FIRST DIVISION

DEMIE L. URIARTE, G.R. No. 169251

December 20, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

TD No. 121 thus contained significant revisions. The subsequent tax declarations, however,
no longer contained alterations: TD No. 132 [8] which canceled T.D. No. 121; ARP No. 93-0800344[9] in 1994; and ARP No. 96-08-00349 [10] in 1997. However, in ARP No. 96-0800328[11] filed in 2000, the entries in the original tax declarationTD No. 3352were restored.
Meantime, in 1954, Antioco Uriarte, petitioners father, declared a two-hectare lot for taxation
purposes under TD No. 4642.[12] The pertinent entries are the following:
Area: 2 hectares
Location: Doot, Poblacion, Carrascal, Surigao

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Boundaries:
North: Carrascal River;

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan

in A.R. No. 058 and its Resolution [2] denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof.
The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, Branch 41, convicting petitioner DemieL. Uriarte for
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
Petitioner was the Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. In
1948, Joventino Correos declared for taxation purposes a .9434-hectare parcel of land under
Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3352.[4] The pertinent entries read:

Location: Batong, Carrascal, Surigao

Area: .9434 hectares
Boundaries:

South: Maximo Leva;

East: Botong Rill;
West: Maximo Leva and Carrascal River

In 1974, TD No. 4642 was canceled by TD No. 1534, [13] and the entries regarding the
boundaries of the property were also altered. [14] In 1980, TD No. 1534 was cancelled by TD
No. 243,[15] where Embarcadero was inserted on the entry pertaining to the location of the
property. In 1985 TD No. 243 was canceled by TD No. 247. [16] This time, the area of the
property was changed from two (2) to three (3) hectares, and the boundary in the east
became Joventino Correos. The subsequent tax declarations, TD No. 270[17]which canceled TD
No. 247 and ARP No. 96-09-00290[18] effective 1997, did not contain any further alterations.
Thus, the boundaries of the lot became

North: Carrascal River;

South: Maximo Leva and Botong Rill;

North: Carrascal River;

East: Botong Creek;

South: Pantaleon Cervantes;

West: Carrascal River

East: Joventino Correos;

In 1974, TD No. 3352 was cancelled by TD No. 5249. [5] In 1980, the previous tax
declaration was revised by TD No. 116, [6] where the entry pertaining to the location of the
property
was
changed
from Batong, Carrascal, Surigao del Sur to
(S) Botong,
(B) Doyos, Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. In 1985, TD No. 116 was cancelled by TD No. 121,
[7]
where the boundaries of the property were also changed, as follows:

Boundaries:

West: Maximo Leva

The above alterations were allegedly committed by petitioner when she was the
Municipal Assessor and Deputy Provincial Assessor of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. On May 21,
1999, Evelyn Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter[19] informing petitioner of the alterations
that had been made on the tax declarations of her predecessor, JoventinoCorreos. She
requested that the erroneous and prejudicial entries be rectified.

North: Carrascal River

South: Botong Rill
East: Botong Creek
West: Antioco Uriarte

Petitioner complied with the request. Thus, in ARP No. 96-08-00328, the original
entries were restored.

On July 5, 1999, Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter[20] to the Office of the
Ombudsman (Mindanao) stating the alleged unlawful acts of petitioner in altering the tax
declarations of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte. It was alleged that the alterations
prejudiced her since they became the basis of petitioners forceful and unlawful possession of
the subject property.

The Office of the Ombudsman requested Arpilleda to formalize the charges.[21] She later
complied by filing a Sworn Complaint [22] dated August 19, 1999. Petitioner filed his CounterAffidavit,[23] to which Arpilleda filed her Reply-Affidavit[24] on October 28, 1999.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao later filed an Information [25] dated November 24,
1999 before the RTC[26] of Tandag, Surigao del Sur against petitioner for violation of Section
3(e), R.A. 3019.
On December 15, 1999, the Administrative Officer of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tandag, Surigao del Sur forwarded[27] the entire case record to the RTC
ofCantilan, Surigao del Sur, Branch 41.
On March 13, 2000, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Suspend Pendente Lite,[28] alleging that the immediate suspension of petitioner is proper in
view of the provisions of R.A. 3019 and existing jurisprudence.[29]

Private complainant filed a Reservation to File Civil Action [38] which the trial court
granted in an Order[39] dated March 15, 2002. She likewise filed a Manifestation and/or Motion
for Inhibition,[40] which was however denied in an Order[41] dated July 3, 2002.

Trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution presented the following witnesses: private
complainant Arpilleda, who testified that petitioner, as Municipal Assessor, took advantage of
his position and caused changes in the location and boundaries of various tax declarations
of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte, and that these changes were designed to promote
petitioners own interest, thus causing damage and prejudice to her and her co-heirs;
[42]
Tremy Correos who corroborated private complainants testimony, specifically on the
damage they sustained when petitioner evicted them from the land they had been occupying;
[43]
Richard Paniamogan who, as barangay captain of Embarcadero, issued a certification
that Botong is located in that barangay and testified thereon;[44] Charmelinda A. Yaez, then the
provincial assessor who testified on the limitations of the powers of the municipal assessor;
[45]
SPO2 Saturnino Cubero, whose testimony was, however, dispensed with in view of the
parties admission of the copy of the police blotter on the alleged eviction of private
complainant and her co-heirs from the lot; [46] and Carlito A. Ladroma who likewise testified
that Botong is part of barangayEmbarcadero.[47]

The case was then set for pre-trial and the parties submitted their respective pre-trial
briefs. On June 15, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension,
[31]
pointing out that he had already served three months suspension. The trial court granted the
motion on June 16, 2000.[32]

On the other hand, the defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Leovino Constantino, an
employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources who testified that the land
covered by the subject tax declarations had not been surveyed and no title had been issued by
the City Environment and Natural Resources Office; [48] Florida Coma who was once
the barangay captain
of Barangay Embarcadero
and
testified
that Sitio or Purok Doot, Pelong belongs to Barangay Embarcadero, while Botong belongs
toBarangay Doyos;[49] and Gaudiosa Tolentino who
testified
on
the
creation
of barangays Embarcadero and Doyos as well as the existing sitios.[50]

On October 2, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. [33] He claimed that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because in the first place, the special
prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had no authority to file the
information. To support his claim, petitioner cited Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[34]where it was held
that the authority to file the corresponding information before the RTC rests in the prosecutor,
not the Ombudsman, and that the latter exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The trial court provisionally dismissed [35] the case and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners bail bond.

Petitioner, for his part, admitted that he had made changes on the tax declarations.
He however justified the changes, stating that they were the result of the general revision made
in 1978. He also claimed that as municipal assessor, he has absolute authority to determine
the barangay to which a particular property belongs. He further asserted that the prosecution
failed to cite any law that prohibits a municipal assessor from making revisions on (a) the
location of the property according to barangay; (b) the names of the adjoining owner; or (c)
the boundaries of the property. Petitioner likewise insisted that the case is civil and not
criminal in nature.[51]

Petitioner was arraigned on March 14, 2000, and pleaded not guilty. On even date,
the trial court ordered[30] his preventive suspension.

On July 12, 2001, the private prosecutor moved to reinstate the case, [36] claiming that
the Supreme Court likewise declared in a Resolution in Uy v. Sandiganbayan[37]that the
Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and to prosecute
all criminal cases involving public employeesnot only those involving public officers within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
On November 6, 2001, the trial court ordered the case reinstated. Since the bail bond
of petitioner had been cancelled, the trial court further ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioner posted bail.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence [52] dated June 25,
2003. However, the trial court denied the motion in its Order [53] dated August 1, 2003.

After the parties rested their respective cases, the RTC, on April 29, 2004, rendered
a decision[54] convicting petitioner of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The falloreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds DEMIE

URIARTE
Y
LIMGUANGCO,
Municipal
Assessor
of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court
imposes upon the accused the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY; perpetual disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture
of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the
event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such benefits shall be liable to
restitute the same to the government.
The bail bond put up by the accused for his temporary liberty is ordered
cancelled. Accused shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal
Farm, Panabo City, Davao del Norte pursuant to Circular No. 63-97 of the Supreme
Court dated October 6, 1997.
To pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.[55]

On April 29, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal [56] to the Court of Appeals
(CA), which was later withdrawn. [57] On May 6, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal[58] before the Sandiganbayan on the following grounds:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEMIE L. URIARTE FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF R.A. 3019 UNDER THE INFORMATION THAT
DOES NOT CHARGED (SIC) SUCH AN OFFENSE.

