KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L.

MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of
the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be
questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of
Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not
have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from
the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE
CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims
are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does
not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES
in INTEREST

People vs PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463

FACTS:In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle
reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. Inthis Court, Mr. Perfecto was
acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law
had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under
the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the
Libel Law. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: Act No.
292 of thePhilippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is

not necessary to make a pronouncement.ISSUES:Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.On the
subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,is in force.HELD:
The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in
theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court
believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government
T r e a s o n = t h e c r i m e o f b e t r a y i n g o n e s c o u n t r y, e s p e c i a l l y b y a t t e m p t i n g t o k i l l o r overthrow
the sovereign or government.Sedition = conduct or speech inciting rebellion against the authority of a state or monarch
Violation of Art 256 Penal Code Libel LawViolation of Act No. 292 Treason and Sedition Law
defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.During
the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for thedismissal of the
case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the
trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as
charged in the information andunder article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of
arresto mayor
and theaccessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is
no longer in force.. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of
repealingso much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under theinformation
and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the LibelLawThe view of
the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in
theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court
believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government.. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or toimpeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects
of one who is alive, andthereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts
of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."The facts here are that the editor of
a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have hadthe tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possiblyexposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is
exactly libel, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or
writing,shall defame, abuse, or insult
any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority
, while engaged in the performanceof official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or
person, or the offensivewriting be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor
," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insultof any
Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain
(for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the UnitedStates of America),
or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain
.According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protectSpanish
officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, an
Soriano vs. LaguardiaFacts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37,made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia
niCristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang
Daan.
Issue:
Are Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within the
protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners
utterances on
the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners sus
pension was an undue curtailment of his right to freespeech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the

paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and t
he power of the State toregulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, ratherthan the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use ofless offensive language
Bro. Eli Soriano vs. Laguardia
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael
Sandoval
(Iglesia ni Cristos
minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]
Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di
ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito
kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o
di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating
for general
viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him
liablefor his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan.
Sorianochallenged the order of the MTRCB.
HELD:
The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and
thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the
HighCourt said th
at the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering theuse of
television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors
that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be
easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of pe
rmissible administrative sanction
or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority
saidthat it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free
speech
clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner
to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a
sancti
on for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No.
165636, April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action could be both
apenalty and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month suspension takes such form
because it also acts as a restraint to petitioners future speech and thus deserves a higher scrutiny than the
contextbased approach that the majority applied. In voting to grant Sorianos petition, the Chief Justice said that in
the
absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano] should not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a
prior restraint on his speech.