Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
seizure
of
the
vehicle,
its
possible
deterioration and diminution in value as a
result
thereof,
equity
demands
that
Cabacungan should be paid its value, which
is the second alternative provided for in
Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, and
that he should not be held liable for the
remaining unpaid installments on the
promissory note.
NLRC Decision
DOLE VS. ESTEVA
The Court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may look into the records of the
case and re-examine the questioned
findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case. The same principles are now
necessarily adhered to and are applied by
the Court of Appeals in its expanded
jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see
no error on its part when it made anew a
factual determination of the matters and on
that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
Hold Departure Order
RE: HDO ISSUED BY JUDGE SARDIDO
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance
of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the
same being tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to
travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure
Orders which are issued contain complete
and accurate information, the following
guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only
in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the HoldDeparture
Order
shall
furnish
the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
Bureau
of
Immigration
(BI)
of
the
2
Department of Justice with a copy each of
the Hold-Departure Order issued within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of
issuance and through the fastest available
means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain
the following information:
a. The complete name (including the middle
name), the date and place of birth and the
place of last residence of the person against
whom a Hold-Departure Order has been
issued or whose departure from the country
has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number
of the case in which the Hold-Departure
Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the
person against whom a Hold-Departure
Order has been issued or whose departure
from the country has been enjoined should
also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been
acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed,
the judgment of acquittal or the order of
dismissal
shall
include
therein
the
cancellation of the Hold-Departure Order
issued. The courts concerned shall furnish
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of
the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the
order of dismissal twenty-four (24) hours
from the time of promulgation/issuance and
through the fastest available means of
transmittal.
RE: HDO ISSUED BY JUDGE OCCIANO
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance
of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the
same being tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to
travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure
Orders which are issued contain complete
Residual Jurisdiction
ANGELES VS. CA
Prior to the transmittal of the original record,
the trial court may order execution pending
appeal.21 The residual jurisdiction of trial
courts is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject
matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals
by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the
trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.
Totality Rule (Rule 2, Sec. 5 (d))
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS
STANDARD INSURANCE CO. INC
VS.
4
rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That
where
there
are several claims
or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions
where the jurisdiction of the court
is dependent on the amount involved,
the test
of
jurisdiction shall
be
the aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest and
costs, irrespective of WON the separate
claims are owned by or due to different
parties. If any demand is for damages in a
civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948
Where there are several claims or causes
of
action
between
the
same
parties embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the demand in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims
or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or
due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional
test. ...
Comparison of former and present rules
Present Rules
Where
a
plaintiff sues
a defendant
on two or
more
separate
causes
action
If
P2
If
se
the
is
ma
ac
the
be
co
me
Th
of
ag
de
the
of
sh
of
Se
of
Two or more
plaintiffs
having
a
separate
causes
of
action
against
a
defendant
join
in
a
single
complaint
5
The difference between the former and
present rules in cases of permissive joinder
of parties may be illustrated by the two
cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de
Rosario
vs.
Justice
of
the
Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
6
in the articles of incorporation or otherwise
the place where it had actually been
residing or holding its principal office.
St. Francis Squares complaint, being
one
for
enforcement
of
contractual
provisions and recovery of damages, is in the
nature of a personal action which, under
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, shall
be
filed
at
the
plaintiffs
residence. Specifically with respect to a
domestic corporation, it is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the
articles of incorporation.
The letters of Golden Arches itself to
St. Francis indicate the address of the latter
to be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas,
Ortigas Center, just as the letters of St.
Francis Square to Golden Arches before the
filing of the complaint indicate its address to
be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas,
Ortigas Center. Golden Arches was thus put
on notice that at St. Francis Squares filing of
the complaint, the latters business address
has been at Mandaluyong.
Although,
St.
Francis
Squares
Amended Articles of Incorporation of 2007
indicates that its principal business address
is at Metro Manila, venue was properly laid
in Mandaluyong since that is where it
had actually been residing (or holding its
principal office) at the time it filed its
complaint. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court authorizes the plaintiff (St. Francis
Square in this case) to make a choice of
venue for personal actions whether to file
the complaint in the place where he resides
or where defendant resides. St. Francis
Squares choice must be respected as the
controlling factor in determining venue for
cases is the primary objective for which said
cases are filed. St. Francis Squares purpose
in filing the complaint in Mandaluyong where
it holds its principal office is obviously for its
convenience and for orderly administration
of justice.
