TENGKU ATHIRAH BINTI TENGKU AZHAR

A146465
QUESTION 1
Argument for Bersih:
The absence of specified period in the search warrant would raise
doubt as to the originality of the evidence tendered since there
could be a possibility of planting of evidence at the search place.
Further, it is immaterial whether such evidence is obtained illegally
or otherwise. As such, in in Wong Liang Nguk v PP, the appellant
was convicted of assisting in carrying on a public lottery contrary to
section 4(i)(c) of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance. The
charge was that, she was knowingly carrying in a motor car, of
which she was the sole occupant, a number of books containing the
records of stakes relating to 1000 character lottery. The evidence
against the appellant consisted of three books which the police had
seized from her possessions when he stopped and searched her car
such a search was clearly unlawful because the police officer was
not authorised to do so under the Common Gaming Houses
Ordinance.
The judge held that the fact that the evidence is unlawfully
obtained will not affect its admissibility. If the police officer had no
authority to search then no doubt he would have been open to some
sort of civil action, but the question of his authority to search is
completely irrelevant to the admissibility of the evidence. Also, in
the landmark case Kuruma v The Queen, the appellant was
convicted of being in unlawful possession of 2 rounds of ammunition
contrary to Regulation 8A(1)(b) of Emergency Regulations, 1952. He
was sentenced to death. The issue was whether the evidence of
possession of ammunition had been illegally obtained. The court
held that the test to be applied in considering whether the evidence
is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is,
it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the
evidence was obtained.
Therefore, pertaining to the facts, the failure on the part of the
prosecutor to ensure that the search warrant specifies the time of its
enforcement would raise doubt on the evidence tendered, since this
would cause prejudice to Bersih because the duration from 4 th to
15th July is deemed to be long enough for the police inspector to
plant any evidence at the search place. Plus, even if Bersih is
charged for an offence of retaining stolen property under the Penal
Code, the cases had shown that although the evidence was
unlawfully obtained, the court would not be concern with that so
long as it is relevant.

Argument against Bersih:

Generally, provisions of search warrants can be found under section
54 until section 64 of the CPC. Section 54 mentions that a court may
be issued if it has reason to believe that a person will not produce
the property or document when summoned, if it is not known to be
in the possession of any person and if a general search will serve
the purpose of justice or of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
Further, section 56 of CPC provides that a magistrate may issue a
warrant if upon information and after such inquiry as he thinks
necessary, he has reason to believe that anything regarding the
offence or the evidence/thing may be found in any place. Section 57
provides for the form of search. One of its requirements is to specify
the period of how long the search warrant would be in force.
Nevertheless, despite this general rule, the judge in the case of Lam
Chiak v PP states that the paper does not state what is the
reasonable number of days to be in forced however it must be
subject to one limitation, it must be reasonable. What is reasonable
would depend on facts of case. The court emphasized that it is
directory and not mandatory to have the number of days in the
warrant. In the case, the warrant was valid when it was issued and
remained valid for a reasonable number of days, notwithstanding
that such number of days was not stated therein. Thus, pertaining to
the facts, Aman, the police inspector was justified in conducting the
search warrant at the premise although it did not specify the time it
shall remain in force as required by the provision, because the
period from 4th to 15th July would still be considered as reasonable,
as in the case mentioned.
QUESTION 2
The issue is whether Mary has to abide by ASP Lilys request, which
is for the recording of her statement. Basically, section 112 of CPC
is concerned with the examination of witnesses by the police.
Section 112(1) provides that the investigating officer (IO) may
examine orally any person acquainted with the facts and
circumstances of the case and shall reduce into writing any
statement made, whereas clause (2) states that the person is bound
to answer all questions asked by IO, except if those statements
would expose him to criminal charge or penalty or forfeiture he may
refuse to answer. Further, section 112(3) requires the person to
state the truth, whether or not such statement is made wholly or
partly in answer to question. Next, the IO must give general caution
under sub(2) and (3). Lastly, the statement shall whenever possible
be taken down in writing and signed by the maker or affixed with his

thumb print after reading it to him in the language he made it and

after giving him an opportunity to correct it.
Pertaining to the situation, ASP Lily has the right to examine Mary
orally regarding the offence alleged. Since the provision mentions
any person, Mary is compelled to produce herself for the purpose
of the investigation and further answer the questions given by ASP
Lily. She is also compelled to state the truth of the matter. The only
exception to this is if the questions asked would likely expose Mary
to criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture. Plus, if Mary happens to
give false information, she may be liable under Section 193 and 203
of the Penal Code.