Shaftesbury, Stoicism, and Philosophy as a Way of Life

JOHN SELLARS

ABSTRACT: This paper examines Shaftesburys reflections on the nature of

philosophy in his Askmata notebooks, which draw heavily on the Roman Stoics
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In what follows I introduce the notebooks, outline
Shaftesburys account of philosophy therein, compare it with his discussions of
the nature of philosophy in his published works, and conclude by suggesting that
Pierre Hadots conception of philosophy as a way of life offers a helpful
framework for thinking about Shaftesburys account of philosophy.

1. Reading the Askmata

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, is best known for his three
volume work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times published in 1711.1
That work was in fact a compilation of previously published works, supplemented
with further reflections on those works, and was no doubt intended to stand as
the final, complete statement of his philosophy.2 After its publication Shaftesbury
made some further revisions to the text and these were incorporated into the
second edition that was published in 1714, the year after Shaftesburys death.3 In
the second edition of the Characteristicks, then, we have Shaftesburys collected

1

Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. In Three Volumes [] Anno 1711.

The first edition contained A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sensus Communis, and Soliloquy in
volume 1, An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit and The Moralists in volume 2, and the hitherto
unpublished Miscellaneous Reflections in volume 3. Later editions added other texts to volume 3
(e.g. Judgment of Hercules and Letter concerning Design), but these additions were not part of
Shaftesburys original plan.
3

Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. In Three Volumes. The Second Edition
Corrected. By the the Right Honourable Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, MDCCXIV. For a fuller
account of the publishing history of the Characteristicks see W. E. Alderman, English Editions of
Shaftesburys Characteristics, The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 61 (1967), 31534, although this contains a number of errors and should be used with caution.

works, edited and revised by the author himself. This is an extremely fortunate
state of affairs, and not one that is replicated very often. It might lead one to
assume that Shaftesbury is one of the few authors in the history of philosophy
where there is little to be gained from rummaging through manuscripts and
archives, for he has already done the necessary editorial and textual work for us
himself and given us an authoritative edition of his collected works.
Even so people have rummaged through the archives and there they have
found a number of other texts by Shaftesbury. The most famous of these consists
of a pair of notebooks with the title Askmata, now in the Public Records Office at
Kew, and first edited and published by Benjamin Rand in 1900.4 Recently these
have been re-edited for the Standard Edition of Shaftesburys works being
published in Germany.5 A more recent discovery worth mentioning, also in the
Public Records Office, is a short work in Latin under the title Pathologia.6 Both of
these literary remains deal primarily with Stoicism: the Askmata takes
inspiration from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, quoting both often; the
Pathologia offers an account and defence of the Stoic theory of emotions, drawing
on Cicero and Diogenes Laertius. By contrast Shaftesburys published works,
conveniently gathered together for us in the Characteristicks, contain relatively
few references to Stoicism or Stoic authors.

4

B. Rand, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of
Shaftesbury (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900). For a discussion of the notebooks see L. E.
Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
81-90.
5

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, ed. W.
Benda, C. Jackson-Holzberg, P. Mller, and F. A. Uehlein (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: frommannholzboog, 2011).
6

See L. Jaffro, C. Maurer, and A. Petit, Pathologia, A Theory of Passions, History of European
Ideas 39/2 (2013), 221-30, with, immediately preceding in the same volume, C. Maurer and L.
Jaffro, Reading Shaftesburys Pathologia: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic Account of the
Emotions, History of European Ideas 39/2 (2013), 207-20.

3
In the light of what we have already seen regarding Shaftesburys

preparation of his own collected works, what, if any, weight ought we to place on
these manuscript texts? If Shaftesbury thought they were important parts of his
philosophical work, then presumably he would have included them in the
Characteristicks. His decision not to publish them, even in some revised form,
might seem to indicate that he did not think them worthy of a place within what
he took to be the final record of his philosophical work.7 It looks, then, as if these
manuscript remains might simply be discounted.
But before we dismiss these texts too quickly we might perhaps bear in
mind something that Shaftesbury says in one of his published works, his Soliloquy,
or Advice to an Author.8 In this work Shaftesbury advocates a form of Socratic care
of the self that requires the individual to split himself in two so that he can be
both patient and doctor to himself at once. One of the best ways to do this, he
suggests, is to enter into self-dialogue or soliloquy, and one of the most effective
ways to carry that out is via writing. It is through writing, through trying to grasp
our thoughts with language, that we gain self-knowledge. He writes, our
Thoughts have generally such an obscure implicit Language, that tis the hardest
thing in the world to make em speak out distinctly.9 However he also says that
this sort of writing, this sort of dialogue with oneself, ought to be kept private:

As we shall see later Shaftesbury did extract some short passages from the notebooks and
incorporate them into some of his published works.
8

First published in 1710, and cited here from the fourth edition of the Characteristicks, 3 vols
(London, 1727), supplemented with the pagination of L. E. Kleins modernized edition,
Characteristics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 171 (Klein, 78).

