious
that these forces must depend on the distance r between these caloric atmospheres
in fact, on the distance r between molecules. Laplace, Herapath added, did consider
the function (r) (cf. Laplace, 1821, p. 287; Herapath, 1823, p. 64). But he subsumed
it under the constant q in the equations (2) and (2) (Herapath ibid.). However, this
contradicted Laplace statement that the constant q is a factor dependent only on the
nature of the molecules of the gas (1821, p. 281).
Herapath concluded that
Laplaces principal and fundamental equations are erroneously deduced form
his principles; and consequently that his subsequent conclusions [i.e. the laws
of gases] are not consequences of what he first assumed (1823, p. 65)5.
Herapath suggested that Laplaces theory was ad hoc with respect to the known
laws of gases. In effect, Laplace knew what he wanted to derive that is, the
known laws of gases and he cooked up the principles of the caloric theory so
that these laws would follow suit. The known laws of gases were not use-novel vis-vis Laplaces theory; they were accommodated within it in an ad hoc way.
Herapath put this complaint in the following lengthy, but nice, quotation:
Had the principles he [i.e. Laplace] sets out with been given him, namely,
that there is such a thing as caloric, which, while strongly repulsive of its
own, attracts and is attracted by other matter; which by some means radiates
in extremely minute portions with great velocity; which attaching itself in
considerable quantities to particles of mater overcomes their mutual attraction,
and occasions them to stand at the greatest distance the envelope admits from
each other; had, I say, these things been given him [i.e. Laplace] without
any knowledge of what the phenomena require, I would enture to appeal to
himself, whether, with his mind so unacquainted, unbiased, and unprejudiced
26
with the facts in question, his results would not have been very different from
what they are (1823, p. 65).
Herapath challenged Laplace that had he not known in advance the laws he wanted
to derive, the principles of caloric theory would not have been able to yield them.
Laplace, in effect, used these laws in the construction of his theory, in the sense
that he modified its principles in such a way that they, eventually, yield the laws of
gases. As noted earlier, Laplace was aware (in his second paper on the subject) that
the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules
had to be rendered negligible if the derivation were to go through. Herapaths
further point was that even if this were granted, the laws of gases could not be
derived within the caloric theory, unless of course the latter was forced to do so.
6. WHERE IS THE CALORIC THEORY NOW?
The fact is that the caloric theory of heat has long been abandoned. Its replacement
with what came to be known as thermodynamics pioneered by Rudolf Clausius
and William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and foreshadowed by Sadi Carnot was an
intricate and prolonged development. The key episode in this development was the
admission that, contrary to what was implied by the caloric theory; heat was not
a conservative quantity. After Clausiuss work in thermodynamics, it was established
that heat is not a state-function of the macroscopic properties (volume, temperature
and pressure) of a gas. On the contrary, when work is produced in a thermal cycle,
the quantity of heat involved in this cycle does not uniquely depend on the initial
and final states in which the substance undergoing the changes is found. As a
result, heat is not conserved in all thermal processes. If heat is not a conservative
quantity, its representation cannot be based on an indestructible fluid, as caloric
was supposed to be.
I have related this story elsewhere (cf. my 1994 and 1999, chapter 6). The point
here is not to repeat it, but to answer the question in the section-heading in a
straightforward manner: the caloric theory is currently in the history of science books
and not in the science textbooks. The caloric theory is not part of the present corpus
of established scientific theories; not an element in our evolving scientific image of
the world. The world has simply no room for the caloric, despite the fact that a
theory about it was the dominant theory for quite some time in the nineteenth
century and despite the fact that it enjoyed explanatory and predictive success.
Is this case atypical? Is it an one-off case in the history of science? If it were,
there would be no cause for concern. If the advanced caloric theory of heat was a
historical oddity, its consignment to the history of science books would present no
problem to either philosophy of science or to science education. But it is far from a
typical. In fact, a well-known argument in the philosophy of science, known as the
Pessimistic Meta-Induction on the history of science, suggests that current theories
too are likely to be abandoned later on and be replaced by others, which are
radically discontinuous with the extant theories. If this is so, there is a special
problem for science education apart form any other philosophical problem they
might arise. This is that current science will turn out to be chapters in future history
27
PSILLOS
of science books and hence that the teaching of current scientific theories is not the
teaching of a relatively stable and, by and large true, image of the world and of its
deep structure, but rather the teaching of born-to-be-abolished failed explanations
and hypotheses. Before we examine in this problem for science education, let us take
a closer look at the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI).
7. THE PESSIMISTIC META-INDUCTION
Larry Laudan has argued that the history of science is full of theories which were
once empirically successful and yet turned out to be false. Laudans argument can
be summarised as follows (cf. 1981, p. 3233):
The history of science is full of theories which had been empirically
successful for long periods of time and yet were shown to be false about the
deep-structure claims they had made about the world. It is similarly full of
theoretical terms featuring in successful theories which do not refer. Therefore,
by a simple (meta-) induction on scientific theories, our current successful
theories are likely to be false (or, at any rate, more likely to be false than true).
Laudan has substantiated his argument by means of what he has called the
historical gambit: the following list which, Laudan says, could be extended ad
nauseam gives theories which were once empirically successful and fruitful, yet
just false.
Laudans list of successful-yet-false theories:
the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy
the humoral theory of medicine
the effluvial theory of static electricity
catastrophist geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge
the phlogiston theory of chemistry
the caloric theory of heat
the vibratory theory of heat
the vital force theory of physiology
the theory of circular inertia
theories of spontaneous generation
the contact-action gravitational ether of Fatio and LeSage
the optical ether
the electromagnetic ether
What is the target of Laudans argument? It is the realist explanation of the
success of scientific theories in terms of the (approximate) truth of these theories.
In particular, the target of PMI is the epistemic optimism associated with scientific
realism, viz., the view that science has succeeded in tracking truth. One key view
associated with scientific realism is the claim that mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well confirmed and approximately true of the world;
hence, the entities posited by them, or entities very similar to those posited, inhabit
the world (see my 1999 and my 2009 for a defence). Part of the defence of this
epistemic optimism realist has come to be known as the no-miracles argument6.
28
Briefly put, this is an argument that mobilises the successes of scientific theories
(especially their successful novel predictions) in order to suggest that the best
explanation of these theory-driven successes is that the theories that fuelled them
were approximately true at least in those respects that were implicated in the
generation of the successes. But if Laudan is right, then the realists explanation of
the success of science flies in the face of the history of science: the history of
science cannot possibly warrant the realist belief that current successful theories
are approximately true.
There has been some discussion of the exact structure of PMI. I have argued in
detail elsewhere that it is a kind of reductio. The target is the realist thesis that:
(A) Current successful theories are approximately true
Laudan does not directly deny that current successful theories may happen to be
truthlike. His argument aims to discredit the claim that there is an explanatory
connection between empirical success and truthlikeness which warrants the
realists assertion (A). In order to achieve this, the argument compares a number of
past theories to current ones and claims:
(B) If current successful theories are truthlike, then past theories cannot be
Past theories are deemed not to be truthlike because the entities they posited are no
longer believed to exist and/or because the laws and mechanisms they postulated
are not part of our current theoretical description of the world. Then, comes the
historical gambit:
(C) These characteristically false theories were, nonetheless,
empirically successful
So, empirical success is not connected with truthlikeness and truthlikeness cannot
explain success: the realists potential warrant for (A) is defeated.
No-one can deny that Laudans argument has some force. It shows that, on
inductive grounds, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is unlikely to be had in
science. That is, all scientific theories are likely to turn out to be, strictly speaking,
false. This is something that realists as well as everybody else have to concede.
However, a false theory can still be approximately true or truthlike. These are
notions that have resisted a formal explication, but we can say, intuitively, that a
theory is truthlike if it describes a world which is similar to the actual world in its
most central or relevant features. So, the realist needs to show that past successful
theories, although strictly speaking false, have been truthlike.
An obvious strategy that realists can follow is to try to reduce the size of
Laudans list. If indeed only very few past theories make it to Laudans list of falsebut-successful theories, the historical gambit loses much of its putative force. One
way to reduce the size of the list is to impose stringent criteria as to what theories
should count as mature and genuinely successful. It has been argued (see my 1999,
chapter 5) that the notion of empirical success should be more rigorous than simply
getting the facts right, or telling a story that fits the facts. For any theory can be
made to fit the facts and hence to be successful by simply writing the right
kind of empirical consequences into it. The notion of empirical success that realists
29
PSILLOS
should be happy with should such that it includes the generation of novel
predictions which are in principle testable. Consequently, it is not at all clear that
all theories in Laudans list were genuinely successful.
The case of the advanced caloric theory of heat we have already discussed in
some detail is a case in point. Despite its great sophistication, Laplaces mature
theory enjoyed empirical success only by being, ultimately, tailored to fit the
empirical laws. Not only were there no novel predictions issued by the theory, but
even the already known facts that it managed to accommodate, it accommodated
them in an ad hoc way.
The best strategy for blocking PMI is try to meet it head-on, by attacking its
crucial premise (B). Without this premise the pessimistic conclusion does not follow,
irrespective of the size of Laudans list. But how can premise (B) be defeated?
In my (1999), I proposed the divide et impera strategy. The key idea is this. To
defeat (B), it is enough to show that the genuine successes of past theories did not
depend on what we now believe to be fundamentally flawed theoretical claims.
Positively put, it is enough to show that the theoretical laws and mechanisms which
generated the successes of past theories have been retained in our current scientific
image. Accordingly, when a theory is abandoned, its theoretical constituents, i.e.,
the theoretical mechanisms and laws it posited, should not be (and were not)
rejected en bloc. Some of these theoretical constituents are inconsistent with what
we now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not all are. Some of
them, instead of having been abandoned, have been retained as essential constituents
of subsequent theories. The divide et impera move suggests that if it turns out that
the theoretical constituents that were responsible for the empirical success of
otherwise abandoned theories are those that have been retained in our current
scientific image, a substantive version of scientific realism can still be defended.
So for the divide et impera move to work, we need to
(i) identify the theoretical constituents of past genuine successful theories that
essentially contributed to their successes; and
(ii) show that these constituents, far from being characteristically false, have been
retained in subsequent theories of the same domain.
The success of the divide et impera strategy is in the details. One should look at
specific past theories that meet the stringent standards of empirical success and
show in detail how those parts of them that fuelled their empirical successes were
retained in subsequent theories. In my (1999, chapter 6) I engaged in two detailed
case-studies concerning the several stages of the caloric theory of heat and of the
theories of the luminiferous ether7.
A claim that has emerged with some force is that theory-change is not as radical
and discontinuous as the opponents of scientific realism have suggested. It has been
shown that there are ways to identify the theoretical constituents of abandoned
scientific theories which essentially contributed to their successes, to separate them
from others that were idle or as Kitcher (1993) has put it, merely presuppositional
posits and to demonstrate that the components that made essential contributions
to the theorys empirical success were those retained in subsequent theories of the
30
same domain. Given this, the fact that our current best theories may be replaced by
others does not, necessarily, undermine scientific realism. All it shows is that a) we
cannot get at the truth all at once; and b) our judgements from empirical support to
truthlikeness should be more refined and cautious in that they should only commit
us to the theoretical constituents that do enjoy evidential support and contribute to
the empirical successes of the theory. Realists ground our epistemic optimism on
the fact that newer theories incorporate many theoretical constituents of their
superseded predecessors, especially those constituents that have led to empirical
successes. The substantive continuity in theory-change suggests that a rather stable
network of theoretical principles and explanatory hypotheses has emerged, which
has survived revolutionary changes, and has become part and parcel of our evolving
scientific image of the world.
Both Hasok Chang (2003, p. 910912) and Kyle Stanford (2006) have challenged
the move from substantive continuity in theory-change to approximate truth. It is
argued that there is no entitlement to move from whatever preservation in theoretical
constituents there is in theory-change to these constituents being truthlike. But thats
not quite right. What is right to say is that the mere demonstration of continuity in
theory-change does not warrant the realist claim that science is on the right track.
Claiming convergence does not, on its own, establish that current theories are true,
or likely to be true. Convergence there may be and yet the start might have been
false. But the convergence in our scientific image of the world puts before us a
candidate for explanation. The generation of an evolving-but-convergent network
of theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption that this network
consists of truthlike assertions. So there is, after all, entitlement to move from
convergence to truthlikeness, insofar as truthlikeness is the best explanation of this
convergence.
Stanford has also claimed that the divide et impera move cannot offer independent
support to realism since it is tailor-made to suit realism. According to him, it is the
fact that the very same present theory is used both to identify which parts of past
theories were empirically successful and which parts were (approximately) true
that accounts for the realists wrong impression that these parts coincide. He (2006,
p. 166) says:
With this strategy of analysis, an impressive retrospective convergence between
our judgements of the sources of a past theorys success and the things it got
right about the world is virtually guaranteed: it is the very fact that some
features of a past theory survive in our present account of nature that leads
the realist both to regard them as true and to believe that they were the sources
of the rejected theorys success or effectiveness. So the apparent convergence
of truth and the sources of success in past theories are easily explained by the
simple fact that both kinds of retrospective judgements have a common
source in our present beliefs about nature.
This objection is misguided. The problem, as I see it, is this. There are the theories
scientists currently endorse and there are the theories that were endorsed in the
past. Some (but not all) of them were empirically successful (perhaps for long
31
PSILLOS
periods of time). They were empirically successful irrespective of the fact that,
subsequently, they came to be replaced by others. This replacement was a contingent
matter that had to do with the fact that the world did not fully co-operate with the
then extant theories: some of their predictions failed; or the theories became overly
ad hoc or complicated in their attempt to accommodate anomalies, or what have
you. The replacement of theories by others does not cancel out the fact that the
replaced theories were empirically successful. Even if scientists had somehow
failed to come up with new theories, the old theories would not have ceased to be
successful. So success is one thing, replacement is another. Hence, it is one thing to
inquire into what features of some past theories accounted for their success and
quite another to ask whether these features were such that they were retained in
subsequent theories of the same domain. These are two independent issues and they
can be dealt with (both conceptually and historically) independently. One should
start with some past theories and bracketing the question of their replacement
try to identify, on independent grounds, the sources of their empirical success; that
is, to identify those theoretical constituents of the theories that fuelled their
successes. When a past theory has been, as it were, anatomised, we can then ask
the independent question of whether there is any sense in which the sources of
success of a past theory that the anatomy has identified are present in our current
theories. Its not, then, the case that the current theory is the common source for the
identification of the successful parts of a past theory and of its (approximately) true
parts. Current theories constitute the vantage point from which we examine old
ones could there be any other? but the identification of the sources of success
of past theories need not be performed from this vantage point.
8. WHAT IS WRONG WITH SCIENCE EDUCATION?
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors of Bluntly put, it is

that it is oblivious to the complex philosophical lessons that can be drawn from the
history of science. Unless we resolve for the view that current science teaching is
future history-of-science teaching, science education should be sensitive to the
fact that science as we know it is a mixed bag of continuity and change. Science
education seems blind to the fact of theory-change in science and this obscures the
importance of change as well as of continuity.
The responses to PMI outlined above suggest that the current scientific image
of the world (which is what science teaching is about) is a hard-won image which
has emerged out of a clash between truth and falsity; continuity and break. The
continuity depicted in the current scientific image of the world is indeed hard-won,
amidst false starts, failed hypotheses, idle and ad hoc explanations. This continuity
represents whatever elements of past theories have a right to be called truthlike by
having essentially contributed to the successes of otherwise abandoned theories and
by having been retained in subsequent theories. This continuity signifies (at least on
the realist reading suggested above) that what nowadays is taught in science
courses is not destined to be part of the history of science books in two or three
centuries from now.
32
What are science students being taught now? Its not enough to say they are
being taught our best current guess about the deep-structure of the world. Laplace
did not think of his theory as his best guess! He, like us today, thought of his theory
as unveiling the deep and unobservable structure of the world. Guesses come and
go. Theories are based on evidence and are meant to describe the world as it, more
or less, is. An alternative would be to think of what is now taught as a set of practical
recipes or problem-solvers; a rack filled with tools, as Pierre Duhem once put it.
But this instrumentalist approach to science faces a number of problems, most of
which are well-known. For one, it does not tally with the very idea that science has
pushed back the frontiers of ignorance and error; for another, it does not even start
to account for the fact that theories yield successful novel predictions and are used
as premises in explanations of singular events. The question remains: what is
taught now? Is it practical recipes + future chapters of the history of science books?
Or is it chapters of an evolving-but-changing scientific image of the world?
This kind of question (or dilemma) was first raised in a serious way in the dawn
of the twentieth century, just before the two major revolutions that shook up physics.
It took the form of the bankruptcy of science debate in France. In his address to
the 1900 International Congress of Physics, Henri Poincar (1902, p. 173) put the
point thus:
The man of the world is struck to see how ephemeral scientific theories are.
After some years of prosperity, he sees them successively abandoned; he sees
ruins accumulated on ruins; he predicts that the theories in vogue today will
in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely
in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science.
But he went on to correct the view of the man of the world. Poincar says: His
scepticism is superficial; he does not understand none of the aim and the role of
scientific theories; without this he would understand that ruins can still be good for
something.
What then are ruins good for, apart from reminding us the glorious past and
days of bygone splendour? There are two options, really.
One: If theories are merely instruments for the co-ordination of empirical laws
and the prediction phenomena, it is no problem that their theoretical parts might
well be mere speculations which subsequently get abandoned and are destined
to be chapter in hitherto unwritten history-of-science books. As Poincar put it,
after all, Fresnels theory enables us to [predict optical phenomena] as well as
it did before Maxwells time.
Two: There is continuity in theory-change and this is not merely empirical
continuity; substantive theoretical claims that featured in past theories and
played a key role in their successes (especially in novel predictions) have been
incorporated (perhaps somewhat re-interpreted) in subsequent theories and
continue to play an important role in making them empirically successful.
This is the option that Poincar himself favoured8. The key point is that option
number two is not only living, but actually the one that renders science teaching
intelligible and compelling.
33
PSILLOS
How exactly science education should accommodate the philosophical lessons

drawn from the history of science is itself a complex matter that I cannot discuss
here. I will only suggest that part of the very idea of science education should be
the cultivation and development of what might be called scientific conscience. This
is not more theoretical or practical knowledge, but rather a set of methodological
skills that constitute the scientific spirit: critical appraisal of ones own theory;
sensitivity to the strengths and limitations of scientific inquiry; openness to criticism
and correction; responsiveness to epistemic values and theoretical virtues; sensitivity
to the historical complexity and the philosophical implications of the scientific
enterprise.
Here is a case where scientific conscience becomes transparent. When we think
about scientific theories and what they assume about the world we need to balance
two kinds of evidence. The first is whatever evidence there is in favour (or against)
a specific scientific theory. This evidence has to do with the degree on confirmation
of the theory at hand. It is, let us say, first-order evidence, say about electrons and
their having negative charge or about the double helix structure of the DNA and
the like. First-order evidence is typically what scientists take into account when
they form an attitude towards a theory. It can be broadly understood to include
some of the theoretical virtues of the theory at hand (parsimony and the like) of
the kind that typically go into plausibility judgements about theories. The second
kind of evidence (lets call it second-order evidence) comes from the past record of
scientific theories and/or from meta-theoretical (philosophical) considerations that
have to do with the reliability of scientific methodology. It concerns not particular
scientific theories but science as a whole. (Some) past theories, for instance, were
supported by (first-order) evidence, but were subsequently abandoned; or some
scientific methods work reliably in certain domains but fail when they are extended
to others. This second-order evidence feeds claims such as those that motivate the
Pessimistic Induction. Actually, this second-order evidence is multi-faceted it is
negative (showing limitations and shortcomings) as well as positive (showing how
learning from experience can be improved).
This is a philosophical problem. But science education wont educate good
scientists unless it makes them aware that in judging scientific theories, they should
try to balance these two kinds of evidence. And this means that science education
wont train good scientists unless it trains them in history and philosophy of science.
NOTES
1
2
3
4
34
For a detailed account of the causal role that the caloric was called to play, see Fox (1971).
According to Chang (2004, 72) this Laplacian assumption modified considerably Lavoisiers original
picture of the caloric.
For a brief account of Herapaths contribution to the kinetic theory of gases, see Mendoza (1961).
Herapath uses (r) for this function, but this notation has been also used for the attractive force
between two molecules of the gas.
Herapath did also object to Laplaces equation (1), which connected the pressure of a gas with the
quantity of caloric upheld by its molecules. His chief point was that (1) unjustifiably neglects the
attractive forces in virtue of which each molecule attracts its own caloric (1823, p. 62).

6
It is based on Putnams claim that realism is the only philosophy of science that does not make the
success of science a miracle.
Chang (2003) has challenged some of the details of my case-study of the caloric theory. The
discussion of Laplaces advanced theory presented above is meant, among other things, to meet
some of Changs criticisms concerning the actual historical development of the caloric theory.
Though Poincar took it that that there is an inherent limitation in what of the world can be known:
its structure as opposed to how things are in themselves. This limitation was the child of Poincars
adherence to some form of empiricism and some form of neo-Kantianism. It has been known as
structural realism and need not concern us here (see my 2009).
REFERENCES
Black, J. (1803). Lectures on the elements of chemistry (J. Robison, Ed.). Edinburgh all page references
are from Roller (1950).
Chang, H. (2003). Preservative realism and its discontents: Revisiting caloric. Philosophy of Science,
70, 902912.
Chang, H. (2004). Inventing temperature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davy, H. (1799). An essay on heat, light, and the communication of light. In The collected works of
H. Davy (Vol. 2, pp. 186). London: Smith, Elder, and Co. Cornhill (1839).
Earman, J. (1992). Bayes or bust? A critical examination of bayesian confirmation theory. Cambridge
MA: The MIT Press.
Fox, R. (1971). The caloric theory of gases. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fox, R. (1974). The rise and fall of Laplacian physics. In R. McCormmach (Ed.), Historical studies in
physical sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Herapath, J. (1823). Observations on M. Laplaces communication to the Royal Academy of Science,
Sur lAttraction des Sphres et sur la Rpulsion des Fluides lastiques. Philosophical Magazine,
62, 6166.
Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos &
A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Laplace, P. S., & Lavoisier, A. (1780). Mmoire sur la Chaleur. Ouevres Compltes de Laplace (Vol. 10).
Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Laplace, P. S. (1821). Sur lAttraction des Sphres et sur la Rpulsion des Fluides lastiques. In
Connaissance des Temps pour lanne 1824 reprinted in Ouevres Compltes de Laplace (Vol. 13,
pp. 273290). Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Laplace, P. S. (1822). Dveloppement de la Thorie des Fluides lastiques et Application de Cette
Thorie a la Vitesse du Son. In Connaissance des Temps pour lanne 1825 reprinted in Ouevres
Compltes de Laplace (Vol. 13, pp. 291301). Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Laplace, P. S. (1823). Sur lAttraction des Sphres et sur la Rpulsion des Fluides lastiques. In Traite
de Mcanique Cleste (Livre XII, Chapitre II) reprinted in Ouevres Compltes de Laplace
(Vol. 5). Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48, 1949.
Lavoisier, A. (1789). Traite Elmentaire de Chimie. Paris English trans. as Elements of chemistry, by
R. Kerr (1790), reprinted by Dover (1965).
Mendoza, E. (1961). A sketch for a history of the kinetic theory of gases. Physics Today, 14, 3639.
Poincar, H. (1902). La science et LHypothse. (1968 reprint). Paris: Flammarion.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.
Psillos, S. (2009). Knowing the structure of nature. London: Palgrave.
Roller D. (1950). The early development of the concepts of temperature and heat: The rise and the
decline of the caloric theory. In J. B. Conant (Ed.), Harvard case histories in experimental science.
Harvard University Press.
35
PSILLOS
Stanford, P. K. (2006). Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, B. (Count Rumford) (1798). An inquiry concerning the source of the heat which is excited
by friction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 88, 80102.
Thompson B. (Count Rumford) (1799). An inquiry concerning the weight ascribed to heat. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society, 89, 179194.
Zahar, E. (1973). Why did Einsteins programme supersede Lorentzs. British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 24, 95123, 223262.
Stathis Psillos
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens
Panepistimioupolis (University Campus), Athens 15771, Greece
e-mail: psillos@phs.uoa.gr
36
WILLIAM F. MCCOMAS
3. THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE

OF SCIENCE EDUCATION
A Typology of Approaches to History of Science
in Science Instruction
1. INTRODUCTION
In the continuing campaign to enhance science instruction one battle we are winning
relates to the inclusion of elements of the nature of science (NOS) in official
recommendations designed to guide the development of the science curriculum.
Increasingly, standards documents in the U.S. states (which effectively control
what is taught within their borders), the U.S. national science education standards
(NRC, 1996) (which does not have the force of law but is regularly consulted in
planning science instruction by the individual states) and many other nations
now include explicit requirements to include the nature of science in plans for
science learning. We seem to have responded positively to the 1970 call from
Carey and Stauss who stated that, if the teachers understanding and philosophy
of science are not congruent with the current interpretations of the nature of
science, ... then the instructional outcomes will not be representative of science
(p. 363). There is little doubt that NOS should have a central place in the science
curriculum and it is time that teachers blend both NOS and more traditional
content to ensure that students come to understand what science is and how it
functions.
The term nature of science is a label for the description of elements that define
how science operates at a level appropriate for science instruction. This description
draws upon insights from the
history, sociology and philosophy of science combined with research from
the cognitive sciences such as psychology into a rich description of what
science is, how it works, how scientists operate as a social group and how
society itself both directs and reacts to scientific endeavors (McComas,
Clough, & Almazroa, 1998, p. 4).
The picture of science provided under the NOS label is designed for K-16 learners
rather than as instructional objectives for those who will become historians or
philosophers of science.
MCCOMAS
Another front in the NOS campaign that seems to have been secured is that
of defining the range of NOS-related concepts necessary and sufficient to inform
K-12 science instruction. Fortunately, consensus has begun to emerge regarding
the definition of the individual NOS aspects. Osborn, Collins, Ratcliffe, Millar and
Duschl (2003), McComas (1998, 2008), Lederman (2002), for instance, have offered
quite parallel sets of NOS content recommendations including elements such as the
distinctions between law and theory, the role of creativity in science, the role of
history, cultural and social elements, and the necessity of empirical evidence in
scientific research.
Even as we consider the agreement on the place and character of NOS in science
instruction, we face what might be final NOS battle. This last challenge is how to
include the nature of science in science instruction. Of course there have been many
suggestions for way to meet the instructional demand, but nothing as yet has caught
on in any systematic fashion. This chapter will focus on the issue of instruction by
examining role that might be played by the use of the history of science in various
forms in helping students understand the scientific enterprise. We will consider
a proposed taxonomy based on a review of the ways in which the history of science
has been used in the past while considering what role these strategies might play in
the future of science teaching.
The premise of this chapter is that history of science can be both a vehicle to
convey important lessons about how science functions and a destination in its own
right. HOS lessons can humanize the sciences with their inclusion of the personalities
that have shaped the direction and products of the scientific enterprise. In this fashion,
HOS can meet the challenge from the National Science Education Standards to
show science as a human endeavor (NRC, 1996). At the same time, carefully
selected HOS content can also be used in another way to tell the tale of how
science works, what its rules and traditions are, and how knowledge is established
in the sciences.
2. RATIONALES FOR THE USE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (HOS)
IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION INTRODUCTION
Advocacy for the inclusion of history of science in the science classroom is not
new. More than a century and a half ago, the Duke of Argyll in his Presidential
Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1855) stated
that, What we want in the teaching of the young is not so much the mere results as
the methods and, above all, the history of science. (quoted in Matthews, 1992, p. 11).
In the United States a hundred years later, the Educational Policies Commission
Report on Education for All American Youth again raised the promise of the use of
HOS (1944) stated
These scientists are thought of as living men [sic], facing difficult problems
to which they do not know the answers, and confronting many obstacles rooted
in ignorance and prejudice. In imagination, the students watch the scientists
at work, and look particularly for the methods which they use in attacking
their problems
38
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
In 1947 the authors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
Presidents Scientific Research Board suggested that Much more use should
be made of the history of science with its adventure and dramatic action, which
appeal strongly to young peoples interests and arouse their imagination
(Steelman, 1947, p. 86). Even today, the current National Science Education
Standards (NRC, 1996) include an explicit section on the history and nature
of science primarily to illustrate the role played by humans, the nature of
scientific knowledge and historical perspectives of science. The Standards make
the specific proposal that HOS may be useful in this regard with the recommendation that
Through the use of short stories, films, video, and other examples, elementary
teachers can introduce interesting historical examples of men and women
(including minorities and people with disabilities) who have made contributions
to science. These stories can highlight how these scientists worked that is,
the questions, procedures, and contributions of diverse individuals to science
and technology (p. 141).
The introduction of historical examples will help students see the scientific
enterprise as more philosophical, social and human (p. 170).
Use of the history of science will show that many individuals have contributed
to the traditions of science that science has been practiced by different
individuals in different cultures and reveal how difficult it was for scientific
innovators to breakthrough the accepted ideas of their time to reach the
conclusions that we currently take for granted (p. 171).
Recommendations for the use of history of science in science instruction
continued and included, but are not limited to, those by Eichman (1996), Sherratt
(1982, 1983), Matthews (1994), and most recently Hodson (2008). However, in
spite of these recommendations, there is very little inclusion of the history of
science either in textbooks or in classroom discourse. Unfortunately, for most
students science is presented in its final form. This label was coined by Duschl
(1990) to describe the common phenomenon by which we share the current understanding of science with learners but rarely discuss the development of that
understanding. This tradition may seem efficient but it depersonalizes the
scientific enterprise, results in textbooks that are much less interesting than they
might be otherwise and removes a fertile source of material that could be used
to help students see the rules of the game of science in context (Allen & Baker,
2001).
In the past sixty years, a variety of approaches to the inclusion of the history
of science have been proposed and these will be discussed in subsequent sections
of this chapter. Accompanying these approaches is an impressive number of
justifications for the use of HOS which are offered as a group in Table 1 but are
drawn primarily from Sherratt (1982, 1983), Matthews (1994), Monk and Osborne
(1997), Rasmussen (2007), Rudge and Howe (2009) and Wider (2006).
39
MCCOMAS
Table 1. Rationales offered from a variety of sources in support of the

inclusion of the history of science in science teaching
Inclusion of the History of Science in Science Instruction potentially can:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Increase student motivation

Increase admiration for scientists
Help students develop better attitudes toward science
Humanize the sciences
Demonstrate that science has a history
Assist students in understanding and appreciating the interaction between
science and society
Provide authentic illustrations for the way science actually functions
Reveal both the link and distinction between science and technology
Help to connect the science disciplines by showing the commonalities
Make instruction more challenging and thus will enhance reasoning
Provide opportunities for the development of higher order thinking skills
Contribute to a fuller understanding of basic science content
Help to reveal and dispel classic science misconceptions (this rationale is
linked to what is called historical recapitulation in which some learners are
seen to proceed through stages of misconceptions that are occasionally linked
to incorrect ideas held by scientists in the past)
Provide an interdisciplinary link between science and other school subjects
with a particular emphasis on bridging the gap between the two cultures
(humanities and sciences)
Improve teacher education by helping teachers with their own science learning
Readers should understand that these rationales do not pertain to the incorporation
of all particular HOS approaches in science teaching only that, as a group, these
justifications have been offered to support the use of the history of science in the
classroom. These rationales come from a variety of sources; some are frequently
mentioned by various authors, a few have been validated by research studies while
others lack such support and exist primarily as suggestions.
In reviewing the various HOS instructional methods it is clear that there are
as many distinct types as there are rationales for the incorporation of HOS in
instruction. As we move forward in recommending the use of HOS it is now
necessary to provide some definitions about exactly what is meant by a HOS-based
curriculum, a task that we will consider in the next section.
3. WHY PROPOSE A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR HOS CURRICULUM
AND INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGNS?
The classification plan or typology proposed here is designed to do several things.

First, there is the goal to provide a range of approaches and examples for the way
in which HOS may be used in science instruction. This goal builds on some earlier
work in this regard by Allchin (1997). The next element considered in the design of
this proposal is the assumption that not all HOS educational approaches are the same,
are not as easily integrated into instruction, do not all make the same demands on
teachers and students and will not necessarily produce the same impact on students.
40
As the proposal, the author is acutely aware that some may disagree with the
distinctions made between types and that too is to be encouraged. An NOS typology
is a worthy and perhaps even necessary first step in establishing a framework for
examining and discussing the roles, advantages and disadvantages of each of these
instructional types.
This proposed taxonomy is based on several factors starting with a review of
actual HOS instructional models that have been used in preference to ones that are
possible or ideal. Even with this apparent limitation, it seems that almost every
conceivable way to integrate HOS into science instruction has been attempted; the
degree of success of these attempts has generally not be measured well. Another
element that factors into the taxonomy offered here addresses the cognitive and
affective impact that is likely made by the method. One can assume that watching
a film is different from reading an original manuscript. Even here there can be no a
priori judgment about the ultimate kind of impact that each presentation type might
make. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that the impact may lie in the eye of the
beholder; some students may react more positively to some instructional approaches
than others while other learners may have quite a different response to the same
technique.
The classification scheme is also based in part on what might be called the
distance from the primary source material. The question is asked how much of the
original work of the scientist is encountered by the student in comparison to the view
of a scientists achievement as interpreted by others. We will consider how much of
the source material is encountered by students. This will become clear when examining, for instance, the distinction between having students read original works by
Darwin and examining a case study on the history of evolution as a scientific principle.
Finally there is the distinction built into the taxonomy which accounts for those
approaches featuring a hands-on aspect of use of HOS. In some HOS approaches,
students are asked to (re)conduct or in some other way personally experience a
noteworthy experiment or a series of experiments from the history of science.
Readers are cautioned not to assume that the taxonomy is based on a hierarchy
of effectiveness or rigor. This would be useful, but the simple fact is that in most
cases we do not have sufficient empirical evidence of the effectiveness with respect
to any particular application of the history of science as an instructional technique.
For instance, there is no implication that recreating a historical experiment is
better than reading the report of that experiment in the words of the scientist who
conducted the work. Rather, in developing the plan offered here, the issue is one of
difference. This taxonomy defines and distinguishes one HOS approach from
another with the presumption that these distinct approaches probably do impact
students in different ways. At each level of the taxonomy examples will be provided
to illustrate either the approach itself or the source material for such an approach.
No attempt has been made to include every illustration of every technique appearing
in the literature, but the goal is to provide enough detail for readers to evaluate why
one HOS instructional plan is distinct from another.
One aspect of the HOS approach that is not captured by this taxonomy is that
of integration and synergy. For instance, there is no classification provided for an
41
MCCOMAS
approach which has students reenact a classic experiment and read the scientists
report. One could infer that such an approach would be different from the use of
either method in isolation from the others that might be combined with it. There is
also no useful way to categorize an approach that uses a video case study approach
linking biographical elements of individual scientists such as Galileo with an overview of the science of mechanics. Perhaps there is an advantage in proposing an
additional level for such mixed approaches. The challenge in the development of
any taxonomy is to avoid making everything a special case or providing such all
encompassing categories that no distinctions can be made; this, of course, is the classic
dilemma of lumping and splitting. The plan provided here is offered simply as a way
to review and organize the various HOS approaches discovered thus far in a review of
the literature and, as with all such plans, is open to critique and modification.
4. A HISTORY OF SCIENCE INSTRUCTIONAL TAXONOMY
To introduce the scope and scale of the proposed typology, consider the plan
provided in Table 2. Each level is discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections
of this chapter.
Table 2. A proposed taxonomy for the kinds of HOS approaches applied in science
instruction during the past 60 years
1.0
Interactions with original works (or selections) in the history of science

1.1 Original works in their entirety (may include additional commentary)
1.2 Original works abstracted (may include additional commentary)
2.0
Case studies, stories and other similar illustrations of the history of science
(including those with original written materials)
2.1 Case studies (with original content)
2.2 Science stories
2.3 Shorter illustrations, vignettes and examples
3.0
Biographies and autobiographies of scientists and their discoveries
3.1 Autobiography of a Scientist
3.2 Biography of Scientist (Written)
3.3 Biography of Scientist (Dramatic Presentation)
4.0
Book length presentations of some aspect of the history of science
4.1 Account of the General History of Science
4.2 History of a Particular Scientific Discipline
4.3 History of a Particular Scientific Sub-discipline such as genetics, evolution
or quantum physics
4.4 History of a Single Discovery of Event (such as an eclipse, the problem of
longitude, appearance of Halleys Comet, etc.)
4.5 Accounts of classic experiments
5.0
Role playing and related activities with respect to historical personages
6.0
Textbook inclusions related to the history of science
7.0
Experimental reenactments and other hands-on approaches for engagement with historical aspects of science
42
Domain 1.0: First hand interactions with original works

This level of the taxonomy essentially represents the Great Books (Bloom, 1994)
approach to the history of science in which students read the actual accounts of
science as written by the scientists themselves and then engage in guided discussions
regarding what they have read. Such accounts are most likely limited to the original
papers appearing in scientific journals but in rare cases, might also consist of a review
of working documents (such as laboratory notebooks, etc.). The classification at
this level is further subdivided in recognition of the fact that students may read the
original works in their entirety, may read abstracts of those works, may encounter a
single paper or read sets of related papers from the same scientist or scientists
associated with the same discovery or phenomenon.
Such original works are available in collections with commentaries such as
found in the critical editions produced by some publishers. An example includes
the Norton Critical Edition of the discovery of the structure of DNA which includes
a selection of related papers (Watson & Stent, 1980) or an original seminal work
alone such as that written by Watson and Crick (1953).
Many scientists (Einstein and Darwin for example) are represented by extensive
collections sometimes called paper projects that have so completely documented
the life and times of individuals through their own writing that it is almost possible
to know what a famous scientist was doing on a daily basis; such is the case with
Darwin for instance (http://darwin-online.org.uk) whose works have been digitized
and are easily accessible on line.
At the upper levels of the classification plan, students (presumably with help from
teachers) make sense of what they have read without relying on the interpretation
provided by an interceding authority (such as a historian or other interpreter). In our
increasingly wired world it is now possible to download important papers and entire
books making this approach somewhat easier than it was just a few years ago. Even
so, teachers are reminded of the impact on the affective domain that may be made
by actual objects and whether students could have the opportunity to see an
original paper or an actual book from an important episode in the history of science
(called realia). A visit to the rare books section of a library may be able to put
students in touch with the history of science directly.
The additional levels of the taxonomy are provided to make the distinction between
works that are encountered in their original form and those encountered either
as abstracts or with some additional commentary from experts. Illustrative of this
approach are contributions such as Whats the Matter? Readings in Physics
(Whitefield, 2007), Biology: Its People and its Papers (Baumel & Berger, 1973)
and Kampourakis and McComas (2009a).
Domain 2.0: Case studies, stories and other similar illustrations of the
history of science (may include interaction with original written materials
and laboratory experiences)
The case study or case method approach to instruction has been attempted in many
disciplines and science is no exception. For instance, there even exists a center for
the use of case studies in the teaching of science (http://library.buffalo.edu/libraries/
projects/cases/case.html) with an extensive set of such studies along with rationales
43
MCCOMAS
for their use (Herreid, 1994). The explicit use of the history of science has also
been used in a case method format. Much of the early inspiration and advocacy for
the use of the history of science in science instruction came from James B. Conant,
scientist and president of Harvard University who expressed the view that it is
my contention that science can best be understood by laymen through close study
of a few relatively simple case histories (1947, p. 1).
Conants passion for the use of history of science resulted in what is the most
noteworthy example of the case approach, the Harvard Case Studies in Experimental
Science (Conant & Nash, 1948). The titles of the cases are provided in Table 3.
Table 3. The seven case studies included in the Harvard cases in
experimental science (Conant & Nash, 1948)
Robert Boyles Experiments in Pneumatics (64 pgs)

The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of
17751789 (52 pgs)
The Early Development of the Concepts of Temperature and Heat; The Rise
and Decline of the Caloric Theory (98 pgs)
The Atomic-molecular Theory (108 pgs)
Plants and the Atmosphere (114 pgs)
Pasteurs and Tyndalls Study of Spontaneous Generation (54 pgs)
The Development of the Concept of Electric Charge: Electricity from the
Greeks to Columb (98 pgs)
Later, Conants student and later fellow Harvard professor, Leo Klopfer (1964),
adapted the case study approach for use in high schools with the History of Science
Cases (HOSC). Each of these units included the exploration of a major scientific
idea through the examination of excerpts of historical documents and experimentation
carried out either by students themselves or as a demonstration by the teacher (Lind,
1979). Table 4 features a list of the nine titles proposed or developed for HOSC
each of which was represented by individual guides for teachers and students. The
overarching goals for HOSC were to show students the methods used by scientists,
the means by which science advances and the conditions under which it flourishes,
Table 4. The cases developed (or proposed) for the History of Science Cases (HOSC)
(Klopfer, 1964). Note there is a good chance that some of these planned titles
were never published
44
The Cells of Life

The Chemistry of Fixed Air
Fraunhofer Lines
Frogs and Batteries
The Discovery of Halogen Elements
Air Pressure
The Sexuality of Plants
Rejection of Atomic Theory
The Speed of Light
the personalities and human qualities of science, the interplay of social, economic,
technological, and psychological factors with the progress of science and the
importance to science of accurate and accessible records, constantly improved
instruments, and free communication between scientists (Klopfer, 1964).
Strategies at the level of Science Stories (2.2) of the typology include science
stories a term coined by Clough and Olson (2004) and further developed by
Clough (2008). Such narratives are written specifically for instructional purposes
without much original material. Roach (1995) and Roach and Wandersee (1993)
pioneered this approach in the use of short stories to share important lessons about
science purpose-written stories. Sometimes scientists dialogue is created for dramatic
and instructional purposes. The goal is generally for students to learn a very
specific lesson about how science works or about science content and the stories
have been crafted with such goals in mind. Current examples include those by
Clough (2008) and Klassen (2006).
Even shorter HOS illustrations (Level 2.3) can be used to make points within
existing lessons. An example of this approach would be for a teacher to tell the
story of how Kekule imagined a chain of snakes one biting the tail of another to
form a circle inspiring him to conclude the some hydrocarbons formed ring structures
rather than the linear chains that was thought to be the only option. The story is
perfectly suited for a chemistry teacher to make the point that creativity plays a
major role in scientific discovery. Of course, this approach requires that teachers
have such examples from which they may draw in instruction. McComas (2008b)
and Kampourakis and McComas (2009b) further illustrate this technique and provide
such examples.
Domain 3.0: Biographies and autobiographies of scientists and their
discoveries
Here we find the life and research of scientists reported directly. The three types within this strategy will be discussed as a group even though there is likely a difference
in impact on students linked to the way in which the information is delivered and to
the voice of the author. There are countless examples of this HOS approach with
first person narratives such as those by Charles Darwin (2002) Autobiographies,
James Watson (1996) The Double Helix and Richard Feynman (2005) The Meaning
of it All and biographies such as Galileos Daughter (Sobel, 1999), Einstein (Issacson,
2007), Rosalind Franklin (Maddox, 2002) and Issac Newton (Gleick, 2003). Fingon
and Fingon (2009) share an effectively updated version of the traditional strategy
of having students present scientists biographies guided by a rubric for evaluation
of these presentations. Dagher and Ford do provide a cautionary note associated
with the use of this strategy in reporting that some biographies written for younger
children were characterized by a relative absence of description of how science
arrived at their knowledge... (p. 377).
A strategy to reading about the life and work of a scientist is that of a dramatic
presentation delivered on stage or in recorded format. An excellent example of this
is the play QED by playwright Peter Parnell on the life of Richard Feynman. This
play brought science and its history to life for theatre-goers (and presumably for
students too) as actor Alan Alda starred as the eccentric physicist. In 1996 the
45
MCCOMAS
movie Infinity dramatized the earlier life of Feynman during his time as a young
scientist working on the development of the atomic bomb during the Manhattan
Project. The only caution in using such dramatizations is the degree to which these
products depart from the truth.
Finally, there are many products have been produced exclusively for the education
market that present the lives and work of scientists in video format. Many of the
products of the PBS NOVA series include historical recreations. Recent examples
include Einsteins Big Idea, Darwins Dangerous Idea, Newtons Dark Secret and
Galileos Battle for the Heavens (Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Other noteworthy examples of this genre include the series of eight modules, entitled MindWorks
(Becker, 2000) that extend, complement, and enrich existing curricular materials
on various subjects (Table 5) and the Mechanical Universe Project produced by
the California Institute of Technology (1985) that provides explanations of many
concepts in physics frequently accompanied by recreations of the actual personages,
events and experiments with actors in period costumes. Even without viewing the
Mechanical Universe segments in their traditional fashion it would be possible to
extract these dramatic recreations as classroom illustrations of the history of science.
In conclusion, there seems to be no particular strategy reported in the literature
for the way in which biography and autobiography can be used in the science
classroom but this approach to the history of science would seem to stand as
distinct from some of the others.
Table 5. The video titles produced by Becker (2000) as part of the
MindWorks project featuring recreations of
Kinematics (Galileo: Falling Objects)
Dynamics (DuChatelet and Voltaire: Collisions)
Thermodynamics (Count Rumford: Heat)
Statics & Structures (Ferris and the Ferris Wheel)
Electricity & Magnetism (Woods: Communication / Railway Telegraphy)
Light & Color (Newton and Wickins: Refraction of Light and Color)
Atoms & Matter (Curie and Huggins: Radioactivity)
Tomorrows Challenges (Shirley and the Mars Pathfinder Mission)
Domain 4.0: Book length presentations of some aspect of the history

of science
The impact of the strategies in this category relate to those just discussed but have
been separated because of their focus. Instead of featuring the work of a single
individual with emphasis on the life, times and work of that individual from a
biographical perspective there are more generalized discussions. The subcategories
have been arranged from those that are most generic (such as a narrative account of
science itself as might be found in the three book series The Story of Science
(Hakim, 2005), to historical treatments of the history of a discipline (such as biology
as exemplified by The Epic History of Biology; Serafini, 2001) to a subdiscipline
(such as molecular biology like The Eighth Day of Creation; Judson, 1996) or even
the history of a specific event (Longitude; Sobel, 1995, is an excellent example of
46
this genre). A somewhat less related category, accounts of classic experiments, is

also included here. There is little research to show how materials in this category of
the history of science are used and what impact such use would have on students
but original materials have been applied successfully in a wide number of other
areas of instruction (for example Bowler & Morus, 2005).
Domain 5.0: Role playing and related activities with respect to historical
personages
Admittedly, this level of the typology is the most tentative. Since there are a few
inclusions in the literature to the use of direct and indirect role playing activities in
science instruction and because such techniques seem unique from the others
provided here, this category was established. Instructional techniques in this category
would include those in which students take on the roles of historical personages in
the history of science to act out, debate or respond to questions as those persons.
This may or may not involve having students dress up as the personages they portray.
One could imagine students writing a play or otherwise reenacting the trail of
Galileo more fully to understand and communicate the central issues of that debate.
This would be characterized as a direct application of the use of role playing in the
history of science.
Alternatively, the teacher, or even an actor might dress up as a famous scientist
and take on the character of that person to give lectures and respond to questions as
that person. Mendel, Darwin, Newton, Einstein and other such distinctive scientists
have all been the focus of this technique. Regrettably, nothing of substance has
been found in the literature regarding the impact of the application of this strategy
or on any robust discussion for how this might be used in a general way but the
technique would seem to hold some promise.
Domain 6.0: Textbook inclusions related to the history of science
This category is offered to reflect a reality rather than an ideal state for the use of
HOS in science teaching. Presently, relatively little NOS/HOS content is contained
in textbooks and in classroom discussions. Typically, the few major scientific
discoveries explicitly tied to those who made the contributions are discussed from
such a human historical perspective. Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Darwin and Watson/
Crick are commonly mentioned even as the specifics of their work (often the most
interesting and illustrative parts) are omitted. A number of studies substantiate this
point. However, Leite (2002) did a particularly good job in describing how to look
for the historical content in textbooks physics in her case and reported the
finding that in the books examined the historical content did not give students and
adequate image of scientists and their work.
When scientists are mentioned, their contributions are limited to a few sentences,
perhaps a picture, and birth and death dates usually in a side bar in the textbook.
Even this positioning almost guarantees that students and teachers alike will ignore
the potential offered by such content. While this use of HOS is not particularly
robust or compelling, it should be acknowledged as a way to account for as many
possibilities of the incorporation of HOS as possible. One exception to the current
state of inclusion of the history of science in science texts was the Project Physics
47
MCCOMAS
curriculum developed in the 1960s and updated as Physics, the Human Adventure
(Holton & Brush, 2001). This project, which had as a co-author science historian
Gerald Holton, deliberated included a rich historical treatment along with discussion
of the science of physics (Holton, 1969, 2003). While there have been studies of what
history content is mentioned in science texts there have been no comprehensive
examinations of what use teachers make of such content or what impressions
students have of this dimension of science teachers. It is probably not too great a
conclusion to reach that HOS inclusion in science textbooks makes almost no
impact on students or teachers unless it is explicitly woven into the curriculum.
That is likely to happen only in the classrooms of teachers who already possess a
strong interest in the subject.
Domain 7.0: Experimental reenactments and other hands-on
approaches for engagement with various historical aspects of science
The final level in our proposed classification plan is that of the use of classic or
historical experiments in the teaching of science. Of course, investigations such as
the electrostatic effect of rubbing various fabrics on a glass rod are done frequently,
but in the majority of cases are not tied to specific persons or events in the history
of the discovery of static electricity. The kinds of investigations that are considered for
inclusion in this domain of the classification plan are those that are explicitly
linked to the history of science. This aspect of history of science teaching is confounded by the reality that rarely are these hands-on approaches done in isolation
from other techniques. Consider the History of Science Cases, discussed earlier
in this chapter; they too used engaged students in conducting experiments but
blended this with reading about the scientist and the work being pursued. However,
given the special nature of hands-on investigations and the unique impact that
they may make, it seems reasonable to include such approaches in their own
domain in the taxonomy.
Resources of the use of this approach are relatively limited. Several books feature
discussions of experiments that could be used as source material for either reading
about or actually conducting (re-conducting) some of these classic experiments. The
Ten Most Beautiful Experiments in Science (Johnson, 2009), Great Experiments in
Physics (Shamos, 1987) and Great Scientific Experiments (Harre, 1981) are among
the most useful. An extensive compendium of classroom-ready classic experiments
covering all of the sciences has been released as Historical Science Experiments on
File (Walker, 1993).
A number of educators have used various permutations of experimental reenactments. Kipnis (1996) developed what he calls the historical investigative approach
and applied it to the study of optics and electricity. Heerring at the University of
Oldenburg (2000, 2003) has become the expert in the construction of exact
replicas of many important devices in the history of physics for use in teacher
education programs. Most recently, Cavicchi (2008) has found that such an
approach had
value in recovering some of the interrelatedness inherent in the history and
reintroducing the wonder of science phenomena to students today (p. 717)
48
but adds that

the history of science with its experimental legacy has yet to be plumbed as
an educational resource for countering the fragmenting of science knowledge
(p. 719).
5. CONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Even if we agree on the general structure of the proposed taxonomy there are at
least three additional major elements of HOS instruction worth considering. These
would include some focus on the curriculum, pedagogy and the affective domain
illustrated in a model provided in Figure 1.
From a curricular perspective it would seem that HOS can only be effectively
included in instruction if it is integrated within rather than appended to instruction,
if HOS is somehow alighted with standards and other curricular goals and if the
focus of HOS (and HOS derived learning) is featured in science assessment so that
students take it seriously.
Figure 1. Three educational considerations (level of engagement, level of explicitness

and level of integratedness) related to the inclusion of the history of science in science
instruction. The letters are included for illustration purposes only. A represents a
HOS approach with a high level of implicit treatment of HOS and medium levels of
both engagement and integratedness. B represents high levels of all three elements.
The pedagogical element of this model is quite straightforward, HOS-derived

