Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Case no.1
Held:
Petitioner claim in EO 264 is without merit.
E.O 264 the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not
criminal complaints.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no
mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say,
"crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could
have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make
itself applicable thereto.
To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to
pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of
administrative charges against erring government officials. And in fact, the
afore quoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific
reference to "erring officials or employees . . . removed or otherwise
FACTS:
Held:
SC, take exception to the trial court's finding of treachery, to wit: There was
treachery in this case and this is supported by the evidence on record when
Noel and Pablo tried to be friendly with Vidal and deceivingly respectful when
they first greeted him a "Good Evening" which the latter answered also in a
respectful way. Then, all of a sudden, Noel hacked Vidal and Pablo followed
suit, without giving Vidal a fair chance to defend himself.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 16 In People vs.
Lab-eo, (G.R. No. 133438, January 16, 2002) it was held that: The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.
In the instant case, treachery cannot be properly appreciated as the accusedappellant's attack against the victim was not unexpected or without warning.
The trial court also found that abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime. However, this circumstance was not specifically
alleged in the information, hence, it cannot be appreciated either as a
qualifying or an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, accused-appellant
can only be held liable for Homicide, not Murder as found by the trial court.
Case no. 3
SEC. 4 RULE 110
INFORMATION DEFINED
-
HELD:
SC ruled that, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: Sec. 4.
Information defined. An information is an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the
rules would have so provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as a
"sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated". In a case, we ruled that the information
need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the
prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto
and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. Clearly,
respondent had confused an information from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or signed
by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent erred in
dismissing the subject Information on the ground that it was not under oath.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an information as "an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court" (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not
require that it be under oath for otherwise, it would have provided so. On the
other hand, a complaint is defined as "a sworn statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated" (Section 5,
Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a
complaint and an information need to be under oath. But the oath is not
required when it is a public prosecutor who files the information because he
does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his position. The
position of the public prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation had
been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin and the
latter's resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.
Case no. 4
. The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, his
resort to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court, in affirming the trial court held that the trial court RTC
has authority to reverse the prosecutor's finding of probable cause and
dismiss the information on the ground that the evidence presented did not
substantiate the charge.
Petioner Dy avers:
Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge
had the authority to reverse [the public prosecutor's] finding of probable
cause to prosecute accused . . . and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter
on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. The trial court erred in dismissing the Information
filed against the private respondent. Consequently, the Court of Appeals was
likewise in error when it upheld such ruling.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon. Indeed, the public prosecutor
has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Therefore,
if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. . . .
Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only
have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according
to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a
crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the
duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie case."
Case no. 5
On October 9, 1987, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2)
Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan. On the
same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination,"
after which he issued an order downgrading the crimes charged to simple
slander.
The Court conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine
the existence of probable cause by asking searching questions to the
witnesses for the prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is
convinced that the offense committed by the accused was just simple
slander.
On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the
absence of the public prosecutor, who did not receive any calendar of cases
for that day.
The principal issues for resolution here concern the propriety of the
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge, and the
arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the
downgrading of the said cases, and denial of complainant's motion to inhibit
respondent judge from trying the same cases are denounced.
The Court Administrator found respondent judge administratively liable and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
Held:
SC ruled that, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action
as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the
proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and
her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect,
conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary
investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary
investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to
reduce the charge to simple slander.
In the present cases, the respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of
the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the
procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation.
Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation
of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the
officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments
of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an
opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be
denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos.
3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of
said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an
arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of
cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday
schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the
former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject
criminal cases.
Case no. 6
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTION
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- ABSENCE DURING TRIAL
ENRIQUEZ VS. JUDGE VILLARTA.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1398. February 27, 2002.]
FACTS:
The complainant, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, was counsel for the accused in
Criminal Case No. 215-98 for malicious mischief, before the court of
respondent judge. The criminal case involved the alleged malicious cutting by
HELD:
SC. Agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent judge
cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private prosecutor in the
trial of Criminal Case No. 215-98.
Case no. 7
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
D. RULE ON APPEAL
issues raised by the petitioner had become moot and academic since the
Secretary of Justice had denied his petition for review and affirmed the
joint resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause
against him.
The petitioner forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals on November 5, 2001, assailing the orders of the RTC.
On November 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying
due course and dismissing the petition, on the ground that the petitioner
failed to show proof of service of the petition on the respondents, as
mandated by Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to Rules 65 and 13 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended.
Held:
Case no.8
March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials
(scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido
and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte,
then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a
resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for
Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima
facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte an Information.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal
by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido
et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review."
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records,
reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal
case.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance
of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the
Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order
dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would
not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
"commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or
appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte"
. The question presented for determination now is after a case has been
filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his
motion to dismiss it has been denied?
HELD:
Case no. 9
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
3.PRIVATE OFFENSES
- A. FILLING BY A RETARDATE
HELD:
The Supreme Court the determination of the competence of witnesses to testify
rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes
all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided,
except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.
Case. No. 10
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
3.PRIVATE OFFENSES
- B. FILLING BY A DAUGHTER
On October 21, 1997, Ernesto Nicolas sexually abused his first cousin, 53
year-old Flaviana Mendoza, who was physically paralyzed and in a very weak
state of mind and health. By reason thereof, he was charged and convicted of
the crime of rape and the maximum penalty of death was imposed upon him.
Presenting the testimony of daughters and son of the victim including the
findings of physician attended the victim the accused was convicted of the
crime rape.
Accused- appellant raised an issue on appeal for resolution.
Whether or not it is indispensable for the prosecution to present Annaliza
Urmelita, the daughter of the victim who subscribed to the complaint for
rape.
HELD:
In this case, Annaliza was the one who signed the complaint, considering the
physical disability of her paralyzed mother. However, it was her sister Daisy
and brother Joel who saw what had happened on October 21, 1997. The
occurrences that constitute the crime charged were culled from their
testimony. Notably, appellant had the opportunity to confront both Daisy and
Joel, along with the other prosecution witnesses. Daisy and Joel were
presented in court, and their testimonies were adequately tested by the
defense who subjected them to cross-examination. Likewise, the judge had
ample opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying, and evaluate
their testimony. The judge found their testimony candid, straightforward and
credible. 30 It was not, in our view, indispensable under the circumstances of
this case to present Annaliza on the witness stand.