II.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT (THAT) THE
INFORMATION CHARGES THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF
R.A. 3019, STILL, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON FACTS
NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE.

III.
ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE INFORMATION CHARGED VIOLATION
OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, AGAIN, THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED
AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO SPECIFY,
QUANTIFY AND PROVE THE ELEMENT OF UNDUE INJURY PURSUANT

TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN LLORENTE

SANDIGANAYAN (SIC) [G.R. NO. 122166. MARCH 11, 1998].

V.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR.[59]

Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to allege in the information any
prohibited act which he had committed in the performance of his official duties or in relation
to his public position. He further averred that no mention was made of the injury caused to any
party, which is essential in a charge under Section 3(e), R.A. 3019; this violated his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. [60] Petitioner also claimed
that the RTC erred in concluding that he had intended to dispossess private complainant of
their property, since this was not alleged in the information. [61] He pointed out that private
complainant could not prove, much less impute, any undue injury because the original entries
in the tax declarations had already been restored. He also invoked the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official function as an additional ground.

On April 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
[62]
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds
no cogent reason to disturb or reverse, and therefore AFFIRMS, the findings and
conclusion of the trial court, with modification of the imposable penalty, such that
the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The clause and forfeiture
of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the event that
such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the government
is hereby ordered deleted.

SO ORDERED.[63]

The anti-graft court held that all the elements of violation of the offense had been
alleged in the information; the allegation that the appellant willfully changed the location and
boundaries of the subject properties was the prohibited act, while the element of undue injury
was alleged in the phrase to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs. The facts that had not
been alleged in the information were evidentiary matters.

As to the prosecutions alleged failure to specify the element of undue injury, the
anti-graft court held that the injury caused by petitioner was not in terms of money but, on the
part of private complainant, the deprivation of three-fourths of her property. Lastly, the court
held that under the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General

Revision of Real Property Assessment, [64] the municipal assessor had no discretion to change
the entries in tax declarations. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to
notify Joventino Correos of the changes in the entries defies the provision therein that owners
should participate in the revision. Lastly, the presumption of regularity has been overcome by
petitioners unilateral act of restoring the original boundaries and location of the property
owned by Joventino Correos.

Petitioner comes before this Court on the following issues:

I.
CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED UNDER AN INFORMATION
THAT CHARGES AN OFFENSE WHICH THE COURT ADMITTED THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AS A VIOLATION OF ANY LAW?

II.
CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF
R.A. 3019 BASED ON CONCLUSION OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL
COURT
THAT
HE
COMMITTED
LANDGRABBING
AND/OR
DISPOSSESSING THE COMPLAINANT OF HER PROPERTY, WHICH
OFFENSES WERE NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION?[65]

The resolution of the issues raised by petitioner hinges on the interpretation of the
elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, in relation to the facts alleged in
the information and those proven during trial. The provision reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful.

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The essential elements of this crime have been enumerated in several cases [66] decided by this
Court, as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or

inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.

A perusal of the Information filed against petitioner shows that all these elements were
sufficiently alleged, as correctly ruled upon by both the RTC and Sandiganbayan. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That in 1993, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality

of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused DEMIE L. URIARTE, a public officer
being the Municipal Assessor of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, while in the
performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of his position, acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the change
of the location and boundaries of the property of one Joventino Correos as indicated
in Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 121 and 132 despite knowing fully well that in the
previously issued TD Nos. 3352 and 5249, of the same property state different
location and boundaries and also, cause the change of the location and boundaries
of the property of his own father, Antioco Uriarte, particularly, to make it appear
that the property is adjacent to the property of Joventino Correos, in order to favor
his own interest being an heir of Antioco Uriarte and occupant of the land subject of
the application of the heirs of Joventino Correos, to the damage and prejudice of the
said heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[67]

Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed gross
inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. [68]Evident bad
faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
[69]
It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. [70] Gross inexcusable
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.[71]

From the evidence adduced by the parties, petitioner indeed acted with evident bad faith in
making
the
alteration
on
the
entries
in
the
tax
declarations
of
both Joventino Correosand Antioco Uriarte. The fact of alteration is shown not only in the tax
declarations presented in evidence; petitioner also admitted that he made the alterations
himself. Petitioner even attempted to justify his act by stating that such changes were made
pursuant to the General Instructions issued in 1978 for the general revision of tax declarations,
and that he was authorized to make the alterations because municipal assessors were mandated
to identify the properties according to the barangay where the property is located. Petitioner

likewise justified his act of changing the boundaries of the property covered by the tax
declarations of Joventino and Antioco because of the alleged instruction that the boundaries
should be designated using the name of the landowner.

Paragraph 28 of the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in

the General Revision of Real Property Assessments [72] provides:
28) The boundaries which will appear in the field sheets shall be the name of
persons, streets, rivers or natural boundaries adjoining the property subject of
revision. The technical descriptions of the land to be revised should not be written
down on the field sheets, not only to follow the prescribed form but also to avoid
additional or unnecessary typing costs. Tax declarations are issued for taxation
purposes and they are not titles to lands. In case boundary conflict arises, the parties
can refer to the titles.[73]

Thus, contrary to petitioners contention that the boundaries should be designated only
according to the names of persons, the provision clearly allows the streets, rivers, and natural
boundaries of the property to be placed on the tax declarations. Petitioner was aware of the
consequences of altering the entries in the tax declarations, particularly in the untitled
properties. Petitioners bad faith is further strengthened by the fact that he did not
inform Joventino Correos or the private complainant of the alterations, including his act of
restoring the original entries in the tax declarations. Assuming for the sake of argument that he
was not motivated by ill will but merely committed a mistake in the interpretation of the
wording of the Instructions, petitioners act is nevertheless unjustified. We cannot fathom why
a municipal assessor would think that the boundaries of a particular property should only be
designated by persons names. Even one of ordinary intelligence would know that a property
may be bounded by a street, a river, or a mountain. In any event, therefore, petitioner may still
be considered guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner contends that due to the prosecutions failure to cite any law that prohibits
the municipal assessor from altering tax declarations, the presumption is that he regularly
performed his official duties. However, the very Instructions petitioner relies upon to justify
his acts outlines the limitations on the authority of municipal assessors to revise tax
declarations. Paragrah 27 provides:
27) Utmost care should be taken that the full christian and surname
appearing in the existing 1978 tax declaration must exactly be the
same christian and surname which has to be carried forward to the field sheets. For
obvious reasons, no transfer or change of ownership of real property be made by
assessors or appraisers in the process of general revision. The primary purpose of
general revision is not to transfer or change ownership of property from one person
to another during the period of revision but to update or upgrade property values for
real property taxation purposes. However, real property declared for the first time
shall be appraised and assessed for taxation purposes. Lands declared for the first
time shall be accepted provided the declaration is supported by corresponding
certification of the Bureau of Forest Development and the Bureau of Lands that the
land so declared is in the alienable or disposable area (emphasis supplied).

The third element provides for the modalities in which the crime may be committed, namely:
(a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any

private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. [74] The use of the disjunctive
term or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held
in Santiago v. Garchitorena,[75] as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This
does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both.
We affirm the Sandiganbayans finding that there was substantial compliance with the
requirement. The wording of the information shows that petitioner, in willfully changing the
boundaries of the tax declarations of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte, both caused
undue injury to private complainant and gave himself and his father unwarranted benefit. In
jurisprudence,[76] undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage. Undue has been
defined as more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done
to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property, that is, the invasion of any
legally protected interest of another. On the other hand, inGallego v. Sandiganbayan,[77] the
Court ruled that unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable
or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of
action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation
above another.[78]
From the foregoing definitions, petitioners act of altering the boundaries of the property in
question as stated in the tax declaration clearly falls under the very act punishable by Section
3(e), R.A. 3019.
It bears stressing that it is beyond the power of this Court to settle the issue of who, between
petitioner
and
private
complainant,
has
the
better
right
to own and possess the subject property. This Court has no jurisdiction over the issue, and the
evidence presented is not sufficient to make a definite determination of ownership. Suffice it
to state that the alteration of the entries in the subject tax declarations, especially on the
boundaries of the property, caused undue injury to private complainant as an heir
of Joventino Correos. The alteration substantially changed the identity of the property.
Considering that the property in question was not titled and no survey had yet been conducted
to settle the actual areas and boundaries of the properties, the tax declarations constitute
important evidence of the declarants possession and ownership, though not conclusive.

Indeed, the alterations made by petitioner are too substantial to ignore. It was made
to appear that petitioners property is between the Carrascal River and that of the private
complainant. In the original tax declaration, no such property existed. The new entries in effect
lessened the area of private complainants property, which would have been evident had the lot
been surveyed. Moreover, the deletion of the entry Maximo Leva in the south boundary
of Joventino Correos property was also prejudicial, since this alteration had the effect of
deleting the property entirely.