4
I hold it very indecent for any one to publish his Meditations,
Occasional Reflections, Solitary Thoughts, or other such Exercises as
come under the notion of this self-discoursing Practice.10

This sort of writing is an opportunity for an author to think in private, for their
own particular benefit and ought to be kept quite distinct from other forms of
writing that address a public audience.11
It looks, then, as if Shaftesbury had quite specific ideas about different
forms of philosophical writing, some appropriate for publication, others not. The
briefest of glances at the Askmata shows that this text clearly falls under the
heading of private reflections not designed for publication. Perhaps, on
Shaftesburys own terms, that gives us a new reason not to pay these texts too
much attention. Yet, as his remarks in the Soliloquy make clear, it is in this sort of
private writing that the real philosophical work gets done, namely the agonizing
attempt to articulate ones innermost thoughts away from public gaze in pursuit
of the self-knowledge that Shaftesbury calls the proper Object of Philosophy.12
I have already noted that the Askmata engages at length with Epictetus
and Marcus Aurelius, comprising a patchwork of quotations from both,
sometimes with no comment at all, sometimes with a brief gloss, and sometimes
with extended essays on a particular topic inspired by his reading of these two
Stoics. Both Epictetus and Marcus explicitly advocate precisely the sort of writing
that Shaftesbury describes in the Soliloquy and practises in the Askmata.
Marcuss own notebook, known to English readers since the seventeenth century

10

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 164 (Klein, 74).

11

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 164 (Klein, 75).

12

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 285 (Klein, 128). As Klein puts it, The essence of philosophy
[for Shaftesbury] was self-making and self-transformation (Shaftesbury and the Culture of
Politeness, 90).

as the Meditations, has the title To Himself in the Greek textual tradition.13
Epictetus describes the practice in his Discourses:

Have thoughts like these ready to hand by night and by day; write
them, read them, make your conversation about them, communing
with yourself.14

This gives us a further reason to pay attention to the Askmata, for not only does
this work give us an example of Shaftesbury doing what he recommends in the
Soliloquy but it also points us to the inspiration behind the idea, namely Stoic
practices of self-fashioning. These practices clearly form part of a wider
conception of the role and purpose of philosophy and it is this conception of
philosophy that I want to examine in what follows. In the next section (2) I shall
look at what Shaftesbury says about the nature of philosophy in the Askmata
itself, bearing in mind that this is a text in which Shaftesbury is privately trying to
articulate his innermost thoughts. Then (3) I shall contextualize those private
reflections by comparing what he says there with comments on the nature of
philosophy that we find in the Characteristicks. Finally (4) I shall say something
about the image of philosophy that Shaftesbury presents us with and how it differs
from traditional accounts of early modern philosophy. I shall conclude by

13

The title in the editio princeps of 1559, based on a now lost MS, is tn eis heauton. The English
title Meditations dates back to Meric Casaubons translation of 1634. There is an irony in the fact
that Shaftesbury was inspired to write privately by a book that was not intended for public
circulation. Shaftesbury is likely to have known this. In the preface to his translation of the
Meditations, Casaubon wrote that what Antoninus wrote, he wrote it not for the publick, but for
his owne private use (Marcus Aurelius Antoninus The Roman Emperor, His Meditations
Concerning Himselfe, Translated out of the Originall Greeke; with Notes: by Meric Casaubon
[London, 1634], 24). Casaubons version circulated widely and was reprinted in 1635, 1663, 1673,
and 1693.
14

Epictetus, Dissertationes 3.24.103 (trans. W. A. Oldfather, in Epictetus, The Discourses , 2 vols

[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925-28]).

suggesting that Pierre Hadots account of philosophy as a way of life might offer a
productive framework within which to think about Shaftesburys image of
philosophy.

2. Shaftesburys Notebook Reflections on Philosophy

In Benjamin Rands 1900 edition of the Askmata, a title he translated as

Philosophical Regimen, there is a chapter entitled Philosophy.15 The new edition
shows us that the bulk of this was written during Shaftesburys stay in Rotterdam
in 1698-9, with a couple of shorter additions in 1703-4 and after 1704.16 These were,
for Shaftesbury, periods of retreat, time away from his duties as a Member of
Parliament at Westminster and an opportunity, through his reading, to converse
with the ancients rather than his contemporaries.17 With pressures of work and
family life taking their toll on his health, the periods of seclusion during which
Shaftesbury filled his notebooks were conceived as a vital opportunity for him to
take care of himself.18 Although there is mention of him suffering from asthma,
exacerbated by the tobacco smoke filling the crowded rooms at Westminster,19
Shaftesburys own comments suggest that the care he needed to give himself was
primarily psychological rather than physical, and this psychological project of

15

See Rand, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, 267-72; cf. Standard Edition
II,6 Askmata, 282-9.
16

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 55.

17

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 22, citing Shaftesburys letter to Locke (9 April 1698).

18

See further Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 22-8.

