Europe and the Ballot:
Voting Behaviour in Referendums on European
Integration
SARA BINZER HOBOLT
Centre of Intemational Studies, University of Cambridge
St, John’s College, Cambridge CB2 1TP, UK
sbh28@cam.ac
Draft paper. Comments appreciated.
Please do not cite without the author's permission
Paper prepared for presentation to the panel on “Referendums and Knowledge
4-10) at the 2” Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research
(ECPR),jmtegration, Hence, rather than assuming that “one-model-fits-all", this paper suggests
that referendum behaviour varies according to the level of EU salience.
This paper addresses several interrelated questions on voting behaviour in EU
referendums: How salient is the EU in different electorates? How stable are European
altitudes and how does attitude stability vary between segments of the population, over
time and between countries? And finail
; how do attitudes impact on voting decisions in
EU referendums? This paper begins by outlining the existing theories of voting
behaviour in referendums on European integration. On the basis of these explanations, a
‘model concerning the impact of attitudes
oF political predispositions ~ on voting
behaviour is developed. This model suggests that attitudes towards European integration
can become stable political predispositions, which act as a filter on elite cues in a
referendum campaign. Hence, as EU attitudes become stronger and mote stable, they
play a more significant role determining voting behaviour, and ‘second-order election’
factors become less important. In order to test these hypotheses, this paper examines
salience levels in Denmark and Ireland, by measuring the media coverage afforded to the
EU. Thereafter, panel studies are used to measure the stability of European attitudes by
‘analysing the level response stability and the impact of political knowledge. Finally, this
Paper tests the impact of attitudes on referendum behaviour relative to other factors, such
as elite cues, in Denmark and freland. Surveys conducted after three Danish and two
{ish referendums are used in order to analyse the variations in referendum behaviour,
‘Theories of referendum behaviour
The scholarly debate on voting behaviour in referendums on European integration has
predominantly been a battle between three competing “schools”: the ‘attitude’ school,
the ‘second-order election” school and the ‘utilitarian expectations’ school The first
schoo! focuses on individuals’ values and beliefs, and argues that voting behaviour in
EU referendums reflects peopte’s underlying broad attitudes towards
Europe. This
attitude-epproach therefore suggests that it is primarily voters" general views on the EU
that drive voting in referendums. (Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard 1994a, 1994b.
Svensson 1994, 2002). Another competing explanation of voting behaviour in EL!
referendums is inspired by the ‘second-order’ theory of elections. The important
characteristic of ‘second-order’ elections (local and regional elections also fall into this
category) is that 1 ist-
'y are regarded of lesser importance than national elections (
order), and consequently voter tumout is lower, protest-voting and voter-switching are|
“mechanisms” that determine whether people (voters) choose to fallow the elites. Lupia
and MeCubbins argue that the elites are only successful at persuading the public, if
People perceive the information provider (the elite) to be trustworthy and
Xnowledgeable, Heuristics such as party aligament, reputation and ideology can convey
information to the public about the knowledge and credibility of the information
Provider. Equally, Zaller refers to political predispositions, that is stable, individual
level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political
communications a person receives, allowing this logie, political predispositions are
likely to play a decisive role in opinion formation during a referendum campaign,
because “predispositions are the critical intervening variable between the
communications people encounter in the mass media, on one side, and their statement of
Political preferences on the othes” (Zaller 1992:23), Zaller does not go into much detail
about where these political predispositions come from or whether they can vary over
Hime or between issues. Yet, it seems plausible that the strength of people's
Predispositions will vary across issues and over time depending on the level of issue
salience. This paper suggests that as people are exposed to an intense flow of
information and debate on European integration over a mumber of years, they become
more knowledgeable and aware of European issues and form more stable
wropiean
autitudes, which influence the reception of elite cues. Stronger predispositions will
consequently act 2s an important intervening variable in the opinion formation process in
referendum campaign, Hence, in an electorate, where people generally have strong and
Stable political predispositions relating to European integration, cite cues and campaign
factors will be met with more resistance than in an electorate with very weak political
Dredispositions. This may not necessarily mean that in the former case, people are more
likely fo vote no (since the elite cues may be consistent with people's political
Predispositions), but it will imply that the elites will find it more difficult to sway the
voters during a campaign.
