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Article history:
Received 16 August 2015
Accepted 21 August 2015
Available online xxx
The merits of decentralization and public participation for designing disaster risk management according
to local needs, priorities and capacities are now widely discussed in the scientic literature and in global
policy frameworks. However, surprisingly little attention is being paid to the potential fault lines that
may result if postulations for decentralization and local empowerment areddespite being adopted on
the surfacedin conict with the (hidden) policy agendas in centralized states. Tensions between
devolution and a central grip on power can particularly emerge around topics considered of relevance for
national development, notably urban growth centers, or the legitimacy of central leadership (frequently
claimed to be essential for the effective protection against disasters and other risks). This paper therefore
uses the example of Can Tho City, which is the high-growth urban center of the ood-prone Vietnamese
Mekong Delta, to analyze in detail (1) whether and to what extent the city has a decentralized system for
disaster risk management, (2) which opportunities and challenges emerge with decentralization, and (3)
which agendas different actors from the local to the national level have to accelerate or restrict local
empowerment. The analysis, based on the review of policy documents and in-depth interviews with
party-state decision-makers as well as other stakeholders, reveals that the picture of decentralization in
Vietnam is much less clear than often proclaimed. There is a convoluted reality in which contradictory
trends of decentralization and centralization co-emerge from overlapping layers of, rst, internal political
contentions, and second, a transforming actor spectrum within the country's changing political economy
of risk reduction.
2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords:
Disaster risk management
Vietnam
Decentralization
Adaptive governance
Urban risk
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
0197-3975/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
(ibid.). This poses relevant questions for this study, with respect to
the freedom of urban governments at district and ward levels to
negotiate and implement local risk management mechanisms
specic to their administrative entities. Furthermore, it raises
questions about opportunities for, and barriers to, local risk
governance that includes local public participation and
empowerment.
In addition, a certain degree of re-centralization during the
1990s has been noted, due to the national government's concern
that it might lose too much control over lower levels and undermine its own power structure (Gainsborough 2004). The confusion
that might result from the contested interplay of decentralization
and recentralization is largely neglected in the literature. Nevertheless, there remain serious questions about whether the capacities (nancial and human) of local urban governments in Vietnam
are sufcient to negotiate the overall increased amount of tasks,
and especially the enhanced level of responsibility (Garschagen &
Kraas 2011; Kerkvliet, 2004). A comprehensive analysis and juxtaposition of the opportunities and challenges of decentralization for
urban risk managementdand particularly for the emerging eld of
urban climate change adaptationdis still lacking to date.
Alongside the explicit move towards decentralization, the
related liberalization reforms have yielded a broadening of the
urban actor spectrum. This leads to increasing pluralism in terms of
the forces (political and monetary) that inuence urban development directions and, hence, potential trajectories of disaster risk (cf.
Garschagen & Kraas 2011). Notably, the real estate industrydoften
tightly linked to the party-state apparatus through crony capitalismdhas gained inuence over decisions on where, when and how
new urban development projects ought to be built, with direct
effect on the generation of new exposure zones with respect to
ooding and other natural hazards. Working towards a fast return
of investment conicts, in particular, with necessary long-term and
risk-sensitive planning horizons that take future climate risks into
account (Birkmann et al. 2014; Sudmeier-Rieux et al. 2014).
Consequently, local decision-making for effective risk reduction
hasddespite the persistence of bureaucratic centralismdbecome
more multi-polar, requiring integrated governance solutions. In
order to better understand this underlying tension between urban
growth engines and risk prevention, the next section examines the
role of urban growth for the general national development
endeavor.
3. The role of urban growth for overall national development
Cities are among the main engines of Vietnam's economic
growth and the wider reform process. Despite signicant aws in
Vietnam's urban statistical data (Jones 2007; Saksena et al. 2014), a
trend towards their increased demographic and economic importance in the national context can be identied. In the mid-1980s,
shortly before the ofcial commencement of doi moi, less than 20
percent of the country's population lived in cities and towns. This
then equaled some 12 million people. The gure rose to over 30
percent in 2010, translating to over 27 million (UN DESA 2015). Also
around 2010, the country's 19 leading cities accounted for 26
percent of Vietnam's population, but contributed 43 percent to the
national GDP, largely through their industry and service sectors
(World Bank 2011). This underscores the considerable role that
cities have been playing in the wider economic transition of the
country. While the agricultural sector contributed over 40 percent
to the national GDP in the mid-1980s, the secondary and tertiary
sectorsdwith their strong basis in urban economiesdaccounted
for a combined 80 percent of GDP in 2010 (World Bank 2015). The
absolute size of the latter two sectors has increased roughly tenfold
over the same timeframe.
