Electronic Warfare For The Digitized Battlefield PDF

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Electronic Warfare
for the Digitized Battlefield
Michael R. Frater
Michael Ryan
Artech House
Boston London
v.;ww.artechhouse.com
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Frater, Michael R.
Electronic warfare for the digitized battlefield I Michael R. Frater, Michael Ryan.
p. em. - (Arrech House information warfare library)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN
I -58053-27 I -3
(aile paper)
I. Electronics in military engineering.
3. I nform ation
2. Command and conrrol systems.
4. Milita ry m and science-Automation.
warf;ue.
I. Ryan. M. J. (ivlichacl J.)
II. Tirle.
Ill. Series.
UG485 .F73 2001

2001026675
623'.043-dc21
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Frater. ,\1 ich 1el R.

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Contents
Preface
XIII
The Digitized Battlefield
1.1
The Operational Environment
1.2
Command and Control
1.2.1
The C2 Cycle
1.2.2
Command Systems
1.3
Information Warfare
11
1.4
Electronic Warfare
12
1.4.1
Communications and Nonco.mmunications

EW
14
1.4.2
EW Subdivisions
15
1.4.3
Other Categories of EW
16
1.5
Summary
16
Endnotes
18
Tactical Communications Systems
21
2.1
Introduction
21
21
25
VI
Electronic Warfare for the Di gitized Battlefield
A S uitable Tactical Communications

Architecture for Future Land Warfare
27
2.5
Trunk Communications Subsystem
30
2.5.1
Fourth-Generation Trunk Networks
32
2.5.2
Trunk Nodes
32
2.5.3
Bearers
35
2.5.4
Access Nodes
36
2.5.5
Mobile Trunk Access
37
2.5.6
Combat Net Radio Interface (CNRI)
38
2.5.7
Interfaces to the Tactical Trunk Subsystem
39
2.6
CNR Subsystem
40
2.6.1
Key Architectural Issues for CNR
40
2.6.2
Range of Communications
44
2.6.3
Modern CNR Solutions
45
2.7
Tactical Data Distribution Subsystem
47
2.8
Tactical Airborne Subsystem
49
2.8.1
Additional Communications Services
51
2.9
Potential Targets for Tactical

Communications EW
53
Summary
54
Endnotes
54
Electronic Protection
57
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Passive Electronic Protection
3.2.1
Identical Equipment
3.2.2
Shielding
3.2.3
Emission Control
3.2.4
Directional Antennas
3.2.5
Frequency Management
3.2.6
Alternate Means
3.2.7
Siting
2.4
2.10
Contents
'/...
vii
3.3
Active Electronic Protection
61
3.3. 1
Encryption
63
3.3.2
Spread-Spectrum Communications
70
3.3.3
Error-Protection Coding
84
3.3.4
Burst Transmission
87
3.3.5
Narrowband Excision
88
3.3.6
Diversity
89
3.4
Use of EP Techniques in Communications

Systems
89
3.4. 1
CNR
89
3.4. 2
Military Radio Relay
90
3.4.3
TADIL-J (Link- 16)
90
3.4.4
Enhanced Position Locating and Reporting

System (EPLRS)
92
3.4.5
Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR)
93
3.4.6
IS-95
93
3.4.7
GSM
95
Endnotes
96
Electronic Suort
99
4. 1
Introduction
99
4.2
Search
1 00
4.2. 1
Narrowband Receivers
101
4.2.2
Wideband Receivers
1 03
4.2.3
Search and the Tactical Communications

System
1 07
4.3
Intercept (Monitoring)
1 12
4.3 . 1
Characteristics of Intercept Receivers
1 13
4.3.2
Intercept Receivers
1 14
1 17
viii
Electro nic W a rfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld
4.4
Direction Finding
1 19
4.4. 1
Sources of Error
1 22
4.4.2
Rotating Directional Antenna
1 23
4.4.3
Warson-Watt DF
124
4.4.4
Wullenweber DF
1 28
4.4.5
Doppler DF
1 28
The D F Baseline
1 30
4.4. 7
DF and the Tactical Communications System
1 32
4.5
Analysis
1 35
4.5. 1
Traffic Analysis
1 35
4.5.2
Cryptanalysis
1 36
4.5.3
The Analysis Function and the Tactical

Communications System
1 36
4.6
ES Platforms
1 38
4.6. 1
Ground Platforms
138
4.6.2
Air Platforms
1 39
Endnotes
1 40
Electronic Attack
1 43
5.1
Introduction
1 43
5.2
Jamming
1 44
5.2. 1
Jamming-to-Signal Ratio
145
5.2.2
Jamming Signals
1 46
5.2.3
Types of Communications Jamming
1 47
5.2.4
Operational Factors
1 53
5.2.5
Standoff Versus Unattended Jammers
1 53
5 .2.6
Jamming and the Tactical Communications

System
1 55
v4.4.6
5.2.7
Jamming Platforms
5.3
Electronic Deception
5.3. 1
Manipulative Electronic Deception
5.3.2
Simulative Electronic Deception
Contents
ix
5.3.3
Imitative Electronic Deception
161
5 .3.4
Example Electronic Deception Techniques
1 62
5.3.5
Received Power
1 63
5.4
N eurralization
1 64
5.4 . 1
Laser Weapons
164
5.4 .2
High-Power RF Weapons
1 66
Endnotes
1 66
Land EW Command and Control
1 69
6. 1
Introduction
1 69
6.2
EW Unit Organization
171
6.2 . 1
Electronic Attack
174
6.2.2
Electronic Support
175
6.2.3
EW Command and Control
1 76
6.3
The Tactical Planning Process
1 77
6.4
The EW Targeting Process
1 79
6.4. 1
Decision
1 80
6.4.2
Detection
1 84
6.4.3
Delivery
185
6.4.4
Assessment
185
6.4.5
Siting Considerations for Jamming Facilities
1 86
6.4.6
Deception Planning
1 87
6.5
Collection Management
1 88
6.5 . 1
The Collection Management Process
1 88
6.5.2
Siting Considerations for Search Facilities
1 89
6.5 .3
Siting Considerations for Intercept Facilities
1 89
6.5.4
Siting Considerations for DF Facilities
1 90
6.5.5
Siting Considerations for Analysis Facilities
191
Endnotes
1 92
Radio Freguency Directed Energy Weaons
1 93
7. 1
Introduction
1 93
Electronic Warfare for the D1g1t1Zed Battlefield
7.2
Characteristics of RF DEW
196
7.2.1
Co nr i n uous Wave and Pulsed RF DE\XI
1 96
7.2.2
Explosive and Nonexplosive RF DEW
196
7.3
Target Effect Mechanisms
198
7.3 . 1
Front-Door Damage
198
7.3.2
Back-Door Damage
199
7.3.3
Damage Mechanisms Employed by RF DEW
200
7.3.4
Propagation Effects
200
7.4
Platform Protection
202
7.4. 1
Avoidance of Illumination
202
7.4.2
Hardening Techniques
202
7.4.3
Issues Associated with the Protection

Provision
204
7.5
Analysis: Offensive
205
7. 5 . 1
Delivery Factors
206
7.5.2
Range of RF DEW
207
7.5.3
Delivery Platforms
208
7.5.4
Target Effects
210
7.6
Analysis: Defense Against
7.6. 1
Land Vehicles and Shelters
2 12
7.6.2
Aircraft
213
7.6.3
Safety and Arming Systems
214
7.6.4
Personnel
214
7.6.5
Support Equipment
2 15
7.6.6
Command Posts
215
7.6.7
Logistics Installations
216
7.7
Summary
216
RF
DEW
RF
Endnotes
8
Electronic Warfare and Digitization
8.1
Introduction
DEW
211
Contents
xi
8.2
Network Issues
220
8.2. 1
Seamless Integration
220
8.2.2
Mobile Networks
222
8.2.3
Ad Hoc Networks
223
8.2.4
Implications for EW
225
8.3
UWB Radio
229
8.3. 1
Implications for EW
23 1
8.4
HF Radio
233
8.4. 1
High-Speed HF Modem Technology
233
8.4.2
HF Automatic Link Establishment
233
8.4.3
Implications for EW
234
8.5
Software Radio
236
8.5. 1
Key Software Radio Technologies
237
8.5.2
Implications for EW
238
8.6
Quantum Computing and Quantum

Cryptography
239
8.6. 1
Quantum Computing
239
8 .6.2
Quantum Cryptography
239
8.6.3
Implications for EW
241
Endnotes
242
List of Acronyms
245
About the Authors
249
Index
251
Preface
Modern land commanders are increasingly dependent on Information Age
systems comprising communications and information systems, networks,
and sensors. While these systems have the potential to produce significant
changes in the conduct and character of war, their reliance on the electromag
netic spectrum also has the potential to increase their vulnerability to interdic
tion by electronic warfare systems.
There have been many books and articles describing noncommunications
electronic waifare, that is, electronic warfare in the context of electronic sensor
systems, particularly radar. In this book we address the critical issues related
to the effect of electronic warfare on the business of command and control on
the digitized battlefield. More specifically, we address the effect of electronic
warfare on the battlefield communications systems that support the command
and control process. This aspect of electronic combat is called communications
electronic waifare. Moreover, we focus on the components and techniques
employed at the tactical level of land warfare, that is, at division and below.
The engineering principles, technology, doctrine, and procedures contained
in this book are drawn from open sources readily available in the public
domain.
Chapter 1 describes the operational environment of the digitized battle
field and examines the process of command and control that is the core
business of the tactical commander. The concept of network-centric warfare
is discussed as an example of a doctrine that is emerging to harness the
power of the information revolution for application to land warfare. This
doctrine is then examined in the context of the heavy reliance that networked
forms of warfare have on the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The
xiii
xiv
Electron i c Warfare for the Digitized Battlefi e l d
information revolution not only provides an improved ability to command

and control, but also brings with it a commensurate ability to disrupt the
process. The emerging doctrine of information warfare, information operations,
and command and control wmfare is then discussed to provide a framework
within which to consider the role of electronic warfare on the digitized
battlefield. A taxonomy is given for the doctrine of electronic warfare, com
prising electronic support, electronic attack, and electronic protection.
Chapter 2 discusses the targets of tactical communications electronic
warfare-the communications systems that underpin the ability of a tactical
commander to command and control. Tactical trunk communications, com
bat net radio, and tactical data distribution systems are described, and an
architecture is developed to illustrate the interrelationship of systems required
to provide the battlefield nerworks that support operational concepts such
as nerwork-centric warfare.
Chapter 3 concentrates on electronic protection, which comprises those
actions taken to protect friendly equipment from any effects of friendly or
adversary use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrades, neutralizes, or
destroys friendly combat capability. This is achieved through a combination
of active (detectable) and passive (undetectable) means.
In Chapter 4 we describe electronic support, which is the component
of electronic warfare focused on the identification of sources of intentional
and unintentional radiation of electromagnetic energy by an adversary. The
elements of electronic support are search, intercept, direction finding, and
analysis. Electronic support provides intelligence on adversary activity and
deployment, as well as steerage for electronic attack.
Electronic attack is the focus of Chapter 5, which describes the issues
associated with the use of electromagnetic energy to attack adversary equip
ment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary
combat capability. Electronic attack can take the form of jamming, electronic
deception, or neutralization.
Chapter 6 provides a description of the organization of EW units and
the planning processes required for the deployment of electronic warfare
capabilities on the battlefield. Effective planning for EW is crucial to over
come the scarcity of EW resources and to maintain security and the require
ment to coordinate with other functional areas such as communications.
In Chapter 7 we discuss the emerging field of directed-energy weapons.
While these weapons provide a means of electronic attack, they have been
considered separately in this chapter due to the different nature of their
attack and their potential to affect a much wider range of equipment through
a broader range of attack mechanisms. The chapter also examines the means
of protection, both tactical and technical, against the use of such weapons.
Preface
XV
Finally, Chapter 8 addresses the future directions of battlefield elec

tronic warfare systems as tactical communications continue to develop to
take advantage of the opportunities offered by the information revolution.
A key driver of future EW will be the way in which target tactical communica
tions systems evolve towards a true battlefield network.
It has been several hundred years since commanders have had the
ability from a convenient hilltop to survey with their own eyes the disposition
of friendly and adversary forces. Now, in the Information Age, modern
commanders, their senses enhanced by electronic sensors and modern com
munications systems, can stand on their electronic hilltop and once again
"see" whatever portion of the battlefield is desired at whatever detail is
appropriate. Yet, while the information revolution promises to change funda
mentally the conduct and character of war, the increased reliance on electrical
communications systems creates the potential for a greater vulnerability to
electronic warfare. Greater investment is therefore required in offensive and
defensive electronic warfare equipment, personnel, and training. As armies
expend large sums of money seeking to attain the advantages of digitization,
consideration must also be given to the flip side of the information revolu
tion-the increased role of electronic warfare on the modern digitized
battlefield.
1
1 .1 The Operational Envi ronment
Throughout history, technological, political, and social advances have caused
profound shifts in military doctrine, organization, strategy, and tactics. In
recent history, six revolutions in military affairs have radically altered the
conduct and character of war. The first five were the institution of universal
military obligation (the French Revolution of 1789) , the Industrial Revolu
tion of the midnineteenth century, the managerial revolution of the late
nineteenth century, the mechanized revolution occurring between 1 9 1 91 939, and the scientific revolution that followed shortly afterwards, culminat
ing in the production of the atomic bomb. Then, in the early 1 970s, the
introduction of precision-strike weapons and computers produced the latest
revolution-an information revolution centered on the concept that the
dominant factor in war is the ability to collect, analyze, disseminate, and
act upon battlefield information [ 1 ] .
These advances i n technology have produced an environment o n the
modern battlefield that is characterized by continuous, 24-hour action;
increased volume, lethality, range, and precision of fire; smaller, more effective
units due to better integration of technology; a disjunction between greater
dispersion of more mobile, faster units and an increased tendency for combat
in built-up areas with congestion of forces in short ranges; and a further
dichotomy between greater invisibility, due to dispersion and speed, and
increased risk of detection, due to larger numbers of more capable battlefield
sensors.
Electronic Warfare for the Dig itized Battl efi eld
Arguably, therefore, the most significant technological revolution in

warfare will be in the role of information and knowledge, and, in particular,
in the degree of situational awareness made possible by the increasing number
of communications and information systems supporting combat forces. How
ever, not all armies will be able (or will choose) to take advantage of this
revolution, and today's Information Age army must be prepared to deal with
a broad spectrum of threats from Agrarian, Industrial, and Information Age
adversaries [2] .
The information revolution, with the associated provision of informa
tion technology, favors networks rather than hierarchies; it diffuses and
redistributes power; it crosses borders and redraws boundaries of offices and
responsibilities; and it expands horizons. This is particularly true in the
civilian environment, where organizations have become more democratic in
information distribution and have realized considerable efficiencies [3] .
The network form is very different from the institutional form. While
institutions (large ones in particular) are traditionally built around hierar
chies and aim to act on their own, multi-organizational networks consist
of (often small) organizations or parts of institutions that have linked
together to act jointly. The information revolution favors the growth
of such networks by making it possible for diverse, dispersed actors to
communicate, consult, coordinate, and operate together across greater
distances and on the basis of more and better information than ever
before. [4]
For warfare, the major lesson from the commercial world is th at in

the Information Age conflict will largely be about knowledge, and mastery
of the network and networked organizations will provide major advantage
in conflict. However, these concepts can be an anathema to military com
manders who tend to see command and information (and even communica
tions in many armies) following the same hierarchical lines. I n a
nonhierarchical, network model, command and information flow must neces
sarily diverge. Sensors, commanders, and weapon systems are connected via
a networked grid that ensures that situational awareness data can be shared
by all elements, regardless of whether they belong to the same unit. Command
lines need no longer be shared with information flow. Information is shared
across the network; command and control are directed in accordance with
the order of battle. Therefore, the adoption of these new technologies will
not only significantly affect the way armies are commanded and controlled,
but it will also change the way they are organized and trained.
_
The Dtglttzed Battlefield
There are many books and anicles that addres the issue of warfare in
the Information Age [5] . However, we will focus on the framework articulated
by the U.S. Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) [6], which provides a useful back
ground for our consideration of electronic warfare on the digitized battlefield.
JV2020 builds upon the conceptual template established in Joint Viion
2010, and has the goal of transforming U.S. forces to create a power that
is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. Modern armed
forces must be able to defeat adversaries across a wide range of operations
such as conventional warflghting, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, coun
terterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and civil support. In this book, the term
"battlefield" is used to refer generically to operations across the spectrum.
A key component of full-spectrum dominance is hiformation superior
ity-the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow
of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability ro do the
same. Information superiority can therefore be defined as "that degree of
dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of opera
tions without effective opposition" [7]. Superior information is to be con
verted ro superior knowledge which, when combined with organizational
and doctrinal adaptation, relevant training and experience, and proper com
mand and control mechanisms and tools, is to achieve decision superiority.
JV2020 proposes that current capabilities for maneuver, strike, logistics,
and protection will become dominant maneuver, precision engagement,
focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. The following descriptiom
of these terms are taken from the definitions provided in JV2020.
Dominant maneuver. This is defined as the ability of joint forces
to
gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming

operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks.
Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations,
and space forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces
and the effects of fire as required for either combat or noncombat
operations, will secure advantage across the range of military opera
tions through the application of information, deception, engage
ment, mobility, and counrermobility capabilities.
Precision mgagemellt. This is the abiliry of joint forces to locate,

observe, discern, and track objectives or targets; select. organize. and
usc the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results: ;md
reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming npcra ti o n :1 l tempo
as required, throughout the (ull range of' militar: opcr;Hiom.
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield
Focused logistics. This is the ability to provide the joint force the
right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the
right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military
operations. This will be made possible through real-time, networked
information systems providing total asset visibility as part of a com
mon relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator
and logistician across service and support agencies. Through transfor
mational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics
will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.
Full-dimensional protection. This is the ability of the joint force to
protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute
assigned tasks. Full-dimensional protection is achieved through the
tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive
measures, within the domains o f air, land, sea, and space, and
information across the range of military operations with an acceptable
level of risk. The dimensions of protection range from forward
deployed forces, through supporting logistics, to home commands
and supporting space surveillance and communications systems. One
dimension of protection, for example, is the protection of forces at
garrisons and military bases. Asymmetric terrorist attacks pose a
threat that must be countered by layers of defense including active
human intelligence (HUMINT) on terrorist activities, passive moni
toring of traffic around the base, alert conditions and procedures
for tightening perimeter security, covert intrusion detection sensors,
facility decoys, and levels of physical security access.
JV2020 also places significant emphasis on information operations (those

actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems
while defending one's own information and information systems) as an
essential element of achieving each of the elements of full-spectrum domi
nance. We will return to this topic shortly, as electronic warfare is an
important component of information operations.
Recognition is also given in JV2020 to the fact that the adoption of
information technologies is not sufficient to make maximum use o f the
opportunities made available by the information revolution. The vision of
JV2020 is to be realized through a transformation of the necessary doctrine,
organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities.
Perhaps the most useful elaboration of the impact of information
technology is 'in the emerging concept of network-centric wmfare (NCW) .
In the current platform-centric warfare, the sensing and engaging capability

normally resides on the weapon system ("shooter"), and there is only a
limited capability for the weapon to engage targets because it can only use
the situational awareness generated by its own sensor. If a weapon is able
to engage a target located by a remote sensor, the passage of weapon data
is normally via stovepipe communications systems (i.e., they connect the
single weapon directly to the single sensor) . By contrast, in network-centric
warfare, sensors and shooters are connected by a ubiquitous network through
which weapons can engage targets based on a situational awareness that is
shared with other platforms. Combat power can therefore be applied with
fewer weapons systems than are currently required. Note that, just because
weapons and sensors are interconnected, it does nor mean that targets can
be engaged randomly or without authority; control is still essential to ensure
that targets are engaged in accordance with the operational plan.
.
While there may continue to be a role for direct links from sensor to
shooter, the ultimate aim ofNCW is that the employment of future precision
weapons is designed around information. No single sensor has the ability
to direct the application of these precision weapons-data must be integrated
from a number of sensors and databases. On the modern battlefield, the
network is a considerable force multiplier. Commanders will be unfettered
by communications and unconstrained to information centers (command
posts). The information network must be ubiquitous across the battle space
and must be fluid, flexible, robust, redundant, and real-time; have integrity
and security; have access and capacity; and be joint- and coalition-capable.
In their discussion of the associated issues, Alberts, Gartska, and Stein
define NCW as "an information superiority-enabled concept of operations
that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision
makers, and shooters to achieve shared situational awareness, increased speed
of command, higher tempo of operation , greater lethality, increased surviv
ability, and a degree of self-synchronization" [8] .
Figure 1 . 1 illustrates the three interlocking grids ofNCW (the informa
tion grid, the sensor grid, and the engagement grid), and the three major types
of participants (sensors, command elements, and shooters). The information grid
.
provides the infrastructure through which information is received, processed,
transported, stored, and protected. The sensor grid contains all sensors,
whether they are specialized devices mounted on weapons systems, carried
by individual soldiers, or embedded into equipment. The engagement grid
consists of all available weapons systems that are tasked to create the necessary
battlefield effect. Proponents of NCW envisage that these three grids will
exist in space, in the air, on land, and on and under the sea.
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefie l d
1-- ----Control------- lnf;-mati;-1

I
I
grid
: r-
---,ntion---
..
Objects
Information
---------I
I
I
I
I
I
I 1
I
1
II
Control
I
1
I 1
I
I
I I
I
I
I
II
._f!!2s grid_
I
I
Information
1 objects
I
------------------------
I
I
Engagem.:_n:_grid
I
L
__ __
_________
Figure 1 .1 The grid a rrangement of network- centric warfare [9].
NCW is not currently part of U.S. doctrine. However, the concept

has considerable merit philosophically and it is most likely that future land
warfare will embrace most, if not all, of the above concepts. The employment
of a tactical nerwork based on wireless, nonnodal communications has the
advantage that armies can disperse as required and then mass effects rapidly
at an appropriate time and place. Less reliance is required on large information
processing centers, which can be distributed to increase physical survivability
without sacrificing processing power.
This section has provided a very brief introduction to the operational
environment of the future. While we have not considered in detail many
of the issues associated with the significant impact that the information
revolution will have on battlefield weapon systems, the most significant
effect for our discussion of electronic warfare will be on the ability of a
commander to acquire information, prepare and disseminate plans, and then
control their execution. This is the business of command and control which
has become increasingly dependent on reliable communications and effective
information systems. So, before we consider further the role of information
warfare, particularly the role of electronic warfare, it is important to address
the issue of command and control in more detail.
1.2 Command and Control

Command and control (and particularly its automation) is too broad a
subject to be treated in detail here. Interested readers are referred to the
many texts that cover the field [ 1 0] . For our purposes, we do no dwell on
the detail but settle for the following working descriptions.
Command is perhaps best described as the authority vested in an
individual for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
Control is the means by which command is exercised. In a simple organiza
tion, the commander does most of the controlling; in a more complex
organization, most of the control functions are delegated to supporting
staff who form a headquarters supporting the commander. Control involves
analysis of requirements, allocation of resources, integration of effort, direc
tion, coordination, and monitoring.
The two terms command and control are inextricably linked-com
mand is hollow without an ability to control; control is toothless without
the authority of command. Therefore, the business of a commander is most
often referred to as command and control (C2), which can be described as
the p rocess of and means for the exercise of authority of a commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the commander's mission. U.S.
doctrine adds that command and control functions are performed through
an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordina
ting, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission [7].
1 .2.1
The C2 Cycle
The interdependence of the various elements of a command system is illus

trated by the C2 cycle shown in Figure 1 .2. Although a very simple model,
the C2 cycle is a useful mechanism for developing a framework for the
application of command and control at any level. Here it is also useful to
visualize the impact that communications and information systems have on
the modern battlefield.
The C2 cycle is also called the decision cycle, the OODA (OUDA)
loop (for the elements of observation, orientation (understanding), decision
and action), or the Boyd cycle [ 1 1 ] (after the retired U.S. Air Force Colonel
John Boyd who pioneered the concept) .
While the cycle is continuous, it can be considered to start with surveil
lance and target acquisition (STA) , or observation, from which the com
mander receives a wide range of information from the many sensors and
systems deployed. This information is invariably reported in digital form,
and the rapid increase in the number of sensors and surveillance systems is
predominantly responsible for the explosion in digital transmission require
ments on the modern battlefield. It should be noted that surveillance data can

Communications
Information
processing
Surveillance and
target acquisition
Communications
C2
CYCLE
Communications
Decision
making
Action
Communications
Figure 1 .2
The C2 cycle
only reach the commander if effective, survivable communications systems are

available from the sensor system through to the data processing facilities in
the command post.
The volume of raw sensor information coming into the headquarters
is overwhelming and must be filtered and displayed in an appropriate format
for the commander and staff to take action on it. As the volume of information
grows, automation of this process is essential. It is estimated that a divisional
commander currently has available something on the order of 1 ,000 times
more information than would have been available in 1 980. High-speed
nerworks must be provided within a headquarters to facilitate data processing.
The commander then makes a number of decisions and finalizes a plan,
following which orders are conveyed to subordinate units through data and
voice nerworks.
The purpose of all the preceding stages of the loop is to initiate action.
The C2 cycle must assist the commander to take effective action based upon
a correct appreciation. However, few plans last beyond first contact with
the enemy so the loop must continue and information begins to flow to
support the new operation. The commander must then control the action
of subordinate units and task STA assets to monitor operations.
There are many more complex models for command and control.
However, the C2 cycle is adequate for our purposes here, since it is evident
even from the simple model that a major factor in success on the battlefield
is the ability to move through the C2 cycle more quicldy than an adversary.
It is here that the information revolution offers the greatest promise for
improvement, albeit with a corresponding increase in vulnerability. We will
return to that point shortly, but for the moment, we should note the
heavy reliance that the C2 cycle has on technologies that require use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
The term battlefield digitization has been adopted to refer to the automa
tion, through digital networks and processes, of command and control opera
tions across the full breadth of the battle space. This integration of ground,
air, and space nodes (sensors, communications, command, and weapons
nodes) into a seamless digital network requires the fully compatible digital
exchange of data and common operating pictures to all nodes. Security, '
compatibility, and interoperability factors dominate the drive toward full
d igitization across the entire battle space;
1 .2.2
Command Systems
While the term C2 remains in common use to refer to the processes and .
means for the exercise of authority, the field has spawned many variations
in terminology, for example: command, control, and communications (C3);
communications and information systems (CIS); command, control, com
munications, and intelligence (C3I) ; command; control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C41); or command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Each of
these terms can be justified by its emphasis on particular vital elements of
the command and control process. For example, without surveillance and
reconnaissance, commanders are blind; without communications they are
isolated, and so on. In the interest of brevity, we will simply consider the
C2 cycle and bring together all of the systems that support it into the generic
term of command systems.
To be successful on the modern battlefield, a commander and staff
must be able to move through the C2 cycle faster than any adversary. Success
in modern warfare depends on tempo, lethality, and survivability. Command
systems must therefore be agile and responsi e to changes in threat and must
be ab le to cope with the influx of huge amounts of information from
intelligence and surveillance systems, both tactical and stategic. In recent
conflicts, this has overloaded tactical communications systems as well as
the labor-intensive intelligence process, making it extremely difficult for the
commander to process and analyze information in a timely manner. The
implementation of automated battlefield information systems offers the only
10
Electronic Warfare for th e Digitized Battl efield
viable solution to process information and to prepare and disseminate plans

within a realistic time frame.
A command system comprises automated and manual procedures to
support a commander and staff. The essential components of a command
system are the commander; supporting staffs; doctrine and procedures; recon
naissance and STA systems; communications systems; and information
systems.
Arguably, the most important component is still the human element,
comprising an able commander supported by well-drilled staff and appro
priate doctrine and procedures. Despite the enormous advantages to be
accrued from the information revolution, we must continue to be mindful
that technology alone will not win battles, nor does the adoption of new
technology obviate the need for the development of appropriate doctrine
and procedures. History repeatedly warns us that it is not technology in
itself that is important, but rather the way in which it is harnessed. Changes
in doctrine, training, and organization have been necessary before any given
technology has had any true battlefield effect [ 1 2 ] . As Van Crefeld observes:
" [S] ince a decisive technological advantage is a fairly rare and always tempo
rary phenomenon, victory often depends not so much on having superior
technology at hand as on understanding the limits of any given technology,
and on finding a way around these limitations" [ 1 3 ] .
It must b e also remembered that a command system comprises a set
of automated and manual procedures. Sometimes manual procedures are
more appropriate and consideration must be given to the implementation
of a set of procedures that can survive the destruction or degradation of
communications and information systems. While maintenance of a techno
logical edge is vital, most command and control failures of this century have
resulted from human mistakes rather than a lack of technology. Modern
Western armies seem increasingly to imagine that precision maneuver enabled
by information will create an overwhelming advantage. It must be remem
bered that the United States maintained an overwhelmipg technological and
airpower advantage throughout the Vietnam War.
However, the implementation of information systems and information
technology is essential to provide the automation necessary to transfer, pro
cess, and store the large volumes of data on the future battlefield. Technology
will play a significant role in the support developed to allow commanders
to plan and maneuver faster than an adversary. Information systems and
technology might be expected to improve several thousand times in the next
20 years and will greatly increase the scope, volume, accuracy, and speed of
information available to commanders.
11
1 .3 Information Warfare
While the Information Age has produced a revolution in military operations
that provides a great promise of decisive advantage on the modern battlefield
to the commander who can gather and exploit information most effectively,
there is a significant dark side to the information revolution. As communica
tions and information systems become vital to military and civilian society,
they can become major targets in war and can also serve as a major means
for conducting offensive operations. Consequently, the military adoption of
information technology creates a new vulnerability-the same information
technology that provides the fuel for the networks that support modern
commanders also provides one of the major means for their destruction. An
increased reliance on communications and information systems increases this
vulnerability. So, while automated command systems increase commanders'
situational awareness, they can also be turned against them and used to
contribute to their uncertainty.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that movement through
the C2 cycle on the modern battlefield depends heavily on the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, whether for surveillance and target acquisition,
passage of information, processing of information, or destruction of adversary
forces. This reliance is a vulnerability that must be exploited in attacking
adversary command systems, while being,. protected in own-force systems.
Operations to counter the C2 cycle are generically termed infonnation waJfare
(IW) , which is a term that recognizes a range of actions taken during conflict
to achieve information superiority over an adversary, and may be defined
as [ 1 4] :
Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary
information, information-based processes, information systens, and
computer-based networks while defending one's own information, infor
mation-based processes, information systems, and computer-based
networks.
The terminology and techniques of IW are ill-defined and without

universal agreement, although there have been a number of comprehensive
. descriptions of the topic [ 1 5]. Again, we will not concern ourselves here
with the detail of IW and related concepts, but limit our discussion to those
aspects that impact on the field of electronic warfare.
The objective of IW is to attain a significant information advantage
that enables the rapid domination and control of an adversary. The U.S.
12
Electr o n i c Warfare for the DJQ JtJzed Battlefield
Army rec.ogniz.cs that the currcnr definition of JW is more narrowly focused

on the impact of information during actual conflict and ha chosen a some
what broader approach ro the impact of information on ground opcrariom,
adopting rhc term information operations (IO). IO integrate all aspects of
information to support and enhance the elements of combat power, with
rhc goal of dominating the barrie space at the right rime, at rhc right place,
and with the right weapons or resources. Information operations arc defined
by FM I 00-6 as [ 1 6] :
Continuous military operations within the military information environ
ment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's abiliry to
collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across
the full range of military operations; IO include interacting with the
global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's
information and decision capabilities.
JV2020 adds that IO also include actions taken in a noncombat or

ambiguous situation to protect one's own information and information
systems as well as those taken to influence target information and information
systems.
The warfighting application of IW in military operations is called
command and control waJfare (C2W) . The aim of C2W is to influence, deny
information to, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting
C2 capabilities against such ations. C2W therefore comprises two major
branches: C2-attack and C2-protect. C2W operations integrate and synchro
nize the capabilities ofps)'chological operations (PSYOPS), deception, operations
security (OPSEC) , and electronic wmfare (EW) [ 1 7] .
It is the EW component, in particular, communications EW, that is
of interest to us in this book. Although IW has the potential to have an
impact much wider than the tactical environment, we focus on the warfight
ing application of communications EW on the digitized battlefield.
1 .4 Electronic Warfare
Domination of the electromagnetic spectrum is a crucial component of most
modern military operations. There are few battlefield elements that do not
rely on communications and information systems . .A5 discussed earlier, the
C2 cycle depends very heavily on the electromagnetic spectrum to maximize
the effectiveness of surveillance and target acquisition, communications, and
13
information systems. I f these systems are destroyed, degraded, o r deceived,

the commander and staffare unable to prosecute war adequately. For example,
without communications on the modern battlefield, the commander is deaf,
dumb, and blind. Therefore, the capability to conduct electronic combat
and dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is now a recognized component
of any modern force structure.
EW can be defined as "the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to
degrade or destroy an adversary's combat capability (including degrading or
preventing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum as well as degrading the
performance of adversary equipment, personnel, and facilities); or to protect
friendly combat capability (including protecting friendly use of the electro
magnetic spectrum as well as friendly equipment, personnel, and facilities
that may be vulnerable to attack via the electromagnetic spectrum)."
The targeting of personnel is beyond the scope of this book, which is
focused on EW conducted against adversary communications and informa
tion systems. We therefore consider EW that is targeted against adversary
communications, EW, and electronics. We also only consider EW as it is
applied in the tactical context of the battlefield.
Figure 1 .3 illustrates how electronic warfare pervades all aspects of the
modern battlefield and has the potential to impact on all elements of the
C2 cycle. In summary, EW resources are used to monitor adversary activities
in the electromagnetic spectrum, indicate adversary strength and dispositions,
Communications
Surveillance and
target acquisition
Infor mation
processing
Communications
Communications
Action
Decision
making
Communications
Figure 1 .3 The potenti al impact of EW on the C2 cycle.
14
give warning of adversary intentions, deceive and disrupt sensors and com
mand and control processes, and safeguard friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
Although EW is targeted against the tecrynology, the ultimate effect is
on a commander's ability to move through the C2 cycle. The human element
of the command system is both the strongest and weakest link and can fairly
rapidly be enshrouded in the fog of war if supporting communications and
information systems are disrupted, degraded, or deceived.
EW activities are applicable across the whole spectrum of military
operations and are not c<;>nfined to warfare, conventional or otherwise. In
peacetime, armies attempt to intercept, locate, and identify the source of a
potential adversary's electronic emissions. Analysis may then reveal details
of capabilities as well as vulnerabilities that can be used to gain an advantage
in times of conflict.
EW is an area of considerable innovation. Inevitably, and often very
rapidly, advantages gained by technological or procedural change are met
with equally effective countermeasures. In order to maintain the edge in any
future conflict, information on friendly methods of electronic protection
and attack must be safeguarded. Therefore, much of the parametric data
associated with EW capabilities is highly classified. However, the underlying
techniques and relationships can readily be obtained from open source
publications.
1 .4.1
Communications and Noncommuni cations EW
EW is normally divided into two main areas: communications EW and non

communications EW Comm unications EW is almost as old as electronic
communications itself and, on the battlefield, is mostly concerned with
communications sources that transmit in frequency bands between HF and
SHF. The intercept and analysis of transmissions are usually more important
than the measurement of transmitter characteristics. Noncommunications
EW has been developed since the early employment of radars in World
War II and is primarily concerned with platform protection, and normally
specifically oriented towards radar systems in the UHF and higher bands.
In noncommunications EW, the measurement of emitter characteristics is
central as they are used to detect the presence of, and possibly identify, a
piece of equipment and/or its performance.
As an aside, EW is also associated with signals intelligence (SIGINT),
which contains two main subcomponents: communications intelligence
(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). To a large extent, these
15
mirror the functional areas of communications and noncommunications

EW, but take place in the strategic environment rather than the tactical one.
EW in the tactical land environment is mostly concerned with commu
nications EW, which is therefore the focus of this book [ 1 8] .
1 .4.2
EW Subdivisions
As shown in Figure 1 .4, there are three fundamental subdivisions within

EW that are applicable to both communications and noncommunications
EW, albeit with the different degrees of emphasis noted earlier:
Electronic support, formerly known as electronic support measures

(ESM), is the divisioi). of EW involving actions tasked by, or under
the direct control of, an operational commander to search for, inter
cept, identifY, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat
recognition and constructing an electronic order ofbattle (EOB) . An
EOB includes information on the nature and the deployment of all
electromagnetic emitting equipment of a military force, including
equipment types, frequencies, modes of operation, locations, and
o.ther relevant data.
Electronic attack, formerly known as electronic countermeasures

(ECM), is the division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to attack personnel, facili ties, or equipment with the intent
of degrading or destroying adversary combat capability. EA comprises
jamming, electronic deception, and neutralization. Jamming is the use
of electromagnetic energy to prevent a radio receiver from receiving
its intended signal. Electronic deception involves the use of false or
misleading transmissions to confuse an adversary. Neutralization
describes the use of very high levels of electromagnetic energy to
disrupt or permanently damage electronic equipment.
Electronic warfare (EW)

Electronic
support (ES)
Figure 1 .4 Major su bdivisions of EW.
Electronic
attack (EA)
Ele ctron ic
protection (EP)
Electro n i c Warfare for the D igitized Battlefield
16
1 .4.3
Electronic protection, formerly known as electronicprotection measures

(EPM) or electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), comprises
those actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment
from any effects of friendly or adversary employment of EW that
degrade, neutralize, or destroy fri'endly combat capability.
Other Categories of EW
EW can also be categorized as either offensive or defensive. ES and EA tend

to be offensive, in that they are targeted toward an adversary and involve
the process of searching, intercepting, direction finding (or locating or position
fixing), analyzing, and engaging adversary electronic systems through jam
ming, deception, and neutralization. Mastery of offensive techniques, capabil
ities, and limitations is vital to the effective conduct of electronic combat. EP
tends to be more defensive and protects own-force use of the electromagnetic
spectrum against an adversary's offensive EW. EP is the concern of all users
of electronic equipment and encompasses practices such as emission security
(EMSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) .
In turn, EW techniques can be characterized as either passive or active
in nature. Passive activities are not detectable and can be implemented and
practiced in peacetime with a limited risk of compromise. Active measures
are detectable and should be carefully controlled on the battlefield and only
permitted in peacetime under strict conditions. ES tends to be passive, while
EA is active. EP contains both active and passive measures.
The diagram in Figure 1 .5 gives an overall view of the interrelated
activities associated with EW.
The remaining chapters of this book discuss each of these subdivisions
in more detail, examining both the procedures and the characteristics of the
equipment used.
1 .5 Summary
Although the promise of command and control in the Information Age may
stop short of completely dissipating the fog of war, it has the potential to
turn night into day, to achieve spans of control that can be measured in
global terms, and to mass collective combat power without massing forces
[ 1 9] . The enduring lesson from recent conflicts since the Gulf War is that
what can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be killed. The function
of "seeing" is now much more sophisticated and entails electronic, optical,
17
Electronic warfare
Passive
Active
Passive
Search
Intercept
Direction finding
Analysis
Jamming
Deception
Neutralization
Active
Siting
Encryption
LPI/LPD
Shielding
Antijam
EMCON
Alternate means
D irectional antennas
Frequency management
Identical equipment
Figure 1 .5 Overal l view of EW.
and acoustic sensors that can have global coverage. These sensors can be
linked -in real time to computer-controlled weapon systems with unparalleled
accuracy and lethality. However, this is not enough. The decisive advantage
on the modern battlefield will go to the commander who can gather and
exploit information most effectively. While this is greatly assisted by the
technologies associated with the information revolution, the human element
is arguably the most significant. For example, if computers and communica
tions systems are used to reinforce hierarchical information flows-and there
fore perpetuate the information overloads and bottlenecks-it is the fault
of humans, not technology [20] .
Commanders of the past have adopted most of their practices because
the technology available simply did not allow them to do more. The informa
tion revolution will change that. Commanders can have unparalleled informa
tion available to them; they can "see" the full extent of the battlefield, even
if it spans the globe. Careful thought must now be given to what practices
are the most efficient. Just because it can be done, does not mean that it
should.
Commanders will not have it all their own way, however. Future
command and control systems will heavily rely on communications and
information systems that cannot operate if access to the electromagnetic
spectrum is denied. So, while the information revolution promises to deliver
an enormous improvement in capability to commanders, it also creates
the potential for new vulnerabilities. These new vulnerabilities offer new
opportunities for the application of electronic warfare on the digitized
battlefield.
18
One of the major impacts of the information revolution and increased

use of networks is a significant broadening of the concept of battle space. As
tactical commanders have increased access to information located anywhere in
the tactical, operational, or strategic environments, they also become more
vulnerable to IW assets located in any of those environments, not just the
battlefield. This book is focused on the application of EW in the tactical
environment and addresses those EW assets that have an intimate effect on
the tactical commander.
Endnotes
[1]
Reimer, D., "Foreword," i n R. Pfaltzgraff and R. Shultz, (eds.), War in the Information
Age: New Challenges for U S. Security Polley, Washington, D.C.: B rassey's, 1 997.
[2 ]
Toffler, A., and H. Toffler, War and Antt- War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st
CentUIJ' Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1 993.
[3 ]
Sproull, L., and S. Kiesler, Connectzons: New Ways of Working in the Networked
Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1 99 1 .

Malone, T., and J . Rockart, "Computers, Networks, and the Corporation," Scientific
American, September 1 99 1 , pp. 1 28-1 36.

Toffler, A., Powmhrft: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge ofthe 21st CentUI)',
New York: Bantam Books, 1 990.
[4]
Arquilla, J., and D. Ronfeldt, Cyberwar Is Coming! Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1 992,
PP
[5]
3-4 .
Further suggested reading on warfare in the Information Age:

Adams, ] . , The Next World War, London, U.K.: Random House, 1 998.
Alexander, ] . , Future War: Non-Lethal Weapom in Twenty-First Centwy Wmfore, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1 999.
Allard, C., Command, Control, and the Common Defense, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1 990.
Arquilla, ]., and D. Ronfeldt, (eds.), In Athena s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the
Information Age, Santa Mon ica, CA: Rand, 1 997.

Campen, A., and D. Dearth, C)1berWar 2.0: Myths and Reality, Fairfax, VA: AFCEA
I n ternational Press, 1 998.
Bellamy, C., The Future of Land Wmfore, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 987.
De Landa, M . , War in the Age ofIntelligent Machines, New York: Zone Books, 1 99 1 .
Gordon, A., The Rules of the Game: jutland and British Naval Command, Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1 996.
The International Insti tute for Strategic Studies (IIS), Strategic Survey 1995-1996,
London, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1 996, p. 30.
Pfal tzgraff, R . , and R. Shultz, (eds.), War in the Info1mation Age: New Challenges for
U S. Security Policy, Washington, D.C.: B rassey's, 1 997.

Rooney, D., V. Kallmeier, and G. Stevens, MiJSion Command and Battlefield Digitiza
tion: Human Sciences Comiderations, DERA Report
19
DERNCHS/HS3/CR980097/ 1 .0, March 1 998.

Scales, R. H., Jr., Future Waifare: Anthology, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 1 999.
Toffler, A., and H. Toffler, War and Anti- War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st
Centu1y, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1 993.
Van Trees, H . , "C3 Systems Research: A Decade of Progress, " in S.E. Johnson and
A. H. Levis, (eds.), Saence of Command and Control: Coping with Complexity, Fairfax,
VA: AFCEA International Press, 1 989.
[6]
"Joint Vision 2020," Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J5 Strategic Division,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000.
[7]
Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms," Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 994 (as amended
September 2000).
[8]
Alberrs, D., J. Garrska, and F. Stein, Network Centric Waifare, CCRP Publication
Series, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 999.
[9]
Cebrowski, A., and J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future,"
Naval Instttute Proceedings, 1 997.

[ 1 0]
Further reading on command and control can be found in:

Dupuy, T., Understanding War: HistOIJ' and The01y of Combat, New York: Paragon
House Publishers, 1 987.
Echevarra, A., "Tomorrow's Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change," Parameters,
Autumn 1 998, p. 1 1 .
Van Creveld, M., Command in ,War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press,
1 985.
Van Creveld, M., The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, 1 99 1 .
[1 1]
For a good description o f the Boyd cycle see: Lind, W., The Maneuver Waifare
Handbook, London, U.K.: Westview, 1 9 8 5 , p. 5 .
[ 1 2]
Builder, C., "Are We Looking in the Wrong Places?" in K. Thomas, (ed.), The
Revolution m Mditay Affairs: Wafare in the Info1mation Age, Canberra, Australia:
Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1 997, p. 7.
[ 1 3]
Van Creveld, M . , Command in War, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1 985,
p. 23 1 .
[ 1 4]
U.S. Army Field Manual F M 1 00-6, "Information Operations," August 1 996.
[ 1 5]
Further readi g can be found in:

U.S. Army Field Manual F M 100-6, "Information Operations," August 1 996.
Joint Publication 3 - 1 3 , "Joint Doctrine for I nformation Operations," Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 998.
Joint Publication 3-13. 1 , "Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) ,"
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 996.
Libicki, M . , What Is Information Waifare? Washington, D.C.: Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1 996.
Rothrock, J., "Information Warfare: Time for Some Constructive Skepticism?" in
J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the
Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1 997.
20
Electronic W a rfare for t h e D igitized B attlefield
[ 1 6]
U.S. Army Field Manual F M 1 00-6, "Information Operations," August 1 996.
[ 1 7]
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 1 00-6, "Information Operations," August 1 996.
[ 1 8]
Readers with interest in noncommunications EW are referred to:

Neri, F., !ntroductton to Electronic Defense Systems, Norwood, MA : Arrech House,
1 99 1 .
Schleher, 0 . , Electronic Wmfare in the Information Age, Norwood, MA : Artech House,
1 999.
[ 1 9]
Allard, C., Command, Control, and the Common Defense, New Haven, CT: Yale
U niversity Press, 1 990, pp. 263-264.
2
Tactical Com m unications Systems
2.1
Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the pace and intensity of modern warfare require

that c9mmanders and staffs are supported by flexible, mobile, reliable, tactical
communications systems that provide sufficient capacity to cope with increas
ingly high traffic loads in a hostile electromagnetic environment. Tactical
communications systems have a similar form in all modern armies. To
understand how tactical communications systems can be attacked by EW
systems, it is important to understand their current structure, as well as
the directions of their future development [ 1 ] . This chap_ter develops an
architecture to illustrate the interrelationship of systems required to provide
the battlefield network that supports operational concepts such as network
centric warfare. Current tactical trunk communications, combat net radio,
tactical data distribution, and tactical airborne systems are then described
in some detail. In Chapter 8 we address the future development of tactical
communrcanons systems.
2.2 Architectural Drivers

Over time, a number of principles for the provision of tactical communica
tions have coalesced for communications support to land operations. These
principles are well known and will not be dwelt upon here. Briefly, the
major principles are that communications support the chain of command,
integration, reliability, sirp.plicity, capacity, quality, flexibility, anticipation
21
22
Ele ctronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield
of requirements, mobility, security, economy, survivability, and interoperabil

ity. In addition, for the modern battlefield, the following issues represent
key design drivers for the provision of the tactical communications system.
Size of Supported Force
In the development of this architecture, attention is focused at the divisional

level, that is, on division and below. While the architecture of the tactical
communications system is developed with cognizance of larger formations,
the most difficult problem is the provision of a sufficient digital capacity to
tactical (division-level) combat forces, particularly at brigade and below.
Communications Support for the Spectrum of Operations
The communications architecture must be able to support a force in a range

of operational deployments: from conventional, high-density motorized or
mechanized operations to low-density operations, or in peacekeeping or
peace-enforcing .operations. To optimize procurement, training, and support,
similar communications interfaces must be provided regardless of the type
of operation. For small armies in particular, this will greatly ease procurement,
logistic support, and training.
Command and Control on the Move
On the future battlefield it is essential that commanders can command and

control on the move; a commander should be able to control force elements
regardless of location. This includes continuity of command and control
while deploying from barracks as well as while moving arou11d the battle
space. This requirement provides one of the most significant design drivers
because it impacts on the power available for transmitters, the antenna size
that can be supported, and so on.
Communications Support Situational Awareness
Communications must support situational awareness to commanders at all

levels (in real time or near-real time) to provide accurate knowledge of
adversary, friendly, neutral, and noncombatant entities. Modern warfare
calls for near-real-rime situational awareness at tactical headquarters, which
provides a significant design driver for the tactical communications system.
Traditionally, tactical communications have been based on the limited
exchange of predominantly voice messages. The exchange of situational
awareness information is based on data messages that must be shared across
the whole battle space.
23
Seamless Connectivity
If concepts such as network-centric warfare are to be implemented on the

future battlefield, the communications architecture must support seamless
connectivity between any two points in the battle space, and between any
point in the battle space and any point in the strategic communications
system. While it will not always be desirable to e able to use such extremes
of connectivity, the possibility of such connections must be supported in
the architecture if the full power of network-centric warfare is to be realized.
Organic, Minimum-Essential Communications
The deployed force must have an organic, field-deployable tactical communi

cations system that meets essential requirements for communications to
support command and control. This minimum-essential system must provide
guaranteed, robust, flexible communications that support the force, whether
deployed on foot, motorized, or mechanized/armored. The tactical communi
cations system is an organic asset that is part of the tactical force's combat
power and can be guaranteed in any deployment. This also requires that
the network is modular so that units and subunits are self-supporting when
deployed separately from the main force and still retain communications
functionality.
Expandable Communications
Since its organic communications will invariably be limited, the tactical force
must be able to make use of other battle space and strategic communications
systems when available. While essential force requirements are supplied by
organic communications, additional capacity, redundancy, and reliability
can be provided by using overlaid communications systems such as the
commrcial telephone network, satellite communications, theater broadcast,
and so on. These systems must be seamlessly integrated with the tactical
commumcanons system.
.
Scalable Communications
Within all available assets, the tactical force must have the ability to provide
scalable communications. That is, a small advance party must be able to
deploy, taking with it sufficient communications for its task. As the force
builds, the communications system must be able to grow to accommodate
the size of the force.
Range
The tactical communications system must be able to support the force when
it is deployed in any one of its roles. In the extreme, the communications
24
system must be able to provide communications in conventional high-density

deployments as well as support widely dispersed deployments. The tactical
communications system must also be able to support high-capacity communi
cations from the area of operations back into the strategic environment,
which may require around-the-world communications.
Quality of Service (OoS)
The tactical communications system is required to carry a wide variety of

traffic including voice, telegraph, video, and sensor data, reports, returns,
navigation, location reporting, targeting da,ta, database transfers, weather
data, and so on. Increasingly, in modern digital networks, all of these forms
of traffic are transmitted as data, albeit with varying requirements for speed
of delivery and error rates. While warfare remains a human endeavor, com
manders will want to communicate using voice. However, concepts such
as network-centric warfare cannot be force multipliers unless data can be
transferred rapidly across the battle space. Since there are many different
types of data on the modern battlefield, it does not necessarily make sense
to distinguish them by their source. Rather, it is more useful to characterize
them by the requirements that each type of data has for services across the
network. In that regard there are two main types of traffic: those that require
real-time services (predominantly video and voice) and those that require
non-real-time services (computer-to-computer transfer). Non-real-time ser
vices tend to be less tolerant of errors introduced into data during trans
missiOn.
Low Probability of Interception (LPI)
LPI, or low probability ofdetection (LPD), is critical to tactical communica

tions systems. Survival on the modern battlefield requires the protection of
communications systems as the first step in protecting the command systems
that they support. LPI techniques include short-duration transmission; spread
spectrum (direct sequence spread spectrum as well as frequency hopping);
directional antennas; low-power settings; terrain screening; and use of air
borne relays so that ground terminals can direct their power upward, away
from a land-based enemy.
Jamming Resistance
Jamming resistance is also critical to the protection of communications links.

Operation in a harsh electromagnetic environment requires the ability to
implement measureno provide resistance to jamming. The techniques listed
for LPI are also relevant to increase jamming resistance. Other techniques
25
that may conflict with LPI requirements include increased power, strong
error coding, jamming-resistant modulation, and adaptive antennas with
steerable nulls.
These drivers are used as a framework in the following sections for the
consideration of the development of architectures' tactical communications
systems. Some issues such as LPI and jamming' resistance are covered in
more detail in Chapter 3.
2.3 Current Tactical Communications Architecture

As illustrated in Figure 2. 1 , in almost all modern armies the tactical communi
cations system has evolved to comprise two major components: the trunk
communications subsystem and the combat net radio (CNR) subsystem. [In
U.S. doctrine, a third subsystem, the advanced data distribution system
(ADDS), is provided-the utility of this third element is discussed in Section
2.7.] The trunk communications system provides high capacity links (terres
trial radio relay, satellite, fiber optic, or line) that interconnect headquarters
at brigade level and above. The network is provided by a number of trunk
CNR
subsystem
Trunk
subsystem
Communications
------------- Chain of command
Figure 2.1 The architecture of the c u rrent tactical communications syste m.
26
nodes interconnected by trunk links, forming a meshed area network. Access

is normally gained through access nodes that connect to one or more trunk
nodes. Voice, telegraph, data, facsimile, and video facilities are provided to
staff officers and commanders. The CNR subsystem is a ruggedized, portable
radio network carried as an organic communications system for combat
troops (brigade level and below). Radios are invariably interconnected to
form single-frequency, half-duplex, all-informed, hierarchical nets, providing
commanders with effective support to command and control.
There are a number of major problems with the current tactical commu
nications system if it is to support command and control in future land
warfare. The CNR subsystem is poorly placed to provide a network to
transfer data between any two points in the battle space, due to its hierarchical
net structure that has traditionally been devoted to analog voice traffic. The
CNR and trunk communications subsystems are not seamlessly integrated
to allow the transfer of information between any two points in the battle
space. The tactical communications system is not seamlessly integrated with
the strategic communications system to allow the transfer of information
between any point in the battle space and any point in the strategic communi
cations system. The data-handling capacity of the trunk communications
subsystem will be sufficient (with some modification to the architecture) to
cope with the volumes of data required to be transmitted between major
headquarters. H owever, there is not a sufficient capacity below brigade (where
trunk communications currently stop in most armies) to cope with future
levels of data traffic required to provide commanders with near-real-time
situational awareness. Finally, neither the CNR nor the trunk communica
tions subsystems provide enough range to allow the dispersal of brigade
elements when required. These issues and the key factors discussed earlier
must be taken into account in the development of an architectural framework
for a future tactical communications system.
The support for command and control in future land warfare requires
the tactical communications system to be a single logical network to provide
connectivity between any two points on the battlefield. The tactical commu
nications system is an organic asset that provides the minimum-essential
voice and data communications requirements to support situational awareness
within the brigade and to allow for the transfer of command and control
information. The tactical communications system interfaces with the strategic
communications system to provide a seamless connectivity between any two
points in the battle space and between any point in the battle space and any
point in the strategic communications system.
Tacflca! CommumcatlO/lS Systems
2.4
27
A S u i ta b l e Tacti c a l Comm u n i cat i o n s Arch itecture for

Future La n d Warfare
The ideal tactical communications system architecture would provide a

mobile infrastructure to support mobile users, a single homogeneous network
supporting all communicating entities in the battle space. The racri cal com
munications system is an organic asset that provides rhe m ini mum-essential
voice and data communications requirements to support situational awareness
within the brigade and to allow for the transfer of command and control
information. The tactical communications system interfaces with the strategic
com m unications system to provide seamless connectivity bet\veen any t\vo
points i n the battle space and between any point in the battle space and
any point in the strategic communications system.
The development of a suitable architecture for the tactical com munica
tions system can draw on the considerable body of knowledge available in
existing commercial and military networks that provide mobile communica
tions. However, in some respects, "mobile communications" is a misnomer
when used in the com mercial environment because only the user is mobile
i n such systems; the communications system (the network infrastructure) is
very much fixed, with mobile access to this fixed infrastructure being provided
by a wireless connection. In the m ilitary environment, the provision of a
mobile com munications system norm ally implies that both the user and
the network infrastructure are mobile. Mobility therefore means m arkedly
different things in the commercial and military environments. Consequently,
while many commercial com munications technologies are useful in rhe mili
tary environment, the mobility of the net\vork infrastructure for military
communications systems tends to require unique solutions.
\Xlhile the tactical communications system can be provided as one
logical net\vork, it cannot be provided as one single physical nct\vork. A t
the lower level, combat troops carry a device that must be a net\\'O rk node
as well as an access terminal. Battery power and the need for small, omnid i rec
tional antennas mean that ranges and capacities arc limited. Ar rhc higher
level, the large capacities requi red of trunk communications syste ms mean
that rhcy will remain sem imobile fo r the fo reseeable future. L1rgc power
requirements must be mer by rhe usc of generators, and high-gain antennas
must be deployed on guyed masts ro provide reasonable ranges.
The data-handling capacity of the trunk communications sstcm will
generally be suffcienr to cope wirh the volumes of data rhat musr he rrans m i l
rcd hct\wen command posts. H owever, the C N R subsvsrcm 's ahilil\ 1 s
28
Electronic W a rfare for the Digitized Battlefield
severely limited, especially as it is still required to transmit voice information.

