THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999

MANUEL
DE
ASIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN
CAMIL
ANDRES
DE
ASIS
represented
by
her
mother/guardian
VIRCEL
D.
ANDRES, respondents.

By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the
dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of
August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit:
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the
defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that
this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will withdraw the counterclaim,
as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED. 2
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel
A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:

PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February
4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion for
reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal
guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support
against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father
of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot
therefore be required to provide support for him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be

rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month
since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff
shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or
before the 5th of each and every month.
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite a monthly allowance of P5,000.00
per month, the first monthly allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this
month and the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each
succeeding month.
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises.

On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the
pertinent portion of which, reads;
1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner) has made a
judicial admission/declaration that "1). defendant denies that the said minor child
(Glen Camil) is his child 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff Glen
Camil . . .
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the defendant, it seems
futile and a useless exercise to claim support from said defendant.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that plaintiff
withdraws the complains against the defendant subject to the condition that the
defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled case, . . . 1

On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata,
alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil
Case Q -88-935.
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled
that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of
future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the
same fate. It was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of
Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question
whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding
that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for
maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the complainant manifested that
because of the defendant's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it
was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant". Because of such manifestation,
and defendant's assurance that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually
agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the lack of filiation between
him and the minor child, which admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation to give
support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the child and the putative parent,
the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal
of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for
support, especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the
case was with prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301
of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted
to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligor. . . .
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:

(6) Future legitime.

The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of
the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce;
hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person
to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a
public burden. This is contrary to public policy. 4
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that
she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his
paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation
between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any
and all future complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would
be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum
that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of
the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished
cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the
right to claim for support. 5

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be
left to the will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given
to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence
of the cause. 6
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an
admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88935 has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs.
Advincula 7 comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for
acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both
parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing
the case against the defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the
complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the
defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the
second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the
amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and
the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated
with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to
support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot
be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV
Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the
present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case
filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as
heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for
support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of
plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that
her cause for action is accrues.. . .
xxx xxx xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise.
Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support,
cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the
first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another
action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis supplied).
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's
pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still
prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
MANUEL MANAHAN, alias "Maning," defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a quo.
He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and
acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. 1 This case is now before us on automatic
review.
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. As a
stay-in waitress she slept at the second floor of the canteen. Manuel Manahan is the brother-in-law
of Josefina Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of Josefina Espiritu.
Manuel and Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together with the family of Josefina as
Primadonna was then pregnant.1wphi1.nt
On 5 January 1995, at about two o'clock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly
awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel
Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the accused covered
her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. She cried; she pushed and kicked him many times in an
effort to free herself but the accused proved too strong for her. Soon enough she became weary and
exhausted. Her condition enabled the accused to pursue his immoral intentions. He lifted her skirt,
removed her panty and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust, the accused warned the victim not to report the incident
to anyone and threatened her that should she squeal he would kill her and her family. Thereafter, he
left her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and could do nothing but cry until dawn. 2
Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents in Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. When her parents discovered it and
learned of her story, they brought her to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Casimero
Bacugan. From there they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was taken
by SPO1 Isagani L. Ico. Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the complaining
witness to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter,
with the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel
Manahan alias Maning of rape. 3
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie
Tibigar.
Accused Manuel Manahan has a different story. He denied having raped Teresita. He claimed they
were lovers. According to him, he met Teresita at the Espiritu Canteen in August 1994 and began
courting her. Subsequently, they became sweethearts and their first sexual intercourse occurred on
27 December 1994 followed by another on 28 December 1994. In the first week of January 1995

they again had a tryst in the house of Teresita's Aunt Fely, their last intercourse being on 7 May 1995
in the house of one Maura Manahan-Quinto, his sister.
Manuel further alleged that even after Teresita left the Espiritu Canteen there were several occasions
when they saw each other in front of the DBP in Dagupan City. In one of those assignations Teresita
allegedly told him that she wanted to have the child aborted as her father might kill her if he
discovered she was pregnant, but accused did not agree.
In September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita but was
later released. We fail to discern from the records the reason for his release. But on 15 March 1996
he was again arrested and detained at the Dagupan City Jail where Estrella, Teresita's mother,
supposedly visited him at least five (5) times to ask about his condition and whether he was tortured
in detention. The accused maintained that Estrella was trying to conceal Teresita's condition from her
father. She purportedly proposed to the accused to sell his land and give the proceeds to Teresita's
father as a form of settlement.
The accused assails in his appeal brief the credibility of the complaining witness. He asserts that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and reiterates that he and the
complaining witness were lovers, and that their sexual congress was consensual.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records and we sustain the conviction of the accused. The
prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable declarations of the
victim and the accused. At the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the
witnesses, to be resolved primarily by the trial court which is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of the
case. The exception is nowhere perceivable in the present case.
The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in rape cases, and vigorously
maintains that the sexual intercourse between him and Teresita was but the culmination of a mutual
passion. But we find otherwise primarily because the accused miserably failed to prove that he and
the complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her.
Moreover, there was no substantial evidence,e.g., love notes, mementos or pictures, presented to
support it.
The testimony of defense witnesses Nelson de Venecia and Arvin Sereban that they used to see
Manuel and Teresita together in front of the DBP in Dagupan City, even if true, did not confirm that
there was indeed an amorous relationship between the two. 4 Likewise, the testimony of Isabel
Remandaban, another defense witness, that she saw the accused and the complaining witness
embracing each other in the house of Maura Manahan-Quinto can hardly be given weight. The trifling
manner by which she answered the questions propounded to her at the witness stand even
prompted the trial court to remark that she was not serious with her testimony. Thus