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
While Vietnam's two primary cities Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
have played the leading demographic and economic roles, the secondary cities (such as Can Tho) are of increasing importance for
fuelling the country's urban transition. The Adjustment of the Master
Plan Orientation for Vietnam's Urban Development up to 2025 with
a Vision Toward 2050 (Decision 445/QD-TTg-2009) foresees that
mid-sized cities will take pressure off the two main urban agglomerations and help to reach a balanced and sustainable urban growth
pathway. Providing precise statistical accounts on secondary cities is
difcult given the many challenges in terms of data accuracy and the
mismatches between administrative demarcations and actual urban
extents. Nevertheless, existing data suggests that Ho Chi Minh City
and Hanoi alone account for 16 percent of Vietnam's population and
over 30 percent of its GDP (World Bank 2011). However, also the
country's secondary cities have been experiencing rapid growth. Can
Tho City's most dynamic district Cai Rang, for example, hosted
86,000 residents in 2009 but makes development provisions in its
current development master plan for an additional 120,000 to
150,000 residents in an area of 800 ha by 2025. Moreover, two new
industrial parks are planned for an area of up to 700 ha (SRV 2006).
Can Tho City is therefore envisaged to continue driving regional
progress in the Mekong Delta.
The key role of the major urban centers for national development and economic growth has translated into their special treatment within the legal architecture for urban planning and
administration. That is, those cities considered of highest importance are put under the direct control of the national government
(so-called centrally-run cities). Conrming earlier legal provisions, the Law on Urban Planning from 2009 species that this
status can be received when cities contribute key functions for the
wider socio-economic system and fulll specic criteria in terms of
population size, population density, economic prole and infrastructure. The status of a centrally-run city has ambiguous implications with regards to decentralized planning and decisionmaking. On the one hand, it gives the city increased nancial responsibility and independence in terms of tax revenues and the
approval of investment projects up to a certain threshold. On the
other hand, the general development master plans and the
fundamental decisions on the overall course of the city (and its
large-scale infrastructure projects) is tightly supervised and steered
by the national government.
There is an enormous pressure on citiesdespecially on the most
thriving urban centers under central controldto maintain strong
economic growth that is able to fuel the continuation of the socioeconomic progress of the country. After a few decades of inexplicit
and internally disputed urban development policy, this link is now
emphasized by the political leadership at the national level, given
that its legitimacy and the country's alleged stability increasingly
rest on continued socio-economic growth. At the same time, the
system of urban administrative hierarchy creates incentives for
local government leaders to push for strong growth of their cities.
This allows them to propel their city into a higher class and earn
political credit for their achievement, as well as gaining personal
prot by using their position to inform economic activities such as
land speculation prior to land reallocation (cf. DiGregorio 2015).
However, these multi-layered incentives for strong growth pose
considerable challenges for long-term disaster risk reduction: urban growth is largely guided by short-term targets and political
motives, rather than by long-term risk prevention considerations.
This conict has been analyzed in depth through the case study of
Can Tho City, where the southern Cai Rang ward in particular features extremely strong urban growth which is fuelled by the
agendas of local and national political leaders and their economic
interests, rather than by a consideration of the considerable ood
risk given by climate change trends (cf. Birkmann et al. 2014;
Garschagen 2014; Sudmeier-Rieux et al. 2014). Against this background of the political economy of urbanization and risk, the
following section examines the Can Tho case study with a specic
focus on the current situation around decentralized disaster risk
governance.