Petitioner in fact admitted that while he declared that the subject property was in the
name of Joventino Correos, he was in possession thereof; he later stated that the property in
his possession was declared for taxation in the name of his father. [79] From this testimony, it

can be inferred that the identities of the properties in his possession, the lot in his fathers name
and that declared under Joventino Correos name, are not certain.

While tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of ownership, they do not
constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They are prima facie proofs of ownership or
possession
of
the
property
for
which
such
taxes
have
been
paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, however, they may become the
basis of a claim for ownership. [80] Moreover, a person who claims ownership of real property is
duty bound to clearly identify the land being claimed in accordance with the document on
which he anchors his right of ownership. Proof of ownership together with identity of the land
is the basic rule.[81]

It must be stressed that the alterations made by petitioner compromised the identity
of the private complainants property. The fact that petitioner restored the original entries in the
tax declarations is of no moment; restoration of the entries in the tax declaration is not one of
those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code [82] as one of the ways by which
to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies in
a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10[83] of the same Code.[84]

Lastly, petitioner avers that he cannot be convicted on the basis of the courts
conclusion of land-grabbing and dispossession as no such facts have been alleged in the
information.

years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from
public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and other lawful income.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by special law, as in the
present case, an indeterminate penalty shall be imposed on the accused, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum not less than the
minimum prescribed therein.

In view of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the Sandiganbayan correctly
imposed the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated March 21, 2005 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 139930

We do not agree. It is evident from the decisions of both the RTC and the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner was charged and convicted of violating Section 3(e), R.A. 3019;
he was not civilly held liable for dispossession of property or eviction. The anti-graft court
correctly held that the finding of the RTCthat there was hidden intention on the part of the
petitioner to grab and dispossess private complainant from their propertywas merely
descriptive of how petitioner acted with evident bad faith. There was thus no need for this
matter to be alleged in the information.

It bears stressing that an information needs only to allege the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. [85] It must state only the relevant facts, since the
reason therefor could be proved during the trial.[86] Thus, an allegation of evident bad faith on
the part of petitioner is sufficient. The trial court correctly found that petitioners hidden
intention to grab the land of private complainant is a manifestation of evident bad faith, which
need not be further alleged in the information.

The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is provided for in Section 9 of
the law:
SECTION 9. Penalties for violations (a) Any public officer or private
person committing any of the unlawful acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3,
4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to
recover ill-gotten wealth acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue
of prescription.

The Facts and the Case

On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar
B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) [1] with an authorized capital stock of P100
million divided into one million shares with a par value of P100 per
share. The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20 million
and paid P5 million.
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1)
increasing its authorized capital stock to three million shares without par
value; (2) converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one million
shares without par value and deemed fully paid for and non-assessable by
applying the P5 million already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the
subscription receivables of P15 million.[2]

On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan
Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C.
Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo
C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua
approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than P500
million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut
farmers.[3]
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10
million shares without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital
Stock stated that the incorporators held one million shares without par
value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth P495 million.[4]
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki
R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and
Jaime
Gandiaga,
approved
another
amendment
to
UNICOMs
capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock to one billion
shares divided into 500 million Class A voting common shares, 400 million
Class B voting common shares, and 100 million Class C non-voting
common shares, all with a par value of P1 per share. The paid-up
subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value (consisting of one
million shares for the incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB) were
then converted to 500 million Class A voting common shares at the ratio of
100 Class A voting common shares for every one without par value share. [5]
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of
directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM
had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track record of
operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the
governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which
was credited to UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred
the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line
with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[7] which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the
preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, [8] stating that although it found
sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, the action has already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOMs
capitalization a third time on September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators
unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million
shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing
of Amended Articles of Incorporation with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public respondents acts as

board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that time and
ended on February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the
OSG filed the complaint with the PCGG for preliminary investigation on
March 1, 1990.

In a Memorandum[9] dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman

approved the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It
additionally ruled that UCPBs subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM
on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the prescription of
the action began to run since respondents act of investing into UNICOM
was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the investment
was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators
prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime
was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet been
amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for
prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the
Ombudsmans action but the latter denied the same;[10] hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent
Maria Clara L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004. [11]

The Issue Presented

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents alleged
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.

The Courts Ruling

Preliminarily,
the
Court
notes
that
what
Republic
of
the Philippines (petitioner) filed in this case is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an adverse resolution of
the Office of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65.[12] Still, the Court will treat this petition
as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that
petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion and reversible jurisdictional
error to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The Court has
previously treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions
for certiorari under Rule 65 for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity,
and fair play.[13]
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the
charge against respondents was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and
cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[14] that Section 15, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of illgotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against
respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising
from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by
prescription.[15]

suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPBs

investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by
respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does
not, however, appear to have been withheld from the curious or from those
who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the
OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board of
directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of
the investment.

Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses

committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment
by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10
years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the
enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as
provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted. [17]

Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM
board rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible
government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to
accommodate UCPBs investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected
in the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated
to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request.

Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period
should be computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, [18] which
provides:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run

from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining

when the prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known;
and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. [19]
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject
to prescription, the same began to run only from the date it was
discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge
could be filed as late as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the
prescriptive period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is
that the government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that those
loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans supposedly
conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government.They could only
have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people
ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person
would have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans. [20]
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what
is questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature,
could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of

The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to
UCPBs investment in UNICOM during martial law at the Presidents or
anyone elses instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been
hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever
kind during martial law since even that regime had a stake in keeping
intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of investments in
the Philippines.
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to
question the UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second
elementthat the action could not have been instituted during the 10-year
period because of martial lawdoes not apply to this case. The last day for
filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years
after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now
questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the
remaining period of prescription run its course before bringing the proper
action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from
the beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it,
the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving
the defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense
witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents
that would have been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover,
the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need
in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too
long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them
failed to show probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third
amendment of UNICOMs capitalization, the stated value of the one million
shares without par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was P5
million. When these shares were converted to 5 million shares with par
value, the total par value of such shares remained at P5 million. But, the
action having prescribed, there is no point in discussing the existence of
probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the

Memorandum dated May 14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that
dismissed on the ground of prescription the subject charge of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.,
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela
Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda,
Iaki R. Mendezona, Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym,
Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga.

SO ORDERED.

penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute

corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary

interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited
by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.

The penalty for violation of the above provision is stated as follows:

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149175 , 149406
October 25, 2005

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking a reversal of the decision, dated May 28, 2001, and
resolution, dated July 23, 2001, of the 4 th Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 23415, entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Jaime H.
Domingo and Diosdado T. Garcia finding herein petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered, finding accused Jaime Domingo y Halili and
Diosdado Garcia y Tabelisma guilty of Violation of Sec. 3(h)
of R.A. 3019 as amended and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day as maximum.
Accused Jaime H. Domingo is further disqualified
perpetually from holding public office.

SO ORDERED.[1]
Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

Sec 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already

Sec. 9. Penalties for violation. - (a) Any public

officer or private person committing any of the unlawful
acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less
than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years,
perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

The petitioners are Jaime H. Domingo in G.R. No. 149175, entitled Jaime H.
Domingo, et al. vs. People of the Philippines, and Diosdado T. Garcia in G.R.
No. 149406, entitled Diosdado T. Garcia vs. People of the Philippines.

