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JOUR 625: Research Methodology for Media Studies

Lecturer: Dafina Paca
MA candidate: Faton Raçi
21 February 2010

Humanizing War – The Balkans and Beyond

by Philip Hammond
(A Critical Review)

The approach that Philip Hammond takes throughout his analysis can be

considered reasonable. Especially, considering that protection of human rights became

the main argument for military actions of the U.S. and/or its NATO allies throughout the

world. Thus, I agree with his formulation that certain propaganda indeed exists

regarding the war on terrorism, as I also agree that – not just – Washington spends

hundreds of thousands of dollars – if not more – on hiring diverse advert consultants

while aiming to “humanize the war” in Afghanistan and Iraq, as he puts it. Likewise,

Hammond is also right when describing the difficulties that, for instance, Afghan

children had, and still have in distinguishing “the aid packages from cluster bombs...

dropped by US planes.”

However, veracity problems emerge when Hammond begins to analyze deeper

the reasons that led to such actions of the US and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, as he –

deliberately – fails to explain in details the main causes that have triggered their

reaction, as well as the results that might have occurred if the US and NATO would

remain inactive. He should, at least, provide some backup information regarding the
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Alliance intervention, especially in Afghanistan, respectively the 9/11 attacks in New

York, Washington and Pennsylvania.

In this context, and considering the US position as a leading world democracy, it

would be reasonable to analyze a bit more what may have happen afterwards if US failed

to respond. Furthermore, since Hammond insists that it’s too excessive to emphasize the

reasons that led to such actions, according to him it’s also useless to invest in “some

higher moral purpose in the form of humanitarian and upholding human rights.” And

this is the exact conclusion that I consider is the most unsustainable.

The best example is certainly the process of disintegration of former Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which occupies a dominant part of Hammond’s

analysis. Hence I will intend to counterargument exactly this section and Hammond’s

one-sided discourse by providing the other side of his story, while simultaneously

arguing that humanitarian intervention is sometimes inevitable and that there’s no other

way of reporting it, but in human manner.

“The illegal” intervention and other Hammond’s allegations

As Hammond’s essay is concentrated on Kosovo, I will attempt to provide the

other side of the argumentation he provides, and to prove that his approach, although

aiming to criticize something else, is obviously wrong and one-sided.

In this regard, it is suitable to start with a perfectly comprehensive analysis of Adam

Roberts about the war in Kosovo.1

Contrary to Hammond, Roberts provides a detailed clarification why NATO

intervention was legitimate and legal. According to him, as obviously the

recommendations, resolutions and suggestions of all relevant international institutions

(EU, NATO, OSCE and UN) were ignored and violated by the Yugoslav authorities, it
1
Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo,’ Survival, Vol. 41, no. 3 (1 October 1999), Web
Souce: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=4&paper=816>
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became clear that no other alternative left but the use of force. It also became clear that

the decision for an NATO joint air-strike was far from being “an unambiguous violation

of international law,” as at least two “main legal arguments were used in support, the

first based on UN Security Council resolutions, the second on general international

law.”2

Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998, in particular, had demanded

that Yugoslavia inter alia 'cease all action by the security forces

affecting the civilian population', and had referred to possible

'further action' if measures demanded in the resolution were not

taken. In addition, Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998, by

demanding Serb compliance with a number of key provisions of

accords concluded in Belgrade on 15-16 October (including with the

NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo), accepted that the

Alliance had a direct standing and interest in the Kosovo issue. An

argument can be made that, even if the Security Council was not

able to follow these resolutions on Kosovo with a specific authority

to use force, they provided some legal basis for military action.3

Concerning the violation of the International Law, which Hammond also

mentions, Roberts argues that the note of October 1998 of the “UK Foreign and

Commonwealth Office, which circulated to NATO allies, suggests elements of both these

approaches: Security Council authorization to use force for humanitarian purposes is

now widely accepted (Bosnia and Somalia provided firm legal precedents). A UNSCR

would give a clear legal base for NATO action, as well as being politically desirable. But

2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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force can also be justified on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity

without a UNSCR.”