learning must be discussed explicitly (rather than implicitly) (Abd-El-Khalick and
49
MCCOMAS
Lederman, 2000ab; Rudge and Howe (2009). As with nature of science itself, if the
ideas that teachers hope to share through a history of science approach are only
implied it is very likely that the will be ignored. Lastly, there is an affective domain
consideration. If the HOS content and instructional approach is not engaging,
interesting and developmentally appropriate it will likely not be responded to positively
by students and, in turn, by teachers. If teachers alone value the incorporation of
HOS in science instruction there is a very good possibility that the innovation
will not last since students themselves will reject it. With the press of time and
demands of coverage presently on the science curriculum, ideas most likely to
inform curriculum development are those that work. Figure 1 provides some
direction in predicting what combination of dimensions HOS will be effective in
the classroom.
6. CHALLENGES FACED IN INCORPORATING HOS IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
There exists a long heritage both of advocacy for (McComas, 1997) and innovation in
the incorporation of the history of science in science instruction and even instructive
criticism (Allchin, 2003 and Kindi, 2005). Even as we laud the depth of scholarship and practical suggestion for the incorporation of history of science in science
teaching, it must be stated that this approach to science teaching remains uncommon
and generally untested for a number of reasons.
First, science teacher education programs must be upgraded to include the effective
use of HOS as part of generating appropriate PCK. Perhaps with guidance from the
taxonomy, we must have a new focus on curriculum models for the effective and
engaging inclusion of HOS into the science classroom. Finally, we should devote
some of our research initiatives to the examination of the role and nature of HOS in
the service of science teaching. Little has been done to determine the degree to
which HOS should be included as an instructional imperative or in gauging the
relative effectiveness of the various techniques for its use in school science teaching.
We do not know what elements of HOS are effective for what science teaching
purposes. We must consider the roles to be played by recapitulation (reenactment) vs.
reconstruction (the writing of history for instructional purposes). We should be
concerned that exposure to old science may be problematic as we try to communicate current science (Lind, 1979).
As we conclude this review of methodologies for the use of history of science it
seems clear that the inclusion of science history in science instruction should be a
high priority. We must humanize sciences by revealing to students the diverse and
interested people who have contributed to science in the past and continue daily.
We should consider again the multitude of ways that educators and scholars have
suggested that we incorporate HOS and consider which ones make sense in our
new world of standards and benchmark tests. The challenge may be to integrate
HOS in subtle yet appropriate ways that do not make large demands on classroom
time and on teacher knowledge but there is little doubt that the science curriculum
would be enriched and enlivened if we can demonstrate to students where science
comes from who has contributed to its development.
50
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Carole Lee and Kostas Kampourakis for their many helpful
additions and corrections to the manuscript. Nevertheless, all opinions and errors
are of course the responsibility of the author.
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William F. McComas
Parks Family Professor of Science Education
University of Arkansas
College of Education and Health Professions
Project to Advance Science Education (PASE)
e-mail: mccomas@uark.edu
53
KOSTAS GAVROGLU
4. TEXTBOOKS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
Problematic Coexistence
That the use of episodes from the history of science and technology is particularly
beneficial to the teaching of the sciences has been well documented and there have
been interesting proposals of how to further elaborate a trend that has already been
welcomed by many teachers and textbook writers. No one doubts the positive effects
of historically informed science textbooks. All too often, historical notes interspersed
throughout the text books, photographs of old instruments or of well known scientific
figures, short biographies, stories about priority disputes, anecdotes from the lives of
scientists, even excerpts from original texts, excite the imagination of students and give
the opportunity to many teachers to make their teaching more lively and effective.
There are two questions worth pursuing from the point of view of a historian of
science. The first is whether such historically informed textbooks play any role
in making students understand what history of science is. The second question is
whether pedagogic expediency is always in tandem with the scholarship of history
of science? Might it be the case that what one wants to achieve in pedagogic terms
may be in conflict with what one wants to convey in historical terms?
In order to discuss these questions we need to make some preliminary comments.
One of them is the need to clarify what we mean by history of science. This is
not a definition of what history of science is, but rather, a way of clarifying the
difference between references to episodes from the past of the sciences, and history
of science, as practised by the members of the community of historians of science.
For many decades since the end of the 19th century, the great majority of historians
and philosophers of science believed that the development of the sciences was the
gradual appearance of a pre-existing objective structure of nature, and that the
origins of the sciences had no effect on their character. In other words, they believed
that what we have come to refer to as science was something independent of human
activities. This view has been radically modified since the 1970s. Few, if any, would
deny that the sciences have come into being as a result of complicated intellectual
and social processes, and their character has been deeply influenced by the scientists
ideological orientations, their cultural environment, their philosophical beliefs as
well as their ontological commitments. History of science is the history of the
people who tried to investigate and understand the structure and function of nature.
At the same time, however, history of science studies the institutions that have
been created in specific historical conditions where the sciences were nurtured and
GAVROGLU
various of its theoretical practices and experimental techniques had been established.
Though these institutions many people attempted to convince others of the truth of
their ideas about nature, and to legitimise the ways they went about understanding
nature. The sciences have been formed and molded by the ideas, techniques and
practices devised by people in order to further investigate nature, its entities, the
principles they postulated and the laws they discovered, the institutions they created
and the applications they thought up. But the development of the sciences has also
been influenced by the different philosophical, aesthetic, religious, and political
outlooks and social practices of those who were actively involved in the scientific
enterprise. It is for these reasons that history of science views science as a social
and cultural phenomenon, and historians of science are obliged to study the history
of the sciences within their spatial, temporal and cultural contexts.
The attempt to describe what historians of science and technology do, is not an
attempt to project that all historians (should) follow a particular historiographic
approach of how they would go about doing history of science. What is being
emphasised is that independent of what aspects each historian of science chooses to
bring to surface, and independent of what aspects each historian of science thinks
are relevant for an understanding of the development of the sciences, they are all
aware that the historical study of the sciences involves a complex framework
comprised of all these parameters.
Another point is that historians of science pose and attempt to answer questions.
In all the articles appearing in professional journals and conference proceedings, in
all the books and seminar talks, there is always a specific set of questions being
posed and arguments constructed in order to answer the question(s). This is exactly
what makes the decisive difference between, say, an article in an encyclopaedia
and an article in a professional journal. In an article in an encyclopaedia what is
important is that the facts are correct. In an article in a professional journal, the facts
have to be correct, of course. But the rules of the discipline, the rules that the members
of the community of historians of science agree by consensus, is that the author
is obliged to raise questions and follow a series of rules of how to answer them.
Again what is implied here is not a historiographically homogeneous approach, but
rules such as the careful reading of published and unpublished material not through
the prism of presentism, but by trying to understand how these texts were read at
the past, the study of the correspondence, the study of the resistances against the new
proposals, etc. What is being emphasised here is that there are serious differences
between what is considered as texts of history of science and those texts where
historical aspects of science appear. In a way, the differences may be analogous to
the differences between the textbooks of a scientific discipline and the popular
books about that particular discipline. No one demands rigour from a popular
account. No one would accept as textbook that lacks rigour.
Another set of issues which is relevant for answering the questions we raised, is
to understand the character of textbooks vis a vis the historical development of the
sciences. In no text book do we find the expressions of a particular theory or
experiment as it was originally formulated. The aim of a textbook writer is to
articulate the archetypal form of a particular theory and try to express it in a way
56
TEXTBOOKS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
that is free of any of its local origins or any of its idiosyncratic characteristics.
What characterises textbooks, is the presentation of, say, a theory in such a manner
as to provide some kind of continuity with what preceded it and what will follows.
Hence, science textbooks by the sheer way they organise their material, express
a kind of historical narrative. Or, to be more exact, they imply a historicity, since,
otherwise there is the danger that various parts will appear to be extraneous and
disjointed something rather catastrophic for a textbook. The way a textbook is
organised is dictated by pedagogic considerations. The aim of a textbook is to
assist the teacher and the student to get the best possible grasp of the particular
discipline depending on the age group or the level of background of a particular
audience. Perhaps the efficiency of a textbook is gauged by how coherent the
whole framework is. This is not to criticize textbooks in general, since their role is
to teach the particular sciences. And textbook writers are morally justified to distort
history, if through such a distortion they feel that they can create a pedagogically
more efficient textbook.
Let us take an example. In the great majority of text books the Special Theory of
Relativity is introduced through the negative result of the Michelson Morley
experiment. The story, roughly, is as follows. The discovery of the electromagnetic
waves by Hertz which were predicted by Maxwells theory of electromagnetism,
gave credence to the view that, like all waves, the electromagnetic waves, and,
hence, light which was shown by Maxwell to be a form of electromagnetic wave,
travel through a medium - the ether. Though the properties of this medium were
turning out to be more and more unphysical, the scientific community had much
to gain in its symbiosis with the problematic ether (which could be elucidated one
day, as it happened so many times in the past) than to abandon it. However,
independent of the properties of the medium, it was, on principle, possible to
measure the relative velocity of the earth and the ether. It was a value that would
appear as a second order effect, something that became possible after the improvement of the interferometer by A. A. Michelson. In a series of carefully conducted
experiments, started in 1887 in collaboration with E. Morley, what was expected to
be a finite value (the relative velocity of the earth with respect to the ether) turned
out to be zero. The unexpected zero value was repeatedly found in the subsequent
redesigned experiments, whereas its theoretical explanation, within the framework
of classical mechanics and electromagnetism, brought about serious problems. The
presentation of the Special Theory of Relativity, in most textbooks, continues as
follows. In 1905, and in order to get out of the deadlock created by the zero result
of the Michelson-Morley experiment, Einstein postulated two new axioms that
should be valid for any theory: that the velocity of light is the maximum velocity
and is, thus, a constant of nature, and that every theory should be invariant under
a particular set of transformations. This approach explained the zero result of
the Michelson-Morley experiment and, furthermore, rendered the ether irrelevant
for electromagnetism. And the presentation of the Special Theory of Relativity
continues by introducing all the novelties of the theory etc.
Such an introduction to the Special Theory of Relativity appears to be faithful to
history. Furthermore, it follows a schema particularly dear to the physicists view
57
GAVROGLU
of history: that there is a fundamental theory (electromagnetism), one of its crucial

predictions is verified (electromagnetic waves), an experiment is performed to
further test the possibilities provided by the theory (Michelson-Morley experiments),
there is an unexpected result (zero relative velocity between the earth and the ether),
there is new theory (Special Theory of Relativity) which explains everything
preceding it and also provides an explanation for what was an anomaly within the
framework of the previous theory. Such a positivist view of history is at the core of
many science textbooks: Theory - predictions - experiments to test the predictions difficulty - a hypothesis which solves the difficulty without affecting the explanation
of other experimental results - new theory - new experiments. Such an approach,
however, is in serious conflict both with the historical facts as well as with historical
scholarship. As to the historical facts, in the actual 1905 paper of Einstein, there is
no reference to the Michelson-Morley experiment, and, at the very best, one can
consider that there is an indirect reference to it, without such a reference playing
any crucial role in the construction of the theory. Furthermore, through the work of
historians of science, and more specifically that of Gerald Holton1, who have
systematically studied this issue, there is a consensus that though Einstein knew
of the experiment, he did not give to it any significance at all. In fact, Einstein
thought that what was problematic in electromagnetic theory was the asymmetric
explanation of what appeared to be symmetric phenomena. The motion of a conductor
with respect to a magnet and, inversely, the motion of a magnet with respect to
a conductor have exactly the same effect: the induction of an electric current in
the conductor. According to electromagnetic theory these two phenomena had
different kinds of explanations. In the first case the appearance of the current was
considered to be the result of the appearance of an electromotive force at the ends
of the conductor, whereas for the second case the current appears because of the
appearance of an electric field where the conductor is. According to Einstein the
two phenomena should have had essentially the same explanation, since the only
thing that mattered was the relative motion between the magnet and the conductor.
What we see here is that the pedagogically effective presentation gives us a
particular view on the way science develops. What is historically inexact is far easier
communicate. To try to introduce the Special Theory of Relativity by sticking to the
approach of the original paper of Einstein is a particularly trying job; it is far more
effective to adopt the method where the Special Theory of Relativity provides a way
out of the deadlock of the Michelson Morley experiment. Might it be the case that a
physics textbook may not be able to teach physics as well as history of physics?
The example we discussed above might be considered as the easy case. Historical
issues are more often than not, complicated matters that transcend the ways facts
are presented and are rearranged. Let us take another example. If asked to respond
to the question as to whose jurisdiction the atom is, the great majority of students
will answer that it is the physicists. The atom is an entity that is studied by the
physicists, and the physics of the atom has come to express the label identifying the
particular discipline which deals with the atom. All this is absolutely true. Yet, it
was not so for many decades. The atom was postulated by Dalton in 1803 in order
to provide an explanatory framework for all the chemical laws and rules that had
58
TEXTBOOKS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
been empirically derived. The atom was an entity which played a theoretical role and
at the same time it defined an ontology for chemistry. Notwithstanding the various
disputes among the chemists as to its role and character, the atom was from the
beginning of the 19th century in the chemists jurisdiction. The periodic table itself
could not be grasped without recourse to atomism. So what happened from the
beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the twentieth when the atom became
the physicists entity? The move over was a slow and very complicated process
of appropriation of the atom by the physicists. This involved public negotiations
through presidential addresses and commemorations, forceful statements in articles
and encyclopedia entries (one is reminded of the entry atom to the 9th edition of
Encyclopedia Britannica whose author was Maxwell where there is no mention of
Dalton and atoms are considered as the vortex atoms of Lord Kelvin!), mathematical
treatments of the atom that were so foreign to the chemists culture, institutional
developments, university courses etc. One can go on to discuss the details of these
processes of appropriation, but the point to be underlined is clear: one of the more
interesting things historians of science do is to study changes of viewpoints, changes
of mentalities, practices of subcultures. It is these aspects of the historical development
of the sciences that are particularly difficult to be incorporated in science textbooks.
History of science has gone a long way. It has not only unearthed a wealth of
information about the past of the sciences. It has developed its own multifarious
methods of how to deal with the past of the sciences, and, most, importantly, it has
kept in pace with what historians do: ask questions and provide answers. History of
science is not a discipline which provides a narrative of the past where facts and
events simply follow the correct order. History of science is almost exclusively
concerned with explanations. Hence, it has considerably distanced itself from its
own past when scientists tried to write the correct narratives, tried to present the
past as it really was.
What, perhaps, we need to do is to encourage the writing of historically
informed textbooks. But let us have no self-deceptions that one can grasp even the
basics of history of science through a science textbook. In exactly the same way
that one cannot learn science from a history of science textbook.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Prof. P. Kokkotas of Athens University, for inviting me to the
7th International Conference on History of Science and Science Education, where
some aspects of this article have been presented.
NOTES
1
G. Holton, Einstein, Michelson and the Crucial Experiment, ISIS, vol. 60, 1969, pp.133197.
Kostas Gavroglu
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
University of Athens, Athens, Greece
59
PANAGIOTIS KOKKOTAS AND AIKATERINI RIZAKI
5. DOES HISTORY OF SCIENCE CONTRIBUTE TO

THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
CONSTRUCTIVIST ENVIRONMENTS OF LEARNING?
1. INTRODUCTION: ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE HISTORY

OF SCIENCE (HOS) IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Over the last twenty years, an increasing interest has been developed in what concerns
the contribution of HOS to the teaching of science in all levels of education. This
interest has been expressed with: a) the creation of the International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group b) the organization of European and International
Conferences (Paris 1988; Tallahassee-Florida 1989; Cambridge 1990; Madrid 1992;
Szombathely 1994; Minneapolis 1995; Bratislava 1996; Pavia 1999; Calgary 2007;
Notre Dame 2009) and c) the publication of the Journal: Science & Education.
The interest in the use of HOS in teaching science is not new. For example,
Ernest Mach claimed that the use of HOS as a vehicle to obtain a genuine understanding of modern scientific contents, to appropriately face new problems and
prompt further progress in science, is unique (Galili & Hazan, 2001). Mach argued
that:
A person who has read and understood the Greek and Roman authors, has felt
and experienced, more than one who is restricted to the impression of the
present. He sees how men, placed in different circumstances, judge quite
differently the same things from what we do today. His own judgments will
be rendered thus more independent (Mach, 1886/1986, p. 347 cited by Galili &
Hazan, 2001).
This opinion of Mach becomes more significant in the context of science teaching.
Since 1927 and until recently the prevailing view for using HOS in science teaching
was that of Haywood (1927). Although he believed in the importance of the historical
approach to science teaching, he had the certainty that students will not benefit as
much from it in their examinations. Even today the situation remains much the
same (Matthews, 1994), since many teachers dont use HOS in their teaching.
Furthermore, it is accepted that present and past science textbooks make only
passing reference to HOS. Where history is included, it all too often becomes
fictionalized conveys the Whig view on history (Brush, 1974). Monk & Osborne
(1997) describe Whig view as a historical approach which interprets the past in
terms of present ideas and values, elevating in significance all incidents and work
that have contributed to the formation of current society, rather than attempting to
KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI
understand social context of the era and the contingent factors that contributed its
production. The contribution of HOS in teaching science even in the form of the
Whig view could be accepted to the extent, it serves science education. Furthermore,
whiggism, according to Nickelss point, is invaluable in the practice of science; it
is the condition for conducting good research (Nickels, 1992, p. 98).
Another direction for the exploitation of HOS in science teaching is that described
by Kuhn, who distinguishes between HOS for scientists (textbook history) and HOS
for historians and philosophers. The importance of Kuhns distinction rests on his
intention to advance and recommend the orderly and heroic history of scientists as
a myth that will entice and blind them (Kindi, 2005). According to her, Kuhn by
recognizing the significance of textbook history in science education highlights the
importance of the bad history of textbooks, since this history is an indelible condition
of scientific practice and it is conductive to forming the scientists course of action.
Kuhn perceives science as a practice and not as a set of propositions forming a theory.
The systematic use of HOS in science education started in the USA at the middle
of the 20th century. HOS in education was used by Conant in his work: Harvard
Case Histories in Experimental Science (Conant, 1957). Another attempt to introduce
HOS in teaching secondary school science was made by Klopher (19641966) in
his project: History of Science Cases for Schools.
Perhaps the most integrated approach arguing for the introduction of History and
Philosophy of Science (HPS) in science teaching is the Harvard Project Physics
Course (HPPC) developed by Rutherford, Holton and Watson (1970). This project
had a humanistic orientation and aimed to attract and motivate students of secondary
education in the study of physics (Bruch, 1989). Even today this aim has not been
achieved in all European countries. For this reason the European Union (EU) calls
for proposals for projects with humanistic orientation to be produced in order to
attract and motivate a wider range of students to study physics or science at post
secondary and university levels.
Over the last decades in the USA and the EU research programs dealing with
the nature of science (NOS) and (HOS) have been developed. For example three
important reports for science education have been introduced: Science for All
Americans (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1989), Benchmarks for Science Literacy (American Association for the Advancement of Science,
1993), and the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council,
1996). This inclusion of HOS in science education is justified on the following
grounds: a) HOS is both a tool for teaching science well, and b) HOS is a part of
the substance of science literacy (Rutherford, 2001). In two of the reports mentioned
above an integrated program containing natural and social sciences, mathematics
and technology has been developed in an interdisciplinary way, using cases of
HOS and reflecting on the values of the educational paradigm: Science Technology
Society (DeBoer, 1991, p. 178184).
In this paper we attempt to answer the question whether HOS contributes to better
quality science teaching and how accomplishes it. For technical reasons our study
is restricted only to constructivist environments and especially to individual and socioconstructivism.
62
CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
2. FROM BEHAVIORISM AND DISCOVERY LEARNING

TO CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
The most well known theories of learning in science education still in use are:
behaviorism, discovery learning, constructivist theories, and sociocultural approaches
to learning.
Behaviorism was the prevailing theory of learning in science education over the
last century. This theory is still in practice in many countries of the world. For
behaviorism a stimulus (S) from the environment produces a response (R) from
the organism, and with repetition, a S-R bond formed so that a given S is almost
inevitably associated with a given R. Behaviorism was largely based on animal
experimentation in laboratories and was extensively practiced in ancient Greece,
where it was believed that repetition is the mother of every learning. Learning in
behaviorism is defined as the change of the behavior of the subject due to knowledge gained. For this theory knowledge is objective and transmittable.
The rigid prescriptive nature of beheviorism was consistent with and supported
by the positivist or empiricist view of the nature of knowledge and knowing made
popular by Bacon, Hume and later by Pearson (1900) and other philosophers of
the Vienna School (Novak, 1993). According to Novak the failure of these ideas
to describe and predict how scholars produce knowledge and how humans learn
allowed new views of knowledge as paradigm construction (Kuhn, 1962) and evolving
populations of concepts (Toulmin, 1972). The epistemology of the discovery of
knowledge by scientists and consequently the discovery of learning by students are
best described by von Glasersfeld. According to him, to most traditional philosophers
true knowledge is a commodity supposed to exist as such, independent of experience,
waiting to be discovered by a human knower. It is timeless and requires no development, except that the human share of it increases as exploration goes on (von
Glasersfeld, 2001). In discovery learning, knowledge is regarded as objective and
independent of the learner. Both the above theories regard students minds as empty
vessels, ignoring their previous knowledge. As the beheviorist theory of learning,
so discovery learning failed to describe and predict how humans learn and how
knowledge is produced. Therefore, it was gradually replaced by new theories, very
well rooted in epistemology, i.e. constructivism and sociocultural theories of learning.
Both these theories reject the traditional epistemological claims about knowledge
as an objective representation of reality.
3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE
IN CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
There is a belief shared by most psychologists who study learning, that from birth
to death individuals construct and reconstruct the meaning of events and objects
they observe. It is an ongoing process, and a distinctly human process. This reality
has been recognized by educators for at least the last two millennia, but it was only
relatively recently that scholars developed methods and tools for the characterization
of personal meanings. Foremost among these tools have been Piagets (1926) clinical
interview; Kellys (1955) repertory grid for eliciting personal constructs and Novaks
concept maps (Novak, 1993).
63
KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI
The psychological processes by which an individual constructs his/her own new

meanings are essentially the same as the epistemological processes by which new
knowledge is constructed by the professionals in a discipline (Schwab, 1964; Toulmin,
1972). A better understanding of the individuals acquisition and organization of
knowledge leads to an understanding of the structure of the knowledge constructed
by scholars in a discipline. In both cases, knowledge construction is a complex
product of the human capacity to build meaning (Novak, 1993).
Constructivism can be connected to Plato and to Aristotle and later to Kant,
Giambattista Vico, and in the 20th century to Dewey. More recently, different
researchers have identified different forms of constructivism. For example, Steffe
and Gale distinguished six different core paradigms of it:
social constructivism, radical constructivism, social constructionism, informationprocessing constructivism, cybernetic systems, and sociocultural approaches
to mediated action (Steffe & Gale, 1995, p. xiii).
We believe that the most important of the constructivist theories are: a) individual
constructivism e.g. Piagetian constructivism or von Glasersfelds constructivismradical constructivism b) social-constructivism and c) sociocultural theories1. In recent
years there has been a shift from perspectives that adopt individual constructivist
assumptions (Tobin, 1993; Von Glasersfeld, 1995; Mintzes, Wandersee & Novak,
1998) to socioconstructivist, sociocultural ones (Lemke, 2001; Wells, 1999).
We are of the opinion that the contribution of HOS to science learning varies in
reference to the theory of learning used. For example HOS is used differently in a
behaviorist learning environment than in a discovery, constructivist, or a sociocultural
one. Also the role of the teacher as well as that of the student is different in each of
the above learning environments.
Individual constructivism is rooted in the Piagetian theory of structuralism and is
regarded by some educators as an epistemology, focusing on the nature, methods, and
limitations of knowledge. It is a model of knowing in which the mental representations that people construct are regarded as learning with no necessary correspondence
to an objective and a priori scientific ontology (Cobb, 1994a, 1994b). In the same
category belongs also the radical constructivism of von Glasersfeld (1988, 1999), who
has stressed that the construction of knowledge is a personal concern and its function
is to organize the experiential world. According to von Clasersfeld (1988, p. 83)
Cognition serves the experimental world, not the discovery of an objective reality.
Furthermore for him every individual constructs his/her on own reality and the notion
of objectivity where observations could be made without an observer is a delusion.
For radical constructivism the question: What is knowledge? is meaningless. On the
contrary of great interest is the question: How is knowledge generated?, which
ought to be the subject of investigations. We are not passively floored by information
from the outside; we actively construct our world (Glasersfeld, 1995).
Radical constructivism, as its name suggests, by applying the idea of viable
constructions also to itself rather than proposing a dogmatic world-view, is consistent
in its claim (Riegler, 2001). Furthermore, von Glasersfeld, by introducing the notion
of functional fit, clearly defines what it means to know in a radical constructivism
context. It possess ways and means to acting and thinking that allow one to attain
64
ones own goals, rather than to posses a true representation of reality. Radical
constructivism is associated with knowledge of the experiential world of which von
Glaserfeld is most commonly concerned. Also, this type of constructivism tends to
have a focus on individual self regulation, similar to the Piagetian view, and the
building of conceptual structures. This view is concerned with mostly cognitive
processes.
OLoughlin argues that the above version of constructivism is problematic
because: a) it ignores the subjectivity of the learner and the socially and historically
situated nature of knowing; b) it denies the essentially collaborative and social nature
of meaning making; and c) it privileges only one form of knowledge namely, the
technical rational (OLoughlin, 1992).
In individual constructivism, the learning of science has to do with the students
and the teacher seeing and coming to see in certain ways. In social constructivism,
the fundamental hypothesis is that the mental representations of the students and
the teacher are regarded as socially constructed. Social constructivism emerged out of
radical and Piagetian constructivism and is concerned with the contributions of social
interactions to the construction of the self which includes a construction of who
I am, including the self as a science learner (Atwater, 1996). According to Gergen
(1995) social construction begins with language as its fundamental presupposition.
He argued that meaning in language is achieved through social interdependence
and it is context-dependent. Language basically aids communal functions and for
him there is only a social mind, not an individual one.
Social constructivism attributes prevailing role to language in what concerns
meaning making and the legitimisation of knowledge. In this form of constructivism
the socially and culturally situated nature of mental activities is of prime importance.
Vygotsky could be regarded as a social constructivist. Amongst the most contemporary scientists is Rosalind Driver who would be mostly associated with this version
of constructivism. In all forms of constructivism people construct their own knowledge. Perhaps the main distinction between individual and social constructivism
is the following: in individual constructivism, the focus is on cognition and the
individual; in social constructivism, the focus is on language and the group.
Attempts have been made to integrate these two different perspectives (e.g., Cobb,
1994a). Millar and Driver (1987) stressed that scientific knowledge is personally
and socially constructed, rather than objective and revealed, science theories are
provisional, rather than absolute and unchanging. They maintained that science
learning depends on the representations a student brings to a situation and the
characteristics of the learning situation itself. Learning occurs when students interact
with others, so, their ideas become modified, extended or changed in the process.
The implication of this epistemology for learning is that what students observe or
predict about natural phenomena and the approaches they take in problem solving and
experimenting depend crucially on the way they construct their world. Whereas,
Driver, et al (1994) emphasized the social aspect of constructivism when they stated:
Scientific knowledge is symbolic in nature and socially negotiated. The objects
of science are not the phenomena of nature but constructs that are advanced
by the scientific community to interpret nature (p. 5).
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Fosnot (1996) proposes a theory of constructivism that describes knowledge as

temporary, developmental, non objective, internally constructed, and socially and
culturally mediated.
According to Vygotsky, the fundamental assumption of development and learning
is that higher mental functions in the individual derive from social life (Vygotsky
1978, p. 128). Leach & Scott (2003, p. 99) by using Vygotskys view of internalization argue that language and other semiotic mechanisms provide the means
for scientific ideas to be discussed by people on the social (or intermental) level.
The process of internalization (Vygotsky, 1987) is where individuals appropriate
and become able to use for themselves (on the intramental level) conceptual tools
first encountered on the social level. The products of internalization will be different
for different individuals. Following the process of internalization, language provides
the tools for individual thinking. Central to this view is the interdependence between
language and thought. It is not true that language offers some neutral means for
communicating personally and internally generated thoughts; language provides
the very tools through which those thoughts are first rehearsed on the intermental
level and then processed and used on the intramental level. A main characteristic of
Vygotskys view of human mental development is that higher order functions
develop out of social interaction. Unlike Piaget, Vygotsky argues that a childs
development cannot be understood by the study of the individual. We must also
study the social environment in which the individual has developed. Vygotsky
(1934/1986) described learning as being embedded in social events and occurring
as a child interacts with people, objects, and events in the environment. According
to Tharp and Gallimore (1988):
Through participation in activities that require cognitive and communicative
functions, children are drawn into the use of these functions in ways that
nurture and scaffold them (p. 6).
The objective of social constructivism is to understand the construction of knowledge in terms of social interaction. Social constructivists recognize the importance
of contextual values. Much of a persons actions (including the knowledge and
intentions of the person) can be understood only in terms of the norms of the society
in which that person is a member. Students cultural realities, including concepts of
self and social roles, are constructed through social interactions (Bauersfeld, 1995,
in Atwater, 1996).
Cobb (1995) asserts that learning is a social activity that cannot be reduced to
a psychological construct. In our opinion Piagetian constructivism focuses on
individual knowing, whereas social constructivism focuses in collaborative knowing.
The word knowing should be used to indicate the subjective meaning of the person
and the word knowledge should be used to indicate socially negotiated and
accepted forms of language (Smith, 1995, p. 24).
Students from various cultures, regardless of class, disability, or ethnicity,
construct their own knowledge socially (Novak, 1985; Strike & Posner, 1985). Hence,
cognitive abilities are socially transmitted, socially constrained, socially nurtured,
and socially encouraged (Day, French & Hall, 1985). Cobb (1994a) maintained that
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the critical issue for researchers is the quality of those socially and culturally
situated constructions of students science conceptions.
According to Bingle & Gaskell (1994), there are two kinds of science knowledge:
(a) ready-made science knowledge, which is taken for granted and seen as undisputed and unrelated to the specific contexts of its development and includes
scientific facts or statements about reality and (b) science-in-the-making knowledge, which is statements about scientific knowledge that are viewed as contestable
and unstable claims. In our opinion ready- made science knowledge is not really
knowledge but it is just information consisting of memorized facts and rules, which
is difficult to be exploited by the learner. Ready-made science knowledge is at the
bottom of Blooms hierarchical system of the taxonomy of educational objectives
(Bloom, 1956).
We argue that learning is a voluntary and pleasant activity and as such it needs
contexts that are attractive to students and allow them through on-going personal
reflection and verbal and written discourse to become socialized to a greater and
lesser extent into practices of the scientific community (Driver et al., 1994, p. 8).
Stinner (1996) believes that such contexts should provide opportunities for personal
reflections and problem solving as well as participation in group discussions and
experimental activities.
4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HOS TO THE CONSTRUCTION
OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
The interest for using HOS in science teaching in relation to the arguments which
question how it could advance the conceptual change are based on two assumptions:
a) the similarity between the conceptions of students and of those of scientists or
philosophers of the past, and b) the parallelism between the development of students
understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in HOS (Masson & VazquezAbad, 2006).
4.1 The Use of HOS for the Detection of Misconceptions
There are many empirical researches, which support the thesis of the relation
between students and past scientists or philosophers conceptions. For example it
was found in a comparative bibliographic study of the conceptions of early
philosophers and those of children relating to the role of light on the one hand and
the role of eye on the other in the process of vision, contacted by Dedes (2005),
that the historical models and the alternative conceptions of children, regarding the
process of vision have a number of common ideas. He noticed that the Pythagorean,
atomist and mathematician philosophers, irrespective of the adoption of emission
or reception theories, do not recognize any role for the external light. For them vision
is possible either with the exclusive emission of visual rays or with the reception of
images. Evidently pupils who adopt interpretations (any systematic relationship
between light, object and eye e.g. we see because our eyes have the ability to see)
and interpretations (the passage of light from the source to the object without
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providing any further detail of the role played by light in the visual process) as well
as children who advocate the first scheme among those where directionality is
suggested, appear to come to the same conclusion. We see an abstract, ambiguous
and unspecified process, in which light plays no role. Galileos dialogs (Azcarate,
Doncel & Romo, 1988) could be used as a good example offered by the HOS of
how to deal with students alternative ideas.
On the basis of these findings the role of HOS obtains a new significance,
namely how it could help educators not only anticipate students misconceptions
but also to assist them to teach effectively science to them. According to Monk and
Osborne (1997) the studies on childrens misconceptions show that this thinking is
more akin to preparadigmatic thinking. They quote (Wandersee, 1985):
.often (the studies) harbour misconceptions which were similar to views held
at one time or another during historical development of that science conceptthus making the history of science a useful heuristic device for anticipating
some students conceptual difficulties (Monk and Osborne, 1997, p. 413).
According to our view teachers studying the evolution of scientific concepts could
have an indication about the difficulties students face when they study these concepts.
Consequently teachers taking into account the above difficulties could organize
effective learning environments for their students. In this case the difficulties themselves could not be regarded as real obstacles but as means to be used for fruitful
learning.
Aristotelian thinking and childrens thinking are similar, since both emphasize
the nature of essence of objects and teleological nature of causality. Aristotle
believed that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones a notion that children also
believe. Other researchers have announced findings similar to the above. For example
Sequera and Leite (1991) identified some analogies of content between historical
and alternative ideas. Moreover the same findings indicated that HOS can anticipate
students alternative ideas, can give physics teachers some insight on how to deal
with these ideas, and provides some teaching materials and approaches, which can
be used in the classroom in order to change students ideas under the perspective of
a constructivist theory of learning.
Alternative ideas on mechanics are very resistant to change (Pozo, 1987) and can
be found in students even after several years of formal teaching of Newtonian physics.
Besides, pre-Newtonian concepts of mechanics also had a strong appeal to scientists
and were at least as resistant to change as students concepts are (Clement, 1982).
4.2 The Relation of Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis
In relation to the second argument i.e. the parallelism among the development of
childrens understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in HOS the terms
of ontogenesis and phylogenesis describe this evolution. Ontogenesis refers to the
evolution of an individuals thought, whereas phylogenesis refers to the evolution
of scientific ideas in human history. Many researchers have pointed to such correspondences (McDermott, 1984; Viennot, 1979; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987, etc).
68
This view is reinforced by the opinion of Duhem, who claimed that there is an
analogy between the development of scientific knowledge and the growth of
individual understanding of nature (Duhem, 1954).
Niaz (2000) in a research aiming to establish a relationship between students
understanding of gases and its parallels in HOS found that their reasoning represents
a form of idealization process used frequently by scientists to understand complex
phenomena. Furthermore, idealization according to him enables students as well as
scientists to separate the ideal or scientific object of knowledge from real objects
and is considered to be the defining characteristic of modern non-Aristotelian science
(McMullin, 1985; Niaz, 1993; Matthews, 1994). He quotes Matthews (1994) that:
History and Philosophy of Science can make the idealization of science more
understandable, and can explain them as scientific tools of trade, or instruments
(idealized lattices in this case) whereby the complex concrete world can be
investigated (p. 212).
There is also the opposite view which supports that ontogenesis and phylogenesis
do not go in parallel. Namely, that it is not supported by the evidence of detailed
examinations of the historical evolution of scientific concepts that ontogenesis
recapitulates/ complements phylogenies. For example, Wiser and Carey (1983) verified
this view by exploring the elaboration of the concepts of heat and temperature, also
Wandersee (1985) when he examined students understanding of photosynthesis,
and Vosniadou and Brewer (1987) when they investigated the development of the
concept of the Earth as a round sphere where down is toward the center of the
Earth. All the above researchers found that there are important differences between
childrens thinking and the phylogenetic origins of these concepts. Nersessian
(1989) trying to explain these differences argued that these could be attributed to
metaphysical, epistemological and sociological factors, which play an important
role in the formation of a representation.
4.3 The Use of HOS for the Design of Learning Constructivist Environments
In our view the contribution of HOS in science teaching and learning has three
main dimensions. The exploitation of HOS is used for the design and development of:
i. educational activities for students conceptual change, ii. environments for understanding the nature of science (NOS) and iii. affective tools (e.g. stories, vignettes,
role-playing) for science teaching.
4.3 i The exploitation of HOS for students conceptual change. In this section we
shall study the use of HOS for the creation of educational activities such as crucial
experiments, teaching models, and simulations for students conceptual change.
We shall also present indicative examples of how the HOS could be used in the
process of teaching and learning science. As we have seen in the previous paragraph
we can find students misconceptions as well as the evolution of them by using the
HOS. Based on this fact we can design learning environments aiming to achieve
students conceptual change, as an individuals process in the case of the personal
constructivism, or as an interactive process in the case of social constructivism.
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From the study of the historical sources i.e. the arguments, the means and the
methods, which helped the scientists change their views, we could choose materials
to be used for the design and development of the educational content which can
contribute to the conceptual change of students. Such an example is the teaching
model of Monk and Osborne (1997). We could say that their model is a transformation of the teaching model of Driver and Oldham (1985). Actually in the phase
of elicitation of students ideas in the above mentioned model, where the ideas
of the groups of students are presented, Monk and Osborne added the historical
study to be presented by the teacher. The historical study includes material from
HOS as described in this paragraph. So, in this teaching approach students have the
opportunity to use the language in a figurative and flexible manner so that they
might recognize that the role of the scientist is not just to discover the facts of
science but also to construct them. In this sense students could perhaps better understand the NOS. Moreover students will become aware that there are often parallelisms
between their thought and earlier scientific thought. This is a possibility which has
been provided to students in order for them to be able to articulate and clarify their
own understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon in question (ibid).
We argue that a teaching model based on discussion is proper for the effective
teaching difficult concepts, such us the laws of Newton where students conceptions
have been constructed over many years and have meaning for them due to their
experience. In this case, it is important that the students will be encouraged to
discuss their ideas with their teacher and colleagues in order to clearly perceive
their own misconceptions when compared to the Newtonian ideas. This teaching
strategy has been advocated over the last decades by researchers and educators
concerned with the students conceptual change. However, it is interesting to point
out that a similar strategy was already used by Galileo (Clement, 1982), in order to
show that his theory was more accurate than the prevalent ideas of the time. It has
been argued that HOS can provide incentives for and support students attempts to
reconstruct their views because it
offers fitting material to illustrate the modification and revision, the rejection
and reinstatement of models, their relativity and dependence on the spirit of
the age. Pupils can critically view historical models more easily than their
own (Lind, 1980, cited by Sequeira & Leite, 1991, p. 55).
Rudge and Howe (2009) have also proposed their own teaching model, which
exploits HOS for students construction of current scientific views. This model
suggests to teachers a new way to use HOS to explore the prior conceptions of their
students and to provide opportunities to them to think along the lines that past
scientists did, as an exercise in thinking like scientists, rather than studying exactly
what happened historically. It gives to students the opportunity to construct their
own scientific knowledge. They think that the HOS is the best instrument to help
students overcome misconceptions they have about scientific concepts. Students
are invited to study the sorts of considerations that led the scientists to overcome
similar misconceptions. The fact that the conceptions usually change from complex
to more complex forces the teachers to teach science qualitatively.
70
As Confrey (1990) argues, discussions on historical conceptions have the

advantage to show to students an evolutionary sequence of their conceptions
towards actual scientific conceptions. The comparison of students concepts with
those of HOS gives the potential to students to understand their advantages and
disadvantages in specific contexts by exposing the differences between ways to
think before and after (Monk & Osborne, 1997). We believe that on the basis of
this view the role of HOS obtains a new perspective, i.e. HOS offers the possibility
to teachers, educators, and designers of the curriculum to anticipate the evolution
of students misconceptions on the basis of the evolution of scientific ideas. These
findings are in accordance with Piagets work, focusing on the phylogenesis of
science concepts and HOS (Piaget & Garcia, 1987).
Binnie (2001) argues that the development of contemporary conceptions of
electricity, magnetism and electromagnetism do not appear in a linear progression
in the HOS. Students observe phenomena in order to explain their observations in
terms of a model usually engaged in discourse. The models that they construct at
first are later modified, altered, or expanded in order to explain new phenomena.
Given that HOS could provide the strategic knowledge of the way scientific
concepts are constructed, change or spread (Izquierdo, 1995), we argue that on this
basis HOS could contribute to the development of the necessary educational material
by science teachers to be used by students for the construction of their knowledge.
As a characteristic example of the exploitation of HOS for the development of
educational material for the teaching of the concept of energy at the 6th grade of
primary school we mention the Rizaki and Kokkotas proposal (2010, in press). The
historiographic study of the concept of energy offered all these characteristics, such
as the unifying and the causal characters of the concept of energy which constitute the
core of the development of the educational material for the teaching of this concept.
Because science is fundamentallyamong other things- a cognitive activity, we
believe that HOS not only could be used for the design of educational material, but
it could also help teachers devise the methodology so that it can be introduced in
the teaching process with the aim solving realistic scientific problems. An indicative
case is the one used by Nersessian (1995) who applied her analysis on historical
episodes in order to understand the way the representational resources are utilized
during the process of problem-solving through which new concepts emerge. She
supports the view that the cognitive dimension of analogies, thought experiments,
and metaphors is central, in the sense that it is these tactics which suggest the
inferential reasoning, which, from the existing representations, produces new ones
(Yamalidou, 2001).
HOS could make people more conscious about the idealization of science, as it
worked in the case of Galileo, and help students discern the explanation of the
phenomena on the basis of experience and idealizations (Matthews, 1994). As an
example of this one can mention the dialogues of Galileo with del Monde (see the
paper of Stefanidou & Vlachos in this volume). The dialogues could help students
recognize that science is a cooperative activity and not an effort of isolated individual
scientists. Furthermore, the presentation of the argumentations in the classroom
and their employment in the teaching process, in parallel with students alternative
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ideas, facilitates them to construct their own scientific knowledge. The exposure of
the students to HOS may help them make sense of scientific claims, and the reconstruction of scientific ideas Gallili and Hazan (2000).
Another case for the use of HOS for the design of educational material is the
experimental simulations: for example Masson and Vzquez-Abad (2006) proposed
a new way to integrate HOS in science education to promote conceptual change by
introducing the notion of historical microworld, which is a computer-based interactive learning environment in built reference to the particular historical conceptions.
Historical microworlds developed not only to help students understand scientific
conceptions of the past, but also to understand the weakness of their own conceptions.
Our project The Science Teacher e-Training (STeT), funded by European
Union, seeks, using the advantages of ICT technologies, to broaden the supply of
training opportunities to science teachers by using HOS in science teaching. This
can be achieved since the program brings HOS and science education into productive
contact and meets the training needs of teachers by making teaching more cooperative
and, related to historical and cultural factors. The program can enable teachers to plan
learning experiences in science lessons that empower their students and also enhance
the computer literacy of teachers and build their skills in using multimedia-based
resources and strategies in their teaching (Kokkotas et al., 2009).
HOS offers a greater possibility for the design of educational material and the
exploitation of the historical instruments-replicas (e.g. Heering, 1994; Riess, 1995).
Experimental work, based on the original experiments can be readily performed in
most classrooms and enhance the excitement of discovery (Binnie, 2001).
4.3 ii Making use of HOS for the understanding of the nature of science (NOS).
HOS was used as a source for the development of education material for the
teaching of science methodology in order for students to develop cognitive skills
(Kipnis, 1996, Arons, 1990; Dunn, 1993). In what it concerns these attempts, until
some years ago, the interest around HOS was how it could be used for the exploitation
of inquiry practices of scientists, aiming at the introduction of students in science
methodology.
Over the last few years the constructivist approach in science teaching and the
understanding of scientific inquiry has acquired an increasing interest for its epistemological dimension. This means that there is a need not only for the understanding of
the empirical processes of inquiry, but also of concepts and theories, to the degree
that they shape the explanation of the results. The use of HOS could contribute to this
direction since it helps students understand the nature of science methodology.
Indeed this is so since it compares different methodologies and offers the possibility
to students to accept that there is not only one scientific method. For example when
students compare the different contexts of scientific methodology they establish the
view that there are different scientific methods, which lead them to better understand
the nature of science (Stinner, 1995a). When students are studying experiments
and the methodology of science, both of which originate from HOS, they discuss
about the scientific inquiry, realize the controversies and the incomplete nature of
scientific knowledge (Matthews, 1992).
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Monk and Osborne (1997) propose the use of HOS, whose focus is always the
conceptual explanation and its justification, would not only support the learning of
science but also the learning about science. They think that the process approach
gives the strong impression that scientific investigation is an empirical process in
which the rigid application of the standard rules of knowing will lead inexorably
to the derivation of certain knowledge of the laws of science. They also think
that the study of scientific ideas in their original context of discovery will help
students develop their conceptual understanding. For them neither the study of
process nor the study of the products of science can provide either an adequate
account of science or an adequate education in science without the incorporation of
some HOS.
According to Kipnis (1998) experiments by themselves do not produce any new
knowledge: they are useful only if students learn how to put together experiment
and theory. With this approach, students understand how and why theories emerge
and replace their predecessors. It can be emphasized that the process of scientific
progress is fluid and constantly changing and should never be taught as a set of
immutable facts (Binnie, 2001). As Kyle (1997, p. 852) noticed, and we agree with
him, students ought to experience the how of scientific enquiry, rather than
merely being exposed to what is known about and by science. In this context our
interpretation of the how of scientific enquiry includes the intellectual struggles
faced by scientists within the relevant historical context.
HOS could contribute to the understanding of the nature of the content of science
not only when students ascertain its evolutionary nature but also its creativity.
Especially, when they study current theories and concepts in comparison to those
which were valid in the past (by discussing theories at length, including their origin,
development and the replacement by other theories), they have the opportunity to
understand the evolutionary procedure of these theories and concepts and also of
science itself (Kipnis, 1998).
When students are engaged in the development of educational material which
encompasses the history of the formulation of a scientific theory they can perceive
its creative potentiality. In our opinion a characteristic example could be the study
of Einsteins theory of relativity based on the history of its formulation. This could
help students grasp not only its originality but also the notion that science does not
proceed inductionally. In this context they could understand what science is. The
study of Einsteins thought experiments, as well as of experiments in general, as
they function in science, according to Bevilacqua and Ganneto (1996) offers the
possibility to students to understand that these are used not only to falsify a theory
but also to argue about its correctness.
Students, using educational material from HOS, could understand the different
explanations of a phenomenon given by the scientists in different times in the past.
A concrete example of this is the Pavia Project Physics where students facing the
different explanations of the natural phenomena realize that there is not only one
truth, but one acceptable view for the explanation of the same phenomenon in each
period of time. According to our view this fact helps students adopt the opinion
that scientific knowledge does not represent the objective reality.
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Gallili and Hazan researched in students conceptions about light and vision and
proposed a broader approach to science teaching which accompanies HPS to teaching
science, replaces the traditional focus on the correct for now scientific contents
and problem solving training. As such, it reflects a cardinal change in the philosophy
of education. History-based instruction uncovers the non-linear process by which
current scientific knowledge was attainted. A special feature, which soundly contrasted
their course from a typical one, was its essential incorporation of historical contents:
the ideas, views and conceptions which constituted the early understanding of light
and vision. They presented the assessment which concerns the courses impact
on the students views about science and some related technological and cultural
issues. According to their research strong differences were found between the
views elicited in the experimental group and parallel data regarding students in
the control group. This study demonstrated the advantage of utilizing historical
materials in a way which is additional to their intention: to improve students
disciplinary knowledge and to affect their views about science (Gallili & Hazan,
2001).
A concrete example for using HOS in science teaching offers our project The
MAP prOject, funded by the European Union. The MAP prOject, was an inservice training program for primary and secondary school science teachers, for
promoting the learning of physics based on HOS. It aimed to exploit authentic
historical events on the topic of falling bodies (Aristotles, Galileos and Newtons
theories on falling bodies), by using students conceptions about the Nature of
Science (NOS), the Nature of Learning (NOL) and the Nature of Teaching (NOT).
This program is based on social constructivist learning principles using a variety of
teaching strategies (e.g. group work, simulations) that utilize historical scientific
materials on the issue of falling bodies (Kokkotas et al., 2009).
Although there are many proponents of the contribution of HOS to the improvement of students NOS views (e.g., Duschl, 1990; Matthews, 1994; Monk & Osborne,
1997; Wandersee, 1992), there are also other researches, which suggest different
findings. For example, the research contacted by Adb-El-Khalick and Lederman
(2000) examined the effect on college students conceptions about the NOS and
studied three different courses whose curriculum used HOS. The research findings
do not indicate empirical support to the assertion that coursework in HOS would
improve students NOS views.
4.3 iii The use of HOS for the development of affective tools (e.g. stories, vignettes,
role- playing). The use of HOS in science teaching aiming to raise the interest of
students and cultivate their emotions, gradually gets more attention from educators,
science researchers and science teachers. HOS obtains a new role in the context of
viewing science as a human activity (Nielsen & Thomson, 1990). This view was
introduced in Danish secondary schools in the 19881990 reform of the physics curriculum, where elements of the History and Philosophy of Science were incorporated
in the teaching process (Thomsen, 1998).
Stinner and Teichmann (2003, p. 214) have developed dramatic settings to
illustrate confrontations (for example, Copernicus and the Aristotelians, Newton
74
discusses the nature of light with Robert Hooke in the HOS classes at the University
of Manitoba). The Manitoba group believes that new ideas in science become
more accessible through dramatization. We also argue that the dramatization of
events based on the HOS offers the opportunity to students to develop positive
attitudes and be motivated for science learning, especially when they play roles
of scientists.
Today, we acknowledge that science teaching needs revision because school
science ignores the needs of students to obtain skills for investigation processes
and for the cultivation of their imagination and inspiration. For the improvement of
this situation the abandoning of the academic tradition in the primary and secondary
science education curriculum is proposed, and at the same time its connection with
the human element (AAAS, 1990; UNESCO, 2000). In this context the exploitation
of HOS could have a vital role in science education. Some writers argue that the
humanizing and clarifying influence of HOS brings the science to life and enables
students to construct relationships that would have been impossible in the traditional
decontextualized way in which science has been taught (Jung, 1994; Kipnis, 1996;
Koul & Dana, 1997).
Such a teaching approach could probably help students appreciate science as
a value-laden procedure where values such as objectivity, curiosity, the pursuit
of truth, intellectual honesty, humility and commitment to human welfare are
central (Stevenson & Byerly, 2000). Students are helped to perceive that scientific
knowledge is not as objective as it is presented in science textbooks, since it is
the outcome of a human endeavor full of successes but also of failures. If we
accept that knowledge is indeed a human construction then not only the prior
conceptions of the learner but also his/her sentimentalities such as fears, anxieties,
hopes and expectations should be taken into account in the teaching process
(Egan, 1990).
Other writers and science education researchers e.g. Arons (1989) and Luth (1990)
have elaborated on the notion of using a story line approach to the teaching of
science, via the construction of historical vignettes. These are stories that describe
a brief episode from the life of a scientist, which characterizes the HPS, demonstrates
scientific attributes, and provides students with a historical perspective of the topic
illustrated. Arons (1989) argued that good science stories that have intrinsic interest
and show connections that are not to be found in textbooks. Egan (1988, 1989a)
has also proposed a procedure based on the story form. According to research
based on the constructivist nature of human sense making (Egan, 1986) the story
metaphor is more appropriate in describing what we learn about the world. Stinner
(1996, p. 263) presents a program of activities placed around contextual settings,
where science stories and contemporary issues of interest are recommended in
order to facilitate the passage of children from the early apprehension of the world
to a personal scientific knowledge rooted in language and to the comprehension of
organized scientific knowledge.
We believe that stories from HOS and storytelling as a teaching strategy can
contribute to the humanizing of teaching, the improvement of the climate in science
classrooms among students and student-teachers and the development of positive
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attitudes towards science learning. In this context the understanding of science

concepts can be improved. Noddings and Witherell (1991) write:
We learn from stories. More important, we come to understand ourselves,
others, and even the subjects we teach and learn. Stories engage us. Stories
can help us to understand by making the abstract concrete and accessible.
What is only dimly perceived at the level of principle may become vivid and
powerful in the concrete. Further, stories motivate us. Even that which, we
understand at the abstract level, may not move us to action, whereas a story
often does (p. 279280).
Nevertheless, science teaching with the use of stories is not an easy process. According
to Egan it is quite complex and difficult to convey in a condensed fashion (Egan, 1979,
1986, 1992, 1997, 2005). This is true since it has as a prerequisite that the teacher
creates an affective environment and engages his/her students in discourse. Given that
stories facilitate understanding, stimulate engagement and produce motivation and
even help us to understand ourselves, the appropriate use of the story form in science
teaching can, indeed, become an heuristic teaching device that is not only attractive,
but also self-sustaining (Klassen, 2006). Furthermore, stories constitute a natural
and effective way of thinking and can be used as a means of communication and
cultural expression (Manna & Minichiello, 2005).
We believe that HOS could be an important resource from which we can get
appropriate material for composing stories in science education, because it links
concepts, theories, phenomena and events of science with the scientists who lived,
worked and were affected from the specific sociocultural environment of their
era. But, it should be realized that the place of history is neither to make only
a conceptual point nor just to place entertaining vignettes in the text but also to
introduce the humanistic element and aspects of the NOS into the process of
learning science (Klassen, 2006). However, we emphasize that the story should be
chosen in a manner that shows respect to the originators and portrays them in a fair
and balanced way. Specifically, storytelling helps the understanding of science
concepts, and consequently to the construction of knowledge, since it helps the
development of romantic understanding due to the fact that it makes students
experience curiosity, mystery and even wonder.
Some writers argue that romantic understanding is an alternative to conceptual
understanding, on the following grounds a) it represents a different way of making
sense of the world and of human experience through an attraction to their exotic,
strange and mysterious features and the desire to transcend everyday reality, b) it
gives the idea that knowledge is a human construction that, cannot be even considered
outside of the context of its construction, c) it makes use of the students imagination
and d) it has an aesthetic dimension (Egan, 1990; Hadzigeorgiou, 2005). Thus,
romantic understanding could stimulate the development of inspiration which has
a cognitive and an emotional dimension and can also lead students to some kind of
action and the development of a special interest for science in general or a specific
topic in particular.
Stories and storytelling also develop the students anticipation. Dewey (1934)
talked about anticipation and argued that consummation
76
does not wait in consciousness for the whole undertaking to be finished. It is

anticipated throughout and is recurrently savoured with special intensity (p. 55).
Therefore students should have ample opportunities to experience anticipation and
this can be added to the experience of mystery and wonder that a good story usually
creates, so the anticipation can help the development of romantic understanding.
Teachers can use narratives into which scientific ideas are embedded (Hadzigeorgiou &
Stefanich, 2001; Stinner, 1995b) and which provide students with opportunities for
reconnecting the knowledge with the transcendent qualities of the individuals who
produced it (Egan, 1990, p. 139). Anticipation can also be experienced if the
students can study the life of the great scientists and dramatize important events of it.
Narration as an art of speech can facilitate the development of students
imagination since:
The development of imagination is linked to the development of speech, to
the development of childs social interaction with those around him, to the
basics of the collective social activity of the childs consciousness (Vygotsky,
1987, p. 346).
So, the extension in narration helps the development of romantic understanding
since imagination is one of its characteristics. According to Vygotsky (1998):
imagination is...a function which is linked to emotional life, the life of drives
and attitudes, is linked to intellectual life ...everything that requires artistic
transformation of reality, everything that is connected with interpretation and
construction of something new, requires the indispensable participation of
imagination.
In our opinion, imagination as the basis of all creative activity is an important
component of all aspects of cultural life, enabling artistic, scientific and technical
creation alike. In this sense,
everything around us that was created by the hand of man, the entire world of
human imagination and creation is based on this imagination (Vygotsky,
2003, p. 910).
Vygotsky considered the development of imagination as necessary for the technical,
scientific creativity of children as it is for the arts. The arts and sciences are not
divided and both demand the need for the cultivation of imagination in our school
curriculum (Gajdamaschko, 2005). Vygotsky proposed the development of imagination through the mechanism of acquisition of cultural tools in the curriculum that
could become the content of the childrens imaginative activities. In addition, Egan
suggested story as congruent with Vygotskian requirements for
cognitive tools because, stories are crystallized in culture and therefore they
could be used as mediators tools for engaging the imagination of children
(Egan, 1992, p. 56).
Furthermore, narratives with stories from HOS used in science education assigns
tasks to children for the development of the imagination. Another important ability
77
KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI
which is developed concurrently with imagination is the ability to transfer the

function from one object into other. This ability is very closely connected to the
development of symbolic function in a child which means that the development of
imagination could help the development of abstract thought (Vygotsky, 1978) and
also in the understanding the abstract concepts in science.
From the arguments developed above, it is deduced that stories and storytelling
strategy develop: the inspiration, the anticipation, the imagination and the romantic
understanding of students. The bridge between romantic understanding and science
education are inspiration, imagination and anticipation. Students in developing
romantic associations with people, events and ideas are inspired as, they are presented
with questions that challenge their beliefs. Additionally stories present the human
element and unfold strange and mysterious situations. This inspiration can lead to
worthwhile experiences since it unites feeling with knowledge in a context of action
and secure the continuity of experiences. If we accept that romantic understanding
not only paves the way for conceptual understanding, but it can also be a prerequisite
for such an understanding (Hadzigeorgiou, 2005), we can strongly argue that storytelling is an important pedagogical strategy which can contribute to the development
of both conceptual and romantic understanding.
Although many researchers propose the adoption of stories and storytelling for
teaching, a few empirical researches in the literature proved their effectiveness in
science teaching. For example Maria & Johnson (1989) examined the effectiveness
of narrative in learning related to scientific reasons for seasonal change on seventh
and fifth graders in different types of texts. Expository and soft expository texts
(a hybrid of narrative and expository text) were used. The researchers concluded
that the subjects understood the scientific explanation of seasonal change better
with the soft expository text which included narrative than with the expository text.
Kokkotas, Malamitsa and Rizaki (2008) proposed a storytelling teaching model
for teaching science. The researchers in their model used the real stories from HOS
together with other activities, such as experiments, discourses and, role playing in a
constructivist environment. Students were able to use the information from the storytelling, and engage in discourse with their peers in order to answer the questions
related to the design of the experimental activities. The outcome was that the
students answered all the questions designed and elaborated all the experimental
activities very efficiently without guidance. The researchers concluded that storytelling could help the students understand the scientific concepts.
Narrative and storytelling could also be used effectively in virtual environments
of various models of information and communication technologies, which enable
children to be story constructors and storytellers with collaborative multimedia
environments (Mott & Lester, 2006). These researchers propose an inquiry- based
learning environment for middle school students by using narrative in teaching and
learning. In these environments narrative and storytelling could be accompanied
with a variety of tools such as role-playing, autobiographical writing and, simulations.
Bostrom in his research examined teachers and students narrative in an effort
to make school chemistry more meaningful to students. He asserted that narrative
made chemistry more pluralistic, giving the opportunity to the lived experiences of
78
the teachers and students to interact with the scientific facts. Such an approach,
suggests a role of narrative as an instructional tool (Bostrom, 2006, in Avraamidou &
Osborne, 2009).
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE TEACHING
We hope that from the text above it has become apparent that the role of HOS
in science teaching has obtained a greater significance among science educators,
researchers and science teachers, since it contributes in various ways to the construction of knowledge. According to constructivist theories of learning knowledge can
not be transmitted from the teacher to the student, but can be constructed by the
latter on the basis of his/hers conceptions and his/her interactions with others and
language. The use of HOS in the construction of knowledge creates new perspectives
for science teaching, the design and development of curricula, the initial education
and the in-service training of science teachers and their practices in the classrooms.
Especially, the design and development of curricula is necessary in order to utilize
the conceptions of the scientists of the past, their controversies, their unanimous
decisions, the cooperative character of the development of science, the nature of
science etc. and contributes to a better understanding of science concepts by
students. The incorporation of HOS in science teaching, as described above,
contributes to the unfolding of its character as a human activity. Furthermore the
inclusion in the curriculum of stories from the life and work of scientists in the
form of narrative could contribute to the emotional development of the students,
something that may result to the development of their romantic understanding and
constitute the bridge to conceptual understanding.
The trend towards the incorporation of HOS in science teaching marks the
change of the orientation of initial teachers education and their in- service training
so that they will become able to employ these practices in the context of socioconstructivist environments of learning. Of course, there is a need to research
further the different ways of the introduction of HOS into the teaching practices.
For example: In what ways do the narratives support science learning?, How do
the narratives improve conceptual understanding?, What are the possibilities of
the exploitation of HOS in the teaching of science in order to contribute to the
understanding and the development of science?
NOTES
1
Our paper is restricted to individual and socioconstructivism theories only.
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Panagiotis Kokkotas, profesor and Aikaterini Rizaki, PhD