19

Ibid.

taking care of himself very much shapes his reflections on the nature of
philosophy in the Askmata.20
Those reflections open with a somewhat blunt rejection of Lockes
philosophical project of analysing the formation and composition of ideas as a
mere specious exercise.21 Locke was of course quite explicit in claiming that the
task of the philosopher was to be an Under-Labourer to the sciences, clearing
Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to
Knowledge.22 By contrast Shaftesburys point of departure is personal and
introspective: let me look a while within my self. Let me observe there, Whether
or no there be Connection, & Consistency.23 What he finds within himself is very
little in the way of consistency: one day all goes well and the world is delightful,
the next is marked by disappointment and despair. In the ups and downs of ones
inner emotional life there is little sign of the Truth, Certainty, [and] Evidence
championed by the philosophers of his day.24 Shaftesbury complains that their
abstract speculations bear little relation to either inner emotional turmoil or the
pressing issues of everyday life, and his retreat, during which he was writing these
comments, was his attempt to confront problems of both sorts in his own life. In
one striking passage he suggests that philosophy is only of value when it grapples
with the question of the value of human life:

20

Indeed, his extended reflections from his first retreat end with the words School of Philos:
Surgeons Shop (Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 287), which is a translation of a line from
Epictetus (Diss. 3.23.30), omitted in Rands edition.
21

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 282 (Rand, 267). Compare with Characteristicks, 4th edn
(1727), 1: 299 (Klein, 134).
22

J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding [first published 1690], ed. P. H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 10.
23

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 282-3 (Rand, 267). Again compare with Characteristicks, 4th
edn (1727), 1: 299 (Klein, 134).
24

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 283 (Rand, 267).

If I have a right Idea of Life now at this moment, that I think slightly
of it & resolve with my Self that it may easily by layd down; teach me
how I shall remain in this opinion; what it is yet changes it; and how
this Disturbance happens: by what Innovation, what Composition,
what Intervention of other Ideas. If This be the Subject of the
Philosophical Art; I readily apply to It, & studdy It. If there be
nothing of this in the Case, I have no occasion for the sort of Learning,
& am no more desirouse of knowing how I form or compound those
Ideas which are distinguished by Words than I am of knowing how, &
by what motions of my Mouth I form those articulate Sounds, which
I can full as well pronounce & use, without any such Science or
Speculation.25

This reference to a Philosophical Art brings to mind Epictetuss definition of

philosophy as an art of living and in the notes added in his subsequent retreats
Shaftesbury turns explicitly to Epictetus.26 The art with which Shaftesbury is
concerned, devoted to wisdom, happiness, and character rather than scientific
knowledge, appears simplistic at first glance but is he suggests far harder to
master.27 To grasp fully the nature of ones desire and aversion, of what is and is not
within ones control, and then to transform oneself in the light of that

25

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 284 (Rand, 268), with contractions expanded. Compare this
with Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 302-3 (Klein, 135), which follows this passage very closely.
26

See Epictetus, Diss. 1.15.2. Shaftesbury worked closely on the text of Epictetus and some of his
textual emendations are recorded in John Uptons Epicteti quae supersunt Dissertationes ab
Arriano collectae , 2 vols (London: Thomas Woodward, 1741).
27

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 288 (Rand, 269).

understanding this is the truly difficult task.28 Quoting Epictetuss statement

that we ought to train ourselves to distinguish between our impressions and
things themselves (in order to avoid mistaken value judgements and unwanted
emotions), Shaftesbury comments Let this be thy Philosophy, & leave the other
Phaenomena for others.29
Shaftesbury goes on to offer a slightly more formal distinction between
these competing ways of conceiving philosophy. Either philosophy is an activity
marked by the subtlety and niceness of the speculation, in which case it includes
all the natural sciences, or it teaches happiness and gives the rule of life, in which
case it stands above all other subjects. If it is the latter, as we have already seen him
affirm, then if happiness is dependent on external things it ought to concern itself
with such things, but if instead it is dependent on the mind then the Work of
Philosophy is to fortify a Mind against avarice, ambition, restlessness, and
anxiety.30

1. marked by subtlety and

niceness of speculation
Philosophy
either
2. teaches happiness
and gives the rule of life

2a. the study of outward things

in which happiness consists
2b. to correct and amend our
opinions of outward things

28

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 289 (Rand, 269), where Shaftesbury uses a series of
Epictetan technical terms, such as orexis, ekklisis, ta eph hmin, ouk eph hmin, proaireta, and
aproaireta.
29

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 288 (Rand, 269), following a quotation from Epictetus, Ench.
1.5.
30

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 284 (Rand, 269).