Petitioner Domingo, at the time the petition was filed, was serving his third
term as mayor of the Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela. [2] He was elected
to the post in 1992 but was unseated in November 1993 after his
opponent, Reynaldo P. Abesamis, won in his election protest. In 1995,
however, Domingo ran again and won in the mayoralty election. [3]
Petitioner Garcia, on the other hand, is the proprietor of D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply, and, incidentally, is the godson of Domingo in
marriage.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

During Domingos incumbency in 1993 and prior to his ouster in
November of the same year, a Multi-Purpose Pavement (MPP) project was
undertaken on the eighteen barangays of the municipality for the paving
and repair of the barangay roads. The allocated budget for the project
was P520,000 to be charged against the 20% Economic Development Fund
(EDF).
Congressman
Faustino

5. Canvass papers were not properly accomplished;

Dy, Jr. donated a total of 3,600 bags of cement for the project to be divided
equally among the eighteen barangays.[4] The mixed gravel and sand was
to be subsidized by the municipality through its EDF, while the labor was to
be provided by the constituent barangays.
On June 7, 1994, pursuant to Resolution No. 94-40 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Manuel, Isabela, a special audit team was
created by Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Director Pedro M. Guiang,
Jr. to examine the infrastructure and EDF expenditures of the municipality
during the incumbency of petitioner Domingo for the period January 1 to
December 31, 1993.
The audit was conducted from June 13 to 17, 1994, during which two
checks, namely, PNB Check No. 901363-S in the amount of P114,350 and
PNB Check No. 901365-S in the amount of P20,000, were discovered to
have been issued by the municipality to Domingo on June 18, 1993. The
disbursement voucher for said checks, however, indicated that the
claimant for the sum of the two checks totaling P134,350 was D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply for the payment of the cost of gravel and sand
delivered to the barangays. Another PNB check, No. 901362, with a face
value of P264,350, dated June 11, 1993, appeared to have been issued to
D.T. Garcia Construction Supply but was indorsed by Garcia himself to the
Municipality of San Manuel. Domingo handed said check to the municipal
treasurer who later encashed it to replenish the various cash items of the
former. Apparently, Domingo would occasionally advance the salaries of
the municipal employees when the same were not remitted to the
municipality in time for payday. The municipal treasurer, in turn, would
reimburse Domingo when the funds become available.[5]

The findings and recommendations of the audit team were incorporated in

the November 8, 1994 Audit Report of COA on the Infrastructure Projects
and 20% Economic Development Fund of the Municipality of San Manuel,
Isabela for the period January 1 to December 31, 1993.

Some of these findings were:

1. There was no contract or agreement between the municipality
and D.T. Garcia Construction Supply;
2. Procurement of goods and services through public bidding was
not properly observed, in violation of Sections 356 to 365 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Sections 430 to 436 of the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM Vol. 1) as there was actually no
public bidding undertaken;
3. Disbursement vouchers were not properly accomplished and not
fully documented, hence the regularity and appropriateness of the
transaction could not be validated;
4. The contractor had no performance bond;

6. The purchase order served to D.T. Garcia Construction Supply

and the attached canvass sheet differed in amount;
7. A certification, dated June 16, 1994, by Municipal Engineer
Edwin A. Abarra who supervised the project, revealed that dump trucks
owned by Domingo were used to haul the 226.5 truckloads of mixed gravel
and sand to the different barangays.
8. The purchase order, sales invoice, official receipt and the
disbursement voucher indicated that D.T. Garcia Construction Supply sold
the gravel and sand to the municipality but it was Domingos name that
appeared as the payee of the checks, namely, PNB Check No. 901363-S in
the amount of P114,350 and PNB Check No. 901365-S in the amount
of P 20,000.[6]
Based on the above findings, the audit team concluded that D.T.
Garcia Construction Supply was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up
his business transaction with the municipality of San Manuel in connection
with the 226.5 truckloads of mixed gravel and sand in violation of Section
34 of R.A. 7160, Section 108 of P.D. 1445 and Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. [7]
Consequently, Domingo was charged with violation of Section 3(h)
of R.A. 3019 before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for
having financial interest in a business transaction involving the delivery of
226.5 truckloads of mixed gravel and sand to the aforesaid barangays in
San Manuel.
During the preliminary investigation, Garcia submitted an Affidavit,
dated August 9, 1995, and a Counter Affidavit, dated September 6, 1996,
supporting Domingos claim that the contract for the supply and delivery of
gravel and sand to the different barangays was between his firm, D.T.
Garcia Construction Supply and the municipality of San Manuel, and it was
by his instance that the checks in payment for the transaction were to be
issued
in
the
name
of Domingo to pay off the loan obtained by his mother, Anicia Garcia, from
Domingos wife, Consolacion Domingo.[8]
On November 29, 1996, Domingo filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation. After the prosecution conducted a reinvestigation, Garcia
was impleaded as co-accused, along with Domingo, for violating Section
3(h) of R.A. 3019.[9]
In a minute resolution, dated February 19, 1997, the Sandiganbayan,
through the First Division, admitted the Amended Information, dated
October 20, 1996, charging Jaime H. Domingo and Diosdado T. Garcia of
conspiracy for violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019, to wit:

That on or about June 18, 1993, or sometime subsequent

thereto, in San Manuel, Isabela, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jaime H.
Domingo, a public officer, being then the Mayor of the

Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela, committing the crime

herein charged in relation to his office and while in the
performance and taking advantage of his official functions,
conspiring with and with full consent of the accused
Diosdado T. Garcia, a private individual and owner of D.T.
Garcia Construction, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, have a direct financial or
pecuniary interest in the local government s Muti-Purpose
Pavement (MPP) project, a transaction in connection with
which accused Domingo takes part in his official capacity,
by then and there causing PNB Check Nos. 901363-S and
901365-S, both dated June 18, 1993, in the amounts of
P114, 350.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, supposedly
representing full payment to D.T. Garcia Construction
owned and operated by accused Garcia for the delivery of
226.5 truckloads of mixed gravel and sand for the project,
to be made payable to accused Domingo who
subsequently encashed the same or through his wife,
Consolacion Domingo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
Upon arraignment, Domingo and Garcia entered pleas of Not guilty.
On April 30, 1997, Prosecutor Raymundo Julio A. Olaguer filed a Motion to
Discharge Diosdado T. Garcia as a State Witness, alleging:

5. That the testimony of Diosdado T. Garcia is

vitally needed to secure the conviction of Mayor Jaime H.
Domingo since he will attest to the fact that the
transactions involved are not really his; that his trucks did
not really make any delivery of gravel and sand to the
Municipality; that the supporting documents and papers
were signed by him on the assurance of Mayor Jaime H.
Domingo that everything had been arranged or settled by
the Congressman of the place; that he must have
accommodated Mayor Jaime H. Domingo because
somehow the Mayor has a moral ascendancy over him.[11]

Domingo opposed the aforesaid motion. The First Division of the

Sandiganbayan where the case was initially heard resolved to hold in
abeyance any action on said motion until after the prosecution would have
presented its evidence in order to give the court the opportunity to
evaluate whether or not there was a need for the discharge of Garcia as
State witness.
Later, the case was unloaded to the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Marilyn P. Cortez, COA

State Auditor II, and Jose C. Lavadia, COA Technical Audit Specialist, who
testified on the findings of the special audit team relating to the
infrastructure projects and the EDF disbursements made by the
municipality during the incumbency of Domingo as mayor of San Manuel in
1993.
On January 29, 1998, after the testimonial evidence of the COA officers was
concluded, the Fourth Division resolved to deny the Motion to Discharge
Diosdado T. Garcia as a State witness in view of the allegation of
conspiracy between Domingo and Garcia in the Amended Information. [12]
During the trial, the prosecution posited that it was really Domingo who
supplied and delivered the gravel and sand to the eighteen barangays, and
that he merely used Garcia as a front, being aware that as municipal
mayor, he is prohibited by law from having any pecuniary interest or
business involvement in any projects in his municipality. [13]
Domingo, on the other hand, contended that he had no participation in the
supply of gravel and sand to the different barangays of the municipality;
that the two checks issued in his name were intended for D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply; that the municipal treasurer issued said checks in his
name in view of the written request made by Garcia as Garcias mother,
Anicia Garcia, was indebted to Consolacion Domingo, his wife, in the
amount of P300,000 as evidenced by a Promissory Note, dated February
19, 1992.[14] Garcia allegedly deemed it more convenient to have the
checks issued in Domingos name since, after all, he would have used the
amount to pay Consolacion Domingo for his mothers indebtedness.
To prove the existence of the questioned transaction, Domingo presented a
contract purportedly showing the sales agreement between the
municipality and D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, dated May 10, 1993.
[15]
He likewise presented the Certificate of Emergency Purchase, dated May
7, 1993, to justify the absence of a public bidding for the supply and
delivery of mixed gravel and sand.[16]

Also presented as witnesses were Domingos wife, Consolacion Domingo,

[17]
who testified and showed receipts and documents as proof of Anicia
Garcias indebtedness; Municipal Treasurer Rodolfo P. Isidro [18] who
corroborated the existence of the contract and the letter of request by
Garcia for the issuance of the checks in question to Domingos name; then
Municipal Accountant Pete Gerald Javier [19] who stated that the contract for
the subject transaction was signed in the office of Atty. Palacol in May 1993
between Mayor Domingo and E. Agustin on behalf of D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply; and Municipal Engineer Edwin A. Abarra [20] who
contended that the trucks used in the delivery of gravel and sand were
owned by Garcia, contrary to the statements contained in the certification
signed by him, dated June 16, 1994. He expressed that he was compelled
by then Mayor Abesamis to declare that the delivery trucks used to
transport the gravel and sand were owned by Domingo.