Therefore, an additional, purpose-designed, data distribution system is
required to provide sufficient capacity to transfer situational awareness data
across the lower levels of the battlefield. However, CNR must still be voice
and data-capable to allow organic communications of both types within
subunits, should they be deployed individually or beyond the range of the
data distribution subsystem. The additional (albeit limited) data capacity in
the combat net radio subsystem would also provide an overflow capability
should the tactical data distribution subsystem be unable to meet all the
data needs.
Neither the CNR subsystem nor the trunk comm nications subsystem
is able to cover the large ranges required for dispersed operation. The only
solution to providing high-capacity, long-range communications is to elevate
the antennas. In the extreme, the provision of a satellite-based or airborne
repeater or. switch will greatly increase the ranges between network nodes.
A satellite-based solution is not considered desirable due to its inability to
meet the requirements of a minimum organic communications system in
most armies (even in those large armies that could afford integral satellite
communications, such assets are likely to be provided sparingly and are
relatively easily interdicted) . An airborne subsystem is therefore required to
support long-range operations. In addition, an airborne system will increase
the capacity of lower-level tactical communications by removing the range
restriction on high frequencies that can provide additional capacity from
small, omnidirectional antennas.
By its very nature, a minimum organic tactical communications system
will only be able to provide a basic level of service and must be able to be
augmented where possible by overlaid communications systems such as the
public telephone network, satellite-based systems, and personal communica
tion systems. These overlaid systems cannot be guaranteed to be available
and therefore cannot be included in the minimum organic system. If they
are available, however, a great advantage is to be gained from their use.
In order to simplify the user interface to these subsystems, a local
communications subsystem (most probably containing a level of switching)
is .required. This local subsystem could take a number of forms, from a
vehicle harness to a local area network around brigade headquarters.
To support command and control in future land warfare, the tactical
communications system is therefore required to evolve from the two subsys
tems in Figure 2 . 1 to five subsystems [2] . The combat net radio subsystem
provides mobile infrastructure to carry voice and data communications to
support the command and control of combat troops. The tactical data
29
distribution subsystem provides high-capacity data communications to support

the situational awareness required for the command and control of combat
troops. The tactical trunk subsystem provides transportable infrastructure to
support communications between command elements and other large-vol
ume users. The tactical airborne subsystem extends communications ranges
and provides additional capacity when the tactical situation allows. Finally,
the local subsystem simplifies the user interfac to the other communications
subsystems and to overlaid communications systems.
The architecture of Figure 2.2 illustrates the major architectural compo
nents of the tactical communications system. It recognizes that, while the
tactical communications system is to be considered as one logical network,
for practical deployment reasons, it will be provided as a number of physical
networks (at least in the short term). It is also a convenient starting point
since it broadly coincides with the current deployed architecture, requiring
Overlaid
Communications systems
Public voice and data networks
Personal communications systems (PCS)
Theater broadcast
Satellite communications systems
Q)
en
>.
en
en
c
0
()
c:
:::::l
E
E
0
()
()
c;,
Q)
SUPPORTED SYSTEMS
Command elements
Maneuver elements
Logistics elements
Sensors
Weapons platforms
Information systems
Information services
Network management
(j)
Figure 2.2 An a rchitectural framework for the tactical communications system.
30
Electro nic Warfare for the Di gitized Battl efi eld
the addition of a tactical data distribution subsystem and a tactical airborne

subsystem to increase capacity and range. However, the concept of a single
logical network must remain paramount, as it is a crucial aspect of the
architecture in Figure 2.2.
The tactical communications system does not exist in isolation; it exists
to support a number of battlefield, joint, and combined systems. These
supported systems interface to the tactical communications system as illus
trated in Figure 2.2. As also illustrated in Figure 2.2, the minimum-essential
tactical communications system is augmented where possible by a range of
overlaid communications systems such as the commercial telephone network,
satell ite communications, theater broadcast, and perso A al communications
system. These systems should be seamlessly integrated with the tactical com
munications system.
Here we are interested in those elements of the architecture that are
principal targets for tactical communications EW, namely, the tactical trunk
subsystem, the combat net radio subsystem, the tactical airborne subsystem,
and the tactical data distribution subsystem. The following sections examine
these subsystems in more detail.
2.5 Tru n k Commu n i c at i o n s Su bsystem

Trunk communications exist to interconnect command posts to allow the
passage of large quantities of information between commanders and staffs.
The three main forms of interconnections are radio (including radio-relay, ,
tropospheric, and satellite bearers) ; line (including wire and fiber optic); and
hand carriage (signal dispatch service) . The main forms of traffi c carried by
trunk networks include voice, data, facsimile, telegraph , and data. The ability
to use voice, their natural means of communication, is essential for command
ers and staff. They also require the ability to transm it messages and facsimile
for text transfer. Additionally, as the number of information systems increases,
trunk networks must be able to transmit large volumes of data. The require
ment to handle each of these forms of traffic efficiently is one of the major
architectural drivers for tactical networks.
In addition to electronic forms of communication, most trunk networks
include a hand-carriage component, as there are many communications that
are roo bulky and are best transferred between command posts by the signal
dispatch service (SDS). Despite considerable advances, it is not likely that
the technology of the information revolution will be able to provide the
bandwidth to transmit all communications electronically.
31
Within a headquarters, commanders and staff officers are intercon

nected by their local subsystem to a local telephone exchange to provide
connections to local subscribers as well as connections to the trunk switches
through common-user trunk circuits. Data subscribers within a headquarters
are interconnected by high-speed local area networks that are connected to
each other across the trunk network.
Trunk communications systems provided. the first forms of communica
tion on the battlefield. Early systems relied on messengers to carry orders
between a commander and subordinates. However, military communications
requirements began to expand as fronts became wider, weapons became more
sophisticated, and logistic tails became .longer. To attack successfully, deploy
reinforcements, commit reserves, and ward off counterattacks, commanders
had to be aware instantly of events on distant battlefields-more swiftly
than was possible by courier. Various visual and acoustic signaling systems
were then deployed, including smoke, fire signals, heliograph, signaling lamp,
and colored signaling flags. While these extended ranges and decreased the
time taken to transmit simple messages, they were quickly replaced by the
electrical telgraph, where the on-off keying of a simple electrical signal
allowed the transmission of complex messages over long distances.
The first military use of the telegraph was during the Crimean War
( 1 8 53-1 856), and by World War I, it provided the mainstay of communica
tions between headquarters. Tens of thousands of miles of telegraph cables
had been laid by the end of the war. Radio telegraphy had been developed
by the end of World War I, but it had been developed too late to be of
any great use. By the beginning ofWorld War II, however, radio had begun
to provide high-capacity interconnections between headquarters, providing
commanders with significantly greater freedom of movement, as they were
no longer constrained by the cables connecting them with superior and
subordinate commanders. By the end of World War II, radio had taken
over as the principal bearer of trunk communications due to the greater
mobility it offered commanders, with line being laid when time permitted.
Because they were designed to interconnect headquarters, early (first
generation) trunk networks followed the chain of command, which required
headquarters to act as both tactical bases and large communications nodes.
This dual role caused significant conflict in siting and hampered the mobility
of commanders, as any movement of the headquarters disrupted communica
tions.
Second-generation networks alleviated the siting quandary of the head
quarters by separating the communications and tactical responsibilities
through the provision of a separate communications center that could be
32
sited separately from the headquarters. However, the communications center

had to shut down to move with the headquarters, which limited command
and control in fast-moving tactical environments.
Third-generation networks provided a headquarters with two commu
nications centers, which allowed the headquarters to step up. A step-up
element could move to the new location and set up one of the communica
tions centers. Once this headquarters element was established and had com
munications with the old location as well .as all subordinate commanders,
command could be transferred and the elements at the old headquarters
location could close down and move to join the new location. A headquarters
was also more robust through having two comm nications centers, which
allowed it to have alternative routes for communications in and out.
The logical extension of these developments is the fourth-generation,
meshed, area trunk network. Most modern trunk communications systems
have been developed as fourth-generation networks, for example: United
Kingdom's PTARMIGAN; United States' MSE; Germany's AUTOKO; The
Netherlands' ZODIAC; Italy's MIDAS; and France and Belgium's
RITA [3] .
.
2.5.1
Fourth-Generation Trunk Networks
Within a fourth-generation meshed trunk communications system, there are

three basic entities: trunk nodes to provide backbone switches (we use the
term "switch" here in a generic sense as a label for a device that enables
interconnection between users and user applications); bearers to interconnect
nodes into a network; and access nodes that serve a community of users. As
illustrated in Figure 2.3, the trunk nodes are deployed across the corps area,
providing a meshed network within which users can maneuver. While the
network is deployed with a logical grid, connectivity will have varying physical
configurations depending on. the location of nodes as dictated by the terrain
and tactical situation.
2.5.2
Trunk Nodes
Typically there are approximately 40 trunk nodes in a corps network. Nodes

are normally allocated on the basis of four per division and the rest are
deployed as corps assets. In principle, one element of the user community
should be able to connect to the communications system at any point on
the battlefield and have seamless access to any other user similarly connected,
without any knowledge of their location. Similarly, while the network of
__
XXX Cor ps
XX Division
X Brigade
Trunk bearer
33
\j Tru nk node (switch)
Access node
Chain of command
Figure 2.3 Architecture of tactical trunk communications systems.
trunk nodes may need to reconfigure to account for movements by user

communities, any movement by the network should not have an impact on
the service provided to user elements.
This separation of the user community and the switch network is often
depicted as a "cloud" (see Figure 2.4) indicating that the topology and
location of nodes within the network are largely irrelevant to the user commu
nity. User communities need only be able to access one of the trunk nodes
in the network, through Jhich communications can be achieved to any
other group of users that is: similarly connected.
As outlined earlier, in the trunk networks of most major armies, brigade
headquarters is .the lowest level of access node in the trunk network. The
lowest extent of the trunk network is to battalion headquarters via mobile
access. However, for most modern deployments using single-channel radio,
the trunk network must extend to lower levels. While the trunk network
supports communications between command posts from joint force level to
brigade level, the major tactical need in most deployments exists below
brigade-brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters, logistics installations,
and headquarters ofother major units in brigade areas of operations. However,
there are a number of attendant problems with the provision of trunk facilities
34
Figure
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battl efi eld
2.4 The fourth g e n e ratton of tru nk network represented as a "cloud" diagram.
to the small, mobile headquarters at battalion and below. While high capacity
access is desirable at all levels, the mobility and tactical movement of low
level headquarters will tend to militate against the provision of large, vehicle
mounted equipment within the headquarters. At these levels, however, mobile
access can be provided without restricting the tactical movement of
commanders.
Fourth-generation networks provide great flexibility to a deployed force.
Nodes can be deployed and redeployed to account for tactical movement
by the force, and the network density can be adjusted according to force
composition and distribution. Figure 2.5 illustrates the basic components
of a trunk node.
The switch is the heart . of the node providing a processor-controlled
digital switch, which until recently has generally been based on an automatic
circuit switch that has an embedded packet switch. However, most networks
are investigating the incorporation of asynchronous transfer mode (ATM)
switches or IP routers to accommodate traffic with varying quality of service
requirements.
The node will also contain an operator interface to assist in engineering
the switch's role in the network, manage the trunk encryption equipment,
and allow some patching. This node operation center (NOC) can either be

--z._
To another
trunk node
Radio relay vehicle
Radio relay vehicle
m-__,
35
----z.....__
To another
trunk node
N etwork management
facility
Figure 2.5 The basic compon ents of a typical trunk node.
located in the switch vehicle or in a separate vehicle. Also collocated with

the switch vehicle will be a network management facility (NMF), whjch
performs link management Of the radio relay links connected to the switch,
as well as link engineering and frequency management.
Typically, a node will also include four or five radio relay detachments,
each of which can terminate approximately three other radio relay detach
ments. The radio relay vehicles are often located on higher features sur
rounding the switch vehicle and are connected to the switch via cable or a
"down-the-hill" SHF radio link.
2.5.3
Bearers
The interconnection of headquarters requires high-bandwidth digital com

munications that can be provided by any high-capacity bearers HF communi
cations are unsuitable for this requirement because of the low bandwidth
and poor quality. Optical fibers are unsuited to mobile wide area networking
and are only able to be used in short runs due to the time taken to lay and
recover line. Satellite communications cannot be provided as part of the
organic minimum-essential communications system because, in most armies,
the satellite cannot be considered organic to the tactical formation. However,
the use of satellite communications in the overlaid communications system
is very useful to extend ranges of internodal links when required in dispersed
operations.
Electronic Warfare for the Di gitized Battlefield
36
Troposcatter communications do not have the setup and tear-down

times required to support the deployment of trunk nodes. However, tropo
scatter communications can provide high bandwidths (up to 2 Mbps) over
relatively long ranges compared to terrestrial systems ( 1 5 0-300 km for tactical
systems). The utility of ttoposcatter is a useful adjunct to the organic assets
of the tactical communications system While troposcatter systems do not
necessarily have to be provided on a scale to cover links between all trunk
nodes, a small number of troposcatter terminals should be able to be provided
within each tactical formation so that at least one troposcatter link can be
established, as well as an additional terminal to anchor a link to a higher
l
r
wrmanon.
The most suitable bearer for the organic minimum-essential trunk
communications is VHF/UHF terrestrial radio relay. High capacity links
require high-gain (approximately 9 dB) antennas mounted on high ( l Orn)
masts. Even so, the range of these systems is limited to line-of-sight and
needs to be extended for dispersed operations by the organic tactical airborne
subsystem; organic troposcatter communications; and satellite communica
tions provided by an overlaid communications system.
" Although UHF and SHF frequencies provide sufficient bandwidth,
they have the planning difficulty of requiring line-of-sight between antennas.
Additionally, to maintain the required signal-to-noise ratios, particularly for
data links, radio paths are limited to planning ranges on the order of 20 to
30 km. Often, therefore, two trunk nodes cannot be connected by one link,
and radio relay is required through the insertion of an intermediate relay
station in the link. This relay is sited so that there is a good line-of-sight
path to both radio relay terminals, and the signals received from each terminal
are automatically retransmitted to the other. Where long internodal links
are required to support widely dispersed forces, there may be several relay
stations.
As shown in Figure 2.6, where ranges are too long for the available
terrestrial trunk assets, bearers may be replaced by satellite bearers or the
range of terrestrial bearers may be extended by repeating through the tactical
airborne subsystem.
.
I
I
2.5.4
Access N odes
Subscribers gain access to trunk facilities through an access node, which is

a processor-controlled switch capable of interconnecting all local subscribers
as well as providing them with trunk access. In almost all networks, at
least two levels of access node are provided: small acess nodes for brigade
(a )
37
(b)
Figure 2.6 Range extension u sing ( a ) satellite internodal links and ( b ) the tactical ai rborne
s ubsystem.
headquarters and large access nodes for divisional and higher level headquar
ter) Some networks provide access nodes to lower levels-at least to regimen
tal or battalion command posts. In most networks, however, access to these
levels is provided through the mobile access systems described next.
Access nodes are normally connected to the trunk network through
radio relay bearers. However, in most networks, nodes can also be connected
to overlaid systems such as commercial carriers and satellite or troposcatter
bearers. Large access nodes generally have two connections to the network;
small access nodes have one operational link and one engineered in standby
in case of failure. Small access nodes normally provide for approximately 2 5
subscribers, while large access nodes connect about 1 50 subscribers. Figure
2.7 shows a generic configuration of an access node.
2.5.5
Mobile Trunk Access
Mobile remote access is required for trunk network subscribers. This func
tionality should include full duplex voice telephony as well as substantial
data connectivity. In most major trunk networks this access is called single
channel radio access (SCRA). It is normaUy provided by radio access points
(RAP) that are connected to trunk nodes, as illustrated in Figure 2.8. i
Mobile subscribers have secure duplex VHF radio access to the RAP and
have voice, data, telegraph, and facsimile facilities similar to those available to
static subscribers of an access network. The RAP can accept approximately
50 mobile subscribers affiliated within a 1 5-km radius. However, only approx
imately one quarter of these can make a simultaneous call. RAPs are deployed
to provide overlapping coverage of the battlefield, in a manner similar to
Electronic Warfare for the D i g itized Battlefield
38
--z..__
To a
trunk node
Radio relay
vehicle
--z..__
To another
trunk node
\
\
Access node
To approximately
25 or 1 50 subscribers
Figure 2.7 Generic layout of an ac cess node.
To trunk node
Mobile subscribers
Figure 2.8 Configuration of the RAP for mobile s u b scribers.
that used to plan commercial cellular telephone networks. Variable power

settings allow the RAP to reduce its RF signature.
A mobile subscriber is given a unique identification number during a
process called affiliation, through which the subscriber is recognized and the
subscriber's identity is validated. The network normally requires deliberate
action on behalf of the user to affiliate. Some networks provide automatic
handover bf subscribers between RAPs; others require the subscriber to
reaffiliate manually to the new RAP Automatic power control is essential
at the terminal to ensure similar power levels at the RAP from all subscribers.
.
2.5.6
Combat Net Radio interface (CNRI)
In addition to the mobile trunk access provided to SCRA subscribers, most

networks also provide an additional form of access to CNR users who are
39
able to use their CNR to gain temporary (albeit limited) access to the trunk
network. A CNRI vehicle provides semiautomatic access for several VHF
and HF users. The users tune their CNR to the CNRI hailing frequency
and arrange with the operator to have a call placed to a trunk subscriber.
Calls made from the network are automatic and do not need operator
assistance. As CNR nets are single-frequency and half-duplex, CNRI only
provides rudimentary access to network facilities. In most current trunk
networks, CNRI provides the only direct interface between the trunk and
CNR subsystems. A much more sophisticated and ubiquitous interface is
required if the CNR and trunk communications subsystems are to be seam
lessly integrated.
2.5.7
Interfaces to the Tactical Trunk Subsystem
The current limited interface provided by CNRI is not sufficient. The tactical
trunk subsystem is required to interface to other components of the tactical
communications system as well as to the strategic communications system and
to overlaid communications systems. These generic interfaces are illustrated in
Figure 2.9.
Mobile trunk
Figure 2.9 Tactical trunk communications subsystem interfaces.
40
2.6
CNR
Subsystem
Military requirements for communications with fully mobile infrastructure

have been met traditionally by CNR, which is the primary means of exercising
command and control at brigade level and below. CNR combines the advan
tages of simplicity and flexibility with th ability to provide the all-informed
communications that are essential for the close coordination of all-arms
tactics in mobile operations.
The use of radio on the battlefield began in World War I as an
alternative to the use of line as part of trunk communications. Examples
included the connection of observation posts1 to artillery batteries, which
avoided the laying of hundreds of miles of cable to support major offensives.
Radio sets (and particularly their antenna systems) were initially too large
to be of any great use to the infantry. However, as sets and antennas reduced
in size, they began to be employed to form artillery-infantry nets and
infantry-armor nets and became more useful in mobile operations.
By the end of World War II, CNR had become an important means
of communications for infantry and other arms. Technical developments
since that time have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and the
tactical use of CNR has remained largely unchanged. The major difference
is in the ability to pass data, although most CNRs are still analog radios
and are not well placed to cope with the expansion in the volume of data
expected in the next few years.
CNR is easily deployed and requires no infrastructure support. It is
therefore likely to retain its place at unit level for the foreseeable future. At
formation level, it continues to supplement the array of trunk communica
tions systems available to the commander and his staff.
2.6.1
Key Architectural Issues for C N R
Some of the key architectural issues for CNR include the following.
Command and Control on the Move
User terminals and network infrastructure must be capable of operation

while on the movt. without stopping. This requires that either there is
no ground-based i frastructure or that this infrastructure is fully mobile.
Command and control on the move makes the use of line unsuitable as a
sole means of communications; it favors, however, the -use of radio with
omnidirectional antennas. Radios and terminals must also be small and
robust with low-power requirements if they are to provide integral support
to motorized and mechanized forces and especially light-scale forces.
41
Support for the Chain of Command
Support for the chain of command requires that communications between

a commander and subordinates be attained with maximum efficiency. This
is achieved in current systems by hierarchical nets that follow the chain of
command. Support for the chain of command also requires that ground
based equipment used for communications within a unit or subunit is integral
to that unit or subunit. The CNR subsystem should not constrain the
locations of headquarters or other elements. This applies both while on the
move and in static locations. A commander should also be able to alter
command arrangements within a formation or unit without having to funda
mentally restructure the CNR nets.
Voice and Data
Despite the need for voice remaining for the foreseeable future, the require
ment to be able to send data will increase dramatically in the next few years.
Both voice and data communications are required, therefore, although not
necessarily at the same time or using the same equipment. Ideally, voice and
data communications should be seamlessly integrated, using a single piece
of equipment. A major disadvantage of separate equipment for voice and
data may be additional weight.
Multiple Access
The spectrum available for military use is not likely to expand, while the
number of systems that make use of the electromagnetic spectrum increases
constantly. Sharing of the electromagnetic spectrum between users is re
quired. Possible multiple access techniques [4] include frequency division
multiple access (FDMA), synchronous time-division multiple access
(TDMA), carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA) , and code-division multiple
access (CDMA)-see Table 2 . 1 . Multiple access may be provided using a
combination of these basic techniques. In current systems, multiple access
is achieved by grouping stations into nets. Each net operates in a single
frequency, half-duplex mode, with different nets being assigned different
frequencies. For conventional CNR, each net operates on a single frequency,
with FDMA being used to share the electromagnetic spectrum between nets.
Within a net, a form of CSMA is used to share the channel capaci J, between
stations on the net. For voice networks, CSMA takes the form of voice
procedure, RATEL.
Multicast Capability
Traditional CNR provides an all-informed voice capability that is ideally

suited to the coordination of all-arms tactics. This requirement for all-
42
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld
Table 2.1
M u ltiple Access Techniq ues
Technique
Description
FDMA
In FDMA, a portion of the elec.tromagnetic sp ectrum is allocated

to each tra nsmitter, which ca1n tra nsmit in its allo cated channel
all the time. Allo cation of frequencies can be fixed or o n demand.
The advantages of FDMA a re that no central control station is
required unless capacity is demand-all ocated, close to 1 00% of
the ava 1 l a ble c h a n n e l c a p a c ity can be used, there is no loss
of data due to one station overtrank mitting another, a n d there is
no delay introd u c e d by the channel. The disadvanta ges of
FDMA are that the allocation of capa city between transmitters is
relatively inflexible a n d it is relatively diffic u lt for one station
to receive data from more tha n o n e transmitter.
TDMA
In synchronous TDMA, a fixed - l e n gth, p e riodic ti me slot is allocated

to each transmitter. Timing sync hronization requires either a central
control station or reg u l a r transmissions from all stati ons. Each
transmitter has available the whole channel capa city d u ring
its time slot, and must remain silent at all oth e r times. Allocation
of time slots can b e by fixed assignment o r o n demand. The
advantages of synchronous TDMA a re that it is relatively easy for
one station to monitor transmissions i n all time slots, it is
possi ble to use c lose to 1 00% of the ava i l a b l e channel c a p a c ity
if there is eith er a single transm itte r or single receiver, there
i s no loss of data d u e to o n e stati on overtransmitting another, and
there is a fixed upper bound on delay. The disadvantages are
that timing syn c h ronization between stations is required, g u a rd
intervals reduce channel c a p acity when m u ltiple transmitters
and m u ltiple receivers are used, a n d allocation of c a p a c ity
between transmitters is relatively inflexi ble.
informed voice capability is not likt:;ly to decrease. With the introduction

of a data capability into the CNR subsystem, a corresponding multicast
capability for data is also required.
Seamless Connectivity
Seamless connectivity should be provided both within the CNR subsystem

and between this system and trunk subsystem. This may require the rebroad
cast of data within the CNR subsystem or carriage by the trunk subsystem
of some data whose source and destination both lie in the CNR subsystem.
In practice, seamless connectivity is a higher priority for data than for voice
43
Table 2.1 (continued)

Multiple Access Techniques
Technique
Description
CSMA
CSMA techniques a re a form of asynchronous TOMA in which

there are n o fixed time slots. A station wishing to transmit
checks first that no other station is c urrently transmitting. If the
channel is free, the station transmits;- if not, it waits a random
period of time and tries again. If both stations inadvertently transmit
simultaneously, both recog nize the collision, cease transmission, and
wait a random period of time before trying a g ain to ac cess the
channel. Th e advantages of CSMA a re that it is relatively easy
for one station to monitor all transmissions on the channel, no
central control station is req uired, and the allocation of channel
capa city is very flexible. For the transmission of data, the
disadvantages of CSMA a re that the best through put that can
be achieved is approximately 50% of the available channel
capacity, data is lost due to one station overtransmitting
another, and there is no fixed upper bound on d elay. In VHF radios,
such avhe S I N C GARS ASI P [5]. where the total available data
rate is a p proximately 16 Kbps, the throughput has been found to
lie between 1 and 3 Kbps.
C O MA
COMA allows a wideband channel to b e shared by a number of

narrowband s o u rces by spreading their transmissions over the
whole band. By using a different spreading sequence for e a c h
transmitter, multiple access i s a c h ieved. T h e advantages of
COMA are that no central control station is required unless
capacity is demand-allocated, close to 1 00% of the available
channel capacity can be used, there is no loss of data due to one
station overtransmitting another, and there is no delay introduced
by the c hannel. The disadvantages of C O MA a re that the near
far effect makes it infeasible to have more than one transmitter
and more than o n e receiver operating simultaneously, the
allocation of c a p a c ity between transmitters is relatively inflexible,
and it is relatively diffic u lt for one station to receive data from
more th an one transmitter.
and, in fact, may be feasible only for data. Typically, the interface to the
trunk subsystem would be part of that subsystem.
Security
Secure communications should be provided at all levels. Secure operation

for voice and data can be provided by external cryptographic equipment;
more recent designs have an integral cryptographic capability.
44
Electronic Warfare for the O i g1tized Battlefield
Ele ctromc Protect/On

LP
1s
to p o i de L P I a n d re!:. istJnce to j a mmi n g. Th i!> might incl ude

<;uch a s terra i n shielding or the me of directional a n ten nas, J n d
including di recHequence spread pecrrum and frequen cy hoppi ng.
req u i red
p.1sive EP,
active E P ,
Capacity
In currenr systems, !:.eparare capaciry is allocated for each CNR ncr. The
minimum capaciry is one voice channel per net, which may be rime-division
mulri plexed, for example, using CSMA berween a number of terminals.
Furure requiremems will not reduce the need fpr voice capaciry for command
and control, but may impose an additional requirement for data, some of
which will replace certain voice traffic.
2.6.2
Range of Communications
Within the constraints of terrain limitations, the frequency and power of

transmission are key factors that control the range over which communica
tions is possible. The main frequency bands used for CNR are HF and
VHF. UHF is used in some applications where short-range, line-of-sight
com munications ar possible.
In the HF band, military communications occur in the frequency range
from 2 to 30 MHz. Within this band the range of com munications IS
frequency-dependent and rwo modes of propagation are possible:
Sky wave. Sky-wave com munications rely on transmitted energy

being refracted by the ionosphere. Communications over very long
ranges are possible. For given transmit and receive locations at a
given time, sky-wave com munications will only be possible within
a l imited part of the HF band. HF sky-wave antennas tend to be
large and not suited to communications on the move.
Surface wave. Surface-wave propagation uses the Earth's surface as
the medium of propagation. Effective surface-wave propagation
requires a conductive surface, such as salt water or wet, fertile ground.
In optimal conditions, the maximum range may exceed 1 00 km.
HF surface-wave propagation is always vertically polarized, allowing
communications on the move with whip antennas.
CNR in the VHF band usually operates berween 30 and 88 MHz.

Operation at higher frequencies is usually prevented by commercial use of
these bands. VHF propagation in this band is terrain limited to radio line-of-
45
sight, which exceeds optical line-of-sight by approximately 1 5%. Increasing

transmission power will not significantly increase the range. Range extension
is better provided by using an elevated antenna or by retransmitting betWeen
nets.
2.6.3
Modern CNR Solutions
In summary, traditional CNR provides a single voice channel. Multiple

access is provided within nets by CSMA, and between nets by FDMA. CNR
is used in the HF (2-30 MHz), VHF (30-88 MHz), and UHF bands. The
modulation scheme for HF CNR is usually single sideband (SSB), with a
channel bandwidth of 3 kHz; for VHF, frequency modulation (FM) is
commonly used with a channel bandwidth of 25 kHz or 50 kHz. However,
this configuration is not sufficient as a basis for the development of a CNR
subsystem required to support future land warfare.
This section describes the two candidate solutions for the provision of
a fully mobile tactical communications system: CNR with a capability to
pass digital data (data-capable CNR), and packet radio.
2.6.3.1
D ata-Capable C N R
Data modems have been available for CNR for more than 20 years. A single
HF CNR channel can carry up to approximately 2,400 bps, while a VHF
or UHF CNR channel can carry 1 6 Kbps with a channel bandwidth of
25 kHz. CSMA is used to control multiple access. Where automatic control is
provided, an operator can prepare a message and have this message transmitted .
asynchronously.
Voice and data can be supported with a single equipment. This is
common for VHF CNR, althoJgh a separate modem is often required for
carrying data on HF CNR. A net can operate in either a data mode or voice
mode. A data net may drop back to voice operation when an operator presses
the pressel switch. Switching or routing of data requires external equipment
in addition to the data-capable CNR.
2.6.3.2
Packet Radio C N R
The major disadvantage of data transfer over CN& is that there is no support
for automatic rebroadcast of data in fragmented nets. This can be overcome,
at the expense of added complexity, by the use of packet radio. Both voice
and data communications can be supported by means of a digital internetted
radio. Examples of military use of this technology include the BOWMAN
[6] HF and VHF radios currently being procured for U.K. land forces and
the U.S. SINCGARS ASIP.
46
Electronic Warfare fo r the Digitized Battlefield
The data mode is the default mode of operation. In this mode, internet
bridges allow automatic delivery of messages addressed outside a net. These
bridges may be located at any point, but could be expected to be located
in headquarters where stations currently exist on two adjacent nets. This is
illustrated in Figure 2 . 1 0.
In the data mode, messages are auto rh atically relayed if a net becomes
fragmented. This process is known as intranet rebroadcast. In reality, internet
rebroadcast may be limited to two or three hops. The routing/multiple access
problems of such a fragmented net have yet to be addressed in detail in new
systems such as the British BOWMAN neft\Vork.
The secure-voice mode has priority over the data mode, and is entered
immediately when an operator depresses the pressel switch. In the voice
mode, operation of nets is identical to that of conventional secure-voice
radio nets. The data mode is resumed immediately when transmission of
voice ceases. Voice operations in fragmented nets are similar to that of
conventional CNR nets.
Advantages of the tactical internet are that data can be passed automati
cally between any two locations on the battlefield, without manual retransmis
sion at net boundaries; the support of external netwo rk devices is not required;
and messages can be routed around failed parts of the network, because the
transmission path is not fixed. Disadvantages of the tactical internet are that,
because of the low data rates available ( 1 -3 Kbps), the network can easily
become congested; and it is probably necessary to limit the number of
Figure 2.10 C N R tactical internet.
47
intranets across which a message is passed to prevent the whole network

from becoming congested in the event of failure of one part of it.
Advantages of the tactical intranet are that the efficient operation of
a fragmented net is possible; rebroadcast is provided with a single radio at
each site; enemy intercept of transmissions is hindered by use of lower power
levels than would be required for direct communication between all stations
on a net; and traffic analysis of a net may be made more difficult, with many
transmissions being rebroadcasts rather than new messages. Disadvantages of
the tactical intranet are that an operator has less control over the transmission
from his or her radio than in traditional hierarchical nets; because of the
low data rates available and the inefficiencies of multiple-access protocols,
the network can easily become congested; and operation with highly
fragmented nets does not appear to be feasible, with intranet rebroadcast
limited in practice to one or two hops.
2.7 Tactical Data Distribution Subsystem

The requirement for providing real-time situational awareness creates two
key difficulties for the CNR subsystem. The first of these difficulties is the
capacity available in the CNR subsystem, which is unlikely to exceed
1 to 3 Kbps on any one net. The capacity required for real-time situational
awareness in a mechanized brigade may, however, exceed 500 Kbps. A foot
mounted infantry brigade will have a much lower data requirement due to
the slower pace at which it can move. The second difficulty is that aggregation
of data at each level of the chain of command tends to cause an increasing
data requirement at the next higher level.
The tactical data distribution subsystem addresses these two difficulties,
providing a high-capacity, homogeneous, wireless, data network across the
brigade area of operations. The tactical data distribution subsystem does not
need to support voice, which is already well supported at high levels by the
tactical trunk subsystem and at low levels by the CNR subsystem. Indeed,
support for voice at low levels would require very high Jata rates in the
tactical data distribution subsystem, possibly iii excess of 1 Mbps for a
brigade-sized force. These rates are very difficult to achieve.
While its main purpose is the efficient carriage of data for real-time
situational awareness, the tactical data distribution subsystem can also be
used to carry other types of data, such as reports and returns.
A repeated TDMA network overcomes the inefficiency of packet radio
by requiring all stations to transmit in allocated time slots. All network
48
timing and operation are controlled by a central station. A number of repeated

TDMA radios are currently in service in the United States, including the
Enhanced Position Locating and Reporting System (EPLRS) radio and
TADIL-J (Link 1 6) [7] . The suitability of repeated TDMA networks is
described here with reference to the properties of the EPLRS radio. The
additional noncommunications services ptovided by the EPLRS system, such
as position locating and reporting, will not be discussed.
The EPLRS radio supports a variety of data communications services,
providing both point-to-point links and an extensive multicast capability,
including all-informed nets. Data rates \lP to 57,600 bps per connection,
known as a needline, are possible. Common use sees one EPLRS user commu
nity per brigade, with a maximum area of approximately 47 X 47 km. Each
EPLRS user community has a maximum practical data capacity of between
300 to 450 Kbps, depending on configuration. This capacity is reduced when
retransmission is required because multiple user communities are operating in
the same area. Capacity is also reduced when the area over which the user
community operates increases, because of the requirement for larger guard
intervals between TDMA slots.
Multiple access is achieved using a combination of FDMA, TDMA,
and COMA. The EPLRS net control station (NCS), which is vehicle
mounted, controls the net, and provides timing for synchronization. All
other EPLRS stations can be either vehicle-mounted or man-packed. Retrans
mission is used to extend the area of the EPLRS net beyond line-of sight.
Frequencies in the range from 420 to 450 MHz are used, with the band
being segmented into eight channels.
Resistance to jamming is provided through direct-sequence spread
spectrum transmission; frequency hopping operation; error detection and
correction; and network management that facilitates the automatic routing
and rerouting of messages in the EPLRS network, using any user unit as a
relay of opportunity. The combination of direct-sequence spread spectrum
and frequency hopping also provides LPI . Security is provided by an embed
ded cryptographic system.
The network management capability also enables EPLRS to automati
cally build the network from scratch with no prior connectivity information
and to automatically adapt to the changing battlefield conditions of terrain
masking, user motion, jammer dynamics, and varying subscriber data com
munication requirements. In addition, the net management design accommo
dates the assignment and deletion of military users to the network.
Continuity o{ perations in EPLRS is maintained by software that
permits data communications to continue along established paths if an NCS
49
is lost. If the loss of a station occurs, the division's NCS or an adjacent

brigade's NCS automatically assumes net control of the affected user commu
nity. Additional continuity of operations can be gained by the placement
of an additional NCS in division rear to assume net control either in planned
displacement or during unplanned sudden loss of any NCS. In dispersed
operations a brigade may need an internal requndant NCS.
2.8 Tactical Airborne Subsystem

An airborne communications platform is required to provide additional
capacity and to extend ranges of the CNR and tactical trunk subsystems
when dictated by the operational scenario. Traditionally, the solutions to
the provision of high-capacity, long-range communications have relied on
the use of satellite-based services. However, subspace platforms (airborne,
rather than spaceborne) offer a viable alternative, with the potential to deliver
a broader range of services more cost-effectively.
The tactical airborne subsystem provides an airborne platform that
carries robust communications packages to support command and control
across wide areas. High-gain antennas coupled with the ability to loiter at
high altitudes for extended periods will enable tactical users equipped with
lightweight omnidirectional antennas and low-power radios to establish long
range communications from mobile platforms. This capability will provide
a significant improvement in communications ranges and will enhance the
ability for commanders to command and control on the move. The tactical
airborne subsystem is required to provide range extension of CNR, tactical
trunk, and tactical data distribution subsystems; additional communications
services, including surrogate satellite communications; and coverage extension
of overlaid communications systems, such as personal communications sys
tems and the theater broadcast system.
As illustrated in Figure 2. 1 1 , the range extension offered by an airborne
communications platform is very significant. In their normal terrestrial
modes, CNR and radio relay are generally terrain-limited, not power-limited.
For example, ground ranges of CNR are limited to 5 to 1 5 km depending on
how high the operator can elevate the antenna. An airborne communications
platform extends those ranges to up to 500 km, which is a dramatic improve
ment. For example, had an airborne communications platform been available
during the Gulf War, true communications-on-the-move could have been
provided to support a fast-moving, wide-ranging envelopment, at a time
when terrestrial networks were stretched to the breaking point [8] . An
50
20 k m (-65,000 ft)
- 500 km
Figure 2.1 1 Footprint of a i rborne c o m m u n i cations platform.
airborne communications platform would provide commanders with com

mand and control on the move over a large operational area.
Further extension in coverage can be provided by cross-linking between
platforms as illustrated in Figure 2. 1 2. However, it should be noted that
cross-linking requires high-gain antennas that have to be accurately pointed
to another airborne platform. This will represent some engineering challenges
for most platforms except those that can be maintained in a geostationary
position, although modern phased-array antennas go some considerable way
to solving th is problem. The inclusion of a cross-linking capability will reduce
the communications payloads on board the platform.
Cross-link
' \
Figure 2.12 In crease in covera g e by cross-linking between airborne pl atforms.
Tactzcal Commumcatzons Systems

2.8.1
51
Additi o n a l Communications Services
In addition to range extension, a number of additional communications

services can be provided from the airborne platform. An airborne platform
presents the opportunity to provide true joint and combined communications
in a simple manner. Figure 2. 1 3 illustrates how the airborne platform can
relay communications and establish a net between joint assets as well as
provide reach-back communications by LEO or GEO satellite.
It may also be possible to mount a surrogate satellite transponder on
board the airborne platform. In-service satellite ground terminals could be
used to communicate to the surrogate transponder rather than to a satellite.
Since the airborne platform is much closer, lower powers (higher data rates)
are possible throughout the AO, without having to be within the satellite
footprint.
It may be possible to mount a cellular PCS base station on the airborne
platform and provide digital mobile telephony coverage within the footprint.
However, commercial PCS base stations tend to be large and heavy, although
there are some moves within the commercial industry to reduce the size and
weight, since there a number of programs in the United States and Europe
that are examining the possibility of airborne PCS base stations. The large
power requirements of a base station provide an additional problem. How-
Figure 2.13 I mproved battle space communrcatrons usmg the a r rborne communrcatrons
platform.
52
ever, even if a base station is not included in the platform payload, the
airborne platform has the potential to support the connection back to a base
station on the ground.
The airborne platform also offers two opportunities with regard to
theater broadcast:
Broadcast relay. One of the difficulties in getting satellite theater

broadcast to tactical units is the difficulty that combat troops have
in deploying reasonably sized satellite antennas. Broadcast relay
would take the satellite theater broadca on the airborne platform
and rebroadcast it into the footprint in the VHF/UHF band. Broad
cast communications can then be provided to tactical users who
can receive broadcasts with small omnidirectional ;'.ntennas and less
expensive receivers.
In-theater broadcast. It is doubtful whether the brigade commander
would allow theater broadcast into the brigade area without modifica
tion by the brigade staff; the most useful product for brigade units
is a broadcast of the brigade/divisional view, rather than a strategic
one. In that case, the airborne platform allows the brigade com
mander to take the satellite broadcast at brigade headquarters, modify
and add information, and then provide an in-theater VHF/UHF
broadcast through the airborne platform. Again, any mobile units
in the footprint can receive high-capacity broadcast with small,
omnidirectional (whip) antennas.
.
The deployment of an airborne communications platform opens up

many other communications uses. For example, should commanders decide
that videoconferencing is required, terrestrial solutions are diffic ult to arrange.
However, an airborne platform provides an ideal vehicle for the delivery of
videoconferencing facilities into the footprint. Also, high-capacity, long
range communications are normally difficult for special forces, who are forced
to operate using HF. An airborne communications platform can extend
high-capacity communications to special-forces patrols, which can be
equipped with small, low-powered receivers with small, omnidirectional
antennas.
In addition to communications uses, the tactical airborne subsystem
may also potentially be used for noncommunications purposes. Just as the
airborne platform provides a1,1 ideal communications base, it also provides
an excellent platform for EW. Ground-based intercept is invariably terrain
limited, and many more ground assets would be required to have the same
53
coverage as an airborne EW platform. The airborne platform could also

provide broad area surveillance of the AO in a range of frequencies, through
its ability to carry a range of optical, infrared, multispectral, and synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) sensors. However, it is not likely that such additional
uses could be incorporated on a communications platform without suffering
some loss in communication ability due to .the incorporation of extra equip
ment, antennas, and so on. Sensors also come with considerable additional
space and weight requirements, as stabilization systems are often several times
heavier than the sensors themselves. Additionally, the operation of a multirole
platform may be difficult to coordinate if the other tasks demanded an
operational profile at odds with its communications tasks. For those reasons,
it is most likely that additional tasks such as EW and remote sensing would
be conducted from separate dedicated platforms, although the same type of
platform could be utilized in each role.
2.9 Potential Targets for Tactical Communications EW

In this chapter we have described the adversary communications systems
that can be targeted by tactical communications EW. More explicitly, m
subsequent chapters we discuss the following types of targets:
CNR, VHF, and HF radio nets;

Terrestrial trunk radio (HF, VHF, and UHF);
SCRA;
Radio links to airborne communications subsystems;
Radio links for tactical data distribution subsystems;
Interfaces between subsystems;
Communications equipment including radio and line.
Overlaid systems such as satellite and PCS are also vulnerable to EW

but would not normally be attacked by tactical assets due to the level of
control required to ensure the coordination of monitoring and jamming
missions on such systems. In general, tactical EW will only be employed to
attack tactical communications systems. Where systems such as satellite and
PCS systems have a broader impact and range than the tactical environment,
EW is normally coordinated and conducted by operational or, more likely,
strategic assets. However, as overlaid systems are deployed more commonly
at the tactical level, it is possible that tactical assets will be targeted against
54
such systems. The following chapters therefore also consider the issues associ
ated with the attack of overlaid systems.
2.1 0 S ummary
This chapter has described the tactical communications systems that are
the target of tactical EW systems. The focus of the chapter has been on
understanding the current structure of tactical communications systems as
the basis for our discussion in subsequent chapte rs of methods of attack by
tactical communications EW systems. The architecture developed illustrates
the interrelationship of systems required to provide the battlefield network
that supports operational concepts such as network-cen tric: warfare. Current
tactical trunk communications, combat net radio, tactical data distribution,
and tactical airborne subsystems have been described in sufficient detail to
allow an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses from an EW point of view.
Chapter 8 discusses the future directions in which tactical communications
systems are being developed.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 now consider the EW functional areas of EP,
ES, and EA as they apply to the tactical communications systems described
here.
Endnotes
[1)
Ryan, M., Battlefield Command Systems, London, U.K.: Brassey's, 2000.
[2]
Ryan, M., and M. Frarer, "An Archirccrural Framework for Modern Tacrical Communi
carions Sysrems," IEEE Milltfll ]' Communications Conference (MILCOM 2000), Los
Angeles, CA, Ocrobcr 23-25, 2000.
[3]
Furrher informarion abour rrunk networks is conrained in:

Hewish, M . , "Tacrical Area Commun icarions Part ) : European Sysrems," Internatwnal
Defense Revrew, May 1 990, pp. 523-526.
Hewish, M., ''Tacrical Area Communicarions Part 2: Non-European Sysrems," !nterna
twnal Defense Review, June 1 990, pp. 675-678.
Ryan, M., Battlefield Command Systems, London, U.K.: Brassey's, 2000.
[4]
Sklar, B., Digital Communicatwns: Fundamentals and Applications, Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prenrice Hall, 200 1 .
[5]
Kagan, M., "Redesigned Communicarion Equipmenr Srrengrhens Firsr-ro-Fighr Opera

rions," Signal, March 1 999, pp . 33-36.
.
[6]
Win, M., "Brirain's BOWMAN: Back ro rhc Begi nning," Milirary Technology, Decem
ber 2000, pp. 64-68.
TacticaL Communications S)'Stems
55
[7]
Further information about JTIDS can be found in:

Toone, J., and S. Titmas, "Introduction to JTIDS," Signal, August 1 987, pp. 55-59.
Stiglitz, M . , "The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System," Microwave journal,
Ocrober 1 987.
"JTIDS/TIES Consolidate Tactical Communications," EW, September/Ocrober 1 977.
M I L-STD-60 1 6, "DoD Interface Standard Tactical Digital Interface Link (TADIL)
J Message Standard," February 1 997.
[8]
McAllister, M., and S. Zabradac, "High-Altitude-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Pick Up Communications Node," Anny Commumcrtor, Spring 1 996.
3
3.1
Introduction
Electronic protection (EP) comprises those actions taken to protect personnel,

facilities, and equipment from ny effects offriendly or adversary employment
of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. In
other words, EP is concerned with minimizing the effect of both friendly
EA and an adversary's EA and ES. While EP is traditionally most concerned
with protecting communications equipment, it is applicable to the protection
of all systems [ 1 ] .
E P is usually divided into passive EP and active EP, as shown i n Figure
3. 1 . Passive EP comprises measures that are not detectable by an adversary,
and is concerned with tactics and procedures for providing electronic protec
tion, including terrain shielding. Active EP, whose measures are detectable
by an adversary, is concerned with providing protection by the use of special
equipment, or special operating modes of equipment.
One important way in which EP differs from the other EW subdivisions
is that it should be practiced by all tactical units, not just by specialist EW
units. Unlike other aspects of EW, EP is directly associated with the tactical
communications system. The techniques discussed in this chapter relate to
the employment of the tactical communications system or to specific features
of the equipment that makes up the tactical communications system.
3.2 Passive E lectronic Protection

Passive EP makes use of tactics and procedures to reduce the exposure of
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum to both friendly and adversary
57
Electronic Warfare for the D i g itized Battlefield
58
Electronic warfare
Passive
Active
Encryption
Siting
LPI/LPD
Shielding
Antijam
EMCON
Alternate means
Directional antennas
Identical equipment
Figure 3.1 EW arc hitecture.
These tactics and procedures include the use whenever possible of

identical equipment, shielding, emission control (EMCON), the use of
directional antennas, frequency management, the provision and use of alter
nate means, and siting of communications.
EA.
3.2.1
Identical Equ ipment
Variations in the characteristics of transmissions from different types of

equipment can be used to infer a variety of information about a force. In
many armies, for example, older CNR equipment used by reserve forces uses
a channel bandwidth of 50 kHz; newer CNR, used by higher-readiness
troops, has a channel bandwidth of 2 5 kHz. The type of unit can therefore
be inferred from the channel bandwidth being used by integral radio systems.
Similarly, coalition forces can often be separated by their equipment. The
use of identical equipment removes this source of information.
3.2.2
Sh ielding
All electronic equipment radiates electromagnetic energy and is potentially

vulnerable to the effects of electromagnetic energy radiated by other electronic
equipment. Shielding is a means of reducing both the amount of energy
radiated and the vulnerability to received radiation, and offers protection
against both adversary ES and EA.
59
The radiation generated by an electronic system is a potential target

for adversary ES. While the potential range over which this ES is likely to
be effective is small (perhaps hundreds of meters at most), ensuring that
adversary ES is excluded from such an area may be difficult, especially in
strategic systems and logistics installations. The use of shielding to reduce
vulnerability to adversary ES is known as TEMPEST [2] .
The use of shielding to protect systems from external radiation counters
the potential use of neutralization as a form of EA. The major threat histori
cally has been the EMP resulting from a detonation of a nuclear weapon.
In the future, such high levels of radiation may be able to be generated by
small, nonnuclear devices. This issue is explored further in Chapter 7.
3.2.3
Emission Control
An emission control plan may be used to reduce or alter the electronic

signature of a force. This may be achieved by reducing the level of particular
types of transmissions or the insertion of dummy traffic. Two commonly
used modes of emission control are radio silence, in which all communications
transmitters are deactivated, and electronic silence, in which all electronic
emitters, including radars, are deactivated.
When planning emission control, it must be recognized that the imposi
tion of radio and electronic silences may place operational constraints on
the force, which may in turn increase rather than decrease its vulnerability.
3.2.4
Directional Antennas
Directional antennas are commonly used in tactical communications systems

in which there are a single transmitter and a single receiver. An example of
such a system is a radio relay link. The use of a directional antenna for
transmission also maximizes the amount of power radiated toward the
intended receiver and reduces the amount of power radiated in other direc
tions. With careful siting, this can be used to minimize the power received
at potential sites for an adversary's ES. The use of a directional antenna for
transmission maximizes the received power from the intended transmitter,
and reduces the amount of power received from other directions. This
directionality can be used to reduce the effectiveness of an off-axis jammer.
For systems such as CNR, where there is more than one receiver,
omnidirectional antennas are usually used. The use of directional antennas
is therefore limited. However, some of the benefits of a directional antenna
can be obtained by using an antenna with a steerable null that can be directed
Ele ctronic Wa rfare for the Digit i zed B attlefield
60
rowards an adversary's ES or EA site. However, the practical use of null

steering antennas is restricted in highly mobile nets where the locations of
friendly units change rapidly.
3.2.5
Frequency management is required as part of communications planning ro

allocate the available capacity of the electromagnetic spectrum to users to
avoid cochannel interference. This planning takes into account the relative
locations of units, the likely range of communications (which is frequency
dependent), and interference that may be caused by harmonics and intermod
ulation products between systems located close together. Another important
aspect of frequency management that can assist EP measures is the allocation
of alternate frequencies that can be used in the event of interference or
pmmmg.
3.2.6
Alternate Means
EP can be provided by the use of a variety of alternate communications

means, which may be used either to overcome interfering EA or to reduce
the susceptibility to ES. Some alternate means, such as line and messenger,
do not involve radio. They are therefore particularly useful during periods
of radio silence, but tend to limit mobility. Others may provide a different
type of radio channel, such as using a trunk circuit rather than a CNR
channel.
3.2.7
Siting
Planning for the siting of communications systems takes into account propa
gation of radio waves between chosen sites. This planning should also seek
to minimize an adversary's potential use of EA and ES.
One means of doing this is to use terrain shielding (or terrain screening) ,
as illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In Figure 3.2, where transmitters are
located on the tops of hills, reception is possible at a potential site for an
adversary's ES or EA assets. However, by moving the transmitters down
from the tops of the hills as illustrated in Figure 3.3, communication is
maintained while denying coverage at the adversary's location .
Terrain shielding is most effective at VHF and higher frequencies
where most tactical CNR radios operate. At these frequencies, propagation
is essentially line-of-sight, and therefore tends to be terrain-limited rather
than power-limited.
61
Transmitter
Figure 3.2 I neffective terrain shielding.
Transmitter
Recei
Figure 3.3 Effective terrain shielding.
Effective siting of radio equipment for EP requires a knowledge of the

effective range of communications. This requires carrying out radio path
planning not only for the communications network being planned, but also
for potential sites for an adversary's ES and EA assets.
Some protection can also be gained from the careful use of shields in
the area of the communications system, such as metal buildings, to provide
screening. It is usually difficult, however, to predict the effectiveness of such
procedures in advance. Although their effectiveness against an adversary's
jamming may be measurable while the jammer is inactive, it is difficult to
estimate their effectiveness against ES.
3.3 Active Electronic Protection

Active EP uses special equipment or operating modes of equipment to
provide protection. The specific aims of protection provided by active EP are
communications security, low probability of intercept (LPI), and resistance to
jamming. Masking, which is the jamming of an adversary's ES receivers in
such a way as to prevent their inhibiting friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum, is sometimes also classified as EP. In this book, however, masking
is covered under EA in Chapter 5 .
A wide variety o f techniques are used to provide active EP, including
encryption, modulation, error-protection coding, burst transmissions, nar-
62
rowband exciSion, diversity, free-channel search, and appropriate use of

retransmiSSion.
Encryption is used to modify transmitted data in such a way
that it can only be decoded by the intended recipient. Encryption also
protects against the insertion of dummy traffic by an adversary; some types
of encryption also protect against imitative deception. Encryption is typically
possible only in digital systems.
Encryption
Some forms of modulation provide higher levels of protec

tion than others. Spread-spectrum communications involves the spreading of
a transmission across a wide band of frequencies. This can provide both LPI
and a high-level of resistance to jamming. Morse code can often be used
successfully on communications channels where voice and data communica
tions are not possible. The primary disadvantages are the very low data rates
obtained and the large cost of training operators and maintaining their skills.
Modulation Type
The addition of error protecting codes can increase

the amount of interference that can be tolerated for a given quality of service.
An adversary's EA and ES can be hindered by reducing

the length of transmissions. This may be achieved, for example, by using
data rather than voice. If the length of a burst is sufficiently short, an
adversary's intercept, DF, or responsive jammer may not be effective.
Burst Transmissions
Narrowband Excision The impact of an interfering signal that has a much

smaller bandwidth than a transmission can be minimized by excising the
part of the spectrum containing the interfering signal before decoding. In
digital communications systems, this technique is usually useful only when
applied in conjunction with error-protection coding.
Protection against jamming and other forms of interference can

be gained by transmitting data over more than one channel between transmit
ter and receiver. Diversity can be achieved in space, time, and frequency.
Diversity
Conventional CNR uses a single channel for each

net, with operators required to change frequency manually to overcome
interference or jam ing. Free-channel search allocates a group of frequencies
to a group of nets. Radios on the net automatically identify a free channel
when they wish to transmit, and then signal this choice of channel to other
stations on the same net. Each transmission on the net may therefore use a
different frequency. The potential drawback of such a system is that a jammer
Free-Channel Search
63
may be able to keep stations locked to a particular frequency by making it

appear that this frequency is still in use by the net.
Retransmission is often required for line
of-sight communications. A radio-relay network, for example, is built from
point-to-point links between nodes. In CNR, retransmission is often required
to overcome the effects of terrain. Care in siting, use of manual retransmission,
and action on jamming are required to limit the vulnerability of retransmitted
links to jamming. Rebroadcast stations are typically sited on the tops of
terrain features, where they are most vulnerable to ES and EA. Siting in less
exposed locations may reduce this vulnerability, while still permitting effective
rebroadcast. An automatic rebroadcast will transmit not only voice and data,
but also jamming signals. Manual control may be used so that jamming signals
are not retransmitted. A rebroadcast station may continue to rebroadcast on
a frequency even when other stations on the net have moved to an alternate
frequency due to jamming. This increases an adversary's difficulty in evaluat
ing the effectiveness of jamming.
Appropriate Use of Retransmission
3.3.1
Encryption
Encryption protects digital data by transforming the original data (plaintext)

into a different form (ciphertext) that can be revealed without disclosing the
original data [3] . The basic structure of a secure communications system
employing encryption is shown in Figure 3.4. Encoding (known as
encryption) and decoding (decryption) involve a security-related transforma
tion. Secret information, which is distributed by a trusted third party, is
usually used to modify this transformation so that the security of the system
can be maintained even if the encoding and decoding algorithms are widely
known. This secret information is often referred to as a shared secret or key.
Message
--
Message
Transmission
--
channel
Secret
information
"'
Secret
information
Truste<l
third
party
Figure 3.4 Generic structure of a secure communications system.
64
Electro nic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield
There are three main forms of encryption: bulk encryption, message

encryption, and message-content encryption.
Bulk Enoyption. Here encryption of all data on a link on which

transmission is continuous prevents both unauthorized reception
and traffic analysis. This form of encryption is used by most trunk
communications systems, and is sometimes referred to as trunk
enoyption. In addition to protecting against interception, this form
of encryption protects against deception.
Message Enoyption. Individual messages on a link are encrypted,
inc! uding both message header and contents. This form of encryption
is used in most CNR systems. While the contents of the messages
are protected from interception, message encryption does not prevent
traffic analysis. If synchronization is achieved through a preamble,
no protection is provided against deception by delayed replay of
previous traffic.
Message-Content EnC1yption. The bodies of messages are encrypted,
leaving message headers in plain text. This form of encryption is
often used in packet-switching systems. It has the advantage that
intermediate switches and routers are not required to have attached
cipher equipment. The disadvantage, however, is that detailed infor
mation that can be used in traffic analysis is provided in plain text.
If synchronization is achieved through a preamble, this type of
encryption does not protect against deception by delayed replay of
previous traffic.
In general, the aim of an encryption system is to generate ciphertext

that appears to be a random bit stream. In an ideal system, this randomness
includes:
No structure observable in ciphertext. Any structure of the plaintext,

such as regular repeating patterns or different probabilities of occur
rence for different symbols, should be removed in the encryption
process to produce a ciphertext that has no regular structure.
Long lcey. The maximum amount of work required for cryptanalysis
is to decrypt the ciphertext using every possible key. The use of
long keys maximizes the difficulty of this task. For a key that is n
bits long, there are 2n possible keys.
65
Strong avalanche effect. There should be large differences in ciphertext

for similar keys with the same plaintext and similar plaintexts with
the same key. Without the avalanche effect, similar plaintext can
lead to similar ciphertext, greatly simplifying cryptanalysis.
Diffusion. Every bit of plaintext should affect a large number of bits
in the ciphertext.
In communications systems that introduce errors into transmitted bit

streams, both the avalanche effect and diffusion can lead to a single bit error
in the ciphertext that causes multiple bit errors in the deciphered plaintext.
This phenomenon is known as error extension. For this reason, many practical
encryption systems do not exhibit either a strong avalanche effect or diffusion.
In message encryption and message-content encryption, the encryption
engine is restarted in a known state at regular intervals. In CNR, for example,
where each transmission is independently encrypted, the decryption engine
must know the initial state of the encryption engine at the start of each
transmission. If this known state is always the same, the task of the cryptanalyst
is greatly simplified. Some additional information that is known to both
encryption and decryption systems is normally used to allow the encryption
engine to bring each new message in a different state. Synchronization
between transmitter and receiver can be achieved by transmitting a preamble
containing the additional synchronization information at the beginning of
each transmission, and possibly transmitting further synchronization infor
mation at regular intervals during the transmission; or deriving the additional
synchronization information from an accurate time reference known to both
transmitter and receiver.
3.3. 1 . 1
Stream and B l o c k Ciphers
A stream cipher operates on each bit of the transmitted message separately.