10

For Shaftesbury philosophy is at one neither with the natural sciences and
mathematics (i.e. 1) nor with political and economic sciences (i.e. 2a), but rather is
a psychotherapeutic project devoted to the contents of ones own mind (2b). If
philosophy is anything, Shaftesbury comments, then it is this, and this is a matter
of Practice, an activity ultimately aimed at securing tranquillity of mind.31
The claim that philosophy ought primarily to be concerned with the
analysis of ones opinions and judgements again brings to mind Epictetus, while
the reference to tranquillity as the criterion for assessing the relevance of
philosophical speculation reminds us of Senecas De tranquillitate animae.
Shaftesburys next move brings to mind ancient debates about Stoic ethics. Having
distinguished between happiness dependent on externals and happiness
dependent on the mind, Shaftesbury adds a third option, namely that happiness
might require both a sound frame of mind and certain external goods:

For, either [1] Happiness is in outward things; or [2] from Self &
outward things together; or [3] from Self alone & not from outward
things.32

Of these three options the first can be quickly dismissed, for if it were true then
people would consistently be happy in proportion to their possession of external
goods, which is not the case. Shaftesbury resists choosing between the second and
third options, instead arguing that in either case it will be necessary to pay
attention to ones Self and so this is a task that we cannot ignore. At this point,

31

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 285 (Rand, 270).

32

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 285 (Rand, 270), numbers added.

11

then, Shaftesbury refuses to choose between Stoicism and Aristotelianism.33 He

goes on to list some of the things that he takes this to involve: how to free my Self
from those [] Passions which make me inconsistent with my Self, how to calm
my Anger, how to quell Resentment & Reveng, how to keep out Luxury, how
to stand out against Ambition, and how to bear with Accidents & support the
common Chances of the World.34
This project of taking care of ones Self looks as if it might involve turning
ones back on the world and ones worldly affairs. As a man of the world himself,
albeit one struggling in that role, Shaftesbury was all too aware of the tension
between managing his practical affairs and turning to devote himself fully to a
philosophical life. This brings us back to the choice between the second and third
options outlined earlier: are outward things necessary for a happy life? Again
Shaftesbury resists answering this question directly but instead suggests that this
question is at the very heart of philosophy. He writes that this still is Philosophy:
this is the Thing it Self: to enquire where & in what we are Loosers: which are the
greatest Gains.35 In the attempt to become secure against Fortune is it a matter
of acquiring further external goods or settling matters within? The task of
philosophy is to examine the extent to which we ought to moderate our desires,
control our passions, check our ambition, and place value on external goods such
as wealth and property. Central to this will be assessing the contribution, if any,
such things make to our happiness.
It is, Shaftesbury concludes, part of the human condition to reflect on the
nature of ones own happiness but of course people vary considerably in their

33

It is worth noting that the points mentioned above that resonate with Stoicism (a concern
with opinions, the role of tranquillity) are equally compatible with Aristotelian ethics.
34

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 286 (Rand, 270-1).

35

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 286 (Rand, 271).

12

ability to think rationally about these sorts of issues. This is where philosophy can
help. Philosophy is the art of reasoning about the nature of human happiness.36 It
is also, as we have already seen, the art of training ones Self in the light of that
reasoning so that one becomes happy. That at least appears to have been
Shaftesburys goal during his therapeutic retreat during which he reflected on
these issues and wrote these notes.

3. Shaftesburys Published Metaphilosophy

The discussion of philosophy in the Askmata notebooks was never intended for
publication. These were Shaftesburys private reflections, his attempt to think
through on paper issues of personal concern, such as trying to articulate his own
understanding of philosophy and differentiate it from that of his tutor Locke. As
such it would be unwise to take these notes as a definitive statement of
Shaftesburys considered view on the subject. For that we ought to return to his
published works that he revised and edited to form the Characteristicks.
We have already noted that Shaftesbury advocated a form of Socratic care
of the self in his Soliloquy, and in the light of the Askmata we now have a much
clearer sense of what he took this to involve. We can also see the relevance of the
line from the Stoic poet Persius printed on the title page of the Soliloquy, no need
to inquire outside yourself.37 The internal inquiry that Shaftesbury outlines in the
Soliloquy involves examining ones passions and the opinions on which they are
based, implicitly assuming a Stoic view of the relationship between the two. This

36
37

See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 287 (Rand, 272).

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 151 (Klein, 70), quoting Persius, Saturae 1.7: nec te quaesiveris
extra.

13

in turn leads to the study of human nature.38 Shaftesbury goes on to say that
philosophy conceived thus by Nature, has the Pre-eminence above all other
Science or Knowledg,39 echoing the claim he made in the Askmata. Here,
however, he goes on to give us a reason why, namely that it and it alone assigns
value to things in life. But a more powerful reason for preferring this conception of
philosophy for Shaftesbury is its existential relevance, just as we saw in the
opening sections of the discussion in the Askmata. Indeed, at this point in the
Soliloquy Shaftesbury takes over half a dozen lines from the Askmata almost
word-for-word,40 adding afterwards that whatever the virtues of Lockean
philosophy might be it relates not to Me myself, it concerns not the Man, nor any
otherwise affects the Mind than by the conceit of Knowledg, and the false
Assurance raisd from a supposd Improvement.41
We can see, then, that in the Soliloquy, first published in 1710, Shaftesbury
asserts in public the central ideas that he first developed in private in the
Askmata around a decade earlier, in places taking over sections of text from the
notebooks and reworking them.42 Alongside the Soliloquy we might also note
Shaftesburys work entitled The Moralists, first printed a year earlier, in 1709, in
which he also addresses the topic of the nature of philosophy. Although this work
is harder to interpret insofar as it takes the form of a dialogue, the view of
philosophy that emerges by the end is very much in tune with what we have
already seen in both the Askmata and the Soliloquy. Philosophy is defined as the
Study of Happiness and happiness is asserted to come from within, not from

38

See Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 297 (Klein, 133).

