Section 27 of Evidence Act:

How much of information received from accused may be proved: When any fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much information
(whether it amounts to confession or not) as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.
Section 27 is founded on the principle that if the confession of the accused is
supported by a discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be true and not to have been
extorted. The section is quite apparently laid out as a proviso or an exception to the
section 26 which deals with confessions in police custody and other involuntary
confessions. Thus it seems that the intention of the legislature is that all objections to
the validity of that part of the statement are washed off which leads to the discovery
of an article connected with the crime. Whether such a statement proceeds out of
inducements, threats or torture are absolutely immaterial.
This provision is liable of abuse by the police officers. With a view to finish of cases,
police officers can subject the accused to torture and then plant evidence so as to
proclaim the accused as guilty. This provision should be amended. The discovery of
fact as purported by this section should be made in front of two witnesses so that there
could be no planting of evidence done. This should be included in substantive law,
irrespective of the fact that it exists in procedural law.Also, the statement of the
accused which has lead to the discovery of a relevant fact would be invalid if it had
been taken because of extortion, threat or torture. The accused should sign a document
stating whether any fact discovered is not due to extortion or threat. The accused can
be induced only if it is a valid and legal inducement.
After all these steps, the accused gives a statement which leads to the discovery of a
relevant fact, then the whole statement should be made relevant rather than only the
statement which lead to the discovery of the fact. The accused should, after making
the statement and the police discovering the relevant fact stated in the statement, again
sign a document purporting that he has made the signature and seen what has been
discovered from his statement. A District Judge/Metropolitan Judge should be present
as in when the accused signs the statement.

It should be made mandatory that all these provisions are read out to the accused as
soon as he is arrested. This would help knowing the accused of his rights and he
wouldnt be unaware and act accordingly.
Constitutionality of Section 27
Indian Evidence Act was written before the Constitution of India and Article 20(3) of
the constitution says that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
This article seemingly made Section 27 unconstitutional. SC considered this issue in
the case of Nisa Sree vs State of Orissa AIR 1954, and held that it is not violative of
Article 20(3). A confession may or may not lead to the discovery of an incriminating
fact. If the discovered fact is non incriminatory, there is no issue and if it is selfincriminatory, it is admissible if the information is given by the accused without any
threat.
Requirements Under The SectionThe conditions necessary for the application of section 27 are:
1. The fact must have been discovered in the consequence of the information received
from the accused.
2. The person giving the information must be accused of an offence.
3. He must be in custody of a police officer.
4. That portion only of the information which relates distinctly to the fact discovered
can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.
5. Before the statement is proved, somebody must depose that articles were
discovered in consequence of the information received from the accused. In the
example given above, before the statement of the accused could be proved, somebody,
such a sub-inspector, must depose that in consequence of the given information given
by the accused, some facts were discovered.

6. The fact discovered must be a relevant fact, that is, to say it must relate to the
commission of the crime in question.
Case Study
In Pandu Rang Kallu Patil v. State of Maharashtra 1, it was held by Supreme Court
that section 27 of evidence act was enacted as proviso to the provisions of sections of
Section 25 and 26, which imposed a complete ban on admissibility of any confession
made by accused either to police or at any one while in police custody. Nonetheless
the ban would be lifted if the statement is distinctly related to discovery of facts. The
object of making provision in section 27 was to permit a certain portion of statement
made by an accused to Police Officer admissible in evidence whether or not such
statement is confessional or non confessional.

FACTS
There was a dispute between Al and the father of the deceased over some landed
property. The said dispute made them enemies. This is the background of the
occurrence. While deceased Ramdas, and his brother PW2 Narayan were proceeding
to their village for taking lunch around 1.30 P.M. on 29.6.92 the assailants went in a
jeep and stopped just near the place of occurrence. All the assailants alighted from the
jeep. Al, A2 and A3 had a gun each with them. A4 and A6 had either a knife or a
sword with them. It is unnecessary to mention about the weapons possessed by other
persons. The assailants who were armed with guns opened fire at the deceased as well
as PW2. The deceased was then a few feet ahead of PW2 and both were running up
presumably to escape from the chasing assailants. Both of them sustained serious gun
shot injuries, though PW2 did not succumb to them. But the deceased fell down at the
spot and died. Seeing this the assailants took to their heals leaving the jeep remaining
at the spot as a mute remnant of the acts done by them.
ISSUES RAISED
While dealing with the facts of this case we may point out that the trial court
convicted Al-Shankar Gopal Patil and A3-Balaram Waman Patil under Section 302 of
the 1PC while A2-Nazir Babu Sheikh was convicted only under Section 307 of the
1 APPEAL (CRL.) 194 OF 2000