Venue of Real Actions (Rule 4, Sec.1)
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. VS.
ROOSEMORE MINING & DEV. CORP.
7
are authorized by law to be parties in a civil
action.
Since petitioner is not a natural person, it
cannot also be considered as a juridical
person since Article 44 of the New Civil Code
enumerates what are juridical persons and
as single proprietorship, is it not included in
the enumeration.
"Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and
entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3)
Corporations,
partnerships
and
associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member."
There
is
no
law
authorizing
sole
proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in
court. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form
of business organization conducted for profit
by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure
licenses and permits, register the business
name, and pay taxes to the national
government. It does not vest juridical or legal
personality upon the sole proprietorship nor
empower it to file or defend an action in
court.
MANGILA VS. CA
The petition is GRANTED on the grounds of
improper venue and invalidity of the service
of the writ of attachment. The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the order of respondent
judge denying the motion to dismiss are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves
three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is
not necessary that
jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have
Forum
8
Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No.
1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary
hearing specifically on the defect in the
plaintiffs certificate of non-forum shopping;
or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case
and tackling the issue in the course thereof.
In both instances, parties are given the
chance to submit arguments and evidence
for or against the dismissal of the complaint.
Judge Causapin neither conducted such a
preliminary hearing or trial on the merits
prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.
CRUZ-AGANA VS. SANTIAGO-LAGMAN
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
compulsory
plaintiffs
(Aganas)
complaint.
respondent
compulsory
counterclaim.
waives
In
short,
the
the
an
the
rule
the
same
for
permissive
counterclaims?
No. If it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack
of a certificate of non-forum shopping is
fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the
lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is
immaterial.
9
of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court. x x x (Emphasis ours)
10
11
Indeed,
the
Revised
Katarungang
Pambarangay Law[8] provides that an
amicable settlement reached after barangay
conciliation proceedings has the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court if not
repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is
filed before the proper city or municipal court
within ten (10) days from its date.[9] It
further provides that the settlement may be
enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its
date, or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period.[10] This special provision follows the
general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of
the Civil Code, viz.:
(Rule 3,
12
FELS ENERGY
BATANGAS
Indispensable Party (Rule 3, Sec.7)
PAMPLONA
PLANTATION
CO.,
TINGHIL
VS.
Non-Joinder of Parties
Granting for the sake of argument that the
Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation is
an indispensable party that should be
impleaded, NLRCs outright dismissal of the
Complaints was still erroneous.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
[34] At any stage of a judicial proceeding
and/or at such times as are just, parties may
be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned.[35] If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable.[36] In this case, the
NLRC did not require respondents to implead
the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation
as respondent; instead, the Commission
summarily dismissed the Complaints.
In any event, there is no need to implead the
leisure corporation because, insofar as
respondents are concerned, the leisure
corporation and petitioner-company are one
and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of
Appeals[37] has held that this Court has full
powers, apart from that power and authority
which is inherent, to amend the processes,
pleadings, proceedings and decisions by
substituting as party-plaintiff the real partyin-interest.
INC.
VS.
PROV.
OF
13
decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on
petitioner FELS under the principle of privity
of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are
substantially identical parties as to warrant
the application of res judicata. FELSs
argument that it is not bound by the
erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus
unavailing.
Questioning Interlocutory Order
SILVERIO, JR. VS. FILIPINO BUSINESS
CONSULTANTS
First, interlocutory orders are those that
determine incidental matters that do not
touch on the merits of the case or put an end
to the proceedings.[8] The proper remedy to
question an improvident interlocutory order
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
Rule 45.[9] A petition for review under Rule
45 is the proper mode of redress to question
final judgments.[10]
An order staying the execution of the writ of
possession is an interlocutory order.[11]
Clearly, this order cannot be appealed. A
petition for certiorari was therefore the
correct remedy. Moreover, Silverio, Jr., Esses
and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan
acted on an ex-parte motion to suspend the
writ of possession, which is a litigious matter,
without complying with the rules on notice
and hearing. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
also assail the RTC Balayans impending
move to accept FBCIs evidence on its
subsequent ownership of Esses and Tri-Star.