39

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 297 (Klein, 133).

40

Compare Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 283, lines 4-11 (Rand, 267) with Characteristicks, 4th
edn (1727), 1: 300 (Klein, 134).
41

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 301 (Klein, 134).

42

See in particular the parallel passages mentioned in notes 24 and 38 above.

14

without, so philosophys primary object of study is ones Self.43 But to be a

philosopher is not merely to inquire into the nature of happiness; instead it
involves a process of self-transformation. Thus Theocles, one of the characters in
the dialogue, says Experience shews us every day, That for talking or writing
Philosophy, People are not at all the nearer being PHILOSOPHERS.44 If that seems to
imply an excessively narrow account of who does and does not count as a proper
philosopher, the discussion continues by suggesting that more or less all reflective
human beings are philosophers to varying degrees, to the extent that they reflect
on what might contribute to a happy life. The defining feature of the philosopher
seems to be practical orientation rather than intellectual discourse.

4. Philosophy as a Way of Life

What are we to make of Shaftesburys reflections on the nature of philosophy? At

first glance these look somewhat anomalous when compared with the
predominant models of philosophy current in the early modern period. As we
have seen, they are explicitly at odds with Lockes conception of philosophy,
which has gone on to be so influential in the English-speaking world. They are also
at odds with Kants account of the philosophy of his immediate predecessors, a
narrative that shaped the somewhat simplistic rationalists versus empiricists
story of early modern philosophy in so many textbooks.45 Shaftesbury simply
looks out of place.
I do not think he is in fact as out of place as he might at first appear to be. A
number of other philosophers of the period adopt a similar view. We might

43

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 2: 437-8 (Klein, 336).

44

Ibid.

45

See e.g. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga, 1781/1787), A854/B882.

15

mention Spinozas metaphilosophical ideal of psychotherapeutic selftransformation, outlined in his Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.46 We could
also note Bacons interest in medicine of the mind and of course Montaigne.
Others have commented on the contingent character of traditional narratives of
the history early modern philosophy, and the shift from a biographical model to a
systematic paradigm in the eighteenth century, so I do not intend to cover that
ground here.47 Instead what I want to do in this final section is to point to another
model for thinking about what philosophy is that might offer a useful framework
within which to think about Shaftesburys approach.
The model I have in mind was developed by the French scholar of ancient
philosophy Pierre Hadot.48 Hadot argued in a series of works that in antiquity
philosophy was conceived not as an abstract theoretical system but rather as a
way of life.49 A philosopher in antiquity was not someone who examined a series of
theoretical questions in isolation while continuing to live just as he had done
before. Instead to become a philosopher meant to choose a certain way of life: a

46

In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione Spinoza suggests that unhappiness is the product
of misconceiving what is good or bad, that this requires a remedy just as a physically sick
person requires a remedy and that this remedy begins by studying philosophy, and in particular
the philosophy of nature. See B. Spinoza, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, esp. 7 and 14
(ed. C. Gebhardt [Heidelberg: Carl Winters, n.d.], 7-8; trans. E. Curley in The Collected Works of
Spinoza I [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], 9-11).
47

See e.g. Leo Catana, The Historiographical Concept System of Philosophy: Its Origin, Nature,
Influence and Legitimacy (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
48

C. Brooke, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2012), 122-23, has also suggested that Shaftesbury might be read
productively through the lens of Hadots work. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this
to my attention.
49

See P. Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: tudes Augustiniennes, 1981;
2nd edn 1987; rev. edn 2002), parts of which are translated into English in Philosophy as a Way of
Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Note also his Quest-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris:
Gallimard, 1995), translated as What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2002). I should note that Hadot himself mentioned Shaftesbury as a reviver of this ancient
conception of philosophy; see What is Ancient Philosophy?, 270.

16

life devoted to virtue or to pleasure or to contemplation, for instance. It also often

meant joining a community of like-minded people following the same way of life,
whether that be in the Academy, the Lyceum, the Garden, or at the Stoa. On this
account an ancient philosopher shares more in common with what we would
now associate with a follower of a religious life than he does with our typical
image of a modern scientist.
This shift in focus, stressing the connections between philosophy and
religion over the connections between philosophy and science, is reflected in the
narrative history of ancient philosophy that Hadot developed. In the Englishspeaking world the most common narrative history of ancient philosophy opens
with the Presocratics, whose proto-scientific, epistemological, and metaphysical
concerns are then developed and systematized by Plato and especially Aristotle.50
According to this narrative, various other schools of philosophy developed after
Aristotle but on the whole they merely repeat and rework the insights of their
predecessors in less attractive ways. This narrative for the history of ancient
philosophy probably has its origins in Hegels Lectures on the History of
Philosophy.51 Dismissive of Socrates contribution to philosophy as insufficiently
systematic,52 Hegel summed up the view just described when he wrote:

The development of philosophic science as science, and, further, the

progress from the Socratic point of view to the scientific, begins with

50

See e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1962-81).
51

G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). These lectures (Vorlesungen ber die Geschichte der
Philosophie) were reconstructed by Michelet from lecture notes and first published 1833-36.
Michelet also produced a shortened second edition in 1840-44 upon which Haldane and
Simsons translation is based.
52

See e.g. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1: 396.