IPC. Trial Court acquitted A4-Pandurang Kalu Patil and A6-Janardhan Shaligram
Patil. But the High Court in the impugned judgment reversed the acquittal of A4 and
A6 and convicted them under Section 326 read withSection 149 of the IPC and
sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The High Court confirmed the
conviction and sentence passed on A l and A3 but in the matter of A2 - Nazir Babu
Sheikh, the High Court raised up the conviction from Section 307 to Section 302 read
withSection 149 of the IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The convicted
A l and A3 have filed special leave petitions in this Court but they were dismissed by
this Court.
ARGUMENTS: The prosecution examined four persons as eye witnesses, they are
PW2 to PW5. The trial court and the High Court placed reliance on the testimony of
PW2 Narayan and PW3 Janu Bhoir.
We have absolutely no doubt that PW2 Narayan who was injured and seen the
occurrence and hence he was competent to say who were all the assailants. He also
vouchsafed the presence of PW3 Janu Bhoir. We are not disposed to disbelieve the
testimony of those two witnesses as they were relied upon by the two Courts.
Mr. SR Chitnis, learned senior counsel for the appellants contended that the version of
the eye witnesses is inconsistent with the injuries noted by the doctors. According to
the version of the eye witnesses the deceased was running forward while the
assailants shot him from behind but the fire arm injuries sustained by the deceased
could well have been shot face-to-face. This aspect is not enough to doubt the
correctness of the testimony of the eye witnesses, for, it is quite possible as per the
reflex action the running deceased would have turned back either to see whether he
has gone out of the range of penil or to know the nearness of it. The mere fact that
PW2 eye witness said that the deceased was running forward and the assailants shot
them from behind cannot rule but the possibility of such twirling of the deceased
when the guns were fired.
Learned counsel then contended that the High Court had gone wrong in relying on the
evidence of PW18-Dy. S.P. who said that when A2 was arrested and interrogated a
gun was disintered pursuant to the information supplied by him. It is on the said
aspect that the Division Bench of the High Court considered the ratio in Pulikuri

Kottaya. What PW 18 said in the Court is that the statement made by A2 had been
recorded in Exh. 91 memorandum. We have noticed from the said memorandum the
following statement of A2 as recorded therein :"I have kept the fire arm concealed behind the old house in a heap of wood".
The fact discovered by PW 18 is certainly not the gun. The fact discovered is that A2
had concealed the gun (article no. 5/2) behind the old house under a heap of wood. It
was the same gun with which A2 had fired at PW2 and that aspect has been proved
with the help of other evidence.
Mr. SR Chitnis, made an alternative endeavour to show that the act committed by A2
can at the worst amount only to the offence under Section 307 of the IPC because
PW2 had not succumbed to the injuries. When A2 along with other assailants alighted
from the jeep together and chased the deceased and PW2 together and fired their
lethal weapons together, the common intention shared by A2 with other assailants (Al
and A3) looms large, albeit the fact that the bullet of his fire arm could reach only
upto the body of PW2 who was not destined to die. What A1 and A3 had done was
certainly with the common intention shared by A2-Nazir Babu also. Of course, the
High Court has convicted him under Section 302 with the help of Section 149 of the
IPC. That error has to be corrected by us. We, therefore, confirm the conviction and
sentence passed on A2-Nazir Babu Sheikh under Section 302 with the aid of 34 of
the IPC and dismiss Cr. Appeal No. 189/2000.
But the position of A4 and A6 is different. Though they had knives with them they
had not chosen to do anything. Even after the deceased fell down they did not move
forward to inflict even a scratch on him. They did not do any harm to PW2. There is
nothing to indicate that they knew about the design of the other assailants. They were
acquitted by the trial court. The view taken by the trial court on the facts of the case is
reasonable and hence it was impermissible for the appellate court to interfere with the
acquittal.
JUDGEMENT
The court, therefore, allow Crl. Appeal No. 194/2000 and set aside the conviction and
sentence passed on A4-Pandurang and A6-Janardhan Shaligram Patil. They are

acquitted. Their bail bond will stand discharged. (A copy of this judgment will be
forwarded to the Registrar of the Bombay High Court as copies of the impugned
judgment were directed to be circulated to all the sessions judges under Bombay High
Court. Now it is necessary to bring this also to the notice of all those sessions judges).

Some other case laws

Pulukari Kottaya v Emperor2 the scope of Section 27 was explained by their
lordships:
Section 27 provides one exception to the prohibition imposed by Section 26 and
enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The
condition necessary to bring Section 27 in operation is that the discovery of fact in
consequence of information received from accused must be deposed to, and thereupon
so much of the information as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be
proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered
in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the
information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence.
Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody
produces from some place of concealment, some object e.g. a dead body, a weapon or
ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused.
Section 27 and Narco Analysis, Polygraph and BEAP Tests
In Selvi v. State of Kainataka3, it was held that no individual should be forcibly
subjected to any of the techniques (namely, narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and
the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test) in question, whether in the
context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an
unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. The Court left room for the voluntary
administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice provided
2 AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 IA 65: 48 Cr Lj 533
3 (2010) 7 SCC 263: AIR 2010 SC 1974: 2010 AIR SCW 3011

that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to
undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as
evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses
during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is
subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be
admitted in accordance with section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but the same should
be supported with the guidelines given by the National Human Rights Commission
(Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an
Accused in 2000) are as under:

Section 27 and Article 20 (3) (Self-incrimination)

In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad4, it was urged that section 27 was ultra rires
against the protection guaranteed under Article 20(3) against testimonial compulsion.
The Supreme Court of India in Kathi Kalu Oghad's case held that compulsionnot
being inherent or implicit the fact of the information having been received from a
person in custody, the contention that section 27 of the Evidence Act necessarily
infringes Article 20(3) of the Constitution cannot be accepted. Sinha, C.J., observed
that whether compulsion was used or not will be question of fact in each to be
determined by the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the
evidence before it.

4 (1963) 1 SCJ 195: AIR 1961 SC 1808: (1961) 2 Cr Lj 856