This model of opinion formation also incorporates elements from the different
explanations of referendum behaviour. As with the second-order election school, it
assumes that people will follow cues from national elites and that persuasion is more
successful when the information provider (govemment) is popular
(wustworthy/knowledgeable). However, coatrary to the second-order election school, 1
do not
ume that people necessarily have weak (or non-existing) political
Predispositions concerning the BU itself Instead, my model suggests thatthe strength ofSalience of the EU
The issue of salience has figured prominently in many studies of political behaviour of
lites and masses. Moreover, this concept has found its way to studies on EU
referendums, and it recently played an important role in the debate between advocates of
the attitude-school and advocates of the second-order-clection-school. In a recent article,
Palle Svensson argues that his stady of Danish referendums undermine the “Franklin-
thesis” (second-order election school), because the Danish survey data show that ‘voters
can become more knowledgeable on a topic of
jereasing salience, and more resistant 10
appeals that contradict their views’ (Svensson 2002:7:
). Mark Franklin (2002) has
subsequently acknowledged that, “if any European electorate would have based their
referendum votes on well thought-out preferences rather than on positions taken by their
Parties, it would certainly have been the Danes’ (Franklin 2002: 752). Hence, both
Svensson and Franklin argue that increased salience of the EU has an impact on the
opinion formation process, and they imply that political predispositions become more
important as salience increases. However, the only problem with the use of the
“salience” argument in these studies is that neither of the two authors ~ nor indeed other
researchers in the field - have systematically defined or measured the notion of EU
salience or tested its actual impact on opinion formation. This paper represents a first
attempt to fill this gap in the literature by adopting a new approach to the measurement
of BU salience and applying this to the cases of Ireland and Denmark.
‘The concept of salience can be defined as the importance attached to a certain issue
or policy area, and EU salience can thus be defined as the importance attached to the EU
by the general public, Many studies have shown that both clites and masses may respond
differently to issues depending on their level of salience (Epstein and Segal 2000). Yet
the problem encountered in all studies of salience relates to the operationalisation and
measurement of the concept, The indicator often employed to measure issue salience in
the general public is the “most important problem-question” in public opinion surveys in
hich respondemts are asked what the most (and second most) important problem facing
the nation is, This is indeed a usefull measure when comparing the relative salience of
ifferent domestic policy issues, however, itis problematic when it comes to measuring
the “absolute” salience of any issue. Applying this measure to EU salience is particularly
awkward, because foreign policy issues generally receive a very low ranking in
sesponses
to these types of qu
stions and moreover, the emphasis on the most importantone, the likelihood is that we will find considerably lower EU salience in the former
case, a8 tabloid newspapers tend to focus on domestic issues. Hence, similar criteria
must be employed in choosing national newspapers across countries in order to avoid
serious biases. In this analysis, the four criteria of high circulation, quality (broadsheet),
national scope, and EU attitude’ were employed in choosing the newspapers (see also
Kriesi et al 1995: Appendix). The criteria concerning circulation and national scope were
chosen to target newspapers that reach the maximum mumber of readers across the
country, The “quality” criterion may be controversial, but it was adopted to target
newspapers, which would report more rather than less EU stories. This criterion is likely
to “inflate” the measure of EU salience, but this will not affect the cross-temporal and
cross-national comparisons of frequencies. Applying these criteria, the Irish Independent
was chosen as the newspaper source in Ireland and Berfingske Tidende as the source in
Denmark. Both newspapers are popular daily broadsheets and are very comparable in
political outlook, format, quality and style of news coverage The Irish Independent is by
far the best selling daily newspaper in ireland with an average daily circulation over the
past decade of 158,000 copies.’ Berlingske Tidende has been the largest ot second
largest broadsheet in Denmark during the last three decades with an average daily
circulation of 148,000 copies during the past decade
In the actual analysis of these newspapers, the sampling method* was used,
Hence, rather than analysing every single copy of the newspapers during the past 30
years, a weekly sample was drawn from each newspaper in the period 1971 to 2001. In
this analysis, only the Wednesday editions of the newspapers have been coded.” In the
‘over 1000 issues of newspapers, all articles relating to the EU* were coded in terms of
frequency. Figure | illustrates the result of the frequeney coding, that is, how many
average daily items relating to the EU appeared in the two newspapers
* As the majority of the newspapers in both Ireland and Denmark are fit pro-European, it was decided
toanalyse two pro-European newspapers.