This is usually implemented by generating a pseudorandom keystream. Each
bit of the transmitted stream is the exclusive-or (XOR) of the corresponding
bits of the keystream and the message, as shown in Figure 3.5.
A block cipher operates on blocks of the message. It requires buffering
of a block of data, followed by processing and transmission of that block
on the output channel.
Stream ciphers are easy to implement on synchronous communications
channels because they produce one output bit for every input bit, produce
only one bit-period of delay, and do not require additional buffering. Their
disadvantage is that they cannot exhibit either diffusion or the avalanche
effect with respect to the message.
Electro n i c Warfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld
66
Keystream
generator
Keystream
generator
Tra nsm issi on

ch an nel
Figure 3.5 Structure of a stream-cipher syste m.
Many military encryption systems are used to encrypt data on synchro

nous communications channels. Such systems usually employ stream ciphers.
For data transmission, this prevents the transmission of synchronization
information, except as a preamble at the beginning of a transmission. Some
voice systems steal bits during the transmission to transmit synchronization
information, reducing their susceptibility to loss of synchronization when
jammed. Off-line systems, such as one-time letter pads, are usually block
ciphers.
3.3. 1 .2
P u b l i c - Key Versus Sec ret-Key E n c ryption
In traditional cryptosystems, the same key is used for encryption and

decryption. This type of system is referred to as a secret-lu:y encryption system,
and is illustrated in Figure 3 . 6 . The key that modifies the operation of the
encryption and decryption engines is the shared secret.
Secret-key encryption can only provide limited security services. It
can provide confidentiality (i.e. , ensuring that messages are not disclosed to
unauthorized parries) . I t is difficult, however, to guarantee the integrity of
a message, because any parry capable of decrypting a message is also capable
of changing the message and reencrypting this corrupted version.
The solution to this problem is to separate the encryption and
decryption keys, so that one can be made public without compromising the
security of the other. This form of asymmetric encryption is known as public-
Key
Key
Ciphertext
Pia i n text
message
.I Encrypt I
I
I
Transmission
channel
J Decrypt I
I
I
Figure 3.6 Structure of a sec ret-key sec ure communi cations system.
Plai ntext
m e ssage
67
key encryption. Public-key encryption makes possible a range of additional

security services, including integrity and authentication.
The technical basis of public-key encryption is in the differences in
computational complexity for particular inverse mathematical operations.
Multiplication, for example, is much less complex than factorization. Public
key encryption systems make use of the simpler operation to generate the
keys. Any attack on the security of the system must be based on the more
complex, inverse operation. It is therefore possible to create a system in
which it is easy to generate a matched pair of encryption and decryption
keys, but in which it also is very difficult to obtain one of these keys from
the other.
The computational operations required for public-key encryption and
decryption typically include multiplication and exponentiation. These opera
tions tend to be best implemented using general-purpose computation
engines, such as those found at the heart of a computer. Most secret-key
systems utilize only basic logic operations (AND, OR, and XOR) and a
small number of additions. These operations can be efficiently implemented
in fast, special-purpose hardware. Because of this difference in the types
of operations required, public-key encryption is much more expensive to
implement, especially for high-speed communications.
Hybrid systems use secret-key encryption to transfer data, with the
keys for the secret-key encryption being transferred using public-key
encryption. Such systems have the advantage that they provide only small
amounts of public-key ciphertext for cryptanalysis and favor a regular chang
ing of the secret keys used to encrypt the data to be transferred.
Advantages of secret-key encryption over public-key encryption are
simplicity of implementation and low computational complexity. The pri
mary advantage of public-key encryption over secret-key encryption is the
variety of security services that can be offered.
A number of secret-key encryption systems are in common use. The
Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been established by the U.S. National
Institute of Standards for the secure transmission of commercial data. It uses
a 56-bit key to encrypt blocks of 64 bits of data. The short length of the
key is a serious wealmess, leading to the use of the so-called triple-DES,
which provides a key length of 1 1 2 bits with backward compatibility with
DES if the first and second 56-bit halves of the key are the same. The
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) developed at the Swiss Fed
eral Institute ofTechnology is also based on 64-bit blocks, but uses a 128-bit
key. Skipjack [4] is a block cipher using a 64-bit block size with an 80-bit
key, designed by the U.S. National Security Agency. This algorithm was
68
Electronic Warfare for th e Di gitized Battlefield
initially classified, but has since been released publicly. The basic GSM A5
[5] is a stream encryption system that employs a 64-bit key. Because the
keystream generator is restarted every 228 bits, however, it is effectively used
as a block cipher.
The most commonly used public-key encryption systems are the Rivest
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm [6] , and the Key Exchange Algorithm
(KEA) [7] .
3.3. 1 .3
P u b l i c-Key Authorities a n d C e rtific a te Authorities
The establishment of secure communications requires a trusted intermediary

to enable the secure distribution of public keys. Given the existence of this
third party whose public key is already known to both parties-a public
key authority (PKA)-two parties A and B can exchange public keys and
authenticate one another. For A to receive B's public key (Figure 3.7) , A
sends a plaintext message, which contains a time-stamp and a request for
B' s public key, to the PKA. The PKA sends A an encrypted message containing
B's public key; A's original request, so that A can verify that it has not been
altered during transmission from A to the PKA; and the original time stamp,
so that A can verify that the message was generated in response to this
particular request.
A uses the PKA' s public key to decrypt this message. The placement
of both A's original request and the original time stamp in the message
returned by the PKA is required to prevent spoofing attacks on the key
exchange.
The potential drawback of PKA is that it may become a bottleneck,
especially if a large number of parties wish to establish secure communications.
This problem is overcome by the use of a certificate authority (CA) . The CA
PKA
8
Figure 3.7 Use of the PKA.
69
creates certificates, which are encrypted messages containing the user's public
key, the user's identification, and a time stamp.
The user then distributes this certificate with the time stamp. The
authenticity of the certificate can be assured if the CA's public key is known.
Furthermore, if the CA has suitable controls for the issuing of certificates,
a certificate can authenticate the holder of the certificate.
3.3.1 .4
Level of Security
The process of attempting to obtain plaintext without access to the shared

secret is known as c1yptanalysis. The computational resources required to
attack a particular encryption algorithm define the difficulty of cryptanalysis
and therefore the security of the algorithm.
An unconditionally secure encryption system is one for which it is
impossible to obtain plaintext from ciphertext without possessing the shared
secret. The only such system known is the one-time pad, which works by
defining a sequence of randomly chosen transformations that are applied to
each symbol of the plaintext to produce ciphertext. If a particular one
time pad is only used once, and the transformations are perfectly random,
cryptanalysis is impossible.
However, most practical systems are not based on the one-time pad,
and are therefore not unconditionally secure. While it is possible to apply
cryptanalysis successfully to such systems, it may not be feasible. An
encryption system may be computationally secure if either the cost of breaking
the cipher exceeds the value of the encrypted information, or the time
required to break the cipher exceeds the useful lifetime of the information.
Figure 3.8 shows how the time required for exhaustive cryptanalysis
varies with the key length. The times shown take into account both processing
time and Moore's law, which states that the computational power of comput
ers increases by approximately a factor of 1 0 every five years. It can be seen
that short keys provide only low levels of security. Longer keys, such as
1 28-bit and 256-bit keys, provide much higher levels of security, exceeding
1 00 years even if the initial computational power available is 1 0 ! 8 operations
per second. This far exceeds the capability of any current computer.
Some encryption systems have systematic weaknesses that allow crypt
analysis without having to try all possible keys (i.e., the structure of the
algorithm can be exploited by the cryptanalyst) . These systematic weaknesses
can greatly reduce the required effort for cryptanalysis and hence the security
provided.
Systematic weaknesses can be the result of technical shortcomings in
the design of the encryption algorithm, which is the case for the GSM
Electron i c Warfare fo r the D i g itized Battlefield
70
-------
1 03 .--------.---------.------ -.-- - - i- - - - - - -
- - - - - -
..:><:
'Q)
D..
Q)
. .. .. . .. .. .. ..
........
10
....
....
....
2::
Q)
N
>
cti
.8
Q)
E
i=
.. - - -
2
1 0 -------4---+--
. .. . ..
....
....
....
'
.... ....
101
10
,,
...
,'
10' 6
10
1 09
..
"'
'
,,
'
'
'
'
'
,,
- - - - - - -
- 40-bit key
..
''
,,
'
'
'
'
'
--- 56-bit key

..
'
'
'
64-bit key
--
1 28-bit key
256-bit key
'
12
10
10
15
10
16
Initial processing speed (operations per second)

Figure 3.8 Time required fo r exh austive c ryptanalysis, taking into a c c ount M oore's law.
encryption system, known as A5. These weaknesses are discussed further in

Section 3.4.7. Systematic weaknesses can also be introduced by procedures.
The World War II German Enigma system had two such weaknesses that
were crucial in breaking it: The first group of three letters in the plaintext
was used to key the deciphering Enigma machine. These three letters were
encrypted twice, and the choice of these letters was often predictable. In
addition, it was common for some stations to transmit messages beginning
with phrases such as "Heil Hitler," providing correspondill_g plaintext and
ciphertext for the cryptanalyst.
3.3.2
Spread-Spectrum Commun ications
Spread-spectrum techniques are used in communications to provide multiple

access, resistance to jamming and other interference, and LPI [8]. In military
communications systems, resistance to jamming and LPI (i.e . , EP) and
multiple access are the major motivations for the use of spread-spectrum
techniques. In commercial systems, multiple access and resistance to acciden
tal interference are the major benefits. These features are all achieved by
expanding the bandwidth of a signal so that it is transmitted across a number
of channels.
There are several types of spread-spectrum techniques. The major types
are direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) , frequency hopping (FH), and
71
chirping. Chirping is used to provide EP for radar systems, but is not com
monly used in communications systems, and is not considered further here.
3.3.2.1
Di rect-Sequence S p read Spectrum ( D SSS)
Regardless of the type of modulation used, the bandwidth occupied by a

digital signal is proportional to its symbol rate. Figure 3.9 illustrates this
point for a pseudorandom bit-stream modulated with FSK. "When the bit
period is halved (i.e., the bit rate is doubled), the bandwidth of the signal
around each of the tones is doubled.
A bit-stream can therefore be spread over a larger frequency band by
increasing its rate. One way that this can be achieved is to modulate the
stream with a pseudonoise (PN) stream at a higher rate. For clarity, the term
"bit" is used here to refer to the data unit of the original stream, and the
term "chip" is used to refer to the individual data units of the PN stream.
The number of chips per bit is often referred to as the spreading gain or
processing gain. The spreading gain is also the factor by which the channel
bandwidth is increased.
In a simple example, each 0-valued bit of the stream 0 1 00 1 1 1 0 can
be replaced with the three chips 0 1 0 and each 1 with 1 0 1 , giving a new
chip stream 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 . This stream has three times as
many chips as the original stream has bits.
Decoding the DSSS stream requires replacing each group of three chips
with either a 0 or a 1 to return the original bit stream. For security, a military
DSSS system would usually modify the spreading sequence used from one
bit to the next to avoid transmitting a short, easily decoded, repeating pattern.
Bit period = T
Bit period =
T
f,
Figure 3.9 Changing ban dwidth with symbol time.
Electronic Wa rfare for the D i git i zed B attlefield
72
Where errors have been introduced into the chip stream, a voting
procedure that maps each group of three chips to the closest-valued bit is
used.
000
001
010
01 1
1 00
101
110
111
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
This process can also be illustrated directly in terms of the bandwidth

of the signal. The transmitted spectrum is spread as shown in Figure 3. 1 0
b y modulating the baseband signal with the digital code sequence produced
by the PN code generator. The DSSS receiver uses the same PN sequence
to convert the wideband spread signal back to its original form.
DSSS can be implemented in two ways. In wideband spread spectrum,
a transmission with a fixed information rate is spread over a number of
channels, resulting in an increase in the data rate. In in-band spread spectrum,
a single channel is used at a fixed data rate, resulting in a decrease in
information rate. This form of spread spectrum permits only very small data
rates to be transmitted.
In order to carry out the despreading operation, a DSSS receiver must
know the spreading sequence that has been used to spread the original bitc
u;
c
Q)
"0
Signal
t5
Q)
0..
(f)
Original signal
c
u;
c
Q)
"0
1-r
Spreading
c
u;
c
Q)
"0
t5
Q)
0..
(f)
Signal
Transmitted signal
Code
Signal
t5
Q)
0..
(f)
Received signal
Demodulated signal
Figure 3.10 DSSS.
Despreading
73
stream before transmission. The receiver must also synchronize itself with
the transmitter. This may involve knowing (at least implicitly) how many
bits have been sent in the current transmission and the location in the
PN sequence at which the transmission started. This can be achieved by
transmitting a synchronization preamble at the beginning of each transmis
sion, and possibly inserting resynchronization information at regular intervals
during the transmission; or using an accurate time reference known to both
transmitter and receiver.
Interference from other DSSS signals is covered in this section. Interfer
ence caused by single DSSS transmission to other types of signals will have
similar effects to a small increase in channel noise, leading to a reduction
in the signal-to-noise ratio at the input to the receiver. Where multiple DSSS
transmissions take place in a particular part of the spectrum, this noise level
will rise significantly and may preclude operation of other systems in the
frequency band used.
Resistance to Jamming and Interference
When a spot jammer, or single-channel transmitter, introduces the interfer

ence spike shown in Figure 3. 1 1 , the receiver despreads the signal but, by
the same process, spreads the interference. This means that the receiver can
remove most of the interfering signal in the demodulation process. As a
.2;
u;
c
(!)
"0
t5
(!)
o._
(/)
.2;
u;
c
(!)
"0
t5
Spreading
Original signal
Signal
Interference
.2;
u;
c
(!)
"0
Signal
-r
Transmitted signal
Code
t5
g_ Interference
(/)
Received signal
Despreading
Demodulated signal
Figure 3.11 D SSS in the presence of na rrowband interfe rence.
74
result, a spot jammer has significantly less impact on the spread signal than
on a conventional signal. Additionally, the DSSS signal can occupy the
same bandwidth as a number of single channel radios without significant
interference.
Figure 3 . 1 2 shows that spread-spectrum transmission also provides
protection against wideband interference, such as that caused by a barrage
jammer or by other spread-spectrum transmissions that use different spread
ing sequences. Again, any signal not originally spread by the transmitter will
not be despread at the receiver, but will be spread to reduce its impact on
the wanted signal.
The observations in Figure 3. 1 1 and Figure 3. 1 2 give rise to the concept
of spreading gain. A signal with original bandwidth fo that is spread using
DSSS to a bandwidth of Is is said to have a spreading gain gs:
The spreading gain is a measure of the increased tolerance of a spread

spectrum signal to interference compared to a conventional signal. A signal
spread using the DSSS transmission will provide the same bit error rate as
i?:'
u;
c
Signal
i?:'
u;
c
<1>
"0
<1>
"0
t5
<1>
o_
Cl)
Original signal
i?:'
u;
t5
Spreading
Signal
-r
Interference
Transmitted signal
Code
c
<1>
"0
t5
U)
Interference
Received signal
Despreading
Demodulated signal
Figure 3.12 DSSS in the presence of broa d b a n d interfe rence.
75
a conventional signal with the in-band interference power higher by a factor

of g5
For a jammer, this means that where DSSS is used to protect a single
signal, a jammer must deliver gs times as much in-band power to the receiver
as would be required to achieve the same effect on a conventional transmis
sion. As the number of DSSS transmitters sharing a part of the spectrum
rises, the total jamming power required to achieve a particular effect on each
of the DSSS transmissions individually does not rise. As the number of
transmitters rises to g5 , the amount of jamming power required to achieve
an effect is the same as would be required if the same signals had been
multiplexed using FDMA. The gain from the use ofDSSS is that multiplexing
using FDMA provides the jammer with the option of jamming a subset of
the signals and of concentrating limited jamming power on these signals;
the use of DSSS aims to reduce the jammer's flexibility by offering only the
options of jamming all of the transmissions or none.
DSSS may also be combined with other EP techniques, including PH;
the use of error-correcting codes to reduce the impact of residual errors after
despreading; and the use of narrowband excision to remove narrowband
interfering signals such as those that would be introduced by spot jamming
before despreading, leading to an improved signal-to-noise ratio in the
receiver.
If a DSSS system uses a preamble to provide synchronization, this
preamble may be more susceptible to jamming than other parts of the
transmission. If the preamble is successfully jammed, none of the rest of the
transmission will be successful. One means of avoiding this vulnerability is
to base synchronization on a common, accurate time reference.
Provision of Multiple Access
DSSS can be used to provide multiple access in a radio channel by allocating

a different spreading sequence to each transmitter. This system of code division
multiple access (CDMA) is commonly used in military communications sys
tems as well as in commercial systems such as cellular mobile systems and
satellite communications.
Expanding on the simple example used above, three channels may be
allocated the (orthogonal) spreading sequences:
Transmitter 1 : 0
Transmitter 2: 0
Transmitter 3: 0
--7
--7
--7
001 , 1
01 1 , 1
111, 1
--7
--7
--7
110
1 00
000
76
Electro nic Warfare for the Digitized Battl efield
These spreading sequences can then be used to convert each of the

following four bit streams into a chip stream:
Transmitter 1: 001 1 -7 001 001 1 10 1 1 0
Transmitter 2: 1 0 1 0 -7 1 0001 1 1 0001 1
Transmitter 3: 1 1 0 1 -7 0000001 1 1 000
If these three sequences are transmitted onto the same channel at the
same power, and the three transmissions arrive synchronized at the receiver,
the received chip stream is found to be 00000 1 1 1 00 1 0 by selecting the value
of a chip as 0 if two or more of the individual channel chips are 0 and 1
otherwise. In practical systems, this voting process occurs when the three
modulated signals are combined in the receiver's antenna. Even though the
chip timing of the transmissions is synchronized, the carriers of these modu
lated signals may not be synchronized, causing the received power level to
be lowered by destructive interference between the received signals.
The decoding of one channel can be carried out by taking the XOR
of the received chip stream with the chip sequence associated with the value
0 for that channel, and applying the same voting procedure as described
previously.
For the example above:
Rec eiver 1 : 000001 1 1 00 1 0 -7 0010001 1 001 1 -7 001 1
Receiver 2: 00000 1 1 1 00 1 0 -7 01 1 01 0 1 0 1 001 -7 1 0 1 0
Receiver 3: 00000 1 1 1 00 1 0 -7 1 1 1 1 1 0001 1 01 -7 1 10 1
In this example, a spreading factor of three has allowed three channels

to be multiplexed. The maximum number of bit streams that can be multi
plexed onto a single channel, error-free, is equal to the spreading factor.
In many practical situations, the transmissions do not arrive at the
receiver synchronized at the chip level. In this case when one channel is to
be decoded, the combination of the other interfering signals behaves like
noise. The performance obtained depends on the spreading gain and the
number of channels being multiplexed; in this case, the high levels of error
protection are usually used to reduce the error rate of the output bit stream.
Where DSSS is used to provide multiple access for a number of transmit
ters all operating at the same data rate, the best performance is obtained
when the received power from all DSSS transmitters is equal, and the
performance is significantly degraded when this cannot be achieved. In the
previous example, if one stream were operating at a power significantly higher
77
than the other two, it would have a greater weight in determining the value
of each chip on the channel.
The proportion of the total channel capacity allocated to a stream can
be controlled by adjusting its spreading factor and transmit power.
Where OSSS is used as a multiple access technique, a jammer still
needs to deliver g5 times as much power to a receiver as would be required
for a conventional signal. However, g5 is also the maximum number of
signals that can be orthogonally multiplexed. When COMA is used to full
capacity, the difficulty of jamming all these signals is the same as jamming
the same set of signals using conventional modulation. The difference is that
the jammer does not have the option of concentrating power into one (high
priority) signal; it is forced to jam all signals or none. This effectively prevents
a jammer from obtaining the benefits of spot jamming.
Impact of Overloading
Unlike FOMA and TDMA, COMA allows (at least theoretically) over
allocation of channel capacity. COMA can support an essentially arbitrary
number of streams, so long as each stream is allocated a different spreading
sequence. There is, however, a strict limit on the number of streams that
can be carried without mutual interference. The spreading gain g5 , which
is equal to the maximum number of orthogonal PN sequences, provides an
upper bound on this number of streams. In the absence of external interfer
ence or jamming, this limit is equal to g5 In the presence of external
interference, the number of streams that can be carried without error is less
than g5
Spectrum management for DSSS transmissions involves managing both fre

quencies and spreading sequences. Interfering signals in a OSSS system have
a similar impact to an increase in channel noise. This means that when the
system approaches its capacity, the quality is gracefully degraded. Frequency
management in OSSS systems usually takes advantage of this graceful degra
dation, implementing statistical rather than deterministic separation between
signals. This has the potential to greatly simplif)' the frequency management
process, minimizing the need for procedures such as the analysis of harmonics
and intermodulation products.
Near-Far Effect
A requirement for efficient implementation of COMA (i.e., rhc usc of DSSS

as a multiple access technique) is that each rransmirrer adjusts irs rransm irrcd
78
Electronic Warfare for the D igitized Battlefield
power so that all receivers receive the same power from each transmitter.
This requirement for power balancing has two key implications. First, such
power balancing is not possible where there are multiple transmitters and
multiple receivers. This makes CDMA unsuitable as a multiple access tech
nique for net-oriented communications, such as CNR. This effect is known
as the near-far effect. Second, successful implementation requires continuous
monitoring of received power levels by receivers. The measured levels are
sent to transmitters on a signaling channel.
Power balancing is used in CMDA cellular telephone systems to over
come the near-far effect. This is only possible because all communications
are either to or from a base station; there is no direct mobile-mobile communi
cations.
The power balancing problem is illustrated in Figure 3 . 1 3 . If stations
1 and 3 set their transmit power so that same power is received at station
2 , then station 1 cannot adjust its power to achieve the same received power
at station 3 as station 2. The only solutions to this problem are to accept
a loss in efficiency or to structure the system so that all CDMA operates
with a single transmitter or a single receiver. This can be achieved in systems
that require all communications to pass through a base station, such as in
mobile telephone networks. However, it cannot be achieved satisfactorily in
CNR nets.
Protection Against ES
As shown above, the use of DSSS spreads the power of a transmitted signal
over a large band. This spreading increases the difficulty of detecting the
signal. Typically, a DSSS signal cannot be detected by a narrowband search
receiver. Detection by a wideband search receiver can sometimes be achieved
by measurement of power levels across a wide band of frequencies.
I
Figure 3.13 The power-balancing pro b l e m to overcome the nea r-far effe ct.
79
A DSSS transmitter provides two types of protection against DF. First,
a DSSS signal must be detected before direction-finding techniques can be

applied. Second, a DSSS signal must be separated from other in-band interfer
ing signals (including both DSSS and conventional signals) before DF is
possible. DF techniques able to operate on multiple cochannel signals, such
as Doppler DF, may be capable of providing this separation internally. For
widely spaced transmitters, the removal of these interfering signals may be
achieved by the use of directional antennas. For conventional interfering
signals, the use of narrowband excision may also be an option.
Signal interception is hindered both by the difficulty of detection and
by the fact that received chips need to be despread before decoding. This
can only be achieved if the spreading PN sequence is known or can be
inferred from the received data. Military systems are usually designed with
very long PN sequences to maximize the difficulty of intercept. Commercial
systems, however, tend to use shorter spreading sequences, which may be
known in advance or easily inferable from the received signal.
In conventional half-duplex communications systems, a user commu
nity (or net) consists of those stations that share a particular channel. When
DSSS is introduced, transmissions on a net are no longer confined to a
single frequency, removing this means of identifying user communities.
3.3.2.2
Freq u e n cy Hopping
Frequency hopping (FH) is a form of spread-spectrum communications

where the transmitter periodically changes the frequency of transmission, as
illustrated in Figure 3.14. By knowing the hopping sequence, a receiver
follows the changes in frequency and is able to receive the transmission. A
nonhopping receiver is unable to receive data transmitted by a hopping
transmitter. The effectiveness ofFH relies on having a large set offrequencies
in the hop set and on the pattern of frequency changes appearing to be
random.
In order to provide resistance to jamming, it is necessary that a P.Seudo
random hop sequence be used. This requires that a receiver synchronize
itself to the transmitter, which can be achieved by transmitting a preamble
at the beginning of each transmission and possibly the transmission of further
synchronization information at regular intervals during the transmission, or
using an accurate time reference known to both transmitter and receiver.
The term hop rate refers to the number of times per second that an
FH transmitter changes frequency. Dwell time is the reciprocal of hop rate
and is the time interval in which data is transmitted between consecutive
changes of frequency.
80
Electronic Warfare for the D igitized B attl efi eld
Time O
Time 1
Time 2
Time 3
t
t
t
t
(\
(\
(\
(\
Figure 3.14 Effect of FH.
The terms slow and fast hopping are sometimes used. Fast FH refers
either to a hop rate that is higher than the bit rate or to a hop rate significantly
faster than 1 00 hops per second for VHF and UHF transmissions, and 1 0
hops per second for H F transmissions. Slow FH refers to slower hop rates.
In most FH systems, there is a guard interval during which no informa
tion is transmitted while the transmitter changes frequency. This is required
because the transmitter's power amplifier cannot instantaneously change
frequency. In order to avoid sweeping its power across the band and causing
widespread interference, the transmitter stops transmitting during the period
of the frequency change.
One of the advantages of FH is that it is possible to choose the hop
set from an arbitrary list of channels. Unlike DSSS, there is usually no
requirement for these channels to be adjacent.
FH may also be combined with other EP techniques, including DSSS
and the use of error-correcting codes and interleaving to reduce the impact
of errors caused by clashes with other transmissions.
Resistance to Jamming and Interference
In order to jam a hopping transmission effectively, a jammer must either

generate power across a high proportion of the frequencies used (which
implies a large total power) or be able to follow the frequency changes. A fixed
frequency spot jammer will have minimal impact on an FH transmission.
81
The number of channels in the hop set is analogous to the spreading

gain g5 of a DSSS system, and is a measure of the increased difficulty of
jamming using jammers that are unable to follow the hopping. The gains
that can be achieved with FH may be much larger than can be achieved
with DSSS. It is common, for example, for FH VHF CNR to be able to
hop across the whole of the 30-88 MHz band.
Effective jamming of a hopping transmission requires that the jamming
signal arrive at receiver before end of transmission in one hop. Unless the
frequency in use is known in advance, the following sources of delay occur
between the beginning of transmission and the jamming signal arriving at
the receiver:
The propagation delay difference between the path from transmitter

jammer-receiver and the direct path from transmitter to receiver:
distance Tx-1 + distance1
tpropagation
Rx
distance Tx- Rx
3 X 1 O8
The processing delay at the ES receiver, which is greater than the

reciprocal of the receiver bandwidth;
The jammer's power-up delay.
Successful jamming requires that the sum of these delays be a small

enough proportion of the dwell time that a sufficient portion of the transmit
ted signal is jammed.
Table 3 . 1 shows the maximum distances over which it is possible to
jam a single hop as part of an FH transmission, based on the assumptions
Table 3.1
Maximum Distances (km) over Which a Frequ en cy-Hop ping Transmission
Can Be J ammed
Hop Rate
( hops per
second)
25
1 00
500
1 ,000
1 0,000
992
1 92
92
2
Receiver Bandwidth (kHz)

100
Infinite
50
996
1 96
96
6
998
1 98
98
8
1 ,000
200
100
10
82
Electronic Warfare for the D igitized Battlefield
that the receiver is close to the transmitter, the length of the guard interval
is zero, all delay is due to propagation and the detection time of the receiver
(i.e., the jammer power-up delay is zero) , and the jamming is effective if
one-third of the hop time is jammed.
From Table 3. 1 , it is clear that even for a rate of 1 00 hops per second
(a dwell time of 10 ms), the use of satellite jammers is unlikely to be possible.
Standoff airborne or ground-based platforms, however, are likely to be within
this range limit. At 1 0,000 hops per second, standoff airborne platforms
(e.g., high altitude UAVs) are also infeasible. Jammers, such as UAJ, capable
of close-in deployment are the only systems likely to be effective against
such high-speed hoppers.
Provision of Multiple Access
FH can also be used as a means of multiple access by allowing several nets

to share frequencies in their hop sets. As long as these frequencies are used
in a unique sequence by each net, a statistical separation between nets is
provided.
Impact of Overloading
As the number of FH transmitters sharing common frequencies increases,

the proportion of the time during which two or more transmitters clash on
a single frequency increases. Under these circumstances, it is possible that
neither signal will be correctly received.
For voice, loss of data due to clashes causes glitches that may be
annoying. The comprehensibility of voice, however, tends to degrade grace
fully. This is because even though the voice is digitally encoded and com
pressed, the human auditory system is quite forgiving of errors introduced
in transmission. Voice tends to become unusable only when approximately
one-third or more of all data is lost due to interference from other hopping
or nonhopping signals. Since it is difficult for a jammer to maintain power
levels over one-third of the hopping band, FH provides robust voice perfor
mance in a hostile electromagnetic environment.
Voice
Loss of data due to clashes in the use of a frequency is a particular

problem for data communications, especially on slow hoppers. Unlike voice
services, quality-of-service can be significantly degraded for data services with
interference due to clashes or jamming in only a small proportion of hops.
Some systems, such as those used for situational awareness, overcome this
problem by providing regular repetition of information. Protection can also
be provided using a combination of interleaving and forward-error correction.
Data
83
Frequency management for FH requires the allocation of a hop set to each

hopping transmitter. One or more frequencies in this set can be allocated
to more than one net, as long as each net is allocated a different hop sequence.
In other words, separation between systems can be provided by a choice of
different frequencies in the hop sets or by the use of the same frequencies
in a unique sequence for each net. There is therefore a reduced need for
frequency deconfliction between nets, including processes such as harmonic
analysis that are an important part of conventional frequency management.
There is also no extra management overhead if the capacity allocated to the
nets vanes.
Interference with nonhopping systems is minimized by excluding fre
quencies used by these systems from the hop set. The acceptability of these
clashes depends on the particular service. Some channels, such as those used
for emergency communications, are usually excluded completely from hop
sets.
Interference with other hopping systems is minimized by choosing hop
sets with no frequencies in common. However, this will only be possible on
very rare occasions. More commonly, interference is managed by ensuring
that the proportion of hops for which two or more hoppers in the same
area will share a common frequency does not exceed a quality-of-service
threshold. This issue is discussed further in the next section.
Near-Far Effect
Unlike systems using either DSSS or TDMA, FH communications are not

subject to the near-far effect. This is because no attempt is made to synchro
nize FH transmitters on different nets, and multiple access using FH is based
on FDMA, which does not require synchronization.
Protection Against ES
FH transmissions are relatively difficult to detect using narrowband search

receivers. This is because detection only occurs when the frequency of the
hopping transmission coincides with the frequency of the scanning receiver.
A wideband receiver is more suitable for the detection of FH transmissions
because it can effectively monitor a number of channels simultaneously.
DF of an FH transmitter typically requires detection and DF to occur
within the dwell time. This suggests that a high level of integration between
search and DF is required.
Intercept of an FH transmission can be achieved by using a multichannel
receiver with a directional antenna. Such systems are most successful where
84
there is only a single FH transmitter active in a band at any time or the

frequency hoppers are widely dispersed. Consequently, the LPI properties
of FH are enhanced by the use of multiple FH nets that share at least some
frequencies in their hop sets.
In conventional single-frequency, half-duplex communications systems,
a user community (or net) consists of those stations that share a particular
channel. When FH is introduced, transmissions on a net are no longer
confined to a single frequency, removing this means of identifYing user
communities. FH systems, however, that transmit a preamble either on a
fixed frequency or in some other identifiable way, may lose this protection.
3.3.2.3
C o m p a rison of Spread-Spectrum Tec h n i q u es
The advantages of DSSS are that it hinders adversary ES, making transmis
sions hard to detect above the noise floor; hinders adversary EA; provides
graceful degradation in the presence of jamming and other types of interfer
ence; provides multiple access, known as code division multiple access
(CDMA); and allows mutual interference to be managed more easily than
in FH.
The disadvantages of DSSS are that the near-far effect makes power
management of multiple access in multinet environment difficult; mutual
interference contributes to total jamming power; DSSS provides less efficient
multiple access than TDMA or FDMA; and spreading usually occurs over
contiguous band (i.e., most practical systems do not allow spreading over an
arbitrary collection of channels) . In-band spread spectrum has the additional
disadvantage of providing only very low data rates.
The advantages of FH are that it hinders adversary ES/EA; the hopping
frequencies can be chosen from arbitrary set; the channels used do not need
to be contiguous; and it can be used as a multiple-access technique.
The disadvantages of FH are that hopping nets will usually share some
or all of the frequencies in their hop set, resulting in mutual interference
between hopping nets interference with nonhopping nets whose frequencies
are included in the hop set of a hopping net; and ES techniques, based on
using multichannel receivers and directional antennas, and EA. techniques,
based on follower-jammers, exist that can overcome the EP provided by
slow-hopping transmitters, especially when used in isolation.
3.3.3
Digital signals passing through transmission channels are subject to errors

introduced in the transmission process. While all channels introduce errors,
some channels, especially radio channels subject to jamming, will introduce
85
very high error rates. The types of impairments introduced by an imperfect

transmission channel include additive noise and channel perturbations. Addi
tive noise may take the form of Gaussian noise with stationary statistics,
impulsive noise that is not always stationary or easy to characterize, or
jamming. Channel perturbations may occur due to fading in radio channels,
synchronization slip in digital channels, and breaks in the transmission of
diverse origin.
The likely effects of these channel impairments on a digital signal are
uniformly random errors errors occurring individually and independently,
with approximately uniform probability density, primarily due to noise (often
just called random noise); burst errors errors grouped in clusters, mainly
the result of a combination of noise and channel perturbations; and erasures
irregular intervals when it is known that no reliable signal can be detected,
because of severe channel perturbation.
Channel coding is used to correct errors caused by these channel
impairments through the introduction of controlled redundancy to enable
messages corrupted in transmission to be corrected before further processing
[9] . With this controlled redundancy, only a subset of all possible transmitted
messages (bit sequences) contains valid messages. This subset is called a code,
and the valid messages are called code words or code vectors. A good code is
one in which code words are so separated that the likelihood of errors
corrupting one into another is kept small.
Error detection is simplified to answering this question: Is the received
message a code word or not? If it is a code word, one assumes that no errors
have occurred. The probability of an undetected error getting through is
then the probability of sufficient errors occurring to transform the real
transmitted code word into another, apparently correct, but in reality a false
one.
If an error is detected, it can be corrected in principle by automatic
repeat request (ARQ) or forward error correction (FEC).
-
Automatic repeat request (ARQ). In ARQ, the recipient rejects the

received message as erroneous and requests a repeat transmission.
However, if propagation delays due to distance are large, the tech
nique may become so inefficient as to be useless. There are also
many cases where retransmission is impossible, such as extracting
information from a damaged archive.
Forward error correction (FEC). In FEC, the recipient corrects the
errors by finding the valid code word "nearest" to the received
message, on the assumption that the nearest is the most likely because
few corrupting errors are more likely than many.
86
Ele ctronic Warfare for the D i g itized B attl efi eld
There are two types of FEC: block coding and convolutional coding. In
block coding, source data is partitioned into blocks of k bits, converted by
the encoder into blocks of n (>k) bits with enough checks to enable the
decoder to correct errors of the more probable kinds. Error-correcting codes
have more redundancy than error-detecting codes, and the decoding algo
rithms are much more complex. The most common types of block codes
[9] are cyclic redundancy check (CRC) codes, which provide only error
detection; Golay codes; Bose-Chadhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes; and
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. For a convolutional code, the encoder operates
not on disjoint blocks, but on a running block of bits held in a shift register,
generating a sequence of higher rate. This procedure is normally used for
FEC, but the correcting capabilities are not so clear-cut as with block codes.
Probabilistic decoding, approximating the maximum likelihood, is generally
used.
Block codes are used when information is naturally structured in blocks,
when channel capacity is relatively low and we do not want to waste it
further with unnecessarily low code rates, and when quick efficient decoding
is required because of the limited processing time available.
When long streams of relatively unstructured data are transmitted
on high-capacity channels (e.g., satellite 1 0 Mbps channels) and when the
complexity of the decoder represents a relatively small proportion of the
total cost of the receiving equipment (e.g., a satellite receiver), convolutional
codes can offer the best error-correcting solutions.
Interleaving
Error-correcting codes can be used to detect and correct random bit errors.
The codes are effective as long as the number of errors close together remains
small. In many types of channels, especially radio channels, however, the
channel errors occur in bursts of many errors followed by long periods with
almost no errors.
The problem of bursty channel errors can be overcome by interleaving
the transmitted data. This is achieved by rearranging the coded data at the
transmitter in a predefined pseudorandom order. This means that a burst
of errors will be randomized at the receiver when the bits are placed back
in their original order.
Concatenated Codes
Concatenated codes use two levels of coding-an inner code and an outer
code-to achieve the desired error performance. k illustrated in Figure
87
3. 1 5 , the inner code is configured to correct most channel errors; the outer
code reduces the probability of error to an acceptable level.
One of the most popular systems uses a convolutional inner code and
a Reed-Solomon outer code. The Reed-Solomon coder is chosen because it
can operate on symbols that consist of a number of bits. Like other FEC,
it operates best on isolated symbol errors. Because the symbols may consist
of a number of bits, the Reed-Solomon coder is quite effective at correcting
bursts of bit errors.
3.3.4
Burst Transmission
Many communications systems transmit continuously, making them easy

targets for adversary ES, especially DF, and EA. Even systems that only
transmit when they have data to send have traditionally used voice transmis
sion, resulting in lengthy transmissions that once again present good targets
to adversary ES and EA.
The term bU1st transmission is used to refer to systems that provide
protection against ES and EA by transmitting for short periods only when
they have data to pass. At its simplest, burst transmission may be used to
describe the operation of a data-enabled CNR system . More sophisticated
covert communications systems based on burst transmission use the combina
tion of high data rate transmission and low transmission time as a means
of frequency spreading. This may be used in conjunction with other EP
techniques, such as error protection, spread spectrum, and encryption.
The effectiveness of the burst transmission as a form of EP is controlled
by the length of the burst and the predictability of its transmission. The
length of the burst depends on the amount of data to be transmitted,
overheads such as error protection, the transmit data rate, and the length
of any preambles required for synchronization. Parameters associated with
the predictability of the transmission include the time of start, duration,
carrier frequency, code (if DSSS is used), and bandwidth of the transmission.
The effectiveness of burst transmission can be increased by delays in
handing over targets within the EW system. For example, in a system with
separate search and DF systems, a burst transmission may be over before the
DF has even received the target information. Because of the short transmission
Input
data
Outer
encoder
lnterleaver
Inner
encoder
Figure 3.1 5 Block d iagram of a concatenated coder.
Modulator
To channel
88
times, similar constraints to those discussed for FH apply to the maximum

range over which a jammer can be effective against burst transmissions.
3.3.5
Narrowband Exc ision
A jammer may sometimes transmit in only a portion of the band being used
for communications. This is most likely to happen in higher capacity cha9nels, such as those used for radio relay or DSSS signals. This is illustrated
in Figure 3 . 1 6. Such jamming can be effective against conventional receivers.
Even for a DSSS receiver, the power of the jamming signal is turned into
noise in the demodulation process.
In a receiver employing narrowband excision, narrowband jamming is
detected and removed from the signal before it is passed to the demodulator
as illustrated in Figure 3 . 1 7. While this also removes any information in the
excised band, the overall effect is beneficial because the jammer power is
prevented from having any impact on the demodulation process. Because
the loss of some portion of the received signal is a necessary side effect of
narrowband excision, some means for correcting the resulting errors are
usually required.
'(ij
c
Cl>
"0
Jamming
"
t5
(f)
Signal
Received signal
Figure 3.16 N a rrowb and j a mming of a wide b a n d signal.
'(ij
c
Cl>
"0
"
t5
a.
(f)
Signal
Signal after excision

Figure 3.17 Signal after na rrowband excision.
3.3.6
89
Diversity
Diversity is a means of protecting against jamming and interference by

transmitting data over two or more channels [ 1 0]. There are three types of
diversity commonly used in communications systems: space, frequency, and
time.
Space diversity. The impact of narrowband fading in a communica

tions channel can change significantly when the location of the
receiver's antenna is moved by more than half the wavelength of
the signal. In space diversity, two or more receive antennas are placed
more than half a wavelength apart, effectively providing two channels
between transmitter and receiver. This type of diversity is commonly
used in microwave transmission systems.
Frequency diversity. By transmitting data on two or more different
frequencies, the impact of fading or jamming and interference on
one of the channels can be overcome. This type of diversity is used
in HF sky-wave communications, including TADIL-A (Link- 1 1 )
[1 1].
Time diversity. Data can be transmitted twice on the same channel,
protecting against short-term jamming and interference.
3.4 Use of EP Techniques i n Communications Systems

Many military and commercial communications systems employ one or more
EP techniques. In this section, a selection of these systems is reviewed,
highlighting the differences between the military and commercial use.
3.4.1
CNR
VHF CNR typically operates in the frequency range of 30 to 88 MHz.