Faculty of Primary Education
e-mail: kokkotas@primedu.uoa.gr
84
RICARDO LOPES COELHO
6. ON THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY

History of Science for Teaching
1. WHAT IS ENERGY?
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors It is important to

realize that in physics today we have no knowledge of what energy is, said the
Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman in his Lectures. Nobody knows what energy
really is, one reads in Bergmann and Schaefers Experimental Physics (1998). We
cannot answer the question of what energy really is, explain Dransfeld et al. (2001).
Although everybody has a feeling of what energy is, wrote engel and Boles (2002),
it is difficult to give a precise definition for it. According to Halliday et al. (2003), it
is very difficult to give a simple definition of energy. If we cannot explain in a clear
way what energy is, the concept of energy must be a problem in science teaching.
Students preconceptions or misunderstandings have been subject of much
research (Watts, 1983; Duit, 1986; Nicholls & Ogborn, 1993; Trumper, 1990, 1991;
Cotignola et al., 2002; Barbosa & Borges, 2006; de Berg, 2008; and many others).
Empirical educational research shows alternative ideas, such as Energy is fuel or
Energy is stored within objects (Ogborn, 1993, p. 73; Prideaux, 1995, p. 278). There
is so much confusion with energy, according to Beynon because it is not treated as
an abstract physical quantity but something real, just like a piece of cheese (1990,
p. 315). The most common notion of energy in textbooks can, however, lead to the
idea of energy as something real.
The principle of conservation of energy or the concept of energy is frequently
presented as follows: energy can neither be created nor destroyed but only transformed1. If energy cannot be destroyed, it must be a real existing thing. If energy
can be transformed, it must be a real thing, which appears in the form A, B, C, and
so on. Thus, the concept of energy as a substance is understandable (see Arons
1999, p. 1064).
If energy can be transformed and heat is the end product of such a transformation, it is understandable that heat is considered a form of energy (Bge &
Eichler, 2002, p. 83; Nolting, 2002, p. 148). However, Cotignola et al. (2002, p. 285),
Domnech et al. (2007, p. 54) criticised the definition of heat as a form of energy,
presented in some textbooks. In some textbooks, heat is not a form of energy
(Hertel 2007, p. 135) and is defined as energy transferred (Keller et al. 1993, p. 423).
Different points of view concerning the concepts of heat and energy can become
confusing for a student or even for a teacher (see Galili, 2006).
COELHO
Such difficulties in teaching thermodynamics do not appear in textbooks published

towards the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the following century.
Concerning the heat-motion relationship, Verdet (1868) used the expression principle
of equivalence. The same holds for Poincars Thermodynamics (1892). The first
law of thermodynamics is called principle of equivalence by Preston, 19192.
According to Mller and Pouillet, the law is to be formulated in the form: heat and
mechanical work are equivalents3. In the same chapter Principle of Equivalence,
the authors pointed out that with the thesis, energy is indestructible, the principle
is not an experimental law anymore but a postulate4. The understanding of the
mechanical equivalent of heat as an equivalence factor, which is determined experimentally, and the principle of energy conservation as a principle of equivalence can
be justified by the authors who discovered the energy conservation.
The history of science teaches us that energy was discovered in the 1840s.
Mayer, Joule, Colding and Helmholtz are generally considered the discoverers5.
They did not speak of conservation or transformation of energy but rather of force
(Mayer, Colding or Helmholtz) or conversion of mechanical power into heat and
vice-versa (Joule). The term energy was introduced by William Thomson in 1851.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, energy was understood as a substance
by some scientists, such as Lodge, Poynting or Ostwald. This concept was, however,
criticised by others, such as Planck, Hertz or William Thomson.
The historical development of the concept is reflected in the terminology
concerning energy in contemporary textbooks. Hence, some of our terminology
becomes more understandable through the past. Historical topics linkable with
properties of energy (indestructible and transformable), forms (kinetic and potential)
and transference of energy will be presented. Some consequences for teaching are
explicitly dealt with in the last section. The present paper is based on Coelho
(2007).
2. INDESTRUCTIBILITY AND TRANSFORMABILITY
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors Indestructibility

and transformability of energy have their roots in Mayers theory. According to
this theory, force is indestructible in quantity and transformable in quality. These
properties were justified in the following way. Forces are causes states Mayer,
without any proof or further explanation, in his 1842 article Observations on the
Forces of Inorganic Nature. This statement is used to apply to forces the classical
saying causa aequat effectum6. If c causes an effect e, then c=e. If e becomes a
cause of an effect f, then e=f, and so on. On account of these equations, Mayer
justifies the two properties of force. As c=e=f=c, the quantity holds constant.
Mayer says force is indestructible7. As c=e, Mayer says that c is transformed into e
because when there is e, no part of c can exist, and when there is c no part of e
exists8. Let us consider what these properties mean concerning phenomena, the
first of which is the falling of bodies.
According to Mayer, the weight and height of a body form together the cause
of falling. At that time, weight was considered the cause of falling. However,
86
ON THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY
Mayer argues, height is also necessary for falling. In order to determine the cause
quantitatively, Mayer proposes the product of the mass and the height of the body9.
On account of the relationship between height and velocity of falling from Leibnizs
conservation principle (1686), the height is equal to the square of the velocity10.
Mayer takes the product of mass and square of the velocity as the effect of the
cause referred to. Admitting that cause equals effect, he writes mh = mv2. Let us
move on to phenomena which involve heat and motion.
Mayer set up an experiment to prove that motion causes heat: he agitated water
in a recipient vehemently and the temperature of the water rose 12 or 13 degrees11.
The steam-engine gives an example of the inverse relationship: heat produces
motion12. Thus, he continues, he prefers to admit that heat produces motion or
motion heat, instead of admitting that there is a cause without effect or an effect
without cause13. If there is a causal relationship between heat and motion, an
equation of the form cause=effect is justified by the theory seen above.
To write an equation relating heat to motion, Mayer made recourse to the
specific heat of atmospheric air at constant pressure and constant volume. In order
to increase the temperature of one cubic centimetre of atmospheric air without
changing its volume, a certain quantity of heat, Cv, is necessary. To increase the
temperature of the same value but with a variation in volume, a greater quantity of
heat, Cp, is necessary14. As Cp is greater than Cv, but in the first case there is some
motion and in the second there is none, Mayer considers the difference of these
quantities equal to the force performed in the variation of volume against atmospheric
pressure. Thus, Cp-Cv corresponds to the mechanical effect produced. This effect is
expressed by the weight of the column of air, W, and the change in the height, h.
According to the values known at that time, Cp-Cv = Wh leads to the result: one unit
of heat is equivalent to one unit of weight raised to 366 metres15.
In Mayers dealing with the phenomena, two steps are evident:
1. he verifies if a cause-effect relationship can be applied to the phenomena
considered;
2. he writes an equation, whose sides are constituted by the quantities which
characterise the cause and effect involved.
The writing of an equation of the form
force (cause) = force (effect)
is based on the classical statement causa aequat effectum. This statement implies
that the quantity taken as cause must be equal to the quantity taken as effect. As the
right hand-side and the left hand-side of this equation is called force, it can be said
that the quantity of force is constant. Mayer expresses this by saying that force is
indestructible. Let us move on to the other property of force.
Mayer says, transformation of heat into mechanical effect expresses a fact and
does not explain the transformation. It is said, for instance, that ice is transformed
into water and this is not dependent on how and why the transformation happens.
These kinds of questions, he adds, are useless. Mayer states as well that the
relationship between heat and motion is quantitative and not qualitative16 and that
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COELHO
transformation from falling force into motion cannot express anything but a
numerical relation between both17. According to these statements, transformation
does not explain what is going on in a physical process and the established relationship is only a numerical one. In conclusion, indestructibility and transformability
do not mean that any substance with those properties had been found.
Using observable or measurable data, Mayer established numerical relationships
between certain quantities and determined equivalences between magnitudes, which
were until then non-connected. Thus, it can be said, Mayer found a methodology
for dealing with phenomena. In so far as the equivalence between mechanical units
and units of heat was included in physics, the concept principle of equivalence
becomes understandable (Verdet, Poincar, Mller and Pouillet, among others).
3. THE HEAT-MOTION CONVERSION
The conversion of heat into motion and motion into heat, was the thesis defended
by Joule in his first article concerning this issue On the Calorific Effects of MagnetoElectricity, and on the Mechanical Value of Heat (1843). This thesis is connected
with the concept of heat as a kind of motion. This concept of heat represented a
conditio sine qua non for the acceptance of the heat-motion conversion by the
scientific community.
Within the framework of the science of that time, heat could be a substance or a
kind of motion. Despite the fact that Rumford (1798, p. 99) and Davy (1799, p. 1314)
have defended that heat was motion, the common thesis concerning the nature of
heat during the first part of the nineteenth century was heat is a substance (Haldat,
1807; Berthollet, in cooperation with Pictet and Biot, 1809; Carnot, 1824; Colladon &
Sturm, 1828, among others). If heat is a substance, it cannot be created by motion,
since, if heat is a substance, its quantity must be constant. Joule tried to show
experimentally that heat can be generated by motion. The first attempt is presented
in the article referred to.
Magneto-electricity was the name given to the induced electric current,
discovered by Faraday in 183118. Joule constructed a magneto-electric machine: an
electromagnet rotates in the proximity of a large magnet or an electromagnet.
The following picture, drawn from Verdets Thermodynamics, where Joules
experiments and results are dealt with in detail, does not represent the large electromagnet.
If the axle on the right side is cranked, it brings the other axle into rotation.
Perpendicular to this axle, there is a hollow box, in which an electromagnet was
introduced. This element is immersed in a tube of water and thermally isolated.
The temperature of the water is measured before the rotation and after it and the
heat evolved is determined. From all the experiments set up with this experimental
configuration, Joule concluded that motion creates heat.
As heat could be increased through the magneto-electric machine and this
function by means of motion, Joule tried to determine a proportion between the
heat evolved and the mechanical power used. To estimate the mechanical power,
he replaced the crank with the system represented in the following image19.
88
Figure 1. Joules machine (Verdet 1870, p. 157, fig. 38).
Figure 2. From Joules paper (Joule 1884, p. 150, fig. 51).
The product of the weights and the height make up the value of the mechanical
power. To determine the mechanical power which will be equated with the value of
the heat evolved, Joule took the difference between the mechanical power
necessary to bring the machine into motion as an electromagnetic one,
Weightmag.-elec. x Height,
and as a mechanical one
Weightmec. x Height.
The following equation subsumes the set of experiments referred to above
(Weight mag.-elec. - Weight mec.) x Height = Heat mag.-elec..
89
COELHO
As the equation states that

units of mechanical power = units of heat,
Joule calculates how many mechanical units correspond to one unit of heat. The
value of mechanical power that corresponds to one unit of heat is termed mechanical
equivalent of heat. Let us move on to the interpretation.
If heat can be created by motion, it cannot be a substance. If it is not a substance, it
must be a kind of motion. If heat is motion and the calorific effects of the magnetoelectricity are produced through motion, then we have a motion that causes another
motion. The quantity of one kind is converted into the other kind of motion. The
concept of heat as a state of vibration, a kind of motion, connects from a conceptual
point of view, two entities, which were completely different, heat and motion.
(This connecting role of motion in Joules theory is played by the concept of force
in Mayers theory.)
In 1845, Joule presented for the first time the paddle-wheel experiment. The
apparatus used consists of a brass paddle-wheel working horizontally in a can of
peculiar construction and filled with water. This paddle-wheel moves by means of
weights thrown over two pulleys working in opposite directions. The paddle moved
with great resistance in the can of water, says Joule.
When the weights had descended through that distance, they had to be wound
up again in order to renew the motion of the paddle. After this operation had
been repeated sixteen times, the increase of the temperature of the water was
ascertained by means of a very sensible and accurate thermometer (p. 203).
The schema of the apparatus was presented in the article published in Philosophical
Transactions, 1850. The following picture is drawn from Verdets reproduction of
Joules schema.
Figure 3. Joules paddle-wheel experiment (Verdet 1868, p. 42, fig. 5).

90
Figure 4. Joules schema: detail of the inside of the can, from Joules paper
(Joule 1884, Plate II, fig. 70, 69).
Joules conclusion states:

1. the quantity of heat produced by the friction of bodies [] is always proportional
to the quantity of force expended
2. the quantity of heat capable of increasing the temperature of a pound of water
[] by 1q Fahr. requires for its evolution the expenditure of a mechanical force
represented by the fall of 772 lb. through the space of one foot (p. 328). A third
proposition, which was suppressed in accordance with the wish of the Committee
who reviewed the paper, stated that friction consisted in the conversion of
mechanical power into heat20. Let us consider if there were evidence for this thesis.
Joule determined the weights on the scales and the height covered by them.
Measuring the temperature of the water at the beginning and at the end, he calculated
the heat developed. Thanks to these data, he established the following equivalence
weight x height = units of heat.
If units of mechanical power correspond to units of heat, to one unit of heat
corresponds x. Thus, Joule determined the mechanical equivalent of heat. To do
this, it does not matter, if the phenomenon consists in a conversion from motion
into heat. In fact, what happened within the can, where the conversion took place,
if it occurred, is not important for the final result. No specific information is drawn
from the process of conversion. The conversion from the observable motion of
the weights into the unobservable motion, of which heat would consist, is an
interpretation of the phenomenon, therefore.
In sum, Joule did not research the conversion between motion and heat. Instead
of this, he found experimental methods for determining the mechanical equivalent of
heat. He measured the mechanical power; the heat evolved, established a numerical
relation and determined the mechanical equivalent of heat.
4. KINETIC AND POTENTIAL ENERGY
As heat had been understood as motion (Joule, 1884, 1887; Rankine, 1850; and
Clausius, 1850) and there was a conversion factor, heat could be translated into
mechanical units. Thus, it became meaningful to speak of the mechanical activity
91
COELHO
of a body thanks to its heat. In order to express this activity, Thomson used the
term energy, which etymologically means activity. The mechanical activity of
a body, which depends on the total heat in it, is expressed by the total mechanical
energy of a body. By this, is understood the mechanical value of all effects a body
would produce in heat emitted and in resistances overcome, if it were completely
cooled21. This is, however, impossible to determine22. Hence, Thomson defines the
mechanical energy of a body in a given state23. By this, is understood the mechanical
value of the effects the body would produce in passing from that state to a standard
one or from this to the given state.
In 1852, Thomson divided the stores of mechanical energy available for man into
two sets: static and dynamic. A quantity of weights at a height, ready to descend and do
work when wanted, an electrified body, a quantity of fuel, contain stores of mechanical
energy of the static kind. Masses of matter in motion, a volume of space through
which undulations of light or radiant heat are passing are of the dynamic kind (p. 139).
Rankine 1853 divided energy into two kinds: actual or sensible and potential
or latent. He writes:
Actual energy is a measurable, transferable, and transformable affection of a
substance, the presence of which causes the substance to tend to change its
state in one or more respects [] by the occurrence of which changes, actual
energy disappears, and is replaced by Potential energy (p. 106).
Thomson 1854 adopted Rankines concepts: actual or dynamic for the energy of
motion and potential energy for the other24. In 1862, Thomson and Tait introduced
the concept kinetic energy instead of actual energy25. This alteration was only
a consequence of a terminological reform of mechanics26.
5. CAPACITY OF DOING WORK AND TRANSFERENCE OF ENERGY
In Maxwells Theory of Heat, energy of a body is defined as its capacity of doing

work27. This concept comes from Thomson. Connected with this, is the distinction
between kinetic and potential energy. Maxwell pointed out that we do not know if
there are other forms. We cannot, however, conceive of any other form.
Maxwell adopted also the other meaning of forms of energy, which comes
originally from Mayer. According to this, heat is a form of energy. However, Maxwell
did not categorically assert that heat is a form of energy but rather that it is better to
understand it as such because one can obtain heat through work. He writes:
The reason for believing heat to be a form of energy is that heat may be
generated by the application of work (p. 93).
In 1879, Lodge criticised the definition of energy as the power of doing work28.
One says that a body has some energy. Nevertheless, he argues, it does not mean
necessarily that it can do work29. Hence, Lodge proposed understanding energy as
the work already done upon a body30. The conservation of energy is then expressed in
the form: energy is neither produced nor destroyed but only transferred31. Lodge will
come back to the subject due to Poyntings article On the Transfer of Energy in
the Electromagnetic Field (1884).
92
According to Lodge 1885, energy exists in space, in bodies and in the ether and
it can be transferred between them32. With a transference, there is a transformation
of energy. Thanks to this new doctrine, it would be possible to give an explanation
of potential energy, which had been a problem, according to Lodge33. He writes
about the falling of a stone as follows:
the common mode of treating a falling weight, saying that its energy gradually
transforms itself from potential to kinetic but remains in the stone all the time, is,
strictly speaking, nonsense. The fact is the stone never had any potential energy,
no rigid body can have any; the gravitation medium had it however, and kept on
transferring it to the stone all the time it was descending (p. 486).
There was some criticism on this concept of energy. Planck pointed out the
following difficulty. The energy of an isolated system remains constant. The same
quantity of energy must, therefore, be there. It is, however, not possible, continues
Planck, to localise the energy in the system34. Energy, as a substance, is then
considered by him as a concept, which one day should be overcome35.
Hertz also criticised the concept of energy as a substance36. He pointed out that
what we say about potential energy does not comply with our concept of substance.
The quantity of a substance, for instance, depends upon the substance itself and not
on the existence of other substances. The potential energy of a body is, however,
dependent on other bodies37. The quantity of a substance, further argues Hertz, is
a positive quantity, whereas the potential energy of a system can be negative38. As
energy has properties which contradict the concept of substance itself, such a theory
of energy is not logically permissible, according to Hertz.
Ostwald, Nobel Laureate for Chemistry, claimed, however, that energy is what is
really real39. Energy can subsume matter, the properties of matter, like heat, as well as
what had been ascribed to the spirit. Thus, the traditional distinction between matter
and spirit could be overcome thanks to the concept of energy, according to Ostwald40.
6. HISTORICAL TOPICS IN THE CLASSROOM
The following picture represents a schema of Joules paddle-wheel experiment in a

textbook (Tipler, 2000, p. 554; see also Young & Freedman, 2004, p. 653).
From a historical point of view, this is not Joules schema. From a physical
point a view, such a paddle-wheel would not lead to the value of the mechanical
equivalent of heat. From a pedagogical point of view, it would be useful to give the
idea of friction for different reasons.
Joules experiment is explained as follows: mechanical work is converted into heat
(Arons, 1999, p. 1065) or the potential energy is transformed into heat (Bergmann &
Schaefer, 1998, p. 1032; Halliday & Resnick, 1993, p. 614). As the friction, which
could increase the temperature of the water in a reasonable way, is not shown, a
student will accept that there was a transformation of energy, but will not
understand the reason for it. This can lead to the idea of energy as something with
somewhat strange properties. Furthermore, if Joules experiment is considered as
transformation of energy, energy being something real, the end product of the
process -the heat- is a form of energy. This conclusion is conceptually required.
93
COELHO
Figure 5. Tiplers schema (Tipler 2000, p. 554).
If something changes its form in a process, what appears as end product must be a
form of that entity. If not, we cannot speak of transformation. The concept of
heat as a form of energy has, however, been criticised (Cotignola et al., 2002, p. 285;
Dommech et al., 2007). Let us consider if the difficulties could be avoided.
In 1878, Joule took up the experimental configuration of 1850 again with some
improvements.
Figure 6. From Joules article (Joule 1884, Plate IV, fig. 113).
94
The schema of the section of the calorimeter is not very different from the first one.
Figure 7. From Joules article (Joule 1884, Plate IV, fig. 114).
In 1879, Rowland carried out an analogous experiment, which can be useful to

show in the classroom.
Figure 8. A perspective view of the apparatus, from Rowlands article

(Rowland 1902, p. 425, fig. 6).
95
COELHO
The following pictures show the section of the calorimeter (left) and a perspective
view of the revolving paddles removed from the apparatus (right):
Figure 9. From Rowlands article (Rowland 1902, p. 427, fig. 7, 8).
This picture clearly shows the friction necessary to increase the temperature of the
water. Let us interpret the paddle-wheel experiment thanks to Mayers methodology.
Mayer established equivalences between different domains, such as those which
concern position, motion and heat. Let us now suppose that we use his methodology
for dealing with phenomena. In this case, we are aware that we established an
equivalence between certain magnitudes. Thus, we do not need the indestructibility
of a general or abstract entity to express that its quantity remains constant. As we
have established an equivalence between different domains, the mechanical and the
thermal one, we do not need the transformability of the same entity to justify
the connection. We know in advance that we are dealing with measurement processes
and units of different domains. Thus, using the concept of equivalence, we can understand the conservation of energy as a consequence of our dealing with the phenomena
and dispense with the unknown entity. In doing so, we will not ask the question of
what energy is.
Some empirical research has been carried out within the framework of the
European project History and Philosophy in Science Teaching41. Problem solving
strategies based on the concept outlined above are being developed.
NOTES
1
96
See, for instance, Chalmers, 1963, p. 43; Bueche, 1972, p. 95; Hnsel & Neumann, 1993, p. 222;
Cutnell & Johnson, 1998, p. 177; Young & Freedman, 2004, p. 264.

2
The modern science of thermodynamics is based on two fundamental principles [] The first of these
is the principle of equivalence established by Joule, and is represented algebraically by the equation
W = JH.
10
11
12
13
14
15
This principle, which is known as the first law of thermodynamics, asserts [] (p. 667).
Die am engsten an die unmittelbare Erfahrung sich anschlieende Formulierung des ersten Hauptsatzes,
die von jeder Hypothese, etwa ber die Natur der Wrme frei ist, besagt daher einfach: Wrme und
mechanische Arbeit sind quivalent (p. 109).
Energie wird als unzerstrbar angesehen. Das Energieprinzip ist somit zunchst kein empirisches
Gesetz, sondern ein Postulat, das sich allerdings mit den Erfahrungstatsachen (quivalenzgesetz)
durchaus im Einklang befindet (p. 126).
See, for instance, Breger, 1982; Schirra, 1989; Smith, 1998; Guedj, 2000; or Caneva, 1993; Cardwell,
1989; Dahl, 1963; and Bevilacqua, 1983.
Krfte sind Ursachen, mithin findet auf dieselbe volle Anwendung der Grundsatz: causa aequat
effectum (p. 233).
In einer Kette von Ursachen und Wirkungen kann, wie aus der Natur einer Gleichung erhellt, nie
ein Glied oder ein Theil eines Gliedes zu Null werden. Diese erste Eigenschaft aller Ursachen nennen
wir ihre Unzerstrlichkeit (p. 233).
Hat die gegebene Ursache c eine ihr gleiche Wirkung e hervorgebracht, so hat eben damit c zu seyn
aufgehrt; c ist zu e geworden (p. 234).
Die Gre der Fallkraft v steht [...] - mit der Gre der Masse m und mit der ihrer Erhebung d, in
geradem Verhltnisse; v=md (p. 236).
Geht die Erhebung d=1 der Masse m in Bewegung dieser Masse von der Endgeschwindigkeit c=1
ber, so wird auch v=mc; aus den bekannten zwischen d und c stattfindenden Relationen ergiebt sich
aber fr andere Werthe von d oder c, mc als das Ma der Kraft v (p. 236).
Wasser erfhrt, wie der Verfasser fand, durch starkes Schtteln eine Temperaturerhhung. Das
erwrmte Wasser (von 12q und 13qC.) [..] (p. 238).
umgekehrt dienen wieder die Dampfmaschinen zur Zerlegung der Wrme in Bewegung oder
Lasterhebung (p. 239).
Ist es nun ausgemacht, da fr die verschwindende Bewegung in vielen Fllen (exceptio confirmat
regulam) keine andere Wirkung gefunden werden kann, als die Wrme, fr die enstandene Wrme
keine andere Ursache als die Bewegung, so ziehen wir die Annahme, Wrme entsteht aus Bewegung,
der Annahme einer Ursache ohne Wirkung und einer Wirkung ohne Ursache vor (p. 238).
Angenommen, ein Kubikzoll Luft von 0q und 27 Zoll Quecksilber Druck, sey durch die Wrmemenge
x bei constantem Volumen um 274qC. erwrmt worden [...] Ein andermal aber werde unser
Cubikzoll Luft nicht unter constantem Volumen, sondern unter constantem Drucke der 27zlligen
Quecksilbersule von 0 auf 274q erwrmt. Diessmal ist eine grssere Wrmemenge erforderlich als
zuvor; es sey dieselbe = x+y (p. 12).
hiernach gerechnet ist die Wrmemenge, die unseren Kubikcentimeter Luft bei constantem
Volumen um 1q erhht, =0,000347/1,421 = 0,000244 Grad. Es ist folglich die Differenz
y=0,000347-0,000244=0,000103 Grad Wrme,
durch deren Aufwand das Gewicht P=1033 Gramme auf h=1/274 Centimeter, gehoben wurde.
Durch Reduktion dieser Zahlen findet man
1q Wrme=1Grm. auf 367m [...] Hhe (p. 145).
16
Der Zusammenhang, in welchem, wie wir gesehen haben, die Wrme mit der Bewegung steht, bezieht
sich auf die Quantitt, nicht auf die Qualitt, denn es sind - um mit Euklid zu reden - Gegenstnde,
die einander gleich sind, sich desshalb noch nicht hnlich (p. 43).
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COELHO
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
98
Diese, zwischen der Fallkraft und der Bewegung bestehende constante Proportion, welche in der
hheren Mechanik unter dem Namen Princip der Erhaltung lebendiger Krfte aufgefhrt wird, kann
kurz und passend mit dem Ausdrucke Umwandlung bezeichnet werden. [...] Etwas anderes, als
eine constante numerische Beziehung soll und kann hier das Wort Umwandeln nicht ausdrcken
(p. 412).
The various experiments of this section prove, I think, most completely the production of electricity
from ordinary magnetism (p. 138). I propose to call the agency thus exerted by ordinary magnets,
magneto-electric or magnelectric induction (p. 139).
The axle b [...] was wound with a double strand of fine twine, and the strings [...] were carried over
very easily-working pulleys, placed on opposite sides of the axle [...] By means of weights placed in
the scales attached to the ends of the strings, I could easily ascertain the force necessary to move the
apparatus at any given velocity (p. 150).
A third proposition, suppressed in accordance with the wish of the Committee to whom the paper
was referred, stated that friction consisted in the conversion of mechanical power into heat (p. 328).
The total mechanical energy of a body might be defined as the mechanical value of all the effect it
would produce, in heat emitted and in resistances overcome, if it were cooled to the utmost, and
allowed to contract indefinitely or to expand indefinitely according as the forces between its particles are
attractive or repulsive, when the thermal motions within it are all stopped (p. 475).
in our present state of ignorance regarding perfect cold, and the nature of molecular forces, we
cannot determine this total mechanical energy for any portion of matter (p. 475).
the mechanical energy of a body in a given state, will denote the mechanical value of the effects
the body would produce in passing from the state in which it is given, to the standard state, or the
mechanical value of the whole agency that would be required to bring the body from the standard
state to the state in which it is given (p. 475).
The energy of motion may be called either dynamical energy or actual energy. The energy of a
material system at rest, in virtue of which it can get into motion, is called potential energy. (p. 34).
[...] It had kinetic or (as it has sometimes been called) actual energy. We prefer the first term, which
indicates motion as the form in which the energy is displayed (p. 602).
A few years later, in advocating a restoration of the original and natural nomenclature,
mechanics the science of machines, dynamics the science of force, I suggested (instead of
statics and dynamics the two divisions of mechanics according to the then usual nomenclature) that
statics and kinetics should be adopted to designate the two divisions of dynamics. At the same time
I gave, instead of dynamical energy, or actual energy, the name kinetic energy which is now
in general use to designate the energy of motion (1884, Vol. II, p. 34).
the energy of a body may be defined as the capacity which it has of doing work (p. 90).
This definition of energy, as the effect produced in a body by an act of work, is not so simple as the
usual one the power of doing work but this latter definition seems a little unhappy (p. 279).
energy is power of doing work in precisely the same sense as capital is the power of buying goods.
[] money is a power of buying goods. It does not, however, necessarily confer upon its owner any
buying-power, because there may not be any accessible person to buy from; and if there be, he may
have nothing to sell. Just so with energy: it usually [] confers upon the body possessing it a certain
power of doing work, which power it loses when it has transferred it (p. 279).
Whenever work is done upon a body, an effect is produced in it which is found to increase the
working-power of that body (by an amount not greater than the work done); hence this effect is
called energy (2789).
But in every action taking place between two bodies the work is equal to the antiwork ( 3); hence
the energy gained by the first body is equal to the energy lost by the second; or, on the whole,
energy is neither produced nor destroyed, but is simply transferred from the second body to the first
(p. 279).
The energy may be watched at every instant. Its existence is continuous; it possesses identity (p. 483).
In the older and more hazy view of conservation of energy the idea of potential energy has
always been felt to be a difficulty [...] it was not easy or possible always to form a clear and consistent
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
mental image of what was physically meant by it [...] The usual ideas and language current about
potential energy are proper to notions of action at a distance (p. 484).
die Unbestimmtheit liegt dann im Begriff der Energie, man kennt den Platz nicht, den man ihr
anweisen soll, und hat auch kein Mittel, ihn zu finden (p. 117).
Gewi ist zuzugeben, da diese (sozusagen materielle) Auffassung der Energie als eines Vorrats
von Wirkungen, dessen Menge durch den augenblicklichen Zustand des materiellen Systems bestimmt
ist, mglicherweise spter einmal ihre Dienste getan haben und einer anderen, allgemeineren und
hheren, Vorstellung Platz machen wird (p. 118).
Mehrere ausgezeichnete Physiker versuchen heutzutage, der Energie so sehr die Eigenschaften
der Substanz zu leihen, da sie annehmen, jede kleinste Menge derselben sei zu jeder Zeit an einen
bestimmten Ort des Raumes geknpft und bewahre bei allem Wechsel desselben und bei aller
Verwandlung der Energie in neue Formen dennoch ihre Identitt (p. 256) .
[...] kann der Inhalt eines physikalischen Systems an einer Substanz nur abhngen von dem
Zustande des Systems selbst; der Inhalt gegebener Materie an potentieller Energie aber hngt ab von
dem Vorhandensein entfernter Massen, welche vielleicht niemals Einflu auf das System hatten (p. 26).
Die Menge einer Substanz ist eine notwendig positive Gre; die in einem System enthaltene
potentielle Energie scheuen wir uns nicht, als negativ anzunehmen (p. 26).
Die Energie ist daher in allen realen oder konkreten Dingen als wesentlicher Bestandteil enthalten,
der niemals fehlt, und insofern knnen wir sagen, da in der Energie sich das eigentlich Reale
verkrpert [...] Sie ist das Wirkliche insofern, als sie das Wirkende ist [...] Und zweitens ist sie das
Wirkliche insofern, als sie den Inhalt des Geschehens anzugeben gestattet (p. 5).
Es besteht [...] gar nicht mehr die Aufgabe, zu ermitteln, wie Geist und Materie in Wechselwirkung
treten knnen, sondern es entsteht die Frage, wie sich der Begriff der Energie, der viel weiter als der
der Materie ist, zu dem Begriff des Geistes stellt (p. 144).
The different elements for introducing the concept of energy consist of short texts on Mayers and
Joules biographies and theories; reconstruction of Mayers experiment vehement agitation of
water carried out by the pupils in the classroom. The texts on the theories are read and explained in
the classroom. For the vehement agitation, glasses with different forms and different liquids have
also been used.
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Ricardo Lopes Coelho

Faculty of Science, University of Lisbon
Campo Grande C4, P-1749-016, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: rlc@fc.ul.pt
101
PETER HEERING AND STEPHEN KLASSEN
7. TROUBLESOME DROPLETS
Improving Students Experiences with the Millikan Oil Drop Experiment
1. INTRODUCTION
Millikans oil drop experiment is among the classic experiments from modern
physics; moreover, it is considered to be one of the most beautiful experiments of
all time (Crease, 2002). These classifications, however, contrast with the laboratory
experience of students and instructors in performing the experiment, for as
a teaching-lab experiment it does not enjoy a good reputation for three principal
reasons: eyestrain, tedium, and poor, unconvincing results (Jones, 1995). We, too,
have experienced the frustrations of inconsistent and unconvincing results and the
inevitable questioning of whether the experiment, indeed, still has justifiable
educational value. The existing concerns, led us to start a research project on the
Millikan experiment in order to improve its educational potential. The project is a
joint venture between the Physics Departments at the Carl-von Ossietzky Universitt
Oldenburg in Germany and the University of Winnipeg in Canada, and portions of
this study have been carried out at each institution.
In beginning a review of its pedagogical merit, we thought it worthwhile to
reconsider the words of the Nobel Committee in awarding the Nobel Prize to
Millikan1. In the presentation speech, they noted that:
Millikans aim was to prove that electricity really has the atomic structure,
which, on the base of theoretical evidence, it was supposed to have. To prove
this it was necessary to ascertain, not only that electricity, from whatever source
it may come, always appears as a unit of charge or as an exact multiple of
units, but also that the unit is not a statistical mean, as, for instance, has of
late been shown to be the case with atomic weights. In other words it was
necessary to measure the charge of a single ion with such a degree of accuracy
as would enable him to ascertain that this charge is always the same, and it
was necessary to furnish the same proofs in the case of free electrons. By a
brilliant method of investigation and by extraordinarily exact experimental
technique Millikan reached his goal (Gullstrand, 1923).
One is struck, especially, by the last sentence- brilliant method and extraordinarily exact experimental technique. It holds a clue for the reasons behind the
difficulty that is currently experienced in the typical student laboratory when doing
the experiment. Unless there is ongoing vigilance to make sure that the design and
operation of the apparatus is still able to reproduce this extraordinarily complex
HEERING AND KLASSEN
experiment, albeit in a simplified manner compared to the original, one can expect
that its operation will gradually degrade and lose its value. This is exactly what
appears to have happened in the case of the Millikan oil drop student experiment. In
this respect, Crease makes an excellent point in discussing the vote of his readers:
I was a little disturbed, however, by the ease with which many people seemed
to think that the experiments that they were proposing had been conceived, or
could be carried out and understood. This seemed a function, in part, of the way
that these experiments are often taught. Demonstrations can vastly simplify
the experimental process through the use of modern equipment constructed
with the right answer in view (Crease, 2002).
Yet, with respect to the Millikan experiment, even with modern equipment it is not
as easy as it appears in educational texts as Crease seems to indicate.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTS WORKING PRINCIPLE
The oil drop experiment makes use of small oil droplets that have been produced
by an ordinary atomizer (see Figure 1). The droplets are introduced into the region
between two parallel conducting plates either by spraying directly into the region or by
allowing them to fall through a small hole in the top plate. The process of spraying the
oil produces charge separation in the droplets so that each droplet contains a few
ionized oil molecules that effectively make the droplets electrically charged. The
experiment, thus, measures the amount of electrical charge that is transferred to droplets
in the charge separation process, which is not necessarily the same as measuring the
charge on an electron, per se. Because the droplets are so small, it is possible, using
only a few hundreds of Volts applied to the plates, to produce an electric force on the
charged drops that is large enough to overcome their weight and cause them to move
upward2. By means of relatively simple theory, it is possible to relate the motion of the
drop to the electrical force and, thereby, its electrical charge. When a large number of
charges have been determined, their values may be categorized and sorted and a
common divisor may be determined. It is expected that the values only take on integer
(or near-integer) multiples of the elementary electrical charge.
In his Nobel acceptance speech, Millikan (1924) explains that the oil drops act
somewhat like charged pith balls whose motion can be measured precisely in order
to determine the amount of charge. Furthermore, as Millikan points out, the success
of the experiment is influenced strongly by the correct choice of the values of the
various parameters that allow the effect to be measurable, in the first place. According
to Millikan,
... only a narrow range of field strengths [can be used] within which such
experiments as these are at all possible. They demand that the droplets be
large enough so that the Brownian movements are nearly negligible, that they
be round and homogeneous, light and non-evaporable, that the distance be
long enough to make the timing accurate, and that the field be strong enough
to more than balance gravity by its pull on a drop carrying but one or two
electrons. Scarcely any other combinations of dimensions, field strengths and
materials, could have yielded the results obtained (Millikan, 1924, pp. 5758).
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TROUBLESOME DROPLETS
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the oil drop experiment.
Indeed, the experiment is very much more complex that the simple illustration of
Figure 1 portrays. Parameters that need to be considered include the calibration of the
measuring telescope, the distance between the parallel plates, the value of the Voltage,
the barometric pressure, the viscosity of air, the density of oil, and, most importantly,
the timing measurement of the drops while in motion. The complexity becomes more
understandable when the drawing of Millikans publication is examined:
Figure 2. Millikan experimental set-up (Millikan, 1913).

105
HEERING AND KLASSEN
M and N are the plates of the condenser, A being the atomizer. The entire
chamber is placed in a second one which has been filled with oil to avoid thermal
current in the vessel D. The pressure is controlled with a manometer m, the voltage
is produced with the batteries B; a is the light source; w is a filter for infrared
radiation that has to be absorbed in order to reduce thermal effects in the chamber.
One can also see an X-ray tube which is used to change the charge on the oil
drops.
However, the complexity of the experiment can probably be even better comprehended when looking at the image of the real experiment (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Millikans setup for the oil drop experiment

(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Millikan%27s_setup_
for_the_oil_drop_experiment.jpg, accessed July 26th, 2009).
2. 1 Its Significance
When consulting a number of physics and chemistry textbooks (Niaz, 2000; Niaz &
Rodriguez, 2004) it is obvious from its prevalence that the Millikan oil drop
experiment is considered to be important. The textbooks, generally, accept Millikans
own perspective on the significance of his work. In Millikans words,
[h]ere, then, is direct, unimpeachable proof that the electron is not a statistical
mean, but that rather the electrical charges found on ions all have either
exactly the same value or else small exact multiples of that value (Millikan,
1917, p. 70).
106
The experiment is considered a classic characterized by simplicity, elegance, and

precision and a major, if not definitive, step in the acceptance of the atomic theory
(Niaz & Rodriquez, 2005). The educational materials do, however, not take into
account the controversial nature of Millikans work (Niaz, 2000), in which competing
interpretations of the experimental data produced contradictory conclusions in
regards to the atomicity of the electronic charge. The educational research literature
on the oil drop experiment point out that the experiment is an excellent illustration
of the extraordinarily complex nature of scientific experimentation (Kruglak, 1972).
3. PERSPECTIVES OF THE EDUCATIONAL LITERATURE
It appears that the Millikan oil drop apparatus has been commercially available for
the student physics laboratory at least since ten years after Millikan received the
Nobel Prize (Harnwell & Livingwood, 1993). One would expect that the educational
literature would contain a significant number of publications discussing various
aspects of the laboratory, but such appears not to be the case. In the entire period
up to the present, a literature search has yielded only about a dozen papers discussing
educational aspects of the oil drop experiment in the intervening approximately
75 years since it began to be used in student labs.
The literature deals primarily with the difficulties in performing the Millikan
experiment. The article by Kruglak (1972) is especially critical, reporting findings
that students considered the Millikan experiment as the least liked, least instructive,
and least understood of their physics laboratory experiments (1972, p. 768). Kruglak
recommends abandoning the explicit calculation of the electronic charge in favor
of checking only for the aspect of atomicity. The recommendations of Heald (1974)
are similar with the additional advice of pooling the data of an entire class in order to
obtain sufficient data to demonstrate the atomicity of the electronic charge. In a
different approach, Kapusta (1975) demonstrates the negative effect of inappropriate
measuring times on the error in the data. Jones (1995) on the other hand attempts a
wholesale re-design of the Millikan apparatus based on a study of the apparatus,
itself. The re-designed apparatus along with a new calculating procedure produces
highly-successful results for the students. Many of the improvements appearing in
Jones (1995) are no longer applicable, since manufacturers have produced new
apparatus incorporating many of the original suggestions. However, despite the
existence of new, re-designed apparatus, the experiences of the authors with physics
classes currently performing the Millikan experiment are not far removed from
those reported by Kruglak in 1972. One of the authors (Klassen, 2009) has reported
on student reactions to the Millikan experiment. According to Klassen (2009),
[e]vident in the students writing is the same frustration that Kruglak pointed
out with obtaining e values in between the expected quantized values (p. 604).
It is interesting to note the difference in the notion of the Millikan experiment
expressed in the science education literature as compared to the notion held by
professional physicists and textbook writers. According to one scientist:
the experiment can leave no-one in doubt that modern physics is real,
observable, and true (Crease, 2002, p. 19).
107
HEERING AND KLASSEN
Similarly, contemporary textbooks often portray a caricature of the Millikan

experiment (Niaz & Rodrguez, 2005; Rodrquez & Niaz, 2004). Moreover, several
of the descriptions are erroneous, where it is claimed that the diameter of the drops
is determined with a microscope (Parlow & Heering, 2009).
Despite the research that has been cited, there has been no significant progress
in identifying the underlying nature of the problems inherent in the student Millikan
experiment and solving them. For example, only the study of Klassen (2009) has
analyzed the nature of student difficulties from the perspective of the students.
Kruglak (1972) does poll students attitudes towards the experiment, but does
not attempt to study the nature of their difficulties. The literature reflects a broad
range of experiences with the apparatus, showing that, in some cases, with careful
modification and proper use of the apparatus and appropriate assistance given to
students, the Millikan lab can be done successfully. On the other hand, there are
undetermined factors that make the successful performing of the experiment by
students exceedingly difficult in other cases. The preceding review suggests that there
is a critical need for a renewed effort at researching various aspects of the student
Millikan experiment, including the students own analysis of their experiences.
4. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MILLIKANS EXPERIMENT
When historians accounts of Millikans work are examined, several aspects are
striking. Basically, three lines of discussion can be identified3. The first one was
opened by Gerald Holtons analysis of Millikans work (Holton, 1981). He examined
Millikans lab books and found a contradiction between the entries in the lab books
and the publication. Millikan had claimed that he had published all the data from a
specific period of his experiments and that none of these measurements resulted in
a contradiction to his claim that charge is quantized. Yet, Holton could show that
for the period, Millikan had taken more data than he published. This analysis of
Millikans lab book was also the basis of Allan Franklins analysis (Franklin, 1986).
Even though he explained the omission of several data, he claimed that Millikan
had been trimming and cooking (Franklin, 1986, p. 232). Subsequently, several
authors have claimed that Millikan had been fraudulent (see e.g. Judson, 2004),
while others claim that Millikan had acted properly4 (Goodstein, 2001).
The second aspect that is discussed in the literature has also been introduced by
Holton: Almost simultaneously to Millikans work, the Austrian physicists Felix
Ehrenhaft worked with a comparable set-up. Actually, Ehrenhafts set-up was even
more sensitive than the one used by Millikan. However, after initially publishing data
that seem to correspond to Millikans findings, Ehrenhaft very quickly came to a
completely different result: He (as well as several of his collaborators) claimed that
he had observed droplets with a charge significantly smaller than the one of an
electron. From his data, Ehrenhaft concluded that there are to be subelectrons, yet,
even though it remained unclear how he could come up with such data, his findings
were finally rejected.
However, it is not just a question of data but also a conceptual problem: It has
been clear from experiments in electrolysis that a particular amount of electricity
108
is able to produce a particular amount of a chemical substance. When at the beginning

of the 20th century the atomic concept became more and more accepted5 the question
remained whether electricity also had an atomic structure. From electrolysis
experiments, a determination of the elementary charge was basically possible, yet,
it remained unclear whether this was actually an elementary charge (and electricity
had an atomic structure) or whether this value was to be taken as a mean. Also, it
remained unclear whether the electron was to be taken as a fundamental particle of
electricity or not. Establishing an elementary charge has also to be seen as an
attempt to establish the atomic structure of electricity. It is within this context that
the Millikan-Ehrenhaft controversy is to be seen, and it is within this controversy
that Millikans publishing procedures of his data get particularly questionable.
The third area of discussion was opened by a posthumously published article of
Harvey Fletcher (Fletcher, 1982). In this contribution Fletcher claimed that he had
developed central ideas of the experiment. In particular, he had first experimented
with oil instead of water, thus increasing the observation time and thus the accuracy
of the measurement. However, when Fletcher and Millikan were writing up their
results, Millikan visited Fletcher and insisted that the first paper on the determination
of the elementary charge should only be published under Millikans name, while the
paper on Brownian motion only Fletchers. Again, it can be discussed (if Fletchers
story is going to be accepted) whether Millikans behavior is ethically acceptable.
Moreover, it becomes evident that Millikan is not just working as an isolated
researcher but is part of a collective6.
5. DISCUSSION
A central problem appears to be the fact that the students are not satisfied with their
data and this rating is certainly reasonable when the data are to serve as an
illustration of the elementary charge concept. It is unclear at the moment why the
data are that disappointingly poor, even though some technical aspects may be
identified that offer potential improvements.
In our project, we have taken a multi-pronged approach. In its initial phase, one
of us (Klassen, 2009) has identified four essential aspects to act as the beginning
point for work on the laboratory. These are:
(1) humanizing the experiments originators by focusing on the important and
overlooked role of Harvey Fletcher,
(2) exposing the difficulty in obtaining results in speculative experiments if the
traditional scientific method is followed rather than allowing presuppositions
to guide data analysis,
(3) dealing with the difficult and frustrating nature of the experiment, apparently
somewhat less so in Millikans time than with our current students, and
(4) bearing in mind that the oil drop experiment establishes various aspects of the
fundamental nature of electricity (Klassen, 2009).
In the initial phase, an accurate historical background story was written for the
laboratory, and students were invited to consider Millikans reliance on his preconceptions about the electronic charge and compare his difficulties with their own.
109
HEERING AND KLASSEN
In the current phase of the project, students will be invited to respond, in detail,
to questions relating to their experiences with two different versions of the student
apparatus, and their understanding of what is meant by electron and negative
charge. The experimental data collected by the students will be analyzed to attempt
to identify probable causes for the extraordinarily inconsistent results that they
obtain. The questionnaires will be supplemented by structured interviews, carried out
several weeks after the lab period, in order to evaluate the students understanding
of the experiment after they have submitted reports and to provide clarity for the
questionnaire results. Although questions provide a great deal of information about
students attitudes and knowledge, the issue of the inconsistency of the student
experimental data can only be confronted by a close study of the apparatus, the
data collected by students, and even the apparatus and data of Millikan.
To sum up, we are developing ideas where deficits in the set-up might be and
how the experiment could be made more satisfactory for the students. However,
more research is required.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The researching, writing and presenting of this paper was made possible, in part,
through funding provided by the NSERC CRYSTAL at the University of Manitoba,
the Maurice Price Foundation, and the University of Winnipeg.
NOTES
1
4
5
It has to be remarked that a central reason for the Nobel committee to award Millikan the Nobel
Prize was his work on the photoelectric effect, see (Panusch et al., 2009).
In the literature, several descriptions can be found according to which the electric field is adjusted in
a manner that gravitational force on the observed oil drop is counterbalanced by the electrical force
so that the oil drop is motionless. However, this method was only initially used by Millikan who
abandoned it as it turned out to be too error-prone due to the Brownian motion (see e.g. http://www.
xplora.org/ww/en/pub/xplora/news/latestnews/millikan_experiment.htm, accessed July 26th , 2009).
I am not discussing accounts in which Millikan is characterized as a genius who empirically determined
the charge of the electron.
For a detailed discussion of these aspects see Segerstrale (1995).
Chemists had already been working with the concept of atoms for quite some time, yet, they left it
open whether atoms actually exist to them it was more a useful tool for describing chemical interactions
(see Grs, 1999).
For a criticism of the image of scientific research as being carried out by sole genius see Hentschel
(2003), for the role of lab assistants, technicians and instrument makers see Hentschel (2008).
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Retrieved June 15, 2008, from http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1923/press.html
Fletcher, H. (1982). My work with Millikan on the oil-drop experiment. Physics Today, 35, 4247.
Franklin, A. (1986). The neglect of experiment. Cambridge [u.a.]: University Press.
Grs, B. (1999). Chemischer atomismus: Anwendung, vernderung, alternativen im deutschsprachigen
raum in der zweiten hlfte des 19, jahrhunderts. Berlin: ERS.
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Goodstein, D. (2001). Articles - In defense of Robert Andrews Millikan - Was this Nobel laureate actually
guilty of cooking data? American Scientist, 89(1), 54.
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Hentschel, K. (2003). Das Mrchen vom Zauberer im weien Kittel. Physik in unserer Zeit, 34(5), 225231.
Hentschel, K. (Ed.), (2008). Unsichtbare Hnde: Zur Rolle von Laborassistenten, Mechanikern, Zeichnern
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Holton, G. (1981). Thematische Analyse der Wissenschaft: Die Physik Einsteins und seiner Zeit. Frankfurt/
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Jones, R. C. (1995). The Millikan oil-drop experiment: Making it worthwhile. American Journal of
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Kapusta, J. I. (1975). Best measuring time for a Millikan oil drop experiment. American Journal of Physics,
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Klassen, S. (2009). Identifying and addressing student difficulties with the Millikan oil drop experiment.
Kruglak, H. (1972). Another look at the Pasco-Millikan oil-drop apparatus. American Journal of Physics,
40, 768769.
McComas, W., Clough, M., & Almazroa, H. (1998). The role and character of the nature of science in
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Millikan, R. A. (1911). The isolation of an ion, a precision measurement of its charge, and the correction of
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Millikan, R. A. (1917). The electron: Its isolation and measurement and the determination of some of its
properties. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Millikan, R. A. (1924). Nobel Lecture.
Niaz, M. (2000). The oil drop experiment: A rational reconstruction of the Millikan-Ehrenhaft controversy
and its implications for chemistry textbooks. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37(5), 480508.
Niaz, M., & Rodriguez, M. A. (2005). The oil drop experiment: Do physical chemistry textbooks refer
to its controversial nature? Science & Education, 14, 4357.
Panusch, M., Singh, R., & Heering, P. (2009). How Milikan got the Nobel prize. In S. Klassen (Ed.),
Proceedings of the second international conference of stories in science teaching. Retrieved July 22,
2009, from http://sci-ed.org/Conference-2008/Panusch-et-al.pdf
Parlow, V., & Heering, P. (2009). Das Millikan Experiment und seine Behandlung in der Schule:
Notwendige Elementarisierung, Simplifizierung oder Verzerrung? In P. Heering (Ed.), Der Millikansche
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Rodriguez, M. A., & Niaz, M. (2004). The oil drop experiment: An illustration of scientific research
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Engineering Ethics, 1(3), 197214.
P. Heering
Carl-von-Ossietzky Universitt Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany
e-mail: peter.heering@uni-oldenburg.de
S. Klassen
University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Canada, R3B 2E9
e-mail: s.klassen@uwinnipeg.ca
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XENOPHON MOUSSAS
8. THE ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM

A Mechanical Cosmos and an Eternal Prototype for Modelling
and Paradigm Study
1. INTRODUCTION
The Mechanism of Antikythera is the oldest, the only and in fact the very best
known example of a complex astronomical device, a dedicated analogue astronomical
computer, possibly a planetarium, a device made with gears. We know that this
type of devices have been used as educational devices in schools. As we read in
Cicero and other ancient texts, great scientists and philosophers developed and
used such devices either for education, entertainment, or to impress ones visitors
and guests, including state persons during their state visits. Such mechanisms were
also offered to them as gifts (as it happened during the Byzantine times, and not
only, when visitors entering the palace in Constantinople were passing through a
hall with roaring mechanical lions, and other technological executives).
st
The Antikythera Mechanism was found in a large shipwreck of the 1 century
BC off the coast of the small Greek Island of Antikythera. The vessel was huge,
probably 9 to 12 m wide and 60 to 70 m long (private communication with admiral
J. Theofanidis, 2006, 2009, who was in charge of diving expeditions there several
times). We can guess that it was a commercial ship, or a pirate ship, as the small
Island of Antikythera served as a base of pirates for very long and a fortification
built by the Persians at the time of the Greco-Persian wars was still in use. Finally,
Alexander and the Greeks threw away the Persians out of Greece for good. When
the states of Alexanders successors started to decline and to become weak at
Roman times, the island becomes a pirate base, mainly of Crete and Cilicia. When
there is lack of strong states, or when people are oppressed, piracy becomes the
only road for them to stay free, to survive, and it is accepted initially as a necessity
and then as a profession. The straits of Kythera (Cythera) and Antikythera are part
of the natural route for navigation that links the Eastern to the Western
Mediterranean and are thus of great importance in general, and especially for
the ships of pirates. Recent finds prove that between the 4th and 1st Century BC
Antikythera became an important town, fortified with walls that surround some
300.000 square metres. They were attacked several times by the Rhodians, who
were the traditional important fleet in the Mediterranean, possessing excellent port
th
facilities and navigators. Rhodes, Philip 5 of Macedonia, the Spartans and
MOUSSAS
other Greeks, attack the pirates in Antikythera in their effort to eliminate piracy,
mainly Cretan pirates, and dominate in Crete. Antikythera gets destroyed between
6967 BC by the Romans during the so-called Cretan revolution (Tsavaropoulos,
2008). The shipwreck sunk in this island at a very turbulent historic period, when
the sea battles between the pirates and the other Greeks (Rhodians, Macedonians
and Spartans) and the Romans were at their heights. The content of the ship probably
shows that it is a pirate ship full of treasures that come from all the Aegean, including
statues especially made for the Romans. It is possible that it is merchandise, pirate
lute from the islands and the Ionian coast (Asia Minor, Anatolia) and Roman plunder
taken by the pirates. The possibility that the mechanism comes from Rhodes
increases from the fact that Rhodes participates in the war against the pirates.
Hence the Mechanism might be the planetarium of Cicero described as an educational
and astronomical device in the school of his friend Posidonius. Naturally, the
construction of the mechanism can have roots in the tradition of Hipparchus, the
expertise of Rhodes in metallurgy, the long scientific and mechanical tradition of
Syracuse (Archimedes and his successors), and the unique Alexandrian experience
in automata and astronomy.
Figure 1. The main gear that moves the Sun and part of the Codex Antikytherensis,
the manual of the instrument at the background. Image produced by the author
using X-tek System CT data and Dr T. Malbenders PTM method using his
software (HP). Copyright University of Athens 2010.
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THE ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM
2. THE STORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE MECHANISM
The wreck was a ship full of Greek treasures that were travelling from Greece to
Rome, to transform it to the Eternal City, to decorate Roman villas, the Forum and
Capitolium. We can guess that it was a commercial ship, or perhaps even a pirate
ship, as the Island of Antikythera was full of pirates. It has been discovered the
4th April 1900, just before Greek Easter, by Symian sponge divers that stopped
there in a small port of Antikythera forced by a storm, on their way to Africa from
their island of Syme (Symi, Simi), near Rhodes. The sponge divers initially discovered the hand of a beautiful bronze statue of a handsome, very expressive beard
man named the Philosopher of Antikythera (according to some philosopher
Borysthenis). They had to continue to Libya and Tunisia to collect sponges, as they
had to pay every year an enormous debt, to work very hard for their families,
despite that they realised the seabed was full of antiquities. Few months later they
return with their sponges back home to the island of Syme that was still under
Turkish occupation. They made a meeting with the educated ones and the Greek
authorities of the island, to decide what to do with the antiquities. They discuss the
matter with others, including their Symian archaeologist professor of the University
of Athens A. Economou (Oikonomu) and with the help of the Greek state and
the Greek Navy, under the supervision of the Greek archaeological authorities,
perform a very lengthy, difficult, even deadly for some (one diver out of the initial
six died there and two more were struck by paralysis later) expedition. They had to
work in a depth of 40 to 65 m, where they could stay for only three minutes. They
had to detach the antiquities, which were in a state of conglomerates with rocks and
stones, linked with marine animals, corals and others. In some place they had to
break with hammers a conglomerate that formed a 10 cm thick rock. They discovered almost one hundred statues made of marble and a few in bronze. Amongst
them is probably the most beautiful bronze statue in any Greek Museum, the
Antikythera Youth, possibly Perseus, as it seems that he holds an object hanging
from his hand, possibly Medusas head. Many small bronze statuettes have also
been discovered, one of them that can turn around its base, like the figures we see
in old mechanical clocks.
Amongst the treasures they discovered a piece of metal covered with sea shells
that looked like a stone, as it was calcified, full of small petrified sea animals,
corals and other. It is surprising that in the depth and darkness of 50 m a diver
working for only three minutes could distinguish that it was a man-made object
and not a stone. But no wonder, the experienced diver Elias Lycopantis or Stadiatis
managed to recognize that it was certainly such a mechanism. His granddaughter
Mrs Lisa Mandaliou told me that her grandmother liked to say for the very capable
husband, the best diver, that he always found treasures out of the Sea.
The divers did a terrific job indeed. They discovered numerous treasures, the
extremely heavy statues that they had to detach from the seabed, as they were
in some occasions concealed under the rock formed over the years that, as they
reported, was around 10 cm thick. They had to pierce the rock, detach the statue
and fasten and knot it with a rope of ten centimetres in diameter. They discovered
several ornamental objects, like a nice miniature model of a lyre made of bronze,
115
MOUSSAS
a few elaborate sofas, Louis XIV style decorated with lions, head of an Artemis like
goddess, a duck etc. It is evident that the huge ship was loaded with a fabulous
treasure, like the ones we see today in the Vatican Museum and Roman villas and
palaces. As we have the volume of a very large ship, and the treasures recovered
and now hosted in the National Archaeological Museum in Athens, are not sufficient
to fill it up, and as we also know that probably a part of the ship was initially off
a cliff at 65 m below sea level and that after this depth there is an abyss of some
125 m, it is certain that there is a plethora of treasures down there, worth having
a new archaeological investigation conducted with todays technological means.
We know that at least a huge statue fell off a boat and went down to the abyss,
probably a Laocoon complex, as some infer from a description of an eye witness
of 19012 (priv. Comm Mr Dapontes, ex mayor of Kythera). We also need to find
even more gears and plates with inscriptions of the instrument, possibly automata
associated with it, like a rotating statuette discovered in the shipwreck, and the
mechanism of the planets as their names, and especially their motion, is mentioned
many times in the manual of the Mechanism.
Figure 2. The pointer of the Moon. The Moon was a silver sphere inside the hollow
hemisphere at the top left. The angular velocity of the Moon follows a good approximation
of Keplers second law. Image produce by the author using Dr T. Malbenders PTM
method using his software (HP). Copyright University of Athens 2010.
116
3. THE STUDY OF THE MECHANISM
The Mechanism was taken out of the sea probably in spring of 1902. Archaeologists and three naval officers have initially studied it, quite successfully if we
regard the means they had available. Svoronos (1903, 1908), the then director of
the National Archaeological Museum did the first very extensive studies of all
findings, and the Mechanism has been studied by Rediadis, then a charismatic
young officer, that later become minister of finance, who fully apprehended that
it was a very complicated astronomical instrument ahead of its time, much more
advanced than an astrolabe. Rediadis understood that there is a pin in slot
mechanism that drives part of the mechanism and today we know that it gives
the Moon a variable velocity during the period of the month, following an
approximation of Keplers second law. Rados (1905, 1910) and Rehm (1907)
studied it too. Admiral J. Theofanidis [grandson of Greeces liberator Theodoros
Kolokotronis] (1934) spends a fortune and creates a clock-like working model of
the Mechanism, including some planetary functions. During the Second World
War all antiquities of the National Archaeological Museum have been buried
in the ground in order to be saved from destruction or lute. After the Second
World War and the civil war in Greece, Price (1955, 1956, 1974) examined the
mechanism and wrote initially two articles in Scientific American. Twenty years
later, and using new techniques, that is radiographs produced by penetrating
gamma rays, H. Karakalos studied the mechanism and counted the teeth with the
help of his wife Emily. Price consults Theofanidis (priv. Communication. Adm.
J. Theofanidis, 2010) and eventually constructs a more realistic working model
of the mechanism, as he had the internal structure based on the Karakalos
radiographs and having read all the unpublished documents of Theofanidis. The
new model took into account the thirty existing gears properly put in order,
although he had use his constructive thought to put it in function. The interest
of people in Greece, and in the whole world increased dramatically after the
publications of Price. G. Veis and others studied the instrument too. Personalities
like the renowned physicist and Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman showed
great and genuine interest. The fame of the mechanism crosses the borders of
Greece. Using tomography Bromley and Write in collaboration with Mangou
(Bromley, 1986, 1990; Wright et al., 1995, Wright, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) and
with nonlinear computer tomographies (Freeth et al., 2006, 2008) read several
parts of the instrument manual that is written on the device, covering almost
every available bronze surface, possibly on two sheets of bronze, seemingly of
different chemical composition (Zafeiropoulou and Mitropoulos, 2009). Reading
these old texts of the manual is extremely useful but difficult, not because they
are written with classical Greek characters, almost the same as the ones we use
today in books and newspapers, but because the rust destroyed them for over two
millennia and concealed the letters for ever since.
John Seabrook (2007), Jo Marchant (2008) and Freeth (2009) give interesting
aspects of the story and descriptions of the Mechanism.
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MOUSSAS
4. MODELLING AND THE FIRST PARADIGM
Humans understand that the world does not behave randomly. Initially they
attribute every action to the power and will of the gods. Initially they believe that
gods govern their lives and the Cosmos, but gradually they understand that there
exists causality. It is very natural that if you live in a climate accompanied with
mists for very long periods, not to be in position to see clearly. Nothing is clear.
But if you live in Greece, then after sunrise everything becomes crystal clear. This
is one of the reasons Greek philosophers tried to explain everything in terms of
physics and mathematics, rather than gods. Or as my professor, Michael Anastasiades,
said in a lecture forty years ago No Greek philosopher could have ever conceived
the uncertainty principle, but if you live in Gttingen you wake up in the morning
and you cannot see the other side of the road . But probably the main reason
Philosophy and Science started in Greece is because in places with the geography
of Greece, with many mountains, small planes and valleys and islands it is inevitable
to have small societies, many kingdoms or City States, to which they eventually
developed, as the society becomes more and more mercantile and technology
dependent, through the revolution of agriculture, and the trading of goods and
merchandizing and the opening of the sea roads, the roads the Mediterranean
people used at the time linking all important places, from Cyprus and its copper, to
Britain with the tin, Iberia, Marseille, Tyros and all other important places. In the
Agora (market in Greek) they have to persuade the buyers, many learn the art of
talking and exchanging ideas and dialectics, but also rhetoric develops. I believe
this is the reason we eventually have the rise of Philosophy and Science in Greece.
In the Great Civilizations of Great Nations, that developed in the large planes, and
had huge populations, the development of dialectics develops in a different way, as
there is no time to let every single person to talk, to express him/herself. In ancient
China we have small city-states too. On the contrary, such a possibility becomes
even necessity in small societies and probably this helped in the development
of philosophy, natural philosophy and science, together with the development of
democracy driven by the rise of the class of merchants (olive oil, wine, copper etc)
and technologists (metallurgists etc).
Two of the most important developments in the history of science are the notion
of causality and the existence of laws of nature. Gradually humans understand that
laws of nature exist. As they observe the stars night after night, and the Sun day after
day, they understand that they move transversing circles every night, according to
their regular motions, the Moon and the planets, and the Sun during the day with
their seemingly irregular motions, understand that there are normalities, repetitions,
schemes, cycles repeating themselves. They start to count and eventually they can
predict the phases of the Moon or the seasonal changes.
5. THE MOON STUDY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE
This is the beginning of modelling nature. The first important attempt to model
nature and the development of a paradigm is the one of the Moon and its cycles,
starting with the simplest one, the lunar month, from new Moon to new Moon.
118
In the development of science the study of the Moon and its use in the development of calendars has played a very important role. The year is not an integer
multiple of lunar months. The paradigm of the year passes through many stages,
that continue even today and I believe this has contributed greatly in the development
of mathematics and science. The Moon follows a very complicated motion, as
the plane of its journey around the Earth changes periodically, while it wobbles
around the Earth. The Moon moves very fast. In one hour the Moon covers an
angle in the sky slightly larger that its diameter, or ~13 degrees in 24 hours. The
speed varies a lot when it is near the Earth (perigee) or farthest from the Earth
(apogee). The intersection of the plane of the orbit of the Moon with Earths orbit
(ecliptic) precesses with a period of 18.61 years, and the perigee moves 40.7 degrees
in one year, returning to the same position with respect to the stars in 8.85 years.
The angle between the lunar orbit and the ecliptic is slightly variable, of ~5.15 degrees.
Despite all these, ancient astronomers notice the repetitions and managed to
describe the motion of the Moon even in prescientific societies, and to predict
eclipses. The first paradigm is the lunar month that predicts the phases of the Moon,
a necessity for a safer and easier life for hunters and fishers. Another paradigm
comes with the introduction of the solar year. A great advancement comes when
humans understand the existence of the periodicity of eclipses, the Saros cycle of
18 years, 11 days and 1/3 of a day. This model and paradigm is replaced by the
Exeligmos cycle (54 years, one month) that is the triple of the Saros cycle, which
is multiple of a day, hence eclipses occur almost at the same longitude on Earth.
Great advancement comes with the discovery of Metons and Callippus cycles,
which are the periods the Moon reappears in the sky with the same phase (e.g full
Moon) and in the same position according to the stars. The obliquity of the Earths
orbit, 23.5 degrees, and the inclination of 5.15 degrees of the orbit of the Moon,
in combination with the precession of the line of apsides (intersection of the two
orbits) give a variable distance of the Moon in the sky from the celestial equator
with a period of 18.6 years. Very early in Greek literature we have Homer calling
the Muse or the Muses, the goddesses of Science and Philosophy that later become
nine, as disciplines develop and humans classify science in many disciplines.
6. HOW THE MECHANISM WORKS
Since the time of Aristotle the Greeks had developed classified knowledge on how
to use Gears in machines. The foundations of Engineering changed drastically at
the time of Alexander and much more at the time of Archimedes, who continues
the works in mechanics taken up by Eudoxus and Archytas. Probably the best
technological tradition has been established in Syracuse by the tyrant Dionysius
(around 432367 BC), who understood that knowledge and science is power and
established the first research centre recruiting scientists and engineers (Stamatis,
1973) from all the Greek world. They invent or construct catapults and other
military machines capable of hitting a target at a large distance of 180 m with a
huge sphere. The war machines Archimedes constructed during the siege of
Syracuse by the Roman army under Marcellus are monumental, as described by
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MOUSSAS
Polybius, Plutarch and others. Archimedes constructs artillery, catapults throwing

at all distances, machines throwing iron arrows, even a canon, probably working
with hot steam, as stated by Cicero and others. Consequently, the required technology
was available in the Greek world, including engineering and metallurgy.
7. THE GREEKS LIKE CIRCLES AND LINES
The mathematics necessary to design gears to perform given mathematical calculations

has been developed for long in the Ancient Greek world. The knowledge of
astronomy existed also for centuries. The Greeks developed theories for the motion
of the planets since the early days of their civilization. One was based on the use
of concentric nested spheres and a newer one was based on eccentric circles and
epicycles, i.e. combination of two cycles (or more at later times). The analysis of the
motion of a planet with the rotation of several spheres around different axles is a
mathematical invention that can be considered similar to the spherical harmonic
analysis, used today in modern physics, while the use of epicycles, that is the
combination of two, or at later times the combination of a greater number of circles,
with one rotating on the perimeter of the other, is the precursor of another very
useful mathematical method which we call today Fourier series analysis.
Figure 3. The main gear of the mechanism that drives the Sun and all the trains
of gears. The software of Dr Tom Malzbender produces 3D interactive photos and
it is ideal for teaching modelling of a surface. Images produced by Dr T. Malzbenders
PTM method using his software (HP). The 3D interactive image is produced using many
photographs and appropriate mathematics. The pupil learns that using mathematics
and many photographs with the PTM method developed by Dr Malzbender (HP, Palo Alto)
can take off the rust (left) without touching the old mechanism, by calculating
the average smooth surface and rendering method. Additionally one can map the
unit vector normal to the surface and see details that are not visible otherwise (right).
Image produced by the author using Dr T. Malbenders PTM method using his
software (HP). Copyright University of Athens 2010.
120
One wonders why the Greek mathematicians and astronomers prefer to use
circles to describe the motions of celestial bodies. Of course we have the motion of
the stars and the Moon during the night, that move around the Earth in circles.
The heavens are divine, hence the circle becomes divine.
The Greeks prefer to use circles because they are easy to construct using a
compass, or even a piece of string. The compass and the circle together with the ruler
enable the Greek mathematicians and astronomers to perform geometrical constructions
in a simple and unique way, which infact can be reproduced mechanically using
appropriate gears following mathematical theorems that they have developed in
purpose. The Greeks develop gears that can perform with an ingenious combination
(the pin in a slot mechanism that we have rediscovered in the Mechanism of
Antikythera, Freeth et al 2006, as the first one to notice it was Rediadis in 1903) the
epicyclical motion of a planet, the Moon or the Sun.
8. WHAT IS THE MECHANISM
Based on this and more recent analyses we now know that the Mechanism is:
1. a complex astronomical device and observational instrument, whose complexity
surpasses anything else we know and that looks to be ahead of its time
a. the user of the instrument can measure the altitude of a celestial body
b. he can also determine the angular distance between two astronomical objects
2. a dedicated astronomical computer that uses an approximation of Keplers 2nd law,
at least for the motion of the Moon.
a. it gives the position of the Sun in the zodiac, that is divided in 360 degrees,
and
b. the Moon, and its phase during the month,
c. it predicts eclipses, both solar and lunar,
d. the Moon moves, with its trajectory approximating satisfactorily Keplers
second law, obtaining a variable velocity at perigee and apogee. We know
that Hipparchus measured the eccentricity of the Moons orbit, possibly in
Rhodes, perhaps using the petal shaped end of the stadium as a giant accurate
measuring device,
e. the variable motion is calculated with epicycles and reproduced with four
equal gears, two of which have slightly eccentric axles and are interconnected with a pin through a hole, as Rediadis back in 1903 understood
correctly. The accuracy of the method of this eccentric motion is of order of
~1/400 (Gourtsoyannis, 2010).
3. a complex calendar based on three (or five) calendars
a. one solar calendar and
b. the Saros calendar
c. the Exeligmos cycle, equal to three Saros cycles
d. the Metons calendar
e. and Callippus cycle calendar.
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MOUSSAS
Specifically:
i. It has a solar calendar using Egyptian months (as today we use Roman
months).
ii. It has instructions based on the rising or setting of a given star simultaneously
with the Sun that enables the user to know the exact time (rising, setting)
and specify the day of the month and the position of the Sun in the sky.
This star rising or setting calibrates the solar calendar.
iii. It predicts the eclipses based on the lunisolar calendar based of the Saros
cycle and its triple and more accurate period of eclipses, the Exeligmos
cycle, i.e. the periods the eclipses repeat themselves.
iv. It has the 19 year cycle of Meton, and 76 years of Callippus which are
lunisolar concerning the reappearence of the Moon with a given phase
(e.g. full Moon) in the same position in the sky.
4. the oldest known Meteorological and Climatological instrument and
5. used for agricultural activities
6. an educational device. As we know from ancient texts (Cicero) such a device was
in use in the School (University) of the giant of knowledge Posidonius in
Rhodes, where Cicero studied for a period, and it was a valuable teaching device
7. an impressive and very expensive object that one could use to impress his/her
(especially a state person) friends, visitors, for (other) politicians to be afraid of
him/her, especially if they come from a prescientific society, as most people
and societies were at those times, who considered all science as magic, and
were afraid of
8. easily used to measure Geographic Latitude
9. an instrument suitable for cartography, and possibly a navigational instrument.
9. OTHER MECHANISMS
Ancient Greek and Roman literature contains several references to devices similar
to the Mechanism. It is certain that there were other similar mechanisms and
instruments in antiquity. The fact that the mechanism contains instructions for use
implies that it was not the only one made by his constructor, and that it was meant
to be used by other users except the constructor. Naturally, as one can imagine and
from that we can also infer from the ancient texts, there were simpler and some
even more complex mechanisms made of various material. Probably the inexpensive
ones were made of wood and the expensive, the royal ones, made even with gold
and ivory decorations.
The complete works of the great mathematician Archimedes and especially the
manuscript on his clock that has been saved only in Arabic (see Stamatis, 1978)
are worth reading by all mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, educators and
mainly all philosophers, as they contribute greatly to the heritage of humanity, not
only to mathematics and mechanics. There we read about his clockwork, complicated
and luxurious as it is depicted, simple in concept and in its function, immaculate
122
and impressive in appearance. It shows the time automatically, working with a

combination of gears and pulleys and running with water that moves eventually the
hour pointer.
10. AN EDUCATIONAL DEVICE FOR MODELLING
The mechanism, which is the first known mechanical Universe, is based on mathematics, the knowledge of astronomy of that time, the then known laws of nature
of Saros, Exeligmos, Metons and Callippus cycles, that enable the user to possess
calendars of great quality and to predict eclipses, and possibly to read the positions
of the planets. It is a very good example of modelling. The teacher then and now
can use it to teach scientific modelling, the notion of laws of nature, to show how
useful mathematics are, the fact that gears can be used to perform calculations, the
conception or idea to model the Universe, and then to introduce the concept of a
paradigm, using the model of the Cosmos we have in hands.
We have been using the Antikythera Mechanism as an educational device, as it
is a Great Attractor of Children to Science, Mathematics, Technology and Philosophy
(Moussas et al, 2010). We have prepared many exhibitions or contributed to some
around the theme Antikythera Mechanism, the first computer. This attracts the general
public, and especially children with parents that are always oriented for something
of pedagogical value to attract their childrens attention and for their educational
benefit. The first and very successful exhibition is the one at Childrens Museum of
Manhattan named Gods, Myths and Mortals: Discover Ancient Greece, which has
lasted almost three years, is intended to become a national touring exhibition going
around all USA. They present the worlds first computer, as they call it, to
the benefit of the children of USA. At the Childrens Museum of Manhattan the
Antikythera Mechanism is a very interesting exhibit (including several panels,
a bronze model by D. Kriaris, and several computer interactive 3D photos by
Dr Tom Malzbender of HP). I am sure that it is a very successful exhibition, as it
lasts three years, and I have been told by visitors of the museum that children, even
a few year old toddlers, have been queuing to see the mechanism and play with
the interactive images. We also have had many successful exhibitions in various
places including the Planetarium Science Center of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina,
Alexandria, Egypt, The Inauguration of the International Year of Astronomy, the
IAU Symposium 260 and Art Exhibition at UNESCO, Paris, France, the 7em Salon d
Astronomie Constantine, Algeria, the Gustavianum Museum Uppsala, Sweden,
the Olsztyn Planetarium (Copernicus Observatory) Poland, HELEXPO/DETH International Fair 2007, Thessaloniki, Greece, the Ionic Centre Athens, Greece, Titan
Meeting in CosmoCaixa Barcelona, Spain, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed
Arti, Slovac Academy of Science Astronomical Institute. The mechanism was also
exhibited in schools, the Abetian Greek School in Cairo, Egypt, the Averofian
Greek School in Alexandria, Egypt, in the island of Chios (two schools), in the
island of Skiathos, Ermioni, Gymnasium of the island of Kasos, the island of
Rhodes, Megara, Kallithea (two schools) and other places in Greece, for the benefit
of the general public, the children, and the adult learners.
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MOUSSAS
11. EXHIBITIONS OF THE MECHANISM
The Mechanism is an ideal tool for education, as it is a great attractor for the
children leading them to knowledge, and if you are interested, we can help you
in establishing an exhibition in your University, in the Planetarium or Science
Educational Center of your city, for the benefit of the children of the entire world.
Figure 4. The head of a philosopher from the Museum of Rhodes, Greece, assumed
to be of Posidonius, the great man of Rhodes consider second only to Aristotle by
many of his contemporaries. Photo by the author.
12. INTERDISCIPLINARY ASPECTS OF THE MECHANISM
The Mechanism is ideal for investigating interdisciplinarity in the sciences, as it

covers many fields of traditional disciplines, without taking into account traditional
boundaries between academic subjects, so that it helps a pupil and a student, or an
adult learner, to think in a way that crosses the borders of established fields and
have a holistic view. The student is automatically redirected to many new disciplines,
she/he has never thought off before, that might be related to her/his initial interest
on the subject. An astronomy-interested person studying the Mechanism immediately
124
finds that it has extensions in mathematics and then in physics. Then one understands that astronomy is not just nice images but also mathematics. Then one
realises that mechanics and engineering (how to cut the small gears with their
tiny teeth) and furthermore technology enter into her/his interests, as the question
concerning the construction of the mechanism enters in her/his interests. Then the
question of the material the mechanism was made of naturally follows, and then
the study of the metal, its chemical composition, why and how the gears have
harder teeth than their body, also to ask why the use a bit of lead in the composition
of the metal, and then to find out that its use leads to self lubrication. In the study
of the Mechanism history of humanity, history of Greece, of Mathematics and
Astronomy interplays with philosophy, and even with linguistics and geography
and the study of the ancient texts.
Figure 5. The Mechanism (here is part of the manual) is a very interesting 3D puzzle
(or even 4D, as the question of time enters in), that can be used to teach modeling,
paradigm, history, science, astronomy, physics, mathematics and philosophy.
Image produced by the author using Dr T. Malbenders PTM method using his
software (HP) and Photoshop. Copyright University of Athens 2010.
13. THE MECHANISM AS A PARADIGM EXAMPLE
The Mechanism is ideal for the study of the notion of paradigm in the philosophy
and history of science. The understanding of the Cosmos with time can be taught
with the mechanism put in the centre of the investigation. We start with the gods,
and then we improve greatly the model, as we move to a new paradigm introducing
125
MOUSSAS
a rotating sphere, we then add the planets, the complicated motion of the Moon, but
since the spheres of Eudoxus cannot account for the changing brightness of the
planets, and the variable speed of the Moon and the Sun and the planets, eccentric
circles are now introduced and then the epicyclical description of the Cosmos
appears on the stage. Naturally we then continue to Aristarchus, Copernicus and
Kepler that drastically change the paradigm of the Cosmos and we eventually come
to the expanding universe and to the big bang theory of the 20th century.
Another good example is the evolution of calendars, how to reconcile the
months with solar years, and finally the predictions of the eclipses. The perception
of this phenomenon evolves, since humans start at their very early stage of civilization
to predict blindly and as the historical epochs follow and the civilizations alter,
accompanied with the introduction and evolution of science, and physics especially,
they go on to predict the eclipses following the laws of nature they have at hand.
Last, but not least, comes the issue of how to predict them today, with the numerical
solutions to the problem of motion of celestial bodies, and by using celestial mechanics
and modern computer techniques.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The J.F. Costopoulos Foundation is gratefully acknowledged for generous support.

The research that leads to the analysis of computer tomographs was carried
out in collaboration with Prof. M.G. Edmunds, Prof. J. Seiradakis, Dr. T. Freeth,
Dr. H. Mangou, Ms M. Zafeiropoulou, Mr. Y. Bitsakis, Dr. A. Tselikas and the
National Archaeological Museum in Athens, Dr. N. Kaltsas, Ms R. Proskynitopoulou,
Mr. M. Makris and all the staff of the Museum, that enable us to obtain the raw
data, and for their hospitality during the weeks we have been working continuously
in the Museum. The X-ray data were gathered by a team from X-Tek Systems
(UK), now Metris (NL), led by Dr. R. Hadland, that designed a new powerful
computer tomography machine, the BladeRunner. Special thanks are due to A. Ramsey
and A. Ray, D. Gelb, Ambrisco, D. Bate, M. Allen, A. Crawley, P. Hockley. We
thank the team from Hewlett-Packard (US), led by Dr. T. Malzbender, who carried
out the surface imaging and for using his PTM excellent method for analysing the
surfaces of bodies and software. We appreciate the support of C. Reinhart of Volume
Graphics. The photos have been produced using Volume Graphics software and our
X-Tek data. Thanks are due to Dr Goran Henriksson for discussions on ancient
eclipses, Dr. Ch. Kritzas for estimating the age of the instrument based on the shape
of the letters of the manual, Prof. Giovanni Pastore for many discussions on the
Olbia Archimedes gear, Dr. Arnold Lebeuf for discussions on Meton and Saros cycles
and ancient calendars, Mr. Panos Papaspirou for critical reading and many interesting
discussions, Mr. D. Kriaris for creating several bronze models, Dr. F. Vafea and
Prof. M. Papathanassiou and Dr. Alexandra Coucouzeli for interesting long discussions on the Mechanism structure, astrolabes, and ancient texts. Thanks are due
to the University of Athens for support. Special thanks are due to Prof. Panos
Kokkotas for organizing the excellent conference at the National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens and editing this book.
126
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Xenophon Moussas
Astrophysics Laboratory, Faculty of Physics
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Panepistimiopolis, GR 15783 Zographos, Athens, Greece
mobile +30 6978792891
e-mail: xmoussas@phys.uoa.gr
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GBOR . ZEMPLN
9. HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ARGUMENTATION

IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Joining Forces?
1. THE ROOM FOR STUDYING ARGUMENTATION IN CURRICULA
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors. Although national

variations are significant, there appears to be a general trend in most national and
international curricula to stress Nature of Science (NOS) elements increasingly in
science education as well as to incorporate more and more consciously Critical
Thinking (CT) skills, and the understanding of socio-scientific issues (SSI) in the
advanced primary and the secondary school education. For all of these aims an
adequate image of science and the pivotal role argumentation plays needs to be
realised (Driver, Newton et al., 2000). For approaches with deductive orientation, it
is crucial that students acquire the ability to:
determine which of two or more proposed alternative explanations (claim) for
a puzzling observation is correct and which of the alternatives are incorrect
(Lawson, 2003, p. 1389).
Whatever view one holds about the type of argumentation, it clearly has a role in
epistemological questions concerning science education. Theory choice is but one
of the important aspects of argumentation in science education, others include the
means to generate products or answers, a useful tool to teach students to back their
claims or choices with evidence. As Sandoval and Millwood stress:
argumentation is a central practice of science and thus should be at the core
of science education. ... understanding the norms of scientific argumentation
can lead students to understand the epistemological bases of scientific
practice (Sandoval & Millwood, 2008, p. 71).
Argumentation also has social functions. After a successful science education (by
the end of high school) students are expected to be able to use criteria to distinguish
well from poor arguments. Most national curricula expect students to talk science
and write science, and even further to acquire general argumentative skills that can
be used outside the science class or even school; the ability to persuade others or to
reach an agreement with peers (Jimnez-Aleixandre, 2008, p. 97).
2. THE ROOM HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ARGUMENTATION
HAS IN CURRENT CURRICULA
Argumentation appears to be a crucial aspect of science, and, as such, also for

approaches incorporating history of science in curricula. In spite of this, at the
ZEMPLN
moment mostly desiderata are set in course and curriculum objectives, without
providing the necessary time for both history of science and argumentation in
science classes. As a recent study concludes:
Despite such efforts at the level of international policies about the science
curriculum, the systematic uptake of argumentation work in everyday science
classrooms remains minimal (Jimnez-Aleixandre & Erduran, 2008, p. 20).
This is true even of the courses that aim explicitly to develop critical thinking skills
and to teach NOS elements to students. I analysed in detail one such school-system,
the International Baccalaureate Organization (IBO), and the new compulsory Theory
of Knowledge course, launched in 1999 (Zempln, 2007). Yet the IBO is still way
ahead of most national curricula, and most countries lag behind implementing the
NOS and SSI elements into school-science.
It would be unjust to blame only the slow implementation of the specific goals.
There might be other reasons for the generally dismal results of students in comparison
to the aims set. These aims might simply be overambitious, as
Only a minority of people progress to the final, evaluative epistemology, in
which all opinions are not equal and knowing is understood as a process that
entails judgment, evaluation and argument (Zohar, 2008, p. 256).
A large percentage of students never reach many of the curricular requirements
concerning the epistemological understanding of science, even if they received
instruction concerning NOS. In my view this problem is still underestimated by
curriculum-developers, often only paying lip-service to certain goals, the teachability of which has only been demonstrated to be successful for high-ability students
(Zempln, 2007, p. 170174).
Decades of research on the cognitive development of students suggests that this
is not by chance. The desiderata most curricula set are not reachable to the large
majority of students in either the later years of primary school or in high schools.
In fact, for many, these skills only develop in the undergraduate or even postgraduate years if at all (King & Kitchener, 1994). Without explicit instruction the
success-rate is even smaller. Another factor affecting the success of curricular
development is the difficulty of designing learning environments and content. As
the causes of unsuccessful teaching interventions are underdetermined, but the
successful ones are ascribed to the curricular (often modular) development, a
bias is inherently built into any such procedure. As such, cognitive developmental
differences are not addressed in most developmental projects. From this follows
that partial success generally meaning success with high ability students is used
as positive feedback in the course-development, thereby masking the results of lowerability students. The result is that most aims are set with high-ability students in
focus (Voss, et al., 1991).
Apart from the differences in the individual cognitive capabilities of students,
a number of limiting factors also influence the efficacy of teaching, so a cursory
overview of the most important ones is in order before one can proceed.
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HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ARGUMENTATION
3. LIMITING FACTORS
3.1 Individual Cognitive Factors of Students

As has been recognized for decades, reasoning skills of students (and teachers) fall
short of enlightenment ideas it is enough to browse through the immense literature
on responses to the Wason selection task. As a result, most recent studies move
away or even drop logic as a main element of decision making, and instead focus
on a number of malleable heuristics and rules of thumb (Kahneman, Slovic et al.,
1982; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2000;
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Yet, in spite of the significant literature, most curricula
still set aims and objectives that are overoptimistic about cognitive development
of reflective thinking.
More specifically for the argumentation-skills of students, it has been found that
students
have strong confirmation biases in either selecting evidence to conform
prior hypotheses or assessing it differently (or even ignoring it), according
to whether it confirms or disconfirms prior theories, jumping to conclusions
before enough evidence is available, etc. (Garcia-Mila & Anderson, 2008,
p. 33).
In fact, students generally do not exhibit the patterns of argumentation that is often
expected of them:
students commonly advance claims without providing explicit justifications
(or warrants) ... claims are justified only when they are challenged, and even
than not always (Sandoval & Millwood, 2008, p. 72).
This is most probably connected to their naive acceptance of data and of expert
opinion. A further factor is the often unrealistically set tasks and objectives by their
teachers. While scientists are rightly expected to be both motivated to defend their
views and to think and argue critically when challenged, there is no reason to
expect the same of students, who have little direct involvement in the theories they
meet in science classes. Usually a trade-off can be observed. In case the students
are motivated, they are prone to neglect reasoned arguments. On the other hand, in
case they are encouraged to think critically, they are more able to do this when they
are personally not (or only a little) committed to the position they defend.
3.2 Social Factors in the Classroom
This takes us to the next point, the social factors influencing the argumentative
performance of learners. As has been observed numerously, students often refrain from
expressing or defending clear positions. This is easy to understand when the
psychological and sociological factors are taken into account; they usually try to
minimize the social costs of taking up well-marked positions (Billig, 1989). Why
would we commit ourselves to a high cost position, if not involved (e.g. emotionally)1?
131
ZEMPLN
That the social setting in the classroom influences the positions and arguments of
students is clear. Examples show that:
Arguments by peers may be accepted more easily or defended more robustly
according to group dynamics the impact of social relationships within a
group can have a bearing on the course of the argument (Kolsto & Ratcliffe,
2008, p. 123).
This poses a major conundrum for designing learning environments where both
commitment and good arguments can be facilitated and is an ideal entry point for
history of science and role playing in the classroom (Adriz-Bravo & Zempln,
2009). The design of suitable learning environments and the subtle influencing of
the social dynamics of the group is the teachers task but teachers skills also
present themselves as limiting factors.
3.3 Teachers Skills and Situation in the Classroom
In recent decades the literature on NOS views of teachers became substantial (Bell,
Abd-El-Khalick et al., 2001). Much less is known about the argumentation skills
and explicit knowledge of argumentation that teachers have. While science teachers
teach science, most are not practising scientists, and many have little personal
experience with scientific research. As Anat Zohar states:
I also found that teachers were not proficient with what is traditionally identified
as critical thinking skills such as identifying tautologies and assumptions. Teachers
were also often incapable of constructing arguments and counterarguments
(Zohar, 2008, p. 248).
In her research she came to the conclusion that:
teachers ... believed that teaching thinking consists of transmitting rules and
algorithms that are required for solving thinking problems. Curriculum and
learning materials rather than the student were viewed as being in the center
of learning (p. 249).
There is little reason to question these pessimistic findings. Most teachers still
believe in a diffusion model of knowledge, where content is simply to be transmitted from the teacher to the student (Gregory & Miller, 1998). But why would
teachers know so much about argumentation, when they rarely receive explicit
instruction about it? As recent studies show, teachers views about NOS are generally
seen as problematic by the research community, even though they generally receive
some explicit instruction about NOS.
The situation that teachers have in the classroom is further complicated by the
conflict of the didactic situation and an argumentative approach. I also discussed
this earlier (Zempln, 2007), but a very pointed way of stating the dilemma is
whether the teacher can be considered to take part in a rational debate in case he is
not willing to give up his position (Kolsto & Ratcliffe, 2008). As participation
in a critical discussion presupposes a willingness to change view in light of good
132
arguments (p. 120), the teacher should in principle be willing to give up his views
when challenged by strong arguments from students or he is in an eristic dialogue
that is masked as a rational debate! In a world, where students are able to gather
data in the questions they are interested in, this is a more and more pressing dilemma.
Not only internet whiz-kids and Wikipedia know-alls can create conflict of
interest between educational content goals and critical thinking or NOS goals.
Science education and NOS is still dominated by an empiricist-rationalist ideology,
where from the four traditional sources of knowledge (memory, testimony, experience,
reason) reasoning skills and sensory perception are privileged. This fits well to the
naive positivistic conceptions students have of the nature of science (Lederman,
1992), who tend to accept e.g. measurements as undisputable facts about nature.
The awkwardness of this situation becomes clear when we see multi-faceted role
authority plays in the transmission of knowledge. First, teachers themselves mostly
learnt what they know from other teachers and professors, relying on their authority,
rather than doing research themselves2. These teachers trusting their own teachers
teach that science should be based on observation and reasoning and expect their
students to accept this position. Maintaining that facts and not authorities are the
basis of science, teachers use their authorities to overrule data and measurements
when e.g. in a lab setting a result is obtained that is at odds with the theoretical
expectations.
This is of course a huge issue, and I am not the first to address it, yet it touches
on a number of problems connected to argumentation and critical thinking. First,
students are brought up in a rhetoric of fact-based science, when in fact for both
them and their teachers science is implicitly authority-based. They are thus not
instructed explicitly to assess authorities, or, in other words to decide on questions
of expertise (Collins & Evans, 2007). This skill learnt implicitly, even though the
decisions these students will make will more often be a decision to decide which
experts to trust in science-related questions, without having the resources to follow
and deciding upon the content of scientific debates.
For both the teacher and the students defending a position in class cannot be
separated from the reputation of the speaker. As most teachers aim to maintain
their authority, and most students sense this, it is especially risky to challenge the
authority of a teacher unless students are willing to risk their own reputation, or
deliberately aim to challenge that of the teacher. Therefore the choice of the
didactic situation can largely determine the extent to which the teacher, in case she
is willing to facilitate critical attitude and to develop argumentation skills of the
students, can be successful.
These issues are especially acute in the case of the now popular inquiry
learning approach. While in traditional frontal teaching, the teacher is expected to
deliver answers and also to explain (at time explain away) possible incongruous
experimental findings, in inquiry learning the students are asked to develop their
own positions. This means that they are given at least some authority to interpret their findings. Thus, when they come up with theories or hypotheses (these
concepts are generally not separated for students), the burden of proof shifts to
the teacher in case she wants to argue for a different theory. While the teacher is
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trivially the authority in a frontal teaching situation, here at least as the official
ideology goes the facts speak for themselves, and in case of bad measurements,
etc. the teacher might find it exceedingly difficult to justify his (and the textbooks)
position without reverting back to authoritarian teaching. He faces the dilemma of
letting students accept false theories, or to break the rules of the game of inquiry
learning, and to pronounce judgement on data as an expert, disqualifying one and
asserting the truth of another theory3.
Debates therefore need to be very carefully prepared and staged in a classroom to avoid the pitfalls that can hamper the performance of the students. Designing
suitable teaching environments, however, requires a more detailed discussion of
the desiderata what we take arguments to be, and how we specify the relevant
skills to be achieved.
3.4 Definitional Matters
What are arguments? Arguments are clearly not natural kinds, and what we take
to be arguments depend, to a large extent, on the choice of analytical framework.
Traditionally in science education argumentation has been taken to correspond to
logical thinking, and logical thinking to following the laws of logic: By this
generally zero or first order logic was understood but rarely explicated. Logic,
however, is a tool that determines the truth of conclusions given a certain form of
argumentation and true premises. That it is not a suitable tool to decide debated
issues has been obvious from ancient times. As in a paradoxical argument the Stoic
Zeno formulates the problem:
Against the person who said dont give your verdict until you have heard
both sides, Zeno argues as follows: the second speaker is not to be heard
whether the first speaker proved their case (for then the inquiry is at an end),
or they did not prove (for this is tantamount to their not having appeared
when summoned, or to their having responded to the summons with mere
prattle). But either they proved their case or they did not. Therefore the second
speaker is not to be heard. (Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1034 e,
quoted in Bons, 2002, p. 13).
Such reliance on logic (determining the outcome if premises and procedures are
agreed upon) does not appear just to us in a judiciary setting, and would look
equally problematic as a procedure for theory-choice in science. Yet if logic was
able to provide the clear-cut answers we want to have about nature, this would be a
trivially safe and fast procedure.
But logic alone cannot be used to decide on real-life issues, however often we
may present this as the solution in a science class. Recognizing this, most recent
authors in the field today embrace approaches to argumentation that are contextsensitive, and move away from equating argumentation with logic. In science
education somewhat surprisingly the most common framework is the Toulminmodel, based on (Toulmin, 1958). This model by the well-known philosopher of
science was inspired by legal reasoning and is a conscious move away from logic,
relocating argumentation as a field-dependent, i.e. not universal enterprise.
134
Space does not permit me to discuss in detail the shortcomings of these two
most common approaches, but both the logical and the Toulmin-model approach
fall short of providing clear and applicable criteria for evaluating arguments in a
classroom. Too much focus on logic in science classes creates an illusion of
certainty in students that is not realistic in many instances. In a logic of justification
this can be a useful tool, but in many of the socio-scientific issues (SSI) students
encounter, this image of science will not correlate to what students experience when
they see experts disagree. This logical image of science can therefore create a false
impression in students yielding disappointment in the successes of science, and
also giving a weapon in the hands of anti-scientific movements, such as creationism
(Taylor, 1996; Zempln, 2009).
As for the Toulmin model, even leading specialists in the field recognize limitations. It uses a typology the use of which is far from trivial; as Erduran states: the
main difficulty has been in the clarification of what counts as claim, data, warrant,
and backing (Erduran, 2008, p. 57). Not only are all major categories of the model
problematic, its applicability are even more so:
the Toulmin-model did not provide information concerning problem-solving
process. One could of course argue that the Toulmin analysis was not designed
for this purpose (Erduran, 2008, p. 62).
Some experts are blunter when they comment on the model extensively used, but
never developed to either analyse or to evaluate argumentative performances in
a classroom. For example Duschls own experience on the Toulmin-model is quite
devastating:
applying Toulmins argument pattern to analyze group reasoning in a history
context ... the analysis ... did not adequately distinguish signal from noise
(Duschl, 2008, p. 168).
Looking through the recent academic work in the field and in this paper I rely
extensively on the most recent volume in the area (Erduran & Jimnez-Aleixandre,
2008) one can see the problems mounting. The two most commonly used frameworks for the study of argumentation in the classroom and in science education, the
logical and the Toulmin-type approach do not live up to the expectations that
triggered exploring them in the first place.
It appears trivial that in a classroom some dialogical models of argumentation
would be more useful, like the pragma-dialectical approach (Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004), but this paper cannot take up the task of providing a detailed study of this
mostly uncharted territory. All I can do is listing some of the issues that the
choice of framework raises.
First, different approaches to argumentation take different arguments to be good
arguments at least in the cases where the approach has a normative dimension to
it. Choice of framework therefore determines which arguments are to be encouraged
and which are not in the classroom. Unfortunately many approaches to argumentation
do not have a set of normative expectations like the Toulmin model and this is
also true of most rhetorical approaches (Bazerman, 1986), describing but not setting
norms to scientific argumentation.
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Even if the models picked have a normative edge, the differences can be significant.
Some approaches are structural, and arguments will be considered good or bad
depending on their structure. The best known of these are fallacy-theories, which
are not detailed theories, but rather detailed descriptions and groupings of fallacies.
The seminal work in the field was (Hamblin, 1970), but informal logicians, especially
Woods and Walton have significantly developed these insights (Walton, 1998;
Walton, 1999). Debates in this field are common, and it appears nearly impossible to
provide clear-cut answers as to what counts as fallacious argument without recourse
to some dialogical model of argumentation see as a recent example the debate
over ad baculum fallacies (Woods, 1998; Kimball, 2006; Walton & Macagno, 2006).
Structural models of fallacies have been challenged by functional models, which
look at the functions of arguments, and judge their merits based on dialectical
norms of reasonableness or critical rationality (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987;
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). These models start with an ideal procedure for
debate-resolution, and investigate to what extent individual arguments (speech-acts
in a pragmatic model) contribute to or hinder this resolution.
Further, there are approaches that are not structural or functional, but are rather
epistemic, they attempt to judge the epistemic merit of arguments (Siegel, 1988).
It has now been recognised that such epistemic approaches can clash with the
earlier described models (Siegel & Biro, 2006), but the epistemic evaluations of
arguments is also problematic. To mention just one problem: all above approaches
if normative start from an individualistic epistemology, and consider a reasonable
consensus as an epistemically superior state in a debate. Social epistemologies,
however, might even disagree on this fundamental assumption, as is clear from
research in the cognitive division of labour, where some researchers argue, that
at least in certain cases disagreement can be an epistemically preferred status in
scientific debates (Solomon, 2001; Farrell, 2003; Sunstein, 2003; Solomon, 2006;
Solomon, 2007).
Another major but connected issue is the evaluation of expert opinion. Generally
reliance on the views of experts is often considered to be a fallacy, the so-called ad
verecundiam fallacy. This is a major problem, as the still dominant ideology of
science in science classes rejects reliance on experts, but the practice does not.
Trust in expert opinion is indispensable for science (e.g. to legitimate teachers
views) and an educational situation clearly presupposes reliance on experts, yet is
seen as problematic by many.
Apart from this theoretical problem, reliance on expertise poses a direct educational
problem to be overcome. In a class-setting, teachers often expect students to offer
warrants for the scientific theory/ hypothesis in question. But why should students
offer such warrants? As in most argumentative situations, only problematic positions
need warrants, so it is pragmatically awkward and artificial to ask students for the
support of theories that they consider unproblematic, as e.g. they are endorsed by
their teachers, are discussed in the textbooks, etc. The school-science is true science
for most of the students, and even in cases they reject parts of it (like Intelligent
Design supporters), they are not likely to believe that it is worth arguing with
teachers.
136
Not only is there no consensus in the research community on which of the above
approaches to argumentation is to be implemented in teaching and in the analysis
of the argumentative performances of students, the choreography of ideal didactic
interventions is also uncertain:
What teaching style should the teacher adopt?
How should the classroom be prepared and managed?
It appears clear that in an argumentative situation it is illusory for teachers to
think they are being neutral (Simonneux, 2008, p. 194). But whatever stance the
teacher is taking (exclusive neutrality, exclusive partiality, neutral impartiality,
committed impartiality), she should do it consciously. This, however, requires a
new approach to science education. If science teaching is supposed to include NOS,
critical thinking, and SSI, the teachers should be prepared for these tasks. At the
moment, however, professional coaching and instruction in argumentation is lacking
in the curriculum of nearly every teacher-training.
4. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
The problems above were not discussed to discourage the teaching of argumentation in classrooms. They were listed to highlight limiting factors and to point to
challenges that need to be overcome. For one, History of Science, with its own
promises and gradual acceptance in a number of science curricula can join forces
with attempts to teach argumentation.
A variety of argumentative situations including internal monologues in the
discovery process, rhetorical techniques in publications, scientific controversies
in a core group, and debates on socio-scientific issues in the public sphere can
be utilised when teaching the nature of science through what we call histories of
science. Most of these have not been studied with both aims (i.e. historical and
argumentative) in mind, so future cooperation offers a number of promises. But
some results are already suggestive and positive, and point towards the possibility
of a fruitful integration of the two approaches, when the findings of both research
communities involved are consciously taken into account.
Historical case studies offer a window of opportunity where many of the problems
listed above can be overcome. Case studies and the debates about them offer the
students playful possibilities to take up and defend positions which they do not
have to maintain after the debate is over, thus minimizing the social risks involved
for students4.
Also, role-play appears to be one of the best ways to achieve both desiderata
discussed in 3.1, and yield both commitments to a position and attention to use
good argumentation in a debate. In fact, in one researchers experience role-play
was the first [of all the studies] in which changes of opinion were observed
(Simonneux, 2008, p. 185).
To undergo conceptual change and discard older views in light of good arguments
instead of passively appropriating new knowledge has long been the aim of science
education. That this can be brought about employing two recent trends to reform
science education, argumentative approaches and approaches to include history of
137
ZEMPLN
science in the curriculum is a strong argument in favour of both approaches. Much

wished for by experts in education, science, and history of science alike (Goody,
Lynch et al., 2008), a collaboration of the two fields can bring about an increased
awareness of the problems and an increased efficacy of the implementation, to
the benefit of both argumentation-studies and historians of science as well as of the
students. Whether these students will become future scientists or members of the
general public, their skills in argumentation will be important in their lives and as
historical case studies appear to be ideal to transmit these skills, hopefully both
history of science and argumentation will be welcome additional approaches
helping the science teacher.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Panos Kokkotas for his continuing support and help, organizing a wonderful conference in Athens in 2008, and fruitfully coordinating an international
cooperation of researchers. I am also indebted to the insightful discussions with
Agustn Adriz-Bravo, Dietmar Httecke, Cibelle Celestino Silva, and Fanny Seroglou.
This article was prepared during my Jnos Bolyai postdoctoral scholarship. I received
support from the OTKA 72598 and the HIPST EU 7th framework programme
project (SiS-2007-2.2.1.2). The project outlined here is similar in many respects
to Kokkotas more empirical work with primary school students [Malamitsa, A.,
Kasoutas, M., & Kokkotas, P. (2009). Developing Greek Primary School Students
Critical Thinking through an Approach of Teaching Science which Incorporates
Aspects of History of Science. Science & Education, 18(34), 457468.].
NOTES
1
2
But if we are emotionally involved, we often engage in an eristic dialogue and so do the students.
Even todays researchers have to rely much more on authority and are more epistemically dependant
from others (Hardwig, 1985) than was previously believed.
None of these options are ideal the first followed by some alternative teaching methods, like Waldorf
schools, the second more typical of traditional science education.
Douglas Allchin has developed exemplary case studies ready for classroom use. One collects materials
for the replay of Galileos trial (http://www1.umn.edu/ships/galileo/profile.htm), another for Rachel
Carsons Silent Spring (http://www1.umn.edu/ships/pesticides/index.htm) These have been developed
for teacher training, but some of the texts also appear in secondary schools: http://www.duval
schools.org/rhs/Website%20Documents/2008_2009/Teacher_Syllibi/Kelley_ToK.pdf
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Gbor . Zempln
Department for Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of
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e-mail: zemplen@filozofia.bme.hu
140
ANTONI ROCA-ROSELL
10. INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE
The Catalan Experience
1. HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND SCIENCE EDUCATION - GENERAL REMARKS
The complexity of teaching demands the discussion of different resources. As