The second largest daily quality newspaper in Ireland, the /rish Times, has a daily
04,000 copies (1990-2002 average)
“The sampling method is used routinely in survey research, and has aiso been applied 10 newspaper
analysis (see Kriesi etal. 1995),
"The Wednesday issue was chase asa “representative” sample ofthe daily newspapers. This assumption
was tested by coding the Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday issues of tbe newspaper in (wo
years (1985 and 1995) and comparing with the Wednesday data. The results showed thatthe vartance in
ihe frequency coding was less than 58%, and hence the Wednesday issues ean be regarded us 2
representative sample
"This included every article about EU institutions, EL policies or individual EU personalities (
rational commissioner or MEP), but excluded articles ox! European countries when no reference was
the EU (e
lation of o
wade
‘8 German election)Se
Table 1 EU salience in Denmark and Ireland
TS EE
Ireland Denmark
1970-74 low lowimedium
1975-79 low low
1980-84 low low/medium
1985-89 fow mediuin/high
1990-94 low high
1995-99 tow high
2000-01 lowimedium igh
Note: Low « 1.$ articles per day, Medium 1.5.2.5 articles per day, High > 2.5 anticles per day
Source: irish Independent and Bestingske Tidende
Table | presents a summary of the development in EU salience during the past three
decades, and illustrates that whereas salience has increased very little, ifat all, in Ireland
since 1970, it has increased significantly in Denmark. Whilst it would be interesting to
‘examine why EU salience varies between countries and over time, that is not the aim of
this paper. Rather this paper has set out to examine the impact of EU salience on voting
behaviour in referendums on European integration. In the hypotheses presented above, it
‘was argued that an increase in EU salience creates more stable EU attitudes that in tun
have a greater impact on voting behaviour. In the following
‘ction, the stability of BU
attitudes in Denmark and Ireland are examined.
Stability of European attitudes
An increase in EU salience should lead to stronger and more stable attitudes towards
European integration. One way of testing the strength and stability of EU attitudes is to
measure the level of response (in|
tabitity in panel studies. Only around half of the
respondents in panel studies normally manage to state the same opinion on successive
interviews (Zaller 1992; Converse 2000), In the literature on public opinion, the origins
and nature of this response instability have been subject to much debate. In Converse’s
famous monograph (1964), he documents an extensive instability in mass public
opinion, and explains this by using a ‘black-and-white’ model in which the attitudes of a
small seginent of the public are modelled as fixed while the attitudes of the vast majority
are modelied as purely random, He concludes that the majority of people hold “non-
itudes’ towards pol
Many scholars have challenged Converse’s non-
attitude thesis
attributing instability to the measurement error that stems ftom “fuzzyee
Table 2 Consistency in responses on European integration?
Denmark 1972 Denmark 1992 iretand 2001.02
Aittedes towards mambershio a5 7 sees
Attitudes towards future develonment ofthe EU 56 a Serer
N 708 104 188
e-voded into agreeidsagree answers
** Notre-cdk five options (very much are, agree, neither agree nor sare, disspoe, very mck dssgas)
Sources: EF -undersagelsen 1972 DDA 194, Folkeafitemningen om Maastichtaftalon 1992 DDA 1743 &
Panel Study of Nice referendums 2001 82002
Table 2 shows significant variations in attitude consistency levels in Denmark over time
and between Denmark and Ireland. The lowest levels of attitude stability are found in
Ireland. In 2002, only just above half of the re-coded responses were stable over time,
and the “real” response stability was even lower (35-38 per cent), In a panel study
carried out in Denmark in 1972, attitude stability was slightly higher. As we would
expect with the increase in salience of the EU, attitude stability increased over the next
two decades and in 1992 more than two-thirds of the respondents gave consistent
answers to European integration questions over time, Hence, these limited data broadly
Support the proposition that the higher the level of EU salience, the stronger and more
stable the attitudes towards European integration become. A comparison with response
instability on other attitude questions illustrates that the high degree of response
'nstability in Ireland in 2001 and in Denmark in 1972 is not just a result of measurement
error, but aiso a reflection of weak EU attitudes. Response stability on an attitude
