THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 67803-04. July 30, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAT. RICARTE MADALI and ANNIE
MORTEL MADALI, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan B. Soliven for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J p:
Husband and wife Patrolman Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Romblon, Branch LXXXI 1 finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing father and son
Cipriano and Felix Gasang, and seriously wounding Agustin Reloj and Cipriano's daughter, Merlinda. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the guilt of accused Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel
Madali beyond reasonable doubt of the following offenses and sentences each of them as
follows:
"(1) For the frustrated murder of Agustin Reloj, each accused is meted an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Each of them is also sentenced to suffer all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and each is ordered to pay in solidum the offended
party, Agustin Reloj, the sum of P200.00 as reimbursement of medical and hospitalization
expenses.
"(2) For the murder of Felix Gasang, each accused is sentenced the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and each of them is likewise sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties provided
for by law, and each is also ordered to pay in solidum to the heirs of Felix Gasang, the sum of
P12,000, as death indemnity.
"(3) For the murder of Cipriano Gasang and the mortal (sic) wounding of Merlinda Gasang
(which has been converted into a complex crime of murder with frustrated murder) each
accused is sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory
penalties provided for by law and to indemnify in solidum the heirs of Cipriano Gasang the
sum of P12,000.00 and each is also ordered to pay in solidum, Merlinda Gasang the sum of
P6,000 for reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses.
"Each of the accused is likewise ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of deceased, Cipriano
Gasang and Felix Gasang, the sum of P50,000.00, which amount represents the value of the
loss (sic) earning capacity of deceased Cipriano and Felix, both surnamed Gasang, and the
sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"The sentences of reclusion perpetua and the indeterminate penalty imposed upon each
accused should be served successively, with proportionate costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." 2
According to the prosecution, said crimes stemmed from an altercation between the son of the Madali spouses,
Ramon, and the group of Felix Gasang, who was twenty years old when he was killed. 3 It appears that on
October 26, 1979, Felix figured in a fistfight with someone who was a friend of Ramon. The latter interceded
and mauled Felix with a "chako". 4 One of Felix's companions then was Agustin Reloj. 5
The following day, the police summoned Felix to the municipal building. Felix's mother, Desamparada Gasang,
went with him. 6 At the police station, Ricarte Madali, a police officer, angrily scolded Felix and his cousin,
Arnaldo Fadriquilan, and told them that because they were "very brave", he would put them in jail for twelve
hours. Madali added after asking about Felix's age that he would "sow bullets" in the body of Felix. 7 According
to witness policeman Aristeo Fetalino, Madali also uttered, "Kailangan sa imo lubongan bala" which means,
what you need is a bullet embedded in you. 8 Madali's father-in-law, Agustin Mortel, who arrived at the police
station, agreed with Madali that Felix and his group must be "sown with bullets" to eradicate them. 9 Another
group mate of Felix was detained at the municipal jail but Felix was sent home with his mother. 1 0
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 31, 1979, Felix and his cousin, Agustin Reloj, went home
together from the town plaza. Their houses were located near each other in sitio Marawi, barangay Cagbo-aya,
San Agustin, Romblon.

Felix and Agustin parted ways at the Marawi bridge. Felix dropped by the store of Coroy Mangao to buy
cigarettes while Agustin proceeded home. Around fifteen meters from the house of Ricarte Madali, the latter
accosted, him, held him by his arm and said, "So you are here, you devil, now you are finished. I have been
waiting for you. I have been watching for you for three nights already." 1 1 Then Madali dragged Agustin
towards the gate of his (Madali's) house. When Agustin asked Madali why he was dragging him, Madali said that
the reason was because Agustin helped in fighting his son.
As one of Agustin's feet stepped over the knee-high fence at the gate of the Madali residence, he was clubbed
by Annie Madali with a piece of wood. Annie struck him first on the left shoulder and would have given him
another blow had not Agustin freed himself from Madali's hold. Annie landed that blow on Madali instead. 12
Agustin was looking back as he ran away when Madali shot him. He was hit below his right hip. He fell to the
ground and did not get up fearing that Madali might shoot him again. Agustin was still lying down on the ground
with his eyes focused on Madali when Felix Gasang arrived. He saw Annie beamed her flashlight at Felix and she
said, "Here comes another." 13
Agustin saw Felix raising his hands as Annie focused her flashlight on Felix. Felix told Madali that he would not
fight with him but then Madali shot Felix twice. Felix fell to the ground. Madali was still near the gate of his
house when Cipriano Gasang arrived. Annie beamed her flashlight at Cipriano and she said, "Here comes, here
comes another, fire upon him." 14 Madali shot Cipriano who fell to the ground. Merlinda Gasang, who was with
her father Cipriano, clung to the fence nearby and shouted that she was also hit. Then Desamparada Gasang
arrived and shouted for help. One Romeo Manes came and carried away Merlinda. Agustin slowly stood up and
as he walked towards his house, he saw Roman Galicia (Galicha) and the Madali spouses who were then
entering their gate. 15
Merlinda Gasang * was at home when she heard an explosion. Her father, Cipriano, was also at home then but
after the second shot, he went out of the house towards the direction of the source of the gunfire. There was a
minute interval between the first and the second shots but only a second elapsed between the second and the
third shots. The fourth shot came about two minutes later. 16
Cipriano was "beyond the gate" of the Madali residence when he was shot by Madali. Merlinda
was around three meters from her father. 17 She saw Annie focused her flashlight at Cipriano and she
heard Annie say, "Yara pa, yara pa, barila" meaning "Here comes another one, here comes another
one, shoot." 18 That was when the fourth explosion occurred and Merlinda heard her father exclaim
that he was hit. Merlinda felt that she was also hit. 19 She did not fall to the ground because she was
able to take hold of the wooden fence. 20 She saw both her brother Felix and Agustin lying flat on
the ground with the latter's head turned to one side. 21
Merlinda shouted for help. Romeo Manes came and brought her to the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital. 22 She
did not notice anymore where Ricarte Madali was at that time because she was looking towards the direction of
their house. She saw her mother running to her. 23
Desamparada Gasang was washing the dishes after supper when she heard the first shot. After the fourth shot,
she became apprehensive because a policeman was mad at her family. 24 She proceeded to where she heard
the gunbursts and she met her daughter Merlinda who informed her that she was shot by Madali and that she
saw Annie focused a flashlight on her. Then Desamparada saw her husband crawling on the ground. She asked
him to stand up but he could not do so. Cipriano told her, "Ging iwagan ako ni Annie Madali cag ging baril ako ni
Ricarte Madali." (Annie focused a light on me and Ricarte Madali shot me.) She then went back to her daughter
and shouted for help. LexLib
The bodies of Cipriano and Felix Gasang were not removed from the road until around midnight. They were
brought to the Gasang residence for autopsy. 25 The rural health physician who conducted the postmortem
examinations on both Cipriano and Felix found that Cipriano sustained a gunshot wound at the right lower
quadrant of the abdomen along the mammary line. From that point of entry, the bullet followed an obliquely
downward course penetrating the small and large intestines and the urinary bladder, and exited at the middle
of the left buttock. Cipriano's death was caused by hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound. 26
Felix also died of hemorrhage resulting from the gunshot wound at the right second intercostal space within
the midclavicular line of the chest. The bullet veered backwards towards the left hitting the right lung, its
blood vessels and the fourth cervical vertebra. The second gunshot wound was at the right side of the abdomen
at about the level of the navel and within the right anterior axillary line. The bullet hit the subcutaneous
tissues and exited at the posterior axillary line. 27
Merlyn (Merlinda) Gasang sustained a gunshot wound at the anterior upper third portion of her right leg with no
exit wound and which would incapacitate her for ten to fifteen days. 28 However, she stayed for treatment at
the emergency hospital in San Agustin for 39 days. Later, she was brought to the hospital in Romblon for

extraction of the slug lodged in her leg. For the treatment of her wound, Merlinda spent P6,200.00. She could
not go to school for three months.29
Agustin Reloj suffered a gunshot wound at the glutael region of the right thigh. The bullet entered the lateral
aspect of the upper third of the right thigh and exited at the posterior aspect of the gluteus maximus muscle.
The attending physician certified that Agustin's injury would incapacitate him for seven to nine
days, 30 Agustin, who was then a laborer, stayed one week at the hospital and spent P200 for the treatment of
his wound. For his pain and anxiety, he stated, that he should be compensated in the amount of P500.00. 31
Madali voluntarily surrendered to the San Agustin police. 32 He handed his .38 caliber service revolver to the
policemen who arrived at the scene of the crime and they noted that there were only two remaining bullets in
the revolver. 33 He was placed under technical arrest by the provincial commander of the Philippine
Constabulary. 34
After the investigation, on February 1, 1980, two informations were filed against Patrolman Madali and his
wife, Annie Mortel Madali. In Criminal Case No. 981, said spouses were charged with multiple murder for the
killing of Felix and Cipriano Gasang. The information alleged that they conspired, confederated and mutually
helped each other in killing Felix and Cipriano treacherously, with evident premeditation and with the use of
a .38 caliber revolver. 35
In the separate information for multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 982, conspiracy, treachery and
evident premeditation were also alleged as having attended the felonious assault with the use of a .38 caliber
revolver on Merlinda Gasang and Agustin Reloj which could have resulted in the crime of murder had not timely
and able medical assistance intervened. 36
At the trial, both Madali and his wife, who had pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged, testified in their own
defense. According to Madali, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 31, 1979, he and his family were
about to sleep when a stone was hurled at their house. His wife said that it could have been a stray stone. But
then, three other stones landed on the GI sidings, and the lawanit and bamboo walls of their house. Madali
went to their porch where he noticed a person crouching near their gabi plants. He could not identify the
person because of the fog so he went inside their room and dressed up in his fatigue trousers and jacket. He
went down the house and noticed that there was no one in the gabi plants anymore.
Madali was behind their kitchen and about to go back to his house when someone hit his left shoulder. The
person struck him again but he was able to catch the club aimed at him and strike the person with his
nightstick. Madali was about to give him another blow with his nightstick but the person caught it. They tried
to get each other's club.
They were in that position when Madali's foot stepped into a low canal, causing him to fall down flat on his
back. The intruder fell with him and landed on Madali's stomach. The person shouted at someone in the vicinity
what the latter was tarrying about. As Madali tried to get up, he heard his wife call, "Carte, Carte." Just then
he kicked the intruder on the stomach and the latter fell to the ground. LibLex
Madali hurriedly stood up, pulled his gun and fired at the intruder. He noticed two other persons approaching
him. One person had a club and the other had what looked like a knife. He warned them, "This is a policeman.
Do not come near." One of the persons proceeded to strike him and Madali was hit on his forehead by the man
with the club. Madali in turn dealt him with a blow by swinging back his left forearm. The man with a club fell
down.
When the man with the knife was about to stab him, Madali fired his gun at him. As that man was still closing in
on him, Madali shot him again. The man with the knife retreated to the gate and fell just outside of it.
After firing two shots, Madali turned sideward and saw the man with the club about to strike him. So, Madali
shot him. The man walked away. Madali later identified the man crouching amidst their gabi plants as Agustin
Reloj. 37
Annie Mortel Madali corroborated her husband's testimony from the stoning of their house until he dressed up,
got his gun and nightstick, and went out of the house. When she heard Madali opening the door to the stairs,
Annie got up and went to their balcony to peep. She saw her husband going around their house in a clockwise
direction. When he was near their kitchen, Annie saw him grappling with someone over the possession of a
club. Her husband and his protagonist fell into a canal, trampling the gabi plants. She heard the man say, "Hay,
naga tanga pa kamo dira!" meaning "What are you still waiting for!"
Annie then saw two persons rushing inside their premises. One person was holding a club while the other one
had something which he appeared to thrust forward. Losing her composure, Annie warned her husband by