professor John Heilbron said, teaching may be one of the main applications of
History of Science1. This subject offers a number of possibilities for science education,
as well as a general background in scientific knowledge (Olesko, 2006).
First, it offers the opportunity to discuss the process of acquisition of knowledge
by avoiding the stereotypes resulting from the vulgarisation of philosophy of science.
Some interpretations of the so-called scientific method still exert a considerable
influence on teachers (and on the public opinion). New insights into the process of
discovery, diffusion, and appropriation of science and technology are necessary
(McComas, 2008). In this regard, works such as John Pickstones Ways of Knowing
are welcome (Pickstone, 2000).
Second, history of science offers a collective vision of scientific activity, enabling
us to give up a heroic vision of history of science, exclusively based on great
scientists. The history of great men has a wide appeal given that personal stories
usually arouse more curiosity. It is not necessary for Historiography to renounce the
study of great scientists and engineers. Rather individual achievements should be match
with collective ones. This will lead to a deeper understanding of scientific activity.
Third, case studies open up new guidelines for teaching in many subjects. For
example, the study of historical conceptual difficulties, such as the introduction of
number zero, could assist in the introduction of this concept in the classroom. Another
example would be the use of old demonstrations particularly in the case of geometry
that could be useful in classes today.
Fourth, science and technology have a local context, without which it is not
possible to gain a true understanding of these subjects. In the current historiography,
there are different perspectives for studying these local contexts. George Basalla
proposed a rough model for the spread of western science, in which he included
imperial and colonial sciences (Basalla, 1967). His proposal generated a number of
studies in this field. Social history of science has lent a new value to local achievements in which it is possible to study the social aspects of science and technology.
In Spain, the school founded by Professor Lpez Piero was devoted to studying
the Scientific Revolution in Spain. In order to enlarge the social analysis of science
ROCA-ROSELL
and technology Lpez Piero and his collaborators (such as Vctor Navarro and
Eugenio Portela) proposed the concept of cultivators of science, and, continuing
with the agricultural metaphor, the idea of acclimatizing science and technology,
i.e. the process of understanding and use of international science and technology in
a particular context. These proposals have been extraordinarily useful in studies on
Spanish scientific activity2.
Fifth, according to the Bologna declaration on the European Space for Higher
Education, the multidisciplinary, transversal objectives of university education would
be fully met by history of science. The incorporation of history of science into
the new degrees and masters will depend on the recognition of the discipline in the
university system. In Spain, we are endeavouring to convince the teachers and
university authorities that history of science deserves a central place.
It should be noted that not all arguments favour the use of history of science in
science education. In this regard, one should not forget what Martin Klein said
about the organization of courses of physics strongly structured on a historical
basis, such as the course of Holton-Brush3. I think that these arguments have been
superseded. We are now adopting a more balanced approach to the use of history
of science that should be a complementary tool for an improved science education.
At the same time, special courses on history of science continue to play an important
role, mainly in higher levels of education.
2. THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE EDUCATION IN EARLY HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF SCIENCE IN CATALONIA - THE CONTRIBUTION OF
ANTONI QUINTANA-MAR
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors Spain joined the international movement for history of science in the first decades of the XX century (RocaRosell, 1993). Soon after the creation of the Acadmie Internationale dHistoire des
Sciences, the Spanish Group was established. At that time, the policy of the Acadmie
was not only to appoint members but also to obtain support from groups that were
active in many countries. The Acadmie was strongly influenced by Aldo Mieli,
whose initiative was received with scepticism, but finally accepted by the international
community of historians of science, including Hlne Metzger, George Sarton,
Charles Singer and others4. The Spanish Group of the Acadmie was constituted in
1931. Most of its members belonged to the speciality of Arabism, studying the AlAndalus heritage. Mieli had such a passion for Spanish culture that he used to spend
his summer holidays in Spain. On these occasions, he was able to meet scholars who
had links to history of science. One of these was the young Antoni Quintana-Mar
(Tarragona 1907 - Barcelona 1998) (Roca Rosell & Nieto Galan, 2000). QuintanaMar was engaged in the preservation of heritage of the Antoni Mart-Franqus (1750
1832), a Catalan chemist of the Enlightenment. In 1932 Quintana-Mar organised an
exhibition in Tarragona to commemorate the centenary of the death of Mart, and in
1935 he edited Marts main papers, which included a complete biography as an
introduction. In 1933 Quintana-Mar joined the Spanish Group of the Acadmie.
After a grave crisis in 1934, the Spanish Group was dissolved by Aldo Mieli, the
secretary general of the Acadmie. Shortly afterwards, the Acadmie recognised the
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INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE EDUCATION
Catalan Section, whose secretary was Antoni Quintana-Mar. At that time, QuintanaMar had obtained his degree to be a primary school teacher while simultaneously
studying chemistry. He also joined the Department of Pedagogy at the University
of Barcelona, which was supervised by Jaume Serra-Hnter. Quintana-Mar
published a paper on the pedagogical values of History of Science in Archeion, the
journal of the Acadmie. He also gave a seminar on this subject, the manuscript of
which is preserved in his personal archive.
His paper in Archeion (1935) was entitled Valor de la Historia de la Ciencia
como medio de Educacin Integral y Especfica del Individuo [Value of History
of Science as a means of integral and specific education of the individual] (QuintanaMar, 1935). Quintana-Mar begins by stating that science constitutes the main value
of our culture. He alludes to the notions of George Sarton and Max Scheler and
follows the theory of education of the German philosopher Eduard Spranger. For
Quintana-Mar, scientific value is the synthesis of social values. He remarks that
science and philosophical thinking are closely linked and, in the words of Auguste
Comte, history of science is the highest phase of human thought. History of
Science is therefore, the true history of culture.
According George Sarton, History of Science has three central values: scientific
value, psycho-sociological value and pedagogical value. History of Science, after
Otswald, provides us with hypothesis, results, and errors committed in history. The
knowledge of all these elements is crucial for research today.
The psychological and sociological characteristics of individuals also play a major
role in the creation of the intellectual aristocracy of science.
Quintana-Mar devotes the rest of the paper to the pedagogical value of History
of Science. He says that It is impossible to conceive of an integral man if he has
renounced history of science in his education. Despite the fact that there are some
difficulties in characterizing the educational uses of history of science, for QuintanaMar it was opportune and imperative to introduce history of science at all levels
of education, from primary school to the university degree.
First of all, Quintana-Mar asks himself at what age history of science should be
introduced. Second, he suggests the syllabus should be extended at each level.
Third, he asks himself whether history of science should be considered alone or in
the context of Comtes General History. Fourth, he suggests that history of science
should be a separate course in certain cases, but that it should form part of another
subject in other cases. Fifth, he asks himself which parts of History of Science
would contribute most to an integral education.
Quintana-Mar answers these questions as follows. He suggests that history of
science could be introduced in the primary school in the form of stories and anecdotes
to stimulate the imagination of children. Nevertheless, Quintana-Mar considered
that teachers lacked material support at this level. At the secondary school level,
although story telling should be continued, History of Science should be introduced
as something that is alive in all the subjects. In addition, a special course on History
of Science should be introduced at this level. According to Quintana-Mar, the
study of biographies of scientists and original sources should be encouraged. He
also considered the possibility of repeating historical experiments.
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ROCA-ROSELL
As for university degrees, Quintana-Mar considers that each Science Faculty

should incorporate the history of its subject into the syllabus. He believed that the
university degrees were excessively synthetic and hence unsatisfactory for the students
endowed with a research spirit. Quintana-Mar also suggests that the teachers
should receive some training in history of science.
According to him, there were enough textbooks to support teaching at the
secondary and university levels. He only mentions the relative lack of edited versions
of original sources.
Quintana-Mar ended his paper by reminding us that his proposals were in the
same line as those of the foremost historians of science of his time: George Sarton,
Aldo Mieli, Gino Loria, Arnold Reymond and Hlne Metzger.
In 19331935, Quintana-Mar gave a seminar in the Department of Pedagogy of
the University of Barcelona. This seminar could be the origin of a long manuscript
the title of which Historia de la ciencia 1932/1935 [History of Science 1932/1935]
could be added later5. I met Quintana-Mar in 1985, but unfortunately he had no
recollection of this text. Nevertheless, the structure of the text is similar to the paper
in Archeion, but more complete (more than 150 pages). Most of the bibliographical
references were dated before 1935, but there are some from 1942. It is possible that
he continued to work on the manuscript at that time.
In March 1934, the Catalan Section of the Acadmie Internationale dHistoire
des Sciences was set up in Barcelona. There was a public session in which most
of the Catalan historians of science, presided over by Josep M. Mills Vallicrosa,
participated6. In a notebook of Quintana-Mar7, who became the secretary of the
Section, we can find his proposals for the creation of a chair of History of Science,
for the edition of a series of classics of science, etc. All these projects were interrupted
by the Spanish Civil War (19361939), after which Quintana-Mar was unable to
continue his work on history of science. He completed his degree in Chemistry and
subsequently introduced cerealistic chemistry in Spain.
Before obtaining his degree in Chemistry, Quintana-Mar taught physics and
chemistry at secondary schools. This gave him the opportunity to apply some of
his theoretical proposals on the use of history of science in science education. He
prepared a series of problems based on historical references. Despite this long
interval, this is still a valuable series that provides evidence of the integration of
history of science in science education. We have assembled the pdf of the sheets
containing the problems and have distributed them to the participants of the 2007
Catalan workshop on History of Science and Education, during which the centenary
of the birth of Quintana-Mar was commemorated.
3. HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TEACHING IN THE 1980S THE CONGRESS OF VALENCIA
Although the experience of Quintana in the 1930s was remarkable, it was not an
exception. The notion that science education could have a historical perspective or
be a historical complement was present in the scientific community in Spain. This
notion continues to be alive several decades later.
144
One of the subsequent manifestations of this perception was a meeting

organised in 1980 in Valencia, the main subject of which was the study of History
of Science and Teaching. The meeting was promoted by the Spanish Society for
the History of Science, the Department of History of Science, the Institute for
Sciences of Education and the University of Valencia (Navarro-Brotons, 1980).
The meeting took place at an interesting time, during the Spanish Transition to
democracy. The promoters declared history of science should play a more prominent
part in the reforms of the university and secondary schools. The proceedings of the
meeting feature most of the advocates of the application of History of Science and
technology to science education in Spain in the subsequent decades. The meeting
was divided in four sections:
First, history of science at the primary and secondary school levels
Second, history of physics, mathematics, and technology and the teaching of
these subjects
Third, history of chemistry, biology, medicine, and pharmacy
Fourth, history of philosophy, history, geography and human sciences.
Professor Thomas F. Glick delivered a lecture on the history of the environment,
then a new discipline. The volume ends with a bibliography on history of science
and education.
It could be said that the meeting in Valencia in 1980 was the first public
manifestation (after the Franco dictatorship) of the belief that history of science should
be incorporated into science education.
4. THE CASE OF THE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING OF
BARCELONA - THE EXPERIMENTAL PLANNING OF 1987
AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors The introduction of

History of Science in engineering education in the School of Industrial Engineering
of Barcelona resulted from the commemoration in 1976 of the 125th anniversary of
the foundation of the School. A congress on History of Science was organized and
a conclusion was reached: to introduce a course of History of Science in the new
syllabus of the School (Camn et al., 1978). For two years, a group of teachers
prepared a general course on History of Science for the new syllabus. However, the
plan ran into difficulties and was postponed until 1986. In this year, the initial
group underwent a change in composition as well in their orientation. It was
decided that students should have to study not only a general course of history
of science but also specific topics. For the academic year 19871988, a core
curriculum plus a number of options was prepared. All the students followed
a course on the Scientific Revolution that constituted a foundation course8. This
course was complemented by other short courses on more specific matters, such as
Greek science, Engineering in Catalonia and Spain, the Industrial Revolution, the
Steam Engine or Navigation, subjects on which some of the teachers were working
at the time.
This structure of course made up of different subjects (with the common theme
of the Scientific Revolution) formed part of an experimental syllabus until 1991.
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ROCA-ROSELL
In this year, History of Science changed from being a compulsory subject in the
first course (there were more than 600 students) to an optional subject in the
second course (less than 100). In the subsequent years, history of science was
imparted in separate courses. At the same time, some of these courses were taught
in other schools of the University.
In the engineering schools of Barcelona as at many other centres in Spain there
was the feeling that technical education lacked a humanistic and social perspective.
Engineers were working in a complex world, where they had to face up to a variety of
political, social and environmental challenges. To reinforce this aspect of education,
history of science and technology was perceived as a means to delve into the relationships between science, technology and society from a rigorous point of view: the
historical analysis. And this experience would be more useful if the analysis included
the profession to which the students were seeking entry (Lusa-Monforte, 1995).
The Group to which I belong offers a number of courses at five centres of
the Polytechnical University of Catalonia. These courses have a different level of
specialization. In the School of Industrial Engineering of Barcelona, we teach a
course on History of this speciality of engineering in Spain. We also teach courses
on History of Mathematics, History of Technology, Technology in Ancient China,
Engineering at the Renaissance, the Origins of Modern Science in the Scientific
Revolution, History of Aeronautics, and Einstein and his impact on Science in
Spain. These courses correspond to a number of research fields of our group9.
We are currently preparing a postgraduate course on Scientific, Technical, and
Industrial Heritage in Catalonia which has been an industrialized region since early
XVIII century. In the last 20 years, most of the industries created in the XIX and
early XX centuries have become obsolete. A large proportion of the buildings and
machinery, however, are looked after by local museums. Many of these museums
have links to the central Museum, in Terrassa, near Barcelona, constituting a network
of technical and industrial museums10. This network is regarded as an ecomuseum,
i.e. it allows us to know the industrial heritage in situ, generating a new source of
income from cultural or industrial tourism (Roca-Rosell, 2003).
Thus, we plan to organize this postgraduate course in 2009, probably in
September11. The course will consist of 80 hours over two weeks combining
theoretical lessons on history of technology, history of the scientific, technical and
industrial heritage in Catalonia with visits to sites in Barcelona and in other parts of
Catalonia. The course would be linked to the Erasmus Mundus organized by the
University Panthon-Sorbonne Paris I, and the universities of vora and Padova12.
5. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA MASTER STUDIES IN HISTORY OF SCIENCE
Since 2006, the Autonomous University of Barcelona has offered an official master
in history of science13. It is the continuation of a doctoral programme that has
achieved academic recognition in Spain known as quality doctorate. The master
is organised in accordance with the Bologna programme. The master consists of
two parts: first, an introduction to historiography of science and, second, six optional
courses: History of Medicine, two courses on History of Medieval Sciences, History
146
of Psychology, Science and its public, and Contemporary Science and Society. The
master would be obtained in two years and is oriented to research. The Autonomous
University is the coordinating centre of the master, in which the University of
Barcelona and the department of History of Science of the Higher Council for
Scientific Research participate.
It should be noted that this is the first time that a university degree in history of
science has been established in Spain.
6. TEACHING AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN THE CATALAN SOCIETY
FOR THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Catalan Society for the History of Science and Technology was set up in 199114.
Since its beginnings, its members (more than half of them) have been teachers from
secondary and primary schools. Other members are university teachers, researchers,
personnel of science museums and persons engaged in the promotion and public
understanding of science. Ten per cent of the 275 members are full time researchers
on history of science and technology.
The importance of primary and secondary teaching is reflected in the special
workshops dedicated to the relationship between history of science and technology
and education. Although the first workshop took place in 2003, a number of
communications on this subject have been presented at the general meetings of the
Society (Trobada) since 199115.
The workshops devoted to history of science and science education have been
held every year, every two years as a section of the general meeting Trobada.
The works presented fall in two categories: 1) studies on the history of science
education; 2) application of history of science to science education. In the former
case, most of the studies concerned the study of textbooks and scientific
instruments. Textbooks bear witness to the daily activity of science education. If it
were possible to compare these textbooks with the handwritten notes of students or
teachers, the results would be more revealing. As regards scientific instruments, in
the last decades there has been a process of recovering this important heritage which
used to be underestimated. At present, some collections are kept in the Catalan
National Museum of Science and Technology (Museu de la Cincia i de la Tcnica
de Catalunya, 2006), but there are a number of other initiatives, for example at the
University of Barcelona, which is currently preparing its own museum of instruments,
or at the School of Industrial Engineering of Barcelona, which also has a project of
Museum of Catalan Engineering16. In addition, three years ago, in another project
of recovery of their scientific heritage, an exhibition in Valencia presented the
collections of the University and of some secondary schools. For this exhibition, a
catalogue featuring the work of researchers in Valencia was issued (Bertomeu
Snchez, & Garca Belmar, 2002).
In the second case, history of science is used to improve science education. The
idea continues to be that history is a good reference to stimulate learning. It is
possible to use old processes or old mathematical demonstrations as activities in
the classroom. There are several active groups investigating in Chemistry and Mathematics (Massa Esteve, 2003).
147
ROCA-ROSELL
The autonomous government of Catalonia is currently preparing a reform of

primary and secondary education. There is a new subject on Science and Society,
but it has also been decided that science education should incorporate history. For
the teaching of Mathematics, for example, it is mentioned that historical cases should
be used. Members of the Society and of the association of teachers of mathematics
are contributing to the preparation of these historical cases.
This new situation demands the inclusion of history of science in teacher training
courses. In this sense, members of the Society are currently preparing an on-line
course for teachers17.
7. CONCLUSION
In the last decades, history of science has played an important role in the reform of
science education. Many teachers have contributed their experience and the results
of their research to the new syllabus. However, the educational authorities in Spain
have been slow to incorporate these contributions.
At the university, the situation is similar. Some university teachers devote their free
time on history of science. Some courses have been incorporated into the university
degrees. Nevertheless, the university system in Spain is currently debating the new
European Space of University Education. We have to await the results of this new
process. One does not know at this stage if history of science will be recognised and
will play an important role in the new organization of university degrees. For the time
being, an official master in history of science is available in Barcelona.
The Catalan Society for the History of Science and Technology promotes the
study on the relationship between history of science and science education. In fact,
the Society seeks to recover the pioneer sprit of Quintana-Mar, who had already
planned to incorporate history of science into science education more than seventy
years ago. His plans were interrupted by the Spanish Civil war and the imposition
of a military dictatorship.
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Heilbron (1987). See also Gooday et al. (2008).

Lpez Piero (1979); Lpez Piero et al. (1983).
Klein (1972); Brush (1974); Holton, (1952 [1973]).
On Mieli and the origins of historiography of science, see Fox (2006).
The manuscript belongs to the archive of the Quintana-Mars family. We would express our gratitude
for their generosity given facilities for consulting and copying this material.
On Josep M. Mills Vallicrosa, see Glick (1977) & Roca-Rosell (2003).
Archive of Quintana-Mars family, Barcelona.
See for example: Grup dHistria de la Cincia i de la Tcnica (1988).
See: Centre de Recerca per a la Histria de la Tcnica, Assignatures in http://www.upc.edu/cutc
See: http://www.mnactec.cat/
The information will appear in http://www.upc.edu/cutc
For information about this course, see: http://www.tpti.eu
See: Master on History of Science: Science, History and Society in http://einstein.uab.es/suab237w/
eng/default.htm
See: http://schct.iec.cat
148

15
16
17
Two separate volumes have been published: Grap Vilumara. & Massa-Esteve (coords) (2005); Grap
Vilumara & Massa-Esteve (coords) (2007).
For the inventory of the collection of the School of Industrial Engineering of Barcelona, see Centre
de Recerca per a la Histria de la Tcnica, patrimoni histric in http://www.upc.edu/cutc
The course is prepared by the commission devoted to History of Science and Science Education of
the Society.
REFERENCES
Basalla, G. (1967). The spread of western science. Science, 156(3775), 611622. Reprinted in W. K. Storey
(Ed.), 1996. Scientific aspects of European expansion. Aldershot, Eng: Variorum.
Bertomeu Snchez, J. R., & Garca Belmar, A. (Eds.), (2002). Obrint les caixes negres. Collecci
dinstruments cientfics de la Universitat de Valncia. Valncia: Universitat de Valncia.
Brush, S. G. (1974). Should the History of Science Be Rated X? Science, 183, 11641172.
Camn, L., et al. (1978). Jornadas de Historia y Filosofa de las ciencias y las tcnicas. CXXV aniversario
de la Escuela de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona (18511976). Barcelona: CPDA-ETSEIB.
Fox, R. (2006). Fashioning the discipline: History of science in the European intellectual tradition. Minerva,
44, 410432.
Glick, T. F. (1977). Jos Mara Mills Vallicrosa (18971970) and the founding of the history of science in
Spain. Isis, 68, 276283.
Gooday, G., Graeme Gooday, John M. Lynch, Kenneth G. Wilson, and Constance K. Barsky (2008).
Does science education need the history of science? Isis, 99(2), 322330.
Grap Vilumara, P., & Massa Esteve, M. R. (coords.) (2005). Actes de la I Jornada sobre la Histria de
la Cincia i lEnsenyament Antoni Quintana Mar. Barcelona: Societat Catalana dHistria de la Cincia
i de la Tcnica.
Grap Vilumara, P., & Massa Esteve, M. R. (coords.) (2007). Actes de la II Jornada sobre la Histria de
la Cincia i lEnsenyament Antoni Quintana Mar. Barcelona: Societat Catalana dHistria de la
Cincia i de la Tcnica.
Grup dHistria de la Cincia i de la Tcnica (ETSEIB-UPC). (1988). Programa del curs 1988/1989.
Barcelona: CPDA-ETSEIB.
Heilbron, J. L. (1987). Applied history of science. Isis, 78, 552563.
Holton, G. (1952 [1973]). Introduction to concepts and theories in physical science. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley. Second Edition, revised and with new material by Stephen G. Brush. There is an
Spanish translation of this Edition.
Klein, M. J. (1972). The use and abuse of historical teaching in physics. In S. G. Brush & A. L. King,
(Ed.), History in the teaching of physics: Proceedings of the international working seminar on the
role of the history of physics in physics education. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
Lpez Piero, J. M. (1979). Ciencia y tcnica en la sociedad espaola de los siglos XVI y XVII.
Barcelona: Labor.
Lpez Piero, J. M., Glick, T. F., Navarro Brotons, V., & Portela, E. (Ed.), (1983). Diccionario histrico
de la ciencia moderna en Espaa (2 Vols.). Pennsula, Barcelona.
Lusa Monforte, G. (1995). Mantener vivo el asombro, revivir la admiracin, impulsar el progreso.
http://www.upc.edu/cutc/docs/Mantener vivo el asombro.pdf.
Massa Esteve, M. R. (2003, December). Aportacions de la Histria de la Matemtica a lensenyament de la
matemtica. Biaix, 21, 49.
McComas, W. F. (2008). Seeking historical examples to illustrate key aspects of the nature of science.
Museu de la Cincia i de la Tcnica de Catalunya. (2006). El Laboratori de Fsica Experimental
Mentora Alsina. Guia de lexposici. Barcelona: Mnactec.
Navarro-Brotons, V. (Ed.), (1980). Actas del Simposio: La Historia de las Ciencias y la Enseanza.
Sociedad Espaola de Historia de las Ciencias. Valencia: Instituto de Ciencias de la Educacin,
Universidad Literaria de Valencia.
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Olesko, K. M. (2006). Science pedagogy as a category of historical analysis: Past, present, and future.
Pickstone, J. V. (2000). Ways of knowing: A new history of science, technology and medicine. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Quintana-Mar, A. (1935). Valor de la Historia de la Ciencia como medio de Educacin Integral y
Especfica del Individuo. Archeion, XVII, 218223.
Roca-Rosell, A. (1991). El caso del Congreso Internacional de 1934: Guerra entre historiadores de la
ciencia. In M. Valera & C. Lpez Fernndez (Eds.), Actas del V Congreso de la Sociedad Espaola
de Historia de las Ciencias y de las Tcnicas (Vol. II, pp. 1.0661.084). Mrcia-Barcelona: DM-PPU.
Roca-Rosell, A. (1993). Una perspectiva de la historiografia de la cincia i de la tcnica a Catalunya. In
V. Navarro, V. L. Salavert, M. Corell, E. Moreno, & V. Rossell (coords.), II Trobades de la Societat
Catalana dHistria de la Cincia i de la Tcnica (pp. 1326). Barcelona: Societat Catalana dHistria
de la Cincia i de la Tcnica.
Roca-Rosell, A. (2003). Mills i Vallicrosa, Josep Maria. In A. Simon Tarrs (dir.) Diccionari
dHistoriografia Catalana (pp. 809811). Barcelona: Enciclopdia Catalana.
Roca-Rosell, A. (2003). Muses, technique et identit cuturelle. Alliage, 5051, 151164.
Roca-Rosell, A., & Nieto Galan, A. (2000). Antoni Quintana i Mar (19071998) i la fundaci duna
escola catalana dhistria de la cincia. In J. Batll Ortiz, P. De La Fuente Collell, & R. Puig Aguilar,
(coords.), V Trobades dHistria de la Cincia i de la Tcnica (pp. 473483). Barcelona: Societat
Catalana dHistria de la Cincia i de la Tcnica.
Antoni Roca-Rosell
Polytechnic University of Catalonia
Catalan Society for the History of Science and Technology
150
SECTION B: PRAXIS
ARTHUR STINNER
11. TEACHING MODERN PHYSICS, USING

SELECTED NOBEL LECTURES
1. INTRODUCTION
Some years ago I realized that what I can do as a University educator preparing
students who are planning to become physics teachers is to build on their undergraduate knowledge of modern physics using an unconventional approach. I decided
to give them some enthusiasm and self confidence for the teaching of the ideas and
the concepts of modern physics, using a selected number of appropriate Nobel
lectures. Based on my prior experience, I was convinced that the conventional
approach revisiting the main ideas of modern physics using a textbook would only
lead to boredom.
Using seminal papers of the great physicists of the past to teach physics is
notoriously difficult. Papers by the Nobel laureates chosen that contributed to the
work on which the Nobel Prize was awarded are generally inaccessible to students.
However, there are many Nobel lectures that are accessible and can be fruitfully
studied by students.
What follow is a brief description and a rationale of the course I present to
physics teacher candidates at the University of Manitoba. The paper also containes
a shortened version of a handout produced by one of my students (in consultation
with the instructor) based on the work of J. J. Thomson, as reported in his Nobel
lecture.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENTATION
I always begin my classes with a quotation by G. P. Thomson, the son of

J. J. Thomson, taken from his Nobel lecture:
The goddess of learning is fabled to have sprung full-grown from the brain of
Zeus, but it is seldom that a scientific conception is born in its final form, or
owns a single parent. More often it is a product of a series of minds, each in
turn modifying the ideas of those that came before, and providing material for
those that came after. The electron is no exception.
I then emphasize that the Nobel lectures chosen must illustrate the interconnectidness
of ideas and the dependence of new work on earlier achievements, as described in
the statement (Nobel lectures chosen, with a shortened version of the citation
given, are shown in the Block).
STINNER
A note of explanation must be added here. Roentgen did not give an acceptance
speech and Einsteins Nobel lecture (given a year later) was not based on the work
for which he was awarded the prize (photoelectric effect). For Roentgen, my students
read relevant articles taken from the special edition of History of Physics, an
AAPT publication. The Einstein acceptance speech is based on his two theories of
relativity, and is generally inaccessible to students. Here I made an exception,
and I ask my students to read the first part of his ultimately revolutionary 1905
paper on relativity. Finally, Rutherford received his Nobel Prize in chemistry,
much to his annoyance, and the second Nobel Prize of Madame Curie was also in
chemistry.
The following is a shortened version of a students summary of the work of
J. J. Thomson. This report is handed out after the PP (Power Point) presentation by
the student-presenter, to be discussed in detail in the following session. Of course,
appropriate diagrams and pictures are contained in the PP presentation, which are
also handed out to the students.
3. CARRIERS OF NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY
Thomson begins his lecture by reviewing the experiments by Crookes to show that
cathode rays travel in straight lines. These rays were found to be absorbed by a
thin plate of mica. Two views were prevalent in 1897: one, held by English physicists,
that the rays are negatively electrified bodies, shot off the cathode with great velocity,
and the other, supported by German physicists, that these rays are vibrations in the
ether.
The arguments in favour of the rays being negatively charged particles were:
they are deflected by electric and magnetic fields, as we expect moving charges
to behave, and they can be confined in a vessel to give up their negative
charges.
If the electric field E and the magnetic field B are so arranged that the forces
cancel we have:
Bev = Ee
Therefore:
v = E/B
where B is the magnetic field, e the charge on the negative particle, v is the
velocity of the particle (in the horizontal direction) and e the electric charge of the
particle.
We can now determine the velocity of the particles. It turns out that the velocity
can be as high as 1/3 the velocity of light, or about 60,000 miles per second.
Having found the velocity of the rays, we can determine the e/m ratio of the
particle. When the particles find themselves in a constant electric field they
experience a constant force. The physics here is like that of a bullet projected
154
TEACHING MODERN PHYSICS
horizontally with a velocity v and being acted upon by a gravitational force. It is

easy to show that the displacement of the particle will be given by:
d = Ee l2/mv2
where l is the horizontal length, m the mass of the particle.
We can now find the displacement d and then calculate the e/m ratio of the particle:
e/m = V/B2l2
Thomson expressed this as:
e/m = V/B2ld
where
= d/l
This ratio seems to be independent of the velocity as well as the kind of electrodes
we use!
The value for e/m found was about 1.7x107 as measured in the cgs system of
units. The value of this ratio found for atoms of hydrogen was only about 104.
Therefore, this ratio for the corpuscle associated with cathode rays is about 1700
times larger. The conclusion Thomson reached was that the mass of the corpuscle
was about 1/1700 that of the hydrogen atom.
There are many sources of cathode rays: metals heated to a high temperature,
and any substance when heated gives out corpuscles to some degree; sodium and
potassium give off negative corpuscles even when cold and exposed to light. Radioactive materials (uranium and radium) emit them continuously and at very high
velocities.
Thomson goes on to describe how the newly discovered Wilson cloud chamber
has assisted physicists to show those properties described above. He also discusses
a first attempt to find the charge on these particles using Stokes law. He then
estimates the charge on a particle to be about 3.0x10-10 electrostatic units, or about
10-20 electromagnetic units.
Since we know the charge to mass ratio, we can now estimate the mass of the
negatively charged particle. This mass turns out to be about 6x10-28 g.
The conclusion then is that in all known cases in which negative electricity
occurs in gases at very low pressures, it occurs in the form of corpuscles, small
bodies with an invariable charge and mass.
4. QUESTIONS BASED ON THE NOBEL LECTURE BY J.J. THOMSON
1. In what year did J.J. Thomson discover his negatively charged corpuscle, we
now call electron?
2. What were the two hypotheses about what cathode rays are initially?
155
STINNER
3. What were the main arguments in favour of the particle theory of cathode rays?
4. What were the two main conclusions about the particle that was discovered?
5. What physical arrangement allowed the calculation of the velocity of the
particle?
6. About how fast did these particles move?
7. What are some of the sources of these particles?
8. How was the Wilson cloud chamber used to find the charge of the particles?
9. How did Thomson estimate the mass of the particle?
10. Thomson concludes his lecture by stating that:
In all known cases in which electricity occurs in gases at very low pressures,
it occurs in the form of corpuscles, small bodies with an invariable charge
and mass. The case is entirely different with positive electricity.
What did he mean?
Main concepts: Electric field, magnetic field, electric charge, force, potential
difference, kinetic energy.
Relevant Articles: The discovery of the electron: a centenary, by Leif Gerward,
Physics Education, and J. J. Thomson, The Electron, and Atomic Structure, by
Helge Kragh, The Physics Teacher, Sept. 1997.
5. QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
1. How do physicists produce a constant electric field? A constant magnetic field?

Explain.
2. Who first suggested the name of electron for Thomsons electric corpuscle?
When was this suggested?
3. What were the arguments and evidence for believing that cathode rays are
negatively charged particles?
4. Describe how Thomson set up his apparatus and explain how he found the e/m
ratio of the electron?
5. How did Thomson estimate the charge on the electron?
6. In our experiment, we used a 2000 V potential difference for both the plate voltage
and the anode voltage. The coil had 320 turns, and its diameter was 15 cm. The
plate separation was 5.0 cm, and the length of the plate 7.0 cm. The ammeter
reading of the current was 1.0 Amps. Using the method of Thomson, calculate
the e/m ratio, based on these figures.
6. COMPARISON WITH A TYPICAL CONTEMPORARY
TEXTBOOK PRESENTATION
1. Read the textbook presentation of J.J. Thomson experiment and compare the
content with the historical description, taken directly from the Nobel lecture.
Comment.
2. Here is one of the questions in the text: Electrons move with through a 6.0x10-2T
magnetic field balanced by a 3.0x103N/C electric field. What is the speed of
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the electrons? What assumptions does the author make about students conceptual
understanding? How would you change, or extend the problem in order to go
beyond just testing the students ability to plug in values and find an answer?
7. CONCLUSIONS
My students have generally found the reading, the studying, and the discussions of
the selected Nobel lectures refreshingly different from the lecture-based and
textbook-centered presentations in their undergraduate years. Revisiting the basic
ideas, concepts and empirical evidence presented in textbooks using this historical
approach allows students to read the summary of the work of a Nobel laureate from
an accessible primary source. It is hoped that having had this background study
they not only understand the basic ideas of modern physics better but also have
developed confidence and enthusiasm to present them on a level accessible to their
physics students in high school.
8. BLOCK
Wilhelm Roentgen (1901) The discovery of the remarkable rays named after
him.
J.J. Thomson (1906) The experimental investigations on the conduction of
electricity by gases. - Our emphasis is the discovery of the electron.
Ernest Rutherford (1908) The chemistry of radioactive substances.
William Henry Bragg and William Lawrence Bragg (1915/22) The analysis
of crystal structure by means of x-rays.
Madame Curie (1903, 1911) The discovery of the elements radium and
polonium.
Niels Bohr (1922) The structure of atoms and of the radiation emanating from
them.
Albert Einstein (1921) The discovery of the law of the photoelectric effect.
Robert Millikan (1923) The elementary charge of electricity and on the photoelectric effect.
Arthur Compton (1927) For his discovery of the effect named after him.
Lois de Broglie (1929) The discovery of the wave nature of electrons.
James Chadwick (1935) The discovery of the neutron.
G.P. Thomson (1937) The experimental discovery of the diffraction of
electrons.
Dr. Arthur Stinner,
Professor of Science Education
Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba
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ELIZABETH CAVICCHI
12. CLASSROOM EXPLORATIONS WITH

PENDULUMS, MIRRORS, AND GALILEOS DRAMA
1. INTRODUCTION
Ordinary things pass under our notice. We may assume we know what to expect
from them, without ever having set aside the space to scratch beneath those
unexamined assumptions, contemplate the behavior and wonder what is going on.
Through carving out space for observing and rethinking everyday things, scientists
in history generated questions and understandings that unsettled views prevailing at
their time. In the swinging of a pendulum, Galileo gained evidence that contributed
to new means of investigating and comprehending motions and relationships in the
world. Galileos trial thrust into prominence the inextricability of that scientific undertaking from a wider matrix of beliefs, pressures and experiences; its reverberations
extend across subsequent science. This paper follows students in my science class
as they came to their own curiosities about ordinary things and experienced these
curiosities in relation to Galileos researches and his trial.
Science education often undermines the inextricability among ordinary things,
human investigation, and the surrounding worlds of culture and nature. Instruction
treating science in isolation from student experiences leaves students feeling that
their minds and actions do not matter in science. Objecting to this practice in her
high school physics course, one student told an interviewer, Dont just teach me
the facts Let me see and think for myself! (Hughes-McDonnell, 2000, p. 1).
Surveys of science students report that classroom experiments may be fun but do
not engender the observation-based critical thinking that this student advocated
(Angell, 2004; Coleman et al., 1998). As an effort to build such an environment in
the science classroom and analyze it so as to support students thoughtful participation,
researchers collaborated with five middle school teachers in conducting a three
week curriculum, beginning with a competition to design, make and test model boats
and expanding along paths of childrens questions about their boats (Schauble et al.,
1995). By the end, most children could articulate what they had done and propose
a revision to their experiments. Like the physics student quoted above, these
researchers decried science presented in isolation from student involvement, and
instead argued for sustained periods of real experimentation by students (p. 158).
In making my classroom a space where students investigate ordinary things, I seek
to bring about personal experiences relating students to the natural world, each
other, and historical efforts (Cavicchi, 2008a, 2008b, 2007, 2005, 1999). While this
integration among classroom activities and experiences might seem to be a condition
CAVICCHI
that comes about on its own, in fact it depends on a teachers observant participation.
Teachers in the study of Schauble et al. found they had to adopt such new classroom
practices as becoming aware of opportunities for reasoning as these arose in
students activities and responding with challenges and encouragement. Similarly
for me, I find that by interacting with students as their investigation emerges,
opportunities arise for extending what they do, develop, and learn. My classroom
observing and interactions are a research into the process of learning, just as my
students are doing their own researches with pendulums, mirrors and history.
Whereas in Schaubles study, classroom researchers collaborated with teachers, in
mine, my teaching is at the same time research.
In teaching, I am seeking to observe, understand and extend what goes on in: the
classroom, students work, my teaching, and materials of science and history. This
research pedagogy, called critical exploration, was developed by Eleanor Duckworth
(Duckworth, 1973/2006, 1986/2006, 1991/2006, 2005/2006) from the clinical interviewing of Jean Piaget (1926) and Brbel Inhelder (1974) and the experimental
teaching of the 1960s Elementary Science Study (1970). Critical exploration uses
Piaget and Inhelders findings that childrens actions on things, and their thinking,
are the means by which they construct knowledge and develop new capacities.
A teacher sets up a classroom critical exploration to allow curriculum to evolve as
students engage with it. By doing research, the teacher looks for developments in
understandings that students express in relation to the curriculum and of developments in the teacher, in relation to provocatively bringing students together with
curriculum. Since these developments happen in the midst of activities, research
reports on critical explorations preserve narrative context. Students document what
they do; this helps them notice how their understandings develop. The teacher also
documents class activities; this assists her in making teaching decisions and reporting
to other teachers.
Participants in critical explorations discern properties in everyday phenomena
that they had not suspected were there, and realize ways that their study links to wider
surroundings. For example, a group of Genevan teachers who explored floating and
sinking with Eleanor Duckworth as their teaching/learning researcher, dealt thoughtfully with such ambiguities as that, when they poured more water into a pail
containing a sealed plastic bag containing air and small objects, the bag did not lift
off the pails bottom and float (Duckworth, 1986/2001). At the end of this eight
week exploration, one participating teacher reflected that through working out
understandings of floating and sinking, her core perception of the world and its
behaviors evolved. She was now a questioner:
I have the impression of having understood why one object sinks and another
floats I have opened my eyes to a lot of notions that hadnt interested me
before. For example: why in a mountain chalet does the condensation form
on the outside window, while in my Geneva apartment it forms on the inside
window? One question leads to another and another. You start asking about
everything (Duckworth, 1986/2001, p. 37).
Students in my class also perceived a personal deepening in awareness. One
student, Noam, described how rereading what he did and wrote during the course,
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enabled him to see the progression and curiosity in my work (Shabani, 2007)
Noams sense of being in process supported him in making the insight that Galileo
too developed in the course of, and by means of, experimenting and living. Rather
than being static, fixed, and over, both science and history became dynamic in
myriad ways having dramatic resonances for Noam and his classmates. Looking
closely into some of their explorations with pendulums, mirrors, and Galileo, this
paper documents education where curiosity grew while continuing to expand relations
among what goes on in the classroom, everyday life, and history.
2. COURSE OVERVIEW
My class, in which Noam and his classmates participated, is a science course in the
Honors Program at the University of Massachusetts Boston. Students are admitted
to this program on the basis of grades and exam scores. During their sophomore,
junior and senior years, these students are required to take several enriching courses
which are only offered through the nondepartmental Honors Program. Honors
courses engage students in intellectually challenging work in interdisciplinary areas
with in-depth study and resources beyond the classroom such as field trips. Titled
Science Experimenting: Learning from Nature, History and Ourselves, my course
fulfilled a lab science requirement as well as meeting Honors Program expectations.
Most sessions met in a lab where students experimented with a wide range of
materials such as: string, weights, mirrors, water, glass vessels, baby powder, light
sources, laser pointers, magnets, batteries, wires. I developed and taught this course
first in 2005 with nine students (Cavicchi, 2007, 2009); when next teaching it in
the 2007 semester discussed here, the class size doubled.
Like the schools population at large, students in this class came with diverse
backgrounds and academic aims. Many had grown up in part outside the US; having
done some of their schooling on another continent including Europe, Africa, Asia
and South America, English was not their first, or only, language. Others were
longtime residents of Boston. Most had already declared a major; these included:
Psychology, Mathematics, Nursing, Management, Classical Languages, Biology,
Computer Science and Sociology. None had taken a college-level physics course;
a few were also attending a chemistry or biology course. While in college, some
students worked long hours at jobs or internships in: a hospital, nursing, hairdressing,
showroom sales in kitchen dcor or computers, military training. In response to a
reflective writing assignment early in the course, students recalled having a childhood curiosity sparked by: stars, death, snow, softened candle wax, rocks and trees.
At the beginning of the course, some students knew no one else while others were
friends or previous classmates.
I hoped to develop a science classroom where students could act from the
fullness of their personal experience and learn from the particular and differing
outlooks of others. Thus I structured assignments, activities and resources to engage
students with the openness of exploration, where one question leads to another
and another as observed by the teacher quoted above (Duckworth, 1986/2001, p. 37).
Class sessions included time for students to explore science materials in small
groups, and time to discuss, as a class, what they found in those explorations, and
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our readings from historical science. Between classes, they did activities at home and
wrote about this work and our readings. Readings, assignments and other resources
were available on a class website which I expanded continually. Everyone kept
a notebook on their explorations in the class lab and at home. During the last half
of the term, I asked each student to select a science phenomenon that interested
them and investigate it outside of class. They shared these project activities with
others during class and in writing. Topics varied from mirror reflection to bass
vibrations from a speaker to the processes underlying granite countertop surfaces.
From week to week, I developed class activities and assignments that related to
what students were doing, and at the same time challenged them to take it further
or observe by a new perspective. I wrote individual responses to each homework
by which I raised questions that might provoke thinking and extend the interests
that I saw emerging in that students work. Through this responsive method of
designing assignments and reacting to individuals work, I seek to support each
student in becoming aware that their own observations and thoughts are fertile
grounds for science experiments and understandings.
At the same time that I encouraged individual students to experience themselves
as explorers, I also planned activities that brought students to listen to each other
and learn as a community. An assignment titled shared class notes illustrates this
practice. Each week, the students and I documented what unfolded in experiments
and discussion. During the first month of meetings, I used these records to compile
a summary of what happened in class, which I distributed at the next meeting. These
summaries include quotes from discussion, descriptions of experiments, questions,
photos, and references. During the remainder of the term, I assigned three students
each week to compose a summary of what they observed in class, and circulate it
next time with the others. To prepare a summary meant students had to listen
closely to each other and express in their own words the work of others. Then,
when the rest of the class read those three summaries, they noticed differing and
connecting perspectives on the same shared experience.
I integrated historical materials of science into the class experience in many
ways: readings and activities based on historical experiments; a visit to the MIT
Museum and its exhibit of historical simple microscopes (Giodano, 2006); a visit to
a special collections library; guest Elaheh Kheirandish who spoke on optics in the
medieval Islamic world and guest Zuraya Monroy-Nasr who discussed history and
philosophy of science. In addition to these historical resources, I developed a major
assignment on Galileo and his trial. The students presented on Galileo during two
class sessions using a variety of formats, including PowerPoint presentations,
posters, recreations of Galilean experiments, blackboard arguments, conducting a
provocative class discussion, and a short original drama. Everyone wrote a short
reflective paper based on these Galileo presentations.
The research that I was doing, as a teacher, to attend to each students interest,
confusions and potential, also records developments in teaching and learning during
the course. The discussions below excerpt from those records, kept by the students
and myself, in explorations and experiments done in and out of class, in my own
teaching responses, and in work that emerged through the Galileo presentation
162
assignment. Since teaching is a process reflective on itself, more can be learned by

reviewing, narrating, reentering. In the possibilities that came to be, we see the
resilience of the subject together with students curiosities.
Historical knowledge production in the classroom carried over into each facet of
the course. In experimenting with mirrors and pendulums, and watching the night
sky, students became aware of much going on in the physical world that they had
overlooked before. By encountering readings and artifacts from historical science
at the same time, they realized that others in the past witnessed and wondered about
these things. While the students were used to academic settings that privilege answers,
under this courses requirement that they look closely, interact with materials and
interpret what happens, relying on answers began to seem inadequate and limiting.
Through my teaching efforts to continually open up domains for further activity even
in what students assumed they had already covered, I tried to unsettle their inclination
to accept premature conclusions. In addition, the historical examples from Galileo and
others connected with students own experiences and supported them in developing as
explorers that seek questions and are critical of authoritative answers.
3. PENDULUMS
I started off our first class activity saying: suspend a weight on a string. Pull the
weight back, let it go, watch. What do you notice? What can you vary?1 From
structures around the room, the students improvised supports: hands; ring stands;
handles on the lab shower; the electric plugs over each lab bench! Hanging on long
electric cords, these plugs looked so much like pendulums that someone set them
swinging. Then, strings bearing weights were tied to the hooks ending these plugs.
Releasing the weight put both plug line and string into motion. The plug line went like
a pendulum and the weighted string acted as a second pendulum on its end! (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The hanging power cord with a weight on a string hung from it, while
at rest (left) and swinging (next). Drawings by C. Gomez (2007). Photo of power
cord and pendulum assembly. Right: Bar of lab shower support a string pendulum
and its hanging handle; both swing.
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CAVICCHI
Two students tied a weight on a string to the plumbing of the lab shower (Figure 1,
Right). They pulled back and released that weight together with the showers handle,
which hung from the same support. The weight and the handle made up two
pendulums. Was one going faster? How were the two motions relating to each other?
At first both went back and forth, then the paths became circular. The handle kept
swinging longer than the weight.
The following week, I handed out a summary based on what I observed during
the activity:
Try same weight, shorter string.
Hang two pendulum strings from the same point or hand, or beside each other.
Two types of string: try with one string, and then change the type of string.
Compare the two strings: Does one have less tension, go for longer or further?
Compare two pendulums of same length string, where the weights are different.
Is it proportional to weight?
I wonder what happens if I do this?
Do two pendulums sway together? Is one driving the other?
Is one going faster?
What makes it swing longer?
There are a ton of things to write down a lot of factors.
Questions, trial runs, ideas for experiments, inferences about what affects the motion,
emerged from what the students did. I see this as an emergent curriculum. Amid the
playfulness of pitting one pendulum against another and the seemingly odd assemblies
like the swinging shower handle, the students were identifying core features of the
phenomena and proposing experimental tests in the interest of working out how
these matter.
Already, in taking what they noticed seriously enough to recognize that there are
a lot of factors, the students engaged with swinging motions through a complex
context of associations. Through their further explorations, the students contact
with that complexity would branch out and interconnect yet more in physical factors
and human experiences, including historical ones. Other critical exploration studies
(Duckworth, 1986/2001; McKinney, 2004; Schneier, 2001) show that when a subject
matter is provided in its full complexity, students find their own entries into it. The
personal curiosity excited in this process moves them to continue looking closer,
exploring, and reflecting on what they observe. At the same time, the subject matter
itself, by being complex, sustains the multitude of students investigations while
invariantly confronting them with its distinctive properties and relationships.
For example, the next week, I asked the class to talk about their pendulums along
with a paragraph theyd read by Galileo (1638/1914, sec.1401, p. 97). I wrote
what they said on the board. Questions like: Does weight matter? Will it stop?
coalesced with techniques like Start two same weights on different length strings;
and use the ceiling pipes to hang a long pendulum. The class broke into groups.
The long line group set up a single pendulum and successively refined its
mounting. John climbed on a table, tossed a washer tied to a fishing line over the
ceiling pipe, and looped it into a knot (Figure 2, Left). Our largest weight, 20 oz,
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Figure 2. Left: The long string hangs from a ceiling pipe down to the paper where
Yelanas hand is about to pull the bob back. Middle Top: Diagram of pendulum on
ceiling pipe. Middle Bottom: Interpretive sketch of the bobs successive oval path.
Drawings by Y. Zhadanovsky (2007). Right: Two pendulums hang from
a single support.
was tied at the lines bottom end. Immediately after it got started swinging, someone
bumped it; they had to start over. Now Noam, a biology major, noticed that the
washer at the top interfered with the motion. On redoing the attachment without a
washer, the line slipped. An attempt to reduce friction and anchor it better with
tighter knot, gave rise to Noams idea to drill a vertical hole in the ceiling pipe and
thread the string through it. He explained what drove this persistence to ever-improve
the apparatus: We are trying to get it perfect. Because maybe in a non perfect
situation, it would stop and in a perfect situation, it wouldnt. (Shabani, 2007).
Will it stop? Surprising to me, this question of the students reveals the different
grounding of their view, from conventional instruction. Their concerns to reduce
friction, their patience to count all the swings, respond to the role of energy. This
relates to the Pendulum Projects identification of the study of energy conservation
as a counterpart to that of time, in history (Stinner, 2007; Bevilacqua et al., 2005).
Having that outlook, my students observed effects that are not typically acknowledged. Noam wrote: The one thing that puzzles me is why the swing stops moving
back and forth, and eventually takes the shape of an oval. (Shabani, 2007). Nothing
he did eliminated it he even looked up the oval online and found nothing! The
oval path was a genuine finding. Yelena sketched it (Figure 2, Middle). Participants
in the groups doing string length comparisons corroborated it too (Figure 2, Right).
And when they spoke of the longer string lasting longer, they meant longer until
it stops. The short string had stopped sooner by hitting its ring stand support.
By contrast, the Galileo quote took a time perspective, in reporting that whether
a pendulum goes through a large or a small arc, its swing time is the same. It intrigued
and puzzled me when students did not pick up on this analysis in writing reflectively
about it. Yet they found other entries into this rich quote which connected to the
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experimenting they were doing and its surprises. Resonating with Sagredos comment
that:
from such common and trivial phenomena, you (Salviati/Galileo) derive facts
which are not only striking and new, but which are often far removed from
what we would have imagined (Galileo, 1638/1914, sec.1401, p. 97),
Christina wrote: people are able to accomplish amazing things if they pay attention
to every detail (Buonomo, 2007). The students were recognizing some of these
details in the attachments and motions of their pendulums. The Galileo quote
provoked Carolina to ponder: What were Galileos experimental capacities? How
can I relate them to my own? (Gomez, 2007).
Figure 3. Left: The bob swings on a string that passes through a hole in a wood board
which is mounted between the backs of two chairs. Pulling on the string from above the
board shortens the pendulum length. Right: Drawing by N. Shabani (2007).
Next week, I assigned Galileos experiment where a pendulum string passes

through a hook so it can be shortened while swinging (Galilei, 1632/2001, p. 522).
Redoing this, they passed the string through a hole Id drilled in a board, in response
to Noams idea that a drill hole would make a more ideal string support (Figure 3).
On pulling the string from above the hole, while swinging the weight below, the
swing rate quickened with its shortening string. Veronica expressed wonder: It was
EXTREMELY cool how the speed of the pendulum was affected by the length of
the string. (Lantigua, 2007). Noam, focused on extending the swinging time, found
that with the drill hole support, a constant-length pendulum swung for the entire class!
(Shabani, 2007).
While our classtime activities went on to other things from there, several students
pursued their own questions about the pendulum in investigations done at home,
parts of which were shared with the class. By timing a single pendulum swing at
different lengths and weights, Koffi, a math major, concluded that only the first of
these variables mattered and wondered what else might affect it. Interestingly,
John, a classic major who in our first class swung a pendulum from his hands,
researched a pendulums magical associations with truth-telling. He asked class
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members to hand-held a pendulum while saying something false or true. According

to the tradition, the pendulums swing direction exposes either veracity or deceit.
Curiosity about the pendulum clocks origins in history infused Murielles
extensive research of the pendulum. Like Noam, she was looking for the conditions
that made for a better pendulum. She was not looking to establish a particular time
interval. Calling her project The Weight of Time, Murielle, a nursing student,
wanted to know whether different masses of a pendulum effect the time of a
pendulum swing. If so how did early scientists decide the appropriate weight of the
pendulum to be used in clocks in order to keep exact time? (Casseus, 2007).
Borrowing my drill hole boards, she rested them between clothes hampers at home,
so as to have side-by-side pendulums (Figure 4). She tracked down discrepancies
between the two boards and their mounting. With this setup, she tested many factors
alone and in multiple combinations including: string length, string thickness, string
texture, wire strings, weight, string thickness combined with weight, string length.
By generating experimental possibilities that she projected in advance and tested
directly, Murielle worked out an understanding of multiple dimensions going on in
the phenomena. For example, she found that a heavier weight on a lighter string
persisted in swinging for longer than if either factor was altered.
Figure 4. The board supports for two pendulums rest on clothing hampers
(left and middle) and a dresser (right). By watching the two different length
pendulums swing side-by-side, Murielle observed the shorter one swings faster.
Drawing by M. Casseus (2007).
Coming to this inference took critical work on Murielles part. She had to trust,
and recheck, her experimental work, even as it disproved both her own initial
hypothesis and one class members authoritatively delivered statement that physics
says weight doesnt matter. This took courage courage which Murielle expressed
in other ways within the class community, and on her own. In Galileo, and the
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history, she found nourishment for having fortitude in making sense of science for
herself. She wrote: Galileos persistence towards finding and executing his theories
motivated me in my own experimentation I did encounter some opposition to my
project [I was condemned for] making too much noise while this is no
comparison to the opposition Galileo faced it is still an opposition to discovery.
(Casseus, 2007).
4. MIRRORS
Mirrors and light were another area of class activities and a theme in our historical
readings and museum visits. Since we use mirrors everyday, students assumed that
there was nothing to find out about mirrors. When I first introduced mirrors in
class, what the students did bore out their limited experience and yet already there
were curiosities to notice. For example, two students, Gabriela and Koffi, stood on
either side of a refrigerator and didnt see each other directly, but when John put
a mirror before them, one saw the other (Figure 5, Left). Similarly, a mirror held
over the heads of two people let them see each other. But, quickly becoming facile
at placing a mirror so something else could be seen with it, some students called
this activity very easy, and one wondered what she was missing.
Seeking to bring about more provocative involvement with mirrors, I looked for
passages in their work that might open to future exploration. I did this as a piece of
research: I studied my notes, photos and other records of the class activities, and
I examined everyones homework assignments. From this data, I compiled a list of
questions and activities that originated directly or indirectly in what the students
were puzzling about:
Size of mirror: What is it like when a mirror is very big or very small? What
can a mirror show, based on its size? Can any size mirror show any thing?
What size of mirror is large enough for a person to see all of their own face?
Does it matter how far they are?
What is going on with the size of an image seen in a mirror?
What is going on with letters and things seen backwards in mirrors?
Looking in multiple mirrors, seeing behind you
Seeing behind an object, at different distances
Where does light reflected back from a mirror go?
Changing positions and distances of viewer and object from mirror
Read, try to understand and try out, Euclids passage on the mirror.
Crediting those students whose work engendered these questions, I asked the class
to select something from the list as the starting place for their next exploration,
whether it was theirs, or not. I also expanded the array of lab materials that were
available to use, including curved mirrors, mylar, and small lamps.
This time, activities conducted with intent, playful, and sustained participation
broke out in our lab rooms, exhibiting lights behaviors in diverse ways.
Whereas so far, students had only used the mirrors to view reflected images, this
time one group shone a lamps light at a mirror and tried to follow what happened
to the light. Frustrations over working with the lamp in a lit room gave rise to the
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Figure 5. Left: Gabriela and Koffi stand on either side of a refrigerator,