question on abortion'® (a very salient issue in Ireland) was for example 63 per cent,
which is considerably above the 53/56 per cent consistency in the re-coded EU
Guestions. Similarly, the response stability on questions concerning the degree of party
identification reached 68 per cent in the Danish penel study in 1972, and concrete party
identification (which party) was as high as 82 per cent. This suggests that high respor
stability also reflects stronger attitudes/more salient iss
Question wordings are as follows: Denmark 1972: Denmark should leave the EEC: Should the EEC
become a United States of Europe? Denmark 1992: For or against membership of the Common Market:
Should the EU become a United States of Europe”; Irland 2002; Irland should protects independence
{fom the BU; Ireland should not give any more powers to the EU
ory for the abortion question consisted of 4 seale from
The answer es 1 to 10, which was recoded into
8 three-caiezory option (1-3, 4-6 ancl 7-10) before the response stability was measured2
individuals have more consistent attitudes towards the EU, and this may also make them
‘more resistant to elite cues that ate inconsistent with these attitudes. Unfortunately, the
Irish panel study did not include enough variables on demographics and knowledge to
produce a similar stratification according to levels of political awareness.
Table 4 Political awareness and response stability ~ Denmark 1992 (%)
Political awareness
Response stability Low Medium Hi
very inconsistent 7 3 °
somewinat Inconsistent 35 28
mostly consistant “8 56
very consistont 10 15
Source: Folkeafstemningen om Maastrichtaaien 1992 DDA 1743,
in sum, the results presented in this section are consistent with our expectations
based on the salience data: the Danes have more stable attitudes towards the BU, and the
stability and strength of EU attitudes have increased during the last three decades.
Curreat Irish EU attitudes, however, are relatively unstable. This would lead us to expect
that attitudes have the most prominent impact on voting behaviour in recent Danish
referendums, whereas elite cues and government performance are more significant in
earlier Danish and all Irish referendums. This proposition will be tested in the following
section,
Referendum behaviour in Denmark and fretand
This section evaluates the model of voting behaviour in EU referendums, In particular, it
‘0 examine the strength of the explanations put forward in the literature concerning,
attitude factors, second-order election factors and utilitarian expectation factors.
Moreover, it will indirectly test the proposition that the relative explanatory power of
these factors depends on an intervening factor, namely the salience level of the EU.
model
Several post-referendum surveys in Denmark and ireland are used to test
on Bi
Although both countries have held six referendums uropean integration, it has
unfortunately only been possible to examine five of these referendums in this paper, due
to the limited availability of adequate survey data.
This model of referendum behaviour has a dichotomous dependent variable
{yevno vote). Only respondents who actually voted are included in the analysis, since
the aim is to explain and predict actual voting behaviour, The key explanatory variablesexpected that European attitudes become a more significant explanatory variable as the
salience of the EU increases (hypothesis 3). Hence, on the basis of the salience and
attitude stability data, we would predict that attitudes are more significant in more recent
Danish referendums (post-SEA) than in earlier ones, and that attitudes are more
significant in Denmark than in Ireland,
In tab
after the Danish EEC
¢ mode! is tested using public opinion data ftom a survey conducted
accession referendum in 1972. The Danish EEC accession was
‘accepted by a large majority (by Danish standards) of 63.3 per cent of the voters, and
had a high tumout of 90,3 per cent. The vast majority of political parties were in favour
of accession, although the Social Democratic Party was divided on the issue. Only the
small patties on the left actually recommended a no-vote, The majority of civil society
organisations and the media also advocated a yes-vote. Although the EEC received
considerable coverage in the weeks leading up to the referendum, the issue was still
relatively new and unfamiliar to the voters, and it is unlikely that voters had established
Strong underlying predispositions relating to the BEC, The data on stability of EU
attitudes also reveal a relatively high level of response instability in 1972 (table 2)
‘Table $ Predicting the yes-vote in the Danish Accession referendum
Bull model implied mo.