Garcia pointed out, however, that there was no existing contract between
his business entity, D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, and the municipality
of San Manuel; and, that despite the false allegations contained therein, he
merely signed the aforementioned Affidavit and Counter-affidavit prepared
by Domingo and his lawyer during the investigation in 1996 supporting
Domingos defense upon the latters assurance that the matter had already
been settled by Congressman Faustino Dy, Jr. His mother, Anicia Garcia,
likewise denied any outstanding obligation to the wife of Domingo. [21]
In addition, Garcia claimed that the aforesaid contract, dated May
10, 1993, was signed by his attorney-in-fact, E. Agustin, only in 1994. He
was also asked to sign the authorization letter, supposedly dated June 18,
1993, addressed to the municipal treasurer requesting the latter to issue
the checks in the name of Domingo.
Upon a consideration of the testimonies of various witnesses and the
evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed decision,
dated May 28, 2001.[22]
Domingo and Garcia filed separate motions for reconsideration. For his
part, Garcia claimed that he should not have been convicted as principal
by indispensable cooperation to the crime charged but as a mere
accessory for which the penalty should be two degrees lower than that
imposed on Domingo.[23]
In Domingos motion for reconsideration, he argued that the
evidence adduced against him was insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[24]
On July 23, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. [25]
Hence, the petitions of Domingo and Garcia are before us.

In G.R. No. 149175, petitioner Domingo raises the following issues:

I
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH
DIVISION)
OVERLOOKED MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE CAST REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO THE GUILT OF PETITIONER.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
PETITIONER SPECIFICALLY FAILING TO GIVE DUE WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
ADDUCED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.[26]

In G.R. No. 149406, on the other hand, petitioner Garcia asserts that the
Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion when it convicted
him as a conspirator in the violation of R.A. 3019 thereby imposing on him
the corresponding penalty ranging from six years and one month to ten
years and one day. According to him, he should be considered as an
accessory after the fact only, for which the penalty should be two degrees
lower.[27]
The Office of the Prosecutor filed its Comment on December 12, 2001 and
February 10, 2003, respectively, contending that Domingo and Garcia
conspired in violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
Are petitioners guilty and did they conspire to commit the offense?
Under Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019, the person liable is any public officer who
directly or indirectly has financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution
or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as
follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3)
he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.[28]
In other words, there are two modes by which a public officer who
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first
mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. [29]
Petitioner Domingo, in his official capacity as mayor of San Manuel,
Isabela, violated the aforestated provision via the first mode, that is, by
intervening or taking part in his official capacity in connection with his
financial or pecuniary interest in the transaction regarding the supply and
delivery of mixed gravel and sand to the constituent barangays. As
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan:

After considering the testimonies of the various

witnesses and the documentary evidence presented, We
have reason to believe that there was really no contract
between D.T. Garcia Construction and the Municipality of
San Manuel, Isabela involving the delivery of mixed gravel
and sand and that accused Domingo wove an intricate web
of lies, to the extent of fabricating documents in order to
cover up his business transaction with his own municipality.
Consider these:

1. There was supposedly a contract

entered into on May 10, 1993 and yet, even prior
to the alleged contract date, there were already
deliveries made to the different barangays, in line
with the same multi-purpose pavement project and
allegedly by D.T. Garcia Construction. Even on the
contention that the acquisition was done by
emergency purchase, the alleged arrangement
with D.T. Garcia Construction to make the delivery
prior to the issuance of Certificate of Emergency
Purchase already manifests irregularity in the
transaction. The law requires that emergency
purchases should be based on a canvass of prices
of at least three bona fide dealers (Sec. 439
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, Vol.
1) yet it would appear that no such canvass had
been made as of the date of the earliest delivery.

2. The contract price for the materials

delivered to the eighteen (18) barangays
was P398,700. Three checks were issued by the
municipality to cover this amount: PNB Check No.
901362 dated June 11, 1993, in the amount
of P264,350 (Prosecutions Exhibit K), PNB Check
No. 901363 dated June 18, 1993 in the amount of
P114, 350, and PNB Check No. 901365 also dated
June 18, 1993, in the amount of P20,000. And while
PNB Check No. 901362 was issued in the name of
D.T. Garcia Construction, the evidence shows that
said check was subsequently deposited to the
account of the municipality of San Manuel and later
encashed by Rodolfo Isidro, the municipal
treasurer, in order to replenish the various cash
items of accused Domingo. On the other hand, PNB
Check Nos. 901363 and 901365 were both issued
in the name of accused Domingo, despite the fact
that the supporting voucher indicates that these
checks had been issued for the full payment of the
sand and gravel delivered to the different
barangays. While accused Domingo gave his
reason as to why PNB Check No. 901362 was
deposited to the account of the municipality, one
thing is certain though without a doubt, all three
(3) checks representing the supposed contract
price for the deliveries made, benefited accused
Domingo.

The contention of accused Domingo that it was

accused Garcia who requested that PNB checks Nos.

901363 and 901365 be issued instead in Domingos name

because Garcias mother was indebted to Domingos wife
fails to inspire belief in the Courts mind. If indeed, such
loan obligation existed, as accused would have it appear,
accused Domingo and Garcia are not the parties thereto
and therefore, it was highly irregular for the municipal
treasurer to issue the checks in Domingos name, when the
voucher specifically states that they are intended as
payment for the deliveries of sand and gravel to the
municipality.[30]
Furthermore, several other instances point to the fact that
petitioner Domingo had financial interest in the questioned transaction
which he attempted vainly to conceal, thus:
First, he was the co-drawer of the two questioned checks for which
he was also the payee. Said checks were allegedly applied as partial
payment to the indebtedness of Anicia Garcia to his wife, Consolacion
Domingo;
Second, we agree with the Sandiganbayan in giving credence to
the findings of the COA and the certification of the municipal engineer
stating that he saw the trucks of Domingo being used for the delivery of
gravel and sand to the different barangays;[31]
Third, the testimony of Garcia on the following remain undisputed:
1) that he was asked to sign the Affidavit and Counter-affidavit admitting
that he was the contractor for the supply and delivery of the mixed gravel
and sand to the different barangays; 2) that Domingo had borrowed his
official receipt (Official Receipt No. 229) and asked for three sales invoices;
and, 3) that he agreed to sign the aforementioned documents after he was
assured by Domingo that the matter had already been settled by
Congressman Dy;[32]
Fourth, the supporting documents for the issuance of the checks
such as the purchase request,[33] sales invoice[34] and the disbursement
voucher[35]showed manifest irregularity as the signatures of some of the
municipal officials that should have appeared thereon were absent, and
said documents were undated. Likewise, the official receipt [36] that was
supposedly issued by D.T. Garcia Construction Supply evidencing payment
for the mixed gravel and sand was undated;
Fifth, when it conducted the special audit in June of 1994, the COA
team did not find a copy of the contract for the supply and delivery of the
gravel and sand, and the letter of request by Garcia supposedly authorizing
the municipal treasurer to issue the checks in Domingos name; [37] and,

Sixth, it has been established that the subject checks were

encashed by the spouses Domingo.
Thus, in view of the above, petitioner Domingo is guilty of violating
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. As earlier mentioned, what the law
prohibits is the actual intervention by a public official in a transaction in

which he has a financial or pecuniary interest, [38] for the law aims to
prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power. [39]
Next, we address the issue of conspiracy between petitioners
Domingo and Garcia.
The general rule is that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
are conclusive upon the Supreme Court. [40] After reviewing the records of
these cases, we are convinced that the Sandiganbayans finding is
sufficiently rested on the evidence presented by the prosecution to
implicate Garcia as a conspirator for the crime charged in the Amended
Information.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of
another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed.[41] To establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not
necessary.[42] It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during
or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, [43] as the proof of
conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.[44] Once established, all the conspirators are criminally
liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of
them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all. [45]

As succinctly put by the Sandiganbayan:

As for accused Diosdado T. Garcia, his indictment is based
on his alleged conspiracy with accused Domingo. It should
be recalled that initially, Garcia was not included in the
information that was filed before this Court. It was only
after the prosecution conducted a reinvestigation that the
information was amended so as to include Garcia in the
case. It is interesting to note that during said investigation,
Garcia submitted a Counter Affidavit supporting Domingos
claim that the contract for the supply and delivery of
gravel and sand to the different barangays was between
his firm and the municipality of San Manuel and that it was
at his instance that the checks were issued in the name of
accused mayor. He also corroborated the claim of accused
mayor that the checks were to be used to pay off the loan
obligation contracted by his (Garcia) mother with the wife
of accused Domingo. However, he started to sing a
different tune after the prosecution moved for his
discharge as State Witness. This time, he contends that
there was really no contract between his firm and the
municipality and that he was prevailed upon by the
accused mayor to sign the affidavit dated August 9, 1995
and the Counter Affidavit dated September 6, 1996 even
though the allegations thereof are not true, since according
to Mayor Domingo, the matter has already been taken
cared of by Congressman Faustino Dy, Jr.