4. Can Tho City: capacities, limits and contestations of
decentralized disaster risk governance
Can Tho City, located around 180 km southwest of Ho Chi Minh
City, is one of the centrally-run cities in Vietnam due to its key
demographic and economic function for the Mekong Delta and
the entire country. As such, the local decision makers are under
immense pressure to facilitate not only continued demographic
and economic growth, but also regional development. However,
large parts of the city suffer from frequent urban ooding during
the rainy season, resulting from the combined effects of strong
rainfall, tidal ooding and water-logging. In addition, the city is in
principle vulnerable to typhoon hazards and river ooding: while
it has not experienced an extreme ood or typhoon disaster in the
recent past, both hazards are projected to intensify with future
climate change, resulting in growing disaster risk (People's
Committee of Can Tho City 2011). The combination of its shifting
risk prole and its status as a centrally-run growth center turn Can
Tho City into an interesting case study to examine whether and to
what extent the city has a decentralized system for disaster risk
governance, and what role the mitigation of future ood risk plays
in the context of an urban growth primacy.
The analysis has shown that while the city has formally implemented strongly decentralized provisions for disaster risk management in line with the national legislation, major drawbacks in
terms of decentralized capacity, awareness and empowerment
remain. In compliance with the legal DRM architecture, Can Tho has
a Committee for Flood and Storm Control at the city level and in
each district and ward. The role of these committees is to convene
the major party-state agencies relevant for DRM, and to jointly
assess vulnerabilities and make provisions for disaster risk management in terms of contingency planning, prevention, on-the-spot
response and relief. The general mode of operation is supposed to
be a decentralized approach to planning and action, guided by
general directives and check-ups from the committees at the next
higher administrative leveldan approach that in theory is thought
to foster a sense of responsibility, empowerment and proactiveness at the lower levels.
However, the interview results suggest that this end is achieved
only partially, due to a lack of local resource endowment and capacity buildingdand, particularly, the overall centralized bureaucratic structure, which hampers independent decentralized action
despite its formal codication. In fact, the very existence of de facto
decentralized planning is called into question by many of the
interviewed experts. They repeatedly argued that even if local action plans for DRM are produced at the province, district and ward
level, they often simply mirror the instructions and phrasings
handed down from the national level via the National Strategy for
Disaster Risk Reduction or intermediate circulars. This concern,
shared by many interviewees, is captured distinctively in the
following quote by a senior ofcial of the Red Cross in Vietnam.
[T]he national level cannot know if the local level will be able to
implement all of the instructions [ ]. When a hazard strikes, there
is, therefore, a big problem as the local level may not bedand in
many cases is notdable to deal with the situation. That is the
general problem stemming from the top-down planning in Vietnam. [ ] So, if you go to the planning departments in Can Tho City
and ask them for their tasks, they will just know the things that are
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
in the plan of the Committees at the higher levels. (Can Tho City,
May 2009)
Another expert shares the following view on the role of local
technical staff and party-state bureaucrats within the centralized
and rather mechanistic apparatus of state bureaucracy:
It's almost an unspoken rule, but there is no borrowing, no real
investment in the capacities of these local government ofcials
besides a kind of regular training which more relates to being a very
good bureaucrat and complying with the laws and regulations of
the communist partydand that is of course quite sad [ ]. As long
as this is not combined with an investment in the people who are
running the city, or planning for the city, or managing the city e
yes, then it's e quite difcult! (Ho Chi Minh City, May 2009)
In addition, the analysis has found serious challenges with
regards to the implementation and efcacy of the provisions for
decentralized funding for disaster risk management. The State
Budget Law requires that all local governments at province and
district levels allocate and reserve between two and ve percent of
their total budget for preventing, combating and overcoming the
consequences of natural disasters and for other important tasks of
national defense and security which may arise beyond estimates.
