Tamargo vs.

CA 209 SCRA 518

Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted
in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of
Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special
Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court
dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal,
may still file the instant petition. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the
case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.
Ruling:
SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to
the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual
of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to

as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
(re: development of Philippine adoption laws; nature of adoption proceedings;
exception to rule on the non-applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. The trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar
to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Years later, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she
averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to
use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities
and that respondent was indifferent towards petitioner and would only come to see
her once a year. Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552
now reads: "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." The trial court dismissed the
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 and whether or not the adopters action
had prescribed.
Ruling :
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was
months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had already abrogated and
repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind
a decree of adoption. So the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of R A8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is
a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is
not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is
more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree,

are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute

may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised. However, an adopter,
while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,
like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

The lower court granted the petition. The OSG then appealed to the CA, arguing that
the trial court erred in granting the petition for adoption despite:

The lack of consent of the surviving parent

The lack of written consent of the petitioners children
Petitioners failure to establish that she is in a position to support the
children

Landingin v. Republic (2006)

CA reversed RTC ruling.
Callejo, Sr. J.
Issue: W/N the decree of adoption should be granted
Summary:
Diwata wants to adopt her nieces and nephew. Their father (her
brother) was already dead and their mother abandoned them. The RTC granted
Diwatas petition. But the CA and later on, SC ruled otherwise. The SC held that the
adoption decree cannot be granted due to the lack of written consent of their
surviving mother, the absence of admissible evidence showing the written consent of
the consent of Diwatas children and Diwatasfailure to establish her capability to
support the supposed adoptees. Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, US citizen,
of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine, Elma and Eugune Ramos. They are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos (brother of Diwata) and Amelia Ramos.

Held: No.
Ratio:
1.

She alleged that the children were in the custody of their paternal grandmother
(Maria) after the death of their father and that Amelia were no longer in
communication with her children after she went to Italy and remarried there.
Grandmother Maria died, and now Diwata desires to adopt the children. Upon order
of the court, the DSWD conducted a case study (pursuant to Art. 34 of PD 603).
Unopposed, petitioner presented her evidence ex parte consisting of:

Her own testimony

Testimony of Elaine, eldest of the adoptees, regarding their written consent
to the adoption
Affidavit of Consent executed by her own children

The DSWD report recommended the adoption of the children stating among others
that Amelia (surviving parent) voluntarily consented to their adoption.
Diwata, on the other hand, fails to present Pagbilao, DSWD officer who conducted
the study and interviewed Amelia. She also failed to present documentary evidence
to prove Amelias assent to the adoption.

2.

Re: lack of consent of surviving parent

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. (cf Sec. 9 of RA 8552)
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
IN THIS CASE: Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia.
However, Pagbilao did not bother to require Amelia to execute a written
consent. Also, Diwata failed to present Amelia as witness in support of the
petition.
Diwatas contention that Amelias written consent is no longer necessary
because she has already abandoned her children must be rejected. When
Diwata filed her petition, RA 8552 was already in effect. The law requires
the written consent of the biological parents, otherwise, no decree of
adoption may be granted.
Diwata also failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report.
Lack of written consent of petitioners children
Diwata also failed to offer in evidence the Joint Affidavit of Consent
executed by her children. She also failed to prove its authenticity.
The joint written consent of petitioners children was notarized on January
16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the
same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with
Section 2 of Act No. 2103.

3.

Re: capability of petitioner to support the children

Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she
has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and
siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing
should the need arise.
The OSG banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner
has limited income."
SC: Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide
support in keeping with the means of the family.

Validity of Adoption in case the surviving spouseremarries

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009CARPIO, J.:
Facts: On 23 June 1974, Petitioner Monina P. Lim married Primo Lim. They
werechildless. Subsequently, minor children, whose parents were unknown,
wereentrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of
theirown, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were
thechildrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude
P.Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
Theysent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all
theirschool records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Primo
died.On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of theamnesty given
under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals whosimulated the birth
of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separatepetitions for the adoption
of Michelle and Michael, who was already 25 years oldand already married and 18
years and seven months, before the trial court.Michelle, together with her husband
and Michael, gave their consent to theadoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. Moninas husband Angellikewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing thepetitions. On the ground that since petitioner having

remarried, should have filedthe petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption bythe husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section
7(c), Article III of RA 8552 andArticle 185 of the Family Code.Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motionwas denied. In denying the
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fallunder any of the exceptions
under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Issue:
adopt.

Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim, who has remarried, can singly

Held: Joint Adoption by Husband and WifeIt is undisputed that, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed,petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Angel Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm thetrial courts decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law isexplicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads:SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:(a) Any Filipino citizen
of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legalrights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involvingmoral turpitude, emotionally
and psychologically capable of caring for children, atleast sixteen (16) years older
than the adoptee, and who is in a position to supportand care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. Therequirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter andadoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, oris the spouse of the adoptees parent;(b) Any alien
possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipinonationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republicof the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintainssuch residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certifiedby his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/hergovernment allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adoptedson/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency andcertification of the aliens qualification to adopt in
his/her country may be waived forthe following:(i) a former Filipino citizen who
seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse;
or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/herspouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of
theFilipino spouses; or(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination
of the guardianshipand clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt
the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her

own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.In
case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimateson/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
thespouses. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
jointadoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
theconcept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
thechild to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
torequire the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
thespouses.Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed,must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitionerherself, without joining her husband, Angel Olario, the trial court was
correct indenying the petitions for adoption on this ground.Neither does petitioner
fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated inSection 7.Effects of
AdoptionPetitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessarysince the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority isuntenable.It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation
that is, whenhe attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation
terminatesparental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then
bequalified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority
ismerely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates
the effects of adoption, thus:
Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. Adoption has,thus, the
following effects:(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee, exceptwhen the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;(2) deem the
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and(3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from therelationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to:(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is
to be known; and(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee isstill considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimatechild such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receivesupport from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and
othersuccessional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to
theadopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such
assupport and successional rights.Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would showthat joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Angel Olario has filed a casefor dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in
the Los Angeles Superior Court.We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage betweenpetitioner and Angel Olario is of no moment. Until and unless

there is a judicialdecree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Angel Olario, themarriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the
husband and thewife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time
the petitionsfor adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption
ismandatory.