Modern CNR systems provide both secure voice and secure data capabilities.
Most systems, such as the US SINCGARS, also provide an in-built FH
capability. In some radios, the FH is provided by an applique. Free channel
search is also found in some systems.
CNR does not usually employ DSSS because the use of DSSS would
require that channels much larger than the conventional 25 kHz be allocated
to each net, reducing the overall capacity in the 30-88 MHz band; and the
90
near-far effect prevents the effective use of CDMA in CNR to improve the
efficiency of use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Encryption is commonly provided either using in-built systems or an
applique. Traditionally, such encryption has been used at battalion and
higher levels, leaving lower-level transmissions open to intercept. Increasingly,
encryption is being pushed down to the lowest levels.
Because the encryption used in CNR is message-based, the synchroniz
ing preambles of these transmissions are particularly vulnerable to jamming.
Adversary EA may deliberately jam preambles to force nets to operate in
plaintext, allowing their transmissions to be intercepted.
Error protection is not commonly used for voice transmissions in CNR.
The digital voice coding algorithms used tend to provide very high levels
of robustness against transmission errors, operating satisfactorily with bit
error rates as high as 10%. However, some form of error protection may
be provided for data.
3.4.2
M i l itary Radio Relay
Military radio relay systems operate in the VHF and UHF bands above
200 MHz. A network is formed from a number of point-to-point links that
interconnect nodes that perform switching. Traditionally, these systems have
provided circuit-switched voice and data services.
Because they are based on point-to-point links, radio relay systems
almost always use directional antennas. The gain of these antennas is typically
around 1 0 dB. These directional antennas provide a high level of protection
against adversary EA and ES.
Encryption in radio-relay networks is based on bulk encryption of
the point-to-point links, with switching occurring on plaintext data, which
protects against vulnerabilities associated with the restarting of cryptographic
algorithms in message-based encryption. FH and DSSS transmission are
also sometimes employed in these systems to provide additional protection.
Additionally, many radio-relay systems, especially those that provide for the
carriage of data as well as voice, provide some form of error protection,
which is commonly based on a half-rate convolutional code.
3.4.3
TADIL-J (Li nk-1 6)
TADIL-J is a secure, high-capacity, jam-resistant, nodeless data link that uses

the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) transmission
characteristics and the protocols, conventions, and fixed-length message
91
formats defined by the JTIDS Technical Interface Design Plan (TIDP)

[ 1 2] . TADIL-J operates in the UHF band in the frequency range of
960 to 1,2 1 5 MHz, and therefore provides line-of-sight operation. Operation
beyond line-of-sight can be achieved by means of a relay, which may be an
airborne or satellite-mounted system.
TADIL-J operation is based on all-informed nets. Multiple access
between nets is provided by a combination of FH, FDMA, and CDMA.
There are 5 1 channels that are supported. Multiple access within a net is
provided by TDMA. The TDMA structure is shown in Figure 3 . 1 8 . Time
slots of 7.8 1 25 ms are allocated to stations on the net. Approximately 1 ,536
time slots make up a time .frame, and 64 time frames form an epoch. Each
station on the net is allocated at least one time slot per epoch.
Table 3.2 shows the TADIL-J maximum range and data rates, which
depend on the operating mode.
EP in TADIL-J is provided by a combination of FH with an instanta
neous hop rate of 77,000 hops per second over 5 1 frequencies; DSSS with
a spreading gain of 6.4 and a chip rate of 5 MHz; repeated transmission
with data optionally transmitted twice in successive hops; and forward-error
detection and correction, using a (3 1 , 1 5) Reed-Solomon code.
64 time frames per epoch
1 ,536 time slots per time frame
Guard interval
Figure 3.18 TAD I L-J time-slot structure.
92
Table 3.2
TADI L-J O p e rating Modes
Guard Interval
(ms)
Guard Interval
Range limit
(nm)
Throughput After
Error Correction
(Kbps)
Hops per
Second
Stan d a rd f u l l
slot
4.4585
700
30
33,000
P a c ked-2 full
slot
4.4585
700
59
33,000
Pa cke d-4 full

slot
2.0405
300
119
57,000
Mode
In each hop, the transmitter is turned on for 6.4 s, which means

that power from a jammer with transmitter-jammer-receiver path length
2 Ian longer than the transmitter-receiver path length will reach the receiver
after the end of the data transmission.
3.4.4
Enhanced Position Locati ng and Repo rting System ( EPLRS)
EPLRS is a U.S. situational awareness system that is designed to provide

services for position location, navigation, identification, and communica
tions. EPLRS also supports a number of control measures such as boundaries,
fire support coordination lines, limits of advance routes, passage lanes, and
attack directions.
The EPLRS radio supports a variety of data communications services
[ 1 3] , providing both point-to-point links and an extensive multicast capabil
ity, including all-informed nets. Data rates up to 57,600 bps per connection,
known as a needline, are possible. Each EPLRS user community has a
maximum practical data capacity of between 300 and 450 Kbps, depending
on configuration. This capacity is reduced when retransmission is required.
Capacity is also reduced when the area over which the user community
increases, because of the requirement for larger guard intervals between
TDMA slots.
Frequencies in the range of 420 to 450 MHz are used, with the band
being segmented into eight channels, each of 3-MHz bandwidth. Multiple
access within a net is provided by TDMA technology, in which users transmit
information in bursts during predetermined time slots. Multiple access
between nets is provided by a combination of FDMA, FH, and COMA.
93
Resistance to jamming is provided through DSSS transmission with a

spreading gain of approximately five; FH operation among eight channels
with a hop rate of 5 1 2 Hz; error detection and correction; and network
management that facilitates the automatic routing and rerouting of messages
in the EPLRS network using any EPLRS radio as a relay of opportunity.
In each hop, the transmitter is turned on for up to 1 . 1 ms, which
means that the transmitter-jammer-receiver path length must be no more
than 33 km longer than the transmitter-receiver path length if jamming is
to be effective.
The combination of DSSS and FH also provides LPI. Security is
provided by an embedded cryptographic system. While the use of DSSS
provides a multiple-access capability, the near-far effect will limit its efficiency.
The use of DSSS also provides protection against interference from other
EPLRS nets. This would otherwise be a significant problem because only
eight channels among which the transmitter can hop are available.
3.4.5
Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR)
NTDR is an experimental system being developed by the U.S. Army under

the Force XXI program to explore the limits of near-term technology and
to provide a technical baseline for development of a multiband, multimode
digital radio system.
NTDR can be viewed as an RF system with an embedded router!
gateway such as those found in fixed local area networks. NTDR transports
up to 288 Kbps of user information for each cluster of users, backbone
channel, or point-to-point connection for the operating frequency range of
225 to 450 MHz with a channel bandwidth of 4 MHz.
EP will be provided by a combination of DSSS, fast FH, and nar
rowband excision at receivers to eliminate effects of narrowband jamming.
Further protection against error will be provided by three-quarter-rate convo
lutional coding. Once again, the combination of DSSS and FH is designed
to minimize the detectability of signals. The use of narrowband excision
allows jamming signals from narrowband jammers to be removed before
despreading, reducing even further the impact of such signals.
3.4.6
IS-95
IS-95 is an air-interface standard for cellular telephony. It uses a combination

ofCDMA and FDMA to provide multiple access on both downlinks (forward
channels) and uplinks (reverse channels).
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battl efield
94
Data on the forward channel is grouped into 20-ms frames. This data
is convolutionally encoded, repeated if necessary to increase the data rate to
1 9.2 kilosamples per second (ksps) and interleaved, as illustrated in Figure
3 . 1 9. The signal is randomized with a long PN sequence and spread with
a Walsh code to produce a 1 .2288 megachips per second (Mcps) signal.
Power control information is inserted every 1 .25 ms by puncturing.
Mobile terminal transmit power is adjusted in 1 -dB steps. This high-rate,
fine adjustment or transmit power is required to provide power balancing
between mobile stations and to maximize the bandwidth efficiency of the
system.
Quadrature modulation is performed as shown in Figure 3.20, with
in-phase and quadrature components having an orthogonal covering applied
1 .2288 Mcps
to modulator
Walsh code cover
( 1 .2288 Mcps)
Long-code
1 9.2 kcps
-.{
.-
Data
Frame
& CRC
1 .2
2.4
4.8
9.6
1 /2 rate
convolutional
encoder
Kbps
Kbps
Kbps
Kbps
Repeat
2.4 ksps
4.8 ksps
9 . 6 ksps
1 9 .2 ksps
Block
interleave
1 9.2 ksps
Figure 3.19 Downlink processing for IS-95.
sin(w t )
Baseband
filter
Baseband
filter
cos(wt )
Figure 3.20 Downlink modulation for IS-95.
95
before modulation. At the receiver, this makes the received components

approximately independent. The covering is performed with a short code
that is relatively easy for a receiver to acquire.
The use of DSSS in IS-95 is purely intended to provide multiple access.
Because the PN sequences are known or easily deducible, IS-95 does not
provide an LPI or antijam capability, except against a very unsophisticated
attack. The use of high levels of forward-error correction is intended to
overcome the noise introduced by interfering signals, both narrowband and
wideband.
3.4.7
GSM
The GSM digital cellular telephone system provides multiple access using
a combination ofFDMA and TDMA. Eight TMDA channels are multiplexed
onto a carrier with a channel bandwidth of 200 kHz. Each time slot contains
1 14 bits of user data [ 1 4] .
GSM provides an optional FH mode. This mode does not provide an
LPI or antijam capability, because the specification for the hop sequence is
published in the GSM standards, and the hop sequence can therefore be
deduced from the signals transmitted by a base station.
FH in GSM does, however, provide frequency diversity. This diversity
is intended to minimize the impact of multipath propagation, which may
lead to much higher losses in some channels than in others. Because GSM
was not designed for military use, no extra benefit was perceived for LPI or
antijam capabilities.
Error protection in GSM takes 240 bit blocks of data, and codes them
with a half-rate punctured convolutional code to produce 456 bits that are
interleaved across four 1 14-bit TDMA frames. This interleaving spreads
burst errors (that are caused largely by channel fading) over a longer period,
reducing the reduce peak bit error rate, and allows the channel -coding to
correct the now-randomly spaced bit errors.
Encryption in GSM is based on a proprietary, stream-cipher algorithm,
known as A5 . A5 comes in two variants: A5/ 1 is used in European systems
and A5/2 (which is known to provide a significantly lower level of security)
is used in export systems. A5 is a stream cipher whose state is reinitialized
at the beginning of every TDMA time slot. Its vulnerabilities [5] include
the fact that in most deployed versions of GSM, the 10 least significant bits
of the key are set to zero, reducing the effective length of the key to 54 bits;
the keystream is frequently reinitialized, permitting attacks based on a known
initial state; while the state transition function ofA5 is not uniquely invertible,
Electro nic Warfare for the Digitized Battl efield
96
it can be efficiently inverted because the number of possible parent states is

small; and cryptanalysis of A5/ l requires approximately 2 24 operations (with
248 precomputed stored values), while cryptanalysis of A5/2 requires only
2 16 operations.
Endnotes
[1]
U.S. doctrine for EP is contained in U.S. Army Field Manual FM 24-33, "Communica
tions Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures," July 1 990.
[2]
Elecf7omagJ7cttc Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities, Engineering and
Design Pamphlet EP
I l l 0-3-2,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, December I 990.
[3 ]
Sources of information on encryption techniques include:

Denning, D. E., CIJ'f'tOgJ'aphy and Data Semrity, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley,
1 983.
Schneier, B., Applted C'J'PfOtJaphy: Protocols, A lgonthms, and Source Code in C, New
York: Wiley, 1 994.
Singh, S., The Code Book: The SCience of Secrecy fimn A ncient Eg]pt to Quantum
Cl]1JtOgJ'tlf'hy, New York: Anchor Books, 1 999.
Sinkov, A., Ele111mtfll]' C'J'Ptmla6sts, a .Matlmnaflcal Approach, New York: The Mathe
matical AssoCiation of America, 1966.
Stallings, S., Nmuor!t and fntcmetu,orlt Smmty, 2nd Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prenncc Hall, 1 995.
Torricri, D . J., PmiCiples of Semrc Conmnnncattons, Norwood, MA: Artech House,
1 98 5 .
[4 ]
SKIPJA CK and KEA Algoritlnn Spcctjicaflons, Version 2, National Security Agency,

May 1 998.
[5]
B i ryukov, A., A. Sh.1m1r, :nd D. Wagner, "Real Time Cryptanalysis of A511 on a

PC," Fast EnC1J1't/On Soji1uare Workshop 2000, New York, April 2000.
[6]
Stallings, S., Networlt and lntemefluorlt Smmty, 2nd Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1 995.
[7)
SKiPJA CK and
[8]
KEA
Algontlnn Spec(icattow, Version 2, National Securiry Agency,
May 1998.
Sec, for example, Simon, M. I<., Spread Spec1m111 Connnumcatiow, Rockville, MD:
Computer Science Press, 1 985; o r Nicholson, D. L. , Spread Spectm111 Signal DestgJI:
LPE & A} Systems, Rockville, MD: Computer Science P ress, 1 9 88.
[9]
See, for example, Sklar, B., Dtgital Commrmicatiom, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1988; and Pro:kis, J. G . , D1glfal Co111municatiom, 2nd Edition, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1 989.
[ I 0]
Sec, for example, Gibilisco, S., Handboolt ofRadio and Wireless Teclmolog], New York:
McGraw Hi ll, 1 999, pp. 252-253.
ITU-R, Recommendation F. 1 06-2, 1 999.
[I I)
MIL-STD- 1 88-203- 1 A "I nrcropcrabiliry and Performance Smndards for Tactical Digi
tal I n formation Link, (TADIL) A," January 1 988.
97
[ 1 2]
See, for example, "JTIDS/TIES Consolidate Tactical Communications," EW, Septem

ber/October 1 977.
MIL-STD-6016, "DoD Interface Standard Tactical Digital Interface Link (TADIL)
J Message Standard," February 1 997.
Stiglitz, M., 'TheJoinr Tactical I nformation Distribution System," Mtcrowavejournal,
October 1987.
Toone, J . , and S. Titmas, "Introduction to JTIDS," Signal, August 1 987, pp. 55-59.
[ 1 3]
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 24-4 1 , "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)," Final Draft, July 1 999.
[ 14]
Mouly, M . , and M. Pautet, The GSM Systems for Mobile Communications, Palaiseau:
Cell and Sys, 1 992.
4
E lectronic S u p port
4.1
Introduction
Electronic support (ES) is the division of EW involving actions tasked by,

or under the direct control of, an operational commander to search for,
intercept, identifY, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radi
ated electromagnetic energy. The purposes of ES include immediate threat
recognition and construction of an EOB. The main functions of ES are to
produce operational intelligence, to provide steerage for EA, and to cue
surveillance and target acquisition resources.
As illustrated in Figure 4. 1 , the major subdivisions of ES are [ 1 ] :
Search. Before any other EW processes can be carried out, i t is

necessary to search for and classifY electromagnetic signals of interest.
Intercept. Signals of interest, once identified in the search process,
are examined for their technical characteristics, such as bandwidth
and modulation type, as well as their content, which may be moni
tored and recorded either by an operator or electronically.
Directionfinding (DF). The physical location of transmitters is identi
fied by the DF process, based on steerage provided by the search
process.
Analysis. Analysis uses the information gained from the other ES
processes to construct an EOB of the adversary, and attempt to
infer the adversary commander's intent.
Traditionally, each of these processes has been carried out separately

using its own special-purpose equipment. More recent technology makes
99
E l e ctro nic Warfare for the Digitized B attlefield
1 00
Electronic warfare
Passive
Search
I ntercept
Direction finding
Analysis
Figure 4.1 EW a rc hitecture.
possible the integration of two or more processes into a single receiver. The
discussion below deals separately with each process so as to highlight its
special characteristics and because, even if implemented in one equipment
or detachment, there are still four distinct processes involved.
ES may target adversary communications systems, adversary EA. systems,
or adversary electronics. The electromagnetic emissions of communications
systems of adversary communications systems are the primary traditional
targets for ES, obtaining information for use in targeting and intelligence
and supporting friendly EA. EA systems, like communications systems, emit
electromagnetic radiation that can be exploited by ES. The targeting of
adversary electronics other than communications systems is possible with
specialized forms of ES equipment, although only over very short ranges.
As a result of the short range, this type of target is accessible only on rare
occasiOns.
ES functions, as collectors and processors of tactical inform,ation about
an adversary, are closely related to other intelligence functions : This relation
ship is discussed in Chapter 6. In many cases, ES makes up the bulk (as
high as 60-80%) of tactical information obtained about an adversary.
4.2 Search
Search involves reconnaissance ofthe electronic activity in the electromagnetic
spectrum to classify the transmissions occurring within it. Search receivers
must be placed within the coverage of the adversary systems to be detected
and operated at a time during which transmissions are being made. In this
Electronic Support
101
sense, the search function can be seen as occurring in space, time, and
frequency. The results of the search process provide the inputs for other
EW functions. Searching can be conducted in general terms, or it can be
made more specific by looking for particular call signs, types of modulation,
or other signal or traffic characteristics. Sensitive, wideband receivers can be
used to provide an indication of emitter characteristics.
The frequency range of interest can be searched by two main types of
receivers: narrowband (or scanning) and wideband [2] . It is common for
search receivers to be capable of operating across a wide range of frequencies.
Operating frequencies stretching from below the HF band (around 1 MHz)
to the middle of the UHF band (around 1 GHz) are not uncommon.
The theoretical minimum time required for a search receiver to detect
an incoming signal is equal to the reciprocal of the receiver's bandwidth.
Most practical receivers, however, require detection times much longer than
this.
The search process is most commonly applied to the intended emissions
of communications equipment. Under some circumstances, and at very short
ranges, it is also possible to detect the operation of electronic equipment
from unintentional radiation [3] . Protection against such detection is often
referred to as TEMPEST [4] , which is a form of EP.
The following sections describe the operation of major implementations
of narrowband and wideband search receivers.
4.2.1
Narrowband Receivers
A scanning receiver is a single-channel receiver that can be rapidly stepped

between a number of channels being monitored. At each step, the receiver
determines whether the channel is active. Active channels may be flagged
by the receiver pausing its scan to allow monitoring of the channel, or the
receiver maintaining a list of currently active channels, which is made available
to the operator in an appropriate manner. The narrowband search receiver
can be seen as an automation of the traditional manual scanning carried out
by operators to search for an adversary's transmissions.
The advantages of scanning receivers are that they are not limited to
blocks of adjacent channels, and can step through an arbitrary collection of
channels within their operating range; they are of low cost; and they can
provide simultaneous decoding of signals.
The disadvantages of a scanning receiver are that it is effective in
detecting only signals that are of duration longer than the time between
visits to a channel, and are confined to a narrow portion of the frequency
1 02
Electro n i c Warfare for the Digiti zed B attlef1eld
spcc.rrum. Shon-dur.H ion '>ignal!>, particularly frequency hopping, and very

wide-bandwidth signal, such as DSSS tra mmi!>sions, may go undetected.
A scanning receiver is usually based on a superheterodyne receiver
(Figure 4 .2) that runes to a single chan nel. Superheterodyne receivers arc
used because they provide a good tradeoff between sensitiviry and selectivity.
Scanr)ing is achieved by regular stepping of the chosen frequency through
rhe set to be searched.
The power received by the antenna is passed first into the RF stage.
The functions of this first stage of the receiver are to select the channel of
interest and to provide limited amplification of the received signal. The gain
that can be provided in the RF stage is limited by the tradeoff between this
gain and the bandwidth of the receiver. The higher the RF gain, the narrower
the bandwidth. Unfortunately, providing any more than about I ,000 times
amplification at this stage increases the selectivity of the RF stage to the
point where it is attenuating not only our-of-band signals bur also part of
the wanted channel. The choice of channel is specified by the tuning control.
The output of the tunable band-pass filter is passed to the mixer, which
converts the signal to a fixed intermediate frequency (IF) by mixing with a
stable local oscillator frequency. In most modern receivers, the local oscillator
includes a frequency synthesizer that enables accurate tuning to any frequency
across a wide band. The signal is then further amplified and filtered before
being passed to the detector. The purpose of the IF is twofold. First, it
avoids the need for having a large gain at the RF stage, where there is a
tradeoff between gain and selectivity. Second, the fixed frequency allows the
optimization of the IF amplifier and filter to a single frequency, regardless
of the frequency of the channel to which the receiver is tuned. The alerting
system passes on information on active channels to an operator or directly
to other ES processes, such as DF and intercept.
A scanning receiver may allow the operator to select one or more of
the following parameters: frequencies to be searched; channel bandwidth;
Fixed I F
filter/amp
Alerting
system
-....: Figure 4.2 Simple block d i a g r a m of a s u p e rheterodyne search rec eiver.
Electronic Support
1 03
the gain of the RF stage; and detection criteria, which may be power level
or a particular type of modulation.
The detection time, which is the minimum time in which the scanning
search receiver can detect a signal, is limited to the reciprocal of the channel
bandwidth. The scan rate, therefore, can be no more than the channel
bandwidth. In practice, scanning receivers do not achieve this limit. One
reason for this is that a large number of false detections would occur as the
scan rate approached this limit. Practical systems commonly achieve scan
rates on the order of 20 channels per second.
4.2.2
Wideband Receivers
Wideband receivers are able to monitor a number of channels simultaneously.

Therefore, they are more suitable for monitoring signals that are spread
across several channels or are of short duration. Wideband receivers of the
following types are used in searching for communications transmitters. These
include a channelized receiver, compressive receiver, and digital receiver.
In addition, the following types of receiver are used in searching for
other emitters, such as radar:
4.2.2. 1
Crystal video receiver. This type of receiver consists of a tuning stage

to select the band of interest followed by a detector. Multiple receivers
are often used in parallel to monitor a number of bands.
Instantaneous frequency measurement (IFM) receiver. The IFM
receiver allows the frequency measurement of pulsed signals, but
can only respond to one signal at a time. The sensitivity of IFM
receivers tends to be low because of the inherent high signal-to
noise ratio required to measure frequency.
Bragg cell receiver. An instantaneous measure . of the spectrum of
received signals can be obtained using a Bragg cell receiver. This
type of receiver employs a surface-acoustic-wave device to perform
a Fourier transform. The output may be coupled via photodiodes
and then to a charge-coupled device (CCD) that performs time
averaging. The output from the CCD can then be displayed or read
by a computer.
Channelized Searc h Receiver
shown in Figure 4.3, a channelized receiver employs many fixed-tuning

receivers in parallel to cover a complete band simultaneously. Although the
frequency resolution of a channelized receiver may be lower than for a
As
1 04
Electronic Wa rfa re for t h e Digitized Battlefield
Ale rting
system
Figure 4.3 C h a n nelized search receiver.
scanning receiver, it is generally good enough to ensure that a signal is

detected. The receiver output may be used to direct a more detailed search.
A channelized receiver may search across a contiguous band, or may
search a number of nonadjacent channels. Characteristics of the individual
receivers and detection criteria may be chosen by the operator individually
for each channel, chosen once by the operator for all channels, or fixed.
Superheterodyne receivers may be used for each of the fixed-tuning receivers
because they provide a good tradeoff between selectivity and sensitivity.
The channelized receiver searches all channels simultaneously. Any
limitation on search rate comes from the alerting system. The properties of
the individual receivers will, however, control the minimum time to detect
a received signal. This minimum time is the reciprocal of the channel band
width of the individual fixed-tuning receiver. Practical systems will often
have longer detection times to avoid a larger number of false detections.
4.2.2.2
Com press ive S e a rc h R e c e iver
As shown in Figure 4.4, a compressive search receiver has a similar structure

to the superheterodyne receiver. Wideband operation is obtained by replacing
the tuning control with a sweep generator that covers an entire band. The
rate of sweep can be very large, such that the bandwidth of the receiver lies
within the bandwidth of the signal for much less than the detection time
in any one sweep. The purpose of the compressive filter is to provide averaging
over successive sweeps. This allows the compressive receiver to effectively
monitor a whole band simultaneously, while maintaining high receiver sensi
tivity.
Because its receive frequency is controlled by a sweep generator, a
compressive receiver can only be used to search across a contiguous band
of frequencies. Practical limitations in the electronics used to implement the
system limit the total bandwidth to approximately 1 GHz.
Electronic Support
1 05
Fixed IF
filter/amp
Sweep
generator
Compressive
filter/amp
oscillator
Alerting
system
Figure 4.4 Compressive search receiver.
The search rate is limited by output display time, which can be no

less than the reciprocal of the minimum resolvable bandwidth. This limitation
is the same as has been discussed previously for other types of search receiver.
4.2.2.3
Digital Searc h Receiver
The digital search receiver, illustrated in Figure 4.5, consists of a receiver

front end, an analog-to-digital (AID) converter, and a signal processing
system. The purpose of the receiver front end is to amplify the received
signal to a level that can be handled by the analog-to-digital converter, to
band-limit the incoming signal to prevent aliasing in the analog-to-digital
converter, an d possibly to shift the received signal to a known IF. Hence,
the receiver front end would usually consist of an RF stage and a mixer.
For HF and VHF receivers, the front-end receiver may be as simple as a
low-pass filter.
The analog-to-digital converter converts the arriving signal to a digital
fon. The sampling rate of the converter must be at least twice the bandwidth
Receiver
front end
Tuning
control
Figure 4.5 Digital receiver.
AID
converter
Signal-processing
system
Alerting
system
1 06
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battl efield
of the output signal from the receiver front end to prevent aliasing. The
linearity of the analog-to-digital converter is critical to the performance of
the whole system: . any nonlinearity introduced during conversion will result
in intermodulation distortion between received signals, potentially allowing
a strong signal to obscure weaker signals.
The signal-processing system is responsible for the detection of incom
ing signals. A variety of algorithms may be used, but it is most likely that
the processing will involve conversion to the frequency domain.
The required computational capacity required of the signal-processing
system depends on the number of channels that are to be searched; whether
or not it is necessary to continuously monitor these channels, or it is permissi
ble to scan between them; the bandwidth of the individual channels to be
searched; the sampling rate of the analog-to-digital converter; and the search
algorithm that is used.
For a system where the processing is conducted using the fast Fourier
transform (FFT), the channels are to be continuously monitored, and the
sampling rate of the analog-to-digital converter is the minimum required to
prevent aliasing, the required processing capacity expressed in operations per
second can be calculated as follows.
If n channels are required, a 2n -point FFT will be required. Each
2n -point FFT requires 4n log2(2n) operations. With a sampling rate of fs ,
the total number of operations per second ( C) is then given by:
If n channels are to be monitored, the channel bandwidth B is:
The computational capacity required to monitor n channels is:

C
4Bn log2 2n
Approximately 1 0 8 operations per second, with a sampling rate of

6 MHz, would be required to provide continuous search of 1 ,000 channels
with a bandwidth of 3 kHz. This would enable detection of transmissions
as short as 330 JLS. This level of capacity is likely to be available in a system
based on special-purpose, signal-processing hardware.
Electronic Support
1 07
The number of channels searched could be increased by switching

between banks of channels. While this would enable more channels to be
searched without a significant increase in the computational capacity, the
abUity to detect short-term and rapidly changing signals is reduced, along
with the ability to detect weak signals. Table 4. 1 shows the computational
capacity required for searching the whole HF and VHF bands.
4.2.3
Search and the Tactical Commun ications System
The search process aims to detect an adversary's transmissions. The applica

tion of search against the various subsystems of the tactical communications
system is subject to a number of constraints, due to distance, terrain, and
the use by the target system of directional antennas and other means of EP.
The vulnerabilities of each tactical communications subsystem, along with
the in-built protection against detection provided, are summarized in Table
4.2. Each subsystem is identifiable by its radio signature (i.e., type of transmis
sion), including operating band, bandwidth, type of modulation, and traffic
characteristics.
4.2.3 . 1
Tacti c a l Trun k Subsystem
The employment of search to detect transmissions on terrestrial radio relay

links between trunk nodes or command posts is hindered by the use of
direction antennas and possibly other forms of active EP (including spread
spectrum communications) on these links. Figure 4.6 illustrates these diffi
culties. A search facility that is significantly off-axis, such as that labeled " 1 "
in Figure 4.6, is unlikely to be able to receive transmissions from either
Table 4.1
Computational Capacity Required for Digita l Search Receivers
Minimum
Sampling
Rate
Number of
Channels
Channel
Bandwidth
c
(Operations
per Second)
Search VH F band
30-88 M Hz
1 20 M H z
2,320
25 kHz
Search H F band
3-30 M H z
56 M H z
9,000
3 kH z
1 .5
10
Search H F band
in banks of
1 0 channels
56 M H z
900
30 kHz
1 .2
10
Application
9
10
9
9
108
Table 4.2
The Search Function and the Tactical Communicatio n s System
Tactical
Communications
S ubsystem
Vulnerabilities
Protection
Trun k
Omnid irectional antennas in

S C RA.
Directional antennas, long

dista n c e between tra nsmitter
and searc h facil ity, line-of
sight fre q u encies.
CNR
Omnidirectional a ntennas,
short distan c e between
transmitter and s e a r c h
faci lity, tra nsmission only
when messages s e nt.
Low power, low a ntennas,

terrain screening.
Tactical d ata
distribution
s h o rt dista nce between
tra nsmitter and s e a rc h
facility.
Extensive E P .
Airborne
H eight, omnidirectional
antennas.
On ly downlinks likely to be
detected by tacti c a l EW
assets.
/
e<::::::> -
Trun k nodes
- c::::::>e
ES receives only
far station
ES receives neither station

Figure 4.6 Diffi cu lty of employing search a g a i n st the trunk su bsystem.
transmitter. A search facility that is aligned with the axis of the link (labeled
"2") may be able to detect transmissions, but only from one end of the link.
The difficulty of using search against terrestrial radio relay links in the
trunk subsystem is exacerbated by the greater distance that is likely between
the search receivers and the trunk subsystem than is the case for CNR. This
difficulty is greatest for ground-based search facilities, particularly when
Electronic Support
1 09
combined with the impact of terrain at VHF and higher frequencies. This
is especially true for an on-axis search facility, such as the one labeled "2"
in Figure 4.6. The impact of terrain may be reduced by the use of an airborne
platform. However, it is unlikely to be possible to place an airborne search
platform in a position from which it can intercept communications in both
directions over a terrestrial radio relay link. The difficulty of detection of
radio relay links is increased where additional EP techniques such as FH are
employed.
The detection of an SHF down-the-hill link within a trunk node or
command post poses similar difficulties to terrestrial radio relay. The difficulty
is increased by the use of highly directional antennas and low transmission
powers, especially for ground-based search facilities. Because of thei natural
protection due to position, SHF down-the-hill links are less likely to be
protected by active EP than terrestrial radio relay links, which may reduce
the difficulty of detection by an airborne search facility.
SCRA and CNRI are characterized by the use of line-of-sight frequen
cies, medium transmission powers, and omnidirectional antennas. The base
stations for such systems are likely to be collocated with trunk nodes, meaning
that they are also protected against detection by ground-based search facilities
by distance and terrain. Mobile stations may be anywhere in the AO, often
forward of the base station, and are therefore more vulnerable to detection
than the base stations. This vulnerability is offset to some extent by the low
height of antennas on mobile stations above the ground. Because the multiple
channels supported by an SCRA base station tend to be separated from
adjacent channels either by TDMA or FDMA, the detection of one transmis
sion is likely to provide operating frequencies for all channels associated with
that base station . In the past, SCRA base stations have not tended to employ
EP for protection against detection , although future systems may reduce
their signature by employment of measures such as FH.
Transmissions from trunk HF radio employ surface-wave communica
tions where possible (e.g., on links between command posts within the AO)
and sky wave otherwise (e.g., on rear links) . Detection of surface-wave
transmissions from trunk HF radio is possible anywhere within the coverage
of the transmitter. For omnidirectional antennas, such as a vertical monopole
or dipole, the area of coverage will be roughly a circle, the size of which
depends on the permittivity and conductivity of ground and the transmitter
power. Detection of sky-wve transmissions from trunk HF radio requires
that the search facility be located in the footprint of the transmitter, as
illustrated in Figure 4.7. It is unlikely that it would be possible to site a
ground-based search facility within the AO capable of detecting transmissions
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized B attlefield
110
'
.
'
Coverage of 1
Coverage of 2
Overlapping
coverage
Figure 4.7 Footprint of sky-wave tra nsmissions.
in both directions on a duplex link. This may be possible with an airborne

platform. Search may be hindered by EP such as FH. However, HF FH
tends to be slower than VHF (often only 1 0 hops per second), making it
easier to track the changes in frequency.
The detection of an uplink associated with a high-capacity satellite
trunk link is usually only possible if the search receiver is placed directly
between the ground station and the satellite due to the high-gain antennas
used. This may be possible using an airborne search facility, or even a ground
based search facility if the takeoff angle of the link is small enough. Downlinks
for high-capacity trunk links are likely to be detectable over the whole AO.
The use of EP, especially DSSS and FH, can considerably increase the
difficulty of detection.
4.2.3.2
C N R S u b system
VHF and UHF CNR employ mostly omnidirectional antennas and can be
readily detected by search assets located within radio line-of-sight. HF CNR,
like trunk HF communications, uses mostly surface-wave communications,
and can be detected beyond radio line-of-sight, over an approximately circular
area of coverage that depends on transmitter power and the type of ground.
EP, mostly in the form of FH, may be employed to reduce the vulnerability
to detection, especially by narrowband search receivers. The range over which
VHF/UHF CNR can be detected depends critically on the height of the
transmit antenna. Transmissions from higher-level headquarters, where
Electronic Support
111
antennas are likely to be mounted on masts, may be easier to detect than

those from lower-level units even though the lower-level units may be located
closer to the search facility. CNR transmitters are used further forward than
trunk systems, reducing the likely distance between the transmitter and
search facility.
4.2.3.3
Tacti c a l Data Distribution Su bsystem
Detection of transmissions from the tactical data distribution subsystem is

hindered by its extensive use ofEP, most likely including both DSSS and FH.
If technology that can follow the FH is available, the use of omnidirectional
antennas and the short distance between transmitter and search facility will
aid detection. An airborne platform is likely to have some additional utility
over a ground-based platform, although less than in the case of the tactical
trunk subsystem, since terrain is unlikely to be the major limitation on
detection of transmissions from the tactical data distribution subsystem.
4.2.3.4
Airborne Subsystem
An adversary's use of the airborne subsystem eases detection by elevating

transmitters above the effects of terrain. As illustrated in Figure 4.8, an
airborne ES system may be either below the airborne subsystem (" 1 ) , in
"
rES
facility
Figure 4.8 Employment of search a ga inst the airborne subsystem.
112
Electronic Warfare for t h e Digitized Battlefield
which case it will be able to detect both uplinks and downlinks; or above
it ("2"), in which case it may only be able to detect uplinks. A ground
based search facility ("3") is likely to detect only the downlinks, unless it
is placed close to one of the ground terminals. Some systems that convention
ally use directional antennas, such as radio relay, may use omnidirectional
antennas when mounted on the airborne platform, trading off their vulnera
bility to detection against the difficulty of maintaining communications from
a moving platform.
4.3 Intercept (Monitoring)

Once the search function has identified a signal o f interest, the signal is
passed to an intercept receiver that further classifies an electromagnetic
emission by its external characteristics, such as frequency, modulation, and
bandwidth, and if possible, extracts the internal information content, often
referred to as monitoring.
Some external characteristics, such as frequency and bandwidth of
operation, may be relevant to the tasking of other EW assets. The intercept
receiver settings, for example, could be transferred to DF receivers to obtain
bearing samples of the transmitter. Others may be useful in deducing the
adversary's EOB.
Fingerprinting refers to the process of identifYing a transmitter by the
unique characteristics of its spectrum, such as occupied bandwidth, tuning
offset errors, and nonlinearities introduced in high-power amplifiers. In some
cases, it may be possible to identifY not only the type of transmitter but also
an individual item of equipment. Ongoing fingerprinting can then track
this item on the battlefield, thereby tracking its operating unit. In other
cases, only the type of transmitter may be able to be determined. This may
provide indications of the platform on which the transmitter is mounted.
It may be known, for example, that a particular type of radio is used exclusively
in armored vehicles. The transmitter bandwidth by itself may even provide
useful information. Older VHF radios tend to transmit on a 50-kHz channel.
Newer systems tend to use 25-kHz channels. It is likely that a unit using
older equipment will have a lower level of readiness and training than a unit
using the newer equipment.
In the past, recording of intercepted signals was always carried out
manually by an operator. In modern systems, the recording process may be
automatic or manual. Automatic systems are used for data and may be used
for voice. For voice signals, manual gisting by an operator may take place
Electronic Support
113
i n real time, even i f automatic recording is available. This minimizes the

delay in processing and dissemination of time-c0ical tactical intelligence.
However, it cannot be carried out without operators proficient in the language
used by the adversary.
Monitoring of an unencrypted net will reveal call signs, procedures,
and possible locations as well as a wealth of tactical information. An operator
proficient in the adversary's language will often gist a net in real time, passing
information obtained to analysts for collation and fusing with collateral
information. The use of encryption and other EP methods reduces the
accessibility of internal information. Net activity can always be monitored
in CNR even if the net is encrypted.
4.3.1
Characteristics of Intercept Receivers
Intercept receivers are similar to communications receivers [5], but because

they are not designed to interoperate with one particular communications
transmitter, they differ in a number of characteristics:
Sensitivity. An intercept receiver should be able to receive and decode

very weak signals. It would normally be expected that an intercept
receiver would have a higher sensitivity than a communications
receiver. This higher sensitivity is required because the intercept
receiver will usually be farther from the transmitter than a communi
cations receiver. Furthermore, if the transmitter uses a directional
antenna, it will be oriented toward the intended receiver. This
orientation will only rarely coincide with the direction to an intercept
receiver. The sensitivity of an intercept receiver should be not less
than the sensitivity of the supporting search receiver.
Noise peiformance. Much better noise performance will generally be
required in an intercept receiver than for a communications receiver.
This flows partly from the requirement for higher sensitivity. The
cost of improved noise performance may include larger size and
weight, especially for very high-performance systems where special
cooling may be required. The noise performance of an intercept
receiver should also be not less than the sensitivity of the supporting
search receiver.
Range of tuning. An intercept receiver is likely to provide coverage
of a much larger portion of the electromagnetic spectrum than a
communications receiver. Tuning ranges of 1 0 kHz to greater than
1 GHz can be commonly found. A communications transceiver is
1 14
likely to cover a much narrower portion of the spectrum, such as

30 to 88 MHz for a VHF CNR.
4.3.2
Channel bandwidth. An intercept receiver typically has a greater

choice of channel bandwidth than a communications receiver. The
channel bandwidth for a communications system is usually specified
in the design of the equipment, and the operator has little or no
control. VHF CNR, for example, usually has a fixed channel band
width of 25 kHz.
Granularity oftuning. The tuning granularity of an intercept receiver
will usually be much finer than a communications receiver. Tuning
granularities as small as 1 Hz are often found, even in low-cost
commercial equipment.
Modulation. The modulation prcess carried out by a transmitter
shifts the input baseband signal to another part of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The information may be carried in the amplitude, fre
quency, or phase of the transmitted signal. A communications
receiver usually has a fixed form of modulation, which is associated
with the band in which it operates. For example, an analog voice
radio would usually employ SSB in the HF band, while FM would
be more common in the VHF band. An intercept receiver is likely
to have a number of selectable modulation waveforms. For analog
signals, these would include amplitude modulation (both single and
double sideband) and frequency modulation. For digital signals,
amplitude-shift keying (ASK), frequency-shift keying (FSK) , and
phase-shift keying (PSK) are likely to be available [ 6] .
An intercept receiver may allow the operator to control a
number of internal parameters, such as gain of the RF stage, that
allow optimization of performance in marginal reception conditions.
RF gain.
Multichannel. An intercept receiver may also allow more than one

channel to be monitored simultaneously.
I ntercept Rece ivers
The most commonly employed types of intercept receiver are the superhetero
dyne intercept receiver and the digital intercept receiver. This section describes
the characteristics of these receivers, highlighting the likely differences from
the employment of similar architectures as search receivers.
115
Electronic Support
4.3.2.1
Superheterodyne I ntercept Receiver
Figure 4.9 shows a simple block diagram of a superheterodyne intercept

receiver. This block diagram is very similar to that shown previously for the
superheterodyne search receiver, differing only in the use of the output. The
operation of the individual blocks is somewhat modified by the unique
characteristics of intercept receivers outlined previously.
The RF stage of an intercept receiver provides the same function as
for a search receiver, providing amplification and selectivity. In an intercept
receiver, it is likely that the operator will have explicit control over the gain
selectivity tradeoff. This may be particularly important when a very weak
signal is intercepted and there is a strong signal on a nearby channel.
The local oscillator of an intercept receiver will almost certainly be
based on a frequency synthesizer. Without this, the intercept receiver is
unlikely to be able to tune across the wide range of frequencies required or
provide sufficiently fine granularity of tuning. The use of a frequency synthe
sizer also greatly aids the accuracy, stability, and repeatability of tuning.
The mixer converts the incoming RF signal to a fixed IF. As for the
search receiver, the purpose of the IF is twofold. First, it avoids the need
for having a large gain at the RF stage, where there is a tradeoff between
gain and selectivity. Second, the fixed frequency allows the optimization of
the IF amplifier and filter to a single frequency, regardless of the frequency
of the channel to which the receiver is tuned. The major additional feature
of this stage in the intercept receiver is its flexibility: It must be able to deal
with a variety of channel bandwidths and forms of modulation.
The detector provides the final stage of conversion of the signal to
baseband. This stage also requires additional flexibility due to different forms
of modulation. The output of the detector is passed to the recording system.
A superheterodyne intercept receiver would normally only allow a single
channel to be monitored. If the monitoring of more than one channel is
required, multiple receivers are used. The measurement of external character
istics may also be supported by a superheterodyne intercept receiver, possibly
Fixed I F
filter/amp
Recording
system
Figure 4.9 Simple block diagram of a superheterodyne intercept receiver.
116
by the connection of a spectrum analyzer to the output of the IF amplifier. A

combined search/intercept superheterodyne receiver would add a frequency
scanning capability to the basic intercept receiver.
4.3.2.2
D i gital Intercept Rec eiver
The block diagram of a digital intercept receiver is shown in Figure 4. 1 0.

The basic structure is the same as for a digital search receiver. In this case,
however, the operation of the signal-processing system is quite different.
The receiver front end provides amplification, and filtering for selectiv
ity and to prevent aliasing. The bandwidth of the output of the receiver
front end may be Iower for a digital intercept receiver than for a digital
search receiver, thus reducing the computational load on the signal-processing
system. This can be done without a compromise in performance, unless the
intercept receiver is required to provide the continuous monitoring of multi
ple channels spread across a wide bandwidth.
The analog-to-digital converter converts the output signal from the
receiver front end to a digital form. The sampling rate of the converter must
be at least twice the bandwidth of this signal to prevent aliasing. As was the
case for the digital search receiver, the linearity of the analog-to-digital
converter is critical to the performance of the whole system.
The functions of the signal processing system in a digital intercept
receiver are tuning (i.e., providing selectivity) ; measurement of external char
acteristics, such as channel bandwidth or modulation type; and demodulation,
shifting signals to baseband and, if necessary, converting modulated digital
signals into Os and ls.
The computational effort of performing the demodulation for one
channel is likely to be higher than for the continuous search of the same
channel in the digital search receiver. For this reason, there is some advantage
in reducing the sampling rate of the analog-to-digital converter (i.e., provide
some selectivity in the RF front end to reduce the bandwidth of the input
Receiver
front end
AID
converter
r---+
Signal-processing
system
Tuning
control
Figure 4.10 Simple b l o c k diagram of a digital intercept receiver.
Recording
system
Electromc Support
1 17
signal to the analog-to-digital converter), or performing this down-sampling

as the first step within the signal-processing system.
A digital intercept receiver may have an in-built recording and storage
system. If a computer controls the receiver, this storage may be provided
on the hard drive of the computer. Digital intercept receivers may also allow
simultaneous monitoring of multiple channels, subject to the processi ng
capacity of the signal-processing system and the rate at which the recording
system can store the received data.
The difference between a combined search/intercept digital receiver
and a conventional digital intercept receiver is mostly in the software used
to control the radio.
4.3.3
Intercept and the Tacti cal Commun ications System
Intercept aims to monitor and record an adversary's communications. The

growing use of embedded encryption in the tactical communications system .
is increasing the difficulty of decoding intercepted transmissions, especially
at the tactical level. However, extensive information can still be obtained
from traffic analysis of transmissions. Table 4.3 shows a summary of the
interaction between the intercept process and the subsystems of the tactical
communications system.
4.3.3.1
Ta cti c a l Trunk Subsystem
Before interception is possible, a transmission must be detected, which is

difficult due to the use of directional antennas and the distance between
transmitter and ES receiver. In addition to these difficulties, intercept is
hindered by the universal employment of bulk encryption on terrestrial radio
relay l inks. This means that the content of messages cannot be readily decoded
and traffic analysis is severely constrained. Even where decoding is possible,
it is almost certain that a ground-based intercept facil ity will intercept only
one-half of a duplex link, which is of limited value. Even an airborne
intercept platform may be unable to overcome this limitation for terrestrial
transmissions, since it is unlikely to be able to locate itself so as to intercept
both di rections of a ground-based duplex link. The interception of other
elements of the tactical trunk subsystem, including SHF down-the-hill li nks,
trunk H F radio, and h igh-capacity satellite li nks is similarly constrained.
Embedded encryption also h inders the interception of SCRA and si ngle
chan nel satellite communications systems, although limi ted traffic analysis
may be possible if transmission times are recorded, especia lly if multiple
access is provided using FDMA rather than CDMA or TDMA.
1 18
Electron i c Warfare for the D i gitized Battlef i eld
Table 4.3
The I ntercept FunctiOn and the Tact1 c a l Commun i cat i ons System
Tactical
Communications
Subsystem
Vulnerabilities
Protection
Trunk
O mnid irectional ante nnas 1n

SCRA.

dista n c e between transmitter
a n d ES, lme-of-s i ght
frequ e n cies, b u l k encryption,
continu o u s transmission, only
one-half of full-duplex links
a c cessible.
CNR
Omnidirecti o n a l a ntennas,
short d i stance between
transmitter and mtercept
facility, tra nsmission only
when messages sent.
Active EP: encryptiOn and

possibly FH.
Tacti c a l d ata
distribution
short dista nce between
tra nsmitter a nd interce pt
facility.
Extensive EP, including

encryption, continu o u s
transmission.
Airborne
H eight, omnidirectional
antennas.
Only downlink likely to be

intercepted.
4.3.3.2
C N R S ubsystem
Interception and recording of CNR have traditionally been a major part of

communications EW. Like search, intercept of these transmissions is aided
by the use of omnidirectional antennas and the limitation of the employment
of active EP to encryption and possibly FH. Because the CNR subsystem
operates as a single-frequency, half-duplex, all-informed network, intercept
tends to be more fruitful than in the trunk subsystem. For line-of-sight
CNR operating in the VHF and UHF bands, the short distances between
transmitters and ES facilities also favor interception. Some protection against
intercept can be provided by employment of passive EP techniques such as
terrain screening. The effectiveness of such techniques is greatest when only
a single intercept station is used; it is rarely possible to choose transmitter
sites that are screened from all possible locations in which an adversary
could site a ground-based intercept facility. The employment of an airborne
intercept facility greatly reduces the effectiveness of an adversary's terrain
screening and other passive EP techniques.
Electronic Support
1 19
Because of the almost exclusive use of unencrypted voice in CNR

systems in the past, intercept has concentrated on monitoring the internal
content of these transmissions. As well as providing a significant input to
the intelligence process, intercepted transmissions also provided immediate
tactical information of value to a commander. The replacement of voice
with data transmissions for some applications does not change the utility of
intercepted transmissions. However, the growing use of encryption for CNR
at all levels is increasing the difficulty of decoding intercepted transmissions,
whether voice or data. Even if encryption algorithms are weak, large-scale
cryptanalysis is unlikely to occur at the tactical level, limiting intercept
systems to acquiring external data to support traffic analysis.
4.3.3.3
Tacti c a l D ata Distrib ution Su bsystem
Even if detection of transmissions from the tactical data distribution subsys

tem is possible, the extensive use of active EP, including DSSS, FH, and
encryption, effectively prevents the decoding of transmissions at the tactical
level. The use of TDMA, with each station usually transmitting in all of its
allocated time slots, hinders the collection of external data that is useful for
traffic analysis. An airborne intercept facility overcomes limitations of terrain,
but offers no additional advantages for intercept in terms of overcoming the
active EP of this subsystem.
4.3.3.4
Airborne Subsystem
Because of its elevation, the airborne subsystem is more vulnerable to intercept

than the ground-based communications systems of which range it extends.
The use of encryption, however, makes it unlikely that intercepted transmis
sions can be decoded. Because all transmissions passing through the airborne
subsystem must travel on both an uplink and a downlink, the airborne
subsystem may enable a ground-based intercept facility to intercept both
halves of a duplex link even though it may not be able to monitor any of
the ground stations.
4.4 D i rection Finding

Direction finding (DF) can be used to provide information on the approxi
mate location of emitters of electromagnetic radiation. DF is predicated on
the basic principle of triangulation to find the position of an emitter. At
least three DF receivers are positioned on a baselie, as illustrated in Figure
4. 1 1 [7] .
Ele ctron i c Warfare fo r the Digitized Battlefield
1 20
DF3
Figure 4. 1 1 OF baseline and bearings taken on an emitter.
Each D F receiver has a special antenna, which is used to take a bearing

toward the emitter. The bearings are plotted on a map, either manually or
automatically, to form a triangle that should contain the emitter. The size
of the triangle (and therefore the uncertainty in locating the transmitter)
depends on the accuracy of each bearing.
At communications frequencies, the DF accuracies that are likely to
be obtained are in the order of 2 rms. At a range of 30 km, this leads to
an uncertainty of 1 km in the position of the emitter. Further insight into
the location of the emitter can be gained by an analysis of the map to
determine likely locations within the DF error. The accuracy of DF is
sufficient for use in constructing an EOB. However, for long-range target
acquisition DF is unlikely to have sufficient accuracy to be more than a
cuing aid.
The error in estimating the range to a transmitter can be simply
calculated for DF using a pair of DF receivers. Figure 4. 1 2 shows how the
relative error in estimating range varies with the angle between the lines of
bearing and the error in these angles. For large angles between the lines of
bearing, the relative error is equal to the error in the measurement, expressed
in radians. For small angles between the lines of bearing, the error increases,
passing 1 (i.e., 1 00%) when the angle between the lines of bearing reduces
to less than twice the error in the measurement of bearings.
The use of a third DF station can reduce the error in the estimated
location of the transmitter, and provide a check on the process by identifying
when a very large error has occurred in the measurement of one of the
bearings.
The bearing from a DF station to a transmitter may be determined
by one of four methods: the rotating directional antenna, amplitude difference,
Electronic Support
1
0.8
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0
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0.6
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Cil
Q)
a:
0.4
0.2
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
:
I
i
i
i
i
i
i
1 21
20
-----
40
60
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\'\ -:------
1-
'
1'--.
30
. ... _
.........._,____ ,...
-:.--""---.:----
-----
60
90
Angle between lines of bearing (degrees)

Figure 4.12 Relationship between range error, azimuth error, and angle between lines of
bearing.
phase difference, and time difference of arrival (TDOA) . The variation in

output power with orientation of a rotating directional antenna can indicate
the bearing to a transmitter. Alternatively, the bearing can be obtained by
measuring the amplitude difference between the signals received at three or
more antennas in an antenna array. The Watson-Watt and Wullenweber
methods both use amplitude difference to obtain bearings. The phase differ
ence between the signals received at antennas in an antenna array can be
used to determine the bearing. Doppler and pseudo-Doppler DF systems
use phase difference to calculate bearings. In systems that use pulsed transmis
sion, the bearing to the transmitter can be obtained by measuring the time
difference between the arrival of the pulse at two or more antennas. Such
DF systems, while commonly used for radar DF, are not currently in common
use in communications DF.
The advantages and disadvantages of the approaches commonly used
in tactical communications D F are discussed in the following sections.
1 22
4.4.1
Sources of Error
DF is subject to a number of sources of error.

Equipment Error Typical, modern, high-performance DF equipment gives
bearings with an accuracy of 2. Hand-held tactical units will often have
less accuracy, possibly 1 0.
If the baseline is such that the angle between bearing

lines is less than approximately 4 5, the triangle of error becomes significantly
elongated. This leads to a large uncertainty in the location of the transmitter.
Short-Baseline Error
Most tactical DF systems are not capable of distin

guishing between multiple received signals in a single channel. Where a
significant level of cochannel interference is present, the DF will give errone
ous bearings. The use of more than two DF locations may reveal errors
caused by cochannel interference.
Cochannel lnterference
Strong signals in a channel adjacent to the

one being DF'ed can lead to erroneous bearing.
A djacent-Channel Interference
Multipath error is a special case of cochannel interference.

In this case, two or more received signals originate at the same transmitter
but travel over different paths to the receiver. This can be caused by reflection
from natural and man-made obstacles or by mixed modes of propagation,
such as ground wave and sky wave. The choice of appropriate antennas can
reduce the impact of mixed modes of propagation. Multipath error can often
be minimized by the choice of an appropriate DF site, and is therefore often
called site error.
Multipath Error
Night effect is a special case of multipath error that occurs

when sky-wave propagation occurs at night but not during the day. This
effect occurs at HF and lower frequencies, and is most relevant to DF of
communications systems in the HF band.
Night Effect
Surface-wave propagation that crosses a coastline at an

angle other than a right angle is subject to bending caused by refraction.
This can lead to bearings that do not point at the transmitter. Coastal
refraction is usually only significant at frequencies below 1 0 MHz.
Coastal Refraction
Thunderstorms Thunderstorms can lead to erroneous bearings that point

towards the storm rather than the monitored transmitter.
1 23
Electronic Support
Heavy rain can lead to significantly reduced received signal levels in

the SHF and higher bands, reducing the range over which DF is effective.
Rain
4.4.2
Rotating D i rectional Antenna
A directional antenna transmits or receives power at higher levels in some

directions than in others. The bearing to a transmitter can be sensed either
by a maximum or minimum in received power as the orientation of the DF
rotating directional antenna is changed. Two examples of radiation patterns
of antennas that would be suitable for this task are shown in Figure 4. 1 3.
Figure 4 . 1 3 (a) shows a radiation pattern of a directional antenna in which
the bearing to a transmitter would be determined by a maximum in received
power. Figure 4. 1 3 (b) shows a radiation pattern in which the bearing to a
transmitter would be determined by a minimum in received power. The
arrows indicate the direction in which a bearing to a transmitter would be
obtained.
The accuracy with which the bearing can be determined by a rotating
directional antenna depends on the width of the lobe or null on which
bearings are based; the presence of other lobes or nulls that might give rise
(a )
{b)
Figure 4.13 Radiation patte rns of directio n a l antennas suitable for OF in which the bearing
to a transmitter would be determined by a (a) maximum and a (b) mm1mum
in received power.
1 24
Electronic W a rfare for t h e D igitized B attlefield
to false bearings to phantom transmitters; and for weak signals, the sensitivity
of the receiver.
Many antennas, such as the dipole, have radiation patterns that change
markedly with frequency. This can affect both the relative gain and width
of the lobes, and even the presence of the lobes and nulls in the radiation
pattern. Ideally, the radiation pattern of the antenna should be constant
across the frequency band of interest. In practice, some variation will always
occur. For an antenna to be suitable for DF, it is necessary that the feature
on which the bearing is based is present across the frequency band of interest
and that the size of other features remains small enough that they do not
interfere.
The advan tages of a rotating directional antenna for DF are that it
can distinguish between multiple transmitters on the same frequency, as
long as the bearings to the transmitters are not too close together; and very
small, hand-held, DF units can be constructed if the rotation is performed
physically by the operator.
The use of a rotating directional antenna for DF has a number of
disadvantages. Short-term transmissions, such as those from an FH transmit
ter, may not be reliably detected. The accuracy is limited by the width of
the lobe or null of the antenna's radiation pattern on which bearings are
based. Mechanical rotation is likely to be infeasible on many platforms,
including aircraft and land vehicles on the move. Moving parts are likely to
have high maintenance requirements. Antenna side lobes can lead to false
peaks and nulls in power, although this can be minimized with careful
antenna selection and construction.
4.4.3 Watson-Watt OF
The Watson-Watt DF method was developed to provide a DF system that

is able to receive from all directions simultaneously, thus overcoming one
of the principal disadvantages of the directional-antenna systems.
The basic principle of operation of the Watson-Watt DF system is
illustrated in Figure 4 . 1 4, which shows a typical early implementation of
the technique in which the bearing to a transmitter is displayed on a cathode
ray tube (CRT) . A crossed pair of loop antennas is used, with one antenna
oriented north-south and the other east-west. Each antenna is connected to
a receiver. The output signal level from the receiver is used to deflect the
electron beam on the display, with the bearing indicated by the presence of
a bright dot.
Electronic Support
1 25
Crossed-loop
antenna
ES receiver
channel
-<I>
<I>
(.)
<I>
'Cf)
w
-
Figure 4.14 Watson-Watt
Display
c:
c:
ctl
..c:
U
O F system.
The arrangement shown in Figure 4. 1 4 determines the bearing with an

ambiguity of 1 80. A further antenna is required to resolve this ambiguity.
A single dipole or monopole is typically used for this purpose.
A block diagram of a modern Watson-Watt DF system is shown in
Figure 4. 1 5. The CRT is replaced with a separate DF-bearing processor and
DF-bearing display. The DF-bearing processor would often be implemented
using digital signal processing. Both single channel (single receiver) and
multichannel (multiple receivers) implementations are possible.
The sensitivity of a Watson-Watt DF system is affected by the character
istics of the antenna, the receiver, and the bearing processor.
\I
\I
DF receiver
OF-bearing
processor
DF antennas
Figure 4.15 Watson-Watt OF system block diagram.
OF-bearing
display
1 26
The advantages of a Watson-Watt DF system are its capability of

receiving radiated power from all directions simultaneously, easy integration
into mobile D F platforms, and the overall cost-effectiveness of the system
compared to other methods. The disadvantages of a Watson-Watt D F system
are the cochannel interference producing misleading bearings and the higher
complexity and requirement for the calibration of the antenna system com
pared to other methods.
The description of the Watson-Watt technique was based on a loop
antenna. Most such systems use either a loop or an Adcock antenna. The
following sections examine the characteristics and relative advantages of each
type of antenna.
4.4.3.1
Crossed-Loop Antenna
The simplest form of antenna for a Watson-Watt DF system is a crossed

loop. This antenna is formed by placing a pair of loop antennas at right
angles to one another, as shown in Figure 4. 16. Each loop may be connected
to a separate receiver, or a single receiver may be switched between the loops.
The received power from a loop antenna depends on the orientation
of the loop with respect to the line to the transmitter. Maximum power is
received from transmitters broadside to the loop; minimum power is received
from transmitters end-on to the loop. Using a pair of crossed loops placed
at right angles to one another, the bearing to a transmitter can be sensed
by the relative power received from the two antennas. As stated above, the
crossed-loop antenna provides bearings with an ambiguity of 1 80. This
ambiguity can be resolved by the use of an additional antenna, sometimes
called a sense antenna.
North-South loop
East-West loop
Figure 4.16 Crossed-loop ante n n a .
Electronic Support
1 27
The primary disadvantages of the crossed-loop antenna are that it

provides no capability to discriminate between horizontally and vertically
polarized signals, and it is more susceptible than other types of antennas to
cochannel interference due to mixed surface-wave and sky-wave propagation.
4.4.3.2
Ad c o c k Antenna
The Adcock antenna is the most commonly used antenna for modern Watson
Watt DF systems. Figure 4 . 17(a) shows a plan view of two elements of an
Adcock antenna; Figure 4.1 7(b) shows its radiation pattern. The two antennas
may be implemented as monopoles or dipoles, as long as the two antennas
are matched. Signals arriving from the left are inverted at the output of the
summer; signals arriving from the right are passed through without being
inverted.
The simplest practical Adcock antenna consists of four monopoles
placed at the corners of a square. Larger numbers of elements of varying
lengths may be used to increase the bandwidth. This system has the advantage
that it can look in all directions simultaneously. With conventional pro
cessing, however, it can only operate in environments in which there is not
significant cochannel interference.
An n -element Adcock is formed by placing a number of Adcock pairs
around the dashed circle shown in Figure 4 . 1 7. The maximum diameter of
this circle is half the wavelength of the highest frequency signal to be received.
With four or more elements, a bearing to a transmitter with arbitrary azimuth
can be determined. The bearing output of an n-element Adcock antenna,
however, still contains an ambiguity of 1 80. This can be resolved by
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.17 Operation of the Adcock antenna, showing ( a ) a plan view of the a ntennas
and signal processing, and (b) the resulting radiation pattern.
1 28
comparing the phase of the output signals from the Adcock antenna with
the phase of the output of an omnidirectional sense antenna. The sense
signal will be in-phase for signals arriving from the right in Figure 4 . 1 7,
and out-of-phase for signals arriving from the left. The sense signal can be
obtained either by a separate antenna element placed at the center of the
Adcock antenna or by summing the outputs of all n antennas.
The spacing between Adcock pairs is limited to half the wavelength
of the highest frequency signal to be received. The length of the antennas
is also limited by the highest frequency: half the wavelength for a dipole
and a quarter of the wavelength for a monopole. These constraints limit the
aperture of the Adcock antenna and its ability to suppress site error.
The major advantages of the Adcock antenna over the crossed-loop
antenna are that it can discriminate between horizontally and vertically
polarized signals, and it is less susceptible than other types of antenna to
cochannel interference due to mixed surface-wave and sky-wave propagation.
4.4.4
Wullenweber OF
The Wullenweber DF system uses a circular array of antennas, as shown in