However, while nancial gures are always hard to get in Vietnam,
some of the interviewed experts clearly stated that this obligation is
not even closely met within Can Tho City or any of its districts. Most
experts view the so-called Flood and Storm Protection Fund as a
more relevant nancial mechanism for disaster risk preparedness
and relief work in Can Tho. This is a regular fund that is collected
from the local residents and private businesses in Can Tho City to
enable disaster risk management provisions. However, this nancial mechanism, which is entirely decentralized at the city level,
also fails to meet its targets and is not able to effectively provide for
the regular activities around disaster risk management. A senior
bureaucrat in the responsible city department explained this in
more detail:
The target for Can Tho City has been around 1.6 billion Vietnamese
dong per year over the last years [i.e. around 90,000 USD at the
time of the interviews]. However, the actual collection has usually
only totaled up to around 500 to 600 million dong. It has not been
possible to collect more. (Can Tho City, December 2009)
There is a general expectation that other nancial support for
local disaster risk management activitiesdand especially for relief
measuresdwould reach Can Tho in cases of a severe disaster. The
expectation is that this would come from central government funds
and/or private donations collected in other provinces and globally.
Appraising the potential volume of such funds and the question of
their sufciency is extremely difcult. But experience from previous disasters in other Vietnamese provinces suggests that a
considerable shortage is not unlikely, as frequent examples from
oods in Central and Northern Vietnam have shown.
On top of the consideration of immediate disaster risk management contingencies, it is also necessary to ask how strategic and
long-term disaster risk preventiondemphasized as one of the main
elds for necessary action in the 2014 Law on Disaster Prevention
and Controldrelates to general urban planning and how decentralization plays out to shape capacities and barriers in this policy
eld. The previous section of this paper has already provided a
more general introduction to this question; the interview results
help to examine it in some more detail. One of the major concerns
raised in many of the interviews is that the policy shifts at the
national level have a limited effect on the actual action and capacity
in the city. The new Law on Urban Planning outlines strong requirements for risk-sensitive land use planning to be implemented
in a decentralized manner with regards to current and future
ooding scenarios. However, the interview data suggests that this
has rather minor effects in Can Tho City, as long as awarenessraising and more practical guidance are not delivered adequately.
A senior consultant who has worked with many city governments
in Vietnam, including Can Tho City, therefore draws a rather bleak
picture:
I think the unfortunate conclusion [ ] is that the real impact [of
the new legislation] on local governments is unfortunately limited.
The processes [ ] at the local government level are still very much
the same and the level or the capacity of the people who are
running the process are also are still very much the same e while
the pressure to develop has increased immensely and the pressure
to address issues like climate change, [ ] and urban expansion
and so on e they are intensely growing. (Ho Chi Minh City, May
2009)
In particular, the long-term planning horizon and the weighting
of different priorities and interests have been mentioned as problematic issues in local urban planning practicesdfor instance,
when balancing short-term pressures from mighty real estate developers and long-term requirements for climate-proof land use
planning to avoid the generation of new ood risk zones. One of the
key informants stresses in this regard that:
I personally feel that many of the planners indeed are faced with
so many day-to-day disturbances and day-to-day challenges and
day-to-day priorities they need to address that anything which is
beyond time duration of more than e you know e ve years is very
difcult for them to grasp. (Ho Chi Minh City, May 2009)
On a more general level, the observed paradox between formal
movements towards decentralization and a continued grip of
central power surfaced in many of the interviews. Unpacking this
paradox has relevance for determining the freedom of Can Tho City
to independently plan and implement locally customized adaptation measuresdfor instance, in collaboration with international
development organizations or in accordance with guidelines provided by potential donor agencies such as the World Bank or
climate change adaptation funds. Reecting on these issues, a senior urbanization expert within a large UN organization in Vietnam
concludes the following:
The trend towards decentralization in urban planning mostly exists on paper. We have the feeling that in reality the country's urban
segment is rather experiencing a trend towards centralization
because all the important documents, master plans and so forth
have to be approved by the Ministry or even the PM [Prime Minister] in Hanoi. So in particular for those cities like Can Tho which
are climbing up the ladder of administrative levels, they do now
need to have their plans and strategies approved as they are now
centrally-run cities. They did not have this requirement when they
were smaller cities of lower administrative level in the past.
(Hanoi, March 2010)
Lastly, the case study analysis allows for exploring the local reality of one of the main conceptual and political arguments used to
justify and call for decentralization policies: that decentralization
enables an immediate interaction and active involvement of all
local stakeholders who are directly connected to the local disaster,
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030
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Please cite this article in press as: Garschagen, M., Decentralizing urban disaster risk management in a centralized system? Agendas, actors and
contentions in Vietnam, Habitat International (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.030