WITNESS: No sir.
COURT: Why are you smiling? This is a serious matter. Put that on
record the witness is smiling. Not serious about her testimony
(emphasis supplied).
Ultimately, the trial court disregarded altogether, and rightly so, the testimony of Isabel
Remandaban. To emphasize, the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in the stand
and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions of the
witnesses testifying before it, and therefore more competent to discriminate between the true and
the false. 5 We find no trace of whim or arbitrariness on the court a quo in its assessment of the
testimony of this witness.
Also, Exh. "1" of the defense, a photograph showing Estrella talking to the accused while carrying
Melanie, the offspring of Teresita and Manuel, does not establish anything. As Estrella explained, she
visited the accused in jail not to show him Melanie but to ascertain that he was in fact
incarcerated, 6 and that she only brought the child with her incidentally during her visit because
Teresita was sick at that time and there was no one else to take care of the baby. 7
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the accused and the victim were really lovers, that fact
alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against
her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust. 8
Equally untenable is the accused's contention that there can be no rape since the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of intimidation. One of the modes of committing the
crime of rape is by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation. Even if we
concede the absence of intimidation in this case, the fact remains that the accused employed force
against his victim. Thus, testifying in a clear, definitive and convincing manner as concluded by the
trial court, Teresita established beyond any scintilla of doubt the presence of force essential in rape

Q: What were you doing then when Manuel Manahan accosted you?
A: I was sleeping, then suddenly I felt somebody near me and when
I opened my eyes I saw Manuel Manahan and then he immediately
laid on top of me, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was Manuel Manahan who
went, who laid on top of you?
A: I know him, sir.
Q: What did you do when Manuel Manahan laid on top of you?

COURT: This is not a joke. The penalty [for] the accused [if
convicted] is death. Do not testify here as if you are joking, or you
will be the one to [be] sen[t] to jail ahead of Manahan. You want to
be sent to jail?

A: I was about to shout but he covered my mouth and then he

immediately spread my legs, sir.

Q: What did you do when he did that to you?

A: He went on top of me and he put his legs between my legs and

also his legs, sir.

A: I cried, sir.
Q: Before Manuel Manahan spread your legs, what did you do?
Before he was able to spread your legs?
A: I pushed him and I kicked him several times, sir.
Q: What happened when you pushed him and kicked him several
times ?
A: I got weakened because he was strong that is why he was able to
abuse me, sir.

INTERPRETER: Witness, demonstrating by spreading both ends of the

ballpen.
Q: And then by doing so, by spreading his legs between your legs, he
was able to insert his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that precise moment when he was on top of you and also your
legs, where was the right hand of Manuel Manahan?
A: He closed my mouth with his right hand.

Q: After Manuel Manahan was able to spread your legs, what did he
do?

Q: What about his left hand?

A: And then he inserted his penis, sir . . . .

A: He used his left hand in pulling up my dress.

Again, during the cross-examination the victim recounted how she was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the accused, thus
Q: Did you spread your legs voluntarily or did he force open your
legs?

Q: At that precise moment when he was doing the push and pull, was
his right hand still with your mouth?
A: Yes, sir.

A: He forced me, sir.

Q: What about his left hand after raising your skirt, what was his left
hand doing?

Q: What did he do to force open your legs?

A: He was squeezing my neck, sir . . . .

A: By the use of his legs, sir.

Q: During your direct testimony you mentioned about having resisted

him, now, at what precise moment did you try to resist him?

Q: He did that while he was on top of you?

A: When he went on top of me I struggled, sir.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you able to dislodge him from being on top of you?