Figure 4. 1 8. A rotating commutator (known as a goniometer) selects the
direction from which the antenna array receives. At any time, the output
from a number of antennas is fed through variable delay lines to a sum/
different receiver.
The Wullenweber system allows either a sum or difference output from
the receiver to be used to determine a bearing. Like Watson-Watt DF systems,
Wullenweber DF systems determine bearings based on the amplitude of
received signals. For the sum display, the bearing is in the direction of the
lobe. For the difference display, the bearing is in the direction of the null.
Greater precision is typically obtained using the difference display.
Wullenweber DF systems tend to be large, static facilities. They are
mostly used for HF sky-wave DF. The advantages of a Wullenweber D F
system are its high resolution due to the use o f more than two antennas in
the array at any time, and the in-built flexibility in the choice of algorithms
for determining bearings. The disadvantage of a Wullenweber D F system is
that its large size makes it practical only for fixed installations, limiting its
applicability to tactical D F .
4.4.5
Doppler OF
The Doppler DF system calculates bearings based on measured phase differ

ences. The antenna for a Doppler DF system is usually a single element
Electronic Support
1 29
D, D2 D3 are delay lines

with increasing delay time
To receiver and
output indicator
Rotating capacity
coupled goniometer
Difference
Sum antenna
antenna pattern
pattern
Patterns on CRT display
Figure 4.18 Wullenweber OF system.
mounted at the edge of a spinning circular plate. When the antenna is

moving toward a transmitter, the received frequency increases; when the
antenna is moving away from a transmitter, the received frequency decreases.
The bearing to the transmitter can be determined by finding the bearings
at which the maximum and minimum received frequency occurs. Doppler
DF systems can distinguish between multiple transmitters sharing a single
channel as long as the bearings from the DF antenna to the transmitters are
sufficiently separated.
However, the requirement for physical rotation of the antenna has the
same drawbacks as a DF system based on a rotating directional antenna. A
pseudo-Doppler DF system replaces the rotating antenna with a circular
array of fixed antennas and a fast-rotating commutator that switches the
receiver's input between the antennas. This overcomes the requirement for
a physical rotation and permits a much higher commutation rate than would
be possible with physical rotation. The pseudo-Doppler DF receiver employs
FM demodulation followed by phase comparison to the tone formed by the
sequence of commutator angles, known as the commutation tone.
The advantages of a pseudo-Doppler DF system are that there is no
inherent limitation on the aperture of the antenna, in contrast to Adcock
130
Electrontc Warfare for the Dtgtttzed B attleft eld
antennas, which leads to a greater ability to suppress site error; multiple

transmitters sharing a single frequency can be distinguished, as long as their
bearings from the OF receiver are not too close; and it has antenna simplicity
and wider bandwidth than Warson-Watt systems. The disadvantages of a
pseudo-Doppler OF system are that the overall system complexity is typically
higher than for Watson-Watt OF systems taking into account antennas,
commutator and receiver; lower OF sensitivity, arising from the requirement
for a high commutation rate to maximize OF sensitivity but a low commuta
tion rate to minimize susceptibility to variation in the receiver group delay
commutation rate; and the need to employ short antennas to minimize the
impact of antenna reradiation.
4.4.6
The DF Baseline
The stations in a O F baseline may be deployed in a number of configurations:

standalone, convex, concave, and lazy-W
In standalone operation, a single OF station is used to provide a line
of-bearing to a target. Target location cannot occur using this mode, since
only a single OF is employed. The standalone configuration is illustrated in
Figure 4. 1 9 .
The convex configuration deploys the OF stations i n a line, with those
at the center closer to the adversary transmitter and those at the edge farther
away. The convex configuration tends to be best when targets are located
to the sides of the baseline; this is illustrated in Figure 4.20.
The concave configuration deploys OF stations with those at the edge
of the baseline closest to the target. It is best used for targets that are directly
in front of the baseline. The concave configuration is illustrated in Figure
4.2 1 .
The lazy-W configuration is illustrated in Figure 4.22, and uses four
or more OF stations to provide a good overall coverage where the approximate
earing
Figure 4. 1 9 Sta n d a lone OF operati on.
Electronic Support
Figure 4.20 Convex O F baseline.
131
1 32
Electron i c Warfare for the D 1 g itized Battlef i eld
Figure 4.22 Lazv-W. OF baseline.
locations of targets are not known in advance. This configuration may be

easily extended to provide a larger area of coverage.
In practice, terrain and the tactical situation may place additional
limitations on the locations of DF stations, making it difficult to achieve
the desired configuration.
4.4.7
DF and the Tactical Commun ications System
The purpose of DF is to locate an adversary's transmitters, using the frequen

cies provided by the search process and prioritization from intercept. Issues
associated with the employment of DF against the subsystems of the tactical
communications system are very similar to those for search. The major
difference is in the additional difficulties encountered by DF when targeting
short-term and rapidly changing signals, including F H and burst transmis
sion. Many ES systems have a search facility that hands off detected targets
to a separate D F system for location. Detection, hand off, and D F (by all
stations) must all occur before the target signal disappears. In practice, this
Electronic Support
1 33
means that search and DF systems must be highly integrated to operate

against short-term and rapidly changing signals.
Table 4.4 shows a summary of the interaction between DF and the
subsystems of the tactical communications system.
4.4.7.1
Tactical Tru nk Su bsystem
The use ofDF against the tactical trunk subsystem suffers from the difficulties
associated with search. Terrestrial radio relay links, SHF down-the-hill links,
and satellite links are all protected by the use of directional antennas, transmis
sion frequencies providing line-of-sight operation, and the long distances
that will usually exist between transmitters and DF facilities. Even if a
network of DF systems locates one or more nodes in the trunk network,
this does not automatically lead to a picture of the network structure.
The use of DF on transmissions from SCRA base stations that are
collocated with a trunk node may provide an indirect means of locating
such a node, even though its main equipment (terrestrial radio relay and
SHF down-the-hill links) may not be detectable. Used against SCRA mobile
terminals, DF has the potential to reveal the locations of important personnel
Table 4.4
The O F Function a n d the Tactical Communications System
Tactical
Communications
Subsystem
Vulnerabilities
Protection
Trunk
Omnidirectional antennas in
SCRA.

distance between transmitter
and search facility, line-of
sight frequencie s.
CNR
Omnidirectional antennas,
short distance between
transmitter and search
facility, transmission only
when messages sent.
Low power, low antennas,

terrain screening, possibly FH.
Tactical data
distribution
transmitter and search
facility.
Extensive EP, including FH.
Airborne
Height, omnidire ctio nal

antennas.
Only downlinks are likely to be

detected by tactical EW
assets.
1 34
(including commanders) operating outside command posts. Ground-based

DF of base stations will often be easier than for mobile stations due to the
placement of base-station antennas on masts and mobile-station antennas
close to the ground. The height of the base-station antennas will reduce the
shielding effect of terrain.
DF of long-range trunk HF systems within the AO is likely to yield
only the location of the far end of the link, unless the D F stations are
sufficiently close to the transmitter to receive surface-wave signals. For
many uses of these systems, such as those providing a rear link, the location
of the station in the AO is of much more interest than the station outside
the AO.
4.4.7.2
C N R S u b system
The application of DF against the CNR subsystem has perhaps the greatest
potential to reveal an adversary's EOB, regardless of whether VHF or HF
CNR is used. The use of omnidirectional antennas and the short distances
between transmitter and DF facility hinders the use of terrain screening,
while the use of net structures tied to command arrangements eases the
analysis task.
Short-term and rapidly changing signals (such as burst transmission
and FH, which are becoming more commonly used as a means of EP in
the CNR subsystem) provided a particular challenge to DF. Effective DF
requires that the target is detected and passed to the DF system and the
line-of-bearing is acquired all within the time during which transmission
occurs in a single channel. To be effective against such signals, it is necessary
to have a high level of automation and integration between search and DF,
since the involvement of a human operator in the process will lead to response
times that are far too long. One possible approach is to have a number of
integrated search/DF facilities that store a line-of-bearing, reception time,
and frequency for each detected signal. This data can then be passed to
an analysis facility that combines lines-of-bearing associated with the same
frequency and reception time to locate the transmitter.
4.4.7.3
Tacti c a l D ata D i stri b ution S ubsystem
While DF of the transmitters in the tactical data distribution subsystem is

assisted by the use of omnidirectional antennas, the short distance between
transmitter and DF facility, and the regular transmissions of many stations
to share situational awareness data, the extensive use of EP including FH,
DSSS, and burst transmission provides a high level of protection for transmit
ters. Therefore, with currently available technology DF against the tactical
Electronic Support
1 35
data distribution subsystem is very difficult. Because every vehicle in a

mechanized force is likely to be a node of this subsystem and to transmit
regularly (perhaps more than once per minute), DF has the potential to
reveal completely the force's disposition if the impact of the subsystem's EP
can be overcome.
4.4.7.4
Airborne Su bsystem
D F applied to the airborne subsystem is most likely to reveal only the location
of the airborne platform, unless the DF system can also be targeted against
the associated ground terminals. DF may, however, be useful in identifying
the source of transmissions as an airborne platform because of the high
concentration of emissions that are likely.
4.5 Ana lysis

Analysis is carried out in an attempt to put together a comprehensive adversary
EOB and to obtain other information that may give insight into an adversary
commander's plans or intent. Information for analysis might be obtained
from the signal characteristics; traffic patterns in transmissions; information
content, if decoding and decrypting are possible; and transmitter location
[8] .
Information from these sources is analyzed to provide an overall picture
of the adversary's deployment. Conclusions are usually drawn about activity,
future intentions, headquarter locations, unit types, and formation bound
aries. However, as with any intelligence, care must be taken to ensure that
the conclusions are tested against collateral (other intelligence) sources, to
counter possible enemy deception techniques.
4.5.1
Traffic Analysis
In EW, traffic analysis deals with the study of the external characteristics of
radio communications for the purpose of obtaining information on the
organization and operation of the communications system. This information
is then used to construct an EOB, which shows the disposition and command
structure of the adversary's forces. In some circumstances it may also be
possible to identify the adversary commander's intentions, even without
being able to read the contents of transmissions [9] .
Traffic analysis uses three basic types of data. Intercept data is the
contents of the messages transmitted. This is sometimes subdivided to
Electronic Warfare fo r t h e Digitized B attlefield
1 36
distinguish information gained from procedural parts of the messages, such

as call signs, from the actual contents of the messages passed. External data
includes the time and frequency of a transmission. Collateral information
may be available for a particular transmission, such as DF bearings to locate
the transmitter or information available from other sources of intelligence.
4.5.2
Crypta n a lys i s
Cryptanalysis is the process of decoding an adversary's encrypted data. There

are usually insufficient rime, resources, and expertise at the tactical level to
perform cryptanalysis, except possibly for very simple, hand-driven codes.
Cryptanalysis is usually carried our at the strategic level, where ir is a key
function of SIGINT [ 1 0]. Encrypted clara that is intercepted by tactical ES
units m ay be passed to a h ig h er level for cryptanalysis.
4.5.3
The Analysis Fu ncti o n a n d the Tactical C o m m u n i ca t i o n s

System
A n a lysi s p ro vid e the m e.1 n s of fm i n g d .ua obtained hom a variety of ES

s
ou rces to p ro v i de .1
cha rac tc ri !> tics of r h e
an adversary. The
communications system are
cloely related to rhe types of i n fo r m ,u i o n t h u
, can be o b t a i n e d . Table 4 . 5
s h ow a s u m m a ry o f t h e i n tera c t i o n between O F a n d t h e subsystems o f the
h i gher l evel o f i n fo r m :u i o n about
\Ubyrcms o f r h c tac tical
tact ica l co m m u n i c.u i o ns yre m .
T a b l e 4.5
The Ana lysiS F u n ct1on a n d the Ta ct1 c a l C o m m u n 1 c a t1ons System
Ta ctical
Com m u n i cations
S ubsystem
Trunk
V u l n e ra b i l ities
Protection
N etwork topology may be
B u l k e n c rypt1on p revents
mferred.
traffic a n a lysis.
Traff1c a n a lys i s .
( Possibly) FH.
T a c t 1 c a l d ata
L a r g e n u m b e r of transm ittmg
T D M A prevents traffic
d 1stn but1on
stat1 o n s .
a n a lysis.
CNR
A1rborne
T r a n s m 1 s s 1 o n s o p e n e d u p to
O n ly d o w n l i n ks l i kely to be
traffic a n a lysis.
av a i l a b l e for a n a lysis by
t a c ti c a l EW assets.
Electronic Support
4.5.3.1
1 37
Tacti c a l Trun k Su bsystem
Analysis of ES data obtained from the tactical trunk subsystem may be used
to build up a picture of the structure of a terrestrial radio relay network.
This network structure may reveal weak points at which the network may
be easily attacked. It may also be possible to infer the approximate locations
of command posts from the network structure. The use of bulk encryption
and continuous transmission in the trunk subsystem, however, reduces the
external characteristics of the transmissions to the point that they convey
little or no information about the structure of the traffic being carried.
4.5.3.2
C N R S u bsystem
Analysis associated with the CNR subsystem is primarily concerned with

traffic analysis. The CNR subsystem is characterized by a number of features
that make possible traffic analysis by an adversary: transmissions occur only
when a message is to be sent; the hierarchical structure of nets in the CNR
subsystem matches the command structure of the force; the level of activity
on the net will tend to reflect the intensity of operational activities; and not
all transmissions are encrypted, especially at battalion and below.
For encrypted nets, the information available for traffic analysis includes
the start time and duration of transmissions, the frequency on which transmis
sions are made, and, if D F is available, the physical location from which a
transmissiOn 1s sent.
Stations that transmit on the same frequency are almost certainly
associated with the same net. For a command net, it is likely that the net
control station is collocated with the superior headquarters and that it will
be the station that either transmits or receives the most messages. The
net control station is also the most likely station to initiate a check of
communications, which will see all the other stations reply in sequence. It
is also the station that will take the lead in fixing problems, such as when
cryptographic equipment loses synchronization. Other types of nets, such
as artillery nets and EW nets, will also tend to have distinguishing characteris
tics as a result of their operational procedures. Collocation of stations on
multiple nets also gives information on the command relationship between
organizations.
For nets that are not encrypted, traffic analysis may also make use of
some internal characteristics of a transmission, such as station call signs.
Even where suitable encryption equipment is available, judicious application
of jamming may force an adversary to drop back to unencrypted voice
operation. Traffic analysis of unencrypted nets is aided by an adversary who
does not take special measures to conceal the connection between call signs,
1 38
Ele ctronic Warfare for the Digitized B attlefield
nets, and the structure of the force. Examples include using call signs that
were based on abbreviations of the names of units (as was done by the British
for a period during World War I), using the same call sign for a station on
more than one net, using the same call sign for a station on both primary
and alternate frequencies on the same net, basing the selection of call signs
on a theme (such as the names of flowers) that can be identified with a
particular unit or formation, and utilizing the same frequencies and call signs
for a net for long periods of time.
4.5.3.3
Tacti c a l Data Distrib ution Subsystem
The use of a variety of EP techniques and a regular structure of transmission

in the tactical data distribution subsystem also removes structure that might
be used for traffic analysis. Little information is likely to be available about
command arrangemenrs, because every station in a fo rmation appears to be
talking to every other station.
4.5.3.4
Airborne Subsystem
The concentration of transmirters in the airborne subsystem and its use for
range extemion remove any terrain screening that might have been obtained
by the siting of ground-based transmitters. For CNR, this has the potential
to open up to traffic analysis nets that might not otherwise have been
intercepted.
4.6 ES P l atforms
ES can be conducted from ground-based or airborne platforms. Airborne .
ES may complement or provide an alternative to ground-based systems.
Aircraft have several advantages, including increased intercept range; a shorter
reaction time, allowing critical information to be passed to tactical users in
real time; greater mobility and flexibility, perm irting deployment over any
terrain in response to urgent requirements; and enhanced survivability by
operating in a standoff role.
4.6.1
Ground Pl atforms
Ground-based ES may operate from ground vehicles or in a manpack role.

4.6. 1 . 1
G ro u n d V e h i c l e s
Ground vehicles, including small four-wheel drive vehicles, trucks, and

armored vehicles, are commonly used as ES platforms. The type of vehicle
Electronic Support
1 39
is usually dictated by the type of force being supported; ES assets require

at least the same mobility as other parts of the force. Therefore, if the force
is mounted in armored vehicles, it is usually necessary to mount the support
ing ES in armored vehicles.
The weight that can be carried by a ground ES platform varies with
the type of vehicle, ranging from approximately 500 kg for a small four
wheel drive vehicle to in excess of 1 ,000 kg for a truck. Many ground ES
platforms are mounted in shelters, which may weigh significantly more than
the equipment that they house. Space may also be a significant limitation
in some platforms, especially armored vehicles.
Vehicle-based operation permits ES antennas to be deployed on masts,
allowing operation up to approximately 30m above the ground. Effective
ranges at VHF and higher frequencies are likely to be approximately
1 5 to 50 km, depending on terrain and siting.
Operation . of ground vehicle-based ES on-the-move may not always
be possible. It is unlikely that masts longer than 5m could be deployed on
a moving ground vehicle; in fact, mast height would probably need to be
much less for some types of antennas or for movement through foliage.
Significant additional errors are likely to be caused to DF, both because of
higher errors in measurements of bearings and less precise knowledge of the
location from which the bearings were taken. The moving vehicle is likely
to move in and out of coverage of targets, limiting its effectiveness, especially
in search and intercept operations. It is unlikely to be possible to deploy
HF sky-wave antennas on a moving vehicle due to their size. A human
operator inside a moving ground vehicle is unlikely to be able to work
effectively, especially if writing or using a keyboard is required.
4.6. 1 .2
M a n - Po rta b l e ES
The major differences in characteristics between ES systems designed for

vehicle-based operation and those designed to be man-portable are the lower
allowable weight of the man-portable system, the likely accuracy of bearings
obtained in a man-portable DF system, and the height at which both ES
and communications antennas can be deployed.
With the development of digital signal processing (DSP) technology,
the impact of weight on search, intercept, and DF performance is reducing.
However, the establishment of a man-portable ES command system is likely
to be more problematic. This is due to the weight and bulk of the computing
and communications systems that are required.
4.6.2
Air Platforms
Air platforms overcome the limitations of ground-based ES, using their

height to provide long-range line-of-sight paths. These air platforms may be
1 40
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized B attl efield
manned or unmanned fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, UAVs, or aerostats.

The payload weight supported by these platforms ranges from approximately
1 0 kg in a tactical UAV to in excess of 1 0,000 kg in a transport aircraft.
As discussed in Chapter 2 for airborne communication systems, in the
VHF and higher bands, deployment of an airborne ES platform at an altitude
of 65,000 ft would provide coverage of an area 500 km in diameter. At this
height, highly directional antennas may be required to reduce the impact
of cochannel interference. The area of coverage can be increased by the use
of rwo or more airborne platforms, possibly with di rect communications
li nks to facilitate coordination and exchange of data. An airborne platform
also has advan tages for ES i n the I-I F band, especially for sky-wave transmis
sions. A grou nd-based ES platform would usually have to be deployed within
the coverage of both ends of a communications link. This may be difficult
to achieve for a ground platform, bur is eaily achieved for an airborne
platform. An airborne O F platform can provide it own basel ine by measuring
bearings to a rransmirrcr from diffcrciH locations a ir moves over rhe battle
field. This approach will nor be eflecrive agaimr shorr-rerm or rapidly chang
ing rransmis!->iom, !>incc ir relic!'> on rhc con t i nued presence of rhe signal.
An airborne ES p la t lorm may also C.liT)' EA assers.
Endnotes
Ill
U S d o U r i n e o n 1-.\
U.S.
,\rm:
1\
L< >Vernl 1 1 1 :
.1'1- 1 .
held l\'l . l l l l l.ti i M
S e p t e m be r 1 ')') /j ,
U . \ . 1\ rm:
h e l d 1\!.mu.tl F M
U . . A rm :
held M .uw.tl 1 ,\l
J>l.t n n 1 n g . " M a rch 1 'J')Ij .
' ' l n t d l qent.e a n d Eku ro n i c W.ul:tre Opera t ions,"
) /j - 2 ,
Lku ro n i L \V.u{t re . " S e p t e m ber
" C:o l l n t i O i l M . l ll.tgemelll .tnd Syn c h ro n i i..Hion
jlj-,)(,,
1 ') ') 1 .
" S peu.tl Oper:111ons Forces l 11 1 c l l igence a n d
U . S . 1\ r m y held M .t n u .t l 1 ,\l .)/j -_) 7 , " LdtLIom 1\hme Corp.\

l:ku r<HliC \V,t rl.tre ( 1 1 .\\') Oper.l t l o m . " J.mu.try 1 ') ') 1 .
U . S . i\ r my
121
l 11 1 e l l igcnce .1nd
held M .u t u .tl F.'vt 3ft-/j0-'J " D 1 reuion F i n d i n g Oper.H i o n s , " August 1 9 ') 1 .
T h e ch.tr.lU efiSt l l \ o r e.lrth reLeiVL'I' L.tn he f ( n l n d i n :

Neri. 1 . , lntror!t(( /lfJ/1 t o Flrl lroll!f
1 ') ') 1 .
Sch lcher, I ) . C: . , !:lntronJI'

Houe. 1 ')')').
V.KC.Iro, D. D., l:'!n trollll'
1 99.1.
13]
( Ei\C)
/Jt:flwr .\).1 11'111.1',
1\'lmj;m 111
\\'lmj:m
Sec.:, f(>r e x a m p l e . Wn gh t , D . .
N o rwood, M /\: 1\ nech H ouse,
tiH' hfimlltllttlll ;lgl', Norwood, M A : A n ech
Nt'l'l'l/11'1'
!;j)'I'(I/I'!Jrr,
\)'J/t'/1/J,
N o rwood, MA: A n ech H o use,
R 1 c h m o n d , VA: W i l l i a m H e i n e m a n n , 1 9 87.
Electronic Support
[4)
141
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protectzon for Facdzties, Engineering and
Design Pamphlet EP 1 1 1 0-3-2, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, December 1 990. A
number of other publications have recently been declassified, including:
NACSIM 5000, "TEMPEST Fundamentals," National Security Agency, February
1 982.
NACSEM 5 1 1 2 (RP-4), "NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques," National Security
Agency, April 1 975.
NSTISSI No. 7000, "Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities," National Security
Agency, September 1993.
NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-9 5, "Red/Black Installation Guidance," National Security
Agency, December 1 995.
[5)
The characteristics or intercept receivers are discussed i n , for example, Rohde, U. L.,
and T. T. N. Bucher, Communicatwns Recewers: Prmczples and Deszgn, New York:
McGraw Hill, 1 976.
[6)
See, for example, Sklar, B., Dzgital Commumcatwns, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1 988; or Proalcis, ]. G., Digztal Commumcations, 2nd Edition, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1 989.
[7)
A large number of books have been written o n DF, including:

Cotter, C. H., The Princzples and Practice ofRadw Dzrection Fmdmg, London: Pitman,
1 96 1 .
Gething, P . ] . D., Radio Direction Finding and Superresolution, 2nd Edition, Stevenage,
Hens: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1 99 1 .
Lo, Y. T., and S. W. Lee, Antenna Handbook: Theory, Applzcations, and Design, New
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1 988.
Watson, D. W., Radio Direction Finding, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1 97 1 .
[8)
Discussions of the techniques of analysis can be found in:

Callimahos, L. D., and W. F. Friedman, Military Cryptanalytics, Laguna Hills, CA:
Agean Park Press, 1 985.
Levite, A., Intelligence and Strategic Surprises, New York: Columbia University Press,
1 987.
Sinkov, A., Elementary Cryptanalysis: A Mathematical Approach, New York: The Mathe
matical Association of America, 1 966.
[9)
Callimahos, L. D., and W. F. Friedman, Mditmy C1yptanalytzcs, Part 2, Vol. 2, Laguna

Hills, CA: Agean Park Press, 1 985, pp. 477-486.
[ 1 0)
Many books have been written on the contributions of cryptanalysis, especially in

World War II, including:
Smith, M . , The Emperor's Codes: Bletchlq Park and the Breaking ofjapan 's Secret
Ciphers, London: Bantam Press, 2000.
Smith, M., Station X The Codebreakers ofBletchley Park, London: Channel 4 Books,
1 998.
5
Electronic Attack
5.1
Introduction
Electronic attack (EA) is the division of EW involving the use of electromag

netic energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. In a simi
lar manner to indirect fire, EA aims to minimize the effect of adversary
devices that rely upon the EM spectrum [ 1 ] .
The subdivisions of EA are illustrated in Figure 5 . 1 . Jamming aims to
impair the effectiveness of the adversary's electronic equipment or systems
by degrading the quality of the signal at a receiver. Electronic deception
aims to confuse or mislead the adversary or the adversary's electronic systems.
Neutralization is the use of electromagnetic energy to either disrupt or
permanently damage adversary communications or electronic equipment.
The power required for neutralization is typically many times larger than
that required for the effective jamming of a receiver. Neutralization will be
covered briefly in this chapter. RF directed energy weapons, a major new
means for achieving neutralization of communications and other electronic
systems, are examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
EA can target adversary communications systems through jamming,
deception, and neutralization; adversary ES through jamming, deception, and
neutralization; and adversary electronics, primarily through neutralization.
EA does not exist in isolation, but rather as part of a force's fire plan,
which in turn is part of the operational plan. The relationship between EA
and other parts of the operational plan is discussed in Chapter 6.
1 43
1 44
Electronic warfare
Active
Jamming
Deception
N eutralization
Figure 5.1 EW a rc hitectu re.
ES provides a variety of information required for EA, including frequen

cies to be used. While EA is being carried out, ES also provides monitoring
of the effectiveness of the EA.
5.2
Jamming
The aim of comm unications ja m ming is t o disrupt adversary com m unications

by delivering more power at rhe receivers in the net than is delivered by
the intended transmirrer. Receivers, nor transmitters, are jam med. Effective
jam ming requires the jammer either ro be closer than the intended transmit
ter, which is unlikely in mosr racrical situations, or to transmit on higher
power serrings. Eith er of these approaches m akes the jam mer vulnerable to
adversary ES and weapon syste ms. Therefore, the jammer is normally very
mobile and does nor stay in rhc sam e position for very long after jamming.
Ground-based jam mers also rend to operate in pairs, one jamming while
the other is moving. Continuous jamming can therefore be achieved while
minim izing opportunities for detection.
Jamming may aim to jam all the receivers associated with a particular
part of the adversary's communications system (e.g., a net) , or ir may aim
to jam a single receiver. Jam ming is normally used with ES support, so that
the effectiveness of jam ming can be determined. The supporting ES may
be rem otely located or collocated with the jam mer.
Jam ming can be used to target either adversary communications systems
or adversary ES. Jamming used to reduce the effectiveness of adversary
ES is often referred to as masking. The use of masking allows friendly
ELectronic Attack
1 45
communications systems to operate with reduced risk from adversary ES.

Jamming is not used against electronics other than RF receivers.
5.2.1
Jamming-to-Signal Ratio
The performance of a jammer depends on the relative signal levels from the
jammer and the communications .transmitter at the input of a receiver being
jammed. It is therefore a receiver that is jammed, not a transmitter.
The power received by the receiver's antenna from the transmitter
depends on the power generated by the transmitter's power amplifier P T,
the loss in the feeder system to the transmit antenna L T' the gain of the
transmit antenna in the direction of the receiver G TR > the propagation loss
due to the path between the transmitter and receiver L TR > and the gain of
the receiver's antenna in the direction of the transmitter G RT With the
losses and gains expressed as power ratios, the power received from the
transmitter P RT can be expressed as:
The power received by the receiver's antenna from the jammer depends
on the power generated by the jammer's power amplifier, which lies within
the bandwidth of the receiver P1; the loss in the feeder system to the jammer's
transmit antenna L] ; the gain of the jammer's transmit antenna in the
direction of the receiver G]R ; the propagation loss due to the path between
the jammer and receiver L]R ; and the gain of the receiver's antenna in the
direction of the jammer G Rj . With the losses and gains expressed as power
ratios, the power received from the jammer P R] can be expressed as:
These factors are illustrated in Figure 5.2.

The jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR) can be written as:
Two further factors are involved in the transfer of power into the
receiver, but both of these impact equally on signals from transmitter and
1 46
GTR
ft_
PT
Transmitter
Figure 5.2 Factors impacting on power received from jammer and tra nsmitter.
jammer: losses in the feeder system from the receiver's antenna to the receiver,
and the receiver sensitivity.
For j amming to be effective, two conditions must be met: the power
received from the jammer must be greater than the sensitivity of the receiver,
and the JSR must be sufficiently large.
The value of JSR required to achieve a particular effect depends on
the type of modulation used. A rule of thumb for FM voice and for data
systems not protected by spread-spectrum EP techniques is that a JSR of 1
will lead to significant degradation of performance and a JSR greater than
2 will lead to an almost total loss of performance.
5.2.2
Jamming Signals
A jamming signal is created by modulating a baseband signal to the channel

to be jammed. The most common types of jamming signals are frequency
modulated noise, amplitude-modulated noise, and CW.
Frequency-modulated noise can be used to jam both amplitude-modu
lated and frequency-modulated transmissions. The bandwidth of the jam
ming signal is controlled by a combination of the bandwidth of the baseband
signal and the modulation index of the frequency modulator. A s ufficiently
strog frequency-modulated-noise jamming signal will capture a PSK, FSK,
or FM receiver, preventing any of the original signal from being received.
A weaker frequency-modulated-noise jamming signal will increase the bit
error rate in data systems and slightly increase the noise in FM-voice systems.
Electronic Attack
1 47
The freqency-modulated-noise signal will cause additive noise in an AM

receiver, causing significant signal degradation levels .
. Amplitude-modulated noise can be used effectively as a jamming signal
only with AM transmissions. Amplitude-modulated noise has little impact
on FM transmissions, unless the noise leels are very large. The impact of
an amplitude-modulated-noise jamming signal on an AM transmission will
be to increase the additive noise in the receiver.
CW jamming involves transmitting only a carrier signal. This jamming
can be effective against frequency-modulated transmissions via the capture
effect and against AM transmissions when its signal level is much larger than
the intended transmission. The drawback ofCW jamming is its predictability,
which makes it more easily overcome by EP techniques.
One advantage of using noise as a jamming signal is that it is inherently
unpredictable. This increases the difficulty for EP techniques attempting to
reduce the impact of the jamming, whether they are in the transmitted signal
or in the receiver.
5.2.3
Types of Commun ications Jamming
There are a number of different types of communications jamming that

may be employed. The main types and their characteristics are outlined in
Figure 5.3.
Types of jamming
Swept
Spot
Wide coverage
Concentrated power
High fratricide
More efficient
Single frequency
Minimum fratricide
High power
Inefficient
Comb
Multiple frequencies
Medium power
Defined targets
Efficient
Barrage
Wideband
Reduced power
High fratricide
Inefficient
. Figure 5.3 Types of communications jamming.
Responsive
Single frequency
High power
Look-through required
Efficient
Electro nic Warfa re for the Digitized Battlefield
1 48
5.2.3.1
S p ot J a m m i n g
Spot jamming occurs on a single channel. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, .a

spot jammer consists of a generator for the jamming signal; a transmitter
that translates the jamming signal from the baseband to the channel to be
jammed and is likely to differ from a communications transmitter only in
its higher output power; and an antenna that would usually be a directional
antenna.
The generator for the jamming signal produces a baseband signal. As
discussed previously, this would usually be noise. The transmitter modulates
the baseband signal, placing it in the channel to be jammed. This modulation
may be FM or AM. The bandwidth of the transmitted signal would usually
be the same as the channel bandwidth of the system being jammed: 3 kHz
for HF CNR and 25 or 5 0 kHz for VHF CNR. The transmitter also contains
a power amplifier.
The directional antenna would usually be pointed at the receiver to
be jammed. The use of a directional antenna both maximizes the jamming
power at the receiver being jammed and minimizes the jamming power
transmitted in other directions that might impact on friendly communica
tions.
The spot jammer has the advantage that all of the jamming power is
concentrated into a single channel, which will maximize the impact of the
jamming on a receiver tuned to that channel. Jamming on a single channel
also minimizes fratricide, since friendly communications systems using other
channels are unlikely to be affected by the jamming unless they are very
close to the jammer.
The djgg:YC1-_!!._!:ages of a spot jammer are its lack of flexibilicy, the leye.L
q_f control required, and the lack of an in-built method to provide steerage
Directional
antenna
\I
Narrowband
jamming signal
generator
Modulator
Jamming signal
control
Tuning
control
Figure 5.4 O utline structure of a spot ja mmer.
Power
amplifier
1--
Electronic Attack
149
The spot jammer is tuned to a single channel, as would be done for a

communications transmitter. It cannot rapidly change the channel being
jammed. When using a spot jamer, jamming may have to be periodically
suspended for short periods to allow friendly ES to evaluate the effectiveness
of the jamming. This requirement may be overcome if the supporting ES
receiver is located remotely from the jammer, so that its input is not swamped
by the high-power jamming signal.
5.2.3.2
Barrage Jamming
In barrage jamming, the jamming signal is spread across a large number of

adjacent channels. Because it jams a large number of channels, a barrage
jammer requires relativly)ittle information about the frequencies being used
by the targeted system. Its jamming power is spread across a number of
channels, reducing the jamming power in any one channel compared to a
spot j ammer, thereby reducing the impact f the jamming.
A barrage jammer (Figure 5 .5) co nsists of a generator for the jamming
signal; a transmitter, providing modulation and power amplification; and a
directional antenna.
The generator (or the jamming signal produces a baseband signal,
which would usually be noise for a barrage jammer. A means would usually
be provided to adjust the bandwidth of the transmitted jamming signal.
This may involve control of the modulation process or the bandwidth-.cl
the baseband jamming signal.
The use of a directional antenna with a barrage jammer to prevent
fratricide is even more important than with a spot jammer. The power
output in each channel is lower than for a spot jammer, reducing the impact
on adversary communications. Since a large number of channels are being
Directional
antenna
\V
Variable bandwidth
..
jammin g sign al generator
Jamming signal
bandwidth control
Wideband
m odu l ator
Tuning
control
Figure 5.5 Outline structure of a barrage jammer.
f----.
Power
amplifier
1 50
Electronic Warfare fo r the O i g 1t1zed B attlefield
jammed, the likely im pact on friendly communications is higher. The usc

of a directional antenna wi ll provide some protection to friendly commun ica
tions by reduci ng the jam m i ng power transmi tted in other directions.
Evaluating the effectiveness of barrage jamming may require a periodic
suspension of jamming to allow friendly ES to operate. A barrage jammer
is easier to build than a communications transmitter with the same bandwidth
and power because the quality of the transmitted signal is not important.
5.2.3.3
Swept J a m m i n g
A swept jammer consists of a baseband source for the jamming signal, a

transmitter whose output frequency is capable of being swept across a specified
band, and an antenna, as shown in Figure 5.6 . Like a barrage jammer, a
swept jam mer operates on a number of adjacent channels, and th use of a
directional antenna with a swept jammer is important to m i n imize fratricide.
It may sometimes be possible to evqluate the impact of swept jamming
on the adversary's communications system without suspending jamming.
Because the swept jammer jams only one channel at a time, friendly ES can
monitor the channels during the period that they are not being jammed. This
requires close coordination between EA and ES equipment. The difficulty of
coordination is likely to increase as the sweep rate increases.
A swept jammer is likely to have increased effectiveness over a barrage
jammer because it concentrates all of the transmitted power in one channel,
sweeping the frequency of this channel across a band. The i mpact of swept
jamming is likely to be greatest on encrypted nets, where the jamming may
cause the loss of synchron ization i n decryption systems. Even if jamming is
stopped, further transmission of data cannot take place until synchronization
has been reacquired.
Directional
a nt n na
\V
Narrowband
jamming signal
generator
Jamming signal
control
Modulator
Swept tuning
control
Figure 5.6 O utline structure of a swept j a mmer.
Power
amplifier
,.
Electronic Attack
5.2.3.4
1 51
Comb Jamming
A comb jammer allows several channels to be jammed. These channels may

be individually selectable by the operator, or may have a fixed spacing. The
jammer transmits simultaneously on all channels being jammed.
Figure 5.7 shows 'the outline structure of a comb jammer. The comb
generator generates the multiple carriers onto which the output of the jam
ming signal generator is modulated. The use of a directional antenna mini
mizes interference to friendly communications caused by the comb jammer.
The comb jammer has higher flexibility than the spot jammer because
it allows more than one channel to be jammed. The power applied to each
of these channels is reduced because the available power has to be shared
between a number of channels. However, the efficiency is higher than for
a barrage jammer, as the comb jammer jams selected channels rather than
jamming a whole band.
Evaluating the effectiveness of comb jamming may require a periodic
suspension of jamming to allow friendly ES to operate.
5.2.3.5
Respo nsive J a m m i n g
A responsive jammer is a spot jammer (operates on a single channel) that

jams only when it detects a transmission. A responsive jammer consists of
a search receiver, a generator for the jamming signal, a transmitter to modue
the jamming signal, an antenna, and a control unit (see Figure 5.8).
The search receiver is used to detect transmissions that are to be jammed.
The frequencies to be jammed are programmed into the control unit. When
a transmission is detected, the control unit turns on the jamming for a
Directional
antenna
\V
Narrowband
jamming signal
generator
Modulator
Jamming signal
control
Comb
generator
Figure 5.7 Outl ine structure of a comb jammer.
Powe r
amplifier
t--
Electronic W a rfare for t h e Digitized Battlefield
1 52
Directional
antenna
\I
Narrowband
jamming signal
generator
Jamming
signal
control
Power
amplifier
Modulator
Tuning
control
Power
co nt rol
Controller
\V
Search
receiver
Figure 5.8 Outl i n e structu re of a responsive jammer.
specified period. Periodically, the control unit will turn off the jamming for
a short look-through period, during which the search receiver will determine
whether the transmitter is still active. If the transmitter is still active, the
j amming will be recommenced. The look-through period may be of the
order of 40 ms.
The antenna used by a responsive jammer may be directional, where
the location of the receiver being jammed is both fixed and known, or
omnidirectional.
A responsive jammer has all of the advantages of a spot jammer. It has
the additional advantage of flexibility since its control unit can often be
programmed with a number of frequencies to be jammed. By only transmit
ting when there is a signal to be jammed, the responsive jammer reduces its
power consumption, reducing the weight of batteries required in portable
applications; and reduces its electromagnetic signature, increasing the diffi
culty for an adversary to find and neutralize the jammer.
A responsive jammer may include facilities that allow it to operate as
part of an automatic network of jammers in which only one jammer will
be active on a particular channel at a time. This further reduces the signature
of individual jammers.
A typical, modern, responsive jammer will allow a prioritized list of
target frequencies to be entered. The jammer will then scan these frequencies,
starting with the highest priority, until a transmission is detected. This
transmission will then be jammed for a period. During a short period of
Electronic Attack
1 53
look-through, the jammer will rescan its prioritized frequency list. If a higher
priority transmission is detected, jamming will switch to this channel.
5.2.4
Operational Factors
It is essential to note that, without careful planning and control of jamming

resources, there is an inherent risk of fratricide to friendly communications,
surveillance, and intercept assets. However, in order to be effective, jamming
must be comprehensive. For instance, all HF, VHF, and radio relay systems
of a targeted formation must be attacked simultaneously if communications
are to be denied completely to an adversary commander. There are several
operational factors that must be considered before a decision to jam is
initiated:
5.2.5
Intelligence. There may often be less value to be gained from denying

the adversary use of the EM spectrum than there is in monitoring
it to gather intelligence.
Alternatives. EA is one weapon system available. Other forms of
attack, such as artillery or fighter ground attack, may be more
effective. As with all weapon systems, the target effect must be
carefully considered before the method of attack is selected.
.
\
.
.
Securzty. J ammmg may announce to adversanes that' th e1r
' use of
the spectrum has been compromised, prompting them to change
frequencies and have to be found again. In certain sensitive cases,
the ability to intercept and monitor adversary communications is
so critical that jamming may never be considered for fear of compro
mising the capability. Jamming may also disclose future intention
to act, such as a precursor to an attack.
Timing. Like fire support, jamming must be timed to occur at the
appropriate point in battle.
Selectivity. EW assets are scarce and need to be used effectively. They
are therefore controlled at the highest level and have associated
comprehensive doctrines and procedures. Planning issues for EW
are discussed in Chapter 6.
.
Standoff Versus Unattended Jammers
Unattended jammers (UAJ) are lightweight, low-powered jammers that are

deployed in the near vicinity of a radio receiver. The basic principle is that
1 54
Electro nic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld
a low-powered jammer close to a radio receiver will be able to jam far more
effectively than a high-powered jammer farther away. In the example shown
in Figure 5.9, a 1 0-W FM-voice transmitter (Tx) is 5 km away from its
intended receiver (Rx). There is a UAJ about 1 km from the receiver and
a standoff jammer (SOJ) 1 0 km away. To achieve a jamming power equal
to the signal power, the UAJ is required to transmit at 400 m W, while the
SOJ is required to transmit at 40W.
In addition, it is possible that at a distance of 1 0 km, the receiver may
be screened from the SOJ, thus reducing the effect even further. A UAJ,
however, is more likely to have line-of-sight to the victim receiver. In order
to be effective, UAJs must be located close to the victim radio. Therefore,
deployment plays a key role in the utilization of these types of devices. There
are a number of ways in which UAJs can be deployed: withdrawing forces,
special forces, rocket/shell, aircraft, or UAV.
UAJs deployed by withdrawing troops could be used to form an elec
tronic minefield. An area seeded with UAJs would effectively jam the commu
nications of advancing units, thereby creating confusion and delay. Employed
in conjunction with conventional obstacles, such an electronic minefield
might be used to prevent an adversary force encountering the obstacle from
reportmg Its presence. Furthermore, unlike conventional antipersonnel
400 mW
fsoJ
40 W
Figure 5.9 The efficiency of UAJ versus SOJ.
ELectronic Attack
1 55
mines, UAJs do not injure civilians and can therefore be used in peacekeeping
or peace support operations. The use of responsive jammers in this applica
tion, possibly also capable of remote control, would optimize both the
jamming characteristics of the UAJ and its power utilization. UAJs operating
as an electronic minefield would usually operate as a network so that only
one jammer transmits on a channel at a time. This conserves power and
reduces the signature of individual UAJs, making them harder for an adversary
to locate and neutralize.
5.2.6
Jamming and the Tactical Communications System
Jamming has different levels of impact on the subsystems of the tactical

communications system, which depend on the likely distances between jam
mer and target and the use of EP techniques in the target. The issues for
jamming the tactical communications system are summarized in Table 5. 1 .
Because effective jamming requires steerage from ES, the ability to carry out
effective jamming of the tactical communications system is reliant not only
on the issues directly associated with jamming that are discussed in this
section but on the performance of ES, as discussed in Chapter 4.
5.2.6.1
Tacti cal Tru nk S u b system
Jamming of the trunk subsystem is more difficult than for the CNR subsystem
because the elements of the trunk network are typically not deployed as far
Table 5.1
J a mming of the Tactical Communications System
Tactical
Communications
Subsystem
Vulnerabilities
Protection
Trunk
High antennas.

distance between receiver
and jammer.
CNR
short distance.
FH (sometimesL terrain
screening.
Tactical data
distrib ution
receiver and jammer.
Heavy use of EP, including

spread spectrum.
Airborne
Receivers on upl inks are

exposed.
Receivers on downlinks may

be protected from ground
based jammers.
1 56
forward as the CNR subsystem, although this is less so in low-level operations.

The use of directional antennas in a terrestrial radio relay network also makes
it difficult to achieve sufficient JSR for effective jamming. By using altitude
to overcome the limitations of terrain, an airborne jammer lying on the axis
of a terrestrial radio relay link may be able to jam communications in one
direction. It is unlikely, however, that an airborne jammer could be sited
so as to jam both directions on a duplex terrestrial radio relay link, as the
only location from which this would be possible is directly between the two
antennas. The high level of meshing that is usual in the terrestrial radio
relay network means that jamming of a single node has little impact on the
network unless that node is a choke point.
SCRA is more vulnerable to jamming than terrestrial radio relay because
of its use of omnidirectional antennas and the smaller distance between
some SCRA centrals and the jammer. The vulnerability of SCRA uplinks
is increased by the placement of antennas at SCRA centrals on masts, which
is required so that they can provide area coverage. Some protection is afforded
to SCRA mobile terminals by the use of low antennas.
Trunk satellite links may be able to be jammed using tactical assets.
In practice, such jamming is likely to be controlled at the strategic rather
than the tactical level.
5.2.6.2
C N R S u b system
A high proportion of tactical jamming is aimed at the CNR subsystem due

to the employment of CNR in forward areas and its use of omnidirectional
antennas. Jamming of CNR may target all of the stations on a net, all of
the stations in a particular area, or one particular station. It may be used to
deny communications or simply to force an encrypted net to operate in a
nonsecure mode so that friendly ES can obtain information. Jamming of
CNR can be hindered by the use of EP, especially FH.
5.2.6.3
Tacti c a l Data Di stribution Subsystem
Jamming of the tactical data distribution subsystem is aided by that subsys

tem's use of omnidirectional antennas and deployment in forward areas.
The heavy use ofEP techniques, especially spread-spectrum communications,
will often make jamming of the subsystem difficult.
5.2.6.4
Airborne Subsystem
Receivers carried by the airborne subsystem are likely to be vulnerable to

jamming due to their high position, which mal{es the employment of terrain
screening difficult. This vulnerability is likely to be increased by the use
Electronic Attack
1 57
of omnidirectional antennas, even for links that might employ directional

antennas in their ground terminals. Antennas on ground terminals, however,
may have a reduced vulnerability to jamming because the use of the airborne
rebroadcast platform should facilitate the use of terrain screening.
5.2.7
Jamming Platforms
Jammers are deployed in a number of different ways, including mounted

in ground vehicles and aircraft, man-portable, and artillery-delivered. The
various platforms each impose constraints of weight, volume, and mobility,
which combine to limit the capability of the systems.
5.2.7.1
Ground Vehicle
Deployment of a jammer in a ground vehicle, either a truck or armored

vehicle, gives the jammer limited mobility on the battlefield. A ground
vehicle carrying jammers is usually required to have the same or higher
mobility as the force that it supports, for example, a jammer supporting a
mechanized formation would usually be mounted in an armored vehicle.
Like all ground-based transmitters, the useful range of a ground-based
jammer is limited by the terrain, especially at VHF and higher frequencies.
In some circumstances, this limitation can be used to advantage, such as
when a particular receiver on a net is being targeted and terrain screening
is used to ensure that the remainder of the net is not aware of the jammer's
effect.
Some systems allow jamming while the vehicle is moving; others require
the vehicle to stop and a mast is deployed. The advantages gained from the
use of a mast are reduced propagation loss at VHF and higher frequencies
due to the increased height of the antenna, and therefore increased range.
A typical communications jammer would be capable of jamming at
least one military band, for example, the HF band from 2 to 30 MHz or
the VHF band from 30 to 88 MHz. More recent systems are capable of
jamming over larger bands, sometimes as much as 1 00 kHz to 1 GHz. The
jammer may have the capability to transmit simultaneously on a number of
channels, making it possible to jam several targets at one time. The maximum,
total, output power of a vehicle-transported jammer is likely to be at least
1 kW, and may be as much as 1 0 kW. A typical vehicle-mounted jammer
is capable of operating from either batteries or from an external generator.
The jammer's batteries would usually be charged whenever the vehicle's
.
.
.
engme Is runnmg.
The jammer may have an in-built ES receiver to provide steerage, in
the same way that a forward observer provides steerage for artillery. This
El ectromc W a rfare for t h e Di gitized Battlef1eld
1 58
receiver will operate over at least the frequency range of the jammer's transmit
ter and may be a narrowband receiver (scanner) or a wideband receiver. If
the jammer is capable oflook-through, it would be normal for the ES receiver
to be able to determine the status of adversary transmissions during this
nme.
5.2.7.2
M a n- P o rta b l e
Lightweight, portable jammers can be carried by dismounted soldiers, includ

ing special forces. Such jammers usually sacrifice transmitter power for weight,
and are therefore designed to be deployed close to the receiver being j ammed.
They will usually also be operated with low antenna heights, which will further
increase losses between jammer and receiver, and reduce their suitability for
standoff jamming applications. The weight and bulk of a mast usually
preclude its use with a man-portable jammer. Trees and other naturally
occurring features may be used to provide additional elevation for antennas
when the tactical situation permits.
A modern man-portable communications jammer is likely to cover
similar portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to a vehicle-mounted jam
mer. It may also be capable of simultaneous transmission on a number of
channels. The total output power of the man-portable jammer may be up
to approximately 20W, or l OOW using an amplifier applique. The total
weight of the system is likely to be 10 to 1 5 kg. The operating time on the
in-built batteries is likely to be a few hours. The man-portable jammer may
have an in-built ES receiver, which is most likely to be a narrowband receiver.
5.2.7.3
Airborne
An airborne jammer may be deployed in a UAV, a helicopter, or a fixed

wing manned aircraft. Care must be taken in the installation of high-power
jammers in aircraft to ensure that there is no interference with the operation
of navigation equipment.
The main advantage is that, due to their elevation, airborne jammers
overcome the limitations of terrain that reduce the performance of ground
based jammers. However, in doing so, they lose the flexibility of using terrain
to jam a particular receivc:,r while leaving the remaining receivers on the net
unaffected.
A modern airborne jammer deployed in a medium fixed-wing aircraft
is likely to be able to cover the spectrum from below the HF band up to
2 GHz. It may be capable of targeting both communications and noncommu
nications emissions. The output power is likely to be at least 1 kW. The
jammer will take its power from the aircraft, and will be capable of operation
Electronic Attack
1 59
as long as the aircraft remains airborne. The system will almost certainly be
capable of jamming multiple channels simultaneously.
A jammer carried by a small, tactical UAV is likely to have similar
properties to a man-portable jammer. Its capability is significantly enhanced
by its greater operating height. It is unlikely that a UAV-mounted jammer
will take its power from the aircraft, relying instead on batteries.
Jammers carried by other types of aircraft are likely to have intermediate
capabilities. The major limitation in smaller aircraft is likely to be weight,
which limits the output power of the jammer.
An airborne platform is likely to house both EA and ES assets, facilitat
ing coordination between the different EW subdivisions. The in-built ES
would normally be able to provide steerage for jammers carried by the
platform.
5.7.2.4
Artillery-Delivered
An unattended jammer may be delivered by artillery. This has the advantage

of allowing placement of the jammer in areas to which access cannot otherwise
be gained. Such jammers are limited in both weight and volume. This
delivery mechanism will place considerable physical stress on the jammer's
electronics, both at the time of launch and on impact with the ground. A
grenade launcher could potentially provide a similar delivery mechanism.
An artillery-delivered jammer would be designed to operate as an
unattended jammer. It is most likely to operate as a responsive jammer,
operating either when signals are received in preprogrammed channels or
when any signal above a specified power level is received. A number of
artillery-delivered jammers may be deployed as an electronic minefield, which
may be used to deny communications to an adversary within a defined area.
Operation of an artillery-delivered jammer as a responsive jammer is
advantageous both to reduce power consumption and thereby increase battery
life, and to increase the difficulty for an adversary to find and remove the
jammer. To conserve power, some jammers may be remotely activated by
an HF command link. Due to constraints of weight and size, an artillery
delivered jammer is likely to operate in a single band (e.g., VHF CNR
30-88 MHz). The operating time is likely to be not much more than one
hour of transmitting. It is unlikely that replenishment of batteries would
normally be feasible for an artillery-delivered jammer.
5.3 Electronic Deception

.
The aim of electronic deception is to mislead or confuse an adversary. Like

other forms of EA, electronic deception is not practiced in isolation; it forms
6
6.1
Introduction
Chapters 3 to 5 have described the three EW functional areas of ES, EA,

and EP and have demonstrated the technical characteristics of the various
techniques available within each area. Like any other military system, the
employment ofEW also requires a planning and coordination process, which
is the subject of this chapter. Like all other planning on the battlefield, EW
planning does not exist in isolation and must form part of the broader
planning process for an operation.
EW planning itself is inherently based on knowledge of the target
equipment and systems that are primarily associated with an adversary's
communication and information systems (CIS) . EW is not alone in this
regard. Friendly CIS planning should also take into account adversary EW,
mobility planning, the adversary's countermobility capabilities, and so on.
Furthermore, there is always a tension between attacking a target to neutralize
or destroy it, and allowing it to operate under surveillance to obtain intelli
gence. Therefore, once the EW plan is complete, it must be tested against
the CIS plan to ensure that they do not conflict.
EW planning is primarily about ES and EA, that is, the targeting of
adversary systems. The employment of EP, as it is aimed at the protection
of friendly capabilities, is normally considered to be part of the CIS plan.
This chapter is primarily oriented toward ES and EA, as illustrated in
Figure 6. 1 .
1 69
1 70
Electronic Warfare fo r the D ig it1zed B attlefi e l d
Electronic warfare
Jamming
: Deception :
II Neutralization j
Search
I ntercept
: Direction finding
i
Analysis
Passive
Active
Encryption
Siting
LPI/LPD
Shielding
!
Antijam
EM CON
j
Alternate means
Directional antennas
Identical equipment
'
- - ----------- --- -----
Figure 6.1 EW architectu re.
The employment of EW is traditionally controlled at the highest level,

as are a number of other key assets such as artillery. The reasons for this
are scarcity of resources, security, and coordination.
There are many more targets on the modern battlefield
than there are resources to attack, or even j ust to detect and acquire, them.
It is therefore crucial that resources are not wasted (e.g., by using two jammers
against a single target) and that resources are allocated to targets with the
highest payoff.
Scarcity of Resources
Security The use of an electronic asset always tends to gives away informa
tion on friendly capabilities. Like any other transmitter, a j ammer's location

can be identified by DF; arguably, given the higher transmit powers, a
jammer is easier to DF than a communications transmitter. Even the use
of passive means, such as ES, may give away a capability, which could arise
from the physical observation of the ES systems or from the use of information
obtained by ES in the planning and conduct of operations.
The EW plan needs to be coordinated across the force and
with other plans. At the most basic level, coordination is required to resolve
the basic tension on the battlefield between destroying a target and observing
it for intelligence. This coordination is more than deconfliction, however;
it is required to maximize the im.'pact of all action taken. Coordination is
used to ensure that one part of the force does not jam a transmission against
which another part is using ES. Coordination is also essential in other areas,
Coordination
171
such as preventing artillery from destroying a target that is providing valuable

intelligence. Examples of coordination required between EW and other
battlefield planning include CIS planning, deception planning, intelligence
planning, and artillery planning. In a joint operation, coordination with sea
and air planning would also be required.
While EW is controlled at the highest level, EW assets may be provided
in direct support of a part of the force, giving a lower-level commander
control over their use for a given operation, in a particular area, for a particular
time, and under specific rules of engagement. This approach is almost identi
cal to that used for artillery and deception operations, talcing into account
scarcity of resources, security, and coordination while preserving mission
command and thereby maximizing the flexibility of tactical commanders.
This chapter describes the activities that need to occur for EW planning.
The terminology used is consistent with U.S. Army doctrine [ 1 ] , but does
not set out to describe in detail the EW planning process of any particular
army. While the functional grouping of activities may vary, the basic processes
that must be carried out in EW planning are the same.
6.2 EW Unit Organ ization

Before examining the tactical EW planning process, we will briefly discuss
the considerations involved in structuring EW units and assigning assets to
them.
As previously stated, EW is controlled at the highest level, with EW
assets being provided to lower-level commands in support of a particular
operation. EW units are often allocated as direct-command units at the corps
or division level with elements deployed at the brigade and battalion levels.
In conventional operations, a corps EW unit would be expected to provide
ES and EA support to the corps across its frontage and as close to the
adversary as possible.
The allocation of ES and EA assets (i.e., the dimensioning of the EW
system) should take into account a number of criteria: the minimum levels
required for operation, quality, operation on-the-move, the area coverage
required, capacity, the electronic signature of transmitters, redundancy, plat
form mobility, command and control, and economy.
Some EW techniques require more than one
platform to provide even the most basic level of performance. DF, for
example, cannot locate a target without at least two stations, although three
or four are preferred.
Minimum Levels for Operation
172
Electronic Warfare for th e Digitized Battlefi eld
Providing more assets can increase the quality of information

obtained from some ES systems, such as DF. Having reached a certain level,
the quality may not improve significantly with the allocation of further
assets.
Quality
Some platforms, especially airborne platforms,

enable operations to continue as the platform moves. Others, such as ground
vehicles that may require antennas mounted on long masts and are subject
to the effects of terrain, may only be able to operate while stationary. In the
former case, continuous operation may be achieved by using a single platform;
in the latter case, a minimum of two platforms is required to achieve continu
ous operation.
Opera tion On-the-Move
Area Coverage Required At VHF and higher frequencies, the coverage of
EW systems is essentially limited to line-of-sight (i.e., the area covered is

primarily limited by terrain) . If a large area coverage is required, it may be
necessary to subdivide this area, with independent equipment providing
coverage of each subarea.
ES and EA systems are able to provide coverage of a certain
number of channels. For example, a jammer may be able to operate on only
one channel, or an intercept platform may be able to monitor 1 0 channels
simultaneously. If higher capacities are required, some replication of equip
ment and personnel is normally required.
Capacity
In some types of operations, especially deception, the

electronic signature may need to include transmissions from more than one
location.
Elec tronic Signature
Provision must be made for the continued effective operation

ofEW systems in the event of equipment failure due to attack by an adversary.
This attack may be a physical attack, such as artillery, or an electronic attack,
such as masking being used to jam an ES receiver. Redundancy is of particular
importance for a system such as a jammer that advertises its location by
transmitting at a high power level.
Redundancy
Platform Mobility Ground-based platforms may have low rates of movement.