17
Plato and is completed by Aristotle. They of all others deserve to be
called teachers of the human race.53

In contrast to this, Hadot opens his narrative of the history of philosophy with
Socrates, who is the defining figure.54 For Socrates the task of philosophy is to live
well, to live a life marked by sophia, aret, and eudaimonia, and it is to this end
that his cross-examining and questioning is directed. In the wake of Socrates
almost single-handed invention of philosophy as we know it a whole series of
philosophical schools develop, each one continuing the Socratic project in
different ways. According to Hadots narrative, the four central philosophical
traditions are Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean. Plato and Aristotle are
no longer monumental giants, but rather founders of schools on a par with Zeno
and Epicurus. If they seem to tower above all other ancient philosophers that is
simply due to the contingency of textual transmission and the fact their works
happened to survive in greater quantity. On this account of ancient philosophy
the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neoplatonists take centre-stage as proponents of
philosophical ways of life that flourished and attracted numerous adherents.
Hadots view has been criticized in various ways. Martha Nussbuam has
suggested that the focus on the similarities between philosophical and religious
movements runs the risk of undervaluing the role of rational argument in ancient
philosophy.55 More recently John Cooper has argued that to claim that all ancient
philosophers conformed to this model goes too far. While accepting the central
role of Socrates and the Socratic ways of life he inspired in subsequent schools,

53

Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2: 1.

54

See the history outlined in his Quest-ce que la philosophie antique?

55

See M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5,
primarily taking aim at Foucaults use of some of Hadots ideas.

18

Cooper suggests that other ancient philosophers who dont conform to this
model, such as the Presocratics, still deserve to be called philosophers and to find
a place in our histories of ancient philosophy.56
In the present context we shall have to put these criticisms to one side.
What is important to note for our purposes is the striking way in which Hadots
way of thinking about the history of ancient philosophy resonates with
Shaftesburys own. In the Soliloquy Shaftesbury offers a brief genealogy of ancient
philosophy in which Socrates stands as the philosophical PATRIARCH who
contained within himself the several Geniuss of Philosophy and who gave rise
to all those several Manners in which that Science was deliverd.57 Elsewhere, in
his manuscript examining the Stoic theory of the passions, Shaftesbury opens by
calling this Doctrinam Socraticorum, and there he describes Stoics, Cynics, and
ancient Academics all as Socratics.58 The importance of Socrates for Shaftesbury is
further supported by his plan to write a work devoted to reconstructing the views
of the historical Socrates from the evidence of Xenophon, Plato, Aristophanes,
Diogenes Laertius, and others. This was to be called the Chartae Socraticae, and a
notebook of preliminary material survives, also at Kew.59 In contrast to the
emphasis placed on Socrates as the key figure in ancient philosophy, Aristotles
contribution is devalued to the extent that he fails to be a good Socratic. Again in
the Soliloquy Shaftesbury writes:

56

See J. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

57

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 254 (Klein, 114).

58

See Jaffro, Maurer, and Petit, Pathologia, A Theory of the Passions, 221.

59

See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Standard Edition II,5 Chartae Socraticae:
Design of a Socratick History, ed. W. Benda, C. Jackson-Holzberg, F. A. Uehlein, and E. Wolff
(Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2008).

19
As the Talent of this great Man [i.e. Aristotle] was more towards
polite Learning, and the Arts, than towards the deep and solid parts
of Philosophy, it happend that in his School there was more care
taken of other Sciences, than of Ethicks, Dialect, or Logick; which
Provinces were chiefly cultivated by the Successors of the Academy
and Porch.60

Aristotle holds a lesser interest for Shaftesbury, then, for he fails to conform to the
Socratic ideal of philosophy as an ethical project of self-transformation.
Shaftesburys prioritization of Socrates and the presentation of various
subsequent schools of philosophy as Socratic highlights one similarity between
his approach to philosophy and Hadots. There are no doubt various differences
too, though, and we might note that Shaftesburys claims about Socratic
philosophy do not appear to be intended to apply to all ancient philosophers, and
to that extent his position shares something with Coopers revised version of
Hadots history of ancient philosophy.61
There are other, more substantive, points of contact too. Most important
here is Hadots account of what he calls spiritual exercises (exercices spirituels).
Hadot borrows this phrase from Ignatius of Loyola and some, such as Cooper,
have been wary of applying this later Christian notion to ancient pagan
philosophy. However, putting the phrase to one side, the idea of some kind of
psychological or mental training being part of philosophy is widespread in ancient

60

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 256 (Klein, 115). Shaftesbury is not claiming here that
Aristotle was uninterested in logic, which would be absurd, but rather that his school, the
Lyceum, paid little attention to it. This is not unreasonable as an assessment of the Hellenistic
Lyceum.
61

See Shaftesburys letter to Pierre Coste, 1 October 1706 (Rand, 355-66, esp. 359), where he
suggests there are two schools of philosophy, one Socratic embracing Academics, Peripatetics,
and Stoics, and one Democritean, inckuding Cyrenaics and Epicureans.