In fine, the Court believes that accused Mayor Domingo

entered into a business transaction with his own
municipality in clear violation of the provisions of Sec. 3(h)
of R.A. 3019 which prohibits any public officer from directly
or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which
he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law
from having any interest. As municipal mayor, accused was
directly responsible for the prosecution of the multipurpose
pavement
project
in
connection
with which, the sand and gravel were delivered to the
different barangays. He was the one who approved the
payment for these deliveries and he co-signed the two
checks where he was named as payee as well as the
check, which although made payable to D.T. Garcia
Construction, was indorsed to the municipal treasurer and
subsequently encashed to replenish the various cash items
of accused Domingo.
The Court is also convinced that accused Diosdado T.
Garcia should be held liable as co-conspirator to the crime
for having allowed his firm to be used as a front or dummy
by Domingo. Contrary to Garcias claim that he had been
constrained to go along
with Domingo because of the latters moral ascendancy
over him, it appears that Garcia willingly went along with
the scheme to cover up accused Domingos business
transaction with the municipality because Domingo had
promised to give him a project in exchange for his
cooperation. Hence, he shares equal guilt with the mayor
for which he should be held answerable.[46]
The prosecutions evidence has established the conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt. The flimsy excuses given by
petitioner Garcia cannot overturn the same. That the
checks were made payable to petitioner Domingo instead
of petitioner Garcias D.T. Garcia Construction Supply
company could only have been done through petitioner
Garcias active cooperation. Finally, petitioner Garcias
admitted acts of attempting to cover up the transactions
strongly point to his involvement therein.
Petitioner Garcia is, therefore, equally liable with petitioner
Domingo pursuant to Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
dated May 28, 2001 and July 23, 2001, respectively, in Criminal Case No.
23415, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

GR. No. 187340

August 14, 2013

ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is a certiorari Petition1 filed by City Engineer Antonio B. Sanchez
assailing the Sandiganbayan Decision2 dated 24 September 2008 and
Resolution3 dated 06 March 2009 in Crim. Case No. 25971. The Sandiganbayan
found Sanchez guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.4
Eugenio F. Gabuya Jr. (Gabuya), the Barangay Captain of Cogon, Pardo, Cebu City,
filed a request with the Office of the City Engineer for the improvement of an existing
canal traversing Tagunol and Tabukanal in Cogon. The Maintenance and Drainage
Section of the Office of the City Engineer surveyed the existing canal, found it dirty
and clogged, and recommended its improvement. Engineering Assistant Thessani C.
Rubi prepared a "Program of Work" and an ''Estimate of Construction, Plans and
Specifications," which were then checked by Engineer Gerardo C. del Rosario (Del
Rosario).5
Petitioner approved and submitted these documents to the Cebu City Council. In the
course of their preparation, however, he never ordered Rubi, Del Rosario, or any of
his subordinates to verify the ownership of the land through which the canal would
pass because, according to him, it appeared to be public land.6 The Council passed
Resolution No. 1053 authorizing City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia (Garcia) to enter into a
contract for and on behalf of the city for the construction of a "CHB-lined" canal and
the installation of a box culvert at Highway Tagunol in Barangay Cogon.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 3550, P496,054 was appropriated for the project.7
Garcia then entered into a contract with Alvarez Construction for the building of the
canal. The Construction Division of the Office of the City Engineer, together with
Alvarez Construction, implemented the project and completed it on 9 May 1998.8

Sometime in January 1998, Lucia Nadela (private complainant) discovered that a

canal was being constructed on her property without her consent and approval.9 She
also found that the nipa trees on her land, from which she had been harvesting and
selling nipa leaves, had been cut. Despite the assurances of Gabuya that the canal
would be removed in due time, the Office of the City Engineer never initiated efforts to
do so. Nadela filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of
Republic Act 3019 against Gabuya, Garcia and herein petitioner.
The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found probable cause against petitioner
Sanchez only. It relieved Gabuya of responsibility, supposedly because the
construction of the canal was entirely the undertaking of the City Government of
Cebu.10 As for Garcia, he purportedly relied on the representations of petitioner, who
had the duty of verifying the status of the land.11 The OMB thus filed an
Information12 against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, viz.:
That on or about the month of January 1998, and/or sometime subsequent thereto, at
Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ, a public officer, being the Head, City
Engineering Office of Cebu City, in the performance of his official functions, with
deliberate intent and manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the
construction of a dike/canal which traversed the lot owned by Lucia Nadela situated at
Cogon, Pardo, Cebu City and covered with TCT No. 53444, without the consent of the
owner thereof, thereby taking the said property of Lucia Nadela without due process,
depriving Lucia Nadela of the use of her property, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to the City of Cebu, to the undue damage, injury and prejudice of Lucia Nadela.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
The Sandiganbayan held that petitioner, being a public officer by virtue of his position
as the City Engineer of Cebu, acted with gross inexcusable negligence in approving
the construction of the canal without first ascertaining the ownership of the property
where the canal would be constructed or verifying whether the property had been
expropriated.14 This alleged negligence supposedly deprived private complainant of
the control and use of the middle portion of her land, resulting in a loss of P20,000
every four or five months, which represents income from harvesting and selling nipa
leaves. Private complainant also claimed that she suffered injury, because informal
land settlers used the canal as their toilet, thereby dirtying and damaging the
land.15 The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, and sentenced him to imprisonment for 6 years and 1 month minimum, to 8
years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.16
Petitioner comes before this Court assailing the Sandiganbayans factual finding of
gross inexcusable negligence on his part and undue injury to private complainant. He

avers that it was the duty of the Maintenance and Drainage Section of the Inspection
Office, not his, to determine whether or not the land was privately owned. Also, he
purportedly had no hand in the approval of plans for the land or in the implementation
or execution of the project.17 Petitioner also cites Arias v. Sandiganbayan18 in arguing
that he cannot be held liable for the negligent acts of his subordinates, unless there is
a finding of conspiracy between them. Lastly, he argues that there existed a
prejudicial question before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB21748, which delved into the validity of the acquisition of Nadelas lot. According to
petitioner, the instant case was filed on the premise that the construction of the canal
was unlawful, while the identical question in Civil Case No. CEB-21748 was whether
or not the City legally acquired the property of private complainant when it
constructed a canal thereon.19
In a Resolution20 dated 8 June 2009, this Court required respondent to comment.

(2) The inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake;

(3) There is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) The judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) The findings of fact are premised on want of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record.25
None of the foregoing circumstances is present. The findings of fact and conclusion of
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 are
sufficiently supported by the records.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 provides:

21

In its Comment, respondent avers that one of the functions and duties of petitioner
is to coordinate the construction of engineering and public works projects of the local
government unit. Before implementing the project, however, he did not verify with the
Register of Deeds whether the lot on which the canal would be built already had a
title.22 Respondent also emphasizes the undisputed facts: first, private complainant
was the registered owner of Lot. 3520 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
53444; and second, the canal ate up 145 square meters of the middle portion of the
lot. Because of the presence of the canal, informal settlers established their residence
near it and used it as their waste disposal site, resulting in the lots depreciation. To
make matters worse, private complainant was never compensated for the taking of
her property in order to give way to the construction of the canal.23 As to the argument
of petitioner that there existed a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. CEB-21748,
this issue was already decided by the RTC in a Resolution dated 26 September 2007,
which he did not question through a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent
Rule 65 petition. Hence, he cannot now come before this Court asking it to rule on an
issue that has already been settled.24
The sole issue before us is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found nothing therein to
warrant a reversal of the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan. We deny the
Petition and affirm petitioners conviction.
The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court, except
under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjectures;

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,

the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Uriarte v. People27 further elaborates thus:
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is

a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather
than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably
and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will
or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan correctly found the concurrence of the three elements.
First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public officer.
Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the
canal was to be built because of his unfounded belief that it was public land
constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.
In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties
to check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that
it was public land based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e. that it looked
swampy:
Q: xxx Do you recall your statement that the basis in saying that the property of the
private complainant was a public domain was because it appears swampy and a
catch basin (sic), am I correct?