Aide) OO Sinplfied model
‘Manual workers O21 014 | Manat workers 047 018 0.011
y 125 fw ist
Source: Observe pravevalg 1972 DDA 909Table 6 Predicting the yes-vote in the Danish Maastricht referendum
si RSE Si
Pro-Eaopean tides (000 | Pro-European anaes is 2.000
Government sisatsfcion 038 007 600 | Government dssasition 0.38 000
‘Yor for yes-paty 2 000 | Vote ores party 221030900
Sex ae) 036 on |
Fucation ara |
i 026 038 488
Mediu 02103808
occupation 098
Executive 0010480981
Professions 02 0290335
Manual workers 013 033, 0689
see 007004 0093 | Age 007 008 904%
Conse 159 ast 0010 | Constant 138034 0.000
y oo or
Mupetterte R Square 086 ass
Moret prodision 81.50% si.
Source: Folkeafstemningen om Maastrichtafialen 1992 BDA 1743,
‘The Danish Maastricht referendum is widely seen as marking the end of the “permissive
consensus’
at least in Denmark, The Danish and European political establishments
were taken by surprise when @ small majority of the Danish voters (50.7 per cent)
rejected the Treaty on 2 June 1992, The Treaty ratification was supported by the vast
majority of the Danish Parliament, and only the parties on the fringes of the political
spectrum, th
Socialist Peoples’ Party and the Progress Party, together with the very
small Christian Democratic party recommended a no-vote. Most civil society
organisations were also in favour of a yes-vote. Yet, whilst public support for E
membership had in
reased during the past two decades (although it was stil
nong the
lowest in the EU), support for further integration had declined (Mannheim
urobarometer Trend File),
Table 6 shows that party cues are still an important explanatory variabl
the data show that voters who are dissatisfied with
Equally government (a centre-
right coalition government at the time) are more fikely to vote no, As predicted, pro-
European attitudes have also become a significant explanatory vaciable in. this
ferendum, People who are generally in favour of further integration are more likely to
vote yes. Parti dissatisfaction and attitudes are the only si
anship, goverame!‘Table 7 Predicting the yes-vote in the EURO-referendum
Bose Sg a Sig,
Pro-Europeam attitudes 2.97 020.000 | Pro-Europsan anaes 287 025 amo
pany 059052 0.283. | Vote foe yes party 995 046 038
Secale) 08038 064
Education 0428
High 094 04s 28
Meum oss os) 028s
ce 0.380
Executive 088 057 a2
Professions O78 036 a6!
sal workers 4430620491
om 000 as
Constant oat 060 0.495 | Constant 0x7
N a2 902
Nagettrte R Spare ors ons
2ecorrectprodition $9206 5.90%
Source: EURO-afsternningen 2000 DDA 4013,
AS in previous referendums, the Euro-referendum was widely supported by the Danish
establishment, including tade unions, business organisations and political parties
representing more than three-quarters of the seats in parliament. The parties on the left
of the political spectrum, the Unity List and the Socialist People’s Party, as well as the
far right party, the Danish People's party, recommended a no, and so did the smali centre
party, the Christian People's Party. Yet, in spite of this, only 47 per cent of the voters
said yes to the new currency
‘Table 7 shows that in the full model, party cues are no longer important,'* whilst
European attitudes are the only statistically significant variable. At the time of the
referendum, only around 45 per cent of the voters were in favour of @ common currency.
and this had fluctuated between 34 and 53 per cent during the previous
ten years
Public support for a European Political Union or a United States of Europe remained
low. Hence, it seems likely that the strong political predispositions against further
Political integration in Europe among a majority of the electorate meant the elite cues
were not readily accepted by the voters. Consequently, the result was a rejection of the
* In spite ofthis, have chosen to inchude them inthe
S tevel. The substantive effets of pany cue
Mannheim Burabsro
fied model where they ave significant atthegovernment satisfaction, These changes in the explanatory variables ean all be regarded
as plausible and table 8 illustrates their predicted impact on the yes-vote.? when all
other variables ace set to their mean value, As expected, the changes in partisanship and
the govemment satisfaction have the most pronounced impact on the vote in 1972,
whereas a shift in attitudes has only a negligible effect. This has changed by 1992, where
the EU attitude variable has the most significant impact ~ a % point shift in attitudes
in both
increases the yes-vote from SO to 67 per cent. Yet as we can see, chang
partisanship and government satisfaction could also have secured a comfortable yes
In the 2000 Euro-referendum, the
impact of changes in partisanship has disappeared, yet, a shift in attitudes is predicted to
majority in 1992 according to these simulations.
have a quite remarkable impact on the referendum outcome, Hence, these simulations
confirm the proposition regarding the increasing impaet of European attitudes and the
diminishing effect of elite cues, as salience increases.