Q: What legs did he use, was it the right leg or both legs?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Both legs, sir.
Q: You mentioned about crossing his legs and then forced open your
legs, will you please demonstrate how he forced open your legs by
the use of this pencil and ballpen illustrate your legs with these two
other ballpens where the legs of Manuel Manahan, will you please
demonstrate how he forced open his legs when you said first he put
together his legs and then open your legs, will you please do it?

COURT: Then what did he do when you were able to dislodge him on
top of you?
A: He went again on top of me, sir.
Q: Did you again struggle to resist him or no more?

A: No more because I already felt weak, sir . . . .

10

Evidently, complainant offered a tenacious resistance to the criminal acts of the accused, but the
serious determination of the latter to accomplish what he intended to do eventually weakened
complainant and shocked her into insensibility. It is quite understandable that, at a tender age of 16
and innocent in the ways of the world, complainant is no match to the accused, a 28-year old
married man endowed with physical strength she could not possibly overcome.
Neither could she shout to alert the other occupants of the house as the accused prevented her by
covering her mouth with his right hand. The accused however claims that complainant had the
opportunity to shout for help at that precise moment he was removing his pants and brief, but she
did not. Suffice it to say, in this connection, that not every victim of a crime can be expected to act
reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind. Different people react to similar
situations dissimilarity. While the normal response of a woman about to be defiled may be to shout
and put up a wild struggle, others become virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they
experience and the fear engendered by the unexpected occurrence. Yet it can never be successfully
argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former. 11
The failure of complainant to disclose the outrage on her person to anybody, including her parents, is
due to the threats on her life and that of her family. Indeed, one cannot expect her to act like an
adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue because of the
rapists' threats to their lives. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not
necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained, as in this
case. 12
In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the rape charge had she not
become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that many of the victims of rape never
complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy in painful
silence rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists' making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims. 13
That accused also asserts that the rape case is a mere face-saving device of the victim to escape the
anger of her father. Again, we are not convinced. It taxes credulity that a simple barrio lass 14 like
the victim, a minor and a mere elementary graduate at that, could contrive such an unthinkable
solution to save herself from the imagined wrath of her father; what is more, concoct such a good
rape story convincing enough to withstand the rigors of cross-examination, and sway the judge to
impose on the accused the extreme penalty of death.
Indeed, it is very unlikely that the victim would make up a story of rape with all its attendant scandal
and humiliation. Considering the modesty and timidity of a typical Filipina, especially one from the
rural areas, it is hard to accept that the victim would fabricate facts which would seriously cast
dishonor on her maidenhood. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she had been
raped unless that was the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor. As we have long held,
when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has been committed. Her testimony is credible where she has no motive to testify against the
accused. 15

On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a
quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also
be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and
"in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the
child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the
accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if
the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the
judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused
to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
Finally, we do not agree with the trial court that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused is
death, it appearing that the crime committed was merely simple rape, i.e., not committed with or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances enumerated under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659, under which the death penalty is authorized. 17 In this case,
the proper imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, dated 28
November 1996, convicting accused MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED subject however to the modification that the death sentence imposed on the accused is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a
married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and
jurisprudence.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163209

October 30, 2009

SPOUSES
PRUDENCIO
and
FILOMENA
LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S.
LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners
Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
The Facts

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl
bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together
with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards
family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her
(then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." 3
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants)
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.4
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly"
provideP40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the
balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.5
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying
reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because
of the latters "inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x."6
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support
respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its
effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the issue
material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable
with him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their
legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to
the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that
should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This is
because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the
obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. 8

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution
dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners liability
to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory9 and jurisprudential mandate,10 the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to
their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions11 found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon defaultof parental authority, conceivably either by
its termination12 or suspension13 during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued
for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, 14 petitioners submit
that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the
scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on
Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses
the obligation to provide legal support, 15 they differ in other concerns including the duration of the
obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. 16 Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, 17 the same
obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime..
Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability
to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an
ascendants obligation to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this
view.
xxxx

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there
any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide
for her grandson's legal support. x x x18 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal19 lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation
of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree
removed are more than able to fill the void.1avvphi1
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward,
arising from their marital bond.20Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support
the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand
the case to the trial court for this limited purpose. 21
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended

Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. WeREMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166

August 15, 2012

CHARLES
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

GOTARDO, Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge the
March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV
No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code,
as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at
petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The application of Article 204 which provides that

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. 4

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. 5 For the parties failure to
amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. 6 Trial on the merits
ensued.

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners
grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which,
for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as
indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to amoral impediment bringing the case within the
ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.