A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: xxx, You did not order your survey team to verify from the Regional Trial Court if
the City Government of Cebu filed an expropriation proceeding against this lot of the
private complainant?
A: No, because the lot was planted with nipa and pasture land.1wphi1 Because of
the appearance that it is a public domain and the lot was planted with nipa palm. It
was a mangrove area.
Q: So you based your presumption on the appearance of the lot, is that what you
mean?
xxxx
A: xxx Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)28
Petitioners functions and duties as City Engineer, are stated in
Section 477(b) of R.A. 7160, to wit:
The engineer shall take charge of the engineering office and shall:
xxxx
(2) Advise the governor or mayor, as the case may be on infrastructure,
public works, and other engineering matters;

A: Yes, sir.
Q: So on the basis of the appearance of the lot of the complainant, you presumed that
the lot is a public domain, am I correct?
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that is why you did not know that the lot was owned by the private complainant
in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Because you did not make a verification from the Register of Deeds.

(3) Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control the construction,

maintenance, improvement, and repair of roads, bridges, and other
engineering and public works projects of the local government unit
concerned;
(4) Provide engineering services to the local government unit concerned,
including investigation and survey, engineering designs, feasibility studies,
and project management; (Emphases supplied)
Petitioner cannot hide behind the Arias doctrine, because it is not on all fours with his
case. In Arias, six people comprising heads of offices and their subordinates were
charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The accused therein allegedly
conspired with one another in causing, allowing, and/or approving the illegal and

irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In acquitting the two heads of
offices, the Court ruled that they could not be held liable for the acts of their dishonest
or negligent subordinates because they failed to personally examine each detail of a
transaction before affixing their signatures in good faith.
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in
performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to
private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only
be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in
whom the duty is primarily lodged.29
Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done
without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the
palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to
private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied
her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory,
washroom, and waste disposal site.
Lastly, petitioner cannot raise the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question
because, as correctly argued by respondent, the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-21748
has already ruled that there is none. Petitioner failed to avail himself of the remedies
available to him by law in order to question this RTC ruling. As a result, the
Resolution, insofar as he is concerned, is already final and binding on him.
Nevertheless, the question of valid expropriation is irrelevant to this case, in which
petitioner is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in complying with
his duties as City Engineer, to the detriment of private complainant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan
Decision dated 24 September 2008 and Resolution dated 06 March 2009 in Case No.
25971 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
GR. NO. 166570

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The question at the heart of this case is whether petitioners, former employees of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) who were separated from service due to the governments initiative of restructuring the
electric power industry, are entitled to their retirement benefits in addition to the separation pay granted by
law.
Absent explicit statutory authority, we cannot provide our imprimatur to the grant of
separation pay and retirement benefits from one single act of involuntary separation from the service, lest
there be duplication of purpose and depletion of government resources. Within the context of government
reorganization, separation pay and retirement benefits arising from the same cause, are in consideration of
the same services and granted for the same purpose. Whether denominated as separation pay or
retirement benefits, these financial benefits reward government service and provide monetary assistance
to employees involuntarily separated due to bona fide reorganization.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law
against the Decision[1] dated December 23, 2004 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
101, Quezon City in SCA No. Q-03-50681 (for Declaratory Relief) entitled National Power Corporation
v. Napocor Employees and Workers Union (NEWU), NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union
(NECU), NPC Executive Officers Association, Inc. (NPC-EXA), Esther Galvez and Efren Herrera, for
and on their behalf and in behalf of other separated, unrehired, and retired employees of the National
Power Corporation, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Commission on Audit (COA). Said
Decision ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act
No. 186 (CA No. 186),[2] as amended, over and above the separation benefits they received under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9136,[3] otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA).

Legal and factual background

RA No. 9136 was enacted on June 8, 2001 to provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric
power industry, including the privatization of NPCs assets and liabilities. [4] One necessary consequence of
the reorganization was the displacement of employees from the Department of Energy, the Energy
Regulatory Board, the National Electrification Administration and the NPC. To soften the blow from the
severance of employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of the EPIRA, for a separation package
superior than those provided under existing laws, as follows:

SEC. 63. Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of Affected Agencies.

National government employees displaced or separated from the service as a result
of the restructuring of the [electric power] industry and privatization of NPC assets
pursuant to this Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and other
benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations or be entitled to
avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall be one
and one-half month salary for every year of service in the government:
Provided, however, That those who avail of such privilege shall start their
government service anew if absorbed by any government-owned successor
company. In no case shall there be any diminution of benefits under the separation
plan until the full implementation of the restructuring and privatization. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

The implementing rules of the EPIRA, approved by the Joint Congressional Power Commission on
February 27, 2002,[5] further expounded on the separation benefits, viz:

RULE 33. Separation Benefits

Section 1. General Statement on Coverage.
This Rule shall apply to all employees in the National Government service as of
June 26, 2001 regardless of position, designation or status, who are displaced or
separated from the service as a result of the restructuring of the electric [power]
industry and privatization of NPC assets: Provided, however, That the coverage for
casual or contractual employees shall be limited to those whose appointments were
approved or attested [to] by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Section 2. Scope of Application.
This Rule shall apply to affected personnel of DOE, ERB, NEA and NPC.

gratuity. Unable to amicably resolve this matter with its former employees, the NPC filed on September
18, 2003, a Petition for Declaratory Relief[10] against several parties,[11] including the
petitioners, before the RTC of Quezon City, to obtain confirmation that RA No. 9136 did not specifically
authorize NPC to grant retirement benefits in addition to separation pay.[12] The case was docketed as SCA
No. Q-03-50681 and raffled to Branch 101 of said court.
After submission of the respondents respective Answers and Comments,[13] the parties agreed that the
court a quo would resolve the case based on the arguments raised in their memoranda [14] since only a
question of law was involved.[15] In due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, finding
that employees who received the separation benefit under RA No. 9136 are no longer entitled to
retirement benefits:

The aforementioned law speaks of two (2) options for the employee to choose
from, that is: (1) to receive separation pay and other benefits in accordance with
existing laws, rules, and regulations or (2) to avail of the privileges provided under a
separation plan (under R.A. 9136), which shall be one and one half months salary
for every year of service in the government.

Section 3. Separation and Other Benefits.

xxxx

Under Section 3(f) of Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
9136, separation or displacement refers to the severance of employment of any
official or employee, who is neither qualified under existing laws, rules, and
regulations nor has opted to retire under existing laws as a result of the
Restructuring of the electric power industry or Privatization of NPC assets pursuant
to the act. Thus, it is clear that the receipt of benefits under the EPIRA law, by
employees who opted to retire under such law bars the receipt of retirement benefits
under R.A. 1616.

(e) For this purpose, Salary, as a rule, refers to the basic pay including
the thirteenth (13th) month pay received by an employee pursuant to his
appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria, allowances
and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic pay under existing laws.

Moreover, Section 8 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of
both separation pay and retirement benefits. x x x

(a) The separation benefit shall consist of either a separation pay

and other benefits granted in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations or a separation plan equivalent to one and one half (1-12) months
salary for every year of service in the government, whichever is
higher; Provided, That the separated or displaced employee has rendered at least
one (1) year of service at the time of effectivity of the Act.

(f) Likewise, Separation or Displacement refers to the severance of

employment of any official or employee, who is neither qualified under
existing laws, rules and regulations nor has opted to retire under existing
laws, as a result of the Restructuring of the electric power industry or Privatization
of NPC assets pursuant to the Act. (Emphasis supplied)

On February 28, 2003, all NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated from the service. As
a result, all the employees who held permanent positions at the NPC as of June 26, 2001 opted for and
were paid the corresponding separation pay equivalent to one and a half months salary per year of
service. Nonetheless, in addition to the separation package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC
employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186,[6] as amended by RA No. 660[7] and RA
No. 1616.[8] Under these laws, government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service are
entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one months salary for every year of service for the first 20 years, one
and a half months salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months salary for
every year of service in excess of 30 years.[9]
The NPC, on the other hand, took the position that the grant of retirement benefits to displaced employees
in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the grant of a double

xxxx
In said constitutional provision, it is x x x clear that additional or indirect
compensation is barred by law and only [allowed] when so specifically authorized
by law. Furthermore, on the Private Respondents' contention that the second
paragraph should be applied in their [case], the same will not hold water. This is so
because retirement benefits [are] not synonymous to pension or gratuities as
contemplated by law.