How do the results from the Danish referendum surveys compare with Irish data?
The Irish salience data revealed that the salience of the EU has remained low until very
recently (table 1). This is also reflected in the relatively high level of response instability
fon EU attitude questions (table 2). Hence, we would expect that in the recent
referendums on the Nice Treaty, underlying attitudes would play a limited rote, whereas
elite cues, government satisfaction and campaign events would be of higher importance.
‘The Irish voters” rejection of the Nice Treaty in the 2001 referendum came as a
shock to the Irish and European political establishments. The Irish public has
traditionally been one of the most pro-European people in Europe. Moreover, almost the
‘entire establishment was in favour of the Nice Treaty. In Parliament, only two small
parties, Sinn Féin and the Green Party, openly recommended a no-vote, and trade
unions, employer organisations and the media were in favour of the Treaty. Yet, the
campaign effort by the yes-side was very limited and characterised by a high level of
complacency. The Minister of European Affairs, Dick Roche, has later conceded this.
‘There was very jittle political campaigning in the first referendum, J think
when you have situation where the government and the political parties
representing 96 per cent of the elected representatives say yes, where the
main pillars of public opinion ~ the newspapers - say yes, where the trade
union movement says yes-ish, where the business community and farming
1 Danish sur
les are almost accurate. The actualy
49.3 por cent in 1992 and 45.9
The yes-votes in
roferendaumns were 63.3 per cent in 19in Ireland, which has been well above 60 per cent for the past decade, it
seems unlikely that attitudes alone would have led to a rejection of the Treaty. However,
it is plausible that a combination of weak elite cues and weak political predispositions
would result in a highly unpredictable outcome, as was the case
Following this line of argument, it is hardly surprising thet an intensification of
elite cues in favour of the Treaty in the second Nice referendum campaign could
potentially lead to a significant change in voting behaviour, After the defeat in the first
Nice referendum, the Irish government decided to hold a second referendum on the same
issue.* But this time the political parties and civil society organisations launched an
intensive and well-resourced campaign in favour of the Nice Treaty. The result was an
increase in turnout to 49 per cent and a swing of 17 percentage points in favour, which
secured a 63 per cent yes-vote. Such a sizeable swing implies that voters had relatively
‘weak political predispositions. It has been argued that the increase in the yes-vote is
merely due to the increase in the tumout, Yet, an analysis of the data shows that the
increase in the yes-vote was not merely a result of “new” voters, but equally of a swing
among voters who tumed out in the first referendum, The Irish panel study of the Dublin
region, for example, shows that almost 20 per cent of those respondents who voted in
both referendums changed their votes. 15 per cent of the voters changed their voting
behaviour from no in Nice 1 to yes in Nice 2 according to this survey, and this supports
the suggestion that a substantial amount of people were persuaded to change their mind
during the second campaign. If the Irish bad strong underlying attitudes towards Europe,
it seems unlikely that the elites would be able to sway so many voters to vote differently
on the same question. Comparing with a similar scenario in Denmark, the rejection of
the first Danish Maastricht referendum can be attributed to an underlying resistance
towards more political union (illustrated in the survey data) that made it hard for the
elites to sway the voters during the campaign. In the first Irish Nice referendum,
however - conducted in a low-salience and low-knowledge context ~ an effective no-
have caused the
pai
rather than attitudes, were the most important determinants of the Irish no, whereas th
campaign coupled with complacency from the yes-side are likely «
final rejection of the ballot question. It could therefore be argued that factors,
" Although the ballot question was extended fo include two further subsections in addition to the
ticle 29.4.7 fy the Nice Treaty. The additional
proposals related to enfumncad ¢ ‘(Aticle 29.4.8) and a constitutional
ion on Ireland jinn the s-cal clause!