Furthermore, Roberts underlines precisely the criteria that would need to be

applied. Hammond meanwhile argues that the repetition of the pro-strike

announcements made by key British politicians “is a remarkable illustration of the

propaganda role played by the mainstream Western media in reporting Kosovo.”

Surprisingly, The Kosovo Report, compiled by the Independent International

Commission on Kosovo (IICK)4 provides somewhat different explanation.

Both NATO and the Belgrade government engaged in a propaganda war

and made exaggerated claims. Nevertheless, on the whole, journalists did

not allow themselves to be “spun.”... The Commission strongly condemns

the attempts by the Serbian government to place restrictions on their own

media’s coverage of the war and its aftermath, especially the detention of

Miroslav Filipovic for his interviews with FRY soldiers who took part in

operations in Kosovo, and for his publication of their admission of

atrocities and war crimes.5

It remains unclear for me why Hammond continuously digs for something that

opposes all kinds of developments concerning Kosovo intervention. He consequently

claims that even the Rambouillet Conference was intentionally designed to fail in order

to enable NATO strikes, while failing to provide any credible evidences except few

citations – out of their original context. Again, IICK stresses that:

4
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, ‘Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response,
Lessons Learned’, Oxford University Press (New York, 2000)
5
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Many observers doubt that Serbia participated at Rambouillet with either

an expectation or an intention of reaching agreement on the future of

Kosovo. Milosevic, it is argued, was using the negotiating process to buy

time to prepare for the next round of Serb military attacks in Kosovo. He

did not send a high-level delegation to Rambouillet, and those he did send

seemed to engage half-heartedly in the process.6

Further, even the total number of victims in Hammond’s essay differs from other

reliable sources. Although he mentions the UNHCR report emphasizing that the

situation in Kosovo before NATO intervention was “normal”, according to the statement

of regional Special Envoy of the UNHCR, Nicholas Morris, situation on the ground was

different.7 Morris emphasizes that Serb killings of Kosovars, as well as new

displacements occurred much earlier than NATO campaign. As a result, when UNHCR

suspended its operations, on 23 March 1999, there were possibly “over 260,000

internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Kosovo, over 100,000 IDPs or refugees in the

region, and over 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers outside the region.”8

Moreover, the UNHCR published an additional report after the war9 which for

the first time brings total number of victims. According to the report: “13,321 individuals

were killed, wounded, or went missing in the period from January 1998, when rebel

groups fought Yugoslav forces, during the NATO bombing of 1999, and until the arrival

of the international peacekeeping mission in December 2000. The fate of 1,886

individuals is still unknown.”10 Report also states that around 8,000-10,000 of those on

6
Ibid
7
Roberts citing Morris: from 'Coping with the Kosovo Crisis', Informal presentation at UNHCR
Headquarters (Geneva, 7 May 1999).
8
Ibid
9
UNHCR, ‘New Kosovo War Victims Report’, (Published on: 7 October 2009), Web-source:
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4adf20931a.html>
10
Ibid
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the list of war victims were Albanians, while some 2,000-2,500 were Serbs, Roma,

Bosnians and ethnic Albanians who were loyal to Serbia. Compared to Hammond’s

interest in providing just a total of 50,000 Serbs fled to Serbia or to Montenegro, as for

him it seems that Albanian victims were irrelevant, the official UNHCR report obviously

goes far beyond his deficient story.

For Hammond’s disappointment, even the Serbian sources are later contradicting

the reasons he mentions as being crucial for the displacement of Albanian population, as

well as the total number of victims and missing persons and the way they were killed.

While Hammond insists that Albanians were afraid from NATO bombs and therefore

fled from Kosovo, the story of the Serbian news agency Beta, published in daily Politika 11

reports that Hague Tribunal has convicted the former vice-prime minister of FRY, Nikola

Sainovic, the former commander of the 3rd Army of Yugoslav Army (VJ), Nebojsa

Pavkovic and the former chief of VJ Headquarters, Sreten Lukic, with 2o years of

imprisonment, each. Two other high state officials, generals Dragoljub Ojdanic and

Vladimir Lazarevic were sentenced with 15 years of imprisonment, each.