The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee,
while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent
in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January
1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on
Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill. 9

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners
Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice

Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in
the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on
Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte. 10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1,
1993 to August 30, 1994. 11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more

frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was
pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license. 14 The petitioner even inquired about the
costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown. 15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out
of the wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern
Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later, however, the
petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. 18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. 19 When the petitioner did not show
up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995
demanding recognition of and support for their child. 20 When the petitioner did not answer the
demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August
1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he
was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. 23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion, 24 granted a P2,000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995. 25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had
her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last
week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact
even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to
return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as
attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA. 27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents
testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the
questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner,
from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC
order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support. 28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration, 30 the petitioner filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.

THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of
the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondents
testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete
with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several intimate sexual
encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs
findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child." 31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." 33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. 35 We explained that
a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are:
(1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. 37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at
the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.39

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent,
only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994
when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents
clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct testimony
regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when
she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:

the financial capacity of the family.46Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. 47It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support. 48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the
filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the
needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.

ATTY. GO CINCO:

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the
July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?

SO ORDERED.

A Third week of December 1992.

FIRST DIVISION

Q And you accepted him?

G.R. No. 201043
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love. 41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from
the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later
corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the
respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she
had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no
action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered
in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to
consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations
must be calibrated and considered." 43Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively
and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted
that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993. 44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support consists of everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with

June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines

Finance
Center
(AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set
aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders and
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and
permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary protection order
(TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her
previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:

Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form and substance
and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is
forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts of physical
abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence or her
place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with
petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly
weapon on occasions not related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the
petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance from the petitioner for the
implementation of this order. They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal
abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in order to
insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for him to file an
OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference
and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondents retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF
THE
RESPONDENT
APPEARS
WITHOUT
COUNSEL
ON
THE
DATE
OF
THE
PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY

CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND
IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE
PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL
BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled
pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his
own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the petition.
Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte
presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to
give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood
since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC issued
another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of P4,000.00
per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted
and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he
continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her spousal
support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, 6 as follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds that there is
a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that might
be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that respondent who was a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de
Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence
upon the petitioner. Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled and punched petitioner
causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical certificates showing physical injuries
suffered by petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital altercations.
Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre
her and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had
demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when
refused poked a gun at her. Several police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner
documenting the incidents when she was subjected to respondents ill temper and ill treatment.
Verbally, petitioner was not spared from respondents abuses by shouting at her that he was wishing
she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending her threatening text
messages. These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for
her life and these forced her to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner
was also deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court directing him to

give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect
the life of the petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTCs Order 10 dated March 6,
2009.

Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no controverting
evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.

On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of
the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahons retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as spousal
support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, manifesting that there is no
information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit and that the latter
has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal support.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, thus,
pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued
immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R.
YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is
directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be
due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically
deducted from respondents benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro
City for their guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of
the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift
Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP) 8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making
a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC,
on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36)
Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a
letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for
legal opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC
that S/Sgt. Yahons check representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by
the AFPFC, but to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC
had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the
AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the AFPFC is
not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance
of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded due
process and it was thus improper to issue execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner
emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without violating
its right to procedural due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been filed
out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and executory.

After due hearing, the CAs Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution 11 granting respondents
application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondents application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual
ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any all persons
acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the
assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be
ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel,
and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a
protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily
life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 13 The protection orders
issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to
wit:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or

through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief.
(Emphasis supplied.)

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner,
or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any
designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the
petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal
effects, or to supervise the petitioners or respondents removal of personal belongings;

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for the automatic deduction of 50%
from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, 15 which states: Section 31.
The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

xxxx

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to
legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by
the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman
and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable
for indirect contempt of court;

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise
or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his
position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly
weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the
court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or
possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the
offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on matter;

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 16 we held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half
of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latters conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it
violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.

(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited
to, property damage, medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter
and other social services that the petitioner may need; and

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those
properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx

(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension
or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)

sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession."25

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. 19

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon 26 the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the
latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order
issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions
which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
bias and prejudice against women.

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahons
retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of Pacific
Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the
amount of P10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the
Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on the
previous rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion 21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et
al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries of government
employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it. 23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation.1wphi1In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act 24 allow
garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity
problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.28

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who
are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their
personal safety and security.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland. 4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 29

According to petitioner, respondentmade a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. 10 To date, all
the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM,Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503,
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of
financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also
filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of
the crime charged.20

The following facts are culled from the records:

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is analien, the dispositive part of which
states:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty
ishereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation
to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family Code, thus, failure todo so makes him liable
under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to
wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not
a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or
not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus,
in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child. 27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic
v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support
his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino

citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, 38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioners allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents
obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or
her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that
the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child calls
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the
case.
SO ORDERED.