In order to allow for contingencies, it may be necessary to position assets
in advance for a future operation while maintaining support for the current
operation. This may require that more units be available to planners than
would otherwise be required. Additionally, EW assets must be as mobile as
1 73
the force being supported, and arguably more mobile if they are to be in
position ahead of the force to support operations.
Command and Control Like any other part of the force it supports, EW
requires an appropriate structure for command and control, including tasking

and reporting. This limits the number of EW assets that can be deployed
in a single unit. Command and control can also be problematic if EW assets
are dispersed too thinly. Communications place a significant limit on EW
command and control, and it is essential that the EW command facility can
communicate to each of its EW assets.
Economy EW assets are scarce resources and should be used sparingly and
controlled centrally. The collocation of EW elements in a single platform

or at a single location is influenced by the requirement for similar or the
same coverage from assets, platform capacity, and support requirements.
Requirement for Similar/Same Coverage When a search receiver passes infor
mation to an intercept receiver, the intercept receiver must be sited in a

location from which it can receive the same signals as the search receiver.
Search and intercept receivers are therefore naturally collocated on the same
platform. A similar constraint applies to an ES receiver supporting EA.
Although this means that the jammer and supporting intercept receiver are
in the near vicinity of one another, they are normally on different platforms.
Platform Capacity Factors such as weight, volume, availability of power
supply, and mutual interference may limit the number of EW assets that
can be located on a given platform. This is likely to be a particular constraint
on small air platforms, such as tactical UAVs.
For best results, ES should support EA. Minimizing
communications requirements and providing similar coverage suggest collo
cation, but mutual interference suggests remote location. Additionally, sup
port of EA is a secondary task for ES assets, which will normally be deployed
for optimal coverage to achieve intelligence collection. EA assets may there
fore be forced to rely on their look-through capability to assess jamming
effectiveness.
As equipment becomes more integrated, providing complete ES/EA
systems in one unit, the issues for collocation of assets are becoming less
relevant to planning.
Support Requirements
Elec troni.c Vvarlare lor the D igiti7ed B a ttlefield
174
6.2.1
t\
E lectronic Attaclc
m i n un u m
.1!
of one t r.t n <> m i ner is req uired fo r EA. h>r ground '>;.''>tem.
kJsr two tr;tmmirrcr-; Jrc no r m al ly rc:quin:d . c,,i nce oprr.u i o n o n

t ht:-movc is not u o; u a ll y p o., -; i b l e due to .1 com bin n i on of terra i n m d the
hnwc'ver,
physic.1l ch.uactcrisrics of .mrennas for airborne yMems
1 m i n i m u m of
r h rec pl.uform i s probably req ui red to allow for refueling
.and
p la tform
rn.1inrcn.mce. Even if air-to-air refuding j available, it i unl ikely that .111
EA ym: m will be able ro operate during refueling. Pro v i ding coverage
for a corp area in conventional operations probably requires simulrnncou
operation of at leat two separate ground or airborne EA platforms at VHF
and h igher frequencie. although this will depend on the terrain in \'.'hich
the systems are planned to operate. Adequate coverage may be addressed by

aiJocation of a jamming capability to each division, consisting of a mini mum
of two ground-based jammers or three airborne j amming platforms. The
capacity required is likely to be more than one channel per division, and
can be addressed either by providing multichannel jammers or extra jamming
transmitters.
This analysis suggsts that a minimum of three airborne or two ground
based jammers per division is required, increasing to four airborne or three
ground-based jammers per division if redundancy is required. However, on
the modern battlefield, more jammers could always be used and the number
allocated to ground forces is normally as a result of funding compromises
in the provision of an adequate force structure.
Finally, EA must normally be supported by ES for basic steerage, in
the same way that artillery uses a forward observer to adjust fire. This
supporting ES may be integral to EA systems, or provided by separate
equipment. The use of separate ES assets reduces the number of ES assets
available for other ES tasks, and reduces the flexibility of deployment of
these assets. Normally, a compromise is reached i n which the EA asset has
i ts own integral look-through capability, which is augmented where possible

by separate ES assets.
Current U.S. doctrine allocates three airborne (helicopter) and three
ground-vehicle-based jammers to each division
[2] . An
additional rhree
ground-vehicle-based jammers are allocated to each corps. All have an integral
ES capability {intercept and DF) .
The above analysis is based on conventional high-density operations.

For dispersed operations, larger numb.ers of EA systems are likely to be
required due to the range limitations imposed by terrain. This increase in
numbers will be greater for ground platforms than for airborne platforms.

6.2.2
175
Electronic Support
A minimum of one search receiver is required, with operation on-the-move

requiring at least two systems. Allowing for redundancy increases this to
three systems. The provision of coverage to a corps area in most terrain
would be possible with systems allocated on a divisional basis, leading to a
requirement of three search facilities per division, with a total of nine per
corps.
The same criteria apply to intercept, except that the number of channels
that are required to be monitored simultaneously may dictate the use of a
larger number of intercept systems. Because of the requirement for similar
communications coverage, search and intercept facilities are likely to be
collocated, even if the two services are provided by separate equipment. For
example, a tactical intercept shelter may contain two to four intercept receiv
ers, whose operators are directed by the product of a search receiver located
in the same shelter.
For DF, a minimum of two stations is required, with three usually
used to provide sufficient accuracy. For ground systems, twice this number
is required to allow the baseline to move. The coverage of a corps area can
probably be achieved in most terrain by the allocation of these units to each
division, leading to a requirement for 6 units per division, or 1 8 units per
corps. The use of airborne platforms may reduce these numbers to 4 per
division, or 1 2 per corps.
Current U.S. doctrine allocates major communications ES assets [2]
on the basis of 1 2 airborne ES platforms per corps, organized into two
systems of 6 platforms, plus 6 ground-based (vehicle or man-pack) systems.
Each division has 6 ground-based systems. An ES payload may also optionally
be carried by a short-range, tactical UAV.
The search, intercept, and DF functions may be integrated into a single
receiver, which is most likely to occur with a digital receiver. One important
advantage obtained by doing this can be the speed of the handoff of targets
from search to intercept and DF, which can enhance ES against short-term
and rapidly changing signals.
In order to provide effective DF, ES systems tend to be deployed in
groups of approximately three stations. Each of these groups would have its
own internal communications, as well as a rear link to the command and
processing facility. In some systems, equipment required for DF is separate
from that required for search and intercept. This is particularly true for older
equipment. In this case, all stations in a group may be capable of DF, but
only one station may be capable of search and intercept.
Electronic Warfare fo r the Digitized B attlefield
1 76
This analysis is based on conventional, high-density operations. For

dispersed operations, larger numbers of ES systems are likely to be required
due to the range limitations imposed by terrain. This increase in numbers
will be greater for ground platforms than for airborne platforms.
6.2.3
EW Command and Control
In addition to ES and EA assets, effective EW requires both an EW command

system and an EW processing and dissemination system. Communications
between ES, EA, and EW command, processing, and dissemination systems
may be direct via encrypted, data-enabled CNR, or may be carried by
another part of the tactical communications system. If passed across the
trunk subsystem, EW communications are double encrypted (i.e., encrypted
by the EW units and then encrypted again by the bulk encryption on the
trunk links).
A typical arrangement of EW assets in a division is shown in
Figure 6.2.
It is usual that the EW command facility and the EW processing and
dissemination systems are collocated with the highest level headquarters being
--...
.,
mmand,' ,
processing, and '

.
,, dissemination
,,
,' / / : I I \ \ \
.-',
# I I I I \ \
# 1 1 1 1 \ \ \\
,
\
/
I I I I \ \
,
I I I
\
#
I \ \
,,
\
\
/
,
; : : \
,/
'
\
1
1
'
,
.----..:;._
' ...,
.-.-.&.--,
\
/
1
'\
'\
,
Bde
,'
\
I
#
I
\
\
\
+
I
I
\
.-<tI
I
'
EWLO'
,
\
\
,
"
#
I
I
,
\
I
I
#
\
I
I
\
/
.!::,
,'\
I EI
Figure 6.2 EW system.
I E!I i ii
\@J
\ \
/ 1
rEI' \
\\
@]
'
\
1 77
supported. This requirement has existed traditionally because of the amount

of information flowing between these elements and the scarcity of communi
cations resources. In a future networked battlefield, this requirement may
be relaxed by the availability of ubiquitous, high-capacity communications
not only throughout the battlefield, but also in rear areas. EW liaison officers
(EWLO) are typically stationed at lower-level supported headquarters, which
.
is brigade in the case of the example in Figure 6.2. The processing and
dissemination functions take data derived from ES and pass it into the
"broader intelligence processing system.
Unprocessed EW data is normally classified more highly than other
operation data due mainly to a need to protect the existence and capability
of EW assets. Therefore, EW product is rarely distributed directly, but is
sanitized first and then collated with collateral intelligence information before
distribution. Sometimes, some sensitive data is never declassified and is only
distributed directly to commanders who are cleared to receive it.
6.3 The Tactical Planning Process

Most armies have a defined process by which operational plans are developed.
These processes are all based on a planning sequence that begins with an
analysis of the aim of the activity and the factors that have to be taken into
account, and then focuses on the production of one or more candidate plans,
from which the most suitable is chosen for execution. The U.S. process is
known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) [3] . The United
Kingdom's Estimate and the Australian Military Appreciation Process are other
examples.
The sequence of activities in the IPB is shown in Figure 6.3.
The mission is defined by the commander, and will be
based on orders received from the higher headquarters. The mission should
not simply be a task, but should make clear the commander's intent (i.e.,
the mission should state-at least in broad terms-both what is to be achieved
and why). How the mission is achieved is defined by the remainder of the
planning process.
Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis takes the assigned mission and identifies

tasks to be carried out to meet this mission. These tasks may be explicit
(i.e., they are stated as part of the rpission) , or implicit (i.e., they are required
to achieve the mission, but not explicitly stated as part of the mission) .
Mission Analysis
1 78
Electronic Warfare for the Digit i zed B att l e fi e l d
Course-of -action development
Course-of-action analysis
Course-of-action comparison
Course-of-action approval
Figure 6.3 S e q u e n c e of a ctions 1n the I P B .
Implicit tasks are of particular importance in the gathering of information,

such as the adversary electronic order of battle, that occurs on a continuing
basis, not just in response to a specific tasking. As well as identifying what
is to be achieved, mission analysis identifies constraints and limitations
implied by the mission.
Course-of-Action Development A number of possible courses of action are
identified to achieve the mission. At this stage, the details of the feasibility
of the individual courses of action are not important.
Course-of-Action Analysis Each course of action is war-gamed. This step of
the process takes into account the impact of adversary courses of action on
each of the candidate-friendly courses of action. In a large staff, the war
gaming may be carried out with the operations staff taking the part of the
friendly forces and the intelligence staff taking the part of the adversary. In
a small staff, or where the process is carried out by a single person, war
gaming is still performed but without separate actors for the two sides. A
course of action may be refined based on the outcome of the war-gaming.
179
The results ofthe war-gaming permit a detailed

comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate course of
action. These are compared and one course is chosen, possibly with a small
number of options.
Course-of-Action Comparison
Course-of-Action Approval The outcome of the course of action comparison
is presented to the commander, who confirms the solution. If a number of

options are presented, the commander selects the option to be implemented.
Orders Production The final step in the planning process is the production
of orders. These will usually take the form of a main document that sets
out the broad plan, with a number of annexes providing details of specific
areas such as the fire plan, communications plan, engineer plan, and EW
plan.
Regardless of how it is driven from above, EW planning itself consists
of EA planning and ES planning, each of which is coordinated with related
activities such as CIS planning and artillery planning.
6.4 The EW Targeting Process

EA is only one of the means available to a commander to degrade or destroy
an adversary's combat capability. In this sense, EA can be regarded as one
of the fires available to a commander, along with assets such as artillery and
attack helicopters. Because EA is controlled at the highest level, the largest
EA planning capability lies at this same level.
The EA planning process ensures that actions taken are consistent with
the basic constraints imposed by the scarcity of resources, security, and
coordination. A targeting process, such as that used to govern the employment
of EA, may be divided into four parts:
Decision. The first part of the targeting process provides its focus,
a targeting plan, and input to the intelligence collection management
process, including guidance on the prioritization of targets.
Detection. Targets identified by the decision process must be detected
through the use of a combination of ES and intelligence assets.
Functions of detection may include finding operating frequencies
or mapping network structures to identify a critical node or link
for EA.
Delivery. EA assets are llsed to attack targets identified by the decision
process, using information provided by the detection process.
1 80
Assessment. Any form of fire requires an observation of its effect.

For EA, this observation is provided by ES. The final result of the
assessment process is a recommendation for or against reattack.
The sequence of activities involved in the targeting process and the

numbers of the sections in which they are discussed are shown in
Figure 6.4.
While the following discussion is expressed in terms of the targeting
process for a particular operation, functions such as decision and detection
would usually be ongoing. This is required to build up an adequate database
of the adversary EOB, and is a basic part of the intelligence process. The
lead-up to a new operation will simply provide more specific and detailed
guidance for these functions.
Sections 6.4. 1 to 6.4.4 examine each of these parts of the targeting
process. The greatest emphasis is contained in Section 6.4 . 1 on decision,
which is the heart of the planning process.
6.4.1
Decision
Decision provides the EW planning and control functions of the targeting

process. Decision takes its direction from the broader operational plan,
combines this with information provided by the detection and assessment
functions and from other sources, and tasks the available assets. The decision
process is carried out by specialist EW planning staff, who would usually
be collocated with the headquarters that controls EW.
The key outputs of the decision process are a high-payoff target list;
guidance for collection of information to support the delivery of EA, mostly
guidance for ES; and tasking for ES and EA assets, which may take the form
of an EW annex to an operational order.
These outputs are generated prior to an operation. While the operation
is carried out, the decision process continus, updating all its outputs,
Figure 6.4 Sequence of a ctivities in the targeting process and the se ctions in which they
are discussed.
181
including target lists and taskings for the EW assets employed. While EA
assets would usually be tasked to support a specific operation, ES assets will
have continuous tasking to provide information on the adversary electronic
order of battle. The decision process is also continuous, therefore, and cannot
be simply turned on at the beginning of an operation.
The decision process can be broken up into a number of parts. These
are illustrated in Figure 6.5.
The decision process runs parallel to the planning process described
previously. Most of the elements of the decision process form part of the
course-of-action development and course-of-action analysis processes.
6.4. 1 . 1
I n itial Plan
Planning begins with mission analysis. Initial planning proceeds to identify

potential targets that are relevant to the aims of the mission. This process
requires a range of intelligence about the adversary, a database of which
would usually be constructed and maintained on a continuing basis. Without
this database, initial planning is almost impossible. An attempt may be made
to assign a value to targets in terms of their importance to possible adversary
courses of action. This might involve identifying nodes in target communica
tions networks that are critical to their operation and which, if jammed, will
cause maximum disruption.
6.4. 1 .2
T a rget Develo pment
The target development process takes information on targets from the initial
plan, and coordinates targets and effects to achieve the mission. It is primarily
associated with the course-of-action development, analysis, and comparison
phases of the planning process. An important part of this process is the
identification of high-payoff targets, where the payoff is evaluated in the
context of the mission. High payoff may be due to a positive impact on
I nformation
requirements
management
l Mission l
---+ management
Targ et
development
---+ management --+1 management
Initial
plan
r -- -----,
I
I
..__
_
_
_
__, '
Asset
Miss ion
Figure 6.5 The decision process.
Asset
1
1---+1 management 1
i
( ES)
:
(ES)
I
I . .) -
r-- -- --. -!
L__ (-
_
_ . . . -
_.1
Electronic W a rfare for the Digitized Battl efield
1 82
friendly courses of action or a negative impact on adversary courses of action.

This inherently requires coordination with other parts of the operational
plan.
The target development process includes the identification of high
payoff targets and the effect required for each of these targets. As with other
parts of the targeting process, effects are viewed in the context of the adversary
force, rather than the communications system or information system that
may be the direct target of EA.
Like any other tactical action, a number of different effects can be
defined for EA, including disrupt, delay, divert, limit, and destroy.
Disrupt. Aims to fragment the adversary's communications system,

and slow or stop the flow of information. Disruption requires rela
tively little coordination to implement, although deconfliction is
required to ensure that the links targeted for disruption are not also
subjects of an ES collection plan.
Delay. Designed to delay movement and alter the time at which
adversary forces arrive at a location in the battlefield. EA may be
used to cause delay itself, or to deny an adversary the ability to
use communications to overcome delay caused by other means. A
successful application will force an adversary to use an alternative,
slower means of communication, such as runners or hand signals.
Dfvert. Aims to prevent an adversary from using critical resources.
It may be applied in jamming the communications between combat
units and combat support or combat service support elements, reduc
ing the efficiency with which the adversary commander can support
combat troops. This is difficult to achieve because of the level of
intelligence required to pinpoint targets.
Limit. Reduces the adversary commanders' options or available
courses of action. In the context of EA, denial of part or all of the
electromagnetic spectrum can be a form of limiting. For example,
an electronic minefield of unattended jammers may be used to limit
an adversary's options in the advance.
I
Destroy. Destruction of a particular adversary combat capability is

the highest level of effect that can be achieved. Destruction may be
achieved through neutralization, but is unlikely to be achieved
directly by either jamming or deception.
1 83
In all cases, there is a tradeoff between impact and cost; in general,

the higher the impact, the higher the cost. High impacts, such as denying
the electromagnetic spectrum to an adversary commander, can usually only
be sustained for short periods.
Target development will also generate information requirements. For
example, a radio net cannot be jammed deliberately without knowing its
operating frequency and the approximate locations of its stations.
6.4.1 .3
I nformation Requirements M a n a g e m e nt
The commander's information requirement, along with guidance on priority,

is generated by the target development process. This requirement is then
further refined so that it is expressed in a form that is directly collectible.
A commander's information requirement may state the need to identify when
an adversary attack is about to start. This may be refined to a requirement to
search for the adversary's command net and monitor this net for activity
indicating the lead-up to an attack. Information requirements management
is primarily associated with the course-of-action development, analysis, and
comparison phases of the planning process. The detailed prioritization of
information requirements is also executed.
The information requirements developed provide the focus for the
intelligence collection plan. ES provides one of the main means by which
intelligence may be collected. Other intelligence sources may assist with
details of communications networks and systems, equipment, and crypto
graphic codes.
Information requirements management specifies what to collect, as well
as when and where. As well as the planning functions already discussed,
information requirements management is responsible for reporting of infor
mation collected, conducting quality control, and maintaining a database of
collected information. Some requests may be met from the existing database
without further collection.
6.4. 1 .4
M ission M anagement
Mission management tasks EA assets (for targeting) and ES assets (for the
collection of information or to support the delivery of EA). Mission manage
ment is concerned primarily with the course-of-action approval and orders
production phases of the planning process. For ES, mission management
defines how the information requirements generated by the information
requirements-development p rocess are to be collected. The input to mission
management is the information requests in a form that can be directly
1 84
collected. For EA, mission management translates the combat effect specified
in the target development into a direct effect of an EA system.
Mission management takes the input tasks and assigns them to collec
tion assets. In the case of ES, these assets are search, intercept, and DF
systems. Mission management chooses the most suitable asset. This may
involve choosing between a ground and airborne ES system. Mission manage
ment verifies the coverage of the system and chooses details such as the
location from which collection will take place. These details can then be
coordinated with the operation of other systems.
In tasking EA assets, the mission-management process provides a mis
sion that specifies both the task and a commander's intent. Such a task may
be to jam a specified CNR net in order to force the operators to switch
from encrypted traffic to plaintext. Both the task and the intent at this level
are oriented toward the immediate impact of EA on the target system.
6.4. 1 .5
Asset M a n a g e m e nt
The asset management process produces a chain of orders for assigning

particular EA and ES assets to tasks, based on the taskings developed in
mission management. The first of these is associated with the broader opera
tional order, usually as an EW annex to the operational order. During an
operation, various amendments will be made to these orders to take into
account changing circumstances, primarily due to contact with the adversary.
Asset management deals with the platform-specific aspects of tasking a partic
ular asset, such as travel ing times and routes for a ground-based asset.
Asset management is responsible for ensuring that continuous EA
and ES coverage is provided, taking into account downtime caused by the
movement or replenishment of assets. For many ground-based assets, this
downtime will occur whenever the asset is moved. For airborne assets, down
rime may occur during air-to-air refueling, or when the asset is required to
land for refueling or maintenance.
Asset management is concerned primarily with the course-of-action
approval and orders production phases of the planning process.
6.4.2
Detection
The detection function, as it applies to EW, is carried out by ES assets. It

involves the analysis of the outputs of search, for example, to find frequencies
being used and provide basic classification; intercept, to provide more derailed
classification and traffic data; and DF, to identify the locations of transmitters.
The detection process is oriented specifically to meeting the information
requirements developed in the planning process. An ongoing part ofdetection
1 85
is generating an adversary EOB, building a database of information that can

be used to satisfY future information requirements.
6.4.3
Delivery
The delivery ofEA, whether in the form of deception, jamming, or neutraliza

tion, is directed by the taskings evolving from the decision process.
The use of EA always requires continuous steerage provided by ES.
This steerage is analogous to the adjustment of fire for artillery that is
provided by a forward observer. The ES equipment used may be integral
to the EA system or may be separate, requiring separate tasking. At this
level, the effects of the EA will be assessed in terms of impact on the target
communications or electronic system. This will ensure, for example, that
jamming is occurring with sufficient power to disrupt a particular target net.
6.4.4
Assessment
Assessment provides a higher level of evaluation than that provided in the

delivery phase. Making this judgment often requires information from more
than one source, or from a different source than that used to provide steerage
to EA in the delivery phase. The aim of assessment is to determine the
success of EA (and other fires with which it may have been combined) in
terms of the effect that was specified in the target development process,
which is expressed in terms of impact on an adversary combat capability.
This is in contrast to the adjustment performed during the delivery phase,
which for EA is expressed in terms of its effect on the system being targeted.
Assessment will often make use of intelligence gained from a number
of sources. The outputs of the assessment process are battle damage assessment
and a recommendation on reattack. Battle damage assessment specifies in
detail the effect of the attack, not just on particular systems, but on adversary
combat capabilities. Possible reattack recommendations include reattack with
the same asset, reattack with a different asset, and do not reattack. Reattack
with the same asset may be used to maintain the target effect (e.g., where
a jammer is being used. to disrupt an adversary capability) . Reattack with a
different asset, or with the same asset but with different operating parameters,
may be used where a deception operation may not be successful in disrupting
an adversary operation an l a recommendation to change to jamming is
made. Do not reattack might be used when an attack has achieved its aim.
1 86
6.4.5
Siting Considerations for Jamming Fac i l ities
In addition to equipment that directly supports jamming, a jamming facility

will normally include communications equipment that forms part of the
EW communications system. It may be collocated with other EW (ES or
EA) assets. The following criteria should be taken into account in the siting
of jamming facilities:
Coverage. A jamming facility's coverage of potential locations of

relevant adversary receivers should be maximized with a limited
number of friendly jamming assets. This coverage is determined by
the area over which a sufficiently high JSR can be achieved. The
size of this area will depend on the location and power output of
both the jammer and transmitter being jammed. It is also desirable
that receivers can be jammed individually, rather than only being
able to jam a whole net. This may be achieved by careful siting of
jamming facilities or the use of di rectional antennas on jammers.
Fratricide. Jamming facilities should be sited to minimize interference
to friendly communications. The use of directional antennas assists
greatly here, but it does imply that jammers are located forward to
reduce the impact on friendly systems.
Tactical situation. Because they transmit large amounts of power,
jamming facilities are often easy to locate through DF. They should
be sited to minimize the vulnerability to an adversary's weapons
systems. For a standoff jammer, this may mean siting out of the
range of artillery (although this may significantly reduce the effective
range of the jammer) . For an unattended jammer, this may be
achieved by placing the jammer sufficiently close to an adversary's
facilities so that destruction by weapons systems cannot be used
without endangering the facility being protected.
Communications. Jamming facilities should be sited so that they can
communicate directly with related EW command and processing
and supporting ES facilities. These communications would normally
be via a data-enabled VHF CNR. HF CNR may be used where the
coverage of VHF CNR is insufficient. ,
Access. The site must be capable of access using available transport,
given the tactical situation. This applies both to ground-based and
aircraft-based jamming facilities. Ground-based jammers must be
able to tear down and depart rapidly if under attack.
6.4.6
1 87
Resupply. The site must be able to be resupplied.

Defense. A ground-based jammer is typically manned by a small
crew of three to four, which has a very limited capability for self
defense. Such a jammer must therefore be sited unobtrusively or
collocated with some other larger facility that can protect itself.
Deception Planning
In addition to the basic considerations for planning EA, the planning of

electronic deception must be coordinated with the force's overall deception
plan. This requires the integration of electronic deception with a range of
other actions, including visual, sonic, and olfactory. The results of the adver
sary's electronic reconnaissance must be consistent with data obtained from
other sources. For this reason, electronic deception is rarely used in isolation,
and where it is, the effect is often short-lived.
In all deception operations, time is critical. Given sufficient time, the
adversary can discover even the most complex electronic deception. The
longer it is required to deceive an adversary, the better coordinated the
electronic deception must be.
Adversary EW capabilities are a critical factor in planning electronic
deception. All transmissions forming part of the electronic deception must
have sufficient power to be received at an acceptable quality by the target
receivers, transmitted on a frequency that the adversary is capable of inter
cepting and in a form that can be intercepted. There is little value, for
example, in planning a deception requiring the adversary to read a particular
message, and then transmitting this message using a cipher that the adversary
cannot cryptanalyze. Additionally, if the adversary is expected to employ EA
against dummy nets, the deception must be elaborate enough to ensure that
adversary ES will be able to observe the effect that jamming would have on
target nets.
6.4.6.1
Sitin g Consid erations for Dec e ptio n Facilitie s
In addition to equipment that directly supports deception, a deception facility

will normally include communications equipment that forms part of the
EW communications system and will typically be manned by specialist EW
personnel. It may be collocated with other EW (ES or EA) assets. The
following criteria should be taken into account in the siting of deception
facilities:
Coverage. A deception facility's coverage of potential locations of

relevant adversary receivers should be maximized with a limited
1 88
Electronic W a rfare for the Digitized Battlefield
number of friendly assets. It may be desirable that receivers can be

targeted individually, rather than only being able to target a whole
net. This is achieved by the careful siting of deception facilities, or
the use of directional antennas on deception transmitters.
Signature. A deception facility may need to be sited so that its
electronic signature, including DF, matches the deception plan.
Communications. Deception facilities should be sited so that they
can communicate directly with related EW command and processing
and ES facilities. These communications would normally be via a
data-enabled VHF CNR. HF CNR may be used where the coverage
of VHF CNR is insufficient.
aircraft-based intercept facilities.
6.5 Col lection Management

Collection management exists side-by-side with the targeting process, and
is aimed primarily at the tasking of ES assets. The purposes of ES are tactical
intelligence collection, providing steerage for EA, and cuing surveillance and
target acquisition resources. ES planning supports these purposes, which are
crucial to the detection and assessment functions of EA planning.
ES planning is driven by the targeting process, and forms one part of
the intelligence collection management process.
6.5.1
The Collection Management Process
The collection management process is shown in Figure 6.6. The collection

management process can be seen as a subset of the targeting process, incorpo
rating those elements concerned with developing specific information require
ments and tasking assets to meet these requirements.
I
Information
Mission
Asset
requirements _.
management -+ management
management
Figure 6.6 The collection mana gement process.

6.5.2
1 89
Siting Considerations for Search Facilities
In addition to equipment that directly supports the search function, a search

facility will normally include communications equipment that forms part
of the EW communications system. It may be collocated with other EW
(ES or EA) assets, particularly intercept facilities. The following cntena
should be taken into account in the siting of search facilities:
6.5.3
Coverage. A search facility's coverage of potential locations of relevant

adversary communications assets should be maximized with a limited
number of friendly search assets. At VHF and higher frequencies,
the range of search receivers, fundamentally limited by terrain, will
be similar to communications receivers, although a small increase
in range may be achieved due to the higher sensitivity of the search
receiver.
Communications. Search facilities should be sited so that they can
communicate directly with related EW command and processing,
DF, intercept, and EA facilities as well as other search facilities.
These communications would normally be via a data-enabled VHF
CNR. HF CNR may be used where the coverage of VHF CNR is
insufficient.
aircraft-based search facilities.
Defense. A ground-based search facility is typically manned by a
small crew, which has a very limited capability for self-defense. S uch
a facility must be sited unobtrusively or collocated with some other
larger facility that can protect itself.
Siting Considerations for Intercept Faci l ities
In addition to equipment that directly supports the intercept function, an

intercept facility will normally include communications equipment that forms
part of the EW communications system. It may be collocated with other
EW (ES or EA) assets. The following criteria should be taken into account
in the siting of intercept facilities:
Coverage. An intercept facility's coverage of potential locations of

relevant adversary communications assets should be maximized with
1 90
a limited number of friendly intercept assets. The prior use of search

and DF may allow intercept receivers to have a reduced coverage if
the intercept facility is not collocated with other ES assets.
6.5.4
Communications. Intercept facilities should be sited so that they can

communicate directly with related EW command and processing:
search, DF, and EA facilities as well as other intercept facilities.
These communications would normally be via a data-enabled VHF
CNR. HF CNR may be used where the coverage of VHF CNR is
insufficient.
aircraft-based intercept facilities.
Resupp6' The site must be able to be resupplied.
Defense. A ground-based intercept facility is typically manned by a
small crew, which has a very limited capability for self-defense. Such
Siting Considerations for DF Fac i l ities
In addition to equipment that directly supports the DF function, a DF

facility will normally include communications equipment that forms part of
the EW communications system. It may be collocated with other EW (ES
or EA) assets. The following criteria should be taken into account in the
siting of DF facilities:
Coverage. A DF facility's coverage of potential locations of relevant

adversary communications assets should be maximized with a limited
number of friendly DF assets.
DF location. The DF antenna must be sited to have a clear path to
the emitter and must be well forward on a feature and clear of
obstruction. This often conflicts with tactical requirements. The
accuracy with which the location of the emitter can be determined
will depend on the ability to accurately determine the location of
the DF sites. The use of GPS can dramatically improve the accuracy
of location.
Site error. A DF facility should be sited to minimize sources of error,
such as multipath error, that depend on its surroundings.
6.5.5
1 91
Communications. DF facilities should be sited so that they can com

municate directly with related EW command and processing, search,
intercept, and EA facilities as well as other DF facilities. These
communications would normally be via a data-enabled VHF CNR.
HF CNR may be used where the coverage of VHF CNR is insuffi
Cient.
aircraft-based DF facilities.
Angle between bearing lines. The DF baseline should be sited so that
the angle between D F bearing lines is as close as possible to 90.
Angles less than approximately 45 will lead to significant uncertainty
in the transmitter location.
Defense. A ground-based DF facility is typically manned by a small
crew, which has a very limited capability for self-defense. Such a
facility must be sited unobtrusively or collocated with some other
Siting Considerations for Analysis Fac i l ities
The considerations for siting an analysis facility are:
Communications. Analysis facilities should be sited so that they can

communicate directly with related EW command and processing
facilities, as well as the search, DF, intercept, and EA facilities that
are providing the data to be analyzed. This communication would
normally be via a data-enabled VHF CNR. HF CNR may be used
where the coverage of VHF CNR is insufficient.
aircraft-based facilities.
Defense. A ground-based analysis facility is typically manned by a
small crew, which has a very limited capability for self-defense. Such
1 92
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized B attl efi eld
Endnotes
[1)
U.S. doctrine for EW planning is contained in:

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 6-20-1 0 , "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Targeting Process, " May 1 996.
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 34-2, "Collection Management and Synchronization
Planning," March 1 994.
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 34-45, "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic
Attack," June 2000.
[2)
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 6-20- 1 0 , "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Targeting Process, " Appendix B, May 1 996.
[3)
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 34- 1 30 , "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,"

July 1 994.
7
Radio Freq uency Directed Energy
Weapons
7.1
Introduction
The most commonly used forms of EA have traditionally been jamming

and deception, largely because it has been difficulr ro generate sufficienr
power levels for neurralization. Radio frequency directed energy weapons
(RF DEW) have the potencial ro generate sufficiendy high power levels
ro provide effective neutralization of a broad range of military elecrronic
equipmenr. In principle, any equipmenr that employs modern elecrronic
componenrs is at risk from RF DEW attack. The impact of such an attack
could include both disruption of the operation of equipmenr or destruction
of electronic circuits, causing armored vehicles and ships ro operate erratically
or become completely inoperative, and aircraft ro fall our of rhe sky.
In one sense, rhe threat from RF DEW is not new; protection against
rhe nuclear elecrromagnetic pulse (N-EMP) resulting from a nuclear explo
sion has been recognized as imporranr for many years. What is more recenr,
however, is rhe porenrial ro build nonnuclear RF DEW. The principal
advanrages of RF DEW are that rhe desrrucrive energy of the weapon is
delivered almost insranraneously and many rargers can be engaged ac che
same time. The main limitation of RF DEW is thac, unlike lasers, ic is nor
possible ro produce a narrow, high-powered, focused RF beam. Ic is therefore
very difficult ro provide sufficienr power on a cargec ro achieve damage .1 c
useful military ranges, and rhe weapon is difficult ro employ wichouc causing
collateral damage ro the weapon platform or friendly forces.
1 93
1 94
The idea of using electromagnetic energy as a weapon goes back to

the early part of the twentieth century. In 1 924, the British government
offered a prize of 1 ,000 for a "death ray" that could kill a sheep at 1 00
yards [ 1 ] . As far as is known, the prize was never claimed. Nikola Tesla
claimed in 1 933 to have invented a "death ray, " the range of which was
reported to be 200 miles [2] .
There are many reports of the existence of RF DEW and of ongoing
research into development and countermeasures. In 1 987, the Soviet Union
was reported to have conducted extensive research into RF weapons, and to
be likely to test a ground-based radio-frequency weapon capable of damaging
satellites in the 1 990s [3] . Russian technology in the explosive generation
of very-high energy RF pulses, with energies as high as 1 00 MJ, led U.S.
technology by a factor of 10 in the early 1 990s [4] . The Washington Post
reported in 1 996 that the Soviets used such weapons to kill goats at short
ranges. In 1 997, it was assessed that Russia and Ukraine had significant RF
weapons capabilities [5] .
The United States has also invested significant resources into research
into RF weapons, possibly as early as the 1 960s. While much of the develop
ment of explosive RF generators occurred in the Soviet Union, it is believed
that the first report of this approach was that by Fowler [ 6] . U.S. efforts in this
area emphasize countermeasures as well as weapon development. Locations at
which this work takes place include the Philips Laboratory at Kirtland Air
Force Base and Los Alamos National Laboratory [7] , both in New Mexico.
While the Soviet Union may have had led the United States in this area
previously, by 1 993 it was being reported that "there is little doubt that the
U.S., abetted by recently bought Russian technology, has taken a considerable
world lead in this field" [7] .
In 1 996, an Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report on future
weapons included a section on an RF gunship. Additionally, the Air Force's
Armstrong Laboratories at Brooks Air Force Base is heavily engaged in such
research. Budget documents show that the laboratory intended to spend
more than $ 1 00 million over the six years to 2003 to exploit "less-than
lethal biological effects of electromagnetic radiation for Air Force security,
peacekeeping, and war-fighting operations" [8] .
Major areas identified for technological development in the late 1 990s
[9] were compact, high-power microwave (HPM) sources weighing approxi
mately 500 lbs and with a volume of 1 . 5 cu ft (ecluding antenna and pulse
power generator); compact, high-power, high-gain, ultra-wideband antennas
approximately 1 8 inches in diameter with 1 5 to 20 dB gain; compact,
efficient, high-power, pulse generator, weighing approximately 500 lbs with
Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapons
1 95
volume less than 1 0 cu ft and peak power greater than 50 GW; development
of explosively driven, pulsed-power sources; systems integration into existing
military platforms, including aircraft, land vehicles and ships; and radiation
hardening of existing assets.
Funding for development of RF DEW in the United States includes
$ 1 9.8 million in 1 996 for high power microwave technology, with a further
$63 million planned over the following seven years [ 1 O] ; $7 1 . 5 million
between 1 997 and 2003 for "High-Power Microwave C2W/IWTechnology"
to "disrupt, degrade, and destroy electronics in communication and infor
mation systems to support command and control/information warfare
(C2W/IW) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions" [ 1 1 ) ;
$ 1 8. 5 million i n 1 996 with $88.5 million projected between 1 997 and 2001
for HPM/LASER aircraft self protect missile countermeasures [ 1 2] ; and a
$6.6 million contract let to Hughes Missile Systems for demonstration
of "the high power microwave suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)
technology" [ 1 3] .
There have been a number of reports of U.S. RF DEW capabilities.
The U.S. Air Force is reported to have modified cruise missiles to take what
is surmised to be an RF DEW [ 1 4] . In 1 999, the Los Alamos National
Laboratory was reported to have developed a high-power microwave weapon
capable of being carried in a laser-guided bomb or cruise missile [ 1 5] . This
device was reported to have a power output of "tens of terrawatts," and a
range of up to 50m. A further indicator of the importance placed on RF
DEW by the United States is the explicit inclusion in 1 982 of monitoring
of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sources in the functions of the
SIGINT committee [ 1 6] .
Interest in RF weapons has also been evident in The Netherlands,
where the Royal Netherlands Navy has examined the potential impact of
these weapons on future ship design, from both offensive and defensive
perspectives [ 1 7] . The United Kingdom and France are reported to have
significant RF source development efforts [5], with the United Kingdom
also studying a variety of RF weapons [7] . Lesser efforts have been noted
in Germany, Switzerland, China, Japan, Sweden, Israel, and Australia [5] .
The aim of this chapter is to examine the potential impact of RF
DEW, and in particular nonnuclear RF DEW, against land forces. It begins
with a brief discussion of the properties ofRF DEW, followed by an examina
tion of possible platform protection mechanisms and their likely effectiveness.
The power levels required to achieve particular target effects are then analyzed,
and the maximum ranges at which these effects can be achieved. Delivery
mechanisms are then discussed, leading to an analysis of the threat posed
1 96
by these weapons to land forces, relative to that posed by conventional

weapons. Finally, an analysis is presented of the planning considerations for
defense against use of RF DEW by an adversary.
7 .2 Characteristics of RF D EW
RF DEW operate by projecting electromagnetic energy from a transmitter
onto a target at a sufficient power that electronic systems are damaged or
their operation disturbed. Damage is caused to a wide range of electronic
equipment because components, wires and apertures act as antennas to couple
the weapon's energy into the target. RF DEW, therefore, have the potential
to affect almost all electronic equipment, not j ust communications receivers
that might happen to be tuned to the RF DEW transmission.
7.2.1
Conti nuous Wave and Pulsed RF D EW
While there is no agreed definition, RF DEW are herein considered to be

high-powered transmitters (transmitting up to 1 0 GW) that can produce
frequencies within a very wide portion of the electromagnetic spectrum (up
to 1 00 GHz) . The transmitter may produce continuous power, known as
continuous wave (CW), or it may produce one or more short pulses. The
major uses of CW are jamming, and to target personnel. These uses are not
considered further in this chapter.
Pulsed RF DEW could be used against a large variety of electronic
equipment, where the damage caused might be transient (for example, intro
ducing errors into a computer) or permanent (such as the destruction of
electrical conductors within a circuit, preventing it from functioning cor
rectly). These weapons include electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-power
microwave (HPM). EMP weapons aim to produce a broad band of frequen
cies, usually covering frequencies at 1 0 MHz and below. EMP weapons are
reported to have no effect on personnel [ 1 8] . HMP weapons tend to produce
narrowband pulses in the microwave band, with pulse lengths up to 1 ms.
7.2.2
Expl osive and Nonexplosive RF DEW
Pulsed RF DEW can be divided into rwo, categories: nonexplosive and

explosive weapons.
Nonexplosive RF DEW produce one or more pulses of RF energy.
Typical nonexplosive RF DEW would generate long chains of pulses with
1 97
some predefined repetition rime. Such weapons require a large platform due
to rhe weight and space requirements of rhe power generator. In the discussion
below, we will use rhe example of a single RF DEW with a peak power of
10 GW, a pulse length of 1 J.LS and a repetition time of 1 s.
As shown in Figure 7. 1 , rhe nonexplosive RF DEW consists of the
following components: a continuous power generator, a pulse generator, an
RF converter, and an antenna. Some form of cooling is also usually required.
Contin uous Power Generator A source of continuous power is required for
o p eration of rhe RF DEW. This may take rhe form of a battery bank, a
diesel generator or be derived from a vehicle's internal power. The average
power supplied must be greater than the average power required by rhe pulse
generator to allow for losses in the system. For our example 1 0-GW system,
an average power of 1 0 kW is required. In practice, it is unlikely that the
system will be more than 1 0% efficient, so 1 00 kW are probably required.
Pulse Generator A pulse generator stores energy produced by the continuous
power generator and outputs this energy in short pulses. For our example
system, a volume of approximately 0.1 m3 may be required with weight up
to 1 00 kg. In order to minimize losses, rhe pulse generator should be located
as close to the RF converter as possible.
RF Converter The RF converter rakes the output from rhe pulse generator
and produces the signal to be transmitted via the antenna. In a nonexplosive
RF DEW, such as a high power microwave device, rhe RF converter could
be a magnetron that modulates the pulse to shift its frequency into rhe
microwave band. A practical weapon system might have a volume of approx
imately 2 X 1 o-3 m3 and a weight of approximately 40 kg.
The antenna efficiently couples energy from rhe RF converter to

rhe surrounding atmosphere. Irs size will depend on rhe type of antenna.
Antenna
Antenna
Continuous
power
generator
..
...
Pulse
generator
Figure 7.1 Block diagram of nonexplosive RF D EW.
....
RF converter
""'/
1 98
Electronic Wa rfare for the D igitized B attlefi eld
Suitable antennas may include a 1 m-diameter parabolic dish weighing up

to 1 0 kg. The antenna must be located in a suitable position to illuminate
targets. Likely locations are the nose of a missile, the top of a mast, and the
underbelly of an aircraft.
A one-shot RF DEW would not usually require a significant cooling
system. A continuous-pulse system, however, may require a large cooling
system. Much of this cooling will be required in the pulse generator and
RF converter stages. Based on the previous example, and assuming an overall
efficiency of 1 0%, the cooling system would have to dissipate 90 kW.
Explosive RF DEW produce a single pulse of energy, derived from the
detonation of an explosive charge. Since the energy for these weapons comes
from a small explosive source, they are generally much smaller than their
nonexplosive counterparts and can be deployed by missile. Explosive RF
DEW are also most suitable for missile applications because of the damage
that is likely to be caused to the weapon platform on detonation. Explosive
RF DEW may be generated by either a nuclear or conventional explosion.
This chapter concentrates on che nonnuclear case.
Cooling
7.3
Target Effect M e c h a n isms
Because of che difficulty of delivering large amounts of power over long

distances, the major damage mechanism of RF DEW is not destruction of
a cargec, bur rather che damage achieved by penetration of the system by
the RF energy to reach some key, sensitive components in the target. The
destruction of the.c,e key components then corresponds to destruction of the
eqwpmenc.
Target-effect mechanisms of RF DEW are generally divided into two
broad classes: front-door damage through deliberate antennas used by the
target for communications or RADAR, and back-door damage, where radia
tion is coupled through nondeliberate antennas such as lines and component
legs, as well as through apertures and gaps in seals.
7.3.1
Front-Door Damage
Front-door damage occurs in systems, such as f=Ommunications receivers and

radar, which have high-gain antennas that are designed to collect electromag
netic radiation ac a selected frequency. An RF DEW can couple its emissions
at this frequency most effectively into the target when the antenna collects
RLdio Frequency Directed Energy Weapons
1 99
the RF DEW signal and focuses it into the target's own receiving subsystems.
Therefore, from-door damage has much in common with jamming, since
its performance relies on power being coupled into a receiver through a
commumcartons antenna.
7.3.2
Back-Door Damage
Back-door damage occurs when the RF DEW signal is coupled to components

a.nd subsystems. The signal can enter the target through small apertures or
seams in subsystem enclosures and interconnecting cables. The gaps act like
waveguides to funnel the RF DEW signal into the electronics boxes, which
then act as resonant cavities for the signals. In addition, interconnecting
cables act as simple antennas. Once rhe electromagnetic radiation is inside the
equipment enclosures, various electronic components act as simple monopole
antennas that will couple to signals whose wavelength is roughly equal to
the length of the component. Consequently, resistors, wires, printed circuit
board interconnects, component legs or connections all act as good collectors
ofRF DEW signals, which are then fed through the rarger-sysrem electronics
to disrupt the more sensitive elements. Clearly this type of arrack requires
higher power densities to achieve the same level of damage possible via rhe
front-door approach since it does not have the benefit of the high-gain
antenna to collect and focus the signal.
The components that are the most vulnerable to RF DEW are the
sensitive semiconductors (such as receiving diodes and logic chips) contained
in modern equipment such as radar and communication sets and electronics
based equipment (particularly those that are computer-based) . Higher levels
of signal can affect the electronics in ignition systems, and at very high levels
it is even possible to detonate missile warheads, bombs, and possibly artillery
shells.
The main threat is from an RF DEW that can deliver irs energy in
about 1 f..L S or less since semiconductor junctions need this amount of rime
to dissipate the hear. The higher the stare of technology, the more vulnerable
it is. Large-scale use of solid-stare components and the increasing sophistica
tion of component circuitry have increased vulnerability of systems. This is
particularly so when large-scale integrated circuits are used. Ir is important
to recognize rhar this trend cannot be reversed without dramatically reducing
rhe functionality of modern platforms. The solution lies, therefore, nor in
returning to the simpler circuit designs of the past, but rather in incorporating
hardening into circuit and equipment design.
200
7.3.3
Electronic Warfa re fo r the D igitized B attlefield
Damage Mechanisms Employed by RF DEW
Once large amounts of RF energy have entered an electronic system, the

system's performance can be degraded in a number of different ways, includ
ing component failure due to mechanical defects, equipment upset leading
to a temporary failure, insulation breakdown, leading to either temporary
failure or destruction, failure of semiconductor junctions, and burnout of
metal interconnections.
In all cases, it can be expected that the greatest impact will occur in
equipment, such as commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, that has not been
designed to operate in a hostile electromagnetic environment.
The susceptibility ofsystems and subsystems depends on the constituent
devices. For example, a receiver that uses valves has a moderate susceptibility,
whereas a receiver built from semiconductor devices has a high vulnerability
[ 1 9] . The vulnerability of a variety of different components is shown in
Figure 7.2. Typical values relevant to the operation of computer and commu
nications equipment include 80 mW to disrupt the operation of an unshielded
computer, and 1 W to destroy an unprotected transistor in the input stage
of a radio receiver.
7.3.4
Propagation Effects
Once the RF DEW energy has been launched from the antenna, it must
propagate to the target. The amount of energy incident on a target is limited
by three factors: radio line-of-sight, atmospheric dielectric breakdown, and
atmospheric absorption.
Radio Line-of-Sight When a radio wave travels through the atmosphere, it
is affected by the refractive index of the atmosphere, which tends to bend
the wave towards the Earth. Lower frequencies are more affected than higher
frequencies, and VHF and low UHF frequencies tend to follow the curvature
of Earth and can therefore travel further than the optical horizon. At higher
frequencies (> 1 GHz) , the radio waves are unaffected by the refractive index
profile and tend to travel in a straight line. In that case, the range of
transmission will be limited by the horizon due to the curvature of the Earth.
This range is called the optical horizon, which would be approximately
1 0 km over a flat surface for an RF DEW mounted 1 0m above the ground,
aimed at a target placed on the ground.
Another major limiting factor to the

amount of power that can be transmitted through the atmosphere is atmoAtmospheric Dielectric Breakdown
201

1 07
1 05
1 07
Least
susceptible
1 o
1 06
1 06
1 03
1 05
1 05
Power SCRs
Power diodes
Relays
1 02
1 o
1 01
1 03
1 02
101
TTL logic
DTL logic
MOS logic
1 01
Transformers
Ind uctors
Relays
Wire-wound
resistors
EMI filters
Carbon
resistors
High power
transistors
Zeners
Vacum tubes
Medium power
transistors
JFETs, SCRs, UJTs
High voltage
rectifiers
Low power
transistors
DTL logic, ECL logic
Signal diodes
1 o
Paper/polyester
film capacitors
1 03
Film resistors
Ceramic/mylar
capacitors
1 02
Tantalum
capacitors
1 01
Low power
switching diodes
TTL logic, MOS logic
1 0"2
Most
susceptible
Motors
Linear ICs
1 0-3
Upset threshold
(W @ 1 1-l-S)
1 0"1
Microwave mixer
diodes
Damage threshold
(W @ 1 !lS)
Figure 7.2 Powers required to damage various el ectronic devices
[19].
spheric dielectric breakdown, which occurs when the high field strength of
the RF DEW electromagnetic signal leads to atmospheric ionization. The
field strength at which breakdown occurs depends on signal frequency and
pulse length as well as on the air pressure [20] . This limit on the power
output (approximately 10 GW) provides a practical limit on the range of a
nonnuclear RF weapon, and is a major reason why RF DEW cannot be
used to cause structural damage at any useful range.
Atmospheric Absorption Atmospheric constituents at particular frequencies
absorb significant amounts of RF energy. For example, water vapor absorbs
202
strongly at 22 GHz and 1 8 5 GHz, while oxygen absorbs at 60 GHz

and 1 1 8 GHz. This has the effect that, for weapon ranges between 1 and
1 00 km, attenuation within several GHz of the water vapor and oxygen
absorption lines will be too high. Precipitation is also a major atmospheric
absorber. Absorption varies with frequency since scatter depends on the ratio
of droplet size to electromagnetic wavelength. For example, over a 1 0-km
range, 3-GHz radiation is attenuated by 0.01 dB in moderate rain, while
30-GHz radiation is attenuated by 10 dB in the same conditions [20] .
7.4 Platform Protection

Having considered the potential impact of RF DEW, it is important to
consider the methods available to counter them: in other words, EP. Because it
is very difficult to simulate high-power pulses, the development of protection
systems has not been an exact science. However, there are some agreed
methods that can be employed to protect platforms, systems, and equipment.
Two main techniques are avoidance of illumination by the weapon, and
hardening of platforms/systems/equipment against the effects of the weapon.
7.4.1
Avoidance of I l l umi nation
Avoidance of illumination involves ensuring that any threat carrying a single