R.A. 9136 did not clearly and unequivocally authorize the payment of additional
benefits to Private Respondents as the benefits referred to in such law should not be
interpreted to include retirement benefits in addition to their separation
pay. Separation from service due to [the] restructuring of the [electric] power
industry should not be interpreted to mean retirement as both are different in every
respect. The law specifically defines the meaning of separation by virtue of the
restructuring. x x x
xxxx

Thus, the Respondent-Employees are not entitled to receive retirement benefits

under Republic Act No. 1616 over and above the separation benefits they received
under Republic Act No. 9136.[16]

Petitioners sought recourse from the assailed Decision directly before this court on a pure question of
law. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) submitted its Comment on June 30, 2005,
[17]
while the NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on August 23, 2005.
[18]
Petitioners then filed their Consolidated Reply by registered mail on November 18, 2005.
[19]
After the parties filed their respective memoranda,[20] the case was
submitted for decision.

Petitioners arguments

We deny the petition and affirm the court a quos Decision dated December 23, 2004 in SCA
No. Q-03-50681.
Absent clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the grant of both separation pay and retirement
benefits violates the constitutional proscription on additional compensation.

Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that [n]o elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law. In prior decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory
provision to justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. [21] Here,
absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to
double compensation from one single act of separation from employment.

Petitioners claim that Section 9 of RA No. 6656[22] amounts to sufficient statutory basis for the
grant of both retirement benefits and separation pay. Section 9 provides:

Before us, petitioners argue that:

1) The EPIRA does not bar the application of CA No. 186, as amended. Petitioners are
therefore entitled to their retirement pay in addition to separation pay.
2) Petitioners have vested rights over their retirement benefits.
3) The payment of both retirement pay and separation pay does not constitute double
compensation, as the Constitution provides that pensions or gratuities shall not be
considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

Respondents arguments
Respondents NPC and the DBM, on the other hand, maintain that:

1) Section 63 of RA No. 9136 and Section 3, Rule 33 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations do not authorize the grant of retirement benefits in addition to the
separation pay already received. Rather, Section 63 requires separated employees to
choose between a separation plan under existing laws or the separation package under
the EPIRA.
2) The grant of both separation pay and retirement benefit amounts to double gratuity in direct
contravention of the Constitution.
3) No law authorizes the payment of both separation pay and retirement benefits to petitioners.
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether or not NPC employees who were separated from the
service because of the reorganization of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay
under RA No. 9136 are still entitled to receive retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as amended.

x x x Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who have been
separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid
the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under
existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the
case may be. Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action
thereon has been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are
not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the amount
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay
and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the
department or agency concerned.(Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately for the petitioners, their interpretation has little legal precedent. The CSC has
previously ruled that employees similarly situated to petitioners herein were not entitled to both separation
pay and retirement benefits; instead, the concerned employee must either avail of the separation benefit or
opt to retire if qualified under existing laws. In CSC Resolution No. 021112,[23] the CSC interpreted the
phrase separation pay and retirement in RA No. 6656 as follows:

x x x While the aforequoted provision of law used the conjunctive "and" between
the words "separation pay" and "retirement", this does not mean that both benefits
shall be given to an affected employee. This interpretation is supported by the
phrase "if entitled thereto" found before the phrase "be paid the appropriate
separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws". Thus,
payment of both separation and retirement benefits is not absolute.
Also, in CSC Resolution No. 00-1957,[24] the CSC declared:

Our Ruling

The aforequoted provision of law says: separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws. Be it noted that the conjunctive and is used between
separation pay and retirement, which in its elementary sense would mean that they

are to be taken jointly. (Ruperto G. Martin, Statutory Construction, sixth edition, p.

88) Obviously, therefore, separation pay and retirement refer to only one benefit, of
which an employee affected by the reorganization, if entitled thereto, must be paid
plus other benefits under existing laws, i.e. terminal leave pay, etc.

Further, in Cajiuat v. Mathay,[25] we found that in the absence of express provisions to the
contrary, gratuity laws should be construed against the grant of double compensation. Cajiuatinvolved
employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who exercised their option to retire under CA No. 186
and received the appropriate retirement benefits. Subsequently, the Rice and Corn Administration was
abolished by Presidential Decree No. 4.[26] Said Decree also provided for the payment of a gratuity in
Section 26, paragraph 3:

Permanent officials and employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who
cannot be absorbed by the Administration, or who cannot transfer or to be
transferred to other agencies, or who prefer to retire, if qualified for retirement, or to
be laid off, shall be given gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service but in no case more than twenty-four months salary, in addition to all other
benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations. x x x

On the basis of this provision, the retired employees of the Rice and Corn Administration
claimed that they were entitled to the separation gratuity, over and above the retirement benefits already
received. We disagreed and held that:

x x x [t]here must be a provision, clear and unequivocal, to justify a double pension.

The general language employed in paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 4 fails to meet that test. All that it states is that permanent employees of the Rice
and Corn Administration who are retirable are entitled to gratuity equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service but in no case more than twenty four months
salary in addition to other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and
regulations. To grant double gratuity is unwarranted. No reliance can be placed [on]
the use of the term other benefits found in the paragraph relied upon. As clearly
stated in the memorandum of the Solicitor General, they refer to those receivable by
a retiree under the general retirement laws, like the refund of contributions to the
retirement fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves
of said official employee. The clause in addition to all other benefits to which they
are entitled under existing laws and regulations was inserted to insure the payment
to the retiree of the refund of the contributions to the retirement fund and the money
value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official or employee.[27]

Nothing in the EPIRA justifies the grant of both the separation package and retirement benefits.

SEC. 63. Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of Affected Agencies.

National government employees displaced or separated from the service as a result
of the restructuring of the [electric power] industry and privatization of NPC assets
pursuant to this Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and other
benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations or be entitled to
avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall be one
and one-half month[s] salary for every year of service in the government:
Provided, however, That those who avail of such privilege shall start their
government service anew if absorbed by any government-owned successor
company. In no case shall there be any diminution of benefits under the separation
plan until the full implementation of the restructuring and privatization. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
A careful reading of Section 63 of the EPIRA affirms that said law did not authorize the grant
of both separation pay and retirement benefits. Indeed, the option granted was either to a separation pay
and other benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations or to a separation plan which
shall be one and one-half months salary for every year of service in the government. The options were
alternative, not cumulative. Having chosen the separation plan, they cannot now claim additional
retirement benefits under CA No. 186.
This position finds further support in Section 3(f), Rule 33 of RA No. 9136s Implementing
Rules and Regulations, which provides:

(f)
likewise, separation or displacement refers to the severance of
employment of any official or employee, who is neither qualified under existing
laws, rules and regulations nor has opted to retire under existing laws, as a result of
the restructuring of the electric power industry or privatization of NPC assets
pursuant to the act.

As worded, Rule 33, Section 3(f) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No.
9136 precludes the receipt of both separation and retirement benefits. A separated or displaced
employee, as defined by the implementing rules, does not include one who is qualified or has opted
to retire under existing laws. Consequently, a separated employee must choose between retirement
under applicable laws or separation pay under the EPIRA.

Within the context of reorganization, petitioners cannot claim a vested right over their retirement
benefits.

Petitioners claim that having religiously paid their premiums, they have vested rights to their retirement
gratuities which may not be revoked or impaired. However, petitioners fail to consider that under the
retirement laws that they themselves invoke, separation from the service, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is a distinct compensable event from retirement. [28] Nothing in said laws permits an employee
to claim both separation pay and retirement benefits in the event of separation from the service due to
reorganization.

The EPIRA, a legislative enactment dealing specifically with the privatization of the electric
power industry, provides:
Thus, absent an express provision of law to the contrary, separation due to reorganization gives
rise to two possible scenarios: first, when the separated employee is not yet entitled to retirement benefits,

second, when the employee is qualified to retire. In the first case, the employees separation pay shall be
computed based on the period of service rendered in the government prior to the reorganization. In the
second case, where an employee is qualified to retire, he or she may opt to claim separation or retirement
benefits.

above the existing retirement benefits. Therein lies the fundamental difference. Hence, unlike in this
case, there was specific authority for the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits.

Contradistinction with Larao v. Commission on Audit

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 23, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101 in SCA No. Q-03-50681 holding that petitioners are not
entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are entitled to a refund of their contributions to
the retirement fund, and the monetary value of any accumulated vacation and sick leaves.

We are, of course, aware that in Larao v. Commission on Audit[29] we held that employees,
who were separated from the service because of the reorganization of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) and Local Waterworks and Utilities Administration (LWUA) pursuant to RA
No. 8041, were entitled to both a separation package and retirement benefits.[30]
In Larao, however, the Early Retirement Incentive Plan submitted to and approved by then
President Fidel V. Ramos explicitly provided for a separation package that would be givenover and

SO ORDERED.