Risos-Vidal and Lim v.

COMELEC and Estrada

GR No. 206666 | 21 January 2015 | Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
1. On 12 September 2007, the Sandigabayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder
2. The court sentenced Estrada to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of the
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification
3. On 25 October 2007, former President Arroyo extended executive
clemency by way of pardon, to former President Estrada
4. Pertinent portion of the Pardon reads: I hereby grant executive
clemency to Joseph Ejercito Estrada, convicted by the Sandiganbayan
of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
5. On 26 October 2007, Estrada received and accepted the pardon by
affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon
6. On 30 November 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
President; it was opposed by three petitions in the COMELEC, but were
all dismissed on the grounds that:
a. The Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to the sitting
president
b. The pardon granted to Estrada by Arroyo restored the formers
right to vote and be voted for a public office
7. Estrada lost in the 2010 elections so the issue became moot
8. In 2012, Estrada ventured again into the political arena, and filed a
CoC for the post of Mayor of the City of Manila
9. On 24 January 2013, Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case,
filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC, her petition anchored on:
a. The theory that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office
because of his conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan
b. Sec 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec 12 of the OEC
10.
COMELEC 2nd division dismissed the petition for DQ, MR was also
denied
11.
On 30 April 2013, Risos-Vidal filed the present petition. While the
case was pending, the 2013 elections were conducted and President
Estrada was voted into office and proclaimed by the board of
canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Manila. Estradas opponent,
former Manila mayor Lim moved to intervene in the case
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to

vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him
by former President Arroyo -- NO

RATIO:
1. Pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action
a. Section 19, Art. VII: Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress.
b. Section 5, Art. IX-C: No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission
c. Consti provides that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: 1) impeachment cases,
2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction, 3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation from the
COMELEC; therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress
by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power
of the President
d. Consti Comm Records show that the intent of the framers was
not to impair the Presidents power by acts of Congress, when
they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the
pardoning power of the President in the form of offenses
involving graft and corruption
2. DQ of Estrada under LGC in relation to OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
a. Sec 40, LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position: Sec 40(a): those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one year or ore of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence.
b. Sec 12, OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but with an
exception: Disqualifications - ... unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
c. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Sec 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Sec. 12 of the OEC provides a
legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty.
Such allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense

involving moral turpitude to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national
3. Third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional
a. whereas, Joseph Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office, neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective
office has been restored.
b. Jurisprudence provides that a preamble is not an essential part of
an act, it is an introductory clause that explains the reasons for
enactment
c. Echegaray v Sec of Justice: the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text
d. Absent any contrary evidence, PGMAs silence on Estradas bid
for Mayor speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his
rights to suffrage and to hold public office
e. Statement he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights
is crystal clear pardon was absolute, it was unconditional and
unrestricted in scope
f. Omission of qualifying word full no distinction as to the
coverage of the term full political rights and political rights, if
only the latter term used doesnt mean that it is merely partial
Dissenting Leonen:
- Estrada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and convicted for
plunder by the Sandiganbayan. This conviction stands unreversed and
unmodified, and the sentence included an accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification. Apart from the RPC, statutory provisions provide
for the disqualification from elective public office of individuals who have
been convicted for criminal offenses involving moral turpitude
- Section 12 of OEC and Sec 40 of LGC provides for disqualifications for
elective offices;
- Estrada posits that pardon is characterized by forgive and forget, with
Estrada centering on the issue of the need for a new appointment of a
pardoned officer seeking to be reinstated to her former positions, saying
that Monsanto case is not applicable as his issue involves qualification
for elective public offices
- 2 points worthy of particular emphasis, derived from the Monsanto case:
o Pardon is a private, through official, act of the executive. Proceeding
from the power to execute laws, it merely evinces the executives
choice to decline from enforcing punishment so as to mollify penal
misery
o Pardon does not erase the moral stain and the fact of conviction. It
retains the laws regard for a convict as more dangerous to society

than one never found guilty of a crime; the convict remains

deserving of punishment though left unpunished
There was no express remission and/or restoration of rights to vote and
be voted, no categorical statement was made in the dispositive portion of
the pardon; the disposition contains 3 clauses that delimit the effects of
pardon:
o General grant of executive clemency
o Restoration of Estradas civil and political rights
o Continuing validity of the forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan
Reliance on inference that the right to suffrage is subsumed under
political rights is improper
o Fails to consider the consequences of statutory requirements which
specifically refer to the rights of suffrage and to hold public office
Art 36 and 41 of RPC specifically deal with rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, its effect is that these are segregated from all
similar rights
o Fails to recognize that the language used in the pardon is equivocal
at best, and worse, the conclusion he derives from this equivocal
language is even contradicted by other examples previously
considered in jurisprudence if the president does not actually say
that the rights of suffrage and to hold public office are restored, no
plain basis for concluding that they have in fact been restored,
consistent with the public interest inherent in these rights; the lack
of the use of the word full which is a common practice in
jurisprudence
The pardons preambular clauses militate against Estradas position
o Preamble not an essential part of an act but serves as an
introduction which indicates intent or purpose
o Leonen cites People v. Judge Purisima, which interpreted an act of
the President through a reading of whereas clauses which led to the
enactment of PD 9 which excluded instances where defendant
carried bladed weapons in situations not related to the purposes of
Proc 1081, reading as well the whereas clauses of 1081 which aimed
at putting an end to subversive activities the court concluded that
the act of carrying bladed weapons was only punishable to the
extent that it was done in the context of subversive activities
o Pardon extended is definite: no express restoration of Estradas right,
nor a remission of his perpetual absolute disqualification; even if
there remains room for interpretation, a reading of the pardon as a
whole, and an illumination, through the preambular clauses, of the
pardons supposed ambiguity, will lead to the same conclusion that
he is disqualified
o Estrada is no common convict, in him was reposed the trust of the
Filipinos but was convicted of plunder, a conviction that endures and
stand unreversed; this court cant turn a blind eye on its own

recognition of the gravity and grievousness of his conviction;

plundering is a heinous crimes, which would have been punishable
by death had it not been for the enactment of RA 9346
The person convicted of plunder now walks free among us. He did not
spend a single day in an ordinary jail. There is no question that he was
pardoned. Today, the majority completes the circle by reading an ambiguous
pardon allowing him yet again to run for public office. The majority uses the
equivocal silence of the succeeding President who devised the ambiguous
pardon as one of the bases to say that the convicted former President can
again seek public office.
This is template for our political elite at the expense of the masses who toil
and suffer from the consequences of corruption. It is hope for those who
occupy high government offices who commit crimes as they await a next
political term when the people's vigilance would have waned. It is the
denouement in a narrative that will explain why there is no effective
deterrent to corruption in high places. The pragmatism of politics takes over
the highest notion that public office should be of effective public trust. The
rule of law should unravel to meet this expectation.
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