“Sainovic, Pavkovic and Lukic were found guilty of being the key players in the

“joint criminal venture” of violent expulsion of Albanian civil population from Kosovo,

from March till June 1999, whose aim was “the alternation of ethnical equilibration

aiming to maintain Serbian control” on Kosovo.”12 Politika also emphasizes that they

were found guilty for violent displacement, deportation, killings and expulsion of

Albanian population in Kosovo, as the Tribunal has documented that Serbian forces

expelled hundred of thousands of Albanians through a wide and organized terror

campaign, including mass killings. “The Tribunal concluded that massive expulsion of

Kosovo Albanians was not caused by NATO bombardment nor by the conflict between

11
Beta, ‘Hag: postojao plan proterivanja Albanaca,’ Politika (Belgrade: 27 February, 2009), Web-source:
<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Hag-postojao-plan-proterivanja-Albanaca.lt.html>
12
Ibid
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VJ and Serbian police forces with the KLA, as claimed by the defense of the accused.” 13

Beta, concludes that the Tribunal accepted that Serbian military forces at the beginning

of NATO bombardments systematically attacked the Albanian localities. They robbed,

killed and maltreated them, while ordering to leave for Albania or Montenegro and in

parallel burned their houses and destroyed their property. “The bodies of some executed

persons were later found in the massive grave in Batajnica,” Politika cites the words of

Judge Iain Bonomy.

For Hammond was an easy task to get access to information’s concerning

Batajnica, Petrovo Selo and Perucac mass graves, since their existence was divulged by

the Government of Zoran Djindjic14 in 2001, way before he wrote this essay.

“The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs has formed secret mass graves in Serbia

to hide traces of war crimes committed in Kosovo,” points out the Report of Belgrade

based NGO Fond za Humanitarno Pravo,15 while explaining that eight such graves

located in Batajnica military camp were exhumed during summer 2001, and during

summer and fall 2002. Furthermore, the Report reiterates that few serious indications

points out that during Milosevic’s era lots of Albanian victims were burned in some

factories which used high temperature furnaces. As such example Report mentions

Mackatica factory where, as a group of NGO’s pointed out to the Speaker of the Serbian

Parliament in 2004, dozens of Albanian bodies were burned. Speaker of the Parliament

didn’t respond back or initiated any investigations, which is not surprising as he was a

13
Ibid
14
The existence of secret mass graves in Serbia was accepted by the first democratically elected government in Serbia,
after the extradition of former president of RFY Slobodan Milosevic. According to the Government of late Prime
Minister Zoran Djindjic, Serbian forces have transported around 1,000 bodies of Kosovo Albanians, from secret mass
graves in Kosovo, and buried them in secret mass graves in Serbia. Such graves existed inside the military polygon of
the special antiterrorist units of Serbian police (SAJ) in Batajnica, near the other training camp of the unit for special
operations of the Serbian police (JSO) in Petrovo Selo, and near the lake of Perucac.
15
Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, ‘Sudbina nestalih Albanaca na Kosovu,’ Report for 2005 (Belgrade: 23
November 2005), Web-source:
<http://www.hlc-rdc.org/uploads/editor/file/Izvestaji/Kosovo-izvestaj/Sudbina%20nestalih%20Albanaca-
izvestaj-SRP-23.11.05-ff.pdf>
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member of the Serb Radical Party, whose chief is being prosecuted by the Hague

Tribunal.