calling out his name, "Carte, Carte!" Then she heard a gunshot and the person holding a club who grappled with
her husband ran out of the premises.
Annie heard her husband say, "Pulis ini, ayaw maglapit" meaning "This is a policeman do not come near." After
that, she heard three more gunshots. The two who came rushing inside their premises scampered away and out
of their fence. She could not recognize the three intruders. Madali then walked towards her and asked her to
call the police. Annie went inside their sala and told her daughter Agnes to summon the police. 38
Policeman Numeriano Galang who heard the gun reports, met Agnes on his way to sitio Marawi. When he
arrived at the Madali residence, he found Madali with his face and jacket smeared with mud and with a swollen
forehead. 39 Galang asked Madali what happened but he did not put his investigation in writing. 40 At the
yard, he found stones, two slippers and a nightstick. 41 He did not find bloodstains in the yard because it was
drizzling. 42 Neither did he find bloodstains outside the yard because he inspected only the areas surrounding
the Madali house. 43
Policeman Antonio Morales arrived at the scene of the crime with two other policemen. He found Felix Gasang
lying flat on his belly about one foot from the gate. 44 To identify him, they turned Felix's body face up and
found that his right hand was holding a knife. 45 Later, that knife was turned over to police investigator Pfc.
Ernesto Solano. 46 The other victim (Cipriano) was found about five to six meters from the body of
Felix. 47 Like Galang, Morales saw pieces of stones which were different from the stones found in Madali's yard
which were mere corals or "boga", two pairs of slippers and the gabi plants which appeared to have been
trampled upon. 48
To prove aggression on the part of his victims, Madali presented a medical certificate stating that on November
1, 1979, he was examined at the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital for a vertical contusion (hematoma) on his
left forehead and another contusion on the left deltoid region. 49
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution, especially the testimonies of
eyewitnesses-victims Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. It found that the concerted acts of Madali and his wife
while committing the crimes proved conspiracy between them thereby making their criminal responsibility
collective. While finding that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, the lower court positively
appreciated treachery to qualify as murder the killing of both Cipriano and Felix Gasang. It noted, however,
that the prosecution erred in charging as the separate crimes of murder and frustrated murder the killing of
Cipriano and the wounding of Merlinda. Observing that only one bullet hit Cipriano and his daughter, Merlinda,
the lower court concluded that the Madali spouses should have been charged with the complex crime of murder
and frustrated murder. Accordingly, it imposed the penalties set out above for the crimes of frustrated murder,
murder and the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder. prLL
In this appeal, the Madali spouses pray for their acquittal arguing that the lower court erred in: [a] finding
Annie Mortel Madali guilty as principal by direct participation; [b] not finding that the Gasangs and their kins
were motivated by revenge; [c] not finding that Ricarte Madali acted in self-defense; and [d] in giving credence
and/or adopting the theory of the prosecution instead of that of the defense.
The prosecution of these cases was highlighted by notable developments. Firstly, before the defense could
present its evidence, on September 6, 1980, the capitol building of Romblon was razed to the ground. All court
records were lost. The records of Criminal Cases Nos. 981 and 982 were, however, reconstituted and the
accused arraigned anew. 50 Secondly, prosecution eyewitness, Roman Galicia recanted his testimony and
appeared for the defense claiming that he did not see the gunwielder.51 He alleged that he testified for the
prosecution for fear that the special prosecutor would revive the rape case against him. 52 The lower court
thereafter disregarded his entire testimony inasmuch as only the transcript of his cross-examination as
prosecution witness could be reproduced. 53 Thirdly, only the testimony of Ricarte Madali was heard by
the ponente below as the previous presiding judge was transferred to another sala. 54
In view of the disqualification of Roman Galicia as a witness, the issue of the credibility of the eyewitnesses
has gained importance in this case. Significantly, it is the word of the accused Madali spouses as against that of
the surviving victims, Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. Both prosecution and defense failed to present
corroborative witnesses to buttress their testimonies.
Matters of credibility are ordinarily addressed to the discretion and discernment of the trial court which is
presumed to have observed the demeanor of the witnesses at the stand. While the ponente of the decision
below was able to hear only the testimony of accused Ricarte Madali, the Court sees no reason for not giving
sufficient weight to his factual findings considering that he took pains in thoroughly studying the case even to
the extent of conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crimes and hearing part of the crossexamination of Madali thereat. 55

The defense is anchored on the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In order that such plea can prosper, it
must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the
defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing
thereforreasonable means to resist the said attack. 56
The defense miserably failed to pass said test. Its allegation that the Madali residence was hurled with stones
before Madali confronted the Gasang group, was not credibly established. No one was able to positively
identify the stone-throwers. Not even Madali and his wife, Annie. There is no proof that the stones found in the
Madali yard were indeed the stones thrown at their house. It is interesting to note that even defense witness
Antonio Morales, a fellow policeman of Madali, testified that he did not have personal knowledge on where the
stones were discovered because he was only informed by Galang (another policeman) "who in turn was only
told by Ricarte that the latter was stoned." 57
Indeed, the defense story is riddled with contradictions and loopholes which the appellants failed to rectify. At
the trial, Agustin Reloj sketched a map of the neighborhood and placed Felix Gasang's body on a spot across the
road from the Madali gate. 58 The defense tried to discredit Reloj's sketch and his testimony thereon by
presenting policemen Morales and Galang who testified that Felix's body was found close to the gate of the
Madali residence. However, the testimonies of said policemen clashed with each other. Morales testified that
both the two dead bodies were found close to the gate while Galang swore that while one body was near the
gate, the other body was five meters away from the Madali fence. 59 It should be noted that ten days after the
alleged commission of the crime, police investigator Fetalino found blood stains in the middle of the street
indicating that a blood-drenched body had been dragged across the street. 60
If it were really true that both Agustin and Cipriano were armed with clubs, at least Cipriano's club would have
been found as he died on the spot. The nightstick found by the police could not have been the one used by any
of the victims. According to defense witness policeman Galang, the nightstick was similar to that of a
policeman.61 Hence, it could have been the same nightstick which Madali admittedly used in striking one of
the intruders. 62
Granting that Agustin Reloj and Felix and Cipriano Gasang were armed with clubs and a knife, Madali's means of
resisting them was unreasonable under the circumstance. Having known that an interloper was inside his yard,
Madali, being a policeman, should have first fired a warning shot to deter said intruder from executing
whatever vicious plans he had. As it were, he fired directly at his victims and all four shots hit their targets.
Moreover, if Agustin, Felix and Cipriano were the intruders, then they should be credited for their extraordinary
bravery in entering the Madali yard. They were neighbors and they must have known that as a policeman,
Madali possessed a service revolver. The lower court, which saw for itself the Madali yard considered it "rather
inconceivable" for people like the victims to ever dare go inside the premises armed only with a knife and
clubs. 63
The lower court is correct in characterizing the felonious assault on Agustin Reloj as frustrated murder. While
Agustin Reloj was hit only below his right hip, Madali's act of shooting was plainly attended by an intent to kill.
This is evidenced by the revealing statements of Madali while accosting Agustin Reloj some fifteen (15) meters
from Madali's house, thus: "So you are here, you devil, now you are finished. I have been waiting for you. I have
been waiting for you for three nights already." 64 The statements "now you are finished" and "I have been
waiting for you for three nights already" sufficiently show that Madali not only intended to do away with
Agustin Reloj but also that the crime had been premeditated. They satisfactorily prove that Madali had formed
a determination to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution; that he had clung to his
determination and that there was sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 65
Moreover, after uttering those damaging statements, Madali dragged Reloj towards his gate. Annie then
clubbed Reloj who, however, succeeded in freeing himself from Madali's hold. Reloj was running away when
Madali shot him, hitting him below the right hip. 66
Indeed, firing at his fleeing victim and subsequently shooting to death two (2) other persons on the same
occasion, to our mind, evince quite clearly the intent to kill being then entertained by Madali. prcd
There is likewise no doubt that Madali committed murder when he shot Felix Gasang twice in the body.
Treachery qualified the killing to murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There was
treachery because of the suddenness of the attack. Felix was raising his hands, 67 and saying that he would not
fight back when Madali feloniously fired at him twice. Annie Madali's uttering "Here comes another" before
Madali shot Felix may not be considered sufficient warning so as to rule out suddenness of the
attack. 68 However, no generic aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently proven.

We agree with the trial court that with respect to the killing of Cipriano Gasang and the wounding of Merlinda
Gasang, the crime committed was the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder inasmuch as a single
shot hit them both. 69 It is immaterial that Merlinda Gasang was wounded on the leg and not on a vital part of
her body. What is of primordial consideration is the fact that the criminal act which killed Cipriano also caused
Merlinda's injury. 70 As in the killing of Felix, treachery qualified the killing of Cipriano to murder because of
the suddenness of the attack.
Annie Mortel Madali's defense strategy is to deny participation in the commission of the crimes and to interpose
an alibi. She insists that like any other wife, her natural reaction to situations which involve risk is "to stay
away, meditate and to shout and warn her husband of the intruders rushing towards him." 71 She bewails the
fact that the prosecution has pictured her as "a brave, pugnacious and aggressive wife like the heroine of the
pre-war movie 'Annie of the Indies'." 72 Indeed, Annie's role in the commission of the crimes may appear to be
straight out of an action picture were it not for the fact that her denials and uncorroborated alibi cannot stand
against the categorical declarations of prosecution eyewitnesses Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang on her
participation therein. 73 She should have presented witnesses to support her story. As she herself admitted,
she and her husband were not alone in their house when they were allegedly stoned. Six of their children were
home then.74 Some of them must have been within the age of discernment inasmuch as their eldest child was
21 years old and therefore, any one of them could have corroborated her story.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence
of conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be
shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design
among the accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be positive and
convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within
the penal fold. 75 With this and the principle that in criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in favor of
the accused, as guides, the Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the crimes
committed herein, is only that of an accomplice.
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and warning her
husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie assisted
her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious
acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was not so dark nor too
bright" 76 that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same intensity." 77 Ricarte Madali
could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's cooperation and assistance.
Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as having incited Ricarte
to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There is no proof that those inciting words had
great dominance and influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the crimes. 78 The rapidity
with which Madali admittedly fired the shots 79 eliminated the necessity of encouraging words such as those
uttered by Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to their yard does not make
her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being previous to Madali's act of shooting Agustin, was
actually not indispensable to the crime committed against Agustin. 80
Proof of motive is unnecessary where there is a clear identification of the accused. 81 More so in this case
where the principal accused does not deny having fired the fatal shots. But the Madali spouses must have
harbored a deep resentment against the Gasang family to put into action Madali's threat of "sowing bullets" on
them. What makes Madali's crimes even more reprehensible is the fact that he claims to have committed them
in the pursuit of his task as a peace officer. He even went to the extent of wearing his fatigue jacket and
trousers to create a facade of performance of an official function. Sadly, he misused his authority and his wife,
harboring an improper sense of connubial cooperation, did not even try to dissuade him.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of
the penalty for the most serious crime. The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for murder
of reclusion temporal maximum to death under Article 248 of the same Code, the death penalty should be
imposed for the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder considering that under Article 63, an
indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. It should
be noted that under the ruling in People v. Muoz, L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, Article III, Section 19(1) of
the 1987 Constitution does not change the period of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the lower court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Ricarte Madali for said complex crime.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which was proven but not appreciated in favor of Ricarte
Madali by the trial court, should be considered in imposing on him the penalty for the murder of Felix Gasang.
The presence of this mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same justified
the imposition of the minimum period of the penalty for murder pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, the proper penalty should be the indeterminate sentence of not less than ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. 82
The same mitigating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty on Ricarte Madali for
the crime of frustrated murder committed against Agustin Reloj. The penalty for frustrated murder in
accordance with Article 50 in relation to Article 248 is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on Ricarte Madali is four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to 12 years of prision mayor as maximum.
As an accomplice, Annie Mortel Madali should be imposed the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felonies. 83 For the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder,
like her husband, she shall be imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, 84 considering that the penalty
prescribed by law for Ricarte Madali is the death penalty. For the murder of Felix Gasang, the penalty
imposable on her is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, 85and there being no aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be reclusion temporal minimum. 86 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Annie Mortel Madali should therefore be meted the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal as
maximum. For the crime of frustrated murder committed against Agustin Reloj, Annie Mortel Madali shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. LibLex
Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali shall also be liable to the heirs of Cipriano and Felix Gasang for
indemnity in the total amount of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) in the proportion of 2:1 (2 shares for Ricarte
Madali as principal and 1 share for Annie Mortel Madali as accomplice), with each accused-appellant being
subsidiarily liable for the other in case of insolvency. The Court sees no reason to disturb the lower court's
findings on the reimbursement of hospitalization and medical expenses in favor of Merlinda Gasang and Agustin
Reloj as well as the award of damages, except to clarify that payment thereof shall likewise be in the
proportion of 2:1 as above stated and with each accused being subsidiarily liable for the other in case of
insolvency.
WHEREFORE, except as hereinabove modified, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed. Costs against
the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Madali, G.R. No. 67803-04, [July 30, 1990], 266 PHIL 72-97)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-24491. September 30, 1969.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO GENSOLA, FIDELINA TAN
and FELICISIMO TAN, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez for plaintiff- appellee.
Dominador Garin for defendant-appellant Rufino Gensola.
Juan C. Orendain for other defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; DEFENSE OF PERSON NOT MERITORIOUS IN INSTANT CASE. Appellants'
contention that Rufino Gensola alone inflicted with stone blows the serious wounds and fractures of the skull which caused
the death of Miguel Gayanilo, and that he did so in legitimate defense of Fidelina Tan and of himself, is unmeritorious in
view of the following considerations: (1) The testimony of Rufino Gensola and Fidelina Tan that in legitimate defense of
Fidelina and of himself, Rufino picked up two stones, struck Miguel on the left face with one stone and threw the other
stone at him when he started to run away, hitting him on the back of the head causing him to fall and strike his forehead
against a pile of stones, is belied by, first, the serious wounds and fractures of the skull on the back of the head and on the
left forehead of the victim, which could have been caused only by strong blows with pieces of iron; and, second, by the
testimony of Dr. Juan Encanto, who performed the autopsy, that he did not see any pile of stones near the body of Miguel
Gayanilo when he arrived at the place in response to a call. (2) The admission of Rufino Gensola that he alone was
responsible for the serious wounds and fractures of the skull inflicted upon Miguel Gayonilo in legitimate defense of
Fidelina Tan and of himself, has no probative value because it constitutes, in the face of contrary credible evidence for the
prosecution, an assumption by Rufino Gensola of the criminal liability of Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan. The penal law
does not allow anyone to assume the criminal liability of another.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY; TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES IN INSTANT CASE
CREDIBLE. Appellants' contention that the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses, Enrique Gelario and Enrique
Gela, are unworthy of credence because of contradictions and uncertainties, showing that they were not present and did
not witness the commission of the crime is untenable: (1) The contradictions pointed out involve only the relative locations
of the three carinderias near the scene of the crime, not the acts of commission of the three defendants at a distance of
about seven meters from where the two state witnesses were then standing. (2) The uncertainties pointed out refer to the
description of the pieces of iron used by Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan, that is, as to the size, length and other details.
Considering that the place was not well lighted and that there was little time to observe, accurate description of the
weapons used could not be expected three years later when the witness testified. (3) The contention that Enrique Gelario
and Enrique Gela testified against Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan out of spite because the latter had refused to transport
the former to their respective barrios, is not well taken. It is not natural for a person to testify under oath against his
neighbor on a matter of life and death just because of a trifling incident causing slight inconvenience. (4) We find the
testimonies of the four defense witnesses, Fidelina Tan, Felicisimo Tan, Elias Gensola and Salvador Gayatao, that Enrique
Gelario and Enrique Gela were not present at the scene of the crime because they had already left Gerona St. walking to
another street to await transportation to their respective barrios, unworthy of credence.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY, NOT PRESENT IN INSTANT CASE. There is no conspiracy among the appellants in the
commission of the crime of murder because of the following reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she
muttered to herself, "he does not appear because I will kill him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan, who kept silent and
Rufino Gensola was not even in the truck at the time; (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino
Gensola who followed closely behind. Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the Middle of the street. The words shouted
by Fidelina Tan "Rufino, strike him," were meant as a command and did not show previous concert of criminal design; (3)
The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the left forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino
had struck with a piece of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous concert of criminal
design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for
a few seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead."
4. ID.; ID.; EACH ACCUSED LIABLE ONLY FOR HIS OWN ACT. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three
appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY FOR DISFIGUREMENT CAUSED. Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds
inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused disfigurement ("deformity") of the face
within the meaning of Article 263(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods in relation to the indeterminate Sentence Law. The offense having been committed with treachery, the
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.
6. ID.; PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT; MERE COMMAND BY A PERSON TO KILL IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MAKE HIM A PRINCIPAL BY
INDUCEMENT. Fidelina Tan is not liable either as principal by inducement or principal by induction for the crime
committed by Gensola because the command shouted by her "Rufino, strike him, was not the moving cause of the act of
Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition, even without said words
of command.