RF DEW cannot get close enough to the platform to be effective. In this
respect, RF DEW are no different to other weapons systems where avoidance
of detection and illumination by the system is the first level of defense. In
addition, platforms may use terrain shielding as a form of EP. It is therefore
a matter of tactics.
7.4.2
Hardening Tech niques
Hardening involves the development of an electromagnetic barrier to prevent

harmful transients from reaching sensitive equipment. There are a number
of hardening steps that can be taken, but, as with any countermeasure, there
is a price to pay in terms of increased size, weight, and cost. The techniques
that offer the greatest value to counter RF DEW are the use of filters to
reduce out-of-band coupling, the ue of over-voltage or over-current protec
tion devices to arrest pulses, connection between subsystems using fiber
optics, the replacement of sensitive components with hardened functional
equivalents, incorporation of redundant circuits, the development of fault-
203
tolerant devices, and shielding and grounding of cables, subsystems, and full
systems.
MIL-STD- 1 88-125 [2 1 ] gives general requirements for the integration
of EMP hardening with other electromagnetic interference (EMI)/electro
magnetic compatibility (EMC), lightning protection, and TEMPEST design
requirements [22] .
MIL-STD-464 [23] is utilized as the standard to establish the electro
magnetic environmental effects interface requirements and verification crite
ria for all land, air, and sea systems, including associated ordnance. Among
other things, the standard describes the maximum levels of electrical field
allowable in the environments into which systems are to be deployed. These
levels are used in this chapter as the threshold that would have to be exceeded
by the RF DEW to cause any ill effects or damage to target systems.
Platform hardening can be approached at one or more of three layers
or levels: the platform level, the system level, and the equipment interface/
circuit level [24] .
Platform-Level Hardening (Layer 1)
Layer 1 hardening involves shielding

external electrical conductors, installing protective devices at external electri
cal penetration points, and controlling cable routing to minimize the possibil
ity of energy being transferred to interior spaces. EMP hardening of
approximately 40 dB was achieved in hardening Aegis class cruisers [24] . It
is expected that this level could also be achieved for the wider range of
frequencies achieved with RF DEW. For land forces, this type of hardening is
often difficult to achieve. Armored vehicles, for example, are not traditionally
designed with the necessary shielding. In addition, much equipment, such
as Combat Net Radio, must be operated from platforms, such as soldiers'
backs, that are not capable of being hardened.
System-Level Hardening (Layer 2) This layer addresses shielding interrack
connecting cables, grounding shields at connector backshells, and shielding/
grounding of equipment racks to reduce the possibility of DEW energy
being transferred to equipment interface circuits. Terminal protection devices
have been reported to provide an additional 1 5-dB protection between
HF/VHF antenna feeds and receivers [24] . For land forces, this type of
hardening is feasible, provided that it is taken into account during system
design.
Equipment Interface/Circuit-Level Hardening (Layer 3)
Hardening at this level

involves using balanced, high common-mode rejection interface circuits,
replacing interrack signal cables with fiber optic links, incorporating prorec-
204
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized B attlefi eld
rive devices on interface lines, circuit boards, or chips, and selecting harder
circuit components to assure that the equipment can withstand any residual
RF DEW energy. Protective devices need to be individually designed for
each system or circuit to be protected. An example of integrated overvolrage
protection for an HF receiver is shown in Figure 7.3, incorporating spark
gap devices for coarse protection and a varistor and diodes for fine protection.
7.4.3
Issues Associated with the Protection Provision
Protection Planning The main difficulty in providing protection against the

effects of electromagnetic radiation, whether generated by RF DEW or
natural sources such as lightning, is not the technology or the expenditure.
Rather, it is in the equipment procurement process: suffic ient planning must
occur to ensure that adequate provision is made in the early planning phases
for the appropriate protection of plarforms, systems, and equipment.
MIL-STD-464 provides a basis for determining the level of protection
required at each layer.
Cost Providing that consideration is given early enough in the acquisition
cycle, the cost of integrated protection (such as that espoused by MIL-STD464) to encompass all ources of electromagnetic radiating, can cost as little
as 2 to 1 0% [25] , most of which is spent in performance testing and life
cycle maintenance of robustness against electromagnetic radiation [ 1 8] . If
Antenna
Conductor inductance
I
I
I
1 5 kV
600 V
I
I
90 V
5V
I
I
! -=:::::
: Coarse protection
l
I
I
I
:
:
L_ Varistor
I
I
I
.
I
I
--
!.. _ _ Open spark gap
Gas spa.rk gap
-=:
.
:::;:=-=
Fine protection
i
I
L _ _ Diodes
Figure 7.3 I ntegrated overvolta ge protection for an HF rec eiver
(25].
205
included in the procurement phase, the costs of integrated protection are

small enough to be considered negligible, particularly in light of the platform,
system, and equipment vulnerability that results if such protection is not
included. Costs of hardening equipment later in its life (where technically
feasible) have generally been approximately 20% of total system cost [ 1 8] .
In a manner similar to NBC protection, i t is likely
that platform protection measures will result in some constraints on the
operation of particular platforms. For example, armored vehicles and shelters
may be designed/modified to increase sealing to reduce the ingress of RF
energy. These measures will only be effective if hatches and doors remain
shut. The capability of vehicles such as armored reconnaissance vehicles may
be restricted if they have to operate closed-down. The impact of RF DEW
on tactics and doctrine is discussed in detail in Section 7.5. Training must
also take place in a realistic environment to ensure successful operations
when the use of RF DEW is likely.
Tactics and Doctrine
The maintenance of the desired level of hardening throughout

the life cycle of the platform requires a number of additional supporting
activities. In particular, operators and technicians must receive additional
training in the maintenance of systems, subsystems, and devices that have
been modified for protection against RF DEW. The protection of a platform
relies on the interaction of a range of protection levels and activities. Users
and repairers must be aware of the types of protection so that the appropriate
levels are not inadvertently reduced during maintenance.
Maintenance
Disaster Recovery Plans In addition to technical solutions for protection

against the effect of RF DEW, disaster recovery plans must be developed
to allow platforms to recover as best as possible, should key systems be
destroyed or degraded. The plans should include reversion to manual
operating procedures (where possible), incorporation of redundant equip
ment, and so on. While these plans should already exist in the absence of
a RF DEW threat, they would need to be modified to take such a threat
into account. Disaster recovery plans should also be exercised in training to
ensure that all personnel are aware of their roles in regaining as much
operational ability as possible following an RF DEW attack.
7.5 Analysis: Offensive RF DEW

In this section, the issues associated with the offensive use of RF DEW
(i.e., EA) are analyzed; the defense against such attacks is examined in
Section 7.6.
206
7.5.1
Del ivery Factors
When considering the range of possible active applications, the following

factors are taken into account:
Physical considerations. The size and weight of the weapon must be

considered for each type of platform. The type of weapon also needs
consideration. For example, an explosively generated RF DEW is
not suitable for mounting on a high-value vehicle or aircraft because
of the damage that would be caused to the platform itself. Similarly,
a nonexplosively generated weapon is likely to be too large to be
mounted in a missile or a bomb.
Power. The maximum achievable power will be limited by the charac
teristics of the generator, its antenna system, and losses such as
ionization of air if sufficient power is generated to cause an atmo
spheric breakdown. The breakdown of air surrounding the antenna
provides a practical upper limit to the output power of an RF DEW
[26] . Therefore, power levels up to a maximum of approximately
1 0 GW can be obtained from explosive or nonexplosive generators.
Range. The range of effect of RF DEW will be estimated in Section
7 . 5 .2. In practice, this is unlikely to be more than 10 km and will
often be much less. In the land environment, the range will most
likely be reduced further by terrain effects.
Suicide. Unless the weapon platform is to be sacrificed, it must be
sufficiently protected to prevent self-inflicted injury as a result of
firing the RF DEW. Since the platform is much closer to the transmit
antenna than the intended target, it follows that the platform is
potentially in a much larger electromagnetic field than the target.
If the DEW antenna is mounted at a height L above a ground
vehicle, then the power levels at the vehicle are Rl L greater than
the intensities at the target, where R is the distance to the target.
Therefore, the DEW platform must be protected to the levels
required by MIL-STD-464 plus 20 log(R/l ) dB if it is to survive
the activation of the weapon. These levels cn be lowered due to
the reduction in power as a result of the radiation pattern of the
antenna-the platform will not be in the main beam of its own
weapon, but will be in one of the side lobes.
Fratricide. Also significant is the potential fratricide that will result
from friendly platforms within the beamwidth of the DEW antennas.
There is little that can be done about this technically. The best
7.5.2
207
controls come from the implementation of standard operating proce

dures for the use of the weapons. Suicide and fratricide provide
significant limitations on the employment of RF DEW on land,
sea, and air platforms.
Target effect. In all cases it is assumed that the required target effect
is to exceed the values required by MIL-STD-464 on the assumption
that this will result in damage at the target. If the target is less
protected, damage can obviously occur at longer ranges.
Range of RF DEW
The electromagnetic radiation used by RF DEW to deliver energy to a target is

subject to losses during propagation similar to other types of electromagnetic
radiation, including those used for communications and radar. The range
of RF DEW depends on a number of factors, including the altitude at which
the energy is released, the altitude of the target, and the terrain between the
weapon and target.
We assume that the RF DEW generates 1 0-GW peak power, that
there exists approximately 1 0 dB of additional loss in the receive system,
and that there are no additional losses due to ionization of air surrounding
the RF DEW [27] . Given the power required to cause a particular target
impact, it is then possible to determine the maximum path loss that will
still provide sufficient power at the target.
The operation of a land-based electronic system shielded in accordance
with MIL-STD-464 should not be subject to interference at received power
levels less than 3kW at low frequencies (< 1 0 MHz) and 1 OW at higher
frequencies [28] . A loss in propagation of more than 3 5 dB at low frequencies
and 60 dB at higher frequencies, therefore, will result in insufficient energy
reaching the target to disrupt its operation. Assuming no impact from terrain
(i.e., all loss is due to free-space loss), this is equivalent to a distance of less
than l OOm between the weapon and target at low frequencies and 1 km at
higher frequencies.
For the destruction of an unprotected transistor attached to a receive
antenna, a power of approximately 1 W is required, assuming an operating
frequency of approximately 1 GHz. This power will be achieved with a path
loss of 80 dB. In the absence of terrain, this will provide a maximum range
of 8 km.
For interference with the operation of an unshielded computer, a
received power of approximately 80 mW is required, assuming an operating
frequency of approximately 1 GHz and giving a maximum path loss of
Electronic Wa rfare fo r the D igitized Battlefield
208
90 dB, which is equivalent to a maximum range of approximately 25 km

in the absence of additional loss due to terrain. Table 7. 1 summarizes these
likely maximum ranges for RF DEW, based on free-space loss.
In the use of RF DEW against land forces, terrain will also have a
significant impact, reducing the power delivered to a target due to terrain
screening, diffraction, and reflection loss. These additional losses will be
minimized by activating the RF DEW as high as possible from the sur
rounding terrain . As long as there is no significant ionization of air sur
rounding the RF DEW, these calculations will be similar to those used for
communications planning.
As a general rule of thumb, at most RF DEW frequencies, line-of
sight is required between the weapon and the target. This requirement for
line-of-sight reduces the effective range of RF DEW to the optical horizon.
The distance between the RF DEW and the optical horizon will depend on
the heights of the weapon and the target, as well as the terrain in between.
For example, across perfectly flat ground, the maximum line-of-sight distance
between a weapon mounted at 4m above the ground and a target on the
ground is 7 km. Any terrain between the weapon and the target would block
out RF energy and protect the target.
In a practical use of RF DEW, it would be necessary to conduct
experiments to determine the amount of loss that should be allowed for in
the receiving system. Significant advantage may also be obtained by the
choice of operating frequencies to take advantage of known sensitivity of
particular targets.
7.5.3
Del ivery Pl atforms
RF-DEW might be delivered from a variety of platforms, including surface

vehicles (land or sea), aircraft, missiles, foot-mounted forces (particularly
special forces) , and terrorists. In this section, we examine the issues associated
Table 7.1
Likely Maximum Ranges for RF D EW Based on Free-S pace Loss
Target
Maximum Range
M I L-STD-464 protected, < 10 M H z

M I L-STD -464 protected, > 1 0 MHz
Destructio n . of unprotected transistor
Interference with u n protected com puter
1 00m
1 km
8 km
25 km
Radzo Frequency Dzrected Energy Weapom
209
with the delivery by each of these means. The related issues of protection
against each means of delivery are discussed in Section 7.6.
The details of the size and weight of RF DEW generators are not
available in the public domain. The minimum weight of nonexplosive
RF-DEW capable of generating long pulse trains is likely to be in the range
from 200 to 300 kg, although generators capable of only a single pulse could
be built smaller.
Kopp [29] surmises that explosive generators would be small enough
to fit into a missile or a bomb, and provides some details on how such
weapons might be deployed from existing platforms.
Ground Vehicle A ground vehicle could be used to carry either explosive or
nonexplosive RF DEW. In the case of the explosive generator, the vehicle
itself may not survive activation of the weapon. In the case of the nonexplosive
weapon, the vehicle may require special hardening to enable it to continue
operating after the RF DEW has been activated. Given the impact of terrain
on RF propagation, it will most likely be necessary to provide a means for
increasing the elevation of the RF DEW, either by use of high ground or
by means of a mast. In the case of a single-use RF DEW, a mechanism
similar to that used in a jumping-jack mine might be suitable for small
weapons.
Given that the RF DEW projectile is likely to weigh

200 kg or more, it is unlikely that conventional artillery would be a suitable
launch platform. Large naval guns may be capable of performing this function
if land forces are sufficiently close to the coast. Regardless of size and weight
constraints, it is unlikely that the RF DEW weapon could withstand the
forces involved in firing such projectiles over long distances. In this situation,
it makes sense to think of the operating range of RF DEW as similar to the
concentration of artillery; it provides a method for employing the weapon
for area coverage, without necessarily knowing the precise location of the
target.
Artillery and Tank Guns
Special Forces RF DEW may be delivered by special forces carrying the

weapon to a point that is within range of the intended target. The weight
of current weapons (likely to be of the order of 200 kg) makes this difficult,
unless the weapon can be disassembled into a number of man-portable parts.
Due to the effect of terrain, it is likely that some form of elevation will be
required before reasonable effective ranges can be obtained.
210
Electronic Warfare for t h e Digitized Battlefield
In many modern conflicts, terrorists may pose a threat to deployed

military forces as well as to military bases and national infrastructure. Recent
examples of such operations include NATO in Kosovo and INTERFET in
East Timor. Unlike the employment of special forces, RF DEW may be
more easily deployed by terrorists. Small civilian vehicles could be used to
deploy the weapon in a similar manner to car bombs. However, unlike car
bombs, the greater range of RF DEW poses a much larger threat to military
installations such as airfields and command and control centers.
Terrorists
Aircraft An airborne RF DEW has great advantage over a ground-based
system because it operates well above the terrain . However, because of the
range limitations discussed previously, it is unlikely that an airborne RF
DEW would be effective against a hardened target. Furthermore, the carriage
of the required generator capacity on board a fighter aircraft is not thought
to be feasible, but a purpose-built RF "gunship" could be implemented if
the issues of self-damage could be overcome. Such an aircraft may have the
advantage of being able to stand off from a target more than a conventional
ground attack aircraft. This delivery method may be used to provide suppres
sion of enemy air defense (SEAD) prior to launching a conventional attack
to destroy the target.
Missile-Borne RF DEW A missile-borne weapon is thought to be practical
where the RF energy is generated as a result of an explosion. Indeed, there
is evidence that cruise missiles have been modified to enable them to carry
RF DEW [ 1 5 ] . At the extreme, if the power generated was 1 0 GW, the
missile might be able to explode as much as 1 0 km from the target (assuming
line-of-sight between the weapon and the target) and still achieve a significant
impact. Missiles have a similar advantage to aircraft in that they elevate the
RF DEW, and are therefore less affected by terrain than ground-based
systems. Realistically, it is more likely that such devices would only be
effective exploding at ranges of hundreds rather than thousands of meters.
Given that the likely weight of an RF DEW is around 200 kg, it is unlikely
that it will be possible in the near future to use either short-range or medium
range anti-armor weapons (SRAAW or MRAAW) as a launch platform.
Missile-based RF DEW are therefore likely to be launched from larger
ground-based or airborne platforms.
7.5.4
Target Effects
Having considered the possible delivery platforms, we now examine the

possible target effects: likely recovery times and levels of damage.
211
The impact on the vehicle control, sensor, and weapons systems in an

armored vehicle could be either disruption or permanent damage to electron
ics. The recovery time for disruption is likely to be on the order of seconds.
Permanent damage to electronics may constitute an electronic kill, recovery
from which will require repair, possibly taking several hours.
For the disruption of C2 systems in CP or logistics installation, the
recovery time is likely to be on the order of minutes to reboot computers.
Some data may be lost, but in a carefully designed system the impact of
this loss is likely to be small. If a large IP network is used, the recovery of
routing tables for routers may take longer, reducing the systems' connectivity
for this period. The impact on the operation of a CP would be reduced if
an alternate means was established that was not vulnerable to RF DEW,
such as magneto telephones and manual C2 systems. Permanent damage to
electronic systems in a CP or logistics installation may have a similar impact
to the same damage to equipment in an armored vehicle. If an alternate
location is established, however, the impact of such damage on C2 may be
minimal.
7.6
Analysis: Defense Agai nst RF DEW
In this section, the characteristics of RF DEW are examined from the point
of view of defense. The potential range is considered first, followed by aspects
specific to the delivery platforms suggested previously.
In Section 7.4, the range of RF DEW was analyzed from the point of
view of having confidence that sufficient power would reach the target to
achieve the desired effect. In this section, however, the issues are examined
from the point of view of being confident that the operation of systems will
not be compromised as long as adversary RF DEW are not activated within
a certain range of the asset being protected.
In Section 7.4, conservative estimates of range were made by assuming
that 1 0-dB loss occurred in the receiving system. In this section, we assume
that there is no loss in the receiving system, making the estimates conservative
with respect to defense. The maximum ranges over which an enemy RF
DEW might be effective, based on the same assumptions made in Section
7.4, are then for equipment protected in accordance with MIL-STD-464:
300m for frequencies less than 1 0 MHz, 3 km for higher frequencies;
destruction of an unprotected transistor attached to a receive antenna:
25 km; and interference with the operation of an unshielded computer:
80 km.
21 2
These figures assume that the only source of loss is free-space loss.
However, additional loss will usually occur due to terrain shielding, diffrac
tion, and reflection. In situations in which there is not a large volume of
air ionized around the RF DEW, these additional losses can be taken into
account by methods similar to those employed for communications planning.
Further confidence in the safety of systems could be obtained by assuming
that the resilience of equipment was degraded (e.g., by 10 dB), compared
to that specified in MIL-STD-464.
These maximum ranges suggest that systems must be protected to the
standards specified in MIL-STD-464. Furthermore, they suggest that unless
terrain shielding is used in an effective manner, headquarters as high as
brigade may be within range of ground-based RF DEW operating from
within enemy-controlled areas. Indeed, hindering illumination by enemy RF
DEW may be considered one of the advantages of a reverse-slope defense.
Another issue worthy of consideration is the identification of the loca
tion of enemy RF DEW. This problem is related to the function performed
by artillery locating units and also to DF in EW. The process of locating
enemy RF DEW may be significantly easier for very high power weapons
that cause significant ionization of the air.
The basis for defense against RF DEW is the establishment of an
exclusion zone around assets to be protected. The key issue in developing
defensive strategies against the various RF DEW delivery platforms is to
identify how the use of the RF DEW changes the capability of the platform
compared to its more conventional weapons systems. In this section, the
defense of vehicles, aircraft, safety and arming systems, personnel, support
equipment command posts, and logistics facilities will be examined.
7.6.1
land Vehicles and Shelters
Vehicles contain a number of systems that may be neutralized by RF DEW,

including engine management and control systems, communications equip
ment, sensors, information systems, and ordnance.
Armored vehicles and communications shelters can potentially provide
platform-level protection for electronic equipment. Requirements will
include complete shielding of the vehicle or shelter, with special conductive
seals around doors and hatches, maximum use of optic fiber for communica
tions within and between vehicles, and provision of suitable hardening for
necessary electrical interfaces, including antennas and power cables. It is
important to note that this protection is only effective when armored vehicles
are operating closed-down and shelters have doors shut.
213
Other military vehicles are less able to provide platform-level protection.

Soft-skinned equipment such as logistics vehicles, engineering plant, and
communications vehicles are all vulnerable and could potentially be disabled
by RF DEW. Communications and other electronic equipment operated in
these vehicles may require higher levels of integral hardening than similar
equipment operated from hardened armored vehicles and communications
shelters.
The total exclusion of potential delivery platforms from an area of a
3-km radius around a vehicle to be protected is unlikely to be feasible. This
is particularly so for vehicles operating at checkpoints for maintaining an
exclusion zone around command posts and logistics installations.
The tactics of armored vehicles, which attempt to make use of terrain
to minimize visibility to the enemy, may already provide some protection.
This will be aided by the fact that the range of modern MRAAW is similar
to that of RF DEW and that line-of-sight is usually required for launching
these weapons. The Javelin weapon system, for example, has a range of
approximately 2 km. Other types of operation that will tend to increase
protection include operation submerged in water.
Existing procedures for NBC defense, such as closed-down operation,
will also be of importance in providing a measure of protection against an
RF DEW threat.
7.6.2
Aircraft
Aircraft are very vulnerable to RF DEW: If attacked while airborne, platforms

could simply fall out of the sky; if attacked on the ground, aircraft could
be rendered inoperable for a considerable period. Detailed analysis is required
to determine the methods for route planning and protection around airfields
to minimize unnecessary exposure to this threat.
A modern ai tcraft can be highly sensitive to EMP, which can be coupled
with antenna-like protuberances. Currents induced on the outer skin of the
aircraft or on a deployed trailing-wire antenna can flow into the aircraft
interior through apertures such as cockpit windows or imperfect seams at
skin-panel joints, or along antenna mounts or other direct penetrations. A
modern aircraft carries sensitive electronics and is partly built out of advanced
materials, such as carbon-fiber plastics, which have a low electromagnetic
shielding effect. The use of these materials also complicates the problem of
EMI, since many parts of the aircraft contain no conducting and shielding
metal structures. On those external surfaces that do conduct, induced currents
can reach 1 ,OOOA, and currents induced on a deployed trailing wire can
Electronic Warfare f o r t h e Digitized Battlefield
214
reach several thousand amperes. These induced currents are much greater
than aircraft interior wiring currents, which typically range from less than
1A to 1 OA or more [30] .
A high level of RF energy has the potential to damage or destroy
most of electronic-based systems identified earlier: radar, communications
equipment, electrical power generators and engine controls, navigational
aids, electronic flight controls, and weapon fuses.
Solutions require focus on equipment layer hardening. Additionally,
wiring should be replaced with fiber optics, and wiring, housings, plugs and
airframe materials should be effectively earthed and grounded. The cost of
the onboard electronics represents a substantial proportion of an aircraft's
total cost and the cost of maintaining significant holdings of spare parts may
be prohibitive [3 1 ] .
7.6.3
Safety and Arming Systems
Electroexplosive devices (EED) are found in a wide range of military systems,

including warheads, rocket motors, gas generators, cable cutters, thermal
batteries, and flares. They have the advantages of reliability, low-power
requirements, and rapid response time. However, most EED are susceptible
to uncommanded initiation and therefore need to be protected against con
ducted and radiated electromagnetic interference. Two main types of EED
are in service: the bridgewire (BW) and the conductive composition (CC)
[32] .
Various organizations, such as the Australian Ordnance Council [33] ,
have published minimum electromagnetic environments for which ordnance
is designed to be safe. MIL-STD-464 specifies that an additional 6-dB margin
should be provided for ordnance over that mandated for other equipment
[34] . This means that the maximum range of RF DEW against ordnance
is half that of an electronic system protected in accordance with the minimum
requirements of MIL-STD-464.
7.6.4
Personnel
The main direct threat to personnel from microwave radiation is through

heating of the body tissue [35] . The short duration of an RF DEW pulse
is not thought to raise the body temperature sufficiently to pose a hazard
to personnel [36, 1 8] . However, CW RF DEW do have the potential to be
used in the antipersonnel role. The heating of body tissue has been known
to cause cataracts, corneal opacities, testicular damage, lesions, hemorrhages,
215
and induced fevers [37] . In some animals, a transient rise of 1 0 degrees

Celsius in body temperature can be dangerous, and a sustained increase of
1 degree can be fatal [38] .
Although pulsed RF DEW pose little direct threat to personnel, an
indirect threat may exist in future land warfare due to the significant amount
of electronic equipment carried by soldiers. In addition to radios, soldiers'
personal equipment will include night-vision devices, hand-held computers,
and navigation devices, all of which are vulnerable to RF DEW.
While personal equipment can be protected by means of the hardening
techniques described earlier in this chapter, such measures are likely to
increase their size and weight, making them more difficult to carry and
employ. Because of this, the screening effect provided by the terrain sur
rounding ground forces may well provide the best protection for land forces.
7.6.5
Support Equipment
Land forces also employ a wide range of support equipment such as ground
based radar, generators, laser-range finders, water purifiers, and kitchens.
Any of this equipment that relies on electronic devices will be vulnerable to
RF DEW. Platform hardening may be difficult and could affect the operation
of the equipment. The best defense measure against RF DEW may be terrain
screen mg.
7.6.6
Command Posts
The establishment of an exclusion zone around a command post is likely

to be easier than for an individual vehicle, simply due to the greater availability
of manpoWer.
The best defense is the establishment of an exclusion zone around the
command post, at least for vehicles, by the use of checkpoints and active
patrolling. Defense against conventional explosives will require the exclusion
of conventional forces from the command post itself, which will also aid
defense against RF DEW. The establishment of the command post outside
urban terrain may assist defense.
Other current tactics that will assist in protection against RF DEW
include concealment of the command posts, since existing conventional
weapons systems such as MLRS have similar concentrations to that concentra
tion likely for RF DEW; dispersion in main and alternate command posts;
and regular changes of location.
Electronic Warfare f o r the Digitized Battlefield
216
7.6.7
Logistics I nsta llations
Major logistics installations are likely to be out of the range of artillery and
tank guns. Considerations for the defense of smaller installations such as a
brigade maintenance area will be similar to those applying to a command
post. However, additional difficulty will be experienced in the exclusion of
potential threats from the installation due to the volume of traffic entering
and leaving the facility and the likely need to employ local civilian staff.
The establishment of an exclusion zone may be particularly difficult
in situations in which large numbers of personnel (including possibly civilians
of questionable loyalty) and civilian vehicles are working in close proximity
to, or within, the facility to be protected. This problem is likely to arise in
urban terrain, rear logistics areas, and U.N. operations.
7.7
Summary
DEW potentially pose a significant threat to land forces through the

neutralization and destruction of their electronic systems. One of the major
advantages offered by such weapons is the reduced requirement for accuracy
compared to many conventional weapons, such as artillery. In order to
protect land forces against the effects of RF DEW, all electronic systems
should be protected both in accordance with the specifications of MIL-STD464 and by suitable tactics and procedures to minimize the likelihood of
illumination. Difficulties may be created by the size of the area surrounding
headquarters or other installations from which RF DEW must be excluded.
For offensive operations, the impact of RF DEW against platforms
protected in accordance with MIL-STD-464 may only be guaranteed for
ranges up to approximately 1 OOm or 1 km, depending on frequency. It is
likely also that the impact can be greatly increased by taking advantage of
those frequencies at which particular systems are most susceptible.
RF
Endnotes
[1]
'The Technology That Won the War," Reinventing the Wheel, BBC Radio 4. Available
at: Imp:/ / www . bbc.co. uk/ education/archive/wheel/war.htm.
[2]
O'Neill, ] . ] , Prodzgal Genius: The Life of Nikola Tesla, New York: Ives Washburn,
I 944, p. 239.
[3]
Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Military Power, Chapter 3,
I 987.
217
[4]
"Russia Leads in 'Pulse' Weapons," jane 's Deftnce Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 1 5 , October
1 0, 1 992.
[5]
Anny Science and Technology Plan, 1 0, "Electronic Warfare/Directed Energy Weap

ons," U.S. Department of Defense, 1 998.
[6]
Fowler, C., et a!., "Production of Very High Magnetic Fields by Implosion," journal
ofAppiled Physw, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1 960, pp. 588-594.
[7]
"Weapons Systems," jane 's Defence Weekly, Vol. 1 9, No. 24, June 12, 1 993.
[8]
Pasternak, D., "Weapons: The Pentagon's Quest for Non-Lethal Arms Is Amazing.
Bur Is It Smart?" US News and World Report, 1 997, pp. 38-46.
[9 ]
FY 1 997 Defense Technology Area Plan for Weapons, 3.9, U.S. Department of
Defense, 1 996.
[10]
F Y 1 998 USAF Military Space RDDS, U.S. Department of Defense, 1 997.
[11]
FY 1 997 Defense Technology Area Plan for Weapons, WE.22.09, U.S. Department
of Defense, 1 996.
[ 1 2]
Joint Science and Technology Master Plan, WE. 1 9.08, U.S. Department of Defense,
1 996.
[ 1 3]
"Contracts Awarded, R&D," jane 's Defence Contracts, February 1 996.
[ 1 4]
Kopp, C., "EMP-The Emerging Electromagnetic Threat," Australtan Aviation, 1 995,

pp. 50-54. See also Author, "Disabling Technologies-A Critical Assessment," Interna
tional Defense Revzew, Vol. 27, No. 7, July 1 994.
[15]
"Non-Lethal M icrowave Weapons," Defence Systems Datly, June 1 4, 1 999.
[ 1 6]
Director of Central Intelligence D irective No. 6/ 1 SIGINT Committee, May 12,

1 982.
[ 1 7]
"Signals, TNO-PML Studies Pulse Weapon I n tegration for Future Frigates," jane's
Navy International Vol. 1 0 1 , No. 008, Ocr. 1 , 1 996.

[ 1 8]
Wood, L., Statement to House of Representatives Committee o n National Security,

Military Research and Development Subcommittee, on the threat posed by EMP to
U.S. military systems and civil infrastructure, Washington, D.C., July 1 6, 1 997.
[ 1 9]
Trippe, A., 'The Threat of Electromagnetic Pulse," National Deftnse, 1984, pp. 22-27.
[20]
Sutton, P., "RF Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs)," RMCS AnnJ' Staff Course Notes,
1 995.
[2 1 ]
MIL-STD- 1 88-125 is divided into two parts: MIL-STD- 1 88-125- 1 , High-Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Perfonnmg

Critical, Time- Urgent Missions Part 1 Fixed Facilities, U.S. Department of Defense,
July 1 998; and MIL-STD - 1 88-1 25-2, High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
Protection for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Perfonning Critical, Time- Urgent Missions
Part 2 Transportable Systems, U.S. Department of Defense, March 1 999.
[22]
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities, Engineering and
Design Pamphlet EP 1 1 1 0-3-2, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, December 1 990.
[23]
MIL-STD-464, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects-Requirements for Systems, U.S.

Department of Defense, March 1 997.
218
[24]
Jump, M . , and W. Emberson, "Ship Electromagnetic Pulse Survivability Trials,"

Naval Engineers journal, May, 1 9 9 1 , pp. 1 36-1 40.
[25]
Neuheuser, H . , "The Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse," Military Technology. 1 98 5 ,

pp. 9 8- 1 00 .
[26]
Cabeyan, H. S . , "Current Status of Higher Power Microwave Effects and Simulation,"
Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory, December 1 986.

[27]
While generators with power output greater than 1 0 GW are theoretically possible,
they pose a number of practical problems that make them unlikely. The atmospheric
ionization resulting from the use of such powers results in high power losses and poses
a significant threat to the delivery platform that may be unacceptable for nonexplosive
RF DEW.
[28]
MIL-STD-464, Electromagnetzc Envrronmental Effects-Requirements for Systems, U . S .

Department of Defense, March 1 997, Table 1 C, p . 7 .
[29]
Kopp, C., An Innoductzon to the Technical and OperatzonalAspects ofthe Electromagnetic

Bomb, Fairbairn ACT: Air Power Studies Centre, Australia, 1 996. See also Kopp, C.,
The -Bomb: A Weapon of Elecnical Mass Desnuction, Clayton, Melbourne, Vic.:
Monash University, 1 996.
[30]
Soper, G . , and K. Casey, "Understanding the EMP Threat," Defense Elemonics, 1 987,
pp. 1 56- 169.
[3 1 ]
Kopp, C., "A Doctrine for the Use of Electromagnetic Pulse Bomb," Fairbairn ACT:
Air Power Studies Centre, Australia, July 1 993.
[32]
Nott, A., and J. Whitelaw, "Electromagnetic Radiation Hazard Testing ofElectroexplo

sives in Australia," journal of Battlefield Teclmolof!J', Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2000.
[33]
Australian Ordnance Council, "Guidelines for the Preclusion of Electroexplosive Haz

ards in the Electromagnetic Environment," AOC Pillar Proceedings, October 1 994,
pp. 236-294.
[34 ]
MIL-STD-464, Elecnomagnetrc Envrronmental Efforts-Requirements for Systems, U . S .

Department of Defense, March 1 997, p. 5.
[35]
Mumford, W., "Some Technical Aspects of M icrowave Radiation Hazards," Proc.

IRE, Vol. 49, February 1 9 6 1 , pp. 427-447.
[36]
EMP Engmeering and Desrgn Principles, Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1 975, p. 1 38 .
[37]
See, for example, Moore, W., Biological Aspects ofMicrowave Radiation: A Review of
Hazards, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service,
National Center for Radiological Health, July 1 968; Leary, F., "Researching Microwave
Health Hazards," Electronics, 1 959, p. 49; and Weiss, M . , and W. Mumford, "Micro
wave Radiation Hazards," Health Physic, Vol. 5 , June 1 96 1 , pp. 1 60-1 68.
[38]
Solait, 0., and H. Schwan, "Techniques for Relative Absorption Cross Section Deter
minations," i n 3rdAnnual Tri-Service Conference on B{o-Efficts ofMicrowave Radiating
Equipments, RADC- TR-59-140, 1 959. Sec also Mumford, W., "Some Technical
Aspects of Microwave Radiation Hazards," Proc. IRE, Vol. 49, February 1 96 1 ,
pp. 427-447.
8
8.1
Introduction
The defining feature of EW has always been the electromagnetic spectrum.

Traditional EW activities have been aimed at degrading an adversary's ability
to use the electromagnetic spectrum or protecting friendly use of the spec
trum. Expressed in the language of the OSI model for communications
systems, traditional EW has mostly been a physical-layer activity. This means
that it has been oriented mostly at electromagnetic systems. More recent
technology has led to the development of electromagnetic weapons that can
disrupt and damage a range of systems other than those not designed to be
emitters or receivers of electromagnetic radiation.
The key change in the nature of EW on a future digitized battlefield
will be its orientation toward the network, leading to a proliferation of
opportunities for EW. While many of the EW techniques in the future will
be the same as the ones currently used, the focus will change from being
primarily a physical layer to focusing on attacks on network security and
the security services that protect against these attacks. This same network
technology will also greatly increase the capability of friendly EW.
This chapter looks at the future of EW and its targets, examining a
number of key areas of communications technology, with likely advances
and their impact on EW. These key areas are networking, ultra-wideband
radio, improvd high-frequency radio technology, software radio, quantum
computing, and quantum cryptography.
219
220
8.2 Network Issues

In the foreseeable future, the most significant change likely to occur in the
targets for EW due to battlefield digitization is the evolution from a collection
of related, but separate, communications systems to a network. This network
will facilitate the passage of information between any two points on the
battlefield, as well as between any point on the battlefield and terminals
associated with other networks, such as joint and even multinational systems.
In Chapter 2, we outlined the motivations for migrating to a network
architecture: to maximize the effectiveness of the passage of information
between sensors, command elements, and weapons systems. For the reasons
outlined in Chapter 2, primarily related to a tradeoff between mobility,
capacity, and range in communications links, it is unlikely in the near future
that this network can be provided with a single communications technology.
In other words, it is unlikely that an evolution of the equipment and protocols
associated with the CNR subsystem will be able to meet all the requirements
of the tactical communications system; the same applies to the trunk and
tactical data distribution subsystems. Furthermore, there is no single technol
ogy on the horizon that could replace all of these systems.
While a single homogeneous network is not likely, a single logical
network is both desirable and achievable using current and developing tech
nology. The major changes that will occur in this evolution to a network
are seamless integration of all subsystems, the provision of truly mobile
networking, and the use of ad hoc network technology. Seamless integration
of all subsystems will enable the passage of information between any two
points on the battlefield. Mobile networking technology will allow stations
to move at will through the network without being constrained in their
location. Ad hoc network technology will allow the network to be self
forming, without the need for large numbers of dedicated base stations
throughout the area of operations.
8.2.1
Seam less I ntegration
Given the lack of a suitable technology from which to build a homogeneous

tactical communications network, seamless integration between a number
of subsystems is the only means of providing a single logical network. While
this integration has not occurred in the tactical communications system, it
is becoming increasingly common in commercial systems. Examples include
the global telephone network, containing interfaces for both fixed telephones
(both analog and digital) and mobile telephones. The telephone network
Electronic Waifare and Digitization
221
has also evolved to carry data as well as voice. Another example is the Internet,
whose terminals are connected by a range of interfaces, including high
performance local area networks (LANs) providing capacities of 1 0 Mbps
or more, cable modems (approximately 0.5 Mbps) , dial-up modems (up to
56 Kbps), and mobile dial-up connections (up to approximately 1 0 Kbps) .
The practical implementation of a single logical network requires the
use of common protocols, especially at the network layer and higher layers,
the use of suitable link-specific protocols at the physical layer and data-link
layer, and ubiquitous encryption to provide security for the network. Given
the current commercial technology, it is most likely that the majority of
information-processing equipment that will use future tactical communica
tions systems will be based on ruggedized computers using the same TCPIIP
protocol used in the Internet.
An outline view of a typical modern network is illustrated in Figure
8. 1 . It is based on a hierarchical structure. Each terminal is connected to a
local network. Each local network is connected to one or more other networks
via a router, denoted "R" in Figure 8 . 1 . The purpose of the router is to
route data between the various local networks. A group of networks and
routers forms an autonomous system (AS) . In a tactical network, a local
network may be the internal network of a headquarters, while an autonomous
system may consist of all the networks and routers in a formation.
One of the advantages of the hierarchical structure shown in Figure
8. 1 is that it minimizes the requirement for network terminals to understand
Figure 8.1 O utline structure of a TCP/IP network.
222
Ele ctro n i c Warfare for the Digitized Battl efield
the structure of the network. Terminals only needs two pieces of knowledge
about the network: the identities of the other terminals attached to their
local network (to whom they can therefore transmit data directly) and the
address of the router to which all other traffic should be sent. Routers require
knowledge of the next hop to route data between terminals with their local
AS and the identity of the router that handles traffic destined for outside
the AS. Only these boundary routers require explicit knowledge of the outside
network, and even here the knowledge required relates only to the first hop
outside the AS.
Seamless integration will provide the network for network-centric war
fare, underwritten by a variety of technologies, including those associated with
evolutions of cellular mobile telephone systems (especially third-generation
systems) , satellite technology, network protocols, and miniaturization of
electronics. The move to network-centric warfare will lead to a proliferation
in transmitters, each of which is a potential target for ES, and even EA.
This organic, tactical network will be supported by a range of overlaid
communications systems, including operational and strategic-level military
systems. The U.S. global information grid (GIG) is one such concept, aiming
to provide seamless integration throughout a reliable, assured, cost-effective,
global network. An important means for providing this level of connectivity
will be the incorporation of multiple layers of airborne rebroadcast using
aircraft, UAVs, and satellites [ 1 ] .
8.2.2
Mobile Networks
Users in the tactical communications system should be able to move from

one part of the network to another, and transparently receive the same
services in their new location. Depending on the equipment used, this
roaming may be provided using a wireless connection or require connection
to a wired network at the new location. Mobile networking protocols, devel
oped in recent years, provide this service using a forwarding agent (Figure
8.2). When station B moves from network 1 .3 to network 1 .2, it changes
its address to a value lying in network 1 .2. One station (labeled "F") in
network 1 .3 acts as a forwarding agent, receiving any data addressed to B
and forwarding it to B at its network 1 .2 address. So long as a forwarding
agent exists for each local network, stations can roam at will through the
network. The cost of providing mobility is some double-handling of data
destined for a roaming station in passing through the forwarding agent.
The implementation of mobility, particularly wireless mobility, has
implications for the management of encryption keys. It will be necessary to
provide either a common key for use in affiliation across the whole network
Electronic Wmfare and Digitization
(a )
223
(b)
Figure 8.2 Mobile networking. Station B is ( a ) in its home network, and ( b ) roaming in a
different network.
or to provide mobile users keys for use in different parts of the network,
imposing difficulty in guaranteeing the security of such widely distributed
keys. The use of wired network connections may reduce difficulties with
security by allowing individual stations to connect to the network without
the use of encryption systems.
In areas exposed to an adversary EA threat, it is likely that the capacity
of wide-area, fully mobile, tactical wireless communications systems, such
as CNR or developments on it, will remain limited. Nonetheless, there is
the potential for local-area communications systems, based on technologies
such as Bluetooth [2] , to offer high-capacity, truly mobile communications.
These systems may offer ranges of no more than tens of meters, operate in
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum that are not regulated (overcoming
the need to take spectrum away from other tactical uses), and offer data
rates up to 2 Mbps. They are likely to employ a range of EP techniques,
including FH [3] , to reduce their susceptibility to both natural and man
made interference. The combination of short range and the use of EP will
enable communications with very low transmit powers, maximizing battery
life [4] .
The provision of such a local-area communications system will enable
the networking of the sensors, weapons, and communications systems carried
by an individual soldier without the weight and inflexibility of connecting
cables. It will also enable the networking of small groups of soldiers, providing
a "section LAN " on which data from sensors and weapons can be shared.
8.2.3
Ad Hoc Networks
When we speak of mobile communications in current, commercial networks,

we mean only that the user terminal is mobile. The network itself is very much
224
fixed in place. In a cellular telephone system, for example, all communications

passes from a mobile handset to a base station, which is in turn connected
to the fixed network. In tactical communications systems, not only is the
user mobile, but also the whole network must be able to move with the
force it supports, and adapt its structure to changes in the disposition of
forces as required.
In an ad hoc network, stations cooperate to build the network. Stations
communicate using a common wireless channel. Each station can communi
cate directly with one or more of the other stations in the network, bur it
is unlikely that any one station can communicate directly with all of the
other stations. Stations on the network are therefore required to act as relays.
Data is carried through from source to destination by being passed from
one relay to the next. Each station maintains a list of the stations to which
it can directly communicate. Connectivity information is built up and distrib
uted by each station [5] .
In the example net\vork shown in Figure 8.3, B can communicate
directly with A and G . B may send data to E via the path BGE or the path
BACE. Each of these paths would have an associated cost, which may be
as simple as the number of hops involved. B would choose the least cost
path, transmitting the data over the first hop. The relay station (e.g., G)
then transmits the data over the next hop, with this process continuing until
the data reaches its destination .
In larger ad hoc networks, stations may form themselves into clusters.
A small number of stations may then take on the role of communicating
between clusters, possibly using higher transmission power to do so. The
forming of clusters helps to maximize frequency and battery life reuse by
minimizing transmission power. In the example in Figure 8.4, E and F have
taken on the role of inrercluster communication.
Figure 8.3
xample of connectivity withm a n ad hoc network.
225
lntracluster communications
-+-
l ntercluster backbone
Figure 8.4 Example of cl ustering in an ad hoc netwo rk.
An ad hoc network may be integrated with a wider network by one

of the stations on the ad hoc network acting as a gateway.
The major utility of an ad hoc network in the tactical communications
system is the fact that the network is formed by the terminals, without the
requirement for a specific infrastructure to be deployed.
8.2.4
Implications for EW
The advent of the battlefield network will bring with it a number of character
istics already found in commercial networks. One of the most important of
these in the context of EW is the concept of security services [6]. These are
a generalization of the use of encryption to protect information against
unauthorized access. The security services are confidentiality, authentication,
integrity, nonrepudiation, access control, and availability.
Confidentiality Information transmitted through the network should be
available for reading only by authorized parties. This service is traditionally

provided in military systems by encryption. Generalizing the subdivision of
encryption from Chapter 5, the confidentiality service may conceal the
contents of the message; the contents of the message and header information,
such as the identities of sender and receiver; or the very existence of the
message, as is provided by the bulk encryption used in the trunk subsystem
or by LPI techniques such as spread-spectrum communications (in which
case confidentiality can be seen as protecting the location of the transmitter)
[7] .
226
A uthentication Each party to an exchange of information across the network

should be able to guarantee the identity of other parties involved. This
applies to both senders and recipients of information.
Information transmitted though the network should be protected

against modification by an adversary.
Integrity
The sender of a message should receive a receipt that guaran

tees that the message was received by the intended recipient, preventing the
recipient from later denying receiving the message. Similarly, a recipient of
a message should receive an attachment to the message that can be used
to prove that the message was sent by a particular party. One impact of
nonrepudiation is to protect against counterfeit information being inserted
into the network. Nonrepudiation cannot exist without authentication.
Nonrepudiation
Access to systems connected to the network should be

limited to authorized parties. Access control includes physical secunty as
well as electronic measures, such as the use of passwords.
A ccess Control
A vailability The capacity of the communications system should be protected,

preventing an adversary from degrading system performance.
The exploitation of an adversary's network, whether by using ES or
EA, can be seen as an attack against one of more of these security services.
Possible attacks include the following:
Interception. An unauthorized party may attempt to gain access to
data transmitted across the network, or to a portion of this data,
such as its external characteristics. Interception is an attack on confi
dentiality and possibly also on authentication, and encompasses all
of the aspects of ES discussed in Chapter 3 [8] .
Modification. Following interception, an unauthorized party may
modify this data and reinsert it into the network. Modification is
an attack against integrity.
Fabrication. An unauthorized party may insert counterfeit informa
tion into the network. Protection against fabrication is provided by
authentication and nonrepudiation.
Interruption. Also known as a denial-ofservice attack interruption
aims to make become unavailable or unusable. It is an attack on
avai lability.
The taxonomy of these attacks is based on what the attacker is trying

to achieve, which means that there is not a simple one-to-one correspondence
E!cctromc \J?arforc and Dlgillz.tll/011
227
be rvveen the types of attack and the security services used ro protect ::tgai nst
them.
The division of EW into ES, EA, and EP still makes sense in the
context of the network. However, they should be seen in the context of t h e
security services that they are aiming to degrade or provide, rather than
purel y in terms of their relationship ro the electromagnetic spectrum. ES is
the means of exploiting an adversary's use of the elecrromagnetic spectrum
using only passive systems (i.e., receivers). In the language of security services,
ES is about interception, that is, an attack on confidentiality (in the broad
sense defined previously). EA is the means of exploiting an adversary's
use of the electromagnetic spectrum using active means (i.e., transmitters).
Defined in terms of the desired outcome on the adversary's network, these
attacks may take the form of modification, fabrication, or interruption. \XIhen
applied to communications and information systems, EP is the provision of
security services to protect friendly capabilities from the effects of friendly
EA, and adversary ES and EA.
The traditional subdivision of ES into search, intercept, OF, and analysis
remains valid. Derails of the equipment will change to enable, for example,
an intercept receiver ro monitor digital network traffic. ES is primarily used
.
as an attack on confidentiality, wh ether of the contents of a message, the
external characteristics of a message, or the location from which it is trans
mitted.
Similarly, even though the aims of EP may be reframed in terms of
nenvork security services, the basic techniques for providing LPI and resis
tance to jamming will not change.
The application of EA in the context of securiry services and rhe
associated attacks can be understood in terms of the mission given ro an EA
asset. This mission will include a task (e.g., to jam the adversary com m a n d
net) and a required outcome (to deny communications.) The outcome speci
fied here is interruption. An outcome "in order ro force the net to operate
in plain" specifics an interruption arrack, leaving the adversary vulncrahk
to a later interception attack. EA can be used ro prmide modiflcnion.
fabrication, and in rcrru prion atracks. Jamming a n d n c u t ra l i za r i o n a rc excl u
sively associated with inrcrruption; electronic d e ce p ti o n m a y h e assoc i a t ed
w i t h all t h ree.
The usc o f wi reless n etwo rk i n g p rotoco l s creates new nd n cr a h i l i t i e .
m a kin g i n t erru p t i o n poss i b l e by j a m m i ng a n d d ece p t i o n . Tra ns m i t t i n g i g
n a l s rhar i m i rat C t h e tra n s m i s s i o n s of a n aJnrsan-'s d a t a com m u n i c:H i o m
ss t e m s . espcc i a l l fen p ro t o co l s based o n CJ r r i cr-se n se m u l t i p l e :1L"Cl' \ \
(CSi'vl!\ ) . m ;l\
'
r r i c k t h e ;ldnTsa n-'s S\' S t e m s 1 n t n t h i n k i n g t h a t
,\
ch;1 n 11ll i'
228
El ectronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield
active, and prevent them from attempting to transmit. Hence, interruption

may sometimes be achieved at much lower powers than are required for
jamming. This opens up a new class of electronic deception, aimed principally
at the adversary's network rather than at the adversary commander. The
detailed coordination of this type of electronic deception is probably more
closely tied to jamming rather than the force's deception plan.
New vulnerabilities will also be created by the use of ubiquitous wireless
networking of sensors and weapons systems, increasing the potential impact
of electronic minefields. These wireless networks will add an electromagnetic
dimension to the signature of the smallest groupings of soldiers wherever
they operate.
The digitization of the battlefield will cause the number of targets
available for EW to increase significantly. This will place a greater strain on
the already scarce EW assets, especially on ES. Depending on the strength
of the algorithms used, the use of encryption throughout the network may
reduce the need for interception if the algorithms are strong. If the algorithms
are susceptible to cryptanalysis, network-centric warfare will facilitate the
coordination of collection and processing or the intercepted traffic.
Universal encryption will increase the difficulty of obtaining internal
information from intercepted transmissions. The use of network encryption
keys, rather than separate keys for individual links or nets, however, may
also introduce new vulnerabilities. The larger the volume of data that is
transferred using a key, the more vulnerable that key is to cryptanalysis. The
interception of preambles used in the affiliation of mobile stations to net
works, and their retransmission in other parts of the network, makes possible
the use of electronic deception to carry out interruption attacks. The value
of encryption keys stored in captured equipment may also be increased,
potentially allowing that equipment to be used in a wide range of deception
attacks. The extensive use of ad hoc networks potentially increases this
vulnerability. One method for overcoming the vulnerabilities created by the
use of preambles is to employ an alternative means of synchronization for
encryption and spread-spectrum communications. The use of a common
time reference, which may be derived from GPS, is one possibility.
The extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment in
modern tactical communications systems is also a source of increased vulnera
bility. Much of this equipment does not conform to military standards
for EP, such as TEMPEST and MIL-STD-464. Furthermore, commercial
wireless network protocols are not designed to operate in a hostile electro
magnetic environment, and are vulnerable to a variety of attacks, especially
229
interruption. In general, COTS equipment will be more vulnerable to jam

ming, deception, and neutralization.
As well as providing new targets, network-centric warfare will transform
the planning and coordination ofEW itself. It will enable better coordination
of EA as a fire and more effective use of ES assets in their combined roles
of collection and providing steerage for EA. In this context, ES assets are
simply sensors and EA assets are weapons platforms.
8.3 UWB Radio

Ultra wideband (UWB) radio, also known as impulse radio, transmits informa
tion in a sequence of short pulses, typically between 0. 1 and 1 .5 ns. As
illustrated in Figure 8.5, the information content is encoded in time, rather
than frequency or amplitude. In its simplest form, a one may be encoded
as a pulse arriving shortly before a nominated time, a zero as the pulse
arriving shortly after this time [9] .
While a uniform pulse-train spacing may be used (i.e., 'F; }TI ) ,
multiple access is best supported by a system incorporating a pseudorandom
pulse-train spacing, sometimes referred to as time-hopping. The use of a
pseudorandom pulse-train spacing (i.e., the sequence { 'F; } chosen to be
pseudorandom) prevents the loss of a large number of consecutive bits
due to inadvertent synchronization between two transmitters. The use of a
pseudorandom pulse-train to provide multiple access for two transmitters is
illustrated in Figure 8.6. The variation in the pulse-train timing prevents
regular collisions between transmitters, but guarantees that some clashes will
occur. Unlike CSMA, collisions that cause loss of data in impulse radio are
=
-+
0.1 - 1 .5
J\
1:_
1
-r;
ns
fjl:-.
;
fj-t
:
7;.1
Figure 8.5 Time-coding of information in UWB radio.
7; .2
..
E l e c t r o n i c Wil rf a r e f o r the D i g itized B a tt l e f i e l d
230
------- -------
Poss1ble clash
1\
AI\ .
Jj J\
0+-;,_,. 1
0-<'--i..__._ 1
'
'
'
'
!J.
!J.
Transmitter 1
Fi g u re 8.6
Transmitter 2
Mu lilple a c c ess 1n 1mpulse rad1o.
not prim arily due to overtransmissio n , but arise where the receiver receives
two impulses indicating conflicting values for that symbol. The near-far
effect prevents the design of a multiple-transmitter, multiple-receiver
UWB
radio system that uses synchronization of transmitters to overcome collisions.

The use of baseband pulse modulation enables i mpulse radio to have
an extremely wide bandwidth, typically in excess of
25%
of the center
frequency of the signal. The relationship between pulse length and the
8.7. The
frequency content of transmissions is illustrated in Figure
transmis
sion of information using time-modulation of short pulses is a form of

spread-spectrum commun ications. Spreading gains of
been achieved in prototype systems
[1 0] .
45
dB
(30,000)
have
Like the other forms of spread
spectrum communications discussed in Chapter
5,
this frequency spreading
can also p rovide LPI.