20

philosophy, or at least in the traditions that come to the fore in Hadots narrative,
namely the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neoplatonists. The Stoic Musonius Rufus uses
the Greek phrase asksis ts psuchs, or exercise of the soul, and borrowing the
Ignatian phrase spiritual exercises (exercitia spiritualia) to translate this neednt
involve anachronism.62
We have already seen Shaftesbury advocate spiritual exercises of the sort
that Hadot had in mind in his account of philosophy as a way of life, namely the
practice of writing down ones thoughts in an effort to gain self-knowledge. Earlier
we saw this practice advocated by Epictetus and others in antiquity
recommended it too, famously Seneca, who suggested that we ought to combine
the activities of reading and writing in order to help us to digest what we have
read, with the ultimate goal being the transformation of our behaviour.63 Writing
may have also played a role in Senecas nightly exercise of calling himself to
account. Inspired by his own teacher Sextius, who was drawing on Pythagorean
practices outlined in the Golden Verses, Seneca writes:

Sextius had this habit, and when the day was over and he had retired
to his nightly rest, he would put these questions to his soul: what bad
habit have you cured today? What fault have you resisted? In what
respect are you better? Anger will cease and become more
controllable if it finds that it must appear before a judge each day.
Can anything be more excellent than this practice of thoroughly

62

See J. Sellars, The Art of Living (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 110-15. For Coopers concerns see
Pursuits of Wisdom, 402-3.
63

See Seneca, Epistulae 84.5-8.

21
sifting the whole day? And how delightful the sleep that follows this
self-examination.64

This is of course precisely the sort of dialogue with oneself that Shaftesbury
advocates in the Soliloquy. In Michel Foucaults account of ancient practices of
writing the self (lcriture de soi), inspired by the work of Hadot, he points to
different types of writing that were thought to play a role in spiritual exercises,
such as personal notebooks and correspondence, involving respectively dialogue
with oneself or with another.65 This offers a helpful framework within which to
think about what Shaftesbury was doing when he was writing in his Askmata
notebooks. For anyone more accustomed to reading canonical early modern
philosophical texts, these private notebook reflections must look deeply
anomalous, if not worthless and irrelevant, even for an understanding of
Shaftesburys own philosophy as it is presented in his more formal works like An
Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit. Yet in the light of Hadots conception of
philosophy as a way of life, further elaborated by Cooper, Foucault, and others, we
can see the way in which these notes might be read as substantial philosophical
texts in their own right. Indeed, on Shaftesburys own account it is in these private
texts that the real philosophical work gets done.
I have mentioned the work of Hadot and Foucault together and their
approaches to ancient philosophy share much in common. Indeed, Foucault was
quite open about his debt to Hadot.66 But there are also differences, and one of

64

Seneca, De Ira 3.36.1-2 (trans. J. W. Basore, in Seneca, Moral Essays, 3 vols [Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1928-35]).
65

See M. Foucault, Writing the Self, in A. Davidson, ed., Foucault and his Interlocutors (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 234-47.
66

Foucault refers to Hadots work on spiritual exercises in both The Use of Pleasure
([Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986], 8) and The Care of the Self ([Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988],
243), volumes 2 and 3 of his A History of Sexuality.

22

these is significant for anyone thinking about the nature of Shaftesburys

philosophical project. In an essay entitled Reflections on the Idea of the
Cultivation of the Self, Hadot diplomatically tried to correct Foucaults use of
his work.67 His main concern was what he took to be an excessive focus on the self
in Foucaults account of ancient practices. For Hadot many ancient practices of
what we might call self-cultivation were actually aimed at overcoming the
boundaries between self and non-self. It was not about sculpting oneself into a
unique work of art but rather transforming oneself so that one reconnected with,
say, Nature (for a Stoic) or the One (for a Neoplatonist). This involved a
transformation of ones way of life, but perhaps not Foucaults notion of taking
care of the self. Closely connected to this is Hadots concern with Foucaults
phrase aesthetic of existence (lesthtique de lexistence).68 As Hadot puts it:

What I am afraid of is that, by focusing his interpretation too

exclusively on the culture of the self, the care of the self, and
conversion toward the self more generally, by defining his ethical
model as an aesthetics of existence M. Foucault is propounding a
culture of the self which is too aesthetic. In other words, this may be a
new form of Dandyism, late twentieth-century style.69

As Hadot himself commented, it is a great shame that he and Foucault did not
have an opportunity to discuss these issues further, due to Foucaults untimely
death.70 The relevance of this difference between Hadot and Foucault in the

67

In Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 206-13.