Hereto, it is exactly ‘The Programme of the Serb Radical party,’ adopted in May

1996, which proves that the organized genocide in Kosovo has been planned and well-

known for years, and was neither a surprise nor caused by NATO efforts to stop it.16 The

Programme suggest “- to expel without delay all 360 thousand Albanian emigrants and

their descendants," [along with a series of proposals, spelled out, to destroy all aspects of

Kosovar Albanian culture, economy, society, social benefits, and existence]. The claim

here is that 360,000 Albanians entered Kosovo illegally during WW2 and that they, and

their descendants, which would add up to almost every Albanian in Kosovo, should be

expelled.17

A self-styled anti-imperialist

As the humanitarian interventions are varying from one another, they need to be

studied separately and according to their initial cause, thus the alignment of these

arguments represents a factual contradiction to Hammond’s stance. Because of these

kinds of analysts Kosovo war still remains controversial, ten years after it ended.

“Self-styled anti-imperialists, all too often apologists for the imperialism of any

regime that opposes the west, have constructed an alternative history in which Slobodan

Milosevic's crimes are minimized or excused and a rapacious west portrayed as the

instigator of violence,” David Clark18 stresses in his comment published in The

Guardian.19

16
Helsinki Committee in Serbia, ‘The Radicalisation of the Serbian Society,’ (Belgrade, 1997), Web-source:
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070509101140/http:/www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/srpclean2.htm
>
17
Ibid
18
David Clark served as Europe adviser at the Foreign Office, 1997-2001.
19
David Clark, ‘Kosovo was a just war, not an imperialist dress rehearsal,’ The Guardian (Thursday, 16 April
2009), Web source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/16/clark-kosovo-war-crimes>
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Conclusively, considering the fact that many undemocratic states were and are

still violating the very basic human rights of their citizens, it goes without saying that in

the era of globalization the US and other Western democracies have to, firstly, try to

convince them that they’re wrong, but if those attempts fail the only remaining tool is

military action. Not to mention the fact that journalism is, above all, a mission and not

strictly a profession, thus it is logical that journalists will cover only what they see and

how that is perceived by them. Having said this, one cannot argue that reporting is one-

sided just because it doesn’t fit his agenda. Let’s, hypothetically, assume what may

happen if journalists will not raise awareness about a certain issue that may, except

specific state, affect that specific region – as was the case with former Yugoslavia.

Journalism is supposed to inform and raise concerns to the public when something is

going wrong – anywhere. Following Hammond’s logic both, the international

community and media, should remain inactive toward any possible consequence

regardless of its possible wider impact. Hence I absolutely share Mr. Clark’s opinion that

this kind of perceiving things is wrong. Philip Hammond would obviously disagree.
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References:

- Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo,’ Survival, Vol. 41, no. 3 (1 October
1999), Web Souce: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?
outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=4&paper=816> [accessed online on 2 February 2010]

- Beta, ‘Hag: postojao plan proterivanja Albanaca,’ Politika (Belgrade: 27 February, 2009), Web-
source: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Hag-postojao-plan-proterivanja-
Albanaca.lt.html> [accessed online on 3 February 2010]

- David Clark, ‘Kosovo was a just war, not an imperialist dress rehearsal,’ The Guardian
(Thursday, 16 April 2009), Web source:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/16/clark-kosovo-war-crimes> [accessed
online on 5 February 2010]

- Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, ‘Sudbina nestalih Albanaca na Kosovu,’ Report for 2005
(Belgrade: 23 November 2005), Web-source:
<http://www.hlc-rdc.org/uploads/editor/file/Izvestaji/Kosovo-izvestaj/Sudbina%20nestalih
%20Albanaca-izvestaj-SRP-23.11.05-ff.pdf> [accessed online 8 February 2010]

- Helsinki Committee in Serbia, ‘The Radicalisation of the Serbian Society,’ (Belgrade, 1997),
Web-source:
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070509101140/http:/www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/srp
clean2.htm> [accessed online on 11 February 2010]

- Independent International Commission on Kosovo, ‘Kosovo Report: Conflict, International

Response, Lessons Learned’, Oxford University Press (New York, 2000)

- UNHCR, ‘New Kosovo War Victims Report’, (Published on: 7 October 2009), Web-source:
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4adf20931a.html> [accessed online on 6 February 2010]