The use of baseband transm ission creates the possibility o f building
extremely simple receivers, without the requirement for a conventional RF
fro n t end. These receivers have the potential of having a much lower cost
than traditio nal receivers based on FDMA.
1\
(a)
1/T
(b)
Figure 8.7 The relationship between ( a ) p u lse le ngth and (b) frequency content.
Electronic Warfore and Digitization
231
Very low transmission power levels can be used. Once a receiver is

synchronized to a transmission, it does not need to detect pulses. In the
example shown in Figure 8.5, the receiver has only to decide whether it is
more likely that the pulse arrived before or after the nominated time. This
enables the use of low transmission powers for the impulses. The average
power is further greatly reduced by the fact that the transmitter is active for
only a very small proportion of the time. Average transmitter powers are
expected to be on the order of 1 mW. The initial synchronization can be
achieved by the transmission of a long synchronization sequence, or by the
transmission of a short, higher-power synchronization sequence.
Communications applications for UWB radio include short-range,
high-capacity communications systems. It is also possible to construct posi
tioning systems with very high accuracy (better than 1m) and radar imaging
applications capable of operating through walls and other obstructions.
UWB radio has the potential to provide high-capacity, mobile commu
nications within small areas, essentially removing the requirement for fre
quency management. Multiple access is achieved by assigning a different time
hop sequence to each user community. There remain significant challenges in
establishing the feasibility of providing efficient multiple access using impulse
radio and in preventing interference with other communications and naviga
tion systems. For example, current systems are believed to cause interference
with GPS to a range of approximately 30m [1 1 ] . The design of antennas
that provide efficient operation with very high bandwidth is also an open
problem. Additionally, current regulations for frequency management in
most countries explicitly prohibit the use of broadband transmitters that
operate across bands allocated for other purposes. These regulations tend to
be particularly strict for frequencies allocated for safety and emergency uses.
In addition to the technical challenges, therefore, there is a requirement for
the reframing of regulations to accommodate UWB radio [ 1 2] .
8.3.1
Implications for EW
The use of UWB radio will make detection, intercept, and DF impossible
using most conventional ES equipment. Narrowband receivers will see the
UWB transmissions as low-power noise, while wideband systems will see
these transmissions as very short pulses, which they are not designed to
recetve.
The task of a search receiver for UWB radio is of a similar level of
difficulty to other spread-spectrum transmissions. The difficulty is increased,
however, by the very high spreading gains, which can be in excess of 40 dB.
232
Without knowledge of the pseudorandom pulse-train spacing employed, the

search receiver must actually detect the pulses. This is likely to be extremely
difficult to do reliably, given the very low power levels used.
The difficulty of design of a UWB intercept receiver depends on
whether or not the pseudorandom pulse-train spacing is known. If this
spacing is known, the intercept receiver is constructed in the same way as
a communications receiver. If the spacing is not known, the intercept receiver
may be able to record the sequence of pulse interarrival times. In this case,
reliable detection of pulses is of key importance.
DF of a UWB transmission is hindered by its very short duration. It
may be possible to design a DF system that measures the time difference of
arrival of pulses at two or more antennas, and uses this information to infer
a bearing to the transmitter. Conventional techniques, such as Watson-Watt
or Doppler DF, are unlikely to be useable, as they rely on the length of a
transmission being much greater than those used in UWB radio.
Difficulties with search, intercept, and DF will be increased by the
presence of multiple UWB transmitters operating simultaneously.
Jamming of a UWB transmission is hindered by the very high processing
gains achieved by these radios. Efficient operation of a large number of
UWB transmitters in one area and minimization of interference with other
users of the electromagnetic spectrum require the use of very low average
powers on the order of 1 mW. Conventional man-portable CNR trans
mitters, however, operate at transmit powers of up to 1 to 1 OW. In other
words, in comparing jamming of conventional CNR to UWB radio, the
first 30 to 40 dB of spreading gain of a UWB transmission simply overcome
the transmitter power difference. The effect of a UWB transmitter increasing
its transmit power to overcome jamming will be to increase its interference
caused to all conventional transmissions in the same area and to increase
the probability of intercept and detection.
The jamming waveform used against a UWB transmission could be
either noise jamming from a barrage jammer or, more likely, a sequence of
short pulses with bandwidth similar to the transmission being jammed. The
very high synchronization accuracy required between transmitter and receiver
may make pulsed jamming attractive, in which the jammer transmits a
sequence of pulses long enough to c use the UWB receiver to lose synchroni
zation.
The use of electronic deception against an adversary communications
system based on UWB radio relies on having knowledge of the pseudorandom
pulse-train spacing used by that network. This is equivalent to knowing the
key in a conventional, secret-key, secure communications system. Electronic
233
deception is therefore likely to be possible only under exceptional circum

stances.
8.4 H F Radio
In many armies, the use of satellite communications systems has led to a
reduced emphasis on HF radio as a beyond-line-of-sight means of communi
cations. While satellite infrastructure is expensive, it enables the principal
limitations of conventional HF systems (i.e., capacity and reliability) to be
overcome. In conventional HF systems, raw data capacity has been limited
to approximately 2.4 Kbps for a 3-kHz channel. Reliability is limited by
the requirement to use sky-wave propagation to achieve long distances,
which imposes a requirement for a high level of operator expertise, with a
requirement for ongoing training.
Recent advances in HF radio technology, leading to improved data
rates and reliability, have given new life to HF communications, reinforcing
the need for complementary EW systems. Applications include providing
an alternate means to satellite for long-distance communications and long
range, special-forces communications.
8.4.1
High-Speed HF Modem Technology
Conventional HF modems, using QPSK modulation, achieve raw data rates

of approximately 2.4 Kbps over a 3-kHz channel. Recent advances in modula
tion techniques, employing varieties of quadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM), enable data rates up to approximately 9.6 Kbps, depending on the
quality of the link. Some systems also attempt to measure link quality on a
regular basis, selecting the maximum data rate that can be achieved. This
change in data rate may be performed automatically or may require operator
intervention.
8.4.2
HF Automatic Link Establishment
As long as a channel with sufficiently high signal-to-noise ratio is available,

recent improvements in modulation technology enable useful raw data rates
to be achieved using sky-wave communications. The engineering of a channel
of sufficient quality has always required skilled operators who can adjust
antenna characteristics and change operating frequencies to take into account
slow changes in the characteristics of the channel. However, even skilled
234
Electromc Wa rfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld
operators can have great difficulty working with short-term variations in the
characteristics of the channel.
Automatic link establishment (ALE) describes a set of automatic proce
dures that can be used to establish and maintain HF sky-wave communica
tions. It is usual that a station initiating a transfer of data will have available
a number of channels. The connection begins by the initiating station sending
a short message to permit receiving stations to measure link quality. This
process is known as sounding. The receiving stations may measure link quality
by means of the bit error rate or the channel signal-to-noise ratio. Information
on channel quality is returned to the initiating station. The initiating station
may then proceed to the transfer of data if the link quality is acceptable.
Otherwise, it may return to sounding, using another channel. The time
taken for link establishment depends on the number of channels that must
be tried before one with acceptable quality is found, but is usually on the
order of 5 to 20s.
Stations may carry out sounding to maintain current information on
the quality of the available channels, even when they have no data to send.
ALE may be used for voice or data communications, and a number
of standards have been developed [ 1 3] . Some data communications systems
limit the maximum length of message that can be transferred to approximately
one minute. This maximizes the ability of the system to take advantage of
short-term variations in the channel to achieve high data rates, and reduces
the likelihood of the channel quality becoming unacceptable during message
transfer. In a hub-spoke network, limiting the maximum transmit time may
also be useful as a means of providing fair access the channel.
The use of ALE makes possible long-range, reliable H F sky-wave com
munications without the use of skilled operators. However, ALE does impose
overheads, which are necessary for evaluating channel quality and exchanging
this information between stations.
8.4.3
Implications for EW
Siting of ES and EA assets to work against HF sky-wave communications

is inherently more difficult than those working against line-of-sight communi
cations. The main reason for this is that often there will not exist a location
from which all transmitters can be received reliably, or from which all
receivers could be jammed. This is illustrated in Figure 8.8. The likelihood
of this situation occurring is increased by the use of directional antennas by
one or more stations.
235
Earth

Ionosphere
Figure 8.8 Areas may not exist where receiving of two communicating HF transmitters
is possible.
This difficulty of siting EW systems is increased by the use of ALE.

Without knowing all possible operating frequencies in advance, and without
the possibility of obtaining regular soundings on these frequencies between
the locations of EW equipment and the adversary's communications equip
ment, the performance of both ES and EA is likely to be unreliable.
The use of ALE also potentially creates opportunities for ES and EA.
ALE is particularly vulnerable to jamming during link establishment. The
successful jamming of the link establishment exchange prevents the transfer
of data, and can probably be achieved by jamming either one of the stations
involved. Even if the transfer of data is protected by active EP techniques
such as DSSS, it is likely that a part, if not all, of the data exchanged for
link establishment would not be protected. For a target system that operates
in a hub-spoke configuration, where all communications is either to or from
one station, ES and EA planning should therefore concentrate on the hub.
ALE systems that carry out regular sounding, even when they have no
traffic to send, have increased vulnerability to ES.
Electronic Warfare for the D igitized B attlefield
236
If a suitable site can be found for a jammer, it may be able to force a

reduction in channel data rate by reducing the channel signal-to-noise ratio,
even if sufficient power is not available to prevent communications. If an
automated HF data communications system performs this reduction in data
rate automatically, the system's operator may have difficulty establishing
whether the reduction in link quality comes from natural causes or jamming.
8.5 Software Radio

An ideal software radio is a multiband, multimode radio with a dynamic
capability defined entirely in software in all layers of the protocol stack,
including the physical layer [ 1 4] . This ideal radio allows such features as
the air interface (including modulation technique, data rate, and channel
bandwidth), voice coding, and encryption to be reprogrammed, potentially
over the air. A simplified architecture for a transmitter that meets this ideal
is shown in Figure 8.9, with a corresponding receiver architecture shown in
Figure 8 . 1 0. In the transmitter, only two functions are performed after the
digital-to-analog conversion: up-conversion to the transmission frequency
and power amplification. Likewise in the receiver, analog processing is used
only where it is absolutely required, mostly in the initial RF amplification
and band-limiting to prevent aliasing in the analog-to-digital conversion.
Practical systems may compromise on software programmability, most likely
because of the limited power of available signal-processing technology.
The use of software radio technology will see some convergence of
equipment in the various subsystems of the tactical communications system,
\I
-
Digital-toDigital
Power
U p- analog :--+
1-
processing
amplifier
converter
converter
Figure 8.9 Simplified software radio transmitter architecture.
\I
-
RF
amplifier
Analog-toBandDigital
digital ---.
limiting
processing
converter
Figure 8.10 Simplified software radio receiver architecture.
237
especially between the trunk and CNR subsystems. However, in comparison

with the NR subsystem, the trunk subsystem will continue to be character
ized by longer ranges, favoring the use of elevated, directional antennas and
higher transmit powers, preserving the traditional tradeoff between capacity,
range, and mobility.
8.5.1
Key Software Radio Technologies
There are a number of key technologies requiring development for software

radio, including antennas, receiver RF processing and down-conversion,
analog-to-digital conversion, signal-processing technology, and general-pur
pose processors.
One of the major aims for software radio is the construction of
multiband radios. For the tactical communications system, efficient operation
across the HF, VHF, and UHF bands is desirable, using a single antenna.
It is also desirable that a single reconfigurable antenna be used for the
various applications, allowing control (exercised by an operator or automatic
controller) over such parameters as directivity and null steering. Such antennas
are likely to be based on arrays, possibly containing thousands of elements.
Antennas
Because little or none of the

selectivity of the software radio is contained in its RF stage, the requirement
for low distortion is greater than for conventional radios, especially for tactical
systems that must operate in a hostile electromagnetic environment. Any
distortion introduced in this stage will cause leakage of power from one
channel to another, possibly allow a narrowband jammer to jam signals in
many channels, and leave a receiver vulnerable to inadvertent jamming from
closely located friendly transmitters.
Receiver RF Processing and Down-Conversion
The use of software radio systems in cellular

telephone systems has led to a significant improvement in the speed and
precision of analog-to-digital converters. Very low distortion and high preci
sion are required in analog-to-digital converters in order to avoid leaving
software radios vulnerable to off-channel jamming. A receiver's analog front
end and its analog-to-digital converter are possibly the most critical parts of
the system for operation in a hostile electromagnetic environment.
Analog-to-Digital Conversion
Signal-Processing Technology Recent years have seen significant improve
ments in the speed and precision of signal processing hardware, based on

field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or application-specific integrated
238
circuits, and software, based on programmable digital signal processors.

Further gains are required in transmitter and receiver architectures and in
the power of both hardware and software to make a truly programmable
radio possible, into which almost completely arbitrary new waveforms can
be introduced via software updates.
To reach their full potential, software radios
must implement not only physical layer, such as modulation, but complete
protocols stacks. Implementation of higher layers is best performed on a
high-performance, general-purpose processor.
The most ambitious tactical software radio project is the U.S. joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) [ 1 5] , which aims to develop a family of software
radios based on a common architecture, providing a range of services includ
ing voice, video, and data, and operating over a frequency range from
2 MHz to 2 GHz. European projects include the multirole multiband radio
advanced demonstrator model (MMR-ADM) funded by the German and
French governments, and the programmable digital radio (PDR) funded by
the United Kingdom's MoD.
Commercial applications are also under investigation for third-genera
tion cellular telephone systems.
General-Purpose Processors
8.5.2
Implications for EW
Extensive deployment of software radio will create both opportunities and

difficulties for EW. The use of COTS software radio technology is likely
to increase vulnerability to jamming, with cost pressures limiting the quality
of the analog front ends of receivers and their analog-to-digital converters.
The ability to change a transmitter or receiver's EP, modulation scheme,
data rate, and channel bandwidth in software will demand corresponding
flexibility in ES and EA systems.
The flexibility offered by software radio will also reduce the cost of
some EP techniques, such as FH and other spread-spectrum techniques,
increasing their use in the tactical communications system. Responsive jam
mers capable of following a hopper will also be much easier to build, although
the fundamental limitations of range discussed in Chapter 5 will still apply.
ES receivers based on software radio will feature high levels of flexibility.
They offer the potential for automated, search, intercept, and DF of short
term and fast-changing signals, such as those generated using EP techniques
including FH and burst transmission.
Electronic Wmfore and Digitization
239
8.6 Quantum Computing and Quantum Cryptography

The operation of communications and electronic equipment in common
use is based on the deterministic, bulk properties of materials. Recent research
has been aimed at exploiting the statistical properties of quantum mechanics,
developing systems for communications, and computing based on the behav
ior of single subatomic particles.
8.6.1
Quantum Computing
Quantum computing aims to make use of the basic quantum properties of

the nucleus of atoms to make a powerful computer [ 1 6] . A conventional
digital computer manipulates numbers expressed in binary form (i.e., in
terms of bits, each of which takes the value 0 or 1). The spin of a nucleus
can also take two values. Unlike the conventional computer, it can also take
both values at once. This effectively allows a system to be stimulated with
all of its possible input values simultaneously, permitting the parallel compu
tation of all possible output values. It has recently been shown that such an
approach can be used to speed up the factorization of numbers, greatly
reducing the computational effort required for the cryptanalysis of many
public-key encryption systems [ 17] .
The development of practical quantum computers is still in its infancy.
It is not yet known whether it is possible to build a system with sufficient
precision to factorize large numbers. Even if it is feasible to build such
systems, the bulk and cost of the support infrastructure may limit their use.
The number of problems for which quantum computing is known to offer
significant speed improvements over conventional computers is also small,
although it includes a number of important areas such as searching and
factorization oflarge numbers. The realization oflow-cost quantum comput
ers will in itself negate the value of most in-service security services based
on public-key encryption algorithms.
8.6.2
Quantum Cryptogra phy
Quantum cryptography, sometimes more accurately known as quantum key

distribution (QKD) [ 1 8] , provides a means for exchanging encryption keys
with the unconditional security offered by a one-time pad. Once exchanged,
these keys can be used with a secret-key encryption system or as a one-rime
pad.
Let us say that A wants to transfer a key to B (Figure 8 . 1 1). A randomly
generates the key, and for each bit, sends a single photon with the value of
240
A
Generates random key.
Encodes bit values in the
polarization of single photons,
and transmits.
Optical
channel
Guesses A's bit values.

Output of receiving process
for each bit has values
"correct" and "maybe."
Correctly guessed bits

form the key for data
exchange.
Bits correctly guessed
by 8 form the key
for data exchange.
Public
channel
Transmits indices of
correctly received bits.
Figure 8.1 1 Key exchange process fo r q u a ntum c ryptography.
the bit represented in the polarization of this photon. A polarization of 90

may represent a 0, with 45 representing a 1 . For each bit, B guesses the
value that A has sent. If B guesses 0, B sets a polarizing filter to -45; if B
guesses 1 , B sets the polarizing filter to 0. If B 's filter is aligned with the
polarization of A 's photon, it will pass and be detected. If B 's filter is
perpendicular to the polarization of A 's photon, the photon is absorbed by
the filter. Otherwise, there is a 50% chance that the photon passes through
the filter and is detected. Therefore, if B correctly guesses A 's bit value, there
is a 50% chance that the photon will be detected; if B incorrectly guesses
A 's bit value, no photon will be detected. Hence, the detection of a photon
implies that B has correctly g uessed A 's bit value.
After A has transmitted a number of photons, B has detected some of
these photons (on average, 25%), and therefore knows the correct value of
the associated bits. B then tells A over a public communications channel
which bits in the sequence B has received. These bits are then used as for
encrypting data. However, B does not transmit the values of these bits over
the public channel.
If an eavesdropper intercepts the photons between A and B, errors
(with a rate of at least 25%) will be introduced into the transmission process.
This situation will be detected quickly by A and B when they attempt to
communicate using the secret key. They can then reinitiate the key exchange.
They only way that an eavesdropper can subvert this process is to sit between
A and B on both the channel carrying the photons and the public channel.
This type of attack can be prevented by the use of an authenticated public
Electronic Wmfare and Digitization
241
channel, possibly using a small number of bits from a previous quantum

key exchange for the authentication.
Errors on the transmission channel can be corrected using error-correct
ing codes, as discussed in Chapter 5 . Because the introduction of errors is
also associated with the presence of an eavesdropper, it is not possible to
absolutely guarantee security when errors are corrected. It is possible, however,
to calculate the probability that an eavesdropper has successfully intercepted
the key transmission, and to use this probability to provide a statistical
guarantee of security.
Key exchanges using this and similar protocols have been successfully
carried out on optic fiber with ranges up to approximately 50 km. Optic
fiber is an almost ideal transmission medium, preserving the polarization of
photons and minimizing the number of interfering photons arriving at the
receiver.
One of the key areas for future work is on the use of free-space
quantum key distribution. Ranges up to 0.5 km have been reported with
both transmitter and receiver at ground level in daylight with an error rate
of 1 .6%, and 0.2% of transmitted photons successfully detected [ 1 9] . The
overwhelming majority of these errors (approximately 75%) were concluded
to arise from imperfections in the optics used for the experiment. If successful,
this work on free-space quantum cryptography could enable key exchange
between a low-Earth-orbit satellite and a ground station.
8.6.3
Implications for EW
The major relevance of both quantum computing and quantum cryptography

to EW is in the area of encryption. Quantum computing offers the promise of
rendering useless at least those public-key encryption systems whose security is
based on the factorization of large numbers. Quantum cryptography offers
the potential of an alternative means for key exchange, offering unconditional
security, at least on error-free channels.
One important unexplored area is the potential for jamming the trans
mission of a quantum key, which might be achieved by the jammer transmit
ting additional photons toward the receiver. If the transmission error rate
can be increased sufficiently, the key sender (A ) and receiver (B) will be
unable to determine whether or not the key has been intercepted in the
transmission path.
242
Endnotes
[1]
Policy for the GIG is defined in:

U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Guidance and Policy Memo
randum 1 0-8460, "GIG Network Operations," August 24, 2000.
U.S. Department of Defense Chief information Officer Guidance and Policy Memo
randum 7-8 1 70, "GIG Information Management," August 24, 2000.
U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Guidance and Policy Memo
randum 4-8460, "GIG Networks," August 24, 2000.
[2 ]
"Specification of the Bluetooth System," Bluetooth SIG, Version 1 . 1 , February 200 1 .
[3]
As discussed for other commercial technologies in Chapter 5, the implementation o f

frequency hopping in Bluetooth i s designed to provide protection against natural o r
unintentional interference. It i s not design to protect against adversary jamming.
[4]
Farber, D. J . , "Predicting the Unpredictable: Technology and Society," in Anderson,

R. H., The Global Course ofthe lnfonnatton Revolutwn: Technologtcal Trends: Proceedings
ofan International Conftrence, CF- 1 57 -NIC, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,
2000.
[5]
Johnson, D. B., and D. A. Maltz, "Protocols for Adaptive Wireless and Mobile
Networking," IEEE Personal Commumcat1ons, Vol. 3 , No. 1 , February 1 996.
[6]
See, for example, Stallings, S., Network and Internetwork Security, 2nd Edition, Engle
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1 99 5 .
[7)
This definition of confidentiality goes further than would usually be the case for a
fixed network. It is required to encompass protection against traffic analysis.
[8]
There is an unfortunate clash of terminology in the use of the term interception

between ES and that used for network security.
[9]
See, for example, Scholtz, R. A., "Multiple Access with Time-Hopping Impulse
Modulation," in Proc. M!LCOM, October 1 993; or Win, M. Z., and R. A. Scholtz,
"Impulse Radio: How It Works," IEEE Commumcations Letters, Vol. 2, No. 1 , January
1 998, pp. 1 0- 1 2.
[ 1 0]
Multiple Access Communications Ltd, "An Investigation into the Potential Impact
of Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems," U.K. Radiocom munications Agency,
RA0699/TDOC/99/002, February 2000.
[ 1 1]
Letter from Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and

Information Administration to the Federal Communications Commission, imposing
limits on the grant of a waiver to Part 1 5 of the FCC rules for ultra wideband radio,
June 1 5 , 1 999.
[ 1 2]
A waiver for limited use o f UWB radio by fire and police departments in the United
States was granted by the FCC on June 29, 1 999. This waiver is subject to the use
of UWB radio not interfering with other services.
[ 1 3]
Standards defining HF ALE are:

FED-STD 1 045A "Telecommunications: HF Radio Automatic Link Establishment,"
October 1 993.
FED-STD 1 046/1 "Telecommunications: HF Radio Automatic Networking Section
1, Basic Networking ALE Controller," October 1 993.
It
243
FED-STD 1 0491 1 "Telecom mun ications: HF Radio A uromat1c L111 k Estab l i shment
i n Stressed Environments, Section I: Linking Protection," July 1 9 93.
[ 1 4]
[ 1 5]
M i rola, J., 'Technical Chall enges i n t h e Globalization of Software Rad io,' IEEE
Comnmmcat1ons Magazmc, Vol. 37, No. 2 , February 1 999, pp. 86-98.
"Software Co m m u n ications Archi tecture Specification M S RC-5000SCA," J o i n t Tacti

cal Radio System OTRS) Joint Program O ffice, Version 2.0, December 2000.
[ I 6]
Waldrop, M. M., "Quantum Co mputi ng," Technology Rcl!lcw, May 2000.
[ 1 7]
Shor, P. W., "Polynomial-Time Algori thms for Prime Facrorization and D iscrete
Logarithms on a Quantum Computer," SIAM journal of Computmg, Vol. 26, 1 997,
pp. 1 4 8 4 - 1 509.
[ 1 8]
S i ngh, S . , "Quantum Con fi dential," New 5CJei71!St, Vol . I64 , Ocrober 2, 1 999,
pp. 28-33.
[ 1 9]
Sec, fo r example, Hughes, R. J . , et al., " Free-Space Quantum Key Disrriburion i n

Dayl ight," Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report N o . LA-UR-99-737, 1 9 99; and
H u ghes, R. J ., e t al., "Quantum Cryptography for Secure Co mmun ications to Low
Earth Orb i t Satel l i tes," Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report No. LA-UR-99274 1 , 1 9 99. Both of these reports also conra i n extensive bibl iographies.
list of Acronyms
ALE
AM
ARQ
ASK
C2
C2W
C3
CA
CCD
CDMA
CIS
CNR
CNRI
COMSEC
COTS
CP
CRC
CSMA
cw
DES
DEW
DF
DSB
DSSS
Automatic link establishment

Amplitude modulation
Automatic repeat request
Amplitude shift keying
Command and control
Command and control warfare
Command, control, and communications
Certificate authority
Charge-coupled device
Code-division multiple 'access
Communications and information systems
Combat net radio
Combat net radio interface
Communications security
Commercial off-the-shelf
Command post
Cyclic redundancy check
Carrier-sense multiple access
Carrier wave
Data encryption standard
Directed energy weapon
Direction finding
Double sideband
Direct sequence spread spectrum
245
246
EA
EOB
ECCM
ECM
EM CON
EMI
EMP
EM SEC
EP
EPLRS
ES
ESM
EW
EWLO
FDMA
FEC
FFT
FH
FM
FSK
GIG
GPS
GSM
HELW
HF
HPM
HPRF
IDEA
IF
IFM
IO
IP
IPB
IW
JTRS
KEA
LPD
LPI
Ele ctro nic Warfa re for th e Digitized Battl efield
Electronic attack
Electronic order of battle
Electronic counter-countermeasures
Electronic countermeasures
Emission control
Electromagnetic interference
Electromagnetic pulse
Emission security
Electronic protection
Enhanced position locating and reporting system
Electronic support
Electronic support measures
Electronic warfare
Electronic warfare liaison officer
Frequency-division multiple access
Forward error correction
Fast Fourier transform
Frequency hopping
Frequency modulation
Frequency shift keying
Global information grid
Global positioning system
Global system for mobile communication
High-energy laser weapon
High frequency
High-power microwave
High power radio frequency
International data encryption algorithm
Intermediate frequency
Instantaneous frequency measurement
Information operations
Internet protocol
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
Information warfare
Joint tactical radio system
Key exchange algorithm
Low probability of detection
Low probability of intercept
List ofAcronJ'n1S
LSB
MLRS
MRAAW
NATO
NBC
NCS
NCW
N-EMP
NTDR
PCS
PKA
PN
PSK
QAM
QKD
QPSK
RF
RS
RSA
SCRA
SEAD
SHF
SINCGARS
SO]
SRAAW
SSB
TCP
TDMA
UAV
UHF
USB
UWB
VHF
VSB
Lower sideband
Multiple-launch rocket system
Medium-range anti-armor weapon
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nuclear, biological, and chemical
Net control station
Network-centric warfare
Nuclear electromagnetic pulse
Near-term digital radio
Personal communications systems
Public key authority
Pseudonoise
Phase shift keying
Quadrature amplitude modulation
Quantum key distribution
Quadrature phase shift keying
Radio frequency
Reed-Solomon
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
Single-channel radio access
Suppression of enemy air defense
Super-high frequency
Single channel ground and air radio system
Standoff jammer
Short-range anti-armor weapon
Single sideband
Transmission control protocol
Time-division multiple access
Uninhabited aerial vehicle
Ultra high frequency
Upper sideband
Ultra wide band
Very high frequency
Vestigial side band
247
About the Authors

Dr. Michael Frater is an associate professor in the School of Electrical
Engineering at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence
Force Academy. He has more than 1 0 years of experience in the development
of communications systems and services, including videoconferencing and
video and image surveillance. He has led a number of collaborative projects
investigating image and video communications over low-bandwidth links.
Dr. Frater has been actively involved in the development of international
standards for audio-visual communications and broadcasting and has served
as head of the Australian delegation to the Moving Picture Expert Group
(MPEG), one of the major international stanaards bodies working in this
area. He holds a B.Sc. and a B.E. in electrical engineering from the University
of Sydney and a Ph.D. in systems engineering from the Australian National
University. His research and teaching interests lie in digital audio-visual
communications, including compression; transmission and delivery electron
ics; broadcasting and datacasting; telecommunications networks and architec
tures; and mobile communications (PCS technology and services). He is the
author of a number of articles on communications systems and communica
tions services.
Dr. Michael Ryan received his B.E., M.Eng.Sc., and Ph.D. in electrical
engineering from the University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia,
in 1 9 8 1 , 1 989, and 1 996, respectively. Since 1 9 8 1 , he has held a number
of positions in communications and systems engineering and in management
and project management as a lieutenant colonel with the Royal Australian
Signal Corps. Since 1 998, he has been with the School of Electrical Engi
neering at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence
249
250
Ele ctro n i c Warfare for the D i gitized B attl efi e l d
Force Academy, where he is currently a senior lecturer. His research and

teaching interests are in communications systems (network architectures,
electromagnetics, radio wave propagation, mobile communications, and satel
lite communications) , information systems architectures, data compression
for remote sensing applications, systems engineering, project management,
and technology management. He is the editor-in-chief of the journal of
Battlefield Technology, and is the author of a number of articles on communica
tions and information systems and a book on battlefield command systems.
I n d ex
i n tegration with wider network, 225
Access nodes, 32, 36-37
util ity o f, 225
connections, 37
See also Networks
defined, 32
See also Tru n k com m u n i cations
Advanced data distribution system

(ADDS), 25
subsystem
Airborne laser (ABL), 1 65
Active EP, 1 6, 6 1 -89

aims, 6 1
Airborne platform
appropriate use of retransmission, 63
ES , 139-40
burst transmissions, 62, 87-88
jammi ng, 1 58-59
RF DEW, 2 1 0
defined, 57, 6 1
A i rborne subsystem. See Tactical airborne
diversity, 62, 89
encryption, 62, 63-70
subsystem
error-protection coding, 62, 84-87
Amplitude d i fference, 1 20
free-channel search, 62-63
A nalysis, 99, 1 35-38

airborne subsystem a n d , 138
narrowband excision, 62, 88

spread-spectrum communications, 62,
CNR subsystem and, 137-38
70-84
techniques, 6 1 -63
cryptanalysis, I 36
defi ned, 99, 1 3 5
See also Electro n i c protection (EP)
s i ting for facilities, 1 9 1
Adcock antenna, 1 27-28
tactical com m u n ications system and,
1 36-38
advantages, 1 28
defined, 1 27
tactical data distribution su bsystem
11-elemenr, 1 27
and,
138
opera tio n o f, 1 27
tactical tru n k subsystem a n d , 1 .? 7
spacing, 1 28
traffic, 1 3 5-36
Sec also Electro n i c support (ES)
Ad hoc networks, 223-25
clus t eri n g e x amp le , 225

co n
A rti llcry-dcl i vcrcd platform
ne c t ivi ry examples. 224
d e fi n e d ,
j a m m i ng,
RF D EW,
224
251
1 59
209
252
E l e ctro nic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield
Assessment, 1 80, 1 8 5
Asset management, 1 84
Atmospheric absorption, 20 1-2
Atmospheric dielectric breakdown,
200-2 0 1
Auromatic link establishment (ALE),
233-34, 235
Auromatic repeat request (ARQ), 8 5
Auronomous system (AS) , 2 2 1
Barrage jamming, 1 49-50
Banlefield digirizarion. See Digitized
banlefield
Bearers, 35-36, 37
Block cipher, 65-66
Boyd cycle. See C2 cycle
B ragg cell receiver, 1 03
Broadcast relay, 52
Bulk encryption, 64
Burst errors, 85
Burst transmissions, 62, 87-88
defined, 87
effectiveness, 87-88
C2 cycle, 7-9
defined, 7
EW impact o n , 1 3
illustrated, 8
movement through, 1 1
use of, 8
Carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA), 4 1 ,
43
Certificate authorities (CAs), 68-69
Channel coding, 85
Channelized search receiver, 1 03-4
defined, 1 03
illustrated, 1 04
searches, 1 04
Chirping, 70-71
Code-division multiple access (COMA),
4 1 , 43, 75
net-oriented communications and, 78
overallocarion of channel capaciry, 77
Collection management, 1 8 8-9 1
defined, 1 8 8
process illusrrarion, 1 88
Combat net radio (CNR) subsystem,

25-26, 40-49
advantages, 40
analysis and, 1 37-38
architectural issues, 40-44
capaciry, 44
command and control on rhe move,
40
data-capable, 45
deployment, 40
OF and, 1 34
difficulties, 47
electronic protection, 44
EP techniques, 89-90
intercept and, 1 1 8-1 9
jamming and, 1 56
mobile infrastructure, 28
modern solutions, 45-47
multicast capabi liry, 4 1-42
multiple access, 4 1
packer radio, 45-47
range of com munications, 44--45
seamless connecriviry, 42-43
search and, 1 1 0-1 1
securiry, 43
support for chain o f command, 4 1
tactical internet, 4 6
VHF/UHF, 1 1 0
voice and data, 4 1
See also Tactical com m u nications
system
Combat net radio interface (CNRI),
38-39
Comb jamming, 1 5 1
Command and control, 6- 1 0
C2 cycle, 7-9
command systems, 9-1 0
defined, 6, 7
EW, 1 73 , 1 76-77
land EW, 1 69-9 1
on the move, 22, 40
warfare (C2W), 1 2
Command systems, 9- 1 0
auromared/manual procedures, 1 0
defined, 9
elements, 1 0
implementation of, 1 0
Index
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
equipment, 228-29
Communication and information systems
(CIS), 1 69, 1 7 1
Communications electronic warfare, xiii,
14
Compressive search receiver, 1 04-5
defined, 1 04
illustrated, I 05
search rate, 1 0 5
Concatenated codes, 86-87
Concave OF baseline, I 30, I 3 1
Continuous wave (CW), 1 96
Convex OF baseline, 1 30, I 3 1
Crossed-loop antenna, 1 26-27
defined, 1 26
disadvantages, I 27
illustrated, 1 26
See also Watson-Watt OF
Cryptanalysis, 69, I36
Crystal video receiver, 1 03
Data-capable CNR, 45
Data Encryption Standard (DES), 67
Deception planning, 187-88
Decision, I 80-84
asset management, I84
defined, I 79, 1 80
information requirements management,
1 83
initial plan, 1 8 I
key outputs, 1 8 0
miSSion management, I 83-84
process illustration, I 8 1
superiority, 3
target development, I 8 I-83
See also EW targeting process
Decision cycle. See C2 cycle
Defense RF DEW, 2 I I - I 6
aircraft, 2 13-1 4
basis, 2 1 2
command posts, 2 1 5
land vehicles and shelters, 2 1 2-I3
logistics installations, 2 I 6
personnel, 2 1 4- 1 5
safety and arming system, 2 1 4
253
support equipment, 2 1 5
See also RF DEW

Defensive RF DEW, 2 1 1 - 1 6
Delivery, I 79, I 8 5
Detection, 1 84-85
defined, I 79, I 84
process, 1 84-85
OF baseline, 1 20, I30-32
concave, I30, 1 3 I
configurations, 130
convex, I 30, 1 3 I
lazy-W, 130-32
standalone, I30, 1 3 1
See also Direction finding (OF)
Digital intercept receiver, I I 6-I7
Digital search receiver, I 05-7
channel search, I 07
computational capacity, 1 06
computation capacity requirement, 1 07
defined, 1 0 5
illustrated, 1 0 5
Digitized battlefield, 1 - 1 8
command and control, 6-1 0
electronic warfare, I 2-16
information warfare, I I - I 2
network orientation, 2 I 9
operational environment, I-6
summary, 1 6- I 8
Directional antennas, 59-60
Direction finding (OF), 99, 1 1 9-35
accuracies, I20
airborne subsystem and, 1 35
baseline and bearings, I 20
CNR subsystem and, 1 34
defined, 99
Doppler, 1 28-30
error sources, I 22-23
pseudo-Doppler systems, I 2 I
receivers, I 1 9-20
rotating directional antenna, 1 20,
1 23-24
siting for facilities, 1 90-9 I
tactical communications system and,
I32-35
tactical data distribution subsystem
and, 1 34-35
tactical trunk subsystem and, I 33-34
254
Direction finding (OF) (continued)

triangulation principle, 1 1 9
Watson-Watt, 1 24-28
Wullenweber, 1 28, 1 29
See also D F baseline; Electronic
support (ES)
Direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) ,
7 1 -79
combined with other EP techniques,
75
decoding stream, 7 1
frequency management, 77
illustrated, 72
impact of overloading, 77
implementation, 72
in IS-95, 95
near-far effect, 77-78
in presence of broadband interference,
74
in presence of narrowband interference,
73
protection against ES, 78-79
provision of multiple access, 75-77
receivers, 72
signal i nterference, 73
transmitters, 75, 76
See also Spread-spectrum
communtcanons
Diversiry, 62, 8 9
achieving, 62
frequency, 89
space, 89
time, 89
Dominant maneuver, 3
Doppler OF, 1 28-30
advantages, 1 29-30
antenna, 1 28-29
physical rotation requirements, 1 29
See also Direction finding (OF)
Electroexplosive devices (EED), 214
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 1 64, 1 96
Electronic attack (EA), 1 6, 1 43-66, 227
application in context of securiry
services, 227
defined, 1 5 , 143
effects, 1 82
electron i c deception, 1 59-64

introduction to, 1 43-44
jamming, 1 44-59
land EW command and control, 1 74
neutralization, 1 64-66
subdivisions, 1 43
Electronic deception, 1 59-64
aim of, 1 59
example techniques, 1 62-63
imitative, 1 6 1-62
manipulative, 1 60-61
as part of deception plan, 1 59-60
received power, 1 63-64
simulative, 1 6 1
rypes of, 1 60
UWB radio and, 232-33
Electronic order of battle (EOB), 1 5
Electronic protection (EP) , 44, 57-96
active, 1 6, 57, 6 1 -89
in communications systems, 89-96
defined, 1 6, 57
EW subdivisions differences, 57
passive, 1 6, 57-61
Electronic silence, 59
Electronic support (ES), 1 6, 99- 1 40, 227
air platforms, 1 39-40
analysis, 99, 1 3 5-38
defined, 1 5, 99
direction finding (OF), 99, 1 1 9-35
DSSS protection against, 78-79
FH protection against, 83-84
ground platforms, 1 38-39
ground vehicles platform, 1 38-39
i ntercept, 99, 1 1 2- 1 9
i ntroduction to, 99- 1 00
land EW command and control,
17 5-76
man-portable, 1 39
platforms, 1 3 8-40
purposes, 99
receivers, 61
search, 99, 1 00-1 1 2
subdivisions, 99
targets, 1 00
Electronic warfare (EW), 1 2- 1 6
active and passive measures, 1 6
Index
architecture illustration, 58, 1 00, 144,
170
communications, xiii, 1 4
defined, 1 3
digitization and, 2 1 9-4 1
HF radio implications for, 234-36
impact on C2 cycle, 1 3
innovation, 1 4
land command and control, 1 69-9 1
network implications for, 225-29
noncommunications, 1 4
overall view of, 17
planning, 1 69
quantum cryptography implications
for, 24 1
software radio implications for, 238
subdivisions, 1 5- 1 6
system illustration, 1 76
i n tactical land environment, 1 5
techniques, 1 6
UWB radio implications for, 23 1-33
See also EW targeting process; EW
units
Emission control, 59
Encryption, 62, 63-70
bulk, 64
certificate authorities (CAs), 68-69
computationally
. secure, 69
defined, 62
forms, 64
level of security, 69-70
message, 64
message-content, 64
private-key, 66-68
public-key, 66-68
public-key authorities (PKAs), 68
randomness, 64-65
secret-key, 66
stream and block ciphers, 65-66
systematic weaknesses, 69-70
unconditionally secure, 69
Enhanced Position Locating and
Reponing System (EPLRS)
radio, 4 8 , 92-93
continuity of operations, 48-49
defined, 48, 92
net conrrol station (NCS), 48, 49
255
network, 93
support, 92
Error-protection coding, 62, 84-87
ARQ, 85
concatenated codes, 86-87
FEC, 85-86
interleaving, 86
use of, 62
EW liaison officers (EWLO), 1 77
EW targeting process, 1 79-88
assessment, 180, 1 85
deception planning, 1 87-88
decision, 1 79, 1 80-84
delivery, 1 79, 1 85
detection, 1 79, 1 84-85
parts, 1 79-80
EW units
area coverage required, 172
capacity, 1 72
command and control, 1 73, 176-77
EA and, 174
economy, 1 73
electronic signature, 1 72
ES and, 1 75-76
minimum levels of operation, 1 7 1
operation on-the-move, 1 72
organization, 1 7 1 -77
platform capacity, 173
platform mobility, 1 72-73
quality, 1 72
redundancy, 1 72
requirement for similar/same coverage,
1 73
support requirements, 173
See also Electronic warfare (EW)
Explosive RF DEW, 196-98
Fast frequency hopping, 80
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA),
237-38
Fingerprinting, 1 1 2
Focused logistics, 4
Forward error correction ( F EC), 85-86
Fourth-generation trunk nerworks, 32, Yl
Free-channel search, 62-63
Frequency di\'ersiry, 89
256
Electro n i c Warfare for the D i g itized B attlefield
Frequency division multiple access

(FDMA) , 4 1 , 42
Frequency hopping (FH), 79-84
defined, 79
dwell time, 79
effective jamming, 8 1
effect of, 80
fast, 80
guard interval, 80
hop rate, 79
i mpact of overloading, 82
near-far effe.;:t, 83
protection against ES, 83-84
provision of multiple access, 82
resistance to jamming and interference,
80-82
slow, 80
transmitters, 82
See also Spread-spectrum
com munications
Frequency management, 60
DSSS, 77
frequency hoppmg, 83
Full-dimensional protection, 4
Global information grid (GIG), 222
Ground vehicle platform
ES, 1 38-39
jamming, 1 57-58
RF DEW, 209
GSM, 95-96
GSM A5, 68
Hardening
defined, 203
equipment interface/ci rcuit-level,
203-4
platform-level, 203
system-level, 203
techniques, 202-4
H ELEX, 1 65
H F radio, 233-36
automatic link establishment, 233-34
defined, 233
high-speed modem technology, 233
impl ications for EW, 234-36
Higher-energy laser weapons (HELWs),

1 6 5-66
High-power microwave (HPM), 1 94, 1 96
H igh-power RF weapons, 1 66
Identical equipment, 58
I mitative electronic deception, 1 6 1 -62
Impulse radio. See ul tra wideband (UWB)
radio
I n formation
operations (IO), 4, 1 2
requirements management, 1 83
revolution, 2, 1 8
role of, 2
superiority, 3
systems implementation, 1 0
Information warfare (IW) , 1 1 - 1 2
terminology and techniques, 1 1
warfighting application, 1 2
Instantaneous frequency measurement
(IFM) receiver, 1 03
Intelligence Preparation o f the Battlefield
(I PB), 1 77-79
course-of-action analysis, 1 78
course-of-acrion approval, 1 79
course-of-action comparison, 1 79
course-of-action development, 1 78
defined, I 77
mission analysis, I 77-78
orders production, I 79
receipt of mission, 1 77
sequence illustration, 1 78
I mercept, 99, I I 2- 1 9
airborne subsystem and, 1 1 9
CNR subsystem and, 1 1 8- 1 9
defined, 9 9 , 1 1 2
siting for facilities, 189-90
1 1 7-1 P
and, 1 1 9
tactical trunk subsystem and, I I 7
of unencrypted net, 1 I 3
See also Electronic support (ES)
Intercept receivers, 1 I 3- 1 7
channel bandwidth, I 1 4
characteristics of, I 1 3- 1 4
Index
digital, 1 1 6- 1 7
granularity o f tuning, 1 1 4
modulation, 1 1 4
multichannel, 1 1 4
noise performance, 1 1 3
range of tuning, 1 1 3- 1 4
RF gain, 1 1 4
sensitivity, 1 1 3
superheterodyne, 1 1 5-1 6
Interconnections, 30
Interfaces, trunk communications
subsystem, 39
Interleaving, 86
International Data Encryption Algorithm
(IDEA), 67
In-theater broadcast, 52
Intranet rebroadcast, 46
IS-95, 93-95
defined, 93
downlink modulation, 94
downlink processing, 94
DSSS in, 95
Jammers
airborne, 1 58-59
artillery-delivered, 1 59
barrage, 1 49-50
comb, 1 5 1
ground vehicle, 1 57-58
man-porta.ble, 1 58
responsive, 1 5 1 -53
spot, 148-49
standoff (SOJs), 1 53-55
swept, 1 50
unattended (UAJs), 1 53-55
Jamming, 1 44-59
airborne platform, 1 5 8-59
airborne subsystem and, 1 56-57
artillery-delivered platform, 1 59
barrage, 1 49-50
CNR subsystem and, 1 56
comb, 1 5 1
communications, types of, 1 47-53
effectiveness conditions, 146
with ES support, 144
ground vehicle platform, 1 57-58
man-portable platform, 1 58
257
operational factors, 1 53
platforms, 1 5 7-59
resistance, 24-25
responsive, 1 5 1 -53
signals, 146-47
siting for facilities, 1 86-87
spot, 148-49
swept, 1 50
1 55-57
and, 1 56
tactical trunk subsystems and, 1 55-56
use of, 144-45
UWB transmission, 232
See aLso Electronic attack (EA)
Jamming-to-signal ratio, 1 45-46
Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS), 90-91
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 238
Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020), 3--4
defined, 3
definitions, 3--4
information operations emphasis, 4
Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA), 68
Land EW command and control, 1 69-91
collection management, 1 88-9 1
EW targeting process, 179-88
EW unit organization, 1 71-77
introductio n to, 1 69-7 1
tactical planning process, 1 77-79
See also Command and control
Laser weapons, 1 64-66
conventional, 1 65
higher-energy (HELWs) , 165-66
Lazy-W DF baseline, 130-32
Local subsystem, 29
Low probability of interception (LPI), 24
as active EP goal, 6 1
requirements, 25
.techniques, '24
Manipulative electronic deception, I()()_() I
M.iln-porrable platform
ES, 1 39
jamming, 1 58
258
Message-content encryption, 64
Message encryption, 64
Military radio relay, 90
MIL-STD-464, 207, 2 1 2, 2 14, 2 1 6 , 228
Mission management, 1 83-84
Mobile networks, 222-23
Mobile trunk access, 37-38
Monitoring. See Intercept
Multiple access, 4 1
COMA, 4 1 , 4 3 , 7 5 , 77, 78
CSMA, 4 1 , 43
FDMA, 4 I , 42
TDMA, 4 I , 42, 48, 9 1
techniques, 4 1 , 42-43
Multirole multiband radio-advanced
demonstrator model
(MMR-ADM), 238
Narrowband excision, 62, 88
Narrowband receivers, I 0 I -3
detection time, I 03
scanning, I O I -2
superheterodyne se,lrch, I 02
Near-far effect
DSSS, 77-78
frequency hopping (FH), 83
Near-term digital radio (NTDR), 93
Nwvork-centric warfare (NCW) , 4-6
defined, 5
grid arrangement, 6
interlocking grids, 5
Network management facility (NMF), 35
Networks
ad hoc, 223-25
autonomous system (AS), 22I
digitized battlefield orientation, 2 I 9
issues, 220-29
mobile, 222-23
seamless integration, 220-22
TCP/IP, 22I
Neutralization, I 64-66
defined, I 64
EMP, 1 64
high-power RF weapons, I 66
laser weapons, I 64-66
Node operation center (NOC) , 34-35
Noncommunications electronic warfare,

14
Nonexplosive RF DEW, 1 96-98
Offensive RF DEW, 205- 1 1
delivery factors, 206-7
delivery platform, 208- 1 0
range, 207-8
target effects, 2 1 0-1 1
See also RF DEW
Omnidirectional antennas, 59-60
One-time pad, 69
OODA loop. See C2 cycle
Operational environment, 1 -6
Organization, this book, xiii-xv
Packet radio CNR, 45-47
Passive EP, 57-6 I
alternate means, 60
defined, 57
directional antennas, 59-60
emission control, 59
identical equipment, 58
shielding, 58-59
siring, 60-6I
t<lctics and procedures, 57-58
See also Electronic protection (EP)
PCS
base station mount, 5 1-52
EW vulnerabiliry, 53
Phase difference, 1 2 1
Platform protection, 202-5
avoidance of illumination, 202
disaster recovery plans, 205
hardening techniques, 202-4
issues, 204-5
maintenance, 205
planning, 204-5
tactics and doctrine, 205
See also RF DEW
Precision engagement, 3
Private-key encryption, 66-68
Processing gain, 7 1
Programmable digital radio (PDR), 238
Propagation effects, 200-202
atmospheric absorption, 20 1-2
Index
atmospheric dielectric breakdown,
200-201
radio line-of-sight, 200
Public-key authorities (PKAs), 68
Public-key encryption, 66-68
Quality of service (QoS), 24
Quantum computing, 239
Quantum cryptography, 239-4 1
defined, 239
implications for EW, 241
key exchange process, 240
Quantum key distribution (QKD), 239
Radio access points (RAP), 37-38
configuration for mobile subscribers,
38
defined, 37
Radio frequency directed energy weapons.
See RF DEW
Radio relay, 36, 90
Radio silence, 59
Responsive jamming, 1 5 1-53
Retransmission, appropriate use of, 63
RF DEW, 1 93-2 1 6
airborne, 2 1 0
antenna, 197-98
backdoor damage, 1 99
continuous power generator, 1 97
continuous wave, 1 96
cooling, 198
damage mechanisms employed by, 200
defensive, 2 1 1 - 1 6
defined, 1 93
delivery factors, 206-7
delivery platforms, 208- 1 0
existence of, 1 94, 1 95
explosive, 1 96-98
front-door damage, 1 98-99
funding for, 195
generators, 209
location identification, 2 1 2
missile-borne, 2 1 0
nonexplosive, 1 96-98
offensive, 205-l l
platform protection, 202-5
potential impact of, 1 95-96
propagation effects, 200-202
259
pulsed, 1 96
pulse generator, 1 97
range of, 207-8, 2 1 1-12
research in, 1 94
RF converter, 1 97
summary, 2 1 6
target effect mechanisms, 198-202
target effects, 2 1 0-1 1
rhrear, 1 93
Rivesr-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm,
68
Rotating directional antenna, 1 20, 1 23-24
advantages, 1 24
disadvantages, 1 24
radiation patterns, 1 23
Scanning receivers, 1 0 1-2
Search, 99, 1 00- 1 1 2
CNR subsystem and, 1 1 0-l l
defined, 99, 1 00
narrowband receivers, 10 1-3
process, 1 0 1
receivers, 1 00, l 0 1
siring for facilities, 1 89
tactical airborne subsystem and,
1 1 1-12
1 07-1 2
and, I l l
trunk communications subsystem and,
1 07-1 0
wideband receivers, 1 03-7
See also Electronic support (ES)
Secret-key encryption, 66
Security, 43, 1 70
communications system structure, 63
encryption, 69-70
Security services, 225-29
access control, 226
attacks against, 226-27
authentication, 226
availability, 226
confidentiality, 225
defined, 225
EA application and, 227
integrity, 226
nonrepudiation, 226
260
Shielding, 58-59
Signal dispatch service (SDS), 30
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) , 1 4
Simulative electronic deception, 1 6 1
Single channel radio access (SCRA), 37
Siring, 60-61
for analysis facilities, 1 9 1
for deception facilities, 1 87-88
for DF facilities, 1 90-9 1
for intercept facilities, 1 8 9-90
for jamming facili ties, 1 86-87
for search facilities, 189
Sky-wave communications, 44
defined, 44
footprint of, I I 0
Slow frequency hopping, 80
Software radio, 236-38
implications for EW, 238
receiver architecture, 236
technologies, 237-38
transmitter architecture, 236
use of, 236-37
Sounding, 234
Space diversity, 89
Special forces, RF DEW delivery, 209
Spot jamming, 1 48-49
Spreading gain, 7 1 , 74
defined, 7 1
measurement, 74
Spread-spectrum communications, 62,
70-84
chirping, 70-7 1
defined, 62
direct-seq uence (DSSS), 7 1 -79
frequency hopping, 79-84
technique comparison, 84
techniques, 70-71
Standalone DF basel ine, 1 30
Standoff jammers (SOJs), 1 53-55
Stream cipher, 65-66
Superheterodyne in tercept receiver,
1 1 5- 1 6
S uperheterodyne search receivers, I 02
S urface-wave propagation, 44
Surveillance and target acquisition (STA), 7
Swept jamming, 1 50
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors, 53
Tactical airborne subsystem, 49-53

analysis and, 1 38
antennas, 49
battle space communication, 5 1
communications services, 5 1-53
cross-linking between platforms, 50
defined, 29
deployment, 52
DF and, 1 3 5
intercept and, 1 1 9
jamming and, 1 56-57
PCS base station mount, 5 1 -52
platform footprint, 50
platform range extension, 49
search and, 1 1 1 - 1 2
theater broadcast opportunities, 5 2
See also Tactical communications
system
Tactical communications design drivers,
2 1 -25
command and control on the move,
22
communications support situational
awareness, 22
expandable communications, 23
jamming resistance, 24-25
low probability of interception (LPI) ,
24
organic, minimum-essential
communications, 23
quality of service (QoS), 24
range, 23-24
scalable communications, 23
seamless connectivity, 23
size of supported force, 32
support for spectrum of operations, 22
Tactical communications systems, 2 1 -54
analysis and, 1 36-38
architectural drivers, 2 1 -25
architectural framework illustration, 29
architecture for future land warfare,
27-30
CNR subsystem, 40-47
current architecture, 25-26
DF and, 1 32-35
direction finding (DF) and, 1 32-35
EW potential targets, 53-54
Index
intercept and, 1 1 7- 1 9
introduction to, 2 1
jamming and, 1 5 5-57
search and, 1 07-1 2
summary, 5 4
support, 30
tactical airborne subsystem, 49-53
tactical data distribution subsystem,
47-49
trunk communications subsystem,
30-39
design drivers
Tactical data distribution subsystem,
28-29, 47-49
analysis and, 1 3 8
defined, 29
DF and, 1 34-35
EPLRS radio, 48-49
i ntercept and, 1 1 9
jamming and, 1 56
search and, 1 1 1
system
Tactical internet, 46-47
Tactical planning process, 1 77-79
TADIL-J, 48, 90-92
defined, 90
operating modes, 92
operation, 9 1
time-slot structure, 9 1
Target development, 1 8 1-83
defined, 1 82
EA effects, 1 82
elements, 1 82
information requirements generation,
1 83
Target effect mechanisms, 1 98-202
back-door damage, 1 9 9
front-door damage, 1 98-99
propagation effects, 200-202
See also RF DEW
TCP/IP network, 2 2 1
TEMPEST, 59, 228
Terrain shielding
defined, 60
illustrated, 6 1
261
Time difference of arrival (TDOA), 1 2 1

Time diversiry, 89
Time-division multiple access (TDMA),
4 1 , 42
defined, 42
repeated radios, 48
structure, 91
Time-hopping, 229
Time slots, 9 1
Traffic analysis, 1 35-36
Triple-DES, 67
Troposcatter communications, 36
Trunk communications subsystem, 25,
30-39
access nodes, 32, 36-37
analysis and, 137
architecture, 33
bearers, 35-36
combat net radio i nterface (CNRI),
38-39
data-handling capaciry, 27
defined, 29
DF and, 1 3 3-34
fourth-generation, 32
intercept and, 1 1 7
interconnections, 30
interfaces, 39
jamming and, 1 5 5-56
mobile trunk access, 37-38
search and, 1 07- 1 0
trunk nodes, 32-35
system
Trunk nodes, 32-35
components, 35
defined, 32
network management faciliry (NMF),
35
node operation center (NOC), 34-35
number of, 32
Ultra wideband (UWB) radio, 229-33
communications applications, 2 3 1
defined, 229
electronic deception and, 232-33
implications for EW, 23 1-33
multiple access in, 230
potential, 23 1
262
Electron i c Warfare for the Digitized B attlefield
Ultra wideband (UWB) radio (continued)

time-coding of information, 229
transmission DF, 232
transmission jamming, 232
Unattended jammers (UAJs), 1 53-55
defined, 1 5 3-54
deployed by withdrawing troops, 1 54
efficiency, 1 54
See aLso Jammers
Uniformly random errors, 85
Watson-Watt DF, 1 24-28
Adcock antenna, 1 27-28
advantages, 1 26
block diagram, 1 25
crossed-loop antenna, 1 2 6-27

defined, 1 2 4
operation principle, 1 24
sensitivity, 1 25
system illustration, 1 25
technique description, 1 26
See aLso D i rection finding (DF)
Wideband receivers, 1 03-7
channelized search, 1 03-4
compressive search, 1 04-5
defined, 1 03
digital search, 1 05-7
types of, 1 0 3
Wideband spread spectrum, 72
Wullenweber DF, 1 28 , 1 29
The Artech House Information Warfare Libra ry
Electronic In telligence: The Analysis o f Radar Signals, Second

Edition, R i c h a rd G. W i ley
Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield, M i c h a e l R. Frater
a n d M i c h a e l Rya n
Electronic Warfare in the Information Age, D . C u rtis Sch l e h e r
EW 7 0 1 : A First Course in Electronic Warfare, D a v i d A d a my
Information Warfare Principles a n d Operations, Edwa rd Wa ltz
Principles of Data Fusion Automation, R i c h a rd T. Antony
For f u rt h e r i nformatio n on th ese a n d ot h e r Artech H ouse titl es, .

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The Digitized Battlefield

The Operational Environment

Command and Control

Communications and Nonco.mmunications

Tactical Communications Systems

Electronic Warfare for the Di gitized Battlefield

A S uitable Tactical Communications

Trunk Communications Subsystem

Fourth-Generation Trunk Networks

Mobile Trunk Access

Combat Net Radio Interface (CNRI)

Interfaces to the Tactical Trunk Subsystem

Key Architectural Issues for CNR

Modern CNR Solutions

Tactical Data Distribution Subsystem

Tactical Airborne Subsystem

Additional Communications Services

Potential Targets for Tactical

Passive Electronic Protection

Active Electronic Protection

Use of EP Techniques in Communications

Military Radio Relay

TADIL-J (Link- 16)

Enhanced Position Locating and Reporting

Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR)

Search and the Tactical Communications

Characteristics of Intercept Receivers

Electro nic W a rfare for the Digitized Battlefi eld

Rotating Directional Antenna

DF and the Tactical Communications System

The Analysis Function and the Tactical

Types of Communications Jamming

Standoff Versus Unattended Jammers

Jamming and the Tactical Communications