acceptance of amend
arate vote on cachsimulations are presented. As in the analysis of Danish referendums, the predicted
impact of changes in partisanship, government satisfaction and attitudes are cafculated
Unfortunately, the distribution of yes and no-voters in the Irish survey sample is not as
accurate as in the Danish, and this may affeet the validity of the a
alyses presented
below. In the Irish survey sampies the yes-vote is 41 per cent in 2001 and 74 per cent in
2002
‘Table 11 Simulated impact of selected variables on the vote in Irish referendums
Yeor Variable Chango in variable Resulting change in Confidence
yesvote Interval at 95%
oot
Pantisansrip Now foes t0 I yezon pares att0.42% sw
EVatitudoe 120 stated cvetan me OES sto
2002
Partisanship Nove fer 0 1% yea ep 74078% ree
EV atitudos pct sveton) ne po Tato 80% ree
Goverment satsfion __1 pot ean don reeset 710 81% 7885
Source: Treaty of Nice Referendurn 2001 and 2002 surveys
ible 11 predicts that both (positive) changes in partisanship and in FU attitudes would
have a positive impact on the yes-vote in the first Nice referendum, yet not sufficient to
change the outeome of the final referendum (again, this is also due to the deflated yes-
vote in this sample). Equally, partisanship and attitudes have an impact in the second
Nice referendum, however, interestingly, the most significant impact on the vote is
caused by a shift in government satisfaction, This could indicate that, as suggested,
“second order” factors were more significant in the Irish referendums than in the more
recent Danish referendums. The results in tables 9 to 11 thus seem to confirm the
prediction in the hypotheses 1 and 2 relating to the importance of partisan cues and
government satisfaction on an individual level. On an aggregate level, however, the
rejection of the Nice Treaty in the first referendum give the impression of exeerly the
opposite, since the majority of parties recommended a yes and the government was very
ide may need to be
popular at the time, Hence, the level campaign intensity on the
taken inte account as an additional explanatory variable in order to interpret the voting
behaviour in these referendums, since this most probably had s major impact on both the
ent and 63 per cent in 2002. The higher level of inaccura
The actual yes-vere in 2
may be related 10 the i
rah electionsyet, these heuristics are often related to issues of national politics, such as partisanship
and government popularity, rather than Furopean issues. Hence, the model proposed in
this paper borrows elements from the ‘attitude’ as well as the ‘second-order-election’
explanations of referendum behaviour, It suggests that the relative impact of European
attitudes and national political factors depends on whether BU attitudes have become
stable political predispositions as a resuit of fong-term intensive coverage and debate on
the European affairs. To test this model, this paper has examined salience levels in
Denmark and Ireland, by measuring the media coverage afforded to the EU, and
analysed the strength of European attitudes by determining response stability in pane!
studies, The data clearly show that whilst EU salience has increased dramatically in
Denmark over the past three decades, it has remained relatively tow in Ireland, This is
aiso reflected in the analysis of the stability of European attitudes in Denmark and
Ireland, which illustrates stronger and more stable EU attitudes in the more recent
Danish panel study. In the actual analyses of voting behaviour in Danish and trish
referendums, the propositions of the model are also supported. Partisan cues and
government satisfaction were important variables in all referendums (except the Euro-
referendum), whilst EU attitudes have become an increasingly important factor in
Danish referendums over the years. Hence, as expected, attitudes are a stronger predictor
of voting behaviour in electorates with a higher level of EU salience and more stable
attitudes towards European integration than in electorates with low EU salience and
highly unstable EU attitudes, The results based on the irish survey data from the two
Nice referendums were more ambiguous. Both partisanship, government satisfaction and
attitudes were important in both referendums. Yet, this does not explain the large swing
between the two referendums. An important additional explanatory factor may be the
intensity of (pro-EU) elite cues in the two referendums. The level of pro-EU campaign
tensity changed dramatically between the two campaigns, and this is likely to have
affected the reception of cues and the willingness to vote in favour of the Treaty (or vote
at all), For this reason, an improved model could include an additional explanatory
variable of campaign intensity to improve the substance of the findings and the level of
variance explained. Yet, even the limited model presented in this paper reveals that
whilst the voters’ pay attention to national politicians and other elites, European attitudes
have the potential to play an increasingly important role in EU referendums.
»#
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