seeing each other only in the mirror held by John. Right: Top-view diagram
using a line to show light from a laser, at the right of the table, passing to
one mirror on the table, then another, then a third mirror at the top of the diagram,
and a fourth mirror (bottom) that is outside the classroom door.
Drawing by N. Shabani (2007).
idea to use a laser pointer. One student had brought a laser pointer, but its batteries
died. An attempt to run it off AA batteries failed. Disappearing for awhile, Koffi
returned with a much stronger, borrowed laser pointer. When shone at a mirror, the
lasers light went elsewhere in the room. Placing another mirror to intercept that
reflected beam, someone sent it off in another direction. Challenging themselves
to get the lasers light into the next room, the group set up a sequence of mirrors
with tape and stands (Figure 5, Right). Finding where to put the next mirror was an
exploratory process. Through trying to locate the lasers light with a hand or a shirt,
Noam and Carolina conceived the idea to expose the beams path. With the room
lights off, they sprinkled sand into the beam. Its light briefly sparkled in the sand.
Wondering about how a cosmetic mirror magnifies and a convex mirror shrinks,
Shannon tried to analyze that with diagrams (Figure 6, Left). In a prior study exquisite
in its emergence of inference through observation, she had already established for
herself its equal-angle path at a flat mirror. Trying to apply it to the curve, she
became confused. She doubted her diagram. Doubt deepened; she was unsure about
the rule for reflection. This struggle was productive; it brought her to see how
dependent shed been on teachers telling her what was wrong. Here, she had to
work that out for herself. The reality of her doubt became a resource in realizing
that learning encompasses failures.
A similar self-realization arose for Cintia, who stated off that day by writing across
her notebook the claim: today we are going to finish up on mirrors. Selecting from
my list Johns question about backwards letters, she lettered the word MIRROR
and traced its surprising reversals through multiple reflections (Figure 6, Middle,
Right). How did it work? Cintia was unsettled. Later she reflected I wanted answers
I was missing the point at first. But eventually I caught on. The history of mirrors
and how they were built before were all fascinating stories. I finally stopped and
realized that mirrors are very cool and if we pay attention to the details of the
shapes and materials, we would appreciate them more. Now when I look at mirrors
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anywhere, Im more aware of them and I stop to observe them. Something I never
did before (Crespo, 2007). For Cintia, reading about ancient mirrors of the Olmec
civilization in Central America (Carlson, 1981) assisted her in working through the
unsettledness of not having definitive answers, to really look and wonder at the
world.
Figure 6. Left: Diagram using arrows to represent lights reflections at a flat

and concave mirror. Drawing by S. Kiley (2007). Middle: Lettering of the
word MIRROR. Right: Viewing MIRROR through multiple mirrors.
As for Cintia, class explorations were disequilibrating for Gabriela. Wanting to

do things right, Gabrielas outlook in approaching these activities was Ok, what am
I suppose to do? (Antunes, 2007). She came to a new place in relation to exploration
through many many interactions across the term, including her in-depth study of
Cardinal Bellarmine for the Galileo presentation; watching classmate Carolinas
spontaneous curiosity; the complexity and interest of the historical stories our guest
speakers shared; class assignments.
Experiencing what it was like to crack open my wonder, Gabriela aspired to
facilitate this for others with her project sharing (Antunes, 2007). Gabriela laid out
flat, concave and convex mirrors on the table. Being with two or three classmates
at a time, she asked: How does reflections/mirror allow you to see more? What
intrigues you about what you see in the reflection or using a mirror? (Antunes,
2007). Gabrielas effort resonated with Cintia, who collaborated with Noam in her
activity. Gabriela recorded in detail what they did with the mirrors. Confusion and
delight spurred Cintia and Noam to put convex with concave mirrors in sequence
in search of a normal sized image, or in opposition to produce an infinity of
imaged mes (Figure 7; Antunes, 2007).
Afterwards, Cintia wrote: [with Gabriela] I got another chance with the mirrors.
This time around, I was much more into really focusing my observations and
saying what I was thinking out loud. I will always remember the different shapes and
their purposes. If they are convex or concave they reflect differently. It was wonderful to understand the purpose of thinking science. I gave the mirrors a chance and
I explored them, and I discovered many things I didnt know, or never stopped to
think about that were right in front of me. I finally saw how interesting it is to think
about things in a scientific way. (Crespo, 2007).
170
Figure 7. Left: Noam and Cintia use concave and convex mirrors in sequence to
try to produce a normal sized image. Right: Noam looks between two opposing
mirrors at an infinity of mes (Antunes, 2007).
For these students, what mirrors do was no longer obvious, no longer in any danger
of being finished off . Through mirror views, they gained access to seeing in a more
probing way to actually notice that the reflective surfaces shape makes a difference,
and that maybe, as Shannon considered, there are rules or patterns at work in what
light does. By bringing themselves into relation to phenomena of the world, these
observations provided key grounds for beginning explorations. Yet the students
development in exploring took place by a bigger context than just mirror reflections.
In connecting students such as Cintia and Gabriela with mirrors as part of a process
and culture of making and use, our historical readings opened space for them to see
and value their own interactions with mirrors. They had to claim that space from
intrusions by a practice of making and using answers that they had accepted without
realizing that as acceptance, or that there were alternatives. Galileos story brought
this issue into relief in the tension between authority and inquiry.
5. DRAMAS EVOKED THROUGH GALILEO PRESENTATIONS
Into the course, I interwove activities relating to Galileo through topics of pendulums,
astronomy, history, and Galileos works. These included: reading short quotes from
Galileos pendulum work, relating those to our pendulum experiments, discussing
in class; observing the night sky, reading Galileos Sidereus Nuncius (Galileo,
1610/1989), writing Galileo a letter, discussing in class; reading introductions to
Galileo by Heilbron (2001) and Einstein (1953/2001), writing a reflection and
list of questions, discussing in class; looking through many volumes of Galileos
Opere (1968/19291939) in Italian in the library study room, writing a reflection.
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These activities formed a context relating to Galileo that the class shared in common,
as a backdrop for the diverse themes of their Galileo Presentations. In addition to
informing their work on Galileo, the students drew on these readings, activities and
discussions as a core from which their investigative work developed. For example,
many students continued watching the night sky, documenting it in drawings, photos,
and writing.
Taking time to look at pendulums or the sky opened their awareness of things
they had seen, but not truly noticed before. In the wonder that students experienced,
they identified a personal connection with Galileo. Linda wrote: I could feel what
he felt. The surprise of such profound thinking and striking findings derived from
such trivial things such as an object dangling from a string (Chu, 2007). Jeiying
wrote: I can see a little dark spot on the moonthat Galileo mentioned (Lin,
2007). Noam realized: The moon that he drew is almost exactly the same as our
moon today. Obviously this isnt anything new, but to me it really brings me close
to Galileo. We both see the same things; in a way2 it makes him more real to
me. (Shabani, 2007). Renata asked Galileo: How did you get into all of this?
What sparked your interest? (Decarvalho, 2007).
I adapted my Galileo assignment from the historical simulation titled Debating
Galileos Trial that Douglas Allchin developed and demonstrated at meetings of
the International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching group and the History
of Science Society3. Allchins students recreate Galileos 1633 trial by opposing a
Church Team against a Galileo Team. He acts as the Grand Inquisitor. The class
votes on the outcome. I broadened the story to include history prior to the trial, and
its aftermath into our future.
The students individual or group presentations on Galileo took up part of two
classes. The presentations spanned many perspectives and delivery formats, from a
short blackboard lecture on logic, to a thorough study of Galileos thinking on
Scripture, to quotes excerpted from students writing about Galileo, to a participatory
class discussion, to an original monologue involving Galileos trial set in the future.
While there were various mishaps in setting up PowerPoints on the projector and
keeping the presentations in time, the talks held everyones interest. The anxiety
some felt about speaking traded with fascination in hearing everyone elses efforts.
Renata wrote: Presenting my project was exciting because I got to share all I learned;
hearing others present was interesting because it was things I never knew about.
(Decarvalho, 2007). One student who had to leave early said she felt bad to miss
any of it.
The multiplicity of responses to one historical story both amazed my students and
brought about personal curiosity and connection to Galileo. Murielle wrote: I felt
like everyone adapted their own way of presenting Galileos story. (Casseus, 2007).
Yelena observed: I loved how even in the story of one man, everyone found something that they were interested in and could present on. (Zhadanovsky, 2007).
Shannon perceived a relationship between the Galileo presentations which came
together as a class activity and the investigating she was about to commence on
her own: when we had concluded our historical exploration with the Galileo
presentations, I was amazed at how much information we had all collected about
172
different aspects in his life. From his daughter, who was a nun, to the church trials.
I was also very intrigued by the introduction of other scientists through history who
were both inspirational to him and inspired by him. It really helps to exemplify
how interconnected the learning experience is, or should be. It was therefore quite
daunting to venture off on a project I would be doing myself since most of the
course weve relied on one another for ideas and support (Kiley, 2007).
The intensity of Galileos story gave rise to dramatic reverberations in the class
and for students personally. Drama is explicit in Brechts play (1937/1994) that
a group reported on, and one students evocative enactment of her own futuristic
vision of struggles between exploring and authority. Yet qualities of drama
development, reflection and realization arose through other students presentations
as well. As degaard (2003) observed in reviewing uses of drama in the science
classroom, students are reconstructing and reworking their understandings in
blending personal experience with elements of drama. Four examples from my class
illustrate the ways drama enriched students personal experiences with historical
insights: Noam and Lindas sharing on the tides; Murielles question for discussion;
Veronicas insight from politics; Henrys experimental project.
I assigned Noam and Linda to read Day 4 of Galileos Dialogue (1632/2001),
redo some pendulum experiments, and show how Galileo argued about the tides in
support of Copernican views. A scuba diver, Noam knew the lunar explanation of
tides. When he started this project, it appalled him that Galileo got the tides so
wrong. Wanting his classmates to hear from him how tides work, Noam was uneasy
about just reporting on Galileo without adding an update. Noam and Linda took
their partnership seriously. The understanding they worked out showed beautifully
in their presentation as they switched off antiphonally from each other, sometimes
completing each others thoughts (Figure 8, Left). They projected Galileos diagram
on the whiteboard. To illustrate earths motions around the sun and its axis, they
moved their hands along the paths and drew directly on the board in superimposition
with the historical drawing. Linda and Noam demonstrated the back and forth
motion of a pendulum, then of water in an aquarium and a test tube, while describing
how Galileo interpreted tidal motions as evidence of the vessel earths motions
(Figure 8, Right).
Noam ended their tightly interwoven presentation with scholar Stillman Drakes
appreciation of Galileos efforts to observe nature, not accept what others said.
Then Noam concluded with a passionate statement: to say Galileo was wrong
about the tides, is to miss what he did. Galileos exploring, even though incorrect,
is a step forward (Shabani, 2007). While Noams spontaneity imparted dramatic
closure, it did more. With it, Noam expressed his personal transition from preoccupation with Galileos failure to get the answer, to awareness of how curiosity
opens up the world and leaves answers behind. In his final paper Noam reflected
on how studying Galileos story became a process for himself: [Galileo] paved the
way for so many explorers! Linda and I instantly recognized this. It was
incredibly humbling to see what Galileo went through, and as a result we tried to
put ourselves in his shoes. Amongst many things, this required us to be curious and
imaginative. Looking at his theory on the tides, it became very apparent to me how
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Figure 8. Left: Galileos diagram is projected onto the classroom whiteboard;

Linda (left) and Noam (right) gesture over it to show the earths motions. Right:
Noam uses water sloshing in an aquarium to demonstrate Galileos argument
about tides on vessel Earth.
much thought must have gone into all of it. In many ways Galileos theory was so
beautiful, so elegant. It has never been more clear to me that sometimes its not
about the answer, but about the journey. This semester has been a journey; in more
ways than one. I have learned a lot about myself and my ability to be able to think
and explore. Creativity has been my pen, and curiosity my paper, and together they
have created my scientific doctrine. (Shabani, 2007).
Drama is diverse and we experienced drama in a form differing from Noams
reliving of Galileos process, through a question that Murielle initiated. Presenting
with the group on Brechts play and modern science, Murielle identified opposition
to stem cell research with opposition to Copernican ideas in Galileos time (Figure 9,
Left). She ended this report by asking the class what do you think? Do you think the
advancement of science will always be impeded by morality? The class immediately
took up Murielles question. These quotes, each voiced by a different student,
suggest their responsiveness to the issues and each others outlooks.
There is always going to be someone saying no.
Morality is an uncertain thing. Whose morality?
Who are the people making science? Galileo believed in the church Some
people doing science might say I want to make sure it doesnt contradict my
ethics. Those scientists would say we cant do that, we cant destroy something.
Who is going to fund your experiment if no one cares about it?
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War has a tremendous impact on science. War is not moral. Morality nowadays
does not play a role in science.
The places where science is happening now (Northeast and West coast US)
are places where scientists dont have that much religion influence.
Things have changed since Galileo. Now you dont have to take the Bible
word by word.
It may not have to do with religion or morality. Maybe it is about control. I think
progress is always going to have problems.
People will oppose ideas.
Give credit to Murielle for asking the question.
Yelena, a member of Murielles group, wrote later: I was really excited about the
discussion I was very happy that our presentation set in motion what I really
liked about the class, people from different backgrounds, ethnically, academically
and whatnot, all bringing to the table what they had to say. (Zhadanovsky, 2007).
The power of the discussion figures in Christinas pondering: after our discussion,
I am not even sure what my exact opinion is. I do think that we should be open
minded, but to what extent I am not sure I am looking forward to personally
reflecting on this more in the future and throughout my life. (Buonomo, 2007).
Veronica and Henry came to personal realizations that something in their lives
echoed Galileos. Veronica presented on Biagiolis analysis (1993) that those who,
like Galileo, were most successful in gaining a courts patronage, were also most at
risk for becoming its target when times changed (Figure 9, Middle). After working
through this argument based on the historical case, Veronica recognized that it
paralleled the dynamics that led to her removal from a job controlled by a political
boss. She wrote: in Galileos situation many things contributed to the issues he
was facing: changing allegiances, bad timing, misplaced trust. The same issues I faced
when my political umbrella of protection was taken from me. (Lantigua, 2007).
Henry came to a different self-realization while investigating the magnetism of
coils. A seemingly knowledgeable friend told Henry that magnetism only comes
from alternating currents. Henrys experiments showed otherwise. Doubting his
results, he redid the experiments to focus on testing the wires magnetism under
Figure 9. Left: Murielle presenting her analogy between stem cell research
and Galileo. Middle: Veronica presenting on the politics that led to Galileos fall
from papal favor. Right: Diagram of Henrys experiment to see if direct current
affects a magnetic compass. Drawing by H. Lo (2007).
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constant current (Figure 9, Right). Again, magnetism appeared where his friend
said it would not be. This discrepancy facilitated a critical development for Henry:
I realized I hadnt tested his idea thoroughly before accepting it. I trusted that he
knew what he was talking about since he has experimented with similar things a lot
more than I have, yet his idea was either flawed or wrong. This reminded me of
Galileo. In his time, many people simply believed without testing the truth of the
information they were given, and because of that were sometimes led to wrong
conclusions. Though Galileo opened a new way of thinking, there are many people
today that believe whatever is told to them. (Lo, 2007).
With each example, from Noam and Linda, Murielle, Veronica, and Henry,
a lesson passed from an academic assignment into the students everyday life, adding
critical and reflective perspective to personal and collective experience. Putting
themselves in the shoes of Galileo at the same time brought into new balance
a query and struggle that was somehow at the core of where each was in their
development. For Noam, walking with Galileo gave impetus to his own tentative
steps of exploring in a terrain without ready-made answers, a maturation of relevance
to his aspirations for pediatric practice. For Murielle, the torment of Galileos trial
gave voice to her own struggles just to do her self-chosen pendulum project in an
inhospitable environment, and to her concerns, as a future nurse, that society
including her classmates seriously debate and weigh its moral objections to the
pursuit of science that may have possible or unknown human benefits. For Veronica,
a scholars exposure of the ins and outs of political intrigue by which the papal
court orchestrated Galileos fall from favor thrust into stark relief the backstage
machinations that had closed down her early career. From this analysis, she gained
cautionary wisdom toward her future in business. Unaware that in planning his
project, he had accepted ungrounded claims about its outcome just on the basis
of the claimants authority, Henry came into perplexity when the experimental
materials behaved opposite to that guidance. Henry redid his experimental work
with sufficient care to convince himself that what he had been told did not hold.
Further, by reflecting on Galileo, Henry gained awareness of his own complicity in
accepting an authoritative word without questioning it. From the diverse, complex
story of Galileo, each student reached depth with facets that were most needed to
illumine and sustain their own development.
Galileo became more than a long-ago story for my students. Rather than being
put off by his astounding accomplishments and viewing his political battles as
antiquated, they saw what he saw, followed his thinking, and experienced surprise,
wonder, betrayal and opposition with an intensity that met up with Galileos. The
dramas of Galileos history accommodated student participation wherever they were
in their developing as questioners of nature, and in their engagement with the human
dilemmas of research, authority and power.
6. HAVING AND MAKING SPACE FOR EXPLORING
As explorers themselves, my students were doing science and history and that action
deepened their relation with the phenomena, their predecessors, and their learning.
176
Everyday things, such as pendulums and mirrors became in their hands links to
a world of curiosity, patterns and unexpected behaviors. Finding their own struggles,
questions and confusions there and crucially having space to reflect on these
individually and collectively, my students came into respectful dialogue with each
other and explorers of the past.
Teaching in this classroom encompasses creating spaces where everyone can
explore and reflect while having the safety to attempt something as tentative as
holding a mirror so it sends light out a doorway or as risky as broaching a discussion
regarding morality among participants who act from differing grounds. In doing
this work, I found myself becoming curious about each students explorations,
imagining possibilities, and noticing what they overlooked. I used this observational
and reflective research in responding, whether by planning the next activity,
selecting readings and materials, or addressing a question or email. My seeking
to support and provoke fuller explorations on the part of my students had a part
in enriching their exposure to materials and experiences that became integral to
developments in understanding science, history and themselves. While my students,
individually and as a class, were the ones who applied themselves by all the means
that produced these developments, I as their teacher had a role, one that worked
more through the medium of interaction than by directing others.
Such interrelated investigation by students and teacher depends on tolerating,
and working within, confusion, doubt, and unsettled openendedness an unwelcome
condition where education hinges on answers. Noam found Galileos contribution
could not be reduced to right or wrong answers on the tides. Similarly, where
science, history, teaching, and learning are evolving, the students and I found there
is always more to wonder about. Not mirrors, not the story of Galileo, not our own
story, are ever finished.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am happy to thank the Class: Christina Buonomo, Murielle Casseus, Linda Chu,
Gabriela Cordeiro Antunes, Cintia Crespo, Renata De Carvalho, John Kerpan,
Shannon Kiley, Gerard Koffi, Veronica Lantinua, Jennifer Light, Jieying Lin, Henry
Lo, Lillian Rodriguez, Noam Shabani, Yelena Zhadanovsky. I am grateful to the
support of this class at University of Massachusetts Boston from Joyce Morrissey,
Rajini Srikanth, Dick Cluster,Yvonne Vaillencourt and Paul Foster. Debbie Douglas,
Elaheh Kheirandish, Elizabeth Mock, Zuraya Monroy-Nasr, and Qian Yu participated
in class sessions with their own stories and expertise. Jim Bales, Peter Houk, Ed
Moriarty and Wolfgang Rueckner expanded the experimental offerings of the course;
Douglas Allchin, Peter Heering, Elaheh Kheirandish, Ben Marsden and Sam
Schweber contributed to its historical context. Eleanor Duckworth, Fiona McDonnell,
Lisa Schneier and Bonnie Tai inspired its pedagogy. Contributers to this paper
through reading and discussion include: Eleanor Duckworth, Peter Heering, Carl
Angell, Ellen Hendriksen, Dietmar Httecke, Sungmi Kim, Edvin stergaard and
Andreas Quale. I thank Panos Kokkotas and the 7th International Conference for
the History of Science in Science Education (Workshop of Experts) for the
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CAVICCHI
opportunity to present this work in Athens, Greece, and Ellen Hendriksen and the
science education seminar for their invitation to share part of it at the University of
Oslo. Alva Couch, Alanna Connors, Phil and Roy Veatch animated my imagination.
This work honors the memory of Philip Morrison.
NOTES
1
2
3
Unless otherwise identified, quotes and excerpts are from my notes, assignments and records of the
2007 class.
Ellipsis in Shabanis original manuscript (2007).
Douglas Allchin of the University of Minnesota developed a historical simulation assignment titled
Debating Galileos Trial. http://my.pclink.com/~allchin/1814/retrial/profile.htm I provided my students
with the readings referenced on Allchins website, and supplemented these with many additional
readings.
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pendululm: From constrained fall to the concept of potential energy. In M. Matthews, C. F. Gauld, &
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(pp. 117147). Washington, DC.
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De Carvalho, R. (2007). Assignments and final paper for honors 290F. Boston: University of Massachusetts.
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Duckworth, E. (1979/2006). Learning with breadth and depth. In E. Duckworth (Ed.), The having of
wonderful ideas and other essays on teaching and learning (pp. 6981). New York: Teachers
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Elizabeth Cavicchi
Edgerton Center, MIT, Cambridge MA 0213
e-mail: Elizabeth_cavicchi@post.harvard.edu
179
KATERINA MALAMITSA, MICHAEL KASOUTAS AND

PANAGIOTIS KOKKOTAS
13. DEVELOPING GREEK PRIMARY SCHOOL

STUDENTS GRAPH/CHART INTERPRETATION
AND READING COMPREHENSION AS CRITICAL
THINKING SKILLS
Assessing a Science Teaching Approach which Integrates Elements of
History of Science
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Theoretical Assumptions Concerning the Definition and Assessment of

Critical Thinking
Historically, the most prominent and influential concepts regarding Critical Thinking
were advanced by Ennis (1987), Paul, Binker and Weil (1995), Lippman (1991),
Siegel (1988) and Sternberg (1985a, b; 1987) among others. However, due to
the great difficulty in defining and therefore in assessing Critical Thinking, these
conceptualizations only revealed different and often contradictory aspects of Critical
Thinking instead of leading to a coherent theory. These multiple conceptualizations
reflected where emphasis was given each time and consequently led to different
approaches for assessment i.e. as logical fallacies (Dreyfus, & Jungwirth, 1980;
Jungwirth, 1987; Jungwirth, & Dreyfus, 1990), as formal reasoning processes or skills
(Blair, & Johnson, 1980; Lawson, 1982, 1985; Obed, 1997), as scientific reasoning
in general (Friedler, Nachmias, & Linn, 1990) etc.
Many scholars agree that Critical Thinking is more than skills including also
attitudes and dispositions that reflect the decision to use the ability to think critically
(Facione, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Paul, 1990, 1992; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo,
1996; Facione, Facione, Blohm, & Giancarlo, 2002; Halpern, 1996; Giancarlo, &
Facione, 2001; Norris, 2003) and raise concerns about (a) Critical Thinking being
subject specific or not; (b) the extent to which novices can learn to think like
experts; (c) the distinguishing between higher order and lower order thinking skills
for instructional purposes; and (d) Critical Thinking being considered a process or
a set of skills (Facione, 1984; Beyer, 1985; Resnick, 1987; Perkins, Farady, &
Bushey, 1991; Johnson, 1996). However, in this research the conceptualization of
Critical Thinking described in the conference proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (APA) widely known as The Delphi Report (Facione, 1990a,
MALAMITSA ET AL
p. 12) is adopted, a broadly inclusive definition of Critical Thinking that integrates

both cognitive skills and affective dispositions and focuses primarily on Critical
Thinking skills. This conceptualization resulted as the consensus of a panel of
46 leading theoreticians, teachers and Critical Thinking assessment specialists from
several disciplines and is considered to be a historical benchmark.
Based on the Delphi conceptualization of Critical Thinking, a series of psychometrical instruments have been developed, including the Test of Everyday Reasoning
(TER). The construct validity of the TER is grounded on its correspondence to the
Delphi conceptualization of Critical Thinking and on the results of related research
indicating that TER and the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST)
are strongly correlated (0,766) (Facione, 1990b, 1990c, 2001; Facione et al., 2002).
The TER was developed out of the CCTST (Facione, 2001, p. 14) a tool which
has been used in scientific studies involving over 7900 students from 50 colleges
and universities (Facione et al., 2002, p. 5). Furthermore it is a product of longitudinal
research and constant development from 1992 until lately (Form A, Form B, Form
2000). In the present research, TER was translated into Greek and standardized.
The sample of the standardization research consisted of 350 persons, including
primary school students, secondary education students and undergraduate students
(Malamitsa, Kasoutas, & Kokkotas, 2008, 2009a).
1.2 History of Science
History of Science could provide content material which can be used in science
teaching (Matthews, 1994, 1998; Stinner, MacMillan, Metz, Jilek, & Klassen, 2003;
Stinner & Williams, 1998). In this way students could understand how science
works, they could develop the Critical Thinking skills needed to critically analyze
texts and interpret graphs and charts (vignettes, short historical extracts of scientists
biographies, historical experiments, historical photos, pictures, drawings, graphs/
charts etc.). Moreover, students could critically analyze ideas and compare them
with observations of how nature functions. Thus, students are facilitated to distinguish
between concepts, hypotheses and observations of nature. The generous incorporation
of aspects of History of Science into instruction is not necessarily on the expense
of the disciplinary knowledge of the subject as the studies by Galili and Hazan
(2000, 2001) have demonstrated. The incorporation of History of Science could
also motivate students by creating a meaningful learning environment and promote
a richer understanding of socioscientific issues through different representations of
ideas or data (Kokkotas, 2003; Malamitsa et al., 2009a).
A common problem with many of the contemporary science teaching projects
is that they focus on the content of science rather than on the links between the
pedagogy and the academic content and they often neglect sciences methodology,
development, history and effect on our society (Malamitsa et al., 2009a). The incorporation of aspects of History of Science in science teaching could promote
Critical Thinking skills if it is mediated in a pedagogical way that treats its neglected
facets. Such an approach would challenge students to develop their ability of
evidence analysis (e.g. texts and graphs/charts) in rational argumentation.
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DEVELOPING GREEK PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS
1.3 Graph/Chart Interpretation and Reading Comprehension in the Context of

Science Education and Critical Thinking
Literacy in the twenty-first century means educating for
the skills necessary to effectively construct and comfortably navigate multiplicity, to manipulate and critique information, representations, knowledge, and
arguments in multiple media from a wide range of sources, and to use multiple
expressive technologies including those offered by print, visual, and digital
tools (Williams, 2001, p. 22).
Students are exposed to a broad range of information daily but the Greek educational
system seems to have failed to take seriously and adequately respond at the vast
information in visual form. The traditional core of educational aims focusing on
reading, writing and arithmetic is considered incomplete without visual literacy
that involves the interpretation of pictures. All students, and not only during
composition, speech or language classes, should be educated in visual rhetoric and
it is emphasized that a new paradigm is required, one that takes rhetorical education
seriously and that recognizes it for the multidisciplinary endeavor that it is (Hill,
2004, p. 128). Science courses are not an exception as being saturated with visual
images. Specifically the visualized data that a student faces in a science course is
very diverse, ranging from realistic drawings and photographs (e.g., a photo of a
pot with boiling water) to highly abstract representations (e.g., the structure of matter
or a model of an atom). Furthermore, the visual representations carry critical information about the state of our world that may have significant social and economic
implications (e.g., meteorology, weather map diagrams) (Lowe, 2000, 1996; Stokes,
2002; Gordin, & Pea, 1995; Glasgow, Narayanan, & Chandrasekaran, 1995; Iding,
Klemm, Crosby, & Speitel, 2002; Iding, 2000). Baca (1990) created a program
in order to facilitate the development of critical viewing and thinking skills in
children. (p. 30) and identified among other paramaters of visual literacy the use
of visuals for the purposes of: communication; thinking; learning; constructing
meaning; creative expression; aesthetic enjoyment (p. 65). In this paper visual
literacy is conceptualized as an ability to understand (read) and use (write) images
and to think and learn visually, that means in terms of images (Hortin, 1983). Of
course the results of this research concern only the visual literacy skills that are
connected with Critical Thinking skills (Analysis, Evaluation, Inference, Deductive
and Inductive Reasoning) as implemented in the TER.
On the other hand, a large portion of the educational research concerning Science
Education is devoted to the quality of the texts provided to the students within courses
context (Bakken, Mastropieri, & Scruggs, 1997; Breger, 1995; Casteel, & Isom, 1994;
Charron, & De Onis, 1993; Craig, & Yore, 1996; Drake, Hemphill, & Chappel,
1996; Graesser, Olde, Whitten, Lu, & Craig, 2002a; Graesser, Leon, & Otero, 2002b;
Mayer, 1995; Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1992; Neubert, & Binko, 1992; Otero, 2002;
Sutton, 2000). In contemporary approaches to Science Education, an important aim of
the educational process is considered the student capacity to distinguish theories from
observations and to assess the level of certainty described to the claims advanced
(Millar, & Osborne, 1998). This skill seems to be also crucial to the comprehension
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MALAMITSA ET AL
of a text in depth. A clue that a scientific text is being understood is when the
reader is able to generate inferences at a deeper level of representation revealing
causal relations between events, processes and consequences. However, it is often a
challenge, not only for students, but also for adult readers to generate inferences,
to ask and to answer questions concerning the causal mechanisms. There are reasons
why that happens e.g. lack of knowledge, insufficient training or understanding of
the causal mechanisms in scientific texts (Graesser et al., 2002a). The lack of understanding may be among the reasons why students are so often negatively predisposed
towards science courses and Science Education (Dunbar, 1995). Furthermore, this
lack of understanding often leads students and teachers to overemphasize in the
memorization of terminology which, in best terms, can have results only in the
factual and conceptual knowledge of students (Anderson et al., 2001) but has little or
no effect in what it is called Deep Learning and Critical Thinking (Graesser
et al., 2002a).
Since, Interpretation is a basic skill for Critical Thinking according to the
Delphi Report where is defined as to comprehend and express the meaning or
significance of a wide variety of experiences, situations, data, events, judgments,
conventions, beliefs, rules, procedures or criteria (Facione, 1990a, p. 13), there
is an evident interconnection among visual literacy, reading comprehension and
Critical Thinking skills. In response to this interconnection, in the basic description
of TER it is clearly stated that an item may require the proper analysis or interpretation or the meaning of a sentence as well as interpreting and reasoning with
the information provided in charts and graphs, a vital part of living and working
in the world today (Facione, 2001, p. 3). Thus, TER has a series of questions
engaging the participant on the interpretation and reasoning based upon the information provided in charts and graphs as well as the information provided in text.
These skills are considered essential for Critical Thinking and problem solving in
everyday situations and should be fostered in Science Education classes.
2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this research is to examine the development of sixth grade students
Critical Thinking skills regarding graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension in science teaching relatively to the contribution of the integration of issues
of History of Science into instruction (Binnie, 2001; Seroglou, & Koumaras 2001).
TER was used to measure research results.
2.2 Scales and Measure
TER is a 35-item multiple choice test, designed for use with the general population,
adolescents and adults of all ages. Testing purposes supported by TER include: to
assess an individuals or groups reasoning and Critical Thinking skills, to gather
program evaluation on reasoning and Critical Thinking skills research data, to
assess educational learning outcomes. TER provides six scores from an individuals
184
completed test: (a) an Overall Score which ranges from 0 to 35 and represents the
number of the items answered correctly, indicating the overall ability of Critical
Thinking, (b) three Sub-scales corresponding to the following skills: (i) Analysis,
ranging from 0 to 9, (ii) Evaluation, ranging from 0 to 11, (iii) Inference,
ranging from 0 to 15 and (c) two more Sub-scales which follow a rather traditional
conceptualization for Critical Thinking: (i) Deductive Reasoning, ranging from
0 to 19 and (ii) Inductive Reasoning, ranging from 0 to 16 (Facione, 2001, p. 1112,
25). Each of the items of TER is assigned to only one of the three Sub-scales:
Analysis, Evaluation or Inference. The same items are reclassified to only one
of the two other Sub-scales: Deductive Reasoning or Inductive Reasoning. The
items of TER are multiple choice questions designed to be scored dichotomously1
with one correct answer and three or four distractors which represent frequently made
errors or are designed to attract the attention of those who exhibit what are known
as dispositional failures in reasoning (Engel, 1999). They range from simple to
the more complex, they involve analysis, interpretation and reasoning upon the
information provided in charts and graphs as well as in texts and they aim to be
familiar to the general population. TER is suitable for persons in late childhood,
adolescent and adult populations; no other background knowledge is required than
that which is readily achievable through normal maturation and elementary schooling.
A selection of 20 questions from a total of 35 questions of TER (Facione, 2000,
in Greek) was included in the analysis. The questions were grouped accordingly for
the needs of the research. The first group of questions (questions #5, #11, #12, #13,
#15, #16, #22, #23 and #24) involves graph/chart interpretation skills. They were
chosen because answering them correctly involved the interpretation of a graph/ chart.
The second group of questions (#25, #26, #27, #28, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #34
and #35) involves reading comprehension skills and requires interpreting text. Two
composite variables were created, one for Graph/Chart Interpretation Score
ranging from 09 as the sum of the first group of questions scores and one for
Reading Comprehension Score ranging from 011 as the sum of the second group
of questions scores. It should be remarked that answering correctly to those questions
involved also the use of other Critical Thinking skills (Analysis, Evaluation, Inference
etc.). Although these questions are part of a questionnaire designed to assess
Critical Thinking skills, it was assumed that they could sufficiently treat the above
mentioned research questions in order to draw some conclusions which could have
an impact on the Greek Science Education Curriculum design and implementation.
It should be noticed that TER is not designed for giving results concerning
graph/chart interpretation skills and reading comprehension skills, although they
are mentioned as key skills for completing it successfully (Facione, 2001).
2.3 Experimental Design
In order to develop students Critical Thinking skills a project was developed on
electromagnetism concepts which incorporated historical aspects. A class of 22
sixth grade primary school students serves as the experimental group at which
the project was implemented and another class of 22 sixth grade students (with
185
MALAMITSA ET AL
similar characteristics) was the control group that followed the conventional way of
teaching the same concepts, using the instructional books, which are provided by
the State according to the Greek National Curriculum. Both student classes were
from the same school unit of Athens for the minimization of confounding variables
interference, since both groups approximately originated from the same sociocultural
environment.
The experimental group and the control group presented the same initial level of
Critical Thinking skills since they had almost the same mean in pre-test TER
scores (see also Malamitsa et al., 2009a). Experimental and control groups were
taught the same concepts, the same hours, by the same teacher in their science
courses. However, the designed project was implemented only to the experimental
group, while the control group followed the conventional way of teaching.
The design of the project combined: (i) the incorporation of selected material
(i.e. Voltas electrical pile, Oersted experiments) from the History of Science in
science instruction, (ii) an attempt to address the historical and sociocultural
context of the scientist to whom the discovery is attributed, (iii) the engagement of
students in the reflective examination and comparison between texts, graphs and
charts and (iv) 12 worksheets with hands on and minds on activities (vignettes,
short historical extracts of scientists biographies, historical experiments, historical
photos, pictures, drawings, graphs/charts etc.). During the implementation of the
project the students interpreted and completed graphs/charts and they analyzed ideas/
concepts while reading and discussing texts in the class. The innovative teaching
approach seemed to help students improve their visual literacy skills by collecting
data from multiple visual representations.
The assessment of the graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills
development was conducted with TER which was administered to the students before
and after the teaching of the electromagnetism concepts to both the experimental
group and the control group. The experimental hypothesis was that students after
the project would have significantly better results in those TER questions that
targeted the specific skills signifying the improvement in their Critical Thinking
skills. The hypothesis was tested with a series of paired samples t-tests.
3. RESEARCH RESULTS
Summary statistics (Descriptives) of the TER results before and after the implementation of the project are presented at Table (1) and on Figure (1).
Table 1. Descriptives of graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension
scores before and after the project for the experimental group
186
Variables
Min
Max
Mean
Std. Dev.
Graph/Chart Interpretation (Pre)

Graph/Chart Interpretation (Post)
Reading Comprehension (Pre)
Reading Comprehension (Post)
22
22
22
22
0
3
2
2
8
9
7
11
4,23
7,36
4,14
8,45
2,137
1,761
1,670
2,464
Figure 1. Box plot of graph/chart interpretation scores and reading

comprehension scores before and after the project for the experimental group.
The statistical difference for the pre-post test of the experimental group was
determined using paired samples t-tests. Significant differences were found for both
the Graph/Chart Interpretation Score [t(21) = 6,353; p = 0,000 (< 0,05); d = 1,605],
and the Reading Comprehension Score [t(21) = 7,320; p = 0,000 (< 0,05); d = 2,085].
The effect size values of the t-test results were considered, according to Cohens
instructions (1988), much larger than typical (d >1) (see also: Leech, Barrett, &
Morgan, 2005; Morgan, Leech, & Barrett, 2004; Murphy, & Myors 2004; Page,
Braver, & MacKinnon, 2003).
Table 2. Descriptives of graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension
scores before and after the project for the control group
Variables
Min
Max
Graph/Chart Interpretation (Pre)

Graph/Chart Interpretation (Post)
Reading Comprehension (Pre)
Reading Comprehension (Post)
22
22
22
22
1
2
1
1
8
8
8
9
Mean
4,09
4,36
4,18
4,23
Std. Dev.
1,770
1,649
1,816
1,798
The statistical difference for the pre-post test of the control group was determined
correspondingly with paired samples t-tests. No significant difference was found for
the Graph/Chart Interpretation Score [t(21) = 2,027; p = 0,056 (> 0,05); d = 0,160].
187
MALAMITSA ET AL
Furthermore, no significant difference was found for Reading Comprehension

Score [t(21) = 0,370; p = 0,715 (> 0,05); d = 0,025]. Evidently, the results of the
control group showed no significant improvement. The effect size values of both
paired t-tests were considered, according to Cohens instructions (1988), much
smaller than typical (d < 0,20) and the results were evidently less improved than
those of the experimental group (the differences of means between pre and post
scores were less than 0,5) (see also: Leech et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2004; Murphy, &
Myors, 2004; Page et al., 2003).
4. DISCUSSION
In our study we researched the contribution of integrating aspects of History of

Science along with a reflective examination and comparison of texts, graphs
and charts in a science teaching project to the development of students graph/
chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills. The data analysis indicates
a significant improvement of those skills for the experimental group, whereas there
was no significant improvement for the control group. History of Science was
implemented as a teaching strategy and as a rich source of appropriate content
material for the development of skills that were the focus of this research and which
are directly related to Critical Thinking skills (Malamitsa et al., 2009a; Malamitsa,
Kokkotas, & Kasoutas, 2009b). Furthermore, the need to create opportunities for
student engagement with History of Science, in order to develop an understanding
of how scientific ideas are accepted and/or rejected on the basis of empirical evidence,
became apparent. The teaching project intended to interpret science learning as a
process of active individual construction (of knowledge), as a social process which
involves others in this construction (students, teacher, parents, experts etc.) and as
a process of enculturation into the scientific practices of the wider society (Cobb, &
Yacker, 1996).
The use of a small nonrandom sample imposes a locality as a limitation to this
study and, consequently, the findings cannot be generalized since there is difficulty
in knowing whether the same innovative teaching approach would have the same
impact on students within a different context. However, curricular decisions can be
informed from this research in relation to the incorporation of History of Science in
science teaching in order to develop, among others, students graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills. Known limitations of this study also
include the use of TER (that targets specific Critical Thinking and reasoning skills)
in order to measure graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills,
although, they are both key skills for completing it successfully. It was assumed
that TER could sufficiently be used so as to draw some conclusions with an impact
on curricular decisions for Greek Science Education. Moreover, it should be remarked
that the texts included in TER in relation to reading comprehension skills were not
written in Greek; rather they were translated from the English version of TER, but
there has been significant effort to keep the translated text as fluent in Greek as
possible. Additionally, the interference of the development of reading comprehension
skills and graph/chart interpretation skills due to other reasons is not measured,
188
although the control group could be used for an estimate. Test-retest effects have
not been measured for the Greek TER, but they could be approximated from control
group results (as well as students natural maturation) and, most likely, they didnt
have a significant effect. An independent tutor, who was instructed to differentiate
the courses between the control and the experimental group, was the science
teacher for both groups in an effort to reduce the risk of experimenter bias which
would be greater if one of the researchers was also the tutor. This study doesnt
measure effects of gender and age. The limitation of using intact classes (frequently
a necessity in educational research) was addressed through a pre-post test research
design.
The students generally responded positively to the learning environment that
was created within the teaching project that integrated aspects of History of Science
(vignettes, short historical extracts of scientists biographies, historical experiments,
historical photos/pictures/drawings etc.) and a socio-constructivist approach that
prioritized meaningful learning and students motivation. Within the context of this
study the role of History of Science proved valuable since (a) it supported the
development of instructional tools which improved science teaching by adopting
a pluralistic methodology; (b) it supported students learning by engaging them to
discussion, argumentation and consensus as members of a community; and (c) it
contributed towards graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills
development.
On the basis of the paired samples t-tests results and the size effect values of
the control and experimental groups, the null hypothesis that the teaching project
would not have a significant effect on students graph/chart interpretation and
reading comprehension skills, was rejected. Thus, the experimental hypothesis that
the project contributed significantly to students skills development as appraised
by TER, could be accepted. Mean differences reflected on effect size values indicate
that the improvement of the experimental group was relatively bigger comparing
to that of the control group. Moreover, the differences in the control group could
be assigned to possible testretest effects and/or the natural maturation of the
students during the lifespan of the project. It is also suggested that the creation of
opportunities which engage students with aspects of History of Science and their
interwoven values in science courses contributes to their visual literacy and
scientific literacy.
Although not investigated in this study, the students excitement and motivation
was evident at the experimental group. Further research on the emotional and
motivational aspects of integrating History of Science in Science Education within
a skills development context is needed.
Since, the Greek educational system is text-centered (Kokkotas, 2003) there was
an expectation that this would probably be reflected at improved scores for reading
comprehension skills of the control group. Nevertheless, the data analysis revealed
similar scores for graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills. This
is an indication that an instruction based only on texts is inadequate for the development of reading comprehension skills. Towards this direction also point the results
of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2003 which showed
189
MALAMITSA ET AL
that Greece is low beyond average concerning reading comprehension skills

(OECD, 2004, 2005). Moreover, Greece was placed as 31st between 40 participating
countries in mathematics scale (OECD, 2004, p. 91), revealing that more than 1/3
of Greek student population responds only to questions regarding the simplest
mathematical skills (Level 1) while they lack the ability to cope with more
demanding questions (Level 2) (OECD, 2004, p. 90). It seems that the development
of literacy skills such as graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension should
be encouraged simultaneously and within a Critical Thinking skills development
context. The findings of this study may be only indicative, bringing to the foreground the lack of sufficient relative research in Greece; thus, further research is
required.
In retrospection, a differentiated science teaching in Greek classrooms seems to
be required. By focusing on the above mentioned skills this research brings about
the necessity of an improved language use in science courses, in a way that should
emphasize on its role as a semiotic and culturally defined tool (Vygotsky, 1978;
Wertsch, 1991). The incorporation of graphs and charts during the courses should
focus on understanding and interpretation, as essential components of Science
Education. However, this aspect of learning is very often neglected by teachers
because it is generally assumed that pictures are self-explanatory. Teachers may
lack of a better appreciation for the demands that are posed by graphs/charts in
science courses. Additionally, many of them may not have a repertoire of teaching
strategies that will facilitate the development of students visual literacy. Thus,
science teacher education should cover this topic and offer the required support,
even if the resources necessary to help teachers develop visual literacy are limited
(Lowe, 2000). Teaching approaches founded on social constructivism hypotheses,
such as the one adopted at the teaching project of this study, enhance understanding, contribute to knowledge expansion and facilitate deep comprehension
(Black, & Lucas, 1993; Salomon, & Perkins, 1998). Moreover, they create a
framework which can support the development of graph/chart interpretation and
reading comprehension skills by amplifying and reorganizing the way learners
think, facilitating the composition of new knowledge, adding, modifying and
comparing representations.
NOTES
1
Missing items are considered as wrong answers.
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Katerina Malamitsa, PhD, Michael Kasoutas, PhD candidate

and Panagiotis Kokkotas, proffessor
e-mail: katmal@primedu.uoa.gr
e-mail: mkasout@primedu.uoa.gr
e-mail: kokkotas@primedu.uoa.gr
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AGUSTN ADRIZ-BRAVO
14. USE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN THE

DESIGN OF RESEARCH-INFORMED NOS
MATERIALS FOR TEACHER EDUCATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The so-called nature of science (widely known as NOS) has been repeatedly
recognised under different denominations as a major, structuring, component of
science teachers professional knowledge (cf., Shulman, 1986, 1987; Bromme, 1988;
Matthews, 1994; McComas, 1998; Adriz-Bravo, 2005b; Flick & Lederman, 2005).
Consequently, several guidelines, frameworks, programmes, and materials have
been devised for science teacher training in NOS. In this context, one of the many
debates that have pervaded NOS education of science teachers is that around the
specific role that the history of science can play in science education (cf., Matthews,
1994, 2000; Stinner, 1995; McComas, 1998; Quintanilla, 2007).
The aim of this paper is to report some reflections and some actions concerning the
integration of the history of science in the nature-of-science education of prospective
and in-service science teachers for all educational levels, from kindergarten to
university. I focus on a particular kind of relationship between the history of science
and the other meta-sciences within NOS instruction, which I call setting (AdrizBravo, 2001, 2004a; Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2004). According to the
rationale that I present here, the history of science can provide valuable sceneries
within which 20th-century philosophical ideas are used to foster teachers understanding of the deep nature of scientific processes and products.
The reflections that I share here go along the path of considering NOS as a philosophical discourse on science that, in order not be blind or void, needs to be
produced in the context of concrete scientific episodes of discovery or invention;
I contend that such episodes can be constructed on the basis of raw material
furnished by the history of science.
On the other hand, the actions that I report here are related to the design of
instructional materials, mainly teaching-learning sequences (Mheut & Psillos, 2004),
that use the history of science performing the aforementioned function. In these
sequences (didactical units) a historical case study presented via a narrative (what
I call a science story) works as a set for the discussion of NOS ideas.
My focus when using the history of science in science teacher education is
acquainting teachers with some key ideas on NOS (sometimes called tenets in the
literature), and not with the history of science as an academic discipline per se.
Consequently, my work is done from the field of didactics of science (i.e., science
ADRIZ-BRAVO
education as a discipline [Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2005]), and not

from the history of science, with the necessary limitations and recognitions derived
thereof (cf., Brush, 1974, 1989; Lombardi, 1997; Fried, 2001; Quintanilla, 2007).
2. REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE AVAILABLE
2.1 Some Precisions around the History of Science for Science Education
For the purpose of my activity in science teacher education, I consider NOS as a
research line within didactics of science. This research line belongs to the very
large and active research area around the contributions of the meta-sciences
mainly the philosophy, history, and sociology of science to science education
(such area is usually known by its English acronym HPS) (cf., Matthews, 1994;
McComas, 1998; Adriz-Bravo, 2005b).
Consequently, the academic knowledge and practices of reference savoir and
pratiques de reference, using Jean-Louis Martinands (1983, 1989) terminology
for NOS are a broad and varied corpus of disciplinary knowledge on what science
is, coming from the meta-sciences, mainly but not only from the philosophy of
science. I thus adhere to Bill McComass (1998) characterisation of NOS as a
fertile hybrid arena encompassing different kinds of meta-scientific, secondorder, knowledge that is educationally valuable. This NOS is prescribed as content
to be taught in current curricula and is seen as an unavoidable objective in prospective
and in-service science teacher education.
More concretely, I here define NOS as some content from 20th-century philosophy
of science, heavily transposed (i.e., transformed into something that can be taught
and learnt [Chevallard, 1991]), and carefully selected by its educational value, that
is, by the fact that it serves the goals proclaimed for current science education.
Such content is set against the background provided by the history of science, and
warned against scientism by the sociology of science and the so-called science
studies (Adriz-Bravo, 2004b, 2005b, 2007; Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich,
in press).
I think that it is within this framework of ideas NOS as hybrid content, mainly
philosophical ideas, but located into historical case studies that the contribution of
the history of science can and should be discussed (cf., Arons, 1989; Stinner, 1995;
Irwin, 2000; Seroglou & Koumaras, 2001; Stinner et al., 2003; Klassen, 2006). This
also calls for some clarification around the extent to which the expression history
of science is used in this paper.
Let us consider here four different meanings of history of science (cf., Kragh,
1987, for other distinctions):
1. The set of facts that happened in other times (and are happening today?) within
science as an enterprise. Acknowledging, of course, that such facts cannot be
but constructions seen through a particular filter provided by aims, expectations,
culture, background, language, age, gender, ideology, etc.
2. Any explicit, intentional, theory-laden, reading of such facts performed from a
distinctive theoretical positioning.
196
USE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN THE DESIGN
3. An academic discipline systematically investigating such facts and producing

such readings (sometimes called capitalised History of Science, or alternatively
historiography of science, to distinguish it from meanings 1 and 2).
4. Any different way of telling the historical production derived from that discipline,
in various vehicles and formats, and subject to heavy pragmatic and rhetorical
constraints.
The theoretical framework that I present in this paper is mainly concerned with
meaning 4, since I am interested in the use of the so-called historical case studies
in narrative format (Tignanelli et al., 2009) serving as setting for philosophical
discussion in NOS instruction. This implies, of course, the need to discuss the use
of models, ideas, results, terminology, and materials from the history of science
sensu stricto, i.e., in meaning 3.
The history of science has a long and prestigious tradition both within didactics
of science as a scholarly endeavour, and within science education as a reflective
practice (cf., for a rapid revision, Matthews, 1992; Fernndez Gonzlez, 2000). In
the last four decades, historical content has been used in science education in at
least three main formats (Adriz-Bravo, 2008b):
1. Pure history of science interspersed with, infused in, or appearing alongside,
the scientific content.
2. The history of science seen through the lens of the philosophy of science (which
we might call, following Imre Lakatos [1978], rational reconstructions).
3. The history of science as a context, setting or anchoring for the philosophy of
science (cf., Stinner, 1995, 2006; Klassen, 2006).
As to the goals at which the history of science in science education could aim,
I consider the following (Adriz-Bravo, 2001):
1. Intrinsic goal. The history of science is taken at its face value, i.e., it is used due
to the fact that it constitutes a specific and distinct meta-scientific perspective on
science that is supposed to have educational interest.
2. Cultural goal. The history of science provides a richer, more complex, picture
of science as a human endeavour, bridging the mythical gap between the two
cultures, and humanising science.
3. Instrumental goal. The history of science contributes to the teaching and learning
of content from other disciplines (science, or philosophy of science). When using
the history of science instrumentally, historical content scaffolds or fosters understandings but is somehow hidden, not constituting a substantial part of the
instructional aims, but rather serving as an excuse or a vehicle.
It is perhaps possible to also identify a fourth, affective, goal, meaning that the
history of science is a strong motivational tool and can bring science closer to the
audiences.
I also talk about different histories of science (Adriz-Bravo, 2008b), which
could then be transformed into stories of science (i.e., narratives with some
educational intention [Tiganelli et al., 2009]):
1. Descriptions. What in fact happened (acknowledging however that this is
ultimately inaccessible and always told with a strong theory-ladenness). The usual
197
ADRIZ-BRAVO
biographies of scientists, stating dates and events extracted from official

documents would fit into this first category.
2. Interpretations. What we think happened: any interpretation of plain facts
done from a specific standpoint and with specific aims. The roles attributed to
Galileos (real and thought) experiments in bringing forth his contributions to
physics are an often cited instance of divergent historical interpretations of the
same facts.
3. Reconstructions. What could have happened: historians hypothetical and
inferential reconstructions of the gaps in the documental corpus of data. The life
and achievements of science women from Antiquity, such as Miriam the Jewess
or Hypatia of Alexandria, heavily draws on what I here call reconstructions.
4. Legends. What some people think happened: well-known mythical episodes
that have been constructed over ages with moral, hagiographic, chauvinistic,
pedagogical, etc., aims. Archimedes bath or Newtons apple are among the most
(in)famous.
5. Fictions. What did not happen. Counterfactual narratives or speculations, which
might be overtly aiming at argumentative purposes, or reduce themselves to
downright falsifications of history with spurious intentions.
6. Reports. What is now happening. In many cases, historians confront the use of
the term history applied to facts that have too short a temporal distance to admit
reconstruction. In those cases, we could talk about reports, as more or less
careful descriptions of recent and current events in science.
7. Anticipations. What has not yet happened. Science fiction would be a good
example of this category.
All the previous categorisations permit me to define science stories as oral or
written narratives (in any of the seven styles above) with clearly defined educational
goals. Such stories: 1. are constructed resorting to raw material coming from the
history of science; 2. are told with instrumental, cultural, and affective objectives;
and 3. function as contexts for NOS reflection after the didactical operation of setting,
which I define below.
2.2 Adapting Historical Knowledge Production to the Classroom
We as didacticians of science (i.e., science education researchers) and as science
teachers are not professional historians of science; therefore, we need to resort to
work done by historians, especially those who have an interest in science education.
On such work, we need to perform a careful transposition which gives priority
to educational aims, even if this might mean that a certain amount of noise is
introduced in the process.
When adapting the history of science for its use in science classes, we need to
develop criteria for quality assessment, but I think didactical and not strictly
historical criteria should have priority. Among such criteria, I would include:
formative value; communicativeness; relation to an agreed-on rationale or morale;
198
connection to other curriculum content; socio-cultural relevance; frontal questioning

of hagiography, gender bias, or other biases or forms of discrimination.
As an example of these guidelines, I can mention my previous work on the
figure of Madame Curie (Adriz-Bravo, 2005a, 2005b; Seroglou & Adriz-Bravo,
2007; Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich, in press), in which a commercial
French film, Les palmes de Monsieur Schutz, is used in order to learn different
NOS tenets related to creativity, models, and scientific heroes. The film freely
recreates the sanctioned history of Maria Skodowska-Curie, drifting away from
it when dramatic needs require it.
When using the history of science for science education purposes, several different
textual vehicles can be used to convey the historical content into the classroom.
Stinner et al. (2003) talk about units of historical presentation: vignettes, case
studies, confrontations, thematic narratives, dialogues, and dramatisation. McComas
(1998) proposes a list of resource types and instructional approaches: original
works, case studies and illustrations, biographies, presentations, and re-enactments.
My proposed science stories more or less correspond to narratives and case
studies: they consist of plain, non-technical, prose; they avoid as much as possible
the use of quotations from scientists original works; and they are generally longer
than the usual vignettes (e.g., 210 pages of written text or 520 minutes of oral
text).
I have been suggesting that the history of science, when introduced through
science stories or any other vehicle, can serve as a set or scenery in the theatrical
sense for philosophy-based NOS content in NOS instruction (Adriz-Bravo, 2001,
2004a; Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2004). In my opinion, key NOS ideas
can be presented against the backdrop of carefully selected and adapted historical
scenes. As I mentioned before, for this instrumental, NOS-driven, use of the history
of science, science teachers and teacher educators should perform a didactical
transposition of the historical content, in which eclecticism, pragmatism, and a
certain amount of functional distortion could be allowed. In my science stories,
the history of science is not actual content in the traditional sense, but a powerful
context for explicit NOS reflection.
2.3 Actions to Expand the Available Corpus of Materials
Here I report only on the design (i.e., first cycle of the elaboration phase) of
instructional materials for teachers. Such materials can range from just a caption to
an entire book. I want to focus especially on didactical units (i.e., teaching-learning
sequences) in which history-based artefacts are used for the NOS education of
prospective and in-service science teachers. Following recent suggestions from the
literature (cf., Millar, 2002; Mheut & Psillos, 2004), I talk about researchinformed and research-based didactical units. Research-informed NOS units are
designed, applied, evaluated, validated, adapted, etc., using insights (guidelines)
from established didactical research. Research-based NOS units are designed, etc.,
as an integral part of a particular piece of research, in which they are generally
assessed in more or less formal ways.
199
ADRIZ-BRAVO
The next subsection is devoted to present the theoretical apparatus of derivation

