Carpio-Morales vs.

CA
Abandoning the Condonation Doctrine
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this
was a jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which
was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal
precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American
authorities. The SC stated what appears the sole basis forthe condonation
doctrine in Pascual, to wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying
the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term,
to which we fully subscribe.
As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for
the condonation doctrine, except that it seems to incline towards American
authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found that
there was really no established weight of authorities in the United States (US).
In fact, 17 States in the US have already abandoned the condonation doctrine,
as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the findings of the
Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat that said cases are merely
guides of interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it
was able to convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching
Philippine jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are farreaching, since we now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old
ineffective case laws. For this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from
the case, viz:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual,and carried over in numerous cases after, can
be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the
case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are
powerful countervailing considerations against its application. In other words,
stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to
preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly points
out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic
creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, [w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide.'

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time
Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual
was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions
do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the
sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascuals judicious re-examination.
The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate
the notable cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the
1987 Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there exists
legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office,
or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense,and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during
a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may
be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative
offenses: xxx "
The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By
abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense ofttimes used by elected officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made
mention of the data brought forward by the Ombudsman, to wit:
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that
for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon

Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct were placed beyond the reach of
the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Evidently, this

fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not
evade review.