68

See e.g. Writing the Self, 234. See also Foucaults essay On the Genealogy of Ethics, in P.
Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 340-72, at 350-1.
69

Reflections, in Philosophy as a Way of Life, 211.

70

Ibid., 206.

23

present context is that Shaftesbury often expresses himself in ways quite similar to
Foucault. The focus of the discussion throughout the Soliloquy, for instance, is
very much on the Self, as it is in Foucault, and Shaftesbury often makes use of
aesthetic language when trying to define what a transformed self might be like.
For instance he refers to the Beauty of Sentiments, the Sublime of Characters; and
[] the Model or Exemplar of that natural Grace, which gives to every Action its
attractive Charm.71 In the light of these sorts of comments it looks as if
Shaftesbury might stand closer to Foucault than he does to Hadot.72 Indeed,
Shaftesbury himself uses the phrase Care of Self at one point.73
However if we turn back to the Askmata we find material that complicates
matters. In a section entitled The End Shaftesbury considers the telos or goal of
human life and makes the claim that The End & Design of Nature in Man is
Society.74 Human beings are born with natural affections towards other humans,
felt most strongly with close family but ultimately extending to humankind as a
whole. Nature has formed humankind, Shaftesbury suggests, that he be framd &
fitted for Society.75 A good human being is one who is socially inclind &
affected, for that is the fundamental characteristic of human nature.76 Here
Shaftesbury is drawing on the Stoic theory of oikeisis, which posits a natural
instinct of affection between humans.77 By defining sociability as a natural instinct,

71

Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 336 (Klein, 149-50). Here Shaftesbury is referring to the
aesthetic sensibility required by anyone who proposes to write about Men and Manners.
72

See e.g. S. Ylivuori, A Polite Foucault? Eighteenth-Century Politeness as a Disciplinary System

and Practice of the Self, Cultural History 3 (2014), 170-89, at 178-80, who aligns Shaftesbury with
Foucault.
73

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 195 (Rand, 231).

74

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 127 (Rand, 49).

75

Ibid.

76

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 128 (Rand, 49).

77

The theory is reported in Cicero, De Finibus 3.16 and Diogenes Laertius 7.85.

24

Shaftesbury, like the Stoics, can exhort us to follow Nature, which will itself
involve becoming an active and congenial member of society.78
Within this discussion of the goal of human life, Shaftesbury insists that
Whatever is a Mans End is that which he cannot quit or depart from, on the
account of any other thing.79 He goes on say that the Whole Creature has his End
in Nature, & serves to something beyond himself.80 That thing beyond himself will
be society, an end set down by a power beyond himself, namely Nature. If that
sounds somewhat austere, we might restate it by saying that a good human being
will be one who doesnt struggle against his own natural instincts of affection
towards others. Our natural instincts and what is good for us are in complete
harmony, for this is how Nature has arranged it.
The important point for present purposes is that there is no question of
there being any choice in how an individual conceives a good life. What counts as
a good human being has been set down by Nature. The Socratic project outlined
in the Soliloquy of uncovering self-knowledge and then taking care of ones self is
here fleshed out as a Stoic project of uncovering our true human nature, itself an
expression of something beyond itself, namely cosmic Nature, and then living in
harmony with it. The project involves a reconnection between self and Nature
similar to the sort outlined by Hadot in his criticisms of Foucault.81 Although

78

On Shaftesburys relationship with Stoicism see e.g. L. Jaffro, Les Exercices de Shaftesbury: un
stocisme crpusculaire, in P.-F. Moreau, ed., Le stocisme au XVIe et au XVIIe sicle (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1999), 340-54, with further references listed in Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 52-4.
79

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 128 (Rand, 50).

80

Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 130 (Rand, 52).

81

Thomas Bnatoul has commented that although Hadots criticisms of Foucault, first
published in 1989, are understandable given the texts he could read, if we take into account
Foucaults 1981-82 lecture course, first published in 2001, a different picture emerges. There
Foucault highlights the tight connection between the Stoic care of the self and knowledge of
nature (Bnatoul, referring to M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject [New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005], 289-96). As Bnatoul notes, Hadots view perhaps goes too far when dealing

25

Shaftesbury thinks the result will be beautiful as well as moral, reflecting the scope
of the Greek to kalon, there seems to be little room here for a dandyish aesthetics
of existence in which one self-fashions oneself however one might see fit. There is
no doubt a lot more that one could say about the relationship between
Shaftesburys aestheticized ethics and his Stoic commitment to living in
accordance with Nature. In the present context this is, I suggest, a further example
where thinking about what Shaftesbury is doing in the light of Hadots discussions
of ancient philosophy has the potential to be illuminating.

with the Roman Stoics, reflecting his somewhat Neoplatonic perspective. See T. Bnatoul,
Stoicism and Twentieth Century French Philosophy, in J. Sellars, ed., The Routledge Handbook of
the Stoic Tradition (forthcoming).