(Figure 1) of didactical units in which NOS tenets are set in selected historical episodes
(cf., Adriz-Bravo, 2001, 2002, 2007; Adriz-Bravo & Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2002).
The apparatus
what is
science?
how does
it change
in time?
how does
it relate to
society?
correspondence
& rationality
representation &
languages
intervention &
methodologies
...
setting in the
history of
science
what is the relationship between

a scientific model and the reality
for which it is a surrogate?
Ron Gieres
theoretical models
& similarity
NoS key idea

Models and systems share
a family resemblance
Figure 1. The process of derivation. Theoretical apparatus for research-informed

construction of NOS didactical units that feature science stories. Each unit teaches
one or more key NOS ideas set in an episode from the history of science.
2.4 The Theoretical Apparatus to Derive History-based Didactical Units

I start with three main questions on the nature of science that constitute three
possible theoretical perspectives when working with teachers: what is science?
(philosophical perspective); how does it change in time? (historical perspective);
how does it relate to society and culture? (sociological perspective). In the example
provided in Figure 1, the first question is highlighted: the unit aims at inspecting
how science works and how it is constructed.
Each of the three main questions has within it a series of thematic strands
(Adriz-Bravo, 2001, 2004b, 2008a), i.e., clusters of big issues or problems that
have been essential and characteristic in the philosophy of science throughout its
history. So far, I have devised a system of seven strands; in the example discussed
here, the first strand dubbed correspondence and rationality, and dealing with
the nature, reach, and validity of scientific representations is selected to be dealt
with in teacher education.
Once a strand is picked out for NOS instruction, one or a few well-delineated
philosophical questions within it are formulated. In the example under consideration,
the question on the substantive relationship between model and its surrogated
200
system has been posed rather formally, though this can be re-phrased into less
technical formulations when working with science teachers.
The strands by themselves, due to their characteristic of being theoretical fields
constituting the foundations of the philosophy of science as a discipline (cf.
Adriz-Bravo, 2008a), do not imply a particular answer to the NOS questions; such
answer needs to be selected from the available philosophical knowledge from
nowadays or from the history of the philosophy of science. In the illustration, the
definite answer that I want my teacher audience to become acquainted with comes
from the semantic view of theories. In particular, I focus on Ron Gieres (1988)
relationship of family resemblance between theoretical models and real systems.
Figure 2. Facsimile of a science story (in Spanish). The story is meant to be used as a
written text, and is accompanied by an illustration (by Leonardo Gonzlez Galli).
201
ADRIZ-BRAVO
The particular philosophical proposition that constitutes the content to be taught

and learnt is then transformed into what I call a key NOS idea: a non-complex,
straightforward formulation of some aspect of the nature of science that, in spite of
its compactness and simplicity, keeps the trace of its model-based derivation. So
far, the pure philosophical part of the NOS didactical unit has been derived.
The last step of the process is the setting itself: the key idea is now located
against the backdrop of an historical episode that tunes with it. In the case of the
example provided, I have used several sceneries, which work as epitomes (i.e.,
paradigmatic examples [Adriz-Bravo, 2005b]) of scientific modelling: Madame
Curies discovery of radium; the early 17th century dispute between botanical
pharmacists and iatrochemists (cf., Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2000); Jean Richers
scientific voyage to South America (cf., Matthews, 2000); the different atomic
models, especially focussing on the transition between the plum pudding and the
planetary atom; etc.
For the readers benefit, Figure 2 shows a facsimile of one of the science stories
that I am using with science teachers in my interventions. The story, entitled The
Heros crown affaire, is a one-page vignette-style text on Archimedes mythical
Eureka bath.
3. AS A CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have put forward and illustrated a particular use of the history of
science in science education: the history of science as a discipline provides an
irreplaceable input for the design of powerful settings for NOS reflection with
science teachers. In the use I have discussed here, historical ideas are presented
through narratives, a practice that is gaining adepts in current didactics of science
(cf., Abd-el-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Kokkotas & Piliouras, 2005; Rudge, 2006;
Stinner, 2006; Clough, 2009).
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Agustn Adriz-Bravo
Grupo de Epistemologa, Historia y Didctica de las Ciencias Naturales (GEHyD),
Centro de Formacin e Investigacin en Enseanza de las Ciencias (CeFIEC),
Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (FCEyN), Universidad de Buenos Aires
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e-mail: aadurizbravo@cefiec.fcen.uba.ar
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CIBELLE CELESTINO SILVA
15. WHICH HPS DO/SHOULD TEXTBOOKS

REFER TO? THE HISTORICAL DEBATE ON THE
NATURE OF ELECTRICAL FLUIDS
1. INTRODUCTION
There is an agreement in Brazilian and international science teaching community

concerning the relevance of teaching history and nature of science notions at schools
(Martins, 1990; Matthews, 1994). The nature of science is part of national curricula
in many countries. However, curricular recommendations are usually vague. For
instance, Brazilian National Standards emphasizes the social and cultural contextualization as necessary and point some abilities to be developed in physics teaching:
Recognizing physics as a human endevour;
Teaching aspects of its history and its relationship with cultural, social, political
and economic context;
Recognizing the role of Physics in the production system, understanding the
evolution of technology and its dynamic relationship with the evolution of
scientific knowledge;
Establishing relationships between physical knowledge and other forms of
expressing human culture;
Being able to issue value judgments regarding social situations involving relevant
aspects of physics and/or technology;
Recognizing that there is no step-by-step scientific method.
2. HPS IN TEXTBOOKS
There are a lot of sources for teachers and students views about the nature of
science. Among them are public vision of science on TV, internet or videos. For
school science education it is of major importance which messages about the nature
of science are conveyed. Historical-philosophical aspects can contribute to promote
science teaching for the benefit of the development of more adequate views about
the nature of science. On the other hand its absence and above all its misuse generates
distorted views about what science is all about including epistemological beliefs.
In order to figure out messages about the nature of science conveyed by
textbooks more in detail we analyzed how history of electricity is presented in 12
of the most popular science textbooks for fundamental and secondary schools in Brazil.
In particular we focused on the 18th century debate on the nature of electrical fluids
with a special regard of Benjamin Franklins studies on electricity. This study took
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into account the quality of historical information and ideas on the nature of science
conveyed by these historical narratives (Silva & Pimentel, 2008). Here three examples
of our results will be demonstrated allowing for a detailed account on NOS aspects
conveyed by the historical narratives under scrutiny (our emphasis).
Book A:
The famous American politician and scientist Benjamin Franklin, after carrying
out a big number of experimental observations, proved that when two bodies are
rubbed one against the other, if one of them is positively electrified, the other,
necessarily will have negative electric charge. [...] Looking for an explanation for
this fact Franklin formulated a theory according to which electric phenomena were
produced by the existence of an electric fluid that would be present in all bodies.
Book B:
In 18th century a curious scientist called Benjamin Franklin lived in United States.
We acknowledge him a very simple experiment that shows that electricity is a
phenomenon present in nature. With a large silk handkerchief and a metallic cross,
Franklin made a kite and raised it in a stormy day. For this purpose he used a cotton
string which is an electric insulator that is, does not allow electric charges move in
its interior [...]
Book C:
The North American Benjamin Franklin established definitively in 1752 the
electric nature of lightning, with the following experience: he constructed a kite
and fixed a needle in it. The string was made of cotton. In one strings extremity,
he fixed an iron key. He attached the iron key with a silk line (electric insulator) to
a tree, keeping the silk line protected of rain and, therefore, dry.
Obviously these extracts are based on a strong empirical-inductivist view of
science. Historical narratives are mainly based on the exemplification of personages
and celebrities ignoring or despising the contribution of other researchers, the
relevance of social aspects and cultural contexts of science. Many people before
Franklin had already studied the electricity and its production. Even their names
are seldom mentioned (Heilbron, 1999).
There is no agreement among historians of science that Franklin actually performed
the kite experiment. One has to keep in mind the enormous dangers for the lives of
those who performe kite experiments during a thunderstorm. The kite experiment
was furthermore designed to show that the electric nature of lightning causes
similar effects like electricity produced by friction. However, further experiments
with the electricity of lightning accumulated in a Leyden jar are indispensable. The
idea that electricity is a unifying concept covering phenomena like attractions and
repulsions as well as lighting was far from being well established. For Franklin it
was not possible to affirm with certainty that the natures of both electricities
responsible for different kinds of phenomena were the same. It is necessary to use
epistemological arguments as Occams razor. According to this epistemological
rule, one should choose the simplest theory, and not multiply entities if this is not
necessary. Thus, it is simpler to assume that lighting and other electrical phenomena
were of the same kind. This kind of epistemological argument is used in many
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WHICH HPS DO/SHOULD TEXTBOOKS REFER TO
experiments popular in teaching situation as in Newtons experiments with prisms

(Martins & Silva, 2001).
Additionally, neither the general meaning of experiment, the role of experimental
experience and skill nor the role of scientific observation and inference are pointed
out clearly and demonstrated properly. The role of many details for achieving experimental success is not mentioned at all. Among them are procedures like tying cotton
string in a tree
Such a representation of science and its history is hardly appropriate to develop
teachers and students understanding of the nature of science towards more sophisticated views. Instead massages of simple experimental procedures leading to clearcut and unquestionable insights are supported. In previous research we have found
that this sort of problem is recurrent in Brazilian physics textbooks (Silva &
Pagliarini, 2007).
The lack of adequate representations of scientific discourse in textbooks leads us
to important questions of research and development: Which content and which
aspects of HPS should be stressed and included in textbooks in order to support the
development of a more sophisticated understanding of science?.
3. SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING TEXTBOOKS
There are several papers discussing the relevance of curricular changes and teacher
training programs in fostering the implementation of HPS in classrooms (for instance,
Monk & Osborne, 1997; Adriz-Bravo et al., 2002). However, a key element in
this process is not often addressed: the textbooks.
Actually, the effect of including history of science in science education depends
mostly on what history of science is used and how it is used. Usually teachers
lack initial education on history and philosophy of science. Therefore, their own
professional development and teaching practice in this field heavily depend on
accounts on science demonstrated in their textbooks. Hence, it seems to be likely if
a teacher decides for addressing explicitly the nature of science, he or she will heavily
rely on how science is portrayed, which history of science is considered and which
views on the nature of science are conveyed in his or her textbook (Leite, 2002).
In order to raise elements to help us to answer the question posed above I would
like to discuss briefly some aspects of the tension existing between historians of
science, science educators and teachers concerning curriculum contents. The issues
I will address are
Different perspectives on what a proper HPS and NOS is
Didactic transposition
The need of an explicit approach to NOS issues
Textbooks and teachers practice
Other issues to be considered further
3.1 Different Perspectives
Teacher believes and scholar believes about what a proper HPS and NOS teaching
is differ radically. What counts as adequate material, textbook, experiment, case
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studies, etc from a historian of science viewpoint is different form a science

educator and policy makers viewpoint. Thinking about HPS and NOS conveyed
by textbooks means nothing else but thinking about bridging these gaps after
having realized that there are gaps!
My suggestion in this talk it that we must clearly admit the existence of at least 3
different levels and kinds of expertise relevant for the inclusion of HPS in science
textbooks and a wide implementation in teaching practice. Instead of thinking in a
general HPS in science teaching, we should firstly admit and accept that the scholars
and teachers have different views and perspectives.
The gap between professional cultures is not essentially problematic since teachers
are not historians of science and historians of science are not school teachers and
both do not have to do the job of the others. The gap is unavoidable, because the
expertise necessary for doing a good job in each field is very different. Each side
has different roles in the process, different everyday work, and faces different tasks
and problems. It is a challenging objective to our HPST community to help to
bridge this inevitable gap.
And this would be softened if the main actors in each level admit the existence
of levels of didactic transposition where the knowledge is necessarily transformed
and adapted to different types of expertise, interests, goals, believes, etc.
3.2 Didactic Transposition
From the expertise viewpoint textbook knowledge is fragmented, since just some
topics are chosen by curriculum developers. It also applies to HPS knowledge, thus
it is not possible to cover all relevant aspects of a historical topic in the small space
devoted to HPS in science textbooks. Therefore, the first step in establishing a body
of knowledge as teachable knowledge consists in making it into a body of knowledge, i.e., into an organized and more or less integrated whole that explicitly discuss
NOS notions incorporated with scientific contents.
Decisions about this integrated whole is influenced by experts. For instance,
school physics has evolved from physicists physics, although their resemblance is
pale. However, it is not the case with HPS contents, since curricula do not have
a list of HPS topics to be taught as they have a list of physics topics to be taught, in
addition historians of science and philosophers are hardly ever consulted in the
curricula development process.
Considering that we do not expect students in school courses to be experts in
history of science, we should work on some standards enabling well founded decisions
on what historical content should be included in curricula and textbooks and on
which level of elaboration. Moreover, such criteria are not univocal, they strongly
depend on social and pedagogical school realities, national standards as a whole
and also on the target group a textbook addresses (e.g. teacher trainers, teachers
own learning, students at school).
How curricular contents are introduced in schools is different from what experts
have worked them out. To adapt contents to teaching does not mean just simplifying
them, eliminating the more difficult or abstract aspects, but is a much more complex
208
process. The process by which scientific knowledge become school knowledge was
called by Yves Chevallard (1985) didactic transposition.
Didactic transposition firstly proposed in didactics of mathematics concerns the
evolution, from the knowledge of reference to the teachable knowledge and then,
to the finally taught knowledge. Chevallard defines three spheres of knowledge as
illustrated in Figure 1. Each one has its own epistemology, contents and objects,
production and validation rules, social influences, etc.
Figure 1. Three spheres of knowledge according to didactic transposition framework.
According to Chevallard school knowledge (including teachers content knowledge and didactic material contents) is not merely a simplification of the content
knowledge of experts. On the contrary it is a new knowledge able to respond to
demands of two different epistemological domains: science and classroom.
Didactic transposition encompasses the idea that the teachers content knowledge
about fermentation for instance is not the reduced content knowledge of a biochemist.
What science teachers must know about fermentation is less deep, but without
being superficial. On the other hand science teachers must know more about the
didactic and pedagogical dimensions of teaching fermentation. Thus, knowledge
about fermentation is transposed from the expert (scientist) level to teacher level.
It loses technical aspects and wins didactical aspects.
It is clear that not all aspects of expert knowledge will be transposed to teachable
knowledge. There are some basic characteristics that teachable knowledge must
have (Forato, 2009).
Consensual: experts, policy makers, curriculum developers, and in some extend
parents and students must agree that teachable knowledge is correct. In the
case of historical and epistemological knowledge about science, it is not rare to
find disagreement among historians and philosophers. Notwithstanding, textbooks
must incorporate a sort of consensual history.
Actual: This means that it must be considered as relevant to school reality. For
instance, to teach about Faradays induction experiment is relevant, while to
teach about the geometrical analysis of the duration of days and nights in
Sacroboscos Treatise on the sphere is not a topic to be included in textbooks,
although very interesting to a historians of astronomy.
Operational: teachable knowledge must allow activities, exercises, assessment.
It is necessary that historical and philosophical contents included in textbooks
can be assessed. Assessment opportunities provides clear messages to teachers
about the relevance of content to be taught and to students on how to prepare
their assessments and how much studying time to devote for learning a specific
content.
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3.3 Explicit Approach

Of course, there are guidelines and curricular documents for teachers like national
standards which pre-define what content to teach. However, most teachers do not
read (or understand) them carefully and rely on textbooks contents. At least in Brazil,
teachers usually think they must teach what is in textbooks. It makes sense since
someone thought about it, it follows curricular policies, it was supposedly reviewed
by experts and so on. Due to this sort of visceral relationship between teachers and
textbooks, teachers (consciously or not) take the (implicit or explicit) NOS ideas
conveyed by textbooks as true.
Students and teachers do not learn relevant nature of science lessons through
examples alone or as a consequence of reading historical case studies and books. It
is indispensable that complex and subtle ideas such as NOS ideas be explicitly
addressed by textbooks, with clearly formulated learning activities for both students
and teachers.
How can explicit approach to history and philosophy be included in a textbook?
The author should suggest issues for discussion, put questions teachers can ask,
design activities for addressing the NOS explicitly and reflectivly. It is desirable to
research about which scientific contents are appropriate to be taught with history
and which are not, keeping in mind that a combination of learning about scientific
content, history and nature of science is crucial.
Few teachers consider history of science and nature of science aspects as subjects
to be taught. History of science is considered as another didactic strategy that
complements other approaches and introduces new dimensions to school knowledge.
Research with Brazilian teachers show that they see teaching HPS contents as an
extra activity, as they were not part of the mandatory curriculum, and something
to be worked apart regular classes. Since time for covering all syllabus items
usually is insufficient and they see HPS contents as something extra, teachers also
regard the little time available as an impediment for introducing HPS in their
classes (Martins, 2007).
Hence, just the inclusion of explicit NOS contents is not enough to promote an
effective implementation of HPS at classrooms. It is necessary that those contents
be concretely part of school curriculum, not as vague items as they usually appear,
otherwise teachers and students tend to ignore them. It becomes clear that in the
absence of explicit curricular specification and formal assessment, the nature of
science seldom is intentionally and explicitly taught. Neither included in textbooks.
3.4 HPS Textbook Contents and Teachers Practice
When considering the different spheres of knowledge in didactic transposition, the
closer to schools we are, the closer we need to collaborate with teachers for an
effective implementation of HPS. Usually teachers have epistemological beliefs
and beliefs about teaching and learning, which guide and shape their interpretation
and use of textbooks (empirical-inductive). Therefore, we have to consider the role
of textbooks for teachers own learning and regard teachers as part in the teaching
material development process. A textbook has to offer learning opportunities to
210
explicitly confront teachers as well as students beliefs with more elaborated beliefs
on how science proceeds. Taking into account the fact teachers learn HPS and
NOS with textbooks, we can ask how textbooks can be useful to fostering teachers
learning at same time they are designed for students.
In addition, there is the textbook writers and publisher side. The publisher houses
are not very often in the mood to change a system that works, then little historical
content should be expected to enter science lessons. They know a kind of book
sells and teachers choose them. So, changing all the system takes time and demands
active government intervention.
3.5 More Issues to be Considered
An adequate inclusion of history and nature of science contents in textbooks is not
the only issue to be considered in fostering the implementation of them in science
classes. There are many other issues involved that should be more extensively
investigated, such as:
How teachers and future teachers of scientific disciplines see the use of HPS in
their classes?
In what extend do teachers already implement HPS and NOS notions in their
classes and for what specific purpose?
Studying HPS disciplines during pre-service course does lead to a change in
teachers practice?
Which main obstacles do teachers face for implementing HPS, from their own
perspective?
It seems we have a long way ahead in developing adequate case studies and also
in research on pedagogical issues related to inclusion of HPS.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to acknowledge and thank fruitful discussions I had about this talk
with Prof. Dr. Dietmar Httecke.
REFERENCES
Adriz-Bravo, A., Izquierdo, M., & Estany, M. A. (2002). Una propuesta para estructurar la enseanza
de la filosofa de la ciencia para el profesorado de ciencias en formacin. Enseanza de las ciencias:
revista de investigacin y experiencias didcticas, 20(3), 465476.
Chevallard, Y. (1985). La transposition didactique. Du savoir savant au savoir enseign. Grenoble: La
Pense Sauvage.
Forato, T. C. M. (2009). A Natureza da Cincia como Saber Escolar: Um estudo de caso a partir da
histria da luz [The nature of science as scholar knowledge: A case study from the history of light].
Doctoral Thesis, University of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo.
Heilbron, J. L. (1999). Electricity in the 17th and 18th centuries. A study in early modern physics.
New York: Dover Publications.
Leite, L. (2002). History of science in science education: Development and validation of a checklist for
analysing the historical content of science textbooks. Science & Education, 11, 333359.
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Martins, A. F. P. (2007). Histria e filosofia da cincia no ensino: H muitas pedras nesse caminho...
Caderno Brasileiro de Ensino de Fsica, 24, 112131.
Martins, R. de A. (1990). Sobre o Papel da Histria da Cincia no Ensino. Boletim SBHC, 9, 35.
Martins, R. de A., & Silva, C. C. (2001). Newton and colour: The complex interplay of theory and
experiment. Science & Education, 10(3), 287305.
Matthews, M. R. (1994). Science teaching The role of history and philosophy of science. New York:
Routledge.
Monk, M., & Osborne, J. (1997). Placing the history and philosophy of science on the curriculum:
A model for the development of pedagogy. Science Education, 81, 405424.
Silva, C. C., & Pagliarini, C. (2007). History and nature of science in Brazilian physics textbooks: Some
findings and perspectives. Proceedings of ninth international history, philosophy & science teaching
conference.
Silva, C. C., & Pimentel, A. C. (2008). Uma anlise da histria da eletricidade presente em livros
didticos: o caso de Benjamin Franklin. Caderno Brasileiro de Ensino de Fsica, 25, 141159.
Prof. Dr. Cibelle Celestino Silva

Institute of Physics of Sao Carlos, University of Sao Paulo
Brazil
212
VASSILIS KOULOUNTZOS AND FANNY SEROGLOU
16. A WIKI-COURSE FOR TEACHER TRAINING

IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Using History of Science to Teach Electromagnetism
1. DESIGNING A WEB-BASED LEARNING ENVIRONMENT
A web-based learning environment should include collaborative learning tools as

well as control tools. The collaborative learning tools should provide to the
participating facilitators and in-service teachers the capability to research, organize,
put together, save, and share with all participants a variety of objects such as texts,
files, directories, relevant websites, images, notes etc. The creation of data bases,
chat rooms and digital images, texts, music and video should be provided from the
facilitators. A useful contribution of the control tools should foster quantitative and
qualitative evaluation for the interaction between facilitators, in-service teachers
and the web-based learning environment concerning the e-teaching courses and the
research projects being developed.
Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) is based on the idea that
information technology applications may create evolving socio-cognitive procedures
that encourage knowledge construction and dissemination. From the Harmon and
Jones scale (Harmon & Jones, 1999) of five levels of web-based learning environments, that is: informational, supplemental, essential, communal and immersive,
the last communal to immersive are considered as prerequisites in our case. Such a
web-based learning environment may store units of multimedia information and
provide free and easy (at any time) access to all participants (Wang & Beasley,
2002), while interacts with sources and qualities of the World Wide Web (WWW)
in order to facilitate the learning process (Piguet & Peraya, 2000). Another important
characteristic of such a web-based learning environment should be its global
accessibility to a certain section of it, while another topic - theme should be entered
only with the use of a user name and a password in a web browser.
A very common analysis technique used for web-based learning environments is
the configuration of access frequency and time in order to describe the various forms
of their use (Ingram, 1999; Peled & Rashty, 1999). In the web-based learning
environment under development in this case, other analysis parameters are also
taken into account, such as the sources used, the duration of their use and may be
even further statistical analysis of its use at the second stage of this application.
The categories of web pages of web-based learning environments are presented
and briefly described at Table 1 (Sheard et al, 2003):
KOULOUNTZOS AND SEROGLOU
Table 1. Description of page categories in a web-based learning environment

(Sheard et al, 2003)
Page category
Home Page
Time Tracker
File Manager
Document
Templates
Risks Lists
General
Information
Group Forum
Group News
System
Calendar of
events
Past Projects
Database
Discussion
Groups
Resource search
Administration
Surveys
Description
Group/
Individual
Static/
Dynamic
Passive/
Interactive
Entry page for site, news,

announcements
Facility to record project
tasks and times spend.
Generates task and time
reports
Facility for groups and
individuals to store and
retrieve files in a webaccessible location.
Configuration management
facilities
Document templates and
examples of documents from
past projects
Facility to assist project risk
management
Static documents,
guidelines, assessment
guides
Group based discussion
forum
Facility to post news items
to group members
Allows viewing and
scheduling of events
Storage area of past
projects. Facilities to search
projects from previous years
with the possibility of
reusing parts
Discussion forum for all
Searchable database of online resources and printed

material
Not accessible
On-line surveys to provide
feedback about the site
Web-based learning environments such as Blackboard, WebCT, Fle3, Virtual

Campus, Wikis etc. are some examples of Web implementation to education. In
some of them, like Blackboard in the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, there is
a need of an expert to manage and administer the whole complex system. Facilitators
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A WIKI-COURSE FOR TEACHER TRAINING
of virtual learning communities who have access to a web-based learning environment will find that they have access as well to a variety of web-based tools that they
may organize in order to offer to the web-based learning community only those
functional necessary tools to interact.
A flexible and useful web-based learning environment must provide a message
communication system for participants, a discussion board where facilitators and
in-service teachers participating can communicate or start discussing with each
other, announcement boards which are used to distribute files, data, notices etc.
A web-based learning environment must have a design that offers to the facilitator
the opportunity to provide to Participants access to information sources via network
connections, hot internet links or via direct use of it. Navigation through hot links
fosters direct access to information sources on screen.
Some examples of information sources are presented:
Search engines related to libraries hot links
Newspapers links and information sources
Subject portals
Information - site hot link - about the department
Information about the web based learning community
Past projects database.
Some additional programs should include multimedia packages, self-study
materials, designing programs, additional software, a data bank of learning and
training materials, a help desk or how to use this environment manual, assessment
tools such as: questionnaires, on-line discussion forum analysers, and finally traffic
analytics.
Also they provide some personal management facilities like:
Keeping a personal diary or calendar or a desktop when using the environment
Update participant details, like password, e-mail details, personal data required
Creating a personal web page with information each individual want to share to
each other.
Finally web-based learning environment facilitators require access to a control
panel tools that enable them to:
Create and manage groups and individuals
Manage and update the web-based learning environment
Record feedback and monitor user-trainees activity (login, on-line time duration,
results of on-line assignments)
Maintain the system.
Web-based learning environments allow many types and levels of access.
Facilitators, administrators and in-service teachers participating accesses are
different in character and activity. Each in-service teacher participating forms a
potential for interaction that is characterized by the different environment capabilities
provided. For example, in a web-based learning environment, in-service teachers
participating have access to communication tools, information sources and personal
management tools. Facilitators have access to information control tools, assessing
the in-service teachers participating roles, on-line activities, login, on-line time
duration and evaluating the outcomes of the projects developed by the user-trainees.
215
In addition the administrator has the possibility to add new groups or programs and
to provide access to the system to everyone else.
2. WHY WE ARE USING A WIKI IN EDUCATION?
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors. After the fast development of web-based learning environments in the first years where the main focus
was on technology, recently it becomes clearer to the researchers and developers
eyes that the need of certain pedagogical principles is crucial. The use of webbased environments in education may play an important role in facilitating learning
under certain circumstances which allow technology to bring forward educational
improvement and innovation. Technology now gains its primal role as the medium
for the learning interaction, and loses its mystical role of the focus theme in
communication. The demystification of technology opens the way towards effective
web-based learning environments providing fruitful feedback on the learning
procedure. A balance between pedagogical, technical and structural aspects is
needed for a successful web-based learning environment. Such environments wont
replace the traditional educational forms and techniques but will foster teaching
and learning interactions becoming vitally incorporated to the game of education.
(Koulountzos & Seroglou, 2007a).
Our first intention was to combine the basic principles that rule web based
learning environments and especially the extra features a wiki-based learning
environment can offer to teach pre- and in-service teachers science literacy.
A wiki-based learning environment can offer a cooperative environment in which
in-service teachers participating can:
be isolated as a group
work as a team and individually
interact continuously and with no interruptions with each other
communicate and make common the sources
construct knowledge
present research result.
In a wiki-based learning environment traditional roles are changing and a transformation is taking place (Mezirow, 1991), therefore such a web-based learning
environment is an advanced environment using its own rules. There is no centrebased learning process, but a process characterised by dissemination, co-operation,
contribution, co-dependency and group responsibility. Facilitators and in-service
teachers share their ideas and construct knowledge. This is the next stage which
triggers results and changes the way of information-knowledge transmission. This
knowledge-information from one-dimensional as well as time and space limited
shifts to multi-dimensional while time and space independent. Finally, in the first
development stages of a wiki-based learning environment, the sense of humor and
the creation of a pleasant disposal between the facilitator and the users-trainees
play an important role. The facilitator should care to give a sense of humor to the
on-line procedures, answers and advices for users-trainees, to create a positive
climate of development and collaborative improvement of the web-based learning
216
environment and to activate the co-operation of all. It is vitally important for a

web-based learning environment to activate users-trainees participation and nourish
collaboration and long-term function. Nevertheless, a series of potential barriers
may be identified and confronted concerning resourcing, institutional infrastructure and politics, staff development, teaching and learning, content and access
(Koulountzos & Seroglou, 2007b).
In the 1930s Bertolt Brecht commenting on the uses of radio said:
...radio is purely an apparatus for distribution, for mere sharing out. So here
is a positive suggestion: change this apparatus over from distribution to
communication. The radio would be the finest possible communication
apparatus in public life, a vast network of pipes. That is to say, it would be if
it knew how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the listener speak as
well as hear, how to bring him into a relationship instead of isolating him...
(Brecht, 1930).
Brechts prophetic suggestion is fulfilled in our days by wikis, presented by
Cunningham in 1994. Bertolt Brechts radio theory leads us to Cunninghams wikis
64 years later. From the traditional web to the wikis, we observe the transformation
of a medium from one-dimensional to multi-dimensional, multi-functional, interactive
and fully-communicational. The Hawaiian word wiki that means quickly inspired
Ward Cunningham and decided to use wiki to name the collaborative tool he
developed for use on the internet in 1994. Wikis are fully editable websites. Users
may visit, read, re-organize and update the structure and content (text, pictures, and
videos) of a wiki as they see it. This functionality is called open editing (Leuf &
Cunningham, 2001).
A functional and well growing wiki-based learning environment should encourage
the creation of a climate of commitment and trust between its members: the
facilitators and the pre and in-service teachers in our case.
Our design scopes to achieve a user-centered, trainee-centered, interactive,
collective, collaborative structure for the atlaswiki learning environment that allows
the individual to collect organize and re-contextualize knowledge. A double shift
of roles is expected to take place during the above interaction: the teacher is there
not to teach but to advise, encourage and facilitate while the learner participates
and re-structures the teaching and learning procedure. A balance between pedagogical, technical and structural aspects is needed for a successful wiki-based learning
environment, that wont replace the traditional educational forms and techniques
but will foster teaching and learning.
Some of the wiki advantages are the free availability, the reliability and the
easiness to use. Our scope is to implement wikis in the education area. With our
atlaswiki proposal we illustrate how wikis can be used to create collaborative virtual
learning environments (http://atlaswiki.wetpaint.com). To participate in atlaswiki
you dont have to use special equipments and software, but a simple personal
computer connected to the internet with a browser installed like Mozilla, Netscape
or Internet Explorer. Everything that a pre- or in-service teacher needs in order to
present his work is included in the wiki. Furthermore, all e-material that a pre- or
217
in-service teacher wants to present in the atlaswiki by the saving function is

automatically published in the web-environment.
In our atlaswiki there are two different writing modes, the document mode and
the thread mode. In the document mode pre- and in-service teachers create
collaborative documents enriched with multimedia materials as pictures, videos etc.
All authors can edit and put comments in the content of documents and gradually
the content becomes a representation of the shared knowledge or beliefs of the
contributors (Leuf & Cunningham, 2001). In the thread mode pre- and in-service
teachers start a dialogue in the atlaswiki environment by posting signed messages.
The community responds to them, leaving the original messages intact and eventually
a group of threaded messages evolves (Leuf & Cunningham, 2001).
In the atlaswiki we have two states: read and edit. In the read state, atlaswiki is
by default; this means that the atlaswiki page looks just like a normal webpage.
When pre- and in-service teachers wanted to edit on the atlaswiki page, they have
to sign in first, and then click on the atlaswiki edit toolbar. Atlaswiki uses a version
of syntax that helps pre- and in-service teachers to format the atlaswiki content
(e.g. bold, underline, etc., hyperlink text formatting, upload photos and videos).
Pre- and in-service teachers need to learn a set of basic mark up or syntax rules.
The editing toolbar is provided so the user can type in their content and format or
elaborate it by clicking on the toolbar. When teachers are signed in, they can add
new pages to atlaswiki and format the required text using the internal edit tool.
3. INSTRUCTIONAL E-MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR AN E-COURSE
INSIDE ATLASWIKI: FILMS AND VIDEOTAPED ROLE-PLAYS PRESENTED
IN AN EDUCATIONAL WIKI
In the presented atlaswiki case the instructional e-material for pre- and in-service
teachers e-training in electromagnetism consists of short films, photographs, worksheets, guidelines for the teacher, teaching strategies, etc.
Two sets of tasks have been designed. The first set, based on the experiments of
Gardano and Gilbert addresses the differentiation between electrostatic and magnetic
phenomena (Seroglou et al, 1998; Seroglou & Koumaras, 2003). In these tasks,
learners are provided with the opportunity to observe the similarities and differences
between the two kinds of phenomena, as listed by Gardano and Gilbert. In the
current application, the designed tasks have been filmed and are presented in the
atlaswiki learning environment through video-streaming. For example, in order to
differentiate electrostatic and magnetic attractions a series of videos with a magnet
and a plastic strip charged by friction have been developed showing that: a) a magnet
attracts iron fillings, b) a plastic strip charged by friction also attracts iron fillings,
c) a magnet does not attract small pieces of paper and d) a plastic strip charged
by friction attracts small pieces of paper (Seroglou et al, 1998; Koulountzos et al,
2007).
In the same line of thought, tasks inspired by Faradays work were designed,
aiming at the connection between electrostatic and electrodynamics phenomena
(Seroglou et al, 1998; Seroglou & Koumaras, 2003). In these tasks, learners have
218
the opportunity to observe the same electric effects produced either by friction or
by the use of a battery or a high-voltage power supply. For example, in this case, it
is shown that a fluorescent strip light lights up when connected to the lighting
circuit, but also gives out light visible in a dark room, when it is rubbed with a
piece of woollen cloth or a piece of fur (Seroglou et al, 1998; Koulountzos et al,
2007).
All developed sets of videos with the designed tasks supporting the teaching of
electromagnetism, have been incorporated in the atlaswiki learning environment
aiming to help teachers themselves initially to get familiar with some electromagnetic concepts and phenomena and, at a second level, to be able to teach those
concepts and phenomena, either with the use of the developed videos or by actually
recreating and performing the designed tasks in the classroom. The designed tasks
focus on the cognitive dimension of learning and especially on differentiating
electrostatic and magnetic attractions and relating electrostatic phenomena and
phenomena of the electric current.
In order to provide a meta-cognitive focus on relating scientists work with the
social and cultural context in which the theories of electromagnetism were
developed, we have designed a set of activities using a short film about the life and
work of Faraday and short videos presenting role-plays inspired by the film and
performed by in-service teachers. The developed activities have been applied in the
context of a face-to-face postgraduate course for in-service teachers. During the
course, in-service teachers watched the Faraday film, discussed on the science-society
interrelations and on nature of science aspects presented in the film, designed their
own role-plays concerning aspects of Faradays life and work and performed them
in the classroom. The performed role-plays were videotaped, uploaded on youtube,
and incorporated as short films in the atlaswiki learning environment. This way,
pre and in-service teachers participating in the e-training course are provided with
examples of role-plays they could develop in their classroom, as well as with a
fruitful source for discussion, evaluation and reflection on social and cultural
contexts around the scientists work (Koulountzos et al, 2007).
4. RESEARCH FOCUS
Our research interest focuses on how pre and in-service teachers interact with each
other, with atlaswiki designers and facilitators and with the atlaswiki environment,
while being in the atlaswiki and part of atlaswiki. Thus, qualitative data are collected
and analyzed through the threads mode, while quantitative data concerning the site
and the visitors behavior inside the wiki are raised and studied using google
analytics.
In the qualitative analysis in the thread mode of the wiki, facilitators and preand in-service teachers put and respond questions about:
multimedia information
impressions & suggestions
wiki communication
experiments in the classroom
219
watching videos
role-play & history of science
history of science in teaching.
In the quantitative analysis the questions concerning how many:
visitors
new visitors versus returning visitors
times visiting
length & depth of visiting
page views.
The discussion - dialectics that happened trigger a dialogue about impressions
and suggestions for atlaswiki: Is adequate and clarifying multimedia information
and communication inside atlaswiki?
On the other hand the dialogue focuses on experiments and videos presented in
the classroom. The dialogue between participants seeks for the relation between
role-plays, history of science and the contribution of history of science in science
teaching.
5. RESEARCH AND DATA ANALYSIS
The atlaswiki web based learning environment offers the capability of integrating
multimedia information in multiple web pages. It can provide text (web) pages
with pictures on-line, enhanced with experimental and role-play videos, hyperlinks
to external sources and discussion boards. History of science provides the opportunity
to reproduce and replicate experiments as well as repository them on-line via
atlaswiki environment, introducing in-service teachers to science. Never the less, inservice teachers have the opportunity during the activities to seek multiple interpretations of the scientists profile, way of research, effect on his contemporary
culture as well as the affect of the social and cultural matrix on the scientists life
and work. They attend role-plays in videos, develop their own role-plays, rehearse
and perform.
The feedback from in-service teachers participating in atlaswiki has been
fruitful. The in-service teachers impressions have been positive from the beginning.
It was easy to sign up for the first time, there was no need to have special skills and
someone with basic computer literacy could interact easily with the environment.
The basic knowledge was the ability to operate a personal computer with an internet
connection and an internet browser. The atlaswiki environment offers an easy
add page and edit function, offering the ability to in-service teachers to forget
the medium and focus on their community collaboration and knowledge
construction.
In-service teachers were saying that with multimedia information you can understand science better and you can change your opinion about science teaching. They
suggest more e-material existence, more ideas and themes to teach inside atlaswiki.
Atlaswiki web-based learning environment brings science to the people, showing
alternative methods in science teaching by implementing ideas from history of
science and from life outside the classroom in science education.
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Figure 1. Introduction page of our atlas wiki-based learning environment

ATLASWIKI (2008): http://atlaswiki.wetpaint.com
They also suggest performing experiments with simple materials and devices,
acting themselves in videos with experiments, elaborating those videos with audio
inputs, so that in-service teachers visiting atlaswiki will be able to watch with sound
and narratives the performed experiments, making them this way more interesting
and communicative.
Concerning role-plays, pre- and in-service teachers focus on the opportunity
to be in the scientists shoes and support that when they are reproducing an
era and an environment in the context of role-plays, they are introduced to an
understanding of how all those inventions happened and how scientists come to
their results and theories. In other words, science starts to make sense for
them.
Finally, concerning the history of science pre and in-service teachers suggest
that more cases about women in science, science and technology, and the relations
between science and politics, economy, religion, ethics, myths and preconceptions
should be developed.
A quantitative analysis of incoming data as we can see in Figure 2, illustrates
the traffic in the atlaswiki learning environment. In a period of six days, data have
been recorded by Google analytics show 63 absolute unique visitors a) navigating
154 times through atlaswiki learning environment, b) seeing 2,139 web pages,
d) giving a ratio of 13.89 pages per visit and d) spending 15:52 minutes inside the
atlaswiki learning environment. Most teachers visited back atlaswiki 9 to 14 times,
79% of them were returning visitors and most visits lasted from 181 to 600 seconds,
opening at least 20 pages.
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Figure 2. An overview of our atlas wiki-based learning environment.
Our results show that in-service teachers (without any previous introductory workshop) can interact, collaborate within the environment, use all the wiki facilities
and elaborate the communicated knowledge. The only precondition is to have basic
computer knowledge, to understand the operation of a computer with an internet
connection. Beyond that, the multimedia enriched atlaswiki web-based learning
environment guides in-service teachers to accomplish their tasks and present their
results.
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Figure 3. Visits for all visitors.
In Figure 3, as we can see in this six days period, an average of about 26 visits
per day has been recorded showing that almost half of the 63 visitors were visiting
the atlaswiki environment on Wednesday, Friday, Saturday and Monday proving
that this environment can inspire people to work collaboratively on weekdays, as
space and time limits are overcome in such an environment.
This conclusion also shows that the atlaswiki environment encourages participants
to work together collaboratively and to achieve goals in group work more easily.
Also the atlaswiki web-based learning environment offers a comfortable space which
allows in-service teachers to live and work there continuously with no space and
time limitations and produce collaboratively a remarkable result. The atlaswiki
platform offers a user-friendly web-based learning environment that incorporates
aspects of history and philosophy of science, encourages the understanding of science,
facilitates the teaching of science with instructional e-material, tasks and activities
in the classroom and aims to activate teachers towards innovative teaching interventions.
One of our initial goals to make the work of teachers in atlaswiki environment
like a game, pleasant and easy seems to have been fulfilled as in-service teachers
collaborate inside atlaswiki environment, participate in discussions, produce pages
after pages and propose even more science lessons based on the history and philosophy of science.
Most people (25, 32%) visited atlaswiki environment 9 to 14 times, as we can see
in Figure 4. Some of the participants (12, 99%) visited atlaswiki environment 15 to
25 times. An interesting and user friendly learning environment teases participants
to visit it again and again, producing interest feedback and data to analyze and
present. It is a comfortable zone in which in-service teachers can collaborate,
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Figure 4. Visitor loyalty.
ex(inter)change opinions, debate and elaborate knowledge. The easiness in the use
of the atlaswiki is shown in Figure 4, by the participation of in-service teachers
inside the atlaswiki web-based learning environment, as well as the easiness in the
navigation through the wiki.
6. THREADS ANALYSIS
In-service teachers comments have been even enthusiastic concerning the atlaswiki
electromagnetism e-course: It is an excellent attempt. I believe that it will be
helpful in the educational procedure. In the era we are living and the following
years, everyone demands and requests new approaches to teach science a teacher
supports, while someone else goes on in the same mode: Its an innovative attempt
for students, pre- and in-service teachers to communicate by distance, to understand,
exchange ideas and follow new developments and research in science.
The above are some of the responses to the facilitators question How do you
believe that a program like this would facilitate teaching? The electromagnetism
case in atlaswiki has been welcomed by all participating teachers and they all
comment that the electromagnetism case showed them an alternative and innovative
way to teach science through a web-based learning environment such as atlaswiki
wble.
Another thread discussion has been recorded concerning an initial question
whether the atlaswiki web-based learning environment has been manageable and
easy to handle. All participants found the site easy to use, friendly as a tool to learn
and teach science. They appreciated the dissemination of information to all visitors
and the opportunity to connect and interact according to their own time and space
needs.
224
Furthermore, when in-service teachers comment on the facilitators question

What do you expect for a web-based learning environment to contain in science
teaching, they say that they seek for interesting, pleasant, understandable and
alternative solutions to teach science: Atlaswiki web-based learning environment
offers to pre-and in-service teachers a certified and up-to-date informational and
educational source, and It is a well structured tool for the educators to teach
science inside the schools. They suggest that new and fresh ideas coming from
the life and work of great scientists would help and support teachers, especially
in the beginning of their careers, to make science lessons more interesting and
easier to understand for pupils in the classroom. Here follow some of their
comments:
A web-based learning environment in science education, is expected to
provide new didactical ways to the learning procedure with more educational
material such as videos, worksheets, scenarios and experiments, but also to
illustrate problems of the real world based on the peoples unfamiliarity and
misunderstanding of science.
Concerning history and philosophy of science in teaching science and especially
the question about the use of history and philosophy of science aspects in science
teaching, some participants mentioned the historical reviews in the beginning of
science books, but all of them suggested themes to teach from stories about scientists
like Faraday, Einstein, Curie etc that also might have appeared with an unconventional profile to the public. Some of them believe that most interesting science
topics are those concerning the bridging of science with technology, politics,
economy, religion, ethics, myths, prejudice and bias. Such examples could be DNA
research, space, cloning etc.
In their discussions about multimedia information and the use of videos in
science teaching, all of participants acknowledged that it is a source of infinite
information and motivation for learning science. A thousand of words is a picture,
more of that is a video. In-service teachers support: Videos with science experiments
will help teachers to understand and teach science phenomena and it is a
useful tool to teach science, delivered to the hands of teachers. They go on saying
that: Videos with experiments and multimedia material in general are pleasant to
participate and most of people find them as entertainment than as a lesson, or Its
really nice a worksheet to be accompanied by a video with an experiment. An idea
is performers to act in videos with experiments, so the whole result is going to be
more interesting for participants, be more colorful with sound, instructions,
dramatization and actual performing in the video.
Finally, to the question concerning role-play design for teaching science
inspired by history and philosophy of science, all participants agree that the
opportunity to be in the scientists role as well as the recreation of the scientists
times gives us information not only about the scientific event we are discussing,
but for the characters involved, the way that they interact and how they influence the
evolutions, shown through the prism of the socio-cultural matrix of their contemporary conditions.
225
All teachers participating in the electromagnetism case of the atlaswiki webbased learning environment confirmed that web2 with wiki delivery may move the
education procedure a step forward. The atlaswiki web-based learning environment
offers to pre- and in-service teachers a context to support and foster science
teaching, although atlaswiki can be a powerful source to help pre- and in-service
teachers understand and teach science to young students.
7. DISCUSSION
The development and reform of educational material is vital for pre- and in-service
teacher-training. The aim of the ATLAS Research Group is to go beyond the
traditionally developed instructional material that has a static, permanent form not
allowing reform, change and meaningful improvement. While, the development of
instructional e-material carries the ability to reform, change and improve towards
an advancing effectiveness and efficiency. In-service teachers, acting as userstrainees in the atlaswiki web-based learning environment, publish and communicate
their ideas in the form of texts, videos, multimedia material etc. minimizing both
time and storing space needed. Atlaswiki web-based learning environment gradually
overcomes a series of time and space obstacles, encouraging free and global
communication and interaction. At the same time, a double shift of roles is expected
to take place during the above interaction: the teacher is there not to teach but to
advise, encourage and facilitate (thats why the term facilitator is used in this paper),
while the learner (in-service teacher in this case) participates and re-structures the
teaching and learning procedure.
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Vassilis Koulountzos and Fanny Seroglou

ATLAS Research Group, School of Primary Education
Faculty of Education, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
54124 Thessaloniki, Greece
E-mail: bkoul@eled.auth.gr, seroglou@eled.auth.gr
227
CONSTANTINA STEFANIDOU AND IOANNIS VLACHOS
17. COULD SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES BE USED