7. ID.; PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE; INSTANT CASE. Assuming that the trauma inflicted by Felicisimo was by itself
sufficient to produce death due to traumatic shock, should Fidelina be also held liable considering that death could have
resulted anyway from the act of Felicisimo and that a persons cannot be killed twice? The obvious answer is that although a
dead person cannot be killed again, a dying person can still be killed. Miguel was not dead but dying when Fidelina struck
his left forehead with a piece of iron. Hence, the trauma inflicted by her hastened the death of Miguel from traumatic
shock made doubly severe. She must, therefore, be also held criminally liable for the death of the victim.
8. ID.; MURDER; TREACHERY QUALIFIED SAID CRIME IN INSTANT CASE. The crime committed by Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina
Tan is murder, because it was attended with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There was alevosia because after
Rufino suddenly struck Miguel Gayanilo with a stone, Miguel, defenseless, was struck by Felicisimo Tan with a piece of iron
on the back of the head and by Fidelina Tan with a piece of iron on the left forehead.

DECISION
CAPISTRANO, J p:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding the defendants, Rufino
Gensola, Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan, guilty as principals of the crime of murder and sentencing each of
them to reclusion perpetua and ordering said defendants to pay in solidum the sum of P6,000 as indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased Miguel Gayanilo.
Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck,
Gelveson No. 17 (belonging to Jose Tan, father of Fidelina and Felicisimo), with station at Guimbal, Iloilo. They
suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the truck while it was parked in front of
hiscarinderia on Gerona St., Guimbal, on November 18, 1958. In the afternoon of the following day, November
19, on the return trip of the truck, then driven by a temporary driver, Restituto Gersaneva, from Iloilo City,
Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela were among the passengers of the truck. Before the truck entered
thepoblacion of Guimbal, it parked on Gonzales St. to discharge a passenger and his baggage. Enrique Gelario
and Enrique Gela overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to someone she did not name:
"He does not appear because I will kill him." ("No aparece porque le voy amatar.") The truck then continued on
its way and parked in front of Teodora Gellicanao's carinderia on Gerona St. in the poblacion. All the passengers
got off the truck. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela crossed the street towards the carinderia of Pedro
Genciana to await- another passenger truck for their respective barrios. The Gelveson No. 17 then left in the
direction of the nearby carinderia of Violeta Garin, returned a short time later, and parked in front of
the bodega of its owner, Jose Tan. The time was about 6:30 p.m. Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from
the public market in the direction of his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big
as a man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle
of the street After Miguel Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the two, Fidelina Tan shouted,
"Rufino, strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back and Rufino suddenly struck him on the left face
with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious
wounds and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows already given, Fidelina struck Miguel with
another piece of iron on the left forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to the
ground near the canal along the side of the street. Rufino Gensola immediately left for his house situated on
Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a few seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He
is already dead." ("Ya esta muerto.") The two then left the scene of the crime.
The autopsy report shows that Miguel Gayanilo suffered lacerated wounds on the left face, serious wounds and
fracture of the skull on the back of the head, and serious wounds and fracture of the skull on the left forehead.
Death was caused by traumatic shock.
The death of Miguel Gayanilo caused by traumatic shock which resulted from the strong blows inflicting trauma
on the back of the head and on the left forehead, was admitted particularly by the accused Rufino Gensola,
who assumed sole responsibility for the same.
The lower court found the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of murder and rendered judgment
as follows:
"Por tanto el Juzgado declara a los accusados Rufino Gensola, Fidelina Tan y Felicisimo Tan
culpables, fuera de toda duda racional, del delito de asesinato, tal como se alega en la
querella y, no habiendo circunstancias que pueden modificar su responsibilidad criminal,
condena a cada uno de los tres a sufrir la pena de reclusion perpetua, a indemnizar, manco
munada y solidariamente, a los herederos de Miguel Gayanilo en la suma de P6,000.00 sin
sufrir prision subsidiaria correspondiente, en caso de insolvencia, dada la naturaleza de la
pena principal, a las accesorias de la ley y a pagar adem uno una tercera (1/3) parte de las
costas del juicio."

Defendants appealed.
Appellants contend that Rufino Gensola alone inflicted with stone blows the serious wounds and fracture, skull
which caused the death of Miguel Gayanilo, but that he did so in legitimate defense of Fidelina Tan and of
himself. The contention is unmeritorious in view of the following considerations: (1) The testimony of Rufino
Gensola and Fidelina Tan that Miguel Gayanilo, then drunk, angrily demanded to know from Fidelina why she
suspected him of having punctured the tires of the truck and was about to strike Fidelina with a stone, and
that in legitimate defense of Fidelina and of himself Rufino picked up two stones, struck Miguel on the left face
with one stone and threw the other stone at him when he started to run away, hitting him on the back of the
head and causing him to fall and strike his forehead against a pile of stones, is belied by, first, the serious
wounds and fractures of the skull on the back of the head and on the left forehead of the victim, which could
have been caused only by strong blows with pieces of iron; and, second, by the testimony of Dr. Juan Encanto,
who performed the autopsy, that he did not see any pile of stones near the dead body of Miguel Gayanilo when
he arrived at the place in response to a call. (2) The admission of Rufino Gensola that he alone was responsible
for the serious wounds and fractures of the skull inflicted upon Miguel Gayanilo in legitimate defense of
Fidelina Tan and of himself, has no probative value because it constitutes, in the face of contrary credible
evidence for the prosecution, an assumption by Rufino Gensola of the criminal liability of Felicisimo Tan and
Fidelina Tan. The penal law does not allow anyone to assume the criminal liability of another.
Appellants contend that the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses, Enrique Gelario and Enrique
Gela, are unworthy of credence because of contradictions and uncertainties, showing that they were not
present and did not witness the commission of the crime. The contention is untenable for the following
reasons. (1) The contradictions pointed out involve only the relative locations of the three carinderias near the
scene of the crime, not the acts of commission of the three defendants at a distance of about seven meters
from where the two state witness were then standing. (2) The uncertainties pointed out refer to the
description of the pieces of iron used by Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan, that is, as to the size, length and
other details. Considering that the place was not well lighted and that there was little time to observe,
accurate description of the weapons used could not be expected three years later when the witnesses
testified. (3) The contention that Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela testified against Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina
Tan out of spite because the latter had refused to transport the former to their respective barrios, is not welltaken. It is not natural for a person to testify under oath against his neighbor on a matter of life and death just
because of a trifling incident causing slight inconvenience. (4) We find the testimonies of the four defense
witnesses, Fidelina Tan. Felicisimo Tan, Elias Gensola and Salvador Gayatao, that Enrique Gelario and Enrique
Gela were not present at the scene of the crime because they had already left Geron St. walking to another
street to await transportation to their respective barrios, unworthy of credence.
Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three appellants. The lower court found them guilty as
principals of the crime of murder on the assumption that there was conspiracy among them. We do not agree,
for the following reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she muttered to herself, "He does
not appear because I will kill him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan who kept silent. Silence is not a
circumstance indicating participation in the same criminal design. With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not
even in the truck at the time (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino Gensola who
followed closely behind Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of the street. The words shouted by
Fidelina Tan, "Rufino, strike him," were meant as a command and did not show previous concert of criminal
design. (3) The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the forehead by Felicisimo and
Fidelina after Rufino had struck with a piece of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by themselves show
previous concert of criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino immediately left thereafter
while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina
muttered, "He is already dead."
In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable
only for his own act.
Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel
Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused disfigurement ("deformity") of the face within the meaning of Article
268 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods in
relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The offense having been committed with treachery, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period.
Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering that she gave the command "Rufino, strike him"?
The second class of principals, according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, comprises "those who directly
force or induce others to commit it (the act)." Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called
"principals by inducement" or "principals by induction," from the Spanish "autores por induccin." The word
"inducement" comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the Supreme Court of Spain, reward, promise of reward,

command, and pacto. With respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. In the case at bar,
the command shouted by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike him," was not the moving cause of the act of Rufino Gensola.
The evidence shows that Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition, even without said words of
command.
Are the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan both liable for the death of Miguel Gayanilo? Our opinion is
in the affirmative. The trauma inflicted by Felicisimo and the trauma inflicted by Fidelina, combined,
produced death due to traumatic shock. When Fidelina struck with a piece of iron the left forehead of Miguel,
he was not yet dead. It was only after the trauma inflicted by Fidelina that the dying Miguel fell to the ground
and died seconds later. This is clear from the evidence that after Miguel had fallen to the ground, Felicisimo
and Fidelina observed his prostrate body for a few seconds until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead."
Assuming that the trauma inflicted by Felicisimo was by itself sufficient to produce death due to traumatic
shock, should Fidelina be also held liable considering that death could have resulted anyway from the act of
Felicisimo and that a person cannot be killed twice? The obvious answer is that although a dead person cannot
be killed again, a dying person can still be killed. Miguel was not dead but dying when Fidelina struck his left
forehead with a piece of iron. Hence, the trauma inflicted by her hastened the death of Miguel from traumatic
shock made doubly severe. She must, therefore, be also held criminally liable for the death of the victim.
Was the killing murder? Our opinion is in the affirmative because it was attended with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There was alevosia because after Rufino suddenly struck Miguel Gayanilo with a
stone, Miguel, defenseless, was struck by Felicisimo Tan with a piece of iron on the back of the head and by
Fidelina Tan with a piece of iron on the left forehead.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, that part of the appealed judgment sentencing each of the appellants Felicisimo Tan
and Fidelina Tan to reclusin perpetua is affirmed. appellants are also ordered to pay in solidum the sum of
P12,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, Miguel Gayanilo. That part of the judgment against
appellant Rufino Gensola is modified by sentencing said appellant to an indeterminate penalty of from 3
months of arresto mayor as minimum to 3 years of prisin correccional as maximum.
Costs against the appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Sanchez, JJ., are on leave.
||| (People v. Gensola, G.R. No. L-24491, [September 30, 1969], 140 PHIL 121-130)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 90185. March 1, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO ABARRI y BATTING,
CLEMENTE CAWALING y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA y CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO y
GONZALES & RONNIE ANDALES y ROMIROSA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Raymundo A. Armovit for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ALIBI; RULE; CASE AT BENCH. The Court has consistently ruled that for alibi to
prosper as a defense, two requirements must be satisfied that the accused was not at the scene of the crime
at the time it was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at that place and time. The
requisites of time and place must be strictly met. In the case at bench, appellants failed to show that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence, as the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. cHCIEA
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN NOT PRESENT; CASE AT BENCH. This Court did not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to
Andales as sufficient to make him a principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before a remark can produce
such an effect, the same must be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining
cause of the crime. The inducer must have such an overpowering moral ascendancy over the actor, as to make
the utterance a command from a superior to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the decision
of Andales to rape the victim had been made before Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was then leaving
the place with Abarri, Estrada, and Pajalago while Andales purposely stayed behind with the victim. There is
not even a showing that Cawaling had any moral influence over Andales.
4. ID.; ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS; WHEN COMMITTED; CASE AT BENCH. The common intent of robbing the
victim and committing the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred from the behaviors of the
appellants. Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The
other appellants followed them and watched while Abarri divested the victim of her valuables. After robbing
the victim, Abarri with the use of a "balisong," tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse and all the other
appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and biting her nipples. The presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. The
Court finds that the acts of appellants in stripping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts
constitute lewd designs.
5. ID.; ROBBERY WITH RAPE; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BENCH. However, in the case of Andales, the acts of
lasciviousness committed by him culminated in the raping of the victim when he was left alone with her.
Nothing in the records show that the other accused had knowledge or were aware of the rape committed by
Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty of robbery with rape.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Kaloocan City in
Criminal Case No. C-31521, finding accused Ernesto Abarri y Batting, Clemente Cawaling y Cirinio, Conrado
Estrada y Cawaling, Joselito Pajalago y Gonzales, and Ronnie Andales y Romirosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with rape and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. prcd
I
The information filed against the accused reads as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of October 1988, in Kaloocan City, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another with intent to gain and by means of force, threats and
intimidation upon the person of GREGORIA GAN y LIM, that is by poking a knife at the latter,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
following articles, to wit:

