Q: What is the difference between aggressive war and defensive war?

A: In aggressive war, it is the State which initiates the

war (the Philippines as an active subject) as opposed to defensive war in which it is another foreign country which initiates the
war and the State only acts to defend itself (the Philippines as a passive subject).

Petitioner: Boris Mejoff, a Russian national brought to the Philippines as a secret operative by the Japanese during
the Japanese Occupation

Yet another petition for habeas corpus (i.e. this was not the first case filed by Mejoff)

First petition denied by SC on July 30, 1949

[Now that were done with that, lets go back to the story]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines, Mejoff was arrested as a spy by the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps

The Peoples Court ordered Mejoffs release, but the Deportation Board then found out that he had no travel
documents and referred the matter to the immigration authorities

The Immigration Board declared Mejoff an illegal alien, having illegally entered the Philippines in 1944, without
inspection or admission by immigration officials, and ordered that he be deported to Russia come the first available
transport

Mejoff was then under custody, having been arrested on March 18, 1948

Repeated failures to ship Mejoff to Russia

Mejoff was moved to Bilibid where he has been confined for give or take two years; no ship or country would take
him, says the decision
ISSUE:

WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation

RULING:

The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality
Sec. 3, Art. II of the 1935 Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the Nation, which means that the incorporation doctrine holds sway here
The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights proclaims the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to all human beings, stating that all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights (Art.
1); that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2); that every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile (Art. 9 ), etc.
The writ of habeas corpus will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these
terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under reasonable surveillance c/o the immigration authorities or their agents in
such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government
is ready to deport him

83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He
was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were
done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.
Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further
underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering
Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or
international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in
pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
andadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and
other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He
was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were
done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.
Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further
underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering
Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or
international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in
pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
andadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and
other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all
motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to
compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who
sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate
advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after
the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly
after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope,
ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise
prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until
the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor
Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated
by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the
US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless
elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted
the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the
Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked
as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable
assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would
collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may
infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken
all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing
that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the question of whether or not the mayor can
prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

66 Phil. 13 Political Law Defense of State

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National
Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings
and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of
the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.

78 Phil. 721 Political Law Citizenship Defense of State Treason

Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired
together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70
residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces.
Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple
murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayaos counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with
treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese
cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayaos swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese
Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also
emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render
personal, military or civil service
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and
joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also
indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he
does not strictly observe this duty.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1706 August 8, 1980

PROVIDING FOR COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE FOR FILIPINO CITIZENS AND AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER ONE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT"
FOR THE PURPOSE

WHEREAS, Section 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that: "The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government
and the people, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service";
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article V of the same Constitution provides, among others, among others, that it is the duty of the citizen
to contribute to his country's development and welfare and to cooperate with the duly constituted authorities in the attainment
and preservation of a just and orderly society;
WHEREAS, Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, makes it obligatory for all citizens to render military service;
WHEREAS, to serve the urgent needs of a developing country such as the Philippines, at present and in the foreseeable future,
it is equally vital to enhance respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and provide for, promote and develop civic
consciousness and participation as it is to insure national defense preparedness;
WHEREAS, the citizens of our country, particularly its youth, as the most valuable resource of our nation, need to be motivated,
trained, developed, organized, mobilized and utilized in regard to their responsibilities as citizens particularly their commitment
to civic welfare, their respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and the fulfillment of their military or civil obligations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree that:
Section 1. This Decree shall be known as "The National Service Law."
Section 2. National service shall be obligatory for all citizens of the Philippines. As used in this decree, "National service" shall
consist of three main programs namely: civic welfare service, law enforcement service; and military service.
Section 3. Each citizen shall render national service in any of the three main programs stated in Section 2 of this decree or a
combination thereof: Provided, That such service shall be credited in his favor for the purpose of fulfilling educational
requirements established by law.
Section 4. The terms "military service" and "military training" referred to in Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, shall
mean "national service" and "training for national service", respectively, as herein defined.
Section 5. The Minister of National Defense, in coordination with the Ministers of Human Settlements, Education and Culture,
and Local Government and Community Development, shall issue rules and regulations to implement this Decree, subject to the
approval of the President.
Section 6. All provisions of Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 7. This Decree takes effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

PROVIDING FOR THE CITIZEN ARMED FORCE

WHEREAS, Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a
regular force necessary for the security of the State"; and
WHEREAS, Section 4, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution mandates that: "The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may
be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service";

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall include the Citizen Armed Force which is hereby constituted, to be composed
of all reservists, and officers and enlisted men on inactive status. All able-bodied citizens shall become reservists with
appropriate ranks. All reservists in a particular locality shall be organized into reserve geographical units subject to call and
mobilization as the need arises, individually or as a unit. Reservists called to active duty shall serve with the regular troops as
part of the standing force. The Secretary of National Defense shall prescribe and implement a continuing program of
recruitment and training for the Citizen Armed Force to enable it to respond to all types of threats to national security.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of National Defense shall cause the organization of the Citizen Armed Force into Geographical Units
(CAF GUs) throughout the country and the implementation of the reserve force development program of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Sec. 3. The Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units shall consists of cadre of officers and men in the active force and qualified
reservists residing in the locality. The cadre may, however, be assigned to another unit in the active force while the CAF GUs to
which they are assigned are on inactive status.
Sec. 4. Whenever dictated by military necessity, and upon the recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense and
approved by the President, the Citizens Armed Force may be called or mobilized to complement the operations of the regular
force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or to support the regular force formations or units. For this purpose, Active Auxiliary
Units which shall be part of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units, may be utilized, to be constituted out of volunteers to
be screened in consultation with the local executives and civic/business leaders. These Active Auxiliary Units shall mean a
degree of activation of military reservists short of full active duty status. They shall not be vested with law-enforcement or police
functions.
Sec. 5. All member of the Citizen Armed Force on training or service shall be subject to military law and the Articles of War.
Sec. 6. Funds necessary to implement this Executive Order shall be taken from the applicable appropriation of the Department
of National Defense.
Sec. 7. The Secretary of National Defense shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive
Order, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines.
Sec. 8. All laws, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. This Executive Order shall take effect after Ninety (90) days following the completion of its publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general publication in the Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

35 SCRA 514 Political Law Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they
were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacaang. And considering that Germans group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were
wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to
disrupt the ongoings within the Malacaang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Lukes is a violation of their freedom to worship
and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion,
but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by
Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impressed.

Such manner impresses clear and present danger to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the
expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision
if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among
human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful
claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and
comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning,
bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of
worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so
than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by
Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the
scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger
to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the
respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.

86 SCRA 413 Political Law Inviolability of the Separation of Church and State
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as
mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of
Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:
in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by
the Election Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall
not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court
because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be
unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside.
Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be in
duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church
and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election
Code of 1971 every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces shall
ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer
disqualified from running for an elective office. The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly

banned under the Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed
to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, they being not included in the
enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary
qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.