In effect, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
accuse the RTC Balayan of acting without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, which is within the ambit of
certiorari.
However, in the exercise of our judicial
discretion, we will treat the appeal as a
petition under Rule 65.[12] Technical rules
must be suspended whenever the purposes
of justice warrant it, such as in this case
14
transcripts
of
stenographic
notes taken during the trial
were
complete
and
were
presumably
examined
and
studied by Judge Baguilat
before
he
rendered
his
decision. It is not unusual for a
judge who did not try a case to
decide it on the basis of the
record. The fact that he did not
have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial but merely
relied on the transcript of their
testimonies does not for that
reason
alone
render
the
judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214
SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that
the judge who heard the
witnesses testify is in a better
position
to
observe
the
witnesses on the stand and
determine by their demeanor
whether they are telling the
truth or mouthing falsehood, it
does not necessarily follow that
a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a
valid decision since he can rely
on
the
transcript
of
stenographic notes taken during
the trial as basis of his decision.
Accused-appellants
contention that the trial judge
did not have the opportunity to
observe
the
conduct
and
demeanor of the witnesses
since he was not the same
judge
who
conducted
the
hearing is also untenable. While
it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be
in a better position to ascertain
the truth and falsity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, it
does not necessarily follow that
a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a
valid and just decision since the
15
nature;
thus,
is
not
appealable.14
Respondents argue otherwise, maintaining
that such Order is a dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of failure to
prosecute which is, under the Rules,15
considered an adjudication on the merits,
and hence appealable.
A final order is defined as "one which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court."
Conversely, an interlocutory order "does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon" by the court.
Its effects are merely provisional in character
and substantial proceedings have to be
further conducted by the court in order to
finally resolve the issue or controversy.
YU VS. TATAD
While Neypes involved the period to appeal
in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of
a "fresh period" to appeal should equally
apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
following reasons:
a. BP 129 makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in criminal and civil cases
when it categorically stated for appeal from
final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from
b. The provisions of R41S3 and R122S6
although differently worded, mean exactly
the same. There is no substantial difference
between the two provisions insofar as legal
results are concerned - the appeal period
stops running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts to run
again upon receipt of the order denying said
motion for new trial or reconsideration. It
was this situation that Neypes addressed in
civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be
similarly addressed.c. While the SC did not
consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal in
criminal cases, it did include R42 on petitions
for review from the RTC to the CA and R45
governing appeals by certiorari to the SC,
both of which also applies to appeals in
criminal cases.3. Clearly, if the modes of
appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercisedits appellate jurisdiction) and to the
SC in civil and criminal cases are the same,
no cogent reason exists why the periods to
appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and
criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41
and Section 6 of Rule 122 should be treated
differently.
Factual-Issue Bar Rule
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
BERNARDO
VS.
16
As a general rule, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts.
When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court, unless the
case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the findings set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by
evidence on record.
NLRC Decision
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NLRC
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective
March 1995, the mode for judicial review
over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses
by declaring that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the
NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the
amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed
appeals from NLRC to SC are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to
17
(b)
Disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court, or injunction granted by
a court or judge, including the act of a
person who after being dispossessed or
ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
Note that the writ of possession was directed
not to petitioners, but to the sheriff for him
to deliver the properties to respondents. As
the writ did not command the petitioners to
do anything, they cannot be held guilty of
"disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment or command
of a court."
The proper procedure if the petitioners
refuse to deliver possession of the lands is
not for the court to cite them for contempt
but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
premises and deliver the possession thereof
to the respondents. However, if subsequent
to such dispossesion., petitioners enter into
or upon the properties for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or
in any manner disturb the possession of
respondents, then and only then may they
be charged with and punished for contempt
Additional ground for Annulment
Judgment (Denial of Due Process)
of
jurisdiction,
jurisprudence
of
and
18
In this relation, it may not be amiss to
placate
the
RTCs
apprehension
that
respondents recourse before it (was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable
nature of [small claims cases], because it
asks [the court] to supplant the decision of
the lower [c]ourt with another decision
directing the private respondent to pay the
petitioner a bigger sum than what has been
awarded. Verily, a petition for certiorari,
unlike an appeal, is an original action
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction