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Stefan Spataru
Pfortzheimer House, Wolbach 304
Cambridge, MA 02138
stefanspataru@college.harvard.edu
Problem 1
(1) (K, r, P, A) = pf (K, A) rK
(K, r, P, A)
= pfK (K, A) r
K
The first order condition is thus
r
p
(2) The second order derivative is fK,K (K , A) < 0.
(a)
fK (K , A) =
1
1
fK (K, A) = A K 2
2
The 2nd order condtion is satisfied, since
3
1
fK,K (K, A) = A K 2 < 0
4
Now, we have to solve
A K 2 =
2r
p
)2 .
and thus K (r, p, A) = ( Ap
2r
(b)
fK (K, A) = A K
fK,K = 1
Now, this means that f is convex and the 2nd order condition is satisfied. Well
just need to solve
fK (K, A) = A K
since well assume the solution is interior. Thus, we have to solve for
A K (r, p, A) =
r
r
Ap r
K (r, p, A) = A =
p
p
p
c)
Date: September 13, 2016.
1
fK (K, A) =
fK,K =
eK
A
eK
<0
A
(r,p,A)
Ar
p
p
) = ln( Ar
).
or K (r, p, A) = ln( Ar
p
Ar
Now, if p 1, then this is the answer. Otherwise, this is negative, and since
fK (K, A) > 0, it means that the maximum is not achieved, and since
peK
p
= pfK (K, A) r =
r r <0
K
A
A
and thus is decreasing in K and thus the maximum is achieved at K = 0. Thus,
for Ar
1, we have that K (r, p, A) = 0. However, for the rest of the problem, I will
p
asumme this pathological case does not occur (i.e p > Ar)
r
p
K (r, p, A)
1
=
r
p
Therefore,
1
K (r, p, A)
=
r
pfK,K (K (r, p, A), A)
Now, for each of the 3 functions, we have:
a)
1
K (r, p, A)
=
r
pfK,K (K (r, p, A), A)
1
=
3
1
p 4 AK (r, p, A) 2
=
4
Ap
A2 p2
( )3 =
Ap 2r
2r3
2
b)
K (r, p, A)
1
1
1
=
=
=
r
pfK,K (K (r, p, A), A)
p
p
c)
K (r, p, A)
1
=
r
pfK,K (K (r, p, A), A)
K (r, p, A)
=
r
p
1
eK(r,p,A)
A
1
K (r, p, A)
=
Ar
r
p Ap
K (r, p, A)
1
=
r
r
c) We now have to differentiate directly. The theory tells us that the two procedures
should give us the same result. Indeed:
a)
( Ap
)2
1
A2 p2
K (r, p, A)
2r
=
= (Ap)2 (2) r3 =
r
r
4
2r3
b)
Apr
p
r
r
p
r
p
1
p
c)
)
ln( Ar
p
r
1 A
1
= Ar =
p
r
p
(Ap)2
K
Ap2
= 4r = 2 > 0
A
A
2r
This means that a marginal increase in technology would result in an increase in
the optimal price.
1
= pf (K, A) rK = pAK 2 rK
1
= pAK 2 rK
= pA
Ap
A2 p2
r 2
2r
4r
3
(Ap)2 (Ap)2
2r
4r2
(Ap)2
=
4r2
Now,
(Ap)2
=
>0
A
4r2
Now,
> 0 and thus a marginal increase in technology results in a marginal
A
increase in profits.
c) K = ln Ar
p
Then,
K
r p
1
=
= >0
A
p Ar
A
This means that a marginal increase in technology implies a marginal reduction in
the optimal price.
Now,
= pf (K , A) rK
= p(1
eK
) rK
A
eK
rK )
= p(1
A
= p(1
= p
Ar
p
) + r ln
Ar
p
1
Ar
+ r ln
r
p
r p
=r
A
p Ar
r
= >0
A
Therefore, a marginal increase in technology would result in a marginal increase
in profits.
A priori, it makes sense for the profits do not decrease (and even increase), cause
they cannot make less profits than before. (at the end of the day, they could use the
former, worse technology to get the same output).
(5) a)
Lets analyze the two proposals
4
For the first proposal, remark that the model is the same, except r r (1 sK )
(we tehnically just have a lower price r. Thus, by the model developed in part
b), the demand curve should be given by
Ap
)2
2r(1 sK )
For the second proposal, lets set up the profit function.
K = (
= pf (K, A) rK + S
Thus,
= pfK (K, A) r, which is the same as the derivative of the profit
function in part 2. Thus, the 1st and 2nd order conditions are the same, and
thus the maximizing quantity Q is the same, i.e. K = ( Ap
)2 .
2r
b) We can obviously see that the 2nd proposal does not result in an increase of the
output. However, for any procentual subsidy, doesnt matter how small, the output
quantity will increase. (since 1s1 K > 1).
Ap
c) When sK 1, ( 2r(1s
)2 , so therefore with larger subsidies they will tend
K)
to produce larger and larger quantities of output. For sk 1, then the quantity
2 2
of output will be A16rp2 . Therefore, a technical doubling of prices results in the firm
making a quarter as much output as before.
(6) a) The profit function is just
= pf (K, A) r(1 sK )K S
b)
Now,
= f(
1
1 sK
, 1)
S
2
4(1 sK )
4(1 sK )2
Therefore,
=
1
1
S
2(1 sK ) 4(1 sK )
1
S
4(1 sK )
1
Now, 4(1s
14 , and thus for S < 14 , there is no SK with this property, since
K)
profits would always be non-negative. Therefore, the firm would operate even with
no subsidy(so sK = 0). Otherwise:
=
1
=S
4(1 sK )
1 sK =
5
1
4S
sK =
4S 1
4S
Problem 2
(1)
1
K
1
= (K1 + (1 )K2 ) 1 K11
K1
Thus,
X=
K
K1
K
K2
K1
( )1
1 K2
Thus,
X(1 )
K1 1
) = log
log(
K2
Thus,
( 1) log
K1
= log X + log(1 ) log
K2
(1 ) log
K2
= log X + log(1 ) log
K1
Thus,
log
K2
log X + log(1 ) log
=
K1
1
And thus
Thus,
=
A(K1
K2
log K
1
log X
1
1
)K2 ) .
(2) g(K1 , K2 ) =
+ (1
We will compute the partials:
gK1 =
A
A(K1 + (1 )K2 ) 1 K11
1)K1 )
Now, gK1 ,K1 < 0, since A(K1 + (1 )K2 ) 2 K12 > 0, since it is only
composed of positive terms. However, < 0, since > 0 and < 1. Similarly,
1 < 0, since < 1. Thus, the last paranthesis is a negative term and therefore
the whole thing is negative. Similarly,
g1
= A(1 )( )(K1 + (1 )K2 ) 2 K11 K21
K2
Now,
gK1 ,K1 gK2 ,K2
(( 1)K1 + ( 1)(1 )K2 )((1 )( 1)K2 + ( 1)K1 )
=
2
gK
(1 )( )2 K1 K2
1 ,K2
=
=0p
= r1
K1
K1
or
r1
Ap
Absolutely similar,
r2
A(1 )p
Then,
(
K1 1 r1 (1 )
)
=
K2
r2
Thus,
1
K1
r1 (1 ) 1
)
=(
K2
r2
(K2 ( (
1
r1 (1 ) 1
r2
)
+ (1 ))) 1 K21 =
r2
A( 1)p
K21 ( (
1
r1 (1 ) 1
r2
)
+ (1 )) 1 =
r2
A( 1)p
Therefore,
s
1
r2
r1 (1 ) 1
( (
)
+ (1 )) 1
A( 1)p
r2
Absolutely similarly
r
1
r2
r1
1
K1 =
((1 ) (
) 1 + ) 1
Ap
r1 (1 )
(4) Remember that
K2 =
r1
p
r
2
gK2 (K1 , K2 ) =
p
Use the implicit function theorem for K1 , K2 , and differentiate the last 2 equations
w.r.t r. We get
gK1 (K1 , K2 ) =
K1
K2
+ gK1 ,K2
=0
r2
r2
K2
1
K1
+ gK2 ,K2
=
gK1 ,K2
r2
r2
p
Multiply the first line by gK2 ,K2 , the 2nd by gK1 ,K2 and subtract them to get that
gK1 ,K1
2
(gK1 ,K1 gK2 ,K2 gK
)
1 ,K2
K1
gK ,K (K , K )
= 1 2 1 2
r2
p
therefore,
K1
gK1 ,K2 (K1 , K2 )
=
2
r2
p(gK1 ,K1 gK2 ,K2 gK
)
1 ,K2
2
Now, we know that gK1 ,K1 gK2 ,K2 gK1 ,K2 ) is positive since g is convex. It means
it all depends on the sign of gK1 ,K2 . Rembember that
K2
r2
> 0,