one (1) Chinese gold ring P5,000.00

one (1) lady's wristwatch 2,000.00
Cash money amount (sic) to 250.00

TOTAL P7,250.00
belonging to said Gregoria Gan y Lim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned total amount of P7,250.00; and on the occasion thereof, said accused with
the use of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, have sexual intercourse
with one GREGORIA GAN y LIM, against the latter's will and without her consent." (Rollo, p.
7). Cdpr
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On May 22, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision convicting all appellants of the crime of
robbery with rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ERNESTO ABARRI Y
BATTING, CLEMENTE CAWALING Y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA Y CAWALING, JOSELITO
PAJALAGO Y GONZALES, and RONNIE ANDALES Y ROMIROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principals in the special complex offense of robbery with rape as described and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This Court
appreciates the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and there being no
appreciable mitigating circumstance, this Court sentences each of the accused to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. This Court likewise hereby orders the five accused to
indemnify the victim, jointly and severally, the amount of P20,000.00 as consequential
damages; to return the amount of P250.00, the Seiko watch and the Chinese gold necklace,
subject matter of the robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the value thereof, jointly and
severally, in the amount of P7,250.00; and to pay the costs.
The accused shall be credited in the services of their sentences with full time the accused
have undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended." (Rollo, p. 32).
Hence, this appeal.
II
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria Gan was walking along 4th Avenue,
Kaloocan City on her way home, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her and each poked a knife at
her neck. Abarri then grabbed Gan's bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag kang sisigaw." Gan
was dragged by the two and brought inside a fenced, vacant lot strewn with garbage and covered with tall
grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada, and Joselito Pajalago followed them inside the vacant lot.
Cawaling and Estrada were former employees of Gan. prcd
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a "balisong," tore the upper portion of Gan's
blouse. The other accused then started tearing the rest of the blouse and pulling down her pants. The torn
blouse was used to tie her mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the accused started
touching her private parts.
Abarri opened Gan's handbag and took a bunch of keys, which included the key for her store at
Carmen Planas Street in Binondo, Manila. He also got her watch valued at P2,000.00, necklace valued at
P5,000.00 and wallet containing P250.00.
After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales. Before leaving, Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog,
(referring to Andales) bahala ka na, sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim 'yan, makatas pa 'yan."
Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening the tie on her legs, raped her twice.
After satisfying his lust, Andales left.
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll over to the middle of the lot. In the
process, the tie on her mouth loosened and she was able to shout for help. Responding to her cries,
neighbors came and untied her hands.
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay Captain Anita Alejo was informed by a
resident that somebody was opening the store of Gan. Repairing at the place, Alejo saw Abarri and Estrada.
She noticed that the door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked the two what they were
doing there, Abarri answered that Gan instructed them to get the latter's pants. Alejo brought them to the

barangay hall for investigation. Upon further questioning, Abarriadmitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a
vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over the two to the custody of the police
detachment in Binondo. LibLex
The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene. However, Gan was no longer there when
they arrived. The police proceeded to Gan's house where the latter positively identified the two as among
those persons who robbed her.
The findings of NBI Medico Legal Officer Roberto Garcia were as follows: (1) there were physical
injuries outside the victim's genitals, the age of which was consistent with the alleged time of commission
of the crime at about 7:30 P.M. of October 14, 1988; (2) the victim's hymen had old healed lacerations; (3)
the opening of the hymen was big enough to accommodate or to allow the penetration of an average-sized
adult male organ in erection without producing any new injury to the hymen.
III
The defense rests on denial and alibi. All of the accused claim that they were not at the scene of
the crime as each of them was somewhere else.
Abarri testified that at around 8:00 P.M. of October 14, 1988, he and Estrada were on their way
home from work. While walking in Pulgeras Street in Binondo, Manila, they were accosted by some
barangay tanod who accused them of breaking into a store. At first they denied their involvement. But
after they were mauled at the Binondo Police Station, they were forced to admit their involvement in the
robbery.
Estrada corroborated the version of Abarri as to their whereabouts on the night of the robbery. He
further testified that he and Cawaling were former employees of Gan.
Cawaling, Pajalago, and Andales all claimed that they were at their respected homes that night
when the crime was committed. Cawaling claimed that he was coerced by the police to admit his
complicity. Andales claimed that he came to know his co-accused only at the city jail.
We have consistently ruled that for alibi to prosper as a defense, two requirements must be
satisfied that the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at that place and time (People v. Gaguban, G.R. No. 96287, April
25, 1994). The requisites of time and place must be strictly met (People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454 [1993]).
In the case at bench, appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at
the scene of the crime when it was committed.
The defense posits that no direct evidence on the conspiracy was established by the prosecution.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense (People v. Uy, 206 SCRA 270
[1992]; People v. Dela Cruz, 190 SCRA 328 [1990]).
The common intent of robbing the victim and committing the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred
from their behaviors.
Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The
other appellants followed them and watched while Abarridivested the victim of her valuables. After
robbing the victim, Abarri with the use of a "balisong," tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse and all
the other appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and biting her nipples. cdll
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances (People v. Balbas, 129 Phil. 358 [1967]). We find that the acts of appellants in
stripping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts constitute lewd designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness committed by him culminated in the
raping of the victim when he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show that the other accused
had knowledge or were aware of the rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty of
robbery with rape (People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to Andales as sufficient to make him a
principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before a remark can produce such an effect, the same must
be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime

(People v. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]). The inducer must have such an overpowering moral ascendancy
over the actor (People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 [1993]), as to make the utterance a command from a
superior to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the decision of Andales to rape the victim
had been made before Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was then leaving the place with Abarri,
Estrada, and Pajalago whiled Andales purposely stayed behind with the victim. There is not even a showing
that Cawaling had any moral influence over Andales.
The trial court, therefore, erred in convicting all the appellants of the crime of robbery with rape.
In view of the fact that the charge of rape includes abusos deshonestos, the appellants, other than
Andales, can be found guilty of committing the crime of robbery with abusos deshonestos. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from its MODIFIED. Ernesto Abarri, Clemente Cawaling,
Conrado Estrada, and Joselito Pajalago are GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes of
robbery and acts of lasciviousness. This Court sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of SIX
(6) MONTHS ofarresto mayor as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum for the crime
of acts of lasciviousness, and to indemnify Gregoria Gan jointly and severally in the amount of P10,000.00
as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, they are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and 2 MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally Gregoria Gan in the amount of P7,250.00 as actual
damages.
Ronnie Andales is FOUND GUILTY of the crime of robbery with rape. He is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Gregoria Gan in the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and jointly and severally with the other appellants, the amount of P7,250.00 as actual damages. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Abarri y Batting, G.R. No. 90185, [March 1, 1995], 312 PHIL 46-55)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 79168. August 3, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO CAGALINGAN y ROMINA,
JOVITO CAGALINGAN y ROMINA and VICTOR ROMINA, JR. y VELANCIO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan T. Antonio for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No. X-87-187 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan at Aparri, finding them guilty of the crime of Murder and sentencing the
accused Jovito Cagalingan y Romina and Victor Romina, Jr. y Velancio to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; the accused Alfredo Cagalingan y Romina, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prison mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering all of said accused to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased Joemar Desor the amounts of P11,500.00, as actual damages, and P30,000.00, as indemnity for
the death of said Joemar Desor, and the costs of suit.
The facts of the case, according to the People's counsel, are as follows:
"On or about 1:30 in the afternoon of June 4, 1984 at Looban, Block 14, Centro, Aparri,
Cagayan, eight persons were playing bingo in the house of the spouses Alfredo and Benita
Flores. Two of the players were Lory Bunabon and Veron Cagalingan (pp. 6-7, tsn, Dec. 11,
1984). Not long after her arrival and while seated at the door of the balcony, Lory Bunabon
saw the accused Jovito Cagalingan about six meters away holding a basket containing claws
of crabs. Joemar Desor (the victim) approached Jovito, took hold of the basket, and jokingly
asked the latter to give him the crabs so that he could roast them. Jovito refused saying that
he was bringing them home for their viand (pp. 50-53 and 58-59, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
Soon thereafter, the two were laughing although each of them was grappling for the
possession of the basket (pp. 53-54, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
In order to gain advantage over Jovito to secure the possession of the basket, Joemar held
the throat of Jovito with his right hand (pp. 51-54, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984). Jovito however was
able to remove the hand of Joemar and went at the back of the latter (p. 80, tsn, Dec. 11,
1989).
Veron Cagalingan, wife of Alfredo Cagalingan, saw them and shouted that Jovito was being
killed by Joemar. This impelled accused Alfredo Cagalingan, who was inside the house of his
parents-in-law Alfredo and Benita Flores, to jump out of the house and proceed to the scene.
Holding a bolo measuring 15 1/2 inches long (Exh. C), Alfredo went behind Joemar and
stabbed him twice on the right side of his body parallel to his navel (pp. 9-10, tsn, Dec. 11,
1984).
Jovito who was able to free himself from Joemar drew his nine-inch kitchen knife from his
waist and also stabbed the victim twice (pp. 11-12, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
While the stabbing was being perpetrated, accused Victor Romina, Jr. jumped out of the
window of his house to join the other accused. Using a nine-inch kitchen knife (Exh. D), he
also stabbed Joemar once. The latter at the time was already immobile, lying prostrate on
the ground (p. 12, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
Mercedes Desor, mother of the victim, heard the commotion and rushed to the crime site.
There, she saw his (sic) son Joemar lying prostrate on the ground with the three accused still
holding the bladed weapons dripping with blood. At this juncture, Alfredo Cagalingan was
heard uttering a challenge saying 'who else still is brave man companion of Joemar Desor'
(pp. 27-28, tsn, May 15, 1985).
Thereafter, Alfredo and Jovito Cagalingan went towards the direction of the police precinct
while Victor Romina, Jr. ran eastward towards the Ryan Cinema (p. 28, tsn, May 15,
1989). prLL
The mother of the victim embraced and pulled her son up but both of them fell down. She
screamed for help. Her nephew and cousin responded and brought Joemar to the Aparri

Emergency Hospital where the victim was treated by a certain Dr. Macro Ayuyang (pp. 28, 29,
tsn, May 15, 1985). Unfortunately, Joemar died after then (sic) minutes from arrival due to
loss of blood (pp. 3-8, tsn, Aug. 12, 1985).
Dr. Romulo de Rivera, Municipal Health Officer of Aparri, Cagayan, conducted an autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim and submitted his medico-legal necropsy report (Exh. H) containing
the following findings, to wit:
'1. stabbed wound 4.0 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 11.0 cm. depth below the right
axilla directed inward with sharp end backward.
2. stabbed wound 6.0 cm. x 3.0 cm. x 22.0 cm. in depth over the right
flank with 8th rib fractured sharp end anteriorly.
3. stabbed wound 4.0 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 26.0 cm. in depth perpendicular end
of the wound with sharp end downward.
4. stabbed wound 3.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 6.0 cm. over the right lumber region
with sharp end upward.
5. stabbed wound 2.0 cm. x 1.0 cm. x 5.0 cm. along left infra-axillary
region with sharp end downward.
CAUSE OF DEATH: shock secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple stabbed
wounds.'
On the basis of the foregoing happenings, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan, after due
preliminary investigation, filed the corresponding Information for murder against the three
accused-appellants with the Regional Trial Court." 1
The defendant-appellant Alfredo Cagalingan, while admitting having inflicted injuries upon the deceased
Joemar Desor, insisted that he acted in legitimate defense of his brother when he inflicted the mortal wounds
which resulted in the death of the said Joemar Desor. His version of the incident is summarized by the trial
court as follows:
". . . that about 1:30 in the afternoon of June 4, 1984, he was inside their house, owned by
his parents-in-law Alfredo Torres and Benita Flores, at Looban, Aparri, Cagayan, listening to a
radio drama when he heard screams from the bingo players. Looking through the window he
saw Joemar Desor on top of his brother Jovito, about seven meters away, lying on the ground
being strangulated by Joemar. He went to pacify Joemar telling him 'do not do that manong
we are but one.' Joemar answered 'even all of you.' When Joemar partly unsheathed his knife
he stabbed him several times with a big bolo (Exh. '5'-defense, Exh. 'C'-prosecution), thinking
that Joemar will kill his brother with his (Joemar's) stainless steel knife (Exh. '1'-defense).
Thereupon he went to the police headquarters and surrendered to Pat. Edwin Reyes telling
him 'sir, I am surrendering because I killed somebody, Joemar Desor.'" 2
The accused-appellant, Jovito Cagalingan, upon the other hand, denied having stabbed the deceased Joemar
Desor. He claimed that while he was on his way home, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 4 June 1984, he
was suddenly boxed on his right cheek by Joemar Desor. He just cried and went away because Joemar Desor
was bigger than he and was the recognized "kingpin" of the neighborhood. But Joemar Desor followed and
boxed him several times on the chest causing him to fall. When he fell, Joemar Desor went astride him and sat
on his belly, and then held his neck, choking him. As a result, he lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness, he saw his brother, Alfredo Cagalingan, jumping out from the window of their house and coming
to them. Alfredo then stabbed Joemar Desor with a bolo. After a while, Pat. de la Cruz of the local police
arrived at the scene and he (Jovito) was brought to the police precinct. 3
The defendant-appellant Victor Romina, Jr. also denied having stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor and
interposed the defense of alibi. He declared that at about 12:20 o'clock in the afternoon of 4 June 1984, he
went to see a movie at the Ryan Cinema with his friend, one Ferdinand from Faire, Cagayan. At around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, his name was flashed on the screen of the cinema as "wanted outside". He went
outside and was met by policemen who then arrested him and brought him to the police station for
investigation. 4
His testimony was corroborated by Ferdinand Ugale who declared that he and Victor Romina, Jr. went to see a
movie at the Ryan Cinema at about 12:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 4 June 1984; and that while they were
watching a movie, the name of Victor Romina, Jr. was flashed on the screen as "wanted outside" and Victor
Romina, Jr. left him inside the moviehouse. 5

In support of their appeal, the defendants-appellants claim that the trial court erred: (1) in not holding that
the accused Alfredo Cagalingan killed the deceased Joemar Desor in defense of his relative; (2) in not holding
that Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. had no participation in the killing of the said Joemar Desor; and
(3) in sentencing the accused Jovito Cagalingan to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
1. The appellants first claim that the trial court seriously erred in finding that unlawful aggression was not
present in the killing of Joemar Desor. They argue that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased because the latter was strangulating Jovito Cagalingan when he was stabbed by Alfredo Cagalingan.
A review of the evidence, however, fails to lend credence to the appellants' claim that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased. Lory Bunabon categorically stated that the deceased Joemar Desor and
the appellant Jovito Cagalingan were laughing and joking as they were grappling for the possession of the
basket of crabs which Joemar Desor wanted to get from Jovito Cagalingan. For unlawful aggression to be
present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. 6Here, there was no danger to the life of
Jovito Cagalingan as they (Jovito and Joemar) were in a frolicsome mood.
Besides, it would appear that the deceased was unarmed at the time and sustained five (5) stab wounds in
different parts of his body, 7 which indicates that the act (stabbing) was not in defense of a relative but a
determined effort to kill the deceased. LLpr
It would also appear that when Alfredo Cagalingan voluntarily surrendered to the police, he did not inform the
latter that he killed the deceased in order to protect the life of his brother Jovito. He merely said that he
accidentally injured one Desor. 8 As stated by the Court in one case, 9 "if he had really acted in self-defense,
the probability is that he would have immediately informed the authorities of that fact if only to minimize his
guilt if not to exculpate himself."
2. We also find no merit in the claims of the appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. that they did
not participate in the commission of the crime. Lory Bunabon positively identified the said appellants as among
those who stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor. 10 Lory Bunabon could not have been mistaken in her
identification of the appellants (Jovito and Victor) as perpetrators of the crime because she was near them and
the protagonists were her immediate neighbors in the community.
Besides, the trial court found that the testimony of Jovito Cagalingan "is replete with self-contradiction a
mark of untruthfulness and incredulousness" 11 and we find nothing in the record which would justify our
setting aside said finding.
As for the alibi of Victor Romina, Jr. that he was inside the Ryan Cinema at the time of the commission of the
crime, suffice it to state that the said moviehouse is only about 100 to 150 meters away from the scene of the
crime and the said appellant has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. Besides, his alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by Lory
Bunabon.
3. Finally, the appellants claim that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, imposed by the trial court upon the
appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. is excessive. Appellants argue that with the elimination of
the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for Murder was accordingly reduced.
The contention is without merit. This issue had been laid to rest in the case of People vs. Muoz, 12 where the
Court ruled that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except that it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The Court therein further ruled that the range of the medium and
minimum penalties for murder remains unchanged. LLpr
We find, however, that Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. are only accomplices in the crime since their
participations therein were not absolutely indispensable in the commission of the crime. Lory Bunabon
declared that Jovito Cagalingan stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor after Alfredo Cagalingan had stabbed the
deceased at the back, while Victor Romina, Jr. stabbed the said deceased while the latter was already lying
prostrate on the ground. 13 While the acts of Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. show a community of
design with the principal, Alfredo Cagalingan, who inflicted the fatal wound, and they (Jovito and Victor)
cooperated in hastening the victim's death, the said appellants' acts were not absolutely indispensable in the
commission of the crime. A person who assaults a victim already fatally wounded by another is only regarded as
an accomplice. 14
The penalty for appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. as accomplices must be modified. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With the modification above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects,
with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Cagalingan y Romina, G.R. No. 79168, [August 3, 1990], 266 PHIL 334-343)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20911. October 30, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SULPICIO DE LA CERNA, ET
AL., defendants. SULPICIO DE LA CERNA, SERAPIO MAQUILING, TEODORO LIBUMFACIL,
GODOFREDO ROTOR, SEVERINO MATCHOCA, and ANTONIO BAUTISTA, defendantsappellants.
Godofredo Galindez for defendants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MOTIVE; AS BETWEEN PROTAGONISTS IN A PREVIOUS CONFLICT, RESENTMENT RESTS WITH
LOSING PARTY. Sulpicio has more reason to resent and kill Rafael than the latter would have as to him. The source of the
possible motive is the same: land trouble between Rafael Cabizares and Sulpicio's father, and the ejectment suit instituted
before the Agrarian Court against the latter by the former. Considering that Rafael was the prevailing party in the land
dispute before the NARRA, it is quite hard to believe that he would be the one entertaining a grudge against those over
whom he had prevailed. Rather, it was the accused, who were defeated and who were now facing an ejectment suit which
was set for hearing, that harbored resentment against the deceased.
2. ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP OF WITNESSES TO VICTIM; EFFECT. That most of the prosecution witnesses are related to the
victims does not necessarily impair their credibility.
3. ID.; ID.; APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES; WEIGHT OF LOWER COURT'S
FINDINGS. Where from the record, it is apparent that the so-charged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies are without substantial and significant basis, the lower court's findings should stand, especially since they
involve an appreciation of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.
4. ID.; MURDER; TREACHERY; SECOND SHOT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENTLY CONSIDERED WHERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT LAPSE OF
TIME FROM FIRST SHOT. The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery. Appellant Sulpicio contends that the
first shot, fired by him, was not attended with treachery since there is evidence that Rafael was warned by his son
Gumercindo just before he was hit in the lower abdomen. However, even assuming the argument to be tenable, the second
shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously fired since Rafael was then in the third room of Demetrio's house,
wounded and defenseless. The treachery here has to be independently considered due to the sufficient lapse of time from
the first shot, in which the following intervened: (1) the bringing of Rafael to Demetrio's house 100 meters away after being
hit; (2) the washing of his wounds and his being brought to the third room to rests, (3) the arrival of the accused and their
ordering the two women to get out. It was only after the women left that Serapio climbed up the kitchen and fired the
second shot at Rafael.
5. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION. There is evident premeditation where as in this case the plan to kill Rafael
Cabizares was arrived at in a meeting held the day prior to the actual killing. 6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; RETRACTION BY A
WITNESS OF HIS PREVIOUS TESTIMONY; RULE THEREON. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily
vitiate the original testimony otherwise credible. The proper things for the court to do is to weigh and compare both
testimonies. Here, the lower court, after having done so, accepted the witness' original testimony, for the prosecution. The
record supports the court's action.
7. ID.; ID.; INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING OF ANOTHER PERSON IN ADDITION TO THE INTENDED VICTIM. Appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano Cabizares, notwithstanding a conspiracy was to kill Rafael
only and no one else. Nothing was said or agreed upon about the members of Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their plan
appellants let the two women inside Demetrio's house leave unhurt and they did no harm to the remaining companions of
Rafael in the house. The rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy.
For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares.
The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
8. ID.; PRINCIPAL BY INDIRECT CONSPIRACY; CASE OF APPELLANT ROTOR. Appellant Rotor's presence in the situs of the
shootings on February 2, 1958 was not merely passive. His active participation - shooting at Rafael and carrying a pistol
which has a direct connection with the criminal design against Rafael Cabizares makes him a principal by indirect
conspiracy, not an accomplice only. Motive is not wanting. Rotor admitted that his wife is the sister of Sulpicio's wife and
the evidence shows that his father had a land dispute with Rafael Cabizares and was a respondent in the case before the
Agrarian Court.
9. ID.; CO-CONSPIRATORS ARE CO-PRINCIPALS; CASE OF APPELLANTS BAUTISTA AND MATCHOCA. The presence and active
participation of appellants Bautista and Matchoca in Abapo's house where the plan to kill Rafael was arrived at, make them
actual conspirators in the killing of Rafael. They were also present and zealously participating in the execution of their
criminal design, giving a carbine magazine and instructions to appellant Rotor, threatening Rafael and giving
encouragement to Sulpicio to shoot at the latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio's house and left
together with others after finally accomplishing their criminal deeds as agreed upon. Appellants Bautista and Matchoca are
therefore also liable as co- principals in Rafael's murder. Regarding motive, it was proved that both were among those
involved in the land conflict with Rafael Cabizares and were among the respondents in the case before the Agrarian Court.

10. ID.; ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE MURDER; CASE OF APPELLANT LIBUMFACIL. Although appellant Libumfacil was not
present in Abapo's house on February 2, 1958, he was present at Sulpicio's house and in the premises of Demetrio's house
with the other accused and appellants. He was armed, had fired at Rafael also, and took part in the stoning of Demetrio's
house where Rafael was brought. His actuations manifest that he was aware of the criminal design of the original
conspirator's, that he approved of it and carried it out, thus showing that his presence at the scene of the crime was not
merely passive. Consequently, he is a co-principal in Rafael's murder. Motive is not wanting. It was established that his
mother had a land conflict with Rafael and that his step-father Diosdado Esperanza was one of the respondents in the case
before the Agrarian Court.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
Sixteen persons, among them herein appellants, were indicted by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato for double murder for the fatal shooting of Rafael and Casiano Cabizares, 1 father and
son, in Barrio Cebuano, municipality of Tupi, province of Cotabato, on February 3, 1958. All pleaded not guilty.
In the course of the trial, after the prosecution had rested the People's case, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the fiscal, after conducting his own preliminary investigation, included
in the charge the other accused who were already dropped therefrom by the Municipal Court. The trial court
denied said motion but acquitted accused Gaspar Bautista, Agapito Avellana, Cesar Abapo and Eriberto
Matchoca for insufficiency of evidence against them.
The defense then presented its evidence. While at this stage, accused Segundo de la Cerna died and the charge
against him was dropped.
After trial, the lower court, on January 3, 1962 promulgated its decision. Acquitted were Guillermo Esperanza,
Concordio Pardillo, Deogracias Pardillo, Andres Abapo and Joaquin Libumfacil.
Convicted for the murder of Rafael Cabizares were Sulpicio de la Cerna and Serapio Maquiling, as principals,
and Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil, as accomplices.
For the murder of Casiano Cabizares, the court convicted Sulpicio de la Cerna and Serapio Maquiling
as principals, and Ramon Alquizar as accessory.
A motion to reconsider by the convicted accused failed to move the lower court. So the said accused followed
up with their notice of appeal. Two days later accused Ramon Alquizar was allowed to withdraw his intended
appeal. And during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, accused Serapio Maquiling moved to withdraw his
appeal also, and this was granted on August 8, 1967.
The present appeal, therefore, involves only Sulpicio de la Cerna as principal for the killing of both Rafael and
Casiano Cabizares; and Teodoro Libumfacil, Godofredo Rotor, Severino Matchoca and Antonio Bautista
as accomplices for the killing of Rafael Cabizares.
The first question is procedural. It appears that when the municipal court finished with the preliminary
investigation, it opined that only appellant Sulpicio de la Cernawas guilty while the rest of the accused were
not. The fiscal, however, without seeking a review of the findings of the court, conducted his own investigation
and, afterwards, indicted all the accused. It is contended that this was serious error. The objection, however,
was raised only after the prosecution had already rested its case. Hence, whatever procedural defect there
was, had been waived by the appellants by their failure to raise it before entering their pleas. 2
Appellants next assail the lower court for relying on the prosecution witnesses who gave, in substance, the
following narration of facts and circumstances:
Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares, accompanied by his wife, Hospicia, his brothers
Margarito and Romualdo, and his sons Gumercindo, Marcelo, Casiano, Juan and Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano
headed for the poblacion of Tupi, Cotabato, bringing five sacks of corn loaded on a bull cart to be milled in
Tupi. Juan, Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all minors, were then going to school. Upon approaching a hilly
part, they had to stop since the carabao could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then requested his two
brothers and his son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and carry on their backs the sacks of corn. With
Rafael leading, the four proceeded uphill.
As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house on top of the hill and were about to put down the sacks of
corn, appellant Sulpicio, who was in the house, fired at and hit Rafael, who fell down. Sulpicio then ordered
his companions to burn his house so that they would have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano, Gumercindo, Marcelo
and Romualdo brought the wounded Rafael Cabizares to the house of the latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters
away. Felisa Bastismo, Rafael's mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at the time.

After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were washed with hot water and then he was brought
inside the third room of the house. Subsequently, appellant Sulpicio and the other accused arrived at the
premises, armed with firearms, bolos and canes. They stoned the house and thrust their bolos thru the bamboo
walls and flooring. Finding that there were women inside the house, the accused ordered them to get out or
else they would be killed also. As Felisa Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house,
Marcelo Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused Conrado Pardillo and boxed by Serapio
Maquiling, he was able to escape to the nearby forest.
Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the kitchen, and with the carbine which he got from
appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, shot at Rafael Cabizares who was sitting in the third room. At this moment,
Casiano Cabizares jumped down from the house thru the kitchen door and ran away. Serapio Maquiling followed
him and shot the latter at the back, killing him a few meters away from Demetrio's house. Appellant
Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back the carbine, climbed up the house and fired once more at Rafael, who was
now lying down on the floor, killing him finally. Thereafter, the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares was tied to a
bamboo pole, carried by accused Ramon Alquizar and one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and placed near the burned
house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, as some of the accused followed while the rest proceeded to Rafael's house.
The post mortem examination 3 conducted that very same day showed that Casiano Cabizares died from a gunshot wound, the bullet entering the back and passing out in front, while Rafael Cabizares sustained three
gunshot wounds of entrance, one gunshot exit wound, and one stab wound. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia, the
Municipal Health Officer, explained that the bullet which caused the first wound located in front, at the left
lower abdomen, did not go thru at the back but split into two parts after entering the body. However, these
two parts were already palpable on the left buttock of the decedent from which they were extracted. The
bullet which caused the second wound located directly at the back lodged in the 11th thoracic vertebra. The
third bullet entered near the left breast and went out at the right lumbar region.
The prosecution also presented proof that prior to the incident, a land dispute arose between Rafael and some
of the accused, 4 and that he had filed complaints 5 with the Agrarian Court against the latter, the trial of
which cases was scheduled on February 10, 1958.
Appellants would have this Court believe that they are innocent. The four appellants convicted as accomplices
insist they were never at the vicinity of the killing. On the other hand, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna claims
that both Rafael and Casiano were killed in self- defense.
Sulpicio's version of what transpired is this:
In the morning of February 3, 1958, Guillermo Esperanza and Sulpicio de la Cerna had just roasted corn in the
latter's house when Rafael, Casiano, and others, all armed with bolos and canes, arrived. Rafael demanded of
Sulpicio to come down for a confrontation. The latter's refusal to do so angered Rafael who threw his cane at
Sulpicio and ordered his companions to surround the house, thrust their bolos thru it and burn it. Because the
house was on fire, and fearing that he would be killed, Sulpicio alerted Guillermo Esperanza, got his carbine
and fired indiscriminately at his attackers to drive them away. When Rafael and Casiano were hit, their
companions fled. Guillermo Esperanza and Sulpicio then got down from the burning house and left, passing by
the prostrate bodies of the decedents. Sulpicio proceeded to the house of one Pedro Esperanza to drink water
and while there, he saw a jeep coming loaded with policemen, to whom he surrendered himself and his
carbine. Expectedly, Guillermo Esperanza gave the same version as above-narrated.
Said appellant's version cannot be accepted. The autopsy reports contradict Sulpicio's claim that he shot the
decedents frontally while he was up in his house. For both deceased each sustained a gunshot wound directly
at the back. Moreover Casiano's wound of entry located along the 12th rib is lower than the wound of exit
- located along the 6th rib 6 showing that the bullet flight path was upwards, not downwards. A gun fired
from the elevated flooring 7 of a house like Sulpicio's, and aimed downwards, could not have caused such
wounds. Lastly, Rafael's cadaver bore a stab wound on the left side. Appellant's version could not account for
this.
While on the one hand nothing was found around the burned house of appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, such as
the alleged cane thrown by Rafael, nor any other weapon or stones which may indicate aggression or violence,
on the other, bloodstains were found inside Demetrio Cabizares' house 8 and also on the ground at the spot
where, according to the prosecution, 9 Casiano fell when shot by Serapio Maquiling. An empty carbine shell
(Exh. I) was also found by Dr. Garcia in the kitchen. In this regard, his testimony is not hearsay, as appellant
contends, for although Dr. Garcia did not personally pick it up, he saw the empty shell taken from the floor and
handed over to his companions before finally reaching him. 10 While Casiano's body was found near Sulpicio's
burned house, even appellant's own witness 11 admitted having found Rafael's body inside Demetrio's house
right after the incidents occurred. Appellant's supposition that Rafael's companions must have returned and

carried away his body can hardly be accepted since there is no reason why they would not also bring back
Casiano's body.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that Sulpicio, after felling the decedents and dispersing the latter's
companions, would still leave his house when it was not yet totally burned, as he himself admitted. The natural
thing for him to have done were it true that it was decedents who set fire to it - was to put down the fire
and save his house. Anyway his life was no longer in danger.
Lastly, Sulpicio has more reason to resent and kill Rafael than the latter would have as to him. The source of
the possible motive is the same: land trouble between Rafael Cabizares and Sulpicio's father, and the
ejectment suit instituted before the Agrarian Court against the latter by the former. Considering that Rafael
was the prevailing party in the land dispute before the NARRA, it is quite hard to believe that he would be the
one entertaining a grudge against those over whom he had prevailed. Rather, it was the accused, who were
defeated and who were now facing an ejectment suit which was set for hearing, that harbored resentment
against the deceased.
Furthermore, all the foregoing considerations fit well into the prosecution's version. We have gone over the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found them credible. That most of them are related to the
victims does not necessarily impair their credibility. 12 Appellants however invite our attention to
inconsistencies and improbabilities allegedly abounding in their testimonies. We shall consider each witness
and the testimonies separately.
1. Romualdo Cabizares He was with his brother Rafael when the latter was shot near Sulpicio's house and was
among those who brought Rafael to their father's (Demetrio) house 100 meters aways. He did not go up the
house since he had to go back and evacuate his family to a forest 400 meters away. Having done so, he went
back and saw the incidents around Demetrio's house from a place covered with corn plants just 25 meters
away.
Appellants point out that his statements on the whereabouts of Conrado Pardillo were inconsistent, leading the
lower court to disbelieve him and acquit Pardillo. We find no inconsistency since Pardillo's going to Rafael's
house with the other accused was after the events in Demetrio's premises had taken place. 13 The lower court
acquitted Pardillo not because it disbelieved Romualdo but rather, taking his testimony as true, the court held
that the facts proved were insufficient to tack criminal liability on Pardillo. 14
This witness was able to observe the events around Demetrio's house. Even if the corn plants were he hid were
sparse, because of the 25-meter distance from the accused whose attentions were focused on Demetrio's
house, and considering that he was in a hidden place 15 while the accused were in the open field, Romualdo
could see them without their noticing him. It is true that the forest where Romualdo took his family was 400
meters away, but the accused took some time before they followed to Demetrio's house and Romualdo ran
back after hiding his family. 16
2. Margarito Cabizares He was beside his brother Rafael at the hill top when the latter was shot by Sulpicio.
When he tried to hide near some banana clumps, Guillermo Esperanza stabbed him, hitting him near the left
shoulder and causing him to fall unconscious. Shortly later when he recovered consciousness, he followed
Rafael who was being brought to Demetrio's house but he was told by Rafael to save himself so he went to a
forest 400 meters away where he saw the goings-on around Demetrio's house.
Appellants state that nothing much can be gathered from his testimony. However, they overlook the obvious
fact that Margarito was an eyewitness to the shooting of Rafael near Sulpicio's house. Although he lost
consciousness after being stabbed it was momentary only, the wound not being very serious. 17 It was not
impossible for him to have observed activities around Demetrio's house at a distance of 400 meters. Witness
Bonifacio Barro corroborates him on this point. 18 Lastly, he need not be a ballistics expert to recognize
gunshot bursts.
3. Gumercindo Cabizares He was with his father Rafael at the hill top. He warned his father just before
Sulpicio fired the carbine. After Rafael was hit, he helped carry him to Demetrio's house but did not stay there
since he was told by Rafael to go to Dadiangas to call the P.C.
Appellants claim that his testimony regarding a conversation with Juan Cabizares on the way downhill is
contradicted by Juan himself who stated that he was not with those who brought Rafael to Demetrio's house.
We fail to see any contradiction. Juan did not deny having conversed with Gumercindo. And what the latter
said was that after meeting Juan, they went ahead and Juan probably followed behind. 19 We do not think it is
stupidity for a son to warn his father of imminent danger as Gumercindo did - and to come to the latter's aid
despite danger. We prefer to consider such behaviour as "courage under fire."

4. Marcelo Cabizares He was near the bullcart downhill but when he heard gunshots he rushed uphill. There
he helped carry his father Rafael to his grandfather Demetrio's house. After the accused arrived in the latter's
house, the women were ordered to get out. He followed Ursula Cabizares and Felisa Bastismo on the way down
but he was held by Pardillo and boxed by Serapio Maquiling. Still, he was able to escape.
Appellants point out to two statements of his, one wherein he was able to identify all the accused and the
other, wherein he was able to name only four of them, alleging material inconsistency. The statements
however referred to different situations. The first was when all the accused arrived at Demetrio's place, and
the second statement refers to those whom Marcelo Cabizares saw when he came down from the house. 20 He
was able to run away after Serapio Maquiling boxed him because he was freed from the hold of Pardillo and
Serapio. 21 On redirect, he clarified that he left Demetrio's house in the morning. 22
5. Juan Cabizares He also stayed with the bullcart downhill and when he heard gun shots, he went uphill and
saw his father Rafael wounded. He then followed behind the group carrying Rafael to Demetrio's house and
while inside the house, saw the killing of Rafael and Casiano.
Juan did not lie when he said his father was shot by Sulpicio for altho he did not see the actual shooting, he
had good reasons to conclude that Sulpicio fired the shot since he saw the latter, shortly after the shooting
holding the carbine which was still pointed at Rafael. 23 Any way, his testimony on the point is merely
corroborative of the others who were eyewitnesses. He was able to identify Serapio Maquiling as the one who
first shot his father in Demetrio's house although Serapio was behind the bamboo partition, since there were
openings in it enabling one to see thru and he peeped thru it. 24 The measurements in the third room (3m X
4m) are compatible with Juan's statement that Sulpicio was 1-1/2m away from Rafael when the third shot was
fired since Sulpicio did not go inside the room but fired from the window outside.25 Juan was competent to
testify on what occurred outside the house since he was also peeping thru the slits in the bamboo walls. 26
6. Felisa Bastismo She is the mother of Rafael Cabizares. She was with Ursula Cabizares and Segundino
Cabizares inside Demetrio's house when the wounded Rafael was brought in. After Rafael's wounds were
washed, Felisa went down from the house with Ursula, as ordered by the accused. And in the corn fields nearby
she witnessed the killing of Casiano.
Appellants make much of Felisa's testimony referring to Rafael's "wounds" when he was brought in the house,
and argue that Rafael had been shot at least twice already. But Felisa did not examine the wound of Rafael.
Neither did she state how many wounds he had. The substance of her testimony is only that Rafael
waswounded when he arrived. As to the impossibility for the stones to go thru the broken window shutter (Exh.
K), Felisa admitted that she merely heard the sound when they fell on the floor. 27 Surely, appellants cannot
seriously contend that one has to see stones going thru the house to know that it is being stoned. Anyway, it is
not impossible for a large stone hurled against a bamboo shutter to cause a hole therein measuring 14" X 11/2". And assuming that such hole appears more to have been cut by a bolo and forced open, Felisa testified
that the accused also thrust their bolos thru the walls. 28
It is not impossible for Felisa to have seen Casiano's shooting for she lay flat on the ground after having
witnessed it already. 29 She also explained why she was alone in the corn field although she left the house
together with Ursula. Being 76 years old, she was slower than Ursula, and she stumbled while fleeing so she
was able to reach up to the corn fields only. 30 As to Juan's arrival, the testimonies of the other witnesses are
uniform that the group carrying Rafael arrived in Demetrio's house first and Juan, who followed behind, arrived
afterwards. 31 Juan corroborates Felisa that he helped carry Rafael to the third room. 32 Marcelo probably
noticed Juan only after Rafael had been brought to the third room, leading him to say that Juan arrived after
Rafael was brought there. 33
7. Ursula and Segundino Cabizares Both were in Demetrio's house with Felisa Bastismo. They saw the arrival
of the accused and the stoning and thrusting of bolos thru the wallings. One of the bolos wounded Segundino
Cabizares on the left thigh Ursula Cabizares hid in a palay container but when they were ordered to get out,
she and Felisa Bastismo left and returned later in the afternoon.
While Ursula was evidently mistaken when she said that Margarito was also in the house, the error is
immaterial. Contrary to appellants' contention, she saw Serapio Maquiling on her way down from the
house. 34 As to whether the other accused besides appellant Antonio Bautista were armed with bolos, she
stated that she did not know since she only saw the bolo tips penetrating thru the wallings. 35 Her positive
statement that she saw appellant Godofredo Rotor 36 prevails, of course, over the negative testimony of
Maximo Caa.
Appellants argue that since Segundino Cabizares was fearful, he could not have been moving inside the
besieged house of Demetrio, peeping every now and then thru the openings in the walls and observing the
accused. They seem to forget however that different people react differently even when apprehensive. Thus,
Segundino's restlessness inside the house is neither unnatural or ridiculous to believe.

8. Bonifacio Barro He was with Fiscal Daproza and Sgt. Paladin inside Demetrio's house a few days after
February 3, 1958 and upon orders of the Fiscal, he took out part of the flooring (Exh. K), the bamboo slatch
(Exh. L and L-1) and the stones Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2).
His statement that Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2 were some of the stones Fiscal Daproza found on the roof of
Demetrio's house corroborates the other prosecution witnesses who testified that the accused stoned the
house. He also stated that there were other stones inside the house, corroborating Romualdo Cabizares. 37
9. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia As Municipal health officer, he performed the autopsy on Rafael and Casiano
Cabizares on February 3, 1958. He found Casiano's body near the burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, and
Rafael's, inside Demetrio's house. In the latter house, he also saw a bullet hole on the floor (Exh. J-1) and a
carbine shell (Exh. I).
Appellants would cavil on Dr. Garcia's statement that he saw Exh. J (part of the flooring) only in court. What he
said however was that he saw it as cut already from the floor only in court. 38 His statements as to the room
dimensions (3-4m X 4-5m) and the distance of Rafael's body to the partition (1 m or 2 ft.)
are approximations only and not exact measurements. 39 A difference of a few insignificant meters is to be
expected. Lastly, his statement that the bullet hole (Exh. J-1) was on the floor coincides with Barro's testimony
that Exh. J was cut from the flooring. 40
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that the so-charged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies
are without substantial and significant basis. Hence, the lower court's findings should stand, especially since
they involved an appreciation of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.
We now proceed to the criminal liability of the appellants.
The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery. Appellant Sulpicio contends that the first shot, fired
by him, was not attended with treachery since there is evidence that Rafael was warned by his son Gumercindo
just before he was hit in the lower abdomen. 41 However, even assuming the argument to be tenable, the
second shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously fired since Rafael was then in the third room of
Demetrio's house, wounded and defenseless. The treachery here has to be independently considered due to the
sufficient lapse of time 42 from the first shot, in which the following events intervened: (1) the bringing of
Rafael to Demetrio's house 100 meters away after being hit; (2) the washing of his wounds and his being
brought to the third room to rest; (3) the arrival of the accused and their ordering the two women to get out.
It was only after the women left that Serapio climbed up the kitchen and fired the second shot at Rafael.
Appellant Sulpicio is chargeable for the treacherous shooting of Rafael by Serapio Maquiling since both were
acting as co-conspirators pursuant to their understanding in the meeting held the day before in Andres Abapo's
house, as will be shown presently. Anyway, the third shot, fired by Sulpicio, was treacherously done. Rafael was
then flat on the floor and although still alive, was completely defenseless, having been shot twice already The
portion of Dr. Garcia's testimony 43 cited by appellants shows that Rafael died after the third shot hit him
"Q. After wound No. 1 was inflicted, is it possible that Rafael Cabizares was still alive?
A. Rafael Cabizares was still alive.
Q. After inflicting wound No. 2, is it possible that Rafael Cabizares was still alive?
A. He was still alive.
Q. When wound No. 3 was inflicted, was he still alive by your conclusion?
A. He was dead.
Q. What makes you conclude that he was already dead when wound No. 3 was
inflicted?
A. Because wound No. 3 is mortal"
thus corroborating Juan Cabizares' testimony that his father was still alive after the second shot wounded
him.
Evident premeditation was also present in this case. The previous plan to kill Rafael Cabizares was testified to
by witness Maximo Caa who was present in the meeting of February 2, 1958, in the house of Andres Abapo. Of
the many persons present, he recognized only appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Antonio Bautista, Severino
Matchoca and Serapio Maquiling. Bautista told the group that the purpose of the meeting was to plan the killing
of Rafael Cabizares. Then both he and Serapio Maquiling signified their willingness to execute it. Appellant
Sulpicio also offered to do it provided his family would be taken care of. To this offer, Bautista and Maquiling

replied that they would take care of Sulpicio's family. Caa testified further that none of those attending
voiced out any objection but all agreed to the plan. Caa was also present in the early morning of February 3,
1958, when Matchoca, accompanied by Bautista, gave the magazine of bullets to Godofredo Rotor. He was
likewise with the accused when Rafael was shot at the hill top, and when he (Rafael) and Casiano were killed
in Demetrio's place.
However, one year and ten months after he had testified for the prosecution, witness Caa was presented as a
defense witness. As such, he completely retracted on his previous testimony, explaining that all what he had
stated was false since he was not in Tupi on February 2 and 3, 1958. Gaudencio Esperanza, presented to
corroborate him, testified that in August, 1958, Hospicia Cabizares, widow of Rafael, went to the former's
house where Caa was staying, and gave the latter P50.00 to testify falsely for the prosecution. On rebuttal,
Hospicia Cabizares denied this. 44
We have thus two sets of testimonies by Caa, completely at variance with each other. Now the rule is that
mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony otherwise
credible. 45 The proper thing for the trial court to do is to weigh and compare both testimonies. Here, the
lower court, after having done so, accepted Caa's testimony for the prosecution. In this, it did not err.
Firstly, the original testimony is positive and replete with details, and Caa withstood a long and thorough
cross-examination which could not have been so, if the story were merely fabricated. Secondly, Caa's
narration of the shooting incident was fully corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses. Lastly, the
charged inconsistencies and improbabilities therein are too insignificant to affect the substance thereof.
On the other hand, in his subsequent testimony, 46 Caa was evasive and most of his answers were: "I don't
remember" or "I don't know". His statement that he was in Marbel on February 2 and 3, 1958 is not only
uncorroborated but even contradicted by two prosecution witnesses who saw him with accused on February 3,
1958. 47Caa was also insincere, claiming that his conscience bothered him greatly but he admitted that he
could not sleep only in the mornings 48 and notwithstanding the serious predicament he was in - because of
the inconsistent statements made in open court - he was even smiling. 49 Moreover, according to Gaudencio
Esperanza, who is the father-in-law of Serapio Maquiling, Caa was only constrained to testify falsely when he
was bribed by Rafael's widow, Hospicia Cabizares, sometime in August, 1958. This pretense can not be believed
since a month prior to that, or on July 28, 1958, Caa had already executed an affidavit (Exh. V) incriminating
the appellants. It also appears highly improbable for Rafael's widow to go to the house of a relative of the
accused and in his presence openly bribe Caa, a resident therein. Lastly, it is hard to believe that although
Gaudencio Esperanza knew of this incident, he told the defense counsel about it only after Caa had already
testified for the defense and had been incarcerated to face a charge of perjury. 50 The impulse of a man
similarly situated would have been to relate such matter at once to his accused relatives. Gaudencio's failure
to do so makes of his story a worthless fabrication.
There being a previous direct conspiracy one day before the killing, evident premeditation is duly
established. 51 This qualifying circumstance is further buttressed by the following actuations of appellant on
February 3, 1958: (1) Upon seeing Rafael near his house, Sulpicio told his companions to get ready since the
one they wereawaiting was there already. And then he shot at Rafael. (2) As Rafael was being brought to
Demetrio's house, Sulpicio ordered his companions to burn his house so they would have an excuse already. (3)
With the other appellants, he pursued the wounded Rafael to Demetrio's house where after they had stoned
the same and thrust their bolos thru its wallings, they ordered the women folk to leave lest they be killed also;
and (4) after Serapio had already shot at Rafael, Sulpicio still fired a third shot, finally killing Rafael. All these
overtly show appellant's determination to end Rafael's life. The killing, therefore, was properly qualified as
murder.
However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano Cabizares, notwithstanding a
conspiracy between him and Serapio Maquiling. The conspiracy was to kill Rafael only and no one else. Nothing
was said or agreed upon about the members of Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their plan appellants let
the two women inside Demetrio's house leave unhurt and they did no harm to the remaining companions of
Rafael in the house. Their target was solely Rafael Cabizares. And the rule has always been that co-conspirators
are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the
co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual
perpetrators are liable. 52 Here, only Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the
aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, the latter cannot be considered a principal by indispensable
cooperation or an accomplice. There is no evidence at all that Sulpicio wa aware Serapio would use the rifle to
kill Casiano. Presumably, he gave the carbine to Serapio for him to shoot Rafael only as per their agreement.
Neither is there concrete proof that Sulpicio abetted the shooting of Casiano. Sulpicio might have been liable if
after the shooting of Rafael, Serapio returned the carbine to him but upon seeing Casiano fleeing, immediately

asked again for the carbine and Sulpicio voluntarily gave it to him. Serapio's criminal intention then would be
reasonably apparent to Sulpicio and the latter's giving back of the rifle would constitute his assent thereto. But
such was not the case. Sulpicio, therefore, must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares.
Appellants Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil all put up alibi as
their defense. This the trial court rejected but it held them liable as accomplices only, finding reasonable
doubt on their guilt as co-principals. Appellants would again advance their respective alibis here.
Appellant Rotor claims that at dawn on February 3, 1958, he went alone to the spring in Barrio Cebuano to
fetch water and after staying awhile there, started back home. On the way back, his mother met him and told
him not to go home because of an incident (the killing of the decedents) so he went instead to Simeon Navaja's
house and stayed there until February 18, 1958.
The prosecution, however, proved that in the early morning of February 3, 1958, Rotor was with Maximo Caa
fetching water in the spring. On their way home, they met appellants Bautista and Matchoca. The latter gave
Rotor a carbine magazine with bullets, saying: "Here is the magazine of the bullets and give it to
Sulpicio de la Cerna." And appellant Bautista said: "Please hurry. Give it to Sulpicio de la Cerna because we will
follow later on." Shortly afterwards, Caa went with him to Sulpicio's house where he gave the magazine to
Sulpicio, saying: "Here are some bullets supposed to be given to you." 53
Rotor was seen outside downstairs of Sulpicio's house later that morning by Margarito and Gumercindo
Cabizares. After Sulpicio had fired at Rafael, Rotor got the pistol from appellant Libumfacil and fired also at
Rafael. 54 This appellant was also seen by Romualdo, Ursula and Segundino Cabizares as among those who
arrived at Demetrio's house. 55 When Ursula Cabizares alighted from the house, she saw Rotor outside holding
a pistol which he gave to Libumfacil commencing that it was stuck.56 After the killing of the decedents,
Romualdo Cabizares saw him with the group following the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares which was being
brought near Sulpicio's burned house. 57
In the face of the overwhelming positive identification of six prosecution witnesses, Rotor's uncorroborated
alibi must fail. Although he was not present or did not participate in the meeting of February 2, 1958, his
presence in the situs of the shootings on February 3, 1958 was not merely passive. His active participation shooting at Rafael carrying a pistol - which has a direct connection with the criminal design against Rafael
Cabizares makes him a principal by indirect conspiracy, not an accomplice only. Motive is not wanting. Rotor
admitted that his wife is the sister of Sulpicio's wife 58 and the evidence shows that his father had a land
disputed with Rafael Cabizares and was a respondent in the case before the Agrarian Court. 59
Appellant Bautista claims that on February 2, 1958, he left Barrio Cebuano for Tupi (5 kms. away) to get a truck
to load his corn. That afternoon, he returned to Cebuano where they loaded corn but he could not return to
Tupi as the truck would not start, so he slept at home. Early the next day, February 3, 1958, they pushed the
truck to start it. Later, appellant Matchoca arrived and helped them. He also rode in truck but upon reaching
an uphill road, it stopped again. They were able to recharge its batteries from a tractor that happened to pass
by. They continued the trip and finally arrived in the poblacion of Tupi at about 8:00 A.M. Several months later,
while he was at Sergio Rotor's house, his child told him that a P.C. soldier was waiting at home, so instead of
going home, he had a conference with Andres Abapo, Ramon Alquizar, Roberto Matchoca (son of Severino) and
Agapito Avellana. They all decided to proceed to Tupi and surrender to the Mayor.
Appellant Matchoca related the same incident told by Bautista regarding the trip to Tupi. He then claimed to
have returned to Barrio Cebuano about noontime and there learned of the incident. The next day, he
evacuated his family to avoid trouble.
The prosecution however has established that these two appellants were in the meeting held in Abapo's house
on February 2, 1958. They openly participated therein. Their meeting with appellant Rotor early the following
morning has also been established thru the testimony of Maximo Caa.
These two were also seen outside Sulpicio's house. Bautista was carrying a bolo and a cane and was heard
shouting at Rafael thus: "Rafael, you cannot reach the trail because we will kill you." 60 Gumercindo Cabizares
also heard Matchoca shouting: "Go ahead, shoot. We will kill him so that he will not reach the day of the
hearing." 61
Bautista and Matchoca were among those who went to Demetrio's house. 62 The former thrust his bolo thru the
bamboo wallings hitting Segundino Cabizares. 63 When Ursula Cabizares came down from the house, she saw
Bautista holding a bolo. 64 Romualdo, on the other hand, claimed having seen him holding a firearm. 65 After
the killings had taken place, Bautista went with the group that proceeded back to Sulpicio's burned house
whereas Matchoca marched with the other group headed for Rafael's house. 66

The positive identification of the several prosecution witnesses must prevail over the alibis proffered by these
appellants. Their presence and active participation in the meeting in Abapo's house make them actual
conspirators in the killing of Rafael. They were also present and zealously participating in the execution of
their criminal design, giving a carbine magazine and instructions to appellant Rotor, threatening Rafael and
giving encouragement to Sulpicio to shoot at the latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio's
house and left together with the others after finally accomplishing their criminal deeds as agreed upon.
Appellants Bautista and Matchoca are therefore also liable as co-principals in Rafael's murder. Regarding
motive, it was proved that both were among those involved in the land conflict with Rafael Cabizares and were
among the respondents in the case before the Agrarian Court.
Appellant Libumfacil's story is that in the morning of February 3, 1958 he was in the Menzi Area about 6
kilometers from Barrio Cebuano. That afternoon, he returned to the poblacion of Tupi. To corroborate him,
Lauro Esconde started that he saw Libumfacil that day working on the latter's farm lot in the Menzi area.
However, Maximo Caa saw appellant Libumfacil outside Sulpicio's house when the former arrived there with
appellant Rotor in the morning of February 3, 1958. Libumfacil has a pistol which he also fired at
Rafael. 67 Gumercindo Cabizares also saw him holding a pistol which he gave to Rotor who then took a shot at
Rafael. 68
Appellant Libumfacil was seen by Caa again among those who went with the other accused downhill from
Sulpicio's house to Demetrio's house. 69 The other prosecution witnesses saw him also around Demeterio's
house, armed with a pistol. 70 He was among those who stoned the house. 71 When Ursula Cabizares alighted
therefrom, she saw appellant Libumfacil outside, conversing with Rotor and receiving from the latter a pistol
which had gotten stuck. After the incidents in Demetrio's house, Libumfacil went with appellants Rotor and
Bautista to Sulpicio's burned house. 72
Libumfacil's alibi, though corroborated, cannot overcome the positive identification of the eight prosecution
witnesses who saw him. Although he was not present in Abapo's house on February 2, 1958, he was present in
Sulpicio's house and in the premises of Demetrio's house with the other accused and appellants. He was armed,
had fired at Rafael also, and took part in the stoning of Demetrio's house where Rafael was brought. His
actuations manifest that he was aware of the criminal design of the original conspirator's, that he approved of
it and carried it out, thus showing that his presence at the scene of the crime was not merely passive.
Consequently, he is a co-principal in Rafael's murder. And motive is not wanting. It was established that his
mother had a land conflict with Rafael 73 and that his step-father Diosdado Esperanza was one of the
respondent in the case before the Agrarian Court.
We find therefore all five appellants guilty as co-principals in the murder of Rafael Cabizares.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna only, is offset by
his voluntary surrender after the incident. This mitigating circumstance however can not benefit the remaining
appellants who did not voluntarily surrender. For all the appellants, therefore, the penalty for Rafael Cabizares'
murder must be imposed in the medium period. For the killing of Casiano Cabizares, appellant
Sulpicio de la Cerna must be acquitted.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:
(a) Appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca,
and Teodoro Libumfacil are hereby found guilty as principals for the murder of Rafael
Cabizares and sentenced to each suffer reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Rafael Cabizares the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs;
(b) Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna is hereby acquitted for the murder of Casiano Cabizares.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Sulpicio de la Serna, G.R. No. L-20911, [October 30, 1967], 128 PHIL 605-631)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80130. August 19, 1991.]
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Vicente Y. Bayani for petitioner.
DECISION
FERNAN, C. J p:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 16, 1987 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VII of Palo,
Leyte, dated January 11, 1984, convicting him as an accomplice in the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 172 thereof. 1
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and
other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or
May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban
Branch. On several occasions, petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have
drinking sprees. 2 They became close friends. Balo even became the godfather of Abejuela's
daughter. 3 Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding business, claiming that
he was expecting a large sum of money out of the insurance policy of his late father.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook. Abejuela was
surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his passbook. Balo showed Abejuela some checks
purporting to be the proceeds of his father's insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela's
account with Banco Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained
that he was prohibited from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was employed with that bank as a
savings bookkeeper. Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead with another bank but Balo insisted that
he wanted the checks deposited with Banco Filipino so that he could facilitate their immediate encashment as
well as avail himself of some privileges. Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to
use his passbook and even reassured Abejuela that he would accompany him to the bank to make the
deposit. cdrep
Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances, Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. On August 8, 1978, Balo
returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit in the amount of P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again,
Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of
his checks. On the same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the former's behalf, money from
his account with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela reluctantly agreed. He went to
Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 which he gave to Balo at a restaurant called Felisa's
Cafe.
Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook continued for quite some time.
During the month of August 1978, the account ofAbejuela with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of
P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96.
In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from August 9, 1978. But
feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook, Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31,
1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business
profits. 4Abejuela also closed his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the
balance of his deposit.
Thereafter, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between the interest
reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest bookkeeper could not locate the posting
reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He also noticed that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of
BenjaminAbejuela reflected four (4) large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978,
totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits slips thereof could not be located.
After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest bookkeeper were
convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the savings bookkeeper at that time and who
had access to Abejuela savings account ledger. They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by

posting the fictitious deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by
the bank accountant.
The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the accusations, but later
admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuelawas also implicated because he was the owner of
the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing his fraudulent scheme. On December 5, 1978, an information was
filed against Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents. 5 Separately arraigned, both pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. 6 Trial followed.
On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an order of preliminary
attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding
P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled or misappropriated. On September 4, 1979, the Deputy
Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two
accused and which goods were placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the
refrigerator and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a good price on
account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at P62,295.00. 7
In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reported killed by members of the New People's Army in the
mountains of Mat-i, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, on suspicion that he was a PC informer and a collaborator.
This information came from a rattan gatherer and former NPA member whose testimony before the court a
quo was never impeached. Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against
Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice to a civil action for
recovery of damages arising from the offense which may be instituted by Banco Filipino and without prejudice
also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal action in the event the accused would turn out to be
alive. 8 On September 7, 1981, Banco Filipino filed a motion praying for the forfeiture in its favor of the goods
seized from the accused which were in the custody of the National Bureau of investigation. On November 5,
1981, the trial court, thru District Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, granted the motion and ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation to deliver the seized goods to Banco Filipino. In addition, the bank was authorized to
withdraw the savings deposit of Glicerio Balo, Jr. for eventual reversion to said bank. 9
Thereafter, trial continued with respect to petitioner Abejuela. On January 11, 1984, the lower court adjudged
petitioner Abejuela guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: cdrep
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document
under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 172 thereof and as the
amount involved is more than P22,000 he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
not less than fifteen (15) years, three months and 11 days to not more than sixteen (16)
years, eight months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Banco Filipino, Tacloban
Branch, in the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Thousand One Hundred Forty Five Pesos and
Twenty Five Centavos (P176, 145.25), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay one half of the costs.
"On May 29, 1979, the court issued a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties of
defendants Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela. This Attachment is hereby made
permanent." 10
Abejuela appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 1987, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision
of the trial court. 11 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated October
7, 1987. Hence the instant appeal.
Petitioner Abejuela contends that the Appellate Court erred in not acquitting him for the following reasons:
"(1) Accused-petitioner has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused, Glicerio
Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, he cannot be convicted as principal, neither as
accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted
even as an accessory.
"(2) The lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith, and after
he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is necessary because as employee of
Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said Bank.
"(3) The presumption of innocence and the 'equipoise rule' apply in favor of accusedpetitioner." 12

Respondents, in their comment, maintain that petitioner Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent acts of
Glicerio Balo, Jr. They asseverate that petitioner is an intelligent individual who can take care of his concerns,
considering that he is a businessman who finished third (3rd) year college (commerce). 13
Respondent also point out that Abejuela should not only have been convicted as an accomplice but as a
principal by indispensable cooperation, because without the withdrawal slips which he executed allegedly in
spite of his many doubts and apprehensions, Glicerio Balo, Jr. could not have succeeded in his scheme.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he had no knowledge at all of the fraudulent machinations of Balo,
and that his act of lending his passbook was done in good faith. LexLib
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the evidence on
record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuelawas completely unaware of the malevolent scheme
of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking
sprees and parties and cajoled him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would
have questioned Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance proceeds of his
later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his father's insurance
proceeds, Abejuelawas hoodwinked into believing that Balo indeed had money. Balo's request to
borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate the encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough,
considering that they were close friends and "compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is
understandable.
Furthermore, the court takes judicial notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to deposit in an
account even without the owner's passbook, as long as the account number is known. Thus, even
without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been posted by Balo in the savings account
ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record of the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor,
while the passbook is the record of the depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate
and up-to-date. This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded transactions
like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank charges.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who had posted the bogus
deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the one who wisely manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the
fictitious deposits could be placed at his (Balo) disposal. Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the
amount he had earlier placed in the latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually
believed that the money was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that he was interested in
it. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abejuela had knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his
passbook and his utter gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (in this case, Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that
petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered
knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense
intended to be committed.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice. Thus:
"It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished the
means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said criminal
design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is an
accomplice therein." 14
"There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually
participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a
principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying outside of
the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, appellant
effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an
accomplice." 15
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary before a judgment of
conviction can be rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the Court's mind. A conviction of a criminal
offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere assumptions. 16

In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner Abejuela has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which reason he must be acquitted. The question that must be
resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's acquittal on his civil liability.
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered." 17
We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had knowledge of the plan of Balo
to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false deposits and withdrawing these later. Because of this
doubt, however, his exoneration will not extinguish his civil liability. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the same is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases, or where the court has expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature. 18
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 19 we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the
same be punishable by law." LLphil
It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of P176,145.25
representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and systematically withdrawn through the
passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela, was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo,
he nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook
to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must
be held civilly accountable.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against petitioner's properties and those of his co-accused
Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently
made permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Bidin, J ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I quite agree with the holding of the Chief Justice's ponencia that Benjamin Abejuela must be held civilly
accountable and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court
against Abejuela's properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the
amount of P176,145.25.
At the same time, I submit, with respect, that Abejuela should not be completely exonerated of criminal
liability. The facts in this case appear so similar as to be practically on all fours with the facts in Samson v.
Court of Appeals (103 Phil. 277 [1958]). In Samson, the Court held the accused guilty of "estafa through
falsification of commercial documents by reckless negligence." Two (2) out of ten (10) members of the Court
dissented: Reyes, J.B.L., J. and Concepcion, J. As far as I can determine, however, Samson has not been
overruled, expressly or impliedly. Upon the other hand, the doctrine in Samson was explicitly followed
in People v. Rodis, et al. (105 Phil. 1294 [1959]), where the Court held that the accused could be held liable for
the crime of "malversation of public funds through falsification of a public document by reckless negligence."
Much the same doctrine has been applied in both earlier and subsequent cases: U.S. v. Malesa, et al. (14 Phil.
468 [1909]) (Falsification of documents through reckless negligence); People v. Blancas (56 Phil. 801 [1931])
(Unpublished) (Falsification of public document through reckless negligence); People v. Leopando (C.A.) 36
O.G. 2937 (1938) (Falsification of public document through reckless negligence); Sarep v. Sandiganbayan (177
SCRA 440 [1989]) (Falsification of public document through reckless imprudence). LLjur

Finally, it might be noted that the ponencia explicitly found Abejuela to have acted with reckless negligence:
". . . although Abejuela was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he
nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly
entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to
exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable." (Emphasis
supplied)
||| (Abejuela v. People, G.R. No. 80130, [August 19, 1991], 277 PHIL 898-912)