AS A TOOL FOR TEACHING SCIENCE IN THE
COMPULSORY EDUCATION?
The Results of a Pilot Research Based on the Galileo Del Monte
Controversy about the Motion of the Pendulum
1. INTRODUCTION
In most countries it is generally accepted that science has a legitimate place in the
secondary school curriculum. In contemporary aims of science education, there is
an increasing interest in the nature of science (NOS). A scientifically literate
person should also develop a functional understanding of the nature of science
(Abd-EI Khalick et al, 1997). It is commonly accepted that scientific literacy includes
not only scientific knowledge but knowledge about science, its history, philosophy,
social and cultural aspects of science. However research has shown that this aim
has not been fulfilled (Lederman, 1992).
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The Contribution of History and Philosophy of Science to Scientific Literacy

of the Adolescent
The crisis in contemporary science education, as it is demonstrated by the escape
of teachers and students from science classes, as well as by scientific illiteracy,
reveals a need to make concise efforts at two levels: through curricula modification
and at personal level, for every teacher. In the last few years the necessity to introduce
elements from the history and philosophy of science has been recognized.
The history and philosophy of science is certainly not enough to solve every kind
of problem appearing in science education; however it can help a lot in dealing
with several of them. An extensive amount of research has been carried out on the
importance of history of science in teaching science.
Convincing arguments are provided, among others, by: Stephen Brush (1969),
Bernard Cohen (1950), James Conant (1947), Leo Klopfer (1969a), Helge Kragh
(1992), Walter Jung (1983), Michael Matthews (1992).
Interesting teaching suggestions based on the history of science have been made
by Kipnis (1992), Conant (1957), Klopfer (1969b), Seroglou & Koumaras (2001),
Malamitsa, Kokkotas, and Stamoulis (2005), Binnie (2001).
STEFANIDOU AND VLACHOS
There has been a developing interest in incorporating history of science into

curricula, in several countries around the world. Some of the above writers arguments in support of this view are presented by Matthews (Matthews, 2007). Matthews
(2007) summarizes the main findings of these researches:
The history of science encourages understanding of scientific concepts and
methods
Historical approaches combine the development of personal thinking with the
development of scientific ideas
The history of science carries very important data. Everyone should be aware of
Scientific historical events, such as scientific revolution, Darwinism, the
discovery of penicillin,
History of science is important in order to understand the nature of science
History of science counteracts scientism and dogmatism which appear in scientific
writings
History of science, through scientists life and work makes human dimension
appear, making sciences more attractive for the students
History of science displays the unity and continuity of the scientific enterprise.
According to Malamitsa, Kokkotas, and Stamoulis (2005), the use of history of
science in teaching science:
Helps creating teaching tools, which can improve the teaching of sciences
adopting a pluralistic methodology
Contributes to the development of students critical reasoning abilities.
Not only history of science but philosophy of science may help in science
education as well. Even if teachers do not realize that, philosophy of science is usually
incorporated in their teaching. For example, all science teachers use concepts such
as method, explanation, experiment, theory, law, hypothesis, truth, idealization,
etc. These terms are philosophical ones, and especially belong to the field of
epistemology. As Matthews (2000) points out:
in Germany, at the end of 19th century, Ernst Mach argued that both history
and philosophy of science should be a part of all school and university
science instruction.
Nowadays, there is a developing interest in epistemological subjects. Aims and
objectives referred to epistemology are included in Science Curricula depicting
science teachers concern about the issue.
The nature of science has long been of concern to science teachers and
curriculum developers. Since the early 19th century, when science first won
its place in the curriculum of some schools, it has been hoped that science
teaching would have a beneficial impact on the quality of culture and personal
life in virtue of students not only knowing science, but also internalizing
something of the scientific spirit. Clearly these longstanding aspirations for
science education depend upon some understanding by teachers and curriculum
developers of the methodological and epistemological aspects of science.
That is, they depend on some knowledge of the nature of science (Matthews,
2000).
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TOOL FOR TEACHING SCIENCE
The teaching of the nature of science is among the aims of Greek and international
curricula, since it helps achieving the objectives of scientific literacy. The Greek
curriculum, concerning the objectives of sciences states that aims at:
students familiarization with scientific thinking and scientific methodology (including observing, collecting and utilizing data, forming hypothesis,
experimenting, analyzing and interpreting data, drawing conclusions, making
generalizations and constructing models (Cross Thematic Curriculum Framework, p. 177).
Before we decide how to teach the nature of science we must address two
obvious questions: What is the nature of science and why is it important for
students to understand it? It is true that many answers have been given to both
questions.
In regard of the first question, although debate exists about certain aspects of
NOS, scientists and science educators can agree that the scientific enterprise possesses
a set of general characteristics that separates it from other disciplines or ways of
knowing.
According to McComas:
nature of science is the sum total of the rules of the game leading to knowledge production and the evaluation of truth claims in the natural sciences
(McComas, 2004).
McComas presented nine key ideas about the nature of science which represent a
concise set of ideas about science and a list of objectives for every science classroom.
The key ideas about NOS are (McComas, 2004):
Science demands and relies on empirical evidence
Knowledge production in science includes many common features and shared
habits of mind. However, in spite of such commonalities there is no single stepby-step scientific method by which all sciences is done
Scientific knowledge is tentative but durable. This means that science cannot
prove anything because the problem of induction makes proof impossible, but
scientific conclusions are still valuable and long lasting because of the way that
knowledge eventually comes to be accepted in science
Laws and theories are related but distinct kinds of scientific knowledge
Science is a highly creative endeavor
Science has a subjective element
There are historical, cultural, and social influences on science
Science and technology impact each other, but they are not the same
Science and its methods cannot answer all questions.
In regard to the second question, some of the reasons students should understand the nature of science is that it is crucial for reasonable decision making and
responsible local and global citizenship (Bell, 2003). On the other hand, understanding science prepares people to lead personally fulfilling and responsible lives.
The key driving force for the nature of science education is the need for students to
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acquire social skills, supported by individual skills, thus enabling students to play a
responsible role within society in terms of (Holbrook et al, 2007):
(a) developing social values such that a person can act in a responsible manner
within the community, system, nation, or, as in the school situation, at a smaller
group level;
(b) being able to function within the world of work at whatever the skill or
responsibility level; and
(c) possessing the conceptual background or skills of learning to learn to cope
with a need-to-have, relevant public understanding of science and technology
in a changing society.
The above findings suggest that nature of science not only enhances scientific
literacy, but it can humanize the sciences and make them more connected with
personal, ethical, cultural, and political concerns as well.
2.2 Contribution of Scientific Controversies to Science Education
Many major steps in science, probably all dramatic changes, and most of the fundamental achievements of what we now take as the advancement or progress of
scientific knowledge have been controversial. Scientific controversies are found
throughout the history of science. Some examples of scientific controversies are
between Aristotle, his precursors and predecessors about atoms, void, space, movement, celestial spheres, and so on, between Galileo and contemporary seventeenthcentury Aristotelians about the fundamental laws of motion, the structure of the
universe, the causes of tides, floating bodies, and so on. Moreover, Newton quarreled
with Descartes, Hooke, Boyle, and many others about colors, light, and other
topics. Einstein had extent controversies with Poincar and Lorentz about absolute
space and time, and with Bohr, Born, and many others about the interpretation of
quantum mechanical laws.
Scientific controversies are distinguished characteristics of the nature of science
in the way scientific ideas change. According to the British National Curriculum
Council (NCC, 1988, p. 113), among other skills,
students should be able to study scientific controversies and the ways in which
scientific ideas change.
History of science displays the existence of great crisis in the development and
growth of science, for instance from Aristotelian to classical physics, from classical
to modern physics. The United States National Research Council (NRC, 1994)
indicates that students completing a program of science should, among other things,
know that:
tracing the history of science can show how difficult it was for scientific
innovators to break through the accepted ideas of their time and reach to
conclusions that we currently take for granted.
There are at least four reasons for using scientific controversies in science teaching.
There is evidence (Gil & Solbes, 1993) that scientific disputes
232
can help to cause conceptual changes in pupils, so that they comply with
major changes in concepts, models and theories of the evolution of science.
Some ideas non prevailing at present, not only show the tentative character of
science but also unveil some pupils preconceptions and become important epistemological obstacles to overcome. Secondly, following a scientific debate can improve
students understanding of the inner workings of science. Thirdly (Kipnis, 2001)
suggests that:
showing scientific results as debatable issues makes science more similar to
other human activities that are easier to comprehend, such as a political debate
or a court proceedings, which may sparkle an interest in science in some
students.
Finally, scientific controversies can be useful in science teaching as students are
informed about nowadays scientific controversies, i.e. in bio-ethics, nuclear plants,
etc. and prefer group discussion about authentic issues than attending lectures.
2.3 Galileos and Del Montes Dispute on the Motion of the Pendulum
Since 4th century B.C, it was believed that motion of uniform velocity requires the
application of uniform force, which was Aristotles causative view about motion.
At the beginning of 17th century A.D, Galileo was the first who stated that uniform
motion requires no force, conducting his experiments on horizontal and inclined
planes. A body in motion will continue to move eternally unless there is a force that
stops it. Galileos New Science is fully appreciated by the majority of historians of
western science. Galileo has proposed one of the most revolutionary ideas: the idea
of inertia. His argument was opposite to Aristotles common-sense view about
motion. Aristotles idea of motion, that it requires the constant application of force,
is familiar to us in a way that Galileos never can be. According to Wolpert (1992),
the enormous conceptual change that the thinking of Galileo required shows
that science is not just about accounting for the unfamiliar in terms of the
familiar. Quite the contrary: science often explains the familiar in terms of the
unfamiliar.
Galileos study on pendulums motion was very important in scientific revolution.
Galileo used pendulum motion to establish his law of free fall, his law of
conservation of energy, and to undermine the crucial Aristotelian conceptual
distinction between violent and natural motions (Matthews, 2000, p. 2).
The importance of the pendulum for the scientific revolution has not been as widely
recognized as it deserves. Even Descartes, who didnt appreciated Galileos works,
wrote
Galileo seems to have written all his three dialogues for no other purpose than
to demonstrate that the descents and ascents of a pendulum are equal (Works,
letter 146, in Matthews, 2000, p. 2).
233
Recognizing the role of the pendulum in the Newtonian science, Westfall says:
it is not too much to assert that without the pendulum there would have been
no Principia (Westfall, 1990, p. 67 in Matthews, 2000, p. 2).
In spite the scientific, technological, cultural and philosophical importance of the
pendulum, it is placed in science curricula without his context. Science textbooks
pay little attention to the historical and philosophical background of the pendulum.
Often, it is introduced as an instance of simple periodic motion or as an application
of Second Newton Law (Textbook 2, Textbook 3). Usually the formula for
pendulums period is introduced as a matter of learning something, without any
history, philosophy or technology mentioned.
The debate between Guidobaldo del Monte and Galileo over the isochronous
motion of the pendulum, introduces the scientific community of the 17th century to
the New Science Era. The controversy between Galileo and del Monte was much
more philosophical than scientific. It was about the role of idealization in science,
the role of mathematics and the role of theory in observation.
But how did this crucial chapter of the scientific revolution started? Many
historians of science maintain that the curtain opened when the young Galileo
observed the regular swaying of the chandelier of a cathedral during Mass. Galileo
himself, mentions something relevant to this story in the Two New Sciences,
where Sagredo says:
you give me frequent occasion to admire the wealth and profusion of nature
when, from such common and even trivial phenomena, you derive facts which
are not only striking and new but which are often far removed from what we
have had imagined. Thousands of times I have observed vibrations especially
in churches where lamps, suspended by long cords, have been inadvertently
set into motion, but the most which I could infer from these observations was
that the view of those who think that such vibrations are maintained by the
medium is highly improbable But I never dreamed of learning that one and
the same body, when suspended from a string a hundred cubits long and
pulled aside through an arc of 90o or even 1o or o, would employ the same
time in passing through the least as through the largest of these arcs, and,
indeed, it still strikes me as somewhat unlikely (Galileo, 1638/1954, p. 97).
Regardless whether the story about the chandelier is accurate or not, Galileos
preoccupation with the motion in general and especially the motion of the pendulum,
had deep philosophical foundations and extensions. His interest in mathematics
was demonstrated, since 1588, during his lectures on mathematical issues in the
University of Pisa. The formal method which Galileo used for the study of the
pendulum is the one he created to study the motion on the inclined plane. More
precisely, he studied the different forces required for a body to ascend inclined
planes of various inclinations.
Taking fast and steady steps, Galileo was bidding farewell to the Aristotelian
science and philosophy. It is obvious that Galileos methodology was contradicting
the Aristotelian reality.
234
According to the Aristotelian philosophy, we should study the world as it is

and not as we would like it to be. Galileo was the first to use mathematics and
experiments guided by mathematics to discover the properties of pendulum motion.
Until 1600 Galileo had managed to study the motion of the pendulum through the
motion of a sphere inside a concave spherical surface, applying mathematics in
conjunction with idealization. Galileo at different stages made four claims about
pendulum motion (Matthews, 2000, p. 95):
Period varies with the square root of length: the Law of Length.
Period is independent of amplitude: the Law of Amplitude Independence.
Period is independent of weight: the Law of Weight Independence.
For a given length all periods are the same: the Law of Isochrony.
A major rival of Galileos who opposed his views on the motion of the pendulum
was his academic patron Guidobaldo del Monte (15451607). Del Monte had been
a follower of the Aristotelian natural philosophy. A distinguished engineer and
mathematician of his era, he had also writings on timekeeping. His relationship with
Galileo was far from being antagonistic. Galileo in fact owed him his position in
the universities of Pisa and Padua. His disagreement with Galileo was mostly philosophical than anything else. Del Monte believed, as every Aristotelian of his era,
that knowledge is embedded in experience. Whatever is not perceived through the
senses, particularly sight could not be correct. In our case, he had been unable to
prove experimentally the theoretical positions of Galileo about the isochrony of the
pendulums motion. On the other hand, Galileo was the first to use the idealization
approach in a concise manner, so as to refer to an ideal pendulum and not to the
real one with which Del Monte conducted his experiments.
Del Monte believed theory should not be separated from application, believed
that mind and hand should be connected (Matthews, 2000, p. 101).
This great historical dispute between the old and new science reaches its peak through
their correspondence in 1602, part of which is quoted below. Galileo writes:
You must excuse my importunity if I persist in trying to persuade you of the
truth of the proposition that motions within the same quarter circle are made
in equal times The moveable B passes through the large arc BCD and
returns by the same DCB and then goes back toward D, and it goes 500 or
1000 times repeating its oscillations. The other goes likewise from F to G and
then returns to F, and will similarly make many oscillations; and in the time
that I count, say, the first 100 large oscillations BCD, DCB and so on, another
observer counts 100 of the other oscillations through FIG, very small, and he
does not count even one more a most evident sign that one of these large
arcs BDC consumes as much time as each of the small ones FIG. Now, if all
BCD is passed in as much time [as that] in which FIG [is passed], though
[FIG is] but one-half there of, these being descents through unequal arcs of
the same quadrant, they will be made in equal times. But even without
troubling to count many, you will see that moveable F will not make its small
oscillations more frequently than B makes its larger ones; they will always be
together. The experiment you tell me you made in the [rim of a vertical] sieve
235
may be very inconclusive, perhaps by reason of the surface not being perfectly
circular, and again because in a single passage one cannot well observe the
precise beginning of motion. But if you will take the same concave surface
and let ball B go freely from a great distance, as at point B, it will go through
a large distance at the beginning of its oscillations and a small one at the end
of these, yet it will not on that account make the latter more frequently than
the former (Drake, 1978, pp. 6971).
The above letter is considered a milestone in the history of science for many reasons.
It sheds light on Galileos crucial steps in the development of New Science.
In the scope of the present work we shall focus on the use of idealization and
mathematics in science construction. Galileo argued that the movement of a sphere
inside a concave ring was isochronous, in the sense that the period of the spheres
oscillation is independent from the amplitude of the oscillation. Del Monte was
unable to prove Galileos argument experimentally. Galileo argued that his theory
was correct provided that the surface is perfect and perfectly spherical and the
oscillating object is perfectly spherical. This statement depicts the step he made
moving from real to ideal conditions. He had made similar transitions in the past
while studying motion on a horizontal plane. Then he stated that if external interferences (friction) were negligible, then the body will move forever in constant
speed, rejecting thus the Aristotelian doctrine, according to which a body maintains
constant speed when under constant force. Del Monte who was an Aristotelian and
an engineer failed to believe Galileo since his own experiments on the subject
failed. Galileo maintained that the experiments failed due to some mishaps, urging
del Monte to repeat them bearing in mind his remarks. Galileos idealizations may
seem to us absolutely rational and self explanatory, but at that time they were unheard
of. We have been nurtured with Newtonian physics, but we must not forget that at
the time the above mentioned dispute took place, the Aristotelian philosophy was
prevalent and Aristotelian doctrines matched to common logic much better.
Both Galileo and del Monte felt that mathematics should be employed in the task
of explaining phenomena, but Guidobaldo never compromised with the differences
between mathematical theories and the real world. Galileo, though initially sharing
this view with his patron was intent on combining mathematics with scientific
explanations. The interaction between the two great figures of the history of science
had been exceptionally constructive since del Montes criticism was a source of
inspiration for Galileo for the study of motion in general.
it was primarily the contact with Guidobaldo del Monte which, in a decisive
moment of Galileos intellectual development, encouraged him to take up the
life-perspective of the risky but rewarding career of an engineer-scientist
(Renn et al., 1998, p. 41).
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
3.1 Purpose and Choices

According to theoretical framework and the educational needs mentioned above,
the controversy between Galileo and del Monte is suitable not only as a tool for the
236
study of the simple pendulum, but also as a teaching tool for some aspects of the
nature of science that both students and teachers must be interested in.
The purpose of the present pilot research is to incorporate the nature of science
in teaching using as a tool the scientific philosophical controversy between
Galileo and del Monte, and especially the concept of idealization. Particularly, a
handy teaching tool is constructed through the view of nature of science based on
the historical elements of the controversy between Galileo and del Monte. Considering
the curricula objectives, students previous knowledge, time available and contemporary tendencies in science education, specific activities were integrated in the
teaching interventions, so as to increase students interest and let the big picture
of science be revealed. Particularly, the controversy of Galileo and Del Monte on
the isochrony of the simple pendulums motion was chosen based on the following:
The simple pendulum is included in Greek physics textbooks used at the upper
secondary level of education (Lyceum, 10th 12th grades).
The content on the simple pendulum, as it is presented in textbooks is no more
than an introduction to oscillations or an application of the 2nd Newton Law,
offering only the formula of the period of the simple gravity pendulum
(Textbook 2, Textbook 3).
The study of the simple pendulum offers a chance for the study of the processes
trough which science evolves.
More precisely, working on the disagreement about pendulum motion, students
can experience the idea of idealization, as it was put forward, for the first time in
the history of science by Galileo, introducing them in a subtle way to the philosophy of science.
By studying the letters exchanged by Galileo and Del Monte which depict the
controversy between them, students have a chance to understand and identify a
lot of the characteristics of the nature of science in practice.
The setup for the simple pendulum experimentation is based on easily obtainable
cheap materials, and transformable to resemble the historical experiments.
Galileos study of simple pendulum enforced the change of his contemporary
scientific view on motion.
Through the study of the simple pendulum, students can realize the relation
between sciences and mathematics, especially geometry, and part of their
interaction with philosophy (Matthews, 2007).
The study of pendulum motion by Galileo is suitable for presenting the main
epistemological views and how the episode of pendulum can support some of
them.
The simple pendulum in its historical context can be used for cross-disciplinary
teaching (Seroglou, 2007).
3.2 Sample Place Time
The sample of the present survey is a convenient sample, parameter which classifies
this research as Pilot. The sample of students was drawn from a class of the
2nd grade of Lyceum (11th grade) of the 1st Lyceum of the municipality of Vyronas
237
close to Athens. This defined population numbered 19 students. In the first lesson,
3 students were absent and in the second one another 3. Thus the sample was
restricted to 13 students, who attended all three phases of the research. This small
sample does not allow statistic analysis of results and of course neither their
generalization. The majority of the students who participated in the survey were
oriented to study Humanities at the University. Some of them were not interested in
sciences while there was a settled opinion that science is so difficult that they could
not manage with it. It is worth noting that Humanities oriented students responded
positively, when they realized that no formulas and mathematics were included.
With regard to students who were natural sciences oriented, they immediately
recognized that the particular lesson had nothing to do with the preparation for the
national entrance examinations. As a result, their interest was diminished. The
intervention lasted two teaching periods of 90 minutes and took place in the school
laboratory.
The present pilot research started in the beginning of April 2009 and was
completed at the end of the same month. The research was conducted in the
following phases:
Students completed the pre- test questionnaire to assess their knowledge before
the specific teaching interventions.
Two 2 hours teaching interventions, the course of which is presented in detail.
Students completed the post- test questionnaire after the research to assess the
attaining of the teaching objectives.
3.3 Instrumentation
The objectives of intervention. After the two 2 hour sessions teaching intervention,
students should be able to:
Experimentally ascertain the isochrony of pendulum motion.
Discriminate some of the nature of science aspects, such as that science is
developing not only through experimentation but through theory conception as
well.
Identify the way science works in its social context, using the dispute between
Galileo and del Monte for pendulum motion.
Appreciate the idealizations role in science development.
The Worksheets. During the two teaching interventions, students used worksheets
which included activities such as: traditional lab work, i.e. measuring the period of
oscillation at different pendulum lengths and different amplitudes, studying modified
texts from History of Science, group discussions, debates.
The Questionnaires. The questionnaires used for pre and post test were improvised
by us, according to the research purpose. They consist of 19 questions in total, 2 of
which are multiplechoice, 5 of truefalse type, 10 Likert scale, and 2 free-response
questions (written paragraphs). Each teaching objective is assessed by more than
one type of question.
238
3.4 Learning Impediments

The majority of the students are adhering to empirical data. They believe only
what they see. The main reason is that most of them havent reached the stage of
abstract thinking yet.
Most of our high school students (and lower level college students) are at a
dualistic stage of intellectual development at which they are incapable of understanding one philosophical view while holding an opposing one (Smith et al,
1998).
Taking into consideration the structure and the content of science textbooks,
students have not experienced the social character of science.
Students are not familiar with teaching textual material (Demopoulos, 2007).
In science textbooks, scientific knowledge is mainly presented through its
products, diminishing the role of its processes (Koulaidis, 2002).
3.5 Choices for Overcoming Learning Impediments
With respect to the first impediment, we suggest that students should do the first
worksheet activity. The suggested activity to be an optical illusion. Trying to
answer the questions, students might doubt their beliefs about the role of
experience as truth criterion. They may realize that a statement is not true just
because it can be verified by experience.
In regard to the second, third and fourth impediment, we prepared the ground
for familiarization with scientific processes and textual material, before the
teaching interventions. Particularly, during the preceding lessons, students had
some exercise in reading comprehension using texts and dialogues related to
scientific processes. This way, they got familiar with textual context and besides
encountered some of the social aspects of scientific enterprise.
3.6 Other Constraints
Beyond the above mentioned impediments the intervention and the learning results
were influenced by the fact that the pilot research took place at the end of the
school year. Students were engrossed in recaps for their exams. In addition, their
reactions were influenced by the following:
The students were not accustomed to the environment and the procedures of the
school science laboratory. As such, they were belayed and required some
additional guidance to accomplish measurements.
The nature of the teaching objectives is different from what the students were
used to in their science classes. Thus, the students had to adapt their thinking to
the new requirements.
Students had limited experience in group work or collaborative learning. This
impeded their collaboration in measurement tasks and their joining in
discussions.
239
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 we present the obtained results, separately for every

teaching objective. For every question there is the number of accepted, non accepted
and partially accepted answers in the pre and post test. The true-false questions
and the multiple choice questions are categorized as accepted or non accepted
answers.
Regarding the Likert scale questions, they are categorized as accepted, partially
accepted or non accepted answers. Accepted and non accepted answers are the
answers that correspond to A and B or D and E or conversely. Partially accepted
answers are the answers that correspond to C. Accepted means accepted within the
framework of intervention. This framework is described by the teaching objectives
referring either in scientific knowledge, or in epistemological issues. For example,
one of the questions of the pre-post test is question 9, which mentions If two
scientists have different views on a topic, it is meaningless for them to discuss and
interact. In this specific question, accepted answer is considered D and E, non
accepted is considered A and B, and C is a partially accepted answer.
Regarding the written paragraphs, we adopted the following marks distribution.
Supposing that 5 marks are given to a perfect answer, understanding of the answer
contributes with 1 mark, use of the language is marked with 1 mark, 2 marks are
given to rational thinking and 1 mark is given to the conclusion. That means that
3 of the 5 marks are given to the whole concept of the paragraph. We consider an
answer as accepted when it takes 3 marks or more, partially accepted when it is
marked with more than 2 marks and less than 3, and non accepted when it is
marked with 2 marks or less.
4.1 Teaching Objective 1
The first teaching objective: Students to verify experimentally if the motion of the
simple pendulum is isochronous or not, was assessed by questions 1, 4, 5, and 16.
Questions 1, 4 and 5 are true false questions while question 16 is a multiple choice
question. The first objectives findings can be shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Findings on first teaching objective
Objective 1: Students to verify experimentally if the motion of the simple pendulum is
isochronous or not
Pre test (% of answers)
Post test (% of answers)
Change
Question 1 4 5 16 Total
% of 1 4 5 16 Total
% of
%
answers
answers
Accepted 8 3 5 5
21
40.38 10 3 7 4
24
46.15
5.77
Partially
0.00
accepted
Non
5 10 8 8
31
59.62
3 10 6 9
28
53.85
-5.77
accepted
Total
13 13 13 13 52
100
13 13 13 13 52
100
0.00
240
From the above findings we could reach the following conclusion for the first
objective. The teaching intervention had a limited impact on students knowledge
about the period of the pendulum. There is 5.77% increase in accepted answers
comparing pre and post tests. One of the possible reasons is that the particular
students are not familiar with laboratory work. It means they cannot easily interpret
the experimental data in a theoretical framework. Although they got the right data,
they couldnt reach a safe conclusion of what these data were.
Previous studies of students views about data interpretation have suggested
that students often do not recognize the role of theoretical ideas in the interpretation of data (Ryder et al, 2000).
Apart from that, it is possible that some questions were not enough on-spot. For
example question 4 had the same number of accepted answers before and after the
intervention. A possible reason is that during the 1st lesson, through Activity 2,
students conducted the experiment 2, referring to the different shapes of the pendulum
bob, but it was not emphasized that the air resistance depends on the shape. Students
easily concluded that pendulum period depends on the shape, but understandably
they didnt associate the shape with the air resistance. It is better to mildly
differentiate both the activity and the pre- post- question. The results of question
number 16 embarrass us too. According to this multiple choice question, students
should decide whether the tenth oscillation of a simple pendulum has a bigger,
smaller or the same period with the first oscillation. We should have mentioned
that the oscillation was a small amplitude one.
The second teaching objective for students to Discriminate some of the nature of
science aspects, such as that science is developing not only through experimentation
but through theory conception as well was assessed by questions 6, 7, 14 and 18.
Questions 6, 7 and 14 are Likert questions, while question 18 is a written paragraph.
The second objectives findings are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Findings on second teaching objective
Objective 2: Discriminate some of the nature of science aspects, such as that science is
developing not only through experimentation but through theory conception as well
Change
Total
Question 6 7 14 18 Total % of
6 7 14 18
% of
answers
answers
Accepted 9 4 12 5
30
57.69
9 5 11 6
31
59.61 +1.92%
Partially 1 4 1 3
9
17.31
3 2
2
7
13.46 -3.85%
accepted
Non
3 5
5
13
25
1 6 2
5
14
26.93 +1.93%
accepted
Total
13 13 13 13
52
100
13 13 13
13
52
100
241
From the above findings we can reach the following conclusion for the second
objective. A large amount of students had already adopted an accepted or partially
accepted point of view before the teaching interventions. The teaching interventions
had a marginal positive and negative impact on students knowledge about the role
of theory in scientific development. It is worth commenting that some students
seemed to deteriorate their opinion about the role of theory in observation. In this
point two things can be inferred. According to Mayling (1997):
changes in the epistemological profile of students may occur, but it is a long
term objective.
On the other hand, there might be a problem with the Likert questions as Aikenhead
et al. (1987) mention:
they give little guidance for understanding student viewpoints.
Also, according to Aikenhead (1988):
the Likert type responses were the most inaccurate, offering only a guess at
student beliefs. Such guesswork calls into question the use of Likert type
standardized tests that claim to assess student views about science.
Additionally, it is the content of the questions that should have been different.
For example question 14, Science is not based solely in observations cannot
be considered a successful one, because it contains the word solely which makes
it have an obvious answer. As a result, 12 out of 13 answers were accepted in
the pre test. Regarding question 18, which is a written paragraph, we concluded
that most students repeated their words in the pre and post tests. Some of the
answers were also ambiguous. There is at least one reason for which the paragraphs
were not clear enough. Students may not have understood the meaning of one
or more words e.g. expand or contract so the accepted answers didnt increase
much.
Moreover, improvement in written paragraphs requires improvement in reading
comprehension, rational thinking and ability of students to express themselves.
The skills mentioned are long term objectives not only of science education but of
education in general. Thats why Aikenhead (1988) suggests that written paragraphs
should be compared with semi-structured interviews, if possible, and we fully
concur.
The third objective for students to Identify the way science works in its social
context, using the dispute between Galileo and Del Monte for pendulum motion
was assessed by questions 2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 15, and 17. Questions 2 and 3 are true - false
questions, questions 8, 9, 13, and 15 are Likert questions and question 17 is a multiple
choice question.
The findings of the third objective are shown in Table 3.
242
Table 3. Findings on the third teaching objective

Objective 3: Identify the way science works in its social context, using the dispute between Galileo
and Del Monte for pendulum motion
Change
Question
2 3 8 9 13 15 17 Total
Accepted 10 9 9 11 12 10 12
Partially
1
3
accepted
Non
3 4 3 2 1
1
accepted
Total
13 13 13 13 13 13 13
73
4
% of 2 3 8 9 13 15 17 Total % of
answers
answers
80.22 12 10 9 10 9 12 13 75 82.42 +2.2%
4.39
2 1 2 1
6
6.59 +2.2%
14
15.39
91
100
13 13 13 13 13 13 13
10
10.99
91
100
-4.4%
From the above findings we can conclude that the teaching intervention had a
quite limited impact on students behavior towards the social context of science.
The majority of students had already adopted an accepted point of view before the
intervention and maintained it. Pre test results show that most of the students had a
quite positive background regarding the social aspect of science. Therefore there
was little room for improvement. The number of non accepted answers diminished
4.4% while the corresponding number of partially accepted and accepted answers
increased 2.2% each.
The fourth teaching objective for students to Appreciate the role of idealization in
sciences development was assessed by questions 10, 11, 12, and 19. Questions
10, 11, 12 are Likert questions and question 19 is a written paragraph.
Table 4. Findings on the fourth teaching objective
Objective 4: Appreciate the role of idealization in sciences development
Question 10 11 12 19 Total
% of 10 11 12 19 Total % of
answers
answers
Accepted 8 8 3 6
25
48.07 9 6 11 6
32
61.54
3 2 4 7
16
30.78 3 1
7
11
21.15
Partially
accepted
Non
2 3 6
11
21.15 1 6 2
9
17.31
accepted
Total
13 13 13 13 52
100
13 13 13 13 52
100
Change
+13.47
-9.63%
-3.84%
From the above results, it is clearly induced that the interventions had a quite positive
impact on students view about the role of idealization in science. Specifically, there
has been a slight increase of the accepted answers (13.47% of the total number of
the answers) which demonstrate that some students appreciated the method of
idealization in science making after the interventions. It is worth commenting that
students showed stability in their written paragraphs in question 19. There was no
243
change in their overall score. This partially has to do with the recognized impediment
of textual material (Demopoulos, 2007). It was not easy for them either to express
themselves neither to develop their writings in such a short period of time (Aikenhead,
1988).
From Table 4 we can conclude that something goes wrong with question 11, which
congregates more accepted answers in the pre test than the post test. Specifically,
the question mentions that The study of physical world should not be carried out
using non physical terms, meaning objects that do not really exist, but exist only in
theory, for instance smooth plane, weightless string, etc.. The verbalization is
not clear enough as the phrase contains three negative sentences. It should have
been expressed better retaining the same meaning.
Except of question 12 which noted very important positive changes between pre
and post test, the rest of the questions had either limited impact, no impact or opposite
impact. It is a prevalent belief among science educators that:
idealization in science has been recognized as one of the major stumbling
blocks to meaningful learning of science (Nersessian, 1992).
Students are very deeply influenced by everyday concrete experience. As a result,
they confront a problem in conceiving the abstract scientific ideas.
5. SUGGESTIONS
The pilot run showed the necessity to apply an amount of modifications to the research
tools which are presented below as suggestions for improvement. These are presented
separately for each teaching objective to facilitate tracking and control.
5.1 First Objective
During the experiment 2 in the 2nd activity, students examine whether the period of
the pendulum depends on the shape of the bob. After the question According to
your opinion, does the shape of the bob influence the pendulum period? the
questions Why?, How can you explain the above dependence? must follow. In
this way students can make connections between the shape of the bob and the air
resistance, and be more effective when answering question 4 about air resistance.
Regarding question 16, we should have mentioned that the oscillation was a small
amplitude one. So, it better alters to: A simple pendulum needs 1 second for its first,
small amplitude, oscillation. The same pendulum needs for its tenth oscillation:
a. More than 1 second b. Less than 1 second c. Exactly 1 second d. Depends on the
pendulum.
5.2 Second Objective
As it is above mentioned, Likert scale questions give little guidance in understanding
students viewpoints. We suggest replacing questions 6 and 14 with a true-false
and a multiple choice question. Specifically, question 6 alters to Observations
enhance, support and reinforce theories rather than prove them while question 14 is
replaced by Scientists should: a. be continuously conducting experiments b. always
244
trust the empirical data in interpreting their experiments c. be making theories no

matter their empirical data d. pay attention not only in empirical data but in theory
conception as well.
Regarding question 18, we fully concur with Aikenheads view that written
paragraphs should be compared with semi-structured interviews. In order to remove
any impediment caused by the vocabulary, it is suggested that we should explain the
terms expand and contract. Regarding the semi-structured interview, we ask questions
like: Apart from the empirical data, which other factors influence scientists viewpoint?, What exactly do you mean saying?, What do you mean saying that
scientists are influenced by their colleagues? Having in mind the already
recognized impediment of textual material (Demopoulos, 2007), conducting semistructured interviews will allow students to express their views more explicitly.
5.3 Third Objective
Trying to improve students results in future researches, we suggest that some
questions should be embodied in activity 6. The questions directly refer to the
social aspect of science as it is outlined by the dispute between Galileo and del
Monte. The questions should be answered in a group work spirit. Such questions
are: What is your opinion about the relationship between Galileo and del Monte?,
Why do you think Galileo was trying to persuade his colleague that he was
right?, Which role did del Monte play in the development of Galileos theory of
pendulum motion? If students work on the above questions, they will attain better
results in the specific objective.
Referring to pre-post test questions, according to the results, we suggest that
we should replace Likert questions 9 and 13, for the reasons mentioned above.
So, question 9 is replaced by the following multiple choice question: Scientists
communicate with each other mainly because: a. it is obligatory by the institutions
b. everyone wants to establish his viewpoint, especially when he deserves it c. they
discuss their difficulties and become more effective d. todays society appreciate
such communications. Concerning question 13, it is replaced by the following
written paragraph: Describe the role that colleagues play in scientists path. A semistructured interview follows the written paragraph. The following questions are
included: What do you mean by?, Which advantages and disadvantages of
collaboration among scientists can you mention?, Is it worth for a scientist to
collaborate with his colleagues?
5.4 Forth Objective
For reasons already mentioned above, we suggest that question 11 should be replaced
by the following true-false question: The study of the physical world should be
carried out using physical terms, instead of non physical terms like smooth
plane, weightless string that exist only in theory. Referring to question 19,
which is a written paragraph, we have to conduct semi-structured interviews.
Such interviews include question like What do you mean by ?, Why do you
think we use free fall if it doesnt exist?, In which cases the fall of a body is
245
approximately a free fall? After the interviews it is expected that students will
express their change in view more explicitly.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The pilot intervention described above, in general terms, had a limited impact. The
results are not suitable for statistical analysis and generalization because the sample
was both limited and convenient. The best achieved goal was the one regarding the
method of idealization in science. Second to that was the first goal of the research,
about the isochronous motion of the pendulum. The second and third goals of the
research were met with very little success.
The students, who participated in the present study, had never before attended
a lesson based in a teaching reconstruction in the context of history and philosophy
of science. There were benefits and drawbacks in using the history and philosophy
context for the first time. On the one hand, even students who avoid mathematic
formulas, had the opportunity to make sense of the reasoning that was developing
and actively participate in the group work. On the other hand, some students did
not appreciate the absence of mathematical formulas and thought that the topic was
not very important so as to devote attention.
According to the literature, interventions of this kind, of a historical philosophical
approach, require considerably longer time to yield satisfactory results.
The coexistence of experiments with teaching in a historical philosophical frame
is a matter of research. There are different learning impediments to overcome in
these two cases.
The pre and post test data gathering tool contained four types of questions: True
false, Likert, multiple choice and written paragraph. Judging the research results
and the input from literature it is assumed that Likert questions are not reliable when
used for measuring views related to the Nature of Science, because students choose
the Likert degree mostly in random. Concerning the written paragraph questions,
there is a doubt on the motivation of students, their ability to express themselves,
moreover to express their change of view. For safer results, it is suggested to
conduct an assessment with semi-structured interviews in conjunction with a
questionnaire. This would provide a clearer comparison of the students views.
The pilot researchs findings have provided useful material for us in order to make
suggestions that refer both to the teaching tools and the pre- post- test. The alterations
made raise much greater expectations for future researches. We can cautiously
conclude that although a lot remains to be done, teaching nature of science using
historical scientific controversies will prove its value in the long term and will
justify the efforts of teachers and researchers in the field.
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Constantina Stefanidou PhD candidate and Ioannis Vlachos PhD

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GYOUNGHO LEE AND ARIE LEEGWATER1
18. RESOLVING DILEMMAS IN ACQUIRING

KNOWLEDGE OF NEWTONS FIRST LAW IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE HELPFUL?
1. INTRODUCTION
A historical approach has been regarded as one of the most useful ways of teaching
science. Many studies in science education have in fact recognized the importance
of the history of science (Niaz, 1998). For instance, Solomon (1989) argued that the
teaching of the history of science would be useful in the following ways: displaying
science as culture; illustrating the nature of scientific knowledge; showing the human
face of science; and understanding the social relations of science. Matthews (1994)
discussed the role of history of science in promoting science teaching. He saw it
enhancing better comprehension of scientific concepts and methods, and aiding
in connecting the development of an individuals thinking with scientific ideas. The
history of science is intrinsically worthwhile, being necessary for an understanding
of the nature of science and counteracting the influence of scientism and dogmatism.
It also humanizes the subject matter and allows connections to be made among
different topics and disciplines of science.
Recently, Stinner (2008) summarized his reasons for including historical
components in science curricula as follows:
i. History promotes a better understanding of scientific concepts and methods,
ii. History is a storehouse for educational ideas, experiments, and interesting
case studies,
iii. History connects the development of individual thinking with the
development of scientific ideas,
iv. History presents science as a dynamic and often revolutionary process. This
process can be seen as an adventure in ideas that adds to the totality of the
human experience,
v. Important episodes in the history of science and culture should be familiar to
all students,
vi. History of science is necessary to understand the nature of science,
vii. Recent research has shown a parallel between the discovery process and the
learning process,
viii. History counteracts the scientism and dogmatism that are often found in the
media and even in texts and classrooms,
ix. History teaches that scientific theories are tentative, but sometimes very robust
and shows how and why it is so difficult to overthrow critically established
ideas in science,
LEE AND LEEGWATER
x. History allows us to compare the difficulties we encounter in todays

scientific theories with those of earlier times. This comparison may help us
understand the limits of our theories better, clearing a path toward further
development in research,
xi. History allows connections to be made within topics and disciplines of
science as well as with other disciplines,
xii. History often provides simple examples that show how science, technology
and society are interdependent. Even the origin of certain scientific mythologies
can be demonstrated through historical studies,
xiii. History humanizes the subject matter of science.
However, there are a number of objections to the inclusion of history of science
in the science curriculum. For instance, there are several obstacles to its inclusion
such as the lack of sufficient time for instruction or that the introduction of erroneous
content and/or strange concepts may be confusing. Besides teachers may also lack
the appropriate knowledge background (Galili, 2008). The first obstacle of insufficient
time for instruction could be resolved if the historical content was interwoven into
the regular teaching instead of being added as separate material. Many old ideas
in the historical development of science have indeed been nave and frequently
controversial. This can certainly confuse students. However, this fact should not be
an obstacle to learning science. We cannot understand science solely through the
rhetoric of final conclusions, which most science textbooks emphasize. Important
questions make sense only in the context of their own time. Any issue is illuminated
by placing it in its historical context. There is good evidence that in order to
engender meaningful learning, it is essential that teaching and learning methods be
imbedded in an appropriate context (Kenealy, 1989; Martin & Brouwer, 1991).
Historical contexts address the why and how aspects of the development of
science and technology in a way that includes scientists as living, breathing persons
who are concerned with personal, ethical, sociological, and political issues (Niaz
et al., 2010). It is generally accepted that this form of presentation is likely to
increase the motivation of students (Niaz et al., 2010).
It is true that many science teachers are not sufficiently acquainted with the
history of science. Teacher training seldom includes the history of science (Galili,
2008). However, this cannot be a legitimate reason for excluding the history of
science in science curricula. As we indicated earlier, there are many reasons why
the history of science is important in teaching science. In addition, history (and
philosophy) of science can directly help the science teacher in many ways. For
instance, Aduriz-Bravo and Izquierdo (2003) summarized the contribution of history
of science to teachers as follows;
i. it can provide content that teachers could use it in their science classes. An
important aim of scientific literacy is to know about science,
ii. it can help teachers find innovative methods of teaching scientific content,
and
iii. it can provide teachers with a second-order, meta-cognitive perspective that
may favor their autonomy, self-regulation and professionalization.
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RESOLVING DILEMMAS IN ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE
Kokkotas et al., (2009) argues that teachers studying case studies from history
and philosophy of science could get a better understanding of how scientists design
experiments, interpret results, pose questions, generate alternative hypotheses, etc,
and thereby better understand the nature of science.
Science teaching is an uncertain ill-defined domain of knowledge and practice.
Teachers struggle to strike a balance among competing educational goals and
practices. What could make contribution to science teachers to help solve their
complex problems, especially dilemmas-ones which often cannot be resolved in
simple ways? Can the history of science provide a practical guide to teachers who
face dilemmas in their school science classrooms? The purpose of this study was to
investigate the positive role of history of science in resolving such dilemmas. First,
we examine the tension between personal experience and the formal representation
of scientific knowledge in the case of a teachers presentation of Newtons First
law in a physics classroom. Secondly, we present the historical case of natural
motion and its potential for resolving the dilemmas of teaching Newtons First law.
2. DILEMMAS IN PRESENTING NEWTONS FIRST LAW IN THE CLASSROOM
This study aims to explore the usefulness of history of science in addressing dilemmas
in the teaching of physics. We choose a case found in John Wallace & William
Loudens book, Dilemmas of science teaching (2002). The book explores sixteen
contemporary issues in science education, through an examination of the practical
dilemmas these issues create for teachers. In our case, the dilemma generated between
scientific law (formal representation of knowledge) and personal experience is
illustrated by a story written by a physics teacher, David Geelan. The physics teacher
is confronted by students disbelief in Newtons First Law of Motion in a Grade 11
physics class. He begins:
Were discussing Newtons first law of motion. Ive written it up on the
board, in the form that I think flows the best: An object remains in a state of
rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless acted upon by an unbalanced external force. But it doesnt interject Neil.
Here is the continuing discussion between Mr. Geelan and his students:
Neils: The first part is OK - if somethings not moving, you have to have a force
to make it move. But if something is moving, its eventually gonna slow down
and stop.
Teacher: No [I explain (patiently considering how I feel)], thats because there
are forces acting that we dont notice. When things are moving they often have
friction forces, from air resistance or whatever. Thats what slows them down.
Neils: Yeah, but the whole point is that Newtons law isnt right, because if
something is moving it will slow down. So why make up a law that says it
wont? Whats a law like that good for?
Teacher: OK then, [I say]. think about what happens in outer space, where
there are no forces like friction and wind resistance. Out there, an object will
continue in the same straight line forever.
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LEE AND LEEGWATER
Kelly: But how do we know that? [pipes up Kelly] Weve never been to outer
space.
[James joins in]
James: Yeah, and youre always telling us that science is about trying to
explain our own experiences - in our experience, things always slow down and
stop after a while. So, Newtons Law is no good for explaining our
experiences.
Phillip: Lots of stuff in physics is like that though, [says Phillip] it took ages
for the scientists to even work out whether lights a particle or a wave, because
you cant see it or feel it or anything.
Jill: Yeah, they still dont know, and there are other things in science like
atoms and molecules that you cant experience: so whats the use?
Mr. Geelan had no doubt that the Newtonian revolution was enormously important
historically and philosophically. But he thought that to explain the kids normal,
everyday experiences like rolling a skateboard along a car park, Aristotles impetus
theory just works better. And he thought, That being the case, its extremely difficult,
from a science-for-all value position, to defend teaching Newtonian physics at the
secondary school. He said to students: Ill need some time to think about your
point, but I think its well taken, Perhaps we can investigate ways that Newtons
laws might be useful. Um well, if you go on to do physics at university, youll
need to do this stuff. Even though he said things like that, he had different ideas in
his mind. He said in his mind, I hate this, even as I say it If something has no
intrinsic value for me now, but just the chance of being useful at some later time,
why should I put energy into learning it now? Finally, he recognized the dilemmas
between students personal experience and formal representation of scientific knowledge. He mentioned that, There is a gap between what Im preaching-experiencebased science for all and what I am teaching. So what should change the students,
the science or my educational values?
As one can see, here is a dilemma, specifically one between personal experiences
and formal representation of scientific knowledge (formal knowledge, laws). So
what should change? We simply cannot choose just one and eliminate the other.
Each side of the dilemma has its own strengths, but also its own weaknesses. This very
state of affairs heightens the dilemma.
3. INTERPRETING THE DUAL COMPONENTS OF THE DILEMMA
In this section, we will try to interpret the dual components of the dilemma. First,
lets examine the personal experiences side. It is one of the most basic assumptions
of constructivism that learning is experience-based, context-bound, and domainspecific. Personal experience is important and constitutes the basic resource for
learning science. Considering, weighing, and connecting personal experiences are
crucial for effective learning. Connecting with personal experiences can motivate
students to actively engage learning and construct knowledge. However, an overemphasis on personal experiences can create difficulties. Making sense of natural
phenomena and of ourselves requires a greater, more concerted, effort than relying
252
on personal experience or nave observation. This is an example of a negative

effect of overemphasizing personal experience in a teachers mind. At the end of
the episode, the teacher said, If Aristotles impetus theory of motion explains our
everyday experiences better than Newtons or Einsteins schemes, then we ought to
teach it Aristotle would be taught, not as a historical curiosity for ridicule or
background, but as a viable, useful model for understanding what happens around
us. To a science teacher this sounds almost heretical, but if were serious about our
constructivist teaching innovations and about science for all students, then perhaps
the science must come to the students, rather than vice versa.
Aristotles ideas would seem to be more intuitive and easier to grasp for students
than Newtonian explanations. In addition it is also valuable to study that idea in
order to understand how explanations of motion have changed over time. However,
we cannot simply teach aspects of science which seems to make it easy to explain
a particular phenomenon, but that in reality are nave and limited. We need to help
students learn how they can make sense of the physical world around us, not only
in the past, but also in the present; not only from the students side, but also from
sciences side.
Secondly, let us consider the formal representation of scientific knowledge. It
takes simple/abstract/elegant forms. Thus, it is an effective way to inform students
of what scientists have discovered and how to apply discoveries in an efficient
manner. In the early 1960s, the structure of the disciplines that Bruner and Schwab
elevate to the forefront of science learning are theoretical objects of science: the
structure of interrelating definitions and concepts in Newtons Principia, the structure
of geometry as contained in Euclids Elements, etc. (Matthews, 1994). In the early
1960s, based on this idea, the large-scale programs later known as PSSC, BSCE,
CHEMS, ESCP curricula and SCIS for elementary science were developed. These
were all heavily funded by NSF and had a specialist, theoretical, disciplinary
emphasis (Stinner, 2008).
However, an overemphasis on formal knowledge creates its own, but different
problems. It disconnects science teaching from students experiences, teachers
knowledge, and other contextual factors of science such as the historical and
cultural. Later, Stinner (2008) also recognized the problematic character of the
1960s science curricula because as he wrote:
i. the emphasis was on the processes of science rather than on developing
conceptual frames of reference,
ii. most science teachers had never been involved in scientific research, and
iii. few scientists are acquainted with the history and philosophy of science.
According to recent research which evaluated general physics textbooks
(namely the unit on atomic structure), physics textbooks are still described in a
formal and strict manner (Rodrigetz & Niaz, 2004). One of the authors (Niaz et al.,
2010) in the study claims that the formal representation of scientific knowledge
is dominant in most textbooks because most textbook authors hold a fundamental
premise, namely, an empiricist epistemology. In other words, many authors believe
science is done as an accumulation of experimental data and thus emphasize
techniques, both experimental and theoretical, at the expense of ideas (heuristic
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LEE AND LEEGWATER
principles, presuppositions, hypotheses, and guiding assumptions). However, the

history of science shows that it is precisely these ideas that guide scientists in understanding and interpreting the data, standing in contrast to a strictly empiricist view.
4. HISTORY OF SCIENCE: A WAY TO RESOLVE THE DILEMMA
How does a dilemma arise? As we indicated earlier, there are many components in
the teaching of physics; students, teachers, science, educational environment, and
so on. And there are always possible dilemmas (or conflicts) that are generated
between them. For instance, conflicts between student-centered versus teachercentered approach would be the case. In order to resolve a specific dilemma, we
need to find a proper way, a vis media (a middle way) which attempts to integrate
the dual components of the dilemma and thereby overcome some of the tensions.
In other words, we should try to enhance the different benefits and compensate for
the limitations of the two different components of the dilemma.
The dilemma of this study arises, broadly speaking, from the conflict between
content (physics)-centered and student (personal experience)-centered ideas,
specifically between formal physics knowledge and personal experience. Each of
these components of the dilemma has different strengths and weaknesses (in other
words, benefits and costs). We have attempted to find a way of resolving the dilemma
of teaching Newtons First Law by appealing to the history of science.
We will begin with a brief discussion of historical theories of force and motion.
A fuller discussion is given in, for instance, Franklin (1978) and Stinner (1994).
Aristotle (fourth century BC) divided all observed motion of inanimate objects into
two categories: natural motion and violent motion. Natural motion was seen by him
as celestial motion (which is uniformly circular and perpetual) or as terrestrial
motion (which is rectilinear, up and down and finite). Natural motion as terrestrial
motion occurs in the absence of forces, because bodies seek to reach their natural
place, in which they will be in a state of rest. The natural motion of the heavy
elements (earth and water) is to fall downwards, to be as close as possible to their
natural place at the center of the universe. On the other hand, the natural motion of
light elements (air and fire) is to rise, since their natural place is above the center of
the universe. Aristotle claims that objects will come to rest when force is removed.
However, the motion of a projectile was a really difficult problem for Aristotle;
what force keeps the projectile in motion after it loses contact with the projector?
Aristotle thought that the medium somehow provided the necessary force to push the
projectile. This paradoxical state of affairs is connected with Aristotle believing that
the medium not only sustains the motion, but also acts to resist it. In the sixth century
AD, John Philoponus argued that is was not air which provides the negative power
propelling a projectile, but an impressed force that eventually dies out. John Buridan
later (in the fourteenth century AD) developed this impetus theory. He thought that
an impressed force on a projectile was permanent unless acted on by a resistance or
other forces. However, Buridan did not arrive at a statement of inertia. Hundreds of
years later, Galileo showed that force is not necessary to keep a body in motion,
but rather that objects will remain in motion at a constant velocity unless acted
254
upon by an external force. For Galileo, natural motion was understood as the
impeded circumnavigation of the Earth by a ship. In this situation, gravity did not
resist the motion of the ship even though it acted on the ship.
The young Isaac Newton, like students today, believed in the notion of impetus
(Steinberg et al, 1990). However, Newton later transformed the notion of impetus
into the concept of inertial mass and could then think of motion without appealing
to forces. This became Newtons First Law: natural motion is the motion, at
constant velocity, of a body with no external forces acting on it.
The history of motion can help us address the dilemma of teaching Newtons
First Law by compensating for the limitations of each component of the dilemma
and by increasing the benefits of both the formal representation of knowledge and
of personal experiences. The history of motion helps overcome the limitation
of a formal knowledge-centered approach by enabling students to understand the
intellectual struggles involved in scientific thinking and the development of theories
of motion. This would lead students to recognize the tentative nature of science and
to change their strictly logical and abstract image of science. Secondly, the history
of motion can increase the motivation of students since historical contexts address
the why and how theories of motion have developed in a way that sees scientists
as living persons who are concerned with personal, sociological, philosophical, and
religious issues. The history of motion can also help us strengthen the benefits of
a formal knowledge-centered approach. As many researchers have mentioned (for
instance, Coopers argument in Niaz et al., 2010), presenting physics in historic
context makes it more understandable. In our view, the history of motion connects
the formal knowledge of motion (Newtons First Law) with the context of its
development from Aristotle to Newton and illuminates the reasons and limitations
of each persons ideas of motion in their own historic time. Thus, including the
history of motion can enhance the sense of Newtons Law and its historical structure
and meaning.
The history of motion also helps us overcome the limitations of the personal
experience-centered approach. Specifically, studying the history of motion would
allow students to develop a richer understanding of scientific knowledge. For
instance, historical discussions can connect the development of a students personal
experience of free fall, projectile motion, circular motion, etc, and thinking with
the development of scientific ideas. This study of motion would allow students to
compare their difficulties in encountering todays formulation of Newtons laws
with the difficulties of others in an earlier time. For instance, if students learn the
history of motion, they might understand that for pre-Newtonian physics the
conceptual development depends on commonsense perceptions based on personal
kinesthetic memory. And students might understand that it is difficult to connect
Newtons Law to ordinary experience since the law is related to internalist notions
such as thought experiments. This could encourage students to challenge their own
constraints, inquire how scientists think of motion in their own time, and address
their difficulties in learning the theories of motion.
The history of motion also helps us strengthen the benefits of the personal
experience-centered approach. For instance, the history of motion would make
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science more attractive and meaningful to students since history of motion shows
the close relationship between science and student personal experiences and
knowledge. The following students conceptions which are similar to the views of
the past scientists could be used to stimulate active discussions by students in
classrooms and would be a good starting point for a meaningful conceptual change
of the ideas related to inertia (Song et al., 1997):
i. Starscircular motions and objects falling motion are natural motions which
do not need external causes (Similar to Aristotles idea).
ii. A stone on a moving ship has its own force thus it moves with the ship
(Similar to Buridans idea).
iii. A projectile motion is a combination of a uniform horizontal motion and
vertical free-fall motion (Similar to Galileos idea).
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the dilemma of teaching Newtons
First Law as introduced by Wallace and Louden (2002). The dilemma came from
the conflict between the formal representation of knowledge (Newtons First Law)
and personal experience. Since both of them are important in teaching and learning
physics, we cannot choose one of them at the expense of the other. Rather, we need
to address the dilemma generated by promoting their strengths and by complementing
their weaknesses.
We found a possible solution to addressing the inherent dilemma of teaching
Newtons First Law in the history of science:
1) History of science can help us overcome the limitations of a formal knowledgecentered approach. For instance, history of science can show that scientific
theories are tentative since history includes the intellectual struggle involved in
scientific thinking. History of science also shows scientists as living person who
challenged problems, had difficulties, and (sometimes) failed. This can increase
student interests and motivation to learn science.
2) History of science can enhance the strength of formal knowledge-centered
approach. This approach enables students to see what scientists find and to learn
effective ways to solve textbook-style problems by applying formal knowledge,
which is rhetoric of conclusions. However, history of science makes science
more understandable since science makes better sense in the context of its own
time.
3) History of science can help us overcome the limitation of the personal experiencecentered approach. History of science allows us to compare the difficulties we
encounter in todays scientific theories with those of earlier times. This can help
us understand and address our difficulties in learning science.
4) History of science can better relate science to students knowledge and
experience since history shows the connection of the development of student
thinking with the development of scientific ideas. Thus, history of science can
enhance the strength of personal experience-centered approach.
256
In the current PER (Physics Education Research), identifying and resolving

student difficulty in learning physics have enhanced students scientific knowledge
and understanding of physics (Ambrose, 2004; Loverude et al., 2003; Reif, 1986).
On the other hand, in the history of physics, identifying and resolving difficulties
(such as controversial problems) has aided the development of research by physicists
(Cassidy et al., 2002; Kuhn, 1962; Niaz et al., 2002). Likewise, we believe, research
on physics teachers difficulties (or dilemmas) in their teaching could help them
enhance their physics instruction. In future research, we will need to better understand the structure of teachers dilemmas in teaching physics. We also need to
develop history-based teaching strategies and to look for evidence of the effectiveness
of this new approach in resolving teachers dilemmas in teaching physics.
NOTES
1
Calvin College, MI, USA.
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Gyoungho Lee and Arie Leegwater1

Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
1
Calvin College, MI, USA
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Adapting Historical Knowledge

Production to the Classroom

Adapting Historical Knowledge

P.V. Kokkotas, K.S Malamitsa and A.A. Rizaki

ISBN: 978-94-6091-347-1 (paperback)

Published by: Sense Publishers,

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved 2011 Sense Publishers

investigating interdisciplinarity in the sciences, as it covers many fields of traditional

In the chapter Resolving Dilemmas in Acquiring Knowledge of Newtons First

SECTION A: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. TEACHING THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND

A common feature of contemporary science education curricula is the expectation

Science raises philosophical questions and requires philosophical commitments:

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

The Oxford philosopher, R. G. Collingwood in his landmark study The Idea of

mastery of the quantitative skills - a force of X newtons acts on a mass of Y

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

This amalgam of ontological, metaphysics, epistemological and ethical commitments,

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

red-flag to proponents of the established, church-endorsed, philosophical orthodoxy.

Scholastic philosophy, with its Aristotelian categories of substance, accidents

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

And then proceeded memorably to say:

WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE

2. IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

where q is a proportionality constant depending on the molecules of the gas.

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

Figure 1. Laplaces model of caloric.

In a state of thermal equilibrium quantity (A) will be equal to the quantity of

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

is c2 Yet, Herapath observed, in calculating the calorific radiation of a

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors of Bluntly put, it is

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

How exactly science education should accommodate the philosophical lessons

IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND

3. THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Table 1. Rationales offered from a variety of sources in support of the

Increase student motivation

The classification plan or typology proposed here is designed to do several things.

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Interactions with original works (or selections) in the history of science

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Domain 1.0: First hand interactions with original works

Robert Boyles Experiments in Pneumatics (64 pgs)

The Cells of Life

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Domain 4.0: Book length presentations of some aspect of the history

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

this genre). A somewhat less related category, accounts of classic experiments, is

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

but adds that

Figure 1. Three educational considerations (level of engagement, level of explicitness

The pedagogical element of this model is quite straightforward, HOS-derived

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE