NCC Art. 14.

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall

be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
RPC
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the
treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this
Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these
islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding
number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the
law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

G.R. No. L-18176

October 26, 1966

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.
Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant
Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and
she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved
that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and

that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this
motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila
pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the
purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the case was heard on
the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing
plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could
not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do
not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having
been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the
case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue
in the appeal.
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been
solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a
given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have
jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the
parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of
first instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations.3
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission
thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. 4 Defendant
was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of
summons by publication.5
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and
status affects or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the
relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. 6 Jurisdiction over the
same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place
of celebration of marriage, or thelocus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a
citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject
to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and under
plaintiff's theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not
deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her
marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status
therein involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract
or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on
the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of
another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly,
that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of
marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national
of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it

follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could
validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.
As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he
met the defendant in Pusan Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was
operating a nightclub; that they lived together from November 1952 to April
1955; that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as
attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding
she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language,
and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could
contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left
the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in
October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and
its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February
16, 1958, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that
as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her
reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea;
that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant
confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a
Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting
marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her
whereabouts are now unknown to him.
The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that
defendant was married to another person prior to March 15, 1953, and we
agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely
purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly,
the record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal
knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning defendant's status on
February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant was a native, not of
Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more
than hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the
defendant with the contents of Exhibit B, defendant did not say that she
had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having
previously lived with several other men, adding, however, that she had no
impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous marriage.
Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish
defendant's qualification to contract marriage, why is it that the wedding
took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that defendant
was married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that
Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that
the foreign law is identical to the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the
Philippine Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant,
to the effect that, although she had cohabited before with other men, there
was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous
marriage on her part would have been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle to
her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D

contains spaces for the entry of data on whether any of the contracting
parties had been previously married; whether the prior marriage had been
dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such decree, the
date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy
were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that
defendant had had no previous marriage?
Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for
unless full faith and credence are given to his testimony, but we cannot
believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it
suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage
with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this
was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida
Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his
marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he
did no more than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain
documents the contents of which he did not read.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J, is on leave.

Footnotes
1

Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (1918) 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs.

Dizon (1939) 69 Phil. 186; Perkins vs. Roxas (1941) 72 Phil. 514;
Reyes vs. Diaz (1941) 73 Phil. 484; I Moran, Rules of Court (1963
ed.) pp. 32-34.
2

Republic Act 296, Sec. 44(e).

Republic Act 409, Sec. 39-A(c) (as added by Republic Act 1401,
Sec. 1).
4

Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General (1911) 20 Phil. 523; 21

C.J.S. Sec. 82, Courts, p. 122; see also, Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 113, Comment (e).
5

Rule 14, Sec. 17, Rules of Court; Bing Gee vs. Chan Lai Young Gee
(1949) (Cal.) 202 P2d 360; Piper vs. Piper (1907), 91 Pac. 198; Buzzi
vs. Buzzi, 205 Pac. 2d 1125 (1949) (Cal.).

Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage, 32 Harvard Law Review,

806, 810; Leelar Conflict of Laws (1959), p. 305; Freeman on
Judgments, Sec. 1512, Vol. 3.
7

15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, sec. 15; I Beale Conflict of Laws (1935),

p. 468; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 355; 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment
of Marriage, Sec. 60, p. 481; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
115, Anno. 128 ALR 69.
8

4 Am. Jur., Sec. 65 Annulment of Marriage, pp. 484-485.

International Harvester Co. vs. Hamburg-American Line, (1918) 42

Phil. 845; Beale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 3, Sec. 622A-2; Rabel, Conflict
of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol. 4, p. 493.
10

Incidentally, he would not have so lied had he believed that bigamy

or polygamy is not forbidden in Korea.

NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
FCC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6),
3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)

THIRD DIVISION
ATCI
OVERSEAS G.R. No. 178551
CORPORATION, AMALIA G.
IKDAL and MINISTRY OF Present:
PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J.,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent
.

Promulgated:
October 11, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,[1] all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary
period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board
Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated
from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed
the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondents request for reconsideration, she

returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air
fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint [2] for illegal dismissal against petitioner
ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia
Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision[3] of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that
petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant
respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee,
held

that

respondent

was

illegally

dismissed

and

accordingly

ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the
three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision by Resolution[4] of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution [5] of April 22, 2004,
they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the
Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly
dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year
period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision[6] of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the
NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent
of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with
it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment
agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the
contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly
and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment
agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of

Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution[7] of June 27, 2007, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondents

employment

contract

specifically

stipulates

that

her

employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of

Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals
and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts
(Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the
customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the
host country.
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor
laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency
which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing
to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be
held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially
determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign
principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that

such foreign principals liability must first be established before it, as agent,
can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely
affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad[8] explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local agent and
its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide
to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not
at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of
the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed
pursuant
to
the
said
recruitment
agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very
purpose for which the law governing the employment of
workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis
supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the
state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. [9] Verily, to allow
petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or
to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before
petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability
inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary
employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that
the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil
Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to
such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between

the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern
their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the
doctrine of processual presumptionwhich, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. The

Courts

ruling

in EDI-Staffbuilders

Intl.,

v.

NLRC[10] illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes
for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to
the
termination
of
the
employment
of
Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of
fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He
is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine
of presumed-identity
approach or processual
presumptioncomes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,

hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public

documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever

a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA
between

respondent

and

the Ministry, as

represented

by ATCI,

which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one

(1) year and that the host countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations
apply; a translated copy[11] (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,[12] both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs
Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents letter[13] of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8)
months of employment, she was given a rating of Excellent albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary

employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy

of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated
by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what
petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter
which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from
Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was
validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from
Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
presented to this Office for review and certification and the
same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested
party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
supplied)

Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the

same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money
claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The
liability
of
the
principal/employer
and
the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance
bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or

damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the

recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[1]

Annex C of the petition, rollo, pp. 59-60.

CA rollo, p. 197.
[3]
Id at. 32-36. Penned by Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro Franco.
[4]
Id. at 26-29. Penned by Commissioner (now CA Associate Justice)
Angelita A. Gacutan and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner
Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.
[5]
Id. at 30-31.
[2]

[6]

Id. at 95-104. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta

and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Normandie B. Pizarro.
[7]
Id. at 137. Ibid.
[8]

G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639, 645 citing Catan v.
NLRC, 160 SCRA 691.
[9]
Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower And Promotion Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 156029, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 41, 42.
[10]
G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 409, 430.
[11]
Annex D of the petition, rollo, pp. 61-63.
[12]
Annex D-1 of the petition, id. at 64-66
[13]
Annex E of the petition, id. at 67.

SECOND DIVISION
TUNA PROCESSING, INC.,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 185582

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

-versus-

PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 29, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the

Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue
here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,[1] petitioner
Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution [2] dated 21 November
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and
the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.In the assailed
Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioners Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition,

and

Enforcement

of

Foreign

Arbitral

Award [3] against

respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, [4] on the ground
that petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue.[5]
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as
the licensor), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters
Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively
referred to as the Yamaoka Patent), [6] and five (5) Philippine tuna
processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc.,
Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent
Kingford (collectively referred to as the sponsors/licensees) [7] entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[8] pertinent provisions of which read:
1.

Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of

U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three
aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those patents,
and collecting royalties.
The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned
patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia,
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with
Licensor.

xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto
agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. (TPI), a
corporation established in the State of California, in order to
implement the objectives of this Agreement.
5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in
the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit
funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated
to spend in connection with the implementation of this
Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the
purpose of being elected as member of the board of
directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the
Sponsors according to their respective equity shares. [9]

xxx
The

parties

likewise

executed

Supplemental

Memorandum

of

Agreement[10] dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend

Memorandum of Agreement[11] dated 14 July 2003.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees,
including

respondent

Kingford,

withdrew

from

petitioner

TPI

and

correspondingly reneged on their obligations. [12] Petitioner submitted the

dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
in the State of California, United States and won the case against
respondent.[13] Pertinent portions of the award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this
Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the
total
sum
to
be
paid
by RESPONDENT
KINGFORD toCLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due
assessments, RESPONDENT
KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE
DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20%
of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate
with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum
ofTWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS
($271,490.20)[;][14] and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of
the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS
($1,250,000.00). xxx
xxx[15]

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007

a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The petition was raffled to
Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. [16] After
the court denied the motion for lack of merit, [17] respondent sought for the
inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order
denying the motion.[18] Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding
[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the motion.
[19]

Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in

turn, granted respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the

petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the
Philippines.[20]
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing
its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was
correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioners lack of
legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such

corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine

courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action
recognized under Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed
the petition. Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPIs Petition, etc. acknowledges that it is a
foreign corporation established in the State of California and was
given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka
Patent and was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said
patent and collect corresponding royalties in the Philippines. TPI
likewise admits that it does not have a license to do business in
the Philippines.
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that
TPI has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a
license to do so issued by the concerned government agency of
the Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from
five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent Philippine
Kingford, Inc. This being the real situation, TPI cannot be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines. A priori, the Petition, etc. extant of the plaintiff TPI
should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to
sue in the Philippines.[21]
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the
recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004),[22] the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model
Law),[23]as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the
enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on
the following:
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on
a ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this
reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most
Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the

Philippines international obligations and State policy to

strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution may be
defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in the
relevant laws.[24]
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation
Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model Law on
the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature
and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law,
viz-a-viz other special laws.Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,[25] this Court
rejected the application of the Corporation Code and applied the New
Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:
Korugas invocation of the provisions of the Corporation
Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents,
we ruled that:
The Corporation Code, however, is a general law
applying to all types of corporations, while the New
Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other
financial institutions, including the dissolution and
liquidation thereof. As between a general and special
law, the latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non
derogant. (Emphasis supplied)[26]
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council,[27] this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law
providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on
agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non derogant.[28]

Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act

of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the
Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution,
and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted to
actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the

freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their

disputes.[29] It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party
opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award.[30]
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a
municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to
discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York
Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.
In

particular,

the Alternative

Dispute

Resolution

Act

of

2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by specifically

providing:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The
New York Convention shall govern the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.
xxx
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to
a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance
with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme
Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the
New York Convention. Any other ground raised shall be
disregarded by the regional trial court.
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration. International commercial arbitration shall
be governed by the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (the Model Law) adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx.
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the
affirmative.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides

that the opposing party in an application for recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated
under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition
and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the
said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law
of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and
enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue
of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative

Dispute Resolution,[31] which was promulgated by the Supreme Court,
likewise support this position.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award. The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5.
[32]

Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral

awards or arbitrations in instances where the place of arbitration is in the

Philippines,[33] it is specifically required that a petition to determine any
question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such
arbitration agreement[34] available to the parties before the commencement
of arbitration and/or a petition for judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral
tribunal

on

preliminary

question

upholding

or

declining

its

jurisdiction[35] after arbitration has already commenced should state [t]he

facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have
legal capacity to sue or be sued.[36]
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a
foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that
bars

foreign

corporations

not

licensed

to

do

business

in

the

Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters

into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause

and,

as

in

this

case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract,

by the

arbitration

and

by

the

result

of

arbitration,

conceding

thereby the capacity of the otherparty to enter into the contract, participate
in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not
on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,[37] to wit:
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is
gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If
its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved
party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very

beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent

in consensual contracts.[38]
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award
should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and
procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any
conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the
court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York
Convention, governs the subject arbitral award, [39] petitioner may still seek
recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since
the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for
refusing recognition or enforcement.[40]
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the
foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
II
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise
unmeritorious.
First. There is no need to consider respondents contention that
petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited that its
act of entering into a MOA should not be considered doing business in the
Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that
the foreign corporations capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material
insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is
concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for
reconsideration

of

the

assailed

Resolution

dated

21

November

2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the prior
filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule
45.[41]

Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of

hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants the
outright dismissal of the case,[42] we opt to relax the rules following the
pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,[43] to wit:
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of
courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual
allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of
facts.[44] A strict application of this rule may be excused when the
reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present
case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In these
types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we
merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the
unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the
legal issues outright.[45]
Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein
raised should be seriously considered.[46] Surely, there is a need to take
cognizance of the case not only to guide the bench and the bar, but if only
to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the
policy of the State embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end,
the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to
achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets.
xxx
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the
foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a quo where
its recognition and enforcement is being sought.
Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of
origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review

on certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court. [47] We, however,
find petitioners reply in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to Branch 67 in petitioner TPIs
Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 is a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by
respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated
from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPIs motion was
received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.[48]
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone,
precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M6533 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
Branch 61 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 36-59.

Id. at 65-75. Penned by Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati City.
[3]
Id. at 105-113.
[4]
Id. at 41. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
[5]
Id. at 72-75. Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the RTC.
[6]
The Yamaoka Patent pertains to the extra-low temperature smoking
process using filtered smoke on fresh tuna which prevents the
discoloration of the tuna and ensures its freshness during the frozen
state. Id. at 41. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
[7]
Id. at 40. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
[8]
Id. at 76-83.
[9]
Id. at 76-77.
[2]

[10]

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 87-89.
[12]
Id. at 42. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
[13]
Id. at 93-99. Award of Arbitrator dated 26 July 2007. Id. at 103104. Disposition of Application for Modification of Award of Arbitrators
dated 13 September 2007.
[14]
Id. at 103. Pursuant to the Disposition of Application for Modification of
Award of Arbitrators dated 13 September 2007, which modified the
Award of Arbitrator dated 26 July 2007.
[15]
Id. at 97-98. Award of Arbitrator dated 26 July 2007.
[16]
Id. at 184-195.
[17]
Id. at 294-302. Order dated 20 May 2008.
[18]
Id. at 303-326. Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration
dated 30 May 2008.
[19]
Id. at 337-338. Order dated 11 June 2008.
[20]
Id. at 65-75. Resolution dated 21 November 2008.
[21]
Id. at 72-73. Resolution dated 21 November 2008.
[22]
Republic Act No. 9285 approved on 2 April 2004.
[23]
As adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law on 21 June 1985, and as amended by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006.
[24]
Rollo, p. 38. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
[25]
G.R. No. 169053, 19 June 2009, 590 SCRA 49.
[26]
Id. at 68 citing In re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet), Inc., Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 158261, 18
December 2006, 511 SCRA 123, 141 further citing Laureano v. Court
of Appeals, 381 Phil. 403, 411-412 (2000).
[27]
G.R. No. 171101, 5 July 2011, 653 SCRA 154.
[28]
Id. at 244 citing Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., supra note 24.
[29]
Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 9285.
[30]
Secs. 42 and 45, Republic Act No. 9285, which adopted the New York
Convention; and Sec. 19, Republic Act No. 9285, which adopted the
entire provisions of the Model Law.
[31]
A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009.
[32]
RULE 13.5. Contents of petition. The petition shall state the following:
a.
The addresses of the parties to arbitration;
b.
In the absence of any indication in the award, the country
where the arbitral award was made and whether such country is
a signatory to the New York Convention; and
c.
The relief sought.
Apart from other submissions, the petition shall have attached to it
the following:
a.
An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement; and
b.
An authentic copy of the arbitral award.
If the foreign arbitral award or agreement to arbitrate or submission
is not made in English, the petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
translation of these documents into English. The translation shall be
[11]

certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or

consular agent. A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009.
[33]
Rule 3.1, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009.
[34]
Rule 3.2, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009.
[35]
Rule 3.12, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009.
[36]
In relation to a petition to determine any question concerning the
existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement
available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration, Rule
3.6 provides:
RULE 3.6. Contents of petition. The verified petition shall
state the following:
a.
The facts showing that the persons named as
petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be
sued;
b.
The nature and substance of the dispute between the
parties;
c.
The grounds and the circumstances relied upon by
the petitioner to establish his position; and
d.
The relief/s sought.
Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to
the petition an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement.
In relation to a petition for judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral
tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its
jurisdiction after arbitration has already commenced, Rule 3.16 reads:
RULE 3.16. Contents of petition. The petition shall state the
following:
a.
The facts showing that the person named as
petitioner or respondent has legal capacity to sue or be
sued;
b.
The nature and substance of the dispute between the
parties;
c.
The grounds and circumstances relied upon by the
petitioner; and
d.
The relief/s sought.
In addition to the submissions, the petitioner shall attach to
the petition a copy of the request for arbitration and the ruling
of the arbitral tribunal.
The arbitrators shall be impleaded as nominal parties to the
case and shall be notified of the progress of the case.
[37]
[38]

G.R. No. 121171, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 579

Id. at 631.

[39]

In its Resolution dated 21 November 2008, the court a quo observed:

This reliance by TPI solely upon the New York Convention in
conjunction with Section 42 of Republic Act No. 9285 may not be
correct. It is apparent from the Award of Arbitrator that the
International Centre [f]or Dispute Resolution is a Commercial
Arbitration Tribunal and hence, it is engaged in commercial
arbitration. Under the third sentence of Section 40 of Republic Act No.
9285, [t]he recognition and enforcement of an award in an
international commercial arbitration shall be governed by Article 35 of
the Model Law [the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on 21 June 1985] and not the so-called New
York Convention. Rollo, p. 74.
[40]
Article 36 of the Model Law provides:
Article 36. Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of
the country in which it was made, may be refused only:
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party
furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is
sought proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreeement of the parties or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of
the country where the arbitration took place; or
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been
set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made; or
(b) if the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of this State; or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of this State.
(2) xxx

[41]

San Miguel Corporation v. Layoc, Jr., G.R. No. 149640, 19 October,

2007, 537 SCRA 77, 91; Bases Conversion and Development
Authority v. Uy, G.R. No. 144062, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 524,
534; and Paa v. CA, G.R. No. 126560, 4 December 1997, 282 SCRA
448.
[42]
Catly v. Navarro, G.R. No. 167239, 5 May 2010, 620 SCRA 151, 193.
[43]
G.R. No. 156164, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 229.
[44]
Id. at 238 citing Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, G.R. No. 143951, 25
October 2005, 474 SCRA 153,161; Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and
155661, 21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 575, 584.
[45]
Id.
[46]
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 27
January 2004, 421 SCRA 148, 183.
[47]
Rollo, pp. 427-428. Comment/Opposition on the petition dated 1 April
2009.
[48]
Id. at 459. Reply to COMMENT/OPPOSITION (Re: Petitoner Tuna
Processing, Inc.s Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule 45
dated January 23, 2009) dated 1 April 2009.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et
al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who predeceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a
total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each

or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor

pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court
to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict
of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,
while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art.
10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing
from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in

this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the
opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief
after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the
printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs
filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95

Phil. 500.

G.R. No. L-23145

November 29, 1968

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO

D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, United States of
America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in
New York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a
Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate
claims of local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable

Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this
tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated
February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in
connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of
Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of
stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
(2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to
issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said
corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate
Division of this Court."1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the
domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, but by
the Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal
cannot possibly prosper. The challenged order represents a response and
expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific
problem, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific
remedies, with full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and
significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in
New York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the County
Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased. 2 Then came this portion of the
appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted
ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila;
Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January
22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute
arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the
possession of the stock certificates in question. On January 27, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator,
County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did
not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary
administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate
or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of
Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or]
considered as lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits
that "it is immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the
possession of the stock certificates in question; appellant opposed the
petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are
in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...." 4

It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates
cannot be declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that
there was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before
new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The
challenged order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority
sought to be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary
administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then,
can this order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was
called for by the realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that
conduct bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot
without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the
law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a
solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being
buttressed by indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy
considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the
honor of the judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this
challenged order, there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of contingent
frustration brought about by the persistence of the domiciliary administrator
to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its
appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for
relief from a previous order of March 15, 1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and
effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided
would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the
domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously
ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed,
insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete
paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the
appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets
of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such
a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of
local creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is
a "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether
principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found
within the state or country where it was granted," the corollary being "that
an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country." 6

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator

was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often
necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a
person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well
as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which
is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the
principal administration, while any other administration is termed the
ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits
of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a
foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other
than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed
among his heirs."7
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore
be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal
Revenue8 finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the
shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled
[here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even
appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so
even if it were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather
conclusive fashion for the legality of the challenged order, how does
appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely heavy
burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would
assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its
"considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of
Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..." 9 More
specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court could not "consider
as lost" the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his
Honor the trial Judge knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the
appellee, that the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in
the possession of the domiciliary administrator in New York." 10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court.
That certainly does not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order.
Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary
administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant
corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the

Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering

them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being
made to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this
case domiciled abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in
refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to
contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere
scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant
disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower
court did not correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality
of truth may be lacking in such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be
remembered however, again to borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which
the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an
important part in its development."11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state
fictions "were devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and
at times offensive."12 Some of them have persisted even to the present, that
eminent jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the
constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if"
today."13 He likewise noted "a class of fictions of another order, the fiction
which is a working tool of thought, but which at times hides itself from view
till reflection and analysis have brought it to the light." 14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that
fictions as such played in the law. There should be then on the part of the
appellant a further refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such
judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the employment of a legal
fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial order
being disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most
obvious is that this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above
contention by its invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would
set forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed
stock certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or the
pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates
of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate
or certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the
ownership [thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to
apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator
did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise

the express admission of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is

immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to
such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety
exists between the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the
latter is to be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution
overrides a statute, to which, however, the judiciary must yield deference,
when appropriately invoked and deemed applicable. It would be most
highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded such
a high estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but
yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled
unless the appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its
by-laws does not impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly
constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible
court action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in the
circumstances as they have developed gives substance to such a fear.
Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to
nullify the lawful exercise of judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
is fraught with implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate
theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial
being created by operation of law...." 16 It owes its life to the state, its birth
being purely dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a
corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence
through creation by a sovereign power." 17As a matter of fact, the statutory
language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the
Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." 18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A
corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as
though it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an
artificial person distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It
owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain
specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is
fixed by its charter."19 Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person,
resulting from an association of human beings granted legal personality by
the state, puts the matter neatly.20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme
of which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social
and legal entity, independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A

corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any

existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to law.
It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of
a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately
refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding
the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following
American law still of persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more
often within the ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches.
It institutes the appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it
is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty under
the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to
disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but
license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so
minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to contend
that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be
ignored at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was
shown that in a guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court,
the United States Veterans Administration filed a motion for the refund of a
certain sum of money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that
the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the deceased
father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination
arrived at by its main office in the United States. The motion was denied. In
seeking a reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an
American federal statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on all
questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to examine
the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States
court."23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus:
"We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of
the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S.
Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property
submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present
case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant.
There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator
(which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are
imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United
States courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks
a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions
therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would
make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a
party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals

of judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of

the Veterans' Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to
accept as final and conclusive, determinations made by foreign
governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any
coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction,
the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the
whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more
offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which
appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by
its failure to accept the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its
reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed.
The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to
the necessity of negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot
succeed. It is always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive
possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not settle the issue. What carries
weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the just solution obtained,
grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its
correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For through the
appealed order, the imperative requirement of justice according to law is
satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the
Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With
costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur in
the result.

Footnotes
1

Statement of the Case and Issues Involved, Brief for the OppositorAppellant, p. 2.
2

Ibid, p. 3.

Ibid, pp. 3 to 4.

Ibid, p. 4.

Rule 84, Sec. 3, Rules of Court. Cf. Pavia v. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70

(1907); Suiliong and Co. v. Chio Taysan, 12 Phil. 13 (1908);
Malahacan v. Ignacio, 19 Phil. 434 (1911); McMicking v. Sy Conbieng,
21 Phil. 211 (1912); In re Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. 573 (1913);
Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209 (1914); Jaucian v. Querol, 38 Phil.
707 (1918); Buenaventura v. Ramos, 43 Phil. 704 (1922); Roxas v.
Pecson, 82 Phil. 407 (1948); De Borja v. De Boria, 83 Phil. 405
(1949); Barraca v. Zayco, 88 Phil. 774 (1951); Pabilonia v. Santiago,
93 Phil. 516 (1953); Sison v. Teodoro, 98 Phil. 680 (1956); Ozaeta v.
Palanca, 101 Phil. 976 (1957); Natividad Castelvi de Raquiza v.
Castelvi, et al, L-17630, Oct. 31, 1963; Habana v. Imbo, L-15598 & L15726, March 31, 1964; Gliceria Liwanag v. Hon. Luis Reyes, L19159, Sept. 29, 1964; Ignacio v. Elchico, L-18937, May 16, 1967.
6

Leon and Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life, Inc. Co., 990 Phil. 459
(1951).
7

Johannes v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 175, 177-178 (1922).

70 Phil. 325 (1940). Cf. Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 (1939).

Brief for Oppositor-Appellant, p. 5. The Assignment of Error reads:

"The lower court erred in entering its order of May 18, 1964, (1)
considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of
Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, (2)
ordering the said certificates cancelled, and (3) ordering appellant to
issue new certificates in lieu thereof and to deliver them to the
ancillary administrator of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade
Perkins or to the probate division of the lower court."
10

Ibid, pp. 5 to 6.

11

Nashville C. St. Louis Ry v. Browning, 310 US 362 (1940).

12

Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, 34 (1928).

13

Ibid, p. 34.

14

Ibid, p. 34. The late Professor Gray in his The Nature and Sources
of the Law, distinguished, following Ihering, historic fictions from
dogmatic fictions, the former being devices to allow the addition of
new law to old without changing the form of the old law and the latter
being intended to arrange recognized and established doctrines
under the most convenient forms. pp. 30, 36 (1909) Speaking of
historic fictions, Gray added: "Such fictions have had their field of
operation largely in the domain of procedure, and have consisted in
pretending that a person or thing was other than which he or it was in
truth (or that an event had occurred which had not in fact occurred)
for the purpose of thereby giving an action at law to or against a
person who did not really come within the class to or against which

the old section was confined." Ibid, pp. 30-31. See also Pound, The
Philosophy of Law, pp. 179, 180, 274 (1922).
15

This is what the particular by-law provides: Section 10. Lost, Stolen
or Destroyed Certificates. Any registered stockholder claiming a
certificate or certificates of stock to be lost, stolen or destroyed shall
file an affidavit in triplicate with the Secretary of the Company, or with
one of its Transfer Agents, setting forth, if possible, the circumstances
as to how, when and where said certificate or certificates was or were
lost, stolen or destroyed, the number of shares represented by the
certificate or by each of the certificates, the serial number or numbers
of the certificate or certificates, and the name of this Company. The
registered stockholder shall also submit such other information and
evidence which he may deem necessary.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If a contest is presented to the Company, or if an action is pending in

court regarding the ownership of said certificate or certificates of
stock which have been claimed to have been lost, stolen or
destroyed, the issuance of the new certificate or certificates in lieu of
that or those claimed to have been lost, stolen or destroyed, shall be
suspended until final decision by the court regarding the ownership of
said certificate or certificates. Brief for Oppositor-Appelant, pp. 8-10.
16

Sec. 2, Act No. 1459 (1906).

17

Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Co. Law Rev. 343 (1907).

18

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat, 518 (1819). Cook would

trace such a concept to Lord Coke. See 1 Cook on Corporations, p. 2
(1923).
19

Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, pp. 19-20 (1931). Chancellor

Kent and Chief Justice Baldwin of Connecticut were likewise cited to
the same effect. At pp. 12-13.
20

4 Pound on Jurisprudence, pp. 207-209 (1959).

21

Friedmann, Legal Theory, pp. 164-168 (1947). See also

Holdsworth, English Corporation Law, 31 Yale Law Journal, 382
(1922).
22

101 Phil. 762 (1957).

23

38 USCA, Sec. 808.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. (11a)
THIRD DIVISION

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON

ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD.,

G.R. No. 149177

Present:

Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
MINORU KITAMURA,
Respondent.

November 23, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001
Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co.,

Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign
governments,[3] entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
(ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines. [4] The agreement provides
that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a
year starting on April 1, 1999.[5] Nippon then assigned respondent to
work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR)

Project

in

the Philippines,

following

the

company's

consultancy contract with the Philippine Government. [6]

When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy
services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed
engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.[7] Respondent was named as the
project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1. [8]

On February

28,

2000,

petitioner

Kazuhiro

Hasegawa, Nippon's

general manager for its International Division, informed respondent

that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing
his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to
the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000,
just in time for the ICA's expiry.[9]

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his

lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be
assigned to the BBRI project. Nipponinsisted that respondents
contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to
negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.[10]

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the

petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil
Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with
the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.[11]

For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected
in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the
claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be
heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.[12]

In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's

request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as
project manager of the BBRI Project.[13]

On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government
v. Frank[14] that matters connected with the performance of contracts

are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance,

[15]

denied the motion to dismiss.[16] The trial court subsequently

denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, [17] prompting them to

file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].
[18]

On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on

procedural groundsfor lack of statement of material dates and for

insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping.
[19]

An Entry of Judgment was later issued by the appellate court

on September 20, 2000.[20]

Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA,

on September

19,

2000,

still

within

the

reglementary

period,

a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating therein

the material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification and
certification. This second petition, which substantially raised the
same issues as those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60827.[21]

Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court

rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision[22] finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
The CA ruled,

among others,

that the principle of lex loci

celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the

pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The
CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead
the principle of lex loci solutionis.[23]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by

the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.[24]

Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials,

petitioners

instituted

the

instant

Petition

for

Review

on Certiorari[25] imputing the following errors to the appellate court:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY
EXERCISED
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A
QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO
JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO,
JAPAN.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR
ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI
SOLUTIONISIN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S]
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS.[26]

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is

whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil
cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts
executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on
the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the
most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.

However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the

procedural matters raised by the respondent.

Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in

CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing of the second

petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the

same issues as those in the first one) and the instant petition for
review thereof.

We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on

account of the petition's defective certification of non-forum
shopping, it was a dismissal without prejudice. [27] The same holds true
in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in the formal
requirement of verification[28] and in the other requirement in Rule 46
of the Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates. [29] The
dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the petition,
or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification
and certificationas they, in fact didand stating therein the material
dates, within the prescribed period [30] in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said
Rules.[31]

The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a

decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter
in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been
commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the
merits does not bar another action involving the same parties, on the
same subject matter and theory.[32]

Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res
judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and
certification of the secondcertiorari petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds,[33] petitioners are no longer required by
the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the
instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of the
aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the
certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not

constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a
fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are no longer present.[34]

The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner

Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon,
the certiorari petition filed with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the
Authorization[35] dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
second certiorari petition and which is also attached to the instant petition
for review, is limited in scopeits wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given
the authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the
petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to
the instant petition for review.[36] In a plethora of cases, however, this Court
has liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its application whenever
a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements
have been made.[37] Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their
misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply [38] an updated
Authorization[39] for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant
petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.

However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect
in the verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which
we agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in
this case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the
subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's
president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board of
directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are
exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers,
can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board.
[40]

Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his

behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be
denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.[41] Substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands strict observance of
the Rules.[42] While technical rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging
of court dockets.[43]

Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65
petition to question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a
well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory,
and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or man
damus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in
case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course.[44] While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, [45] petitioners'
case does not fall among them.

This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners

question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific
performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the
litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese
nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners
posit

that

local

courts

have

no

substantial

relationship

to

the

parties[46] following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in

Private International Law.[47]

The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory
when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to
Dismiss[48] filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the
RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law
which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that
of Japan,

following

the

principles

of lex

loci

celebrationis and lex

contractus.[49] While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the
appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense
of forum non conveniens.[50] On petition for review before this Court,
petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non
conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable
principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. [51]

Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on
the basis of the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority
v. City of Iloilo.[52] We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their
arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws
principles.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three

consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the
following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2)
Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment
be enforced?[53]

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.

[54]

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to

this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of
a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a

state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do
not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. [55] The
question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment. [56]

In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction,

however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter,
over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over theres or
the thing which is the subject of the litigation. [57] In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter
jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by

the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. [58] It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. [59] To
succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, [60] the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it
the power to adjudicate the claims. [61]

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that
the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and
is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.[62] What they rather raise as

grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant
relationship rule.

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony [63] or
the law of the place where a contract is made. [64] The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed. [65] It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract [66] and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly.[67] Under the state of the most significant relationship
rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of
the parties.[68] This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates
them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved.[69]

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law
applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the
choice of law.[70] They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. [71] Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed

by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws
of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there

should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the

conflict of laws rules.[72] Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked
to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such
law must be pleaded and proved.[73]

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign

element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the
forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. [74] The courts power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not
limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.[75]

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,[76] be

used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a
proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. [77] Second, whether a suit
should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. [78] In this case, the RTC decided to
assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is
more properly considered a matter of defense. [79]

Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and
hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by
petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and
appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with the late

Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and Associate Justice Marina L.
Buzon, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-44.
[2]
Id. at 46-47.
[3]
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), p. 84.
[4]
Id. at 116-120.
[5]
Id. at 32-36.
[6]
Id. at 85.
[7]
Id. at 121-148.
[8]
Id. at 166-171.
[9]
Id. at 38.
[10]
Id. at 39-41.
[11]
Id. at 109.
[12]
Id. at 53-57.
[13]
Id. at 42-43.
[14]
13 Phil. 236 (1909).
[15]
Insular Government v. Frank, id. at 240.
[16]
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), pp. 25-26.
[17]
Id. at 27-28.
[18]
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60205), pp. 2-42.
[19]
Id. at 44. The August 23, 2000 Resolution penned by Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired), with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (retired) and Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed)
pertinently provides as follows:
A cursory reading of the petition indicates no statement as to the
date when the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration and
when they received the order of denial thereof, as required in Section
3, paragraph 2, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
amended by Circular No. 39-98 dated August 18, 1998 of the Supreme

Court. Moreover, the verification and certification of non-forum

shopping was executed by petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa for both
petitioners without any indication that the latter had authorized him to
file the same.
WHEREFORE,
the
and DISMISSED outright.

[petition]

is DENIED due

course

SO ORDERED.
[20]

Id. at 45.
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), pp. 2-24.
[22]
Supra note 1.
[23]
Id. at 222.
[24]
Supra note 2.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 3-35.
[26]
Id. at 15.
[27]
See Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 204, 213-214 (1999),
in which the Supreme Court ruled that compliance with the certification
against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the
avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference in the
treatmentin terms of imposable sanctionsbetween failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum
shopping. The former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice,
of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for
summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt. See also
Philippine Radiant Products, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,
Inc., G.R. No. 163569, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 299, 314, in which
the Court ruled that the dismissal due to failure to append to the petition the
board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to file the same for and in
behalf of the corporation is without prejudice. So is the dismissal of the
petition for failure of the petitioner to append thereto the requisite copies of
the assailed order/s.
[28]
See Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463-464, in which the Court
made the pronouncement that the requirement of verification is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith
does not necessarily render it fatally defective.
[29]
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court pertinently states that x x x [i]n
actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material
dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received. x x x
[30]
Estrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 154235-36, August 16, 2006, 499
SCRA 86, 95; and Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, at
214.
[31]
The Rules of Court pertinently provides in Section 4, Rule 65 that [t]he
petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
[21]

judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new

trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. x x x
[32]
Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, December 21, 2004, 447
SCRA 402, 415.
[33]
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), p. 21.
[34]
Fuentebella v. Castro, G.R. No. 150865, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 183,
193-194; see Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 430 (2001).
[35]
Rollo, p. 33; CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), p. 23. The Authorization
dated September 4, 2000 pertinently reads:
I, KEN TAKAGI, President and Chief Executive Officer of NIPPON
ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., a corporation duly organized
and existing in accordance with the corporation laws of Japan, with
principal address at 3-23-1 Komagome, Toshima-ku Tokyo, Japan, hereby
authorize its International Division General Manager, Mr. Kazuhiro
Hasegawa, to sign and act for and in behalf of Nippon Engineering
Consultants Co., Ltd., for purposes of filing a Petition for Certiorari before
the proper tribunal in the case entitled: Kazuhiro Hasegawa and Nippon
Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. vs. Minoru Kitamura and Hon. Avelino C.
Demetria of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region-Branch 85,
Lipa City, and to do such other things, acts and deals which may be
necessary
and
proper
for
the
attainment
of
the
said
objectives [Underscoring ours].
[36]
Cf. Orbeta v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 155236, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 180,
199-200, in which the Court ruled that the agent's signing therein of the
verification and certification is already covered by the provisions of the
general power of attorney issued by the principal.
[37]
Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 593,
604.
[38]
Dated October 11, 2001; rollo, pp. 192-203.
[39]
Dated August 17, 2001, id. at 202.
[40]
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 147749, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 192, 197; LDP
Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA
137, 142; Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392,
May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 147, 160.
[41]
392 Phil. 596, 603-604 (2000).
[42]
Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, id. at 604.
[43]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 41, 54 (2001).
[44]
Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 83, 92 (2002).
[45]
Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 193
(2003). As stated herein, under certain situations resort to certiorari is
considered appropriate when: (1) the trial court issued the order without or
in excess of jurisdiction; (2) there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court; or (3) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate
remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the
injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs
baseless action and compelling the defendants needlessly to go through a
protracted trial and clogging the court dockets with another futile case.

[46]

Rollo, p. 228.
Id. at 234-245.
[48]
Dated June 5, 2000; CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 60827), pp. 53-57.
[49]
Id. at 55.
[50]
Id. at 14.
[51]
Rollo, pp. 19-28.
[52]
453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003).
[53]
Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. (2000), p.
3.
[54]
Coquia and Aguiling-Pangalangan, Conflict of Laws, 1995 ed., p. 64.
[55]
Supra note 53, at 162, citing Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdictional
Choice of Law in U.S. Conflicts Law, 28 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q. 161 (1979).
[56]
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215; 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2585 (1977), citing
Justice Black's Dissenting Opinion in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
258; 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1242 (1958).
[57]
See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 8th Revised Ed., pp.
7-8.
[47]

[58]

U.S. v. De La Santa, 9 Phil. 22, 25-26 (1907).

Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA
521, 530; Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 374
Phil. 859, 864 (1999).
[60]
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 1.
[61]
See In Re: Calloway, 1 Phil. 11, 12 (1901).
[62]
Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 59, at 531-533; Radio
Communications of the Phils. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62, 68-69
(2002).
[63]
Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 729 (2001); Board of Commissioners
(CID) v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853,
888.
[64]
<http://web2.westlaw.com/search/default.wl?
rs=WLW7.10&action=Search&fn=_top&sv=Split&
method=TNC&query=CA(+lex+loci+celebrationis+)&db=DIBLACK&utid=
%7bD0AE3BEE-91BC-4B2B-B788-3FB4D963677B%7d&vr=2.0&rp=
%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&mt=WLIGeneralSubscription> (visited October 22,
2007).
[65]
<http://web2.westlaw.com/search/default.wl?
rs=WLW7.10&action=Search&fn=_top&sv=Split&
method=TNC&query=CA(+lex+loci+contractus+)&db=DIBLACK&utid=
%7bD0AE3BEE-91BC-4B2B-B788-3FB4D963677B%7d&vr=2.0&rp=
%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&mt=WLIGeneralSubscription>(visited October 22,
2007).
[66]
Id.
[67]
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P.
Eusebio Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA
202, 214-215.
[68]
<http://web2.westlaw.com/search/default.wl?
rs=WLW7.10&action=Search&fn=_top&sv=Split&
method=TNC&query=CA(+most+significant+relationship+)&db=DIBLACK&
[59]

utid=%7bD0AE3BEE-91BC-4B2B-B788-3FB4D963677B%7d&vr=2.0&rp=
%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&mt= WLIGeneralSubscription> (visited October
22, 2007).
[69]
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 105, 127 (1998).
The contacts which were taken into account in this case are the following:
(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
[70]
See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y 155, 159-160 (1954).
[71]
Supra note 53, at 117-118; supra note 54, at 64-65.
[72]
Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA
797, 810-811.
[73]
International Harvester Company in Russia v. Hamburg-American Line,
42 Phil. 845, 855 (1918).
[74]
Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed., p. 44.
[75]
Veitz, Jr. v. Unisys Corporation, 676 F. Supp. 99, 101 (1987),
citing Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 778 F. 2d 1146 (1985).
[76]
Under this rule, a court, in conflicts cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere (Bank
of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at 196). The court
may refuse to entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:
(1) the belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere,
either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign
jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there; (2) the
belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as
forum shopping, merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or
harass the defendant; (3) the unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities
to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
(4) the inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right
sought to be maintained; and (5) the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law
(Puyat v. Zabarte, 405 Phil. 413, 432 [2001]).
[77]
Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493,
June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 113.
[78]
Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at 196.
[79]
Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at 197.

G.R. No. 162894

February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against
petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American
citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and
Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning
for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondents money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondents complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this
Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The
Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an
action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in
government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions
due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondents claim, it was
a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter
any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST
for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,

denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and

obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds
of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed
for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. 11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary
Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary
Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non
conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the
same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of
Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in
Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioners
omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial
court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle
of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order, which motion
was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial
court denied petitioners motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the
Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of
injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September
2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further
proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on
10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have
confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have also
considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioners omnibus motion, it
found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter
Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could
not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the corporations,
including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had indeed merged
together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it
held that the issue should be threshed out during trial. 23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter
decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the
inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices.
The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent,
manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had
severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant
petition and that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag
or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20
November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a
comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and
BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders
our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive
phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element,
the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to
enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed.29

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by

the Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is
an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party
defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. 32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties.33The choice of law stipulation will become relevant
only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioners averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle
of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require the courts desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals
respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers
to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are
binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed
to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general
rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. 37

The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST
to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of
Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the
Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as
well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these
evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and
conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc.
(REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust
International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after
Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC.
Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager
to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust
International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined
into one company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the
surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation of
BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise. 38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether
petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the presentation of
further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

Acting Chairperson.

**

As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who inhibited

himself per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
1

Rollo, pp. 42-46. Dated 28 August 2003; penned by Associate

Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices

Bienvenido L. Reyes, Acting Chairperson of the Special Ninth

Division, and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
2

Id. at 47. Dated 10 March 2004.

Id. at 48-49.

Id. at 61-62.

Id. at 63-74.

Id. at 75-90.

Id. at 48-54.

Id. at 91-99.

Id. at 94.

10

Id. at 96.

11

Id. at 97-98.

12

Id. at 100-111.

13

Records, Vol. I, pp. 180-238.

14

Rollo, pp. 127-131.

15

Id. at 130.

16

Id. at 132-149.

17

Id. at 150-151.

18

Id. at 162.

19

Id. at 163-192.

20

Id. at 191.

21

Supra note 1.

22

Supra note 2.

23

Id. at 44.

24

Id. at 18.

25

Id. at 318.

26

G.R. No. 149177, 23 November 2007.

27

Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181

(2003); Puyat v. Zabarte, 405 Phil. 413 (2001); Philsec Investment
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June 1997, 274
SCRA 102.
28

The Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, 397 Phil. 1, 16-17

(2000); Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. CA, 329 Phil.
487, 510-511 (1996).
29

Agpalo, Ruben E. CONFLICT OF LAWS (Private International

Law), 2004 Ed., p. 491.
30

Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto

Cruz, G.R. No. 162890, 22 November 2005, 475 SCRA 743, 756.
31

Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004, 442

SCRA 156, 168.
32

See Arcelona v. CA, 345 Phil. 250, 267 (1997).

33

Hasegawa v. Kitamura, supra note 26.

34

Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27.

35

Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27

at 113.
36

Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at

194.
37

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 143896, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 64, 73.
38

Rollo, p. 44.

NCC Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of

Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the
provisions
of
this
Code. (16a)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998]

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ,

Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano)
married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in
civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his
death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993,
Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites
in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son
Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in
the marriage contractfalse and fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and
that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision
annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final
and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the
action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action
for annulment of marriage against the other spouse,[1] hence, it was only
Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner
likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and
married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was
vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant
case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code
and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 [2] or the Code of
Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;

hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set
aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br.
89, Quezon City, denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August
1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib
A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to
resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the
other consolidated cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there
are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, like
Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional
Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is
the sharia court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the subject and nature of the action.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, [3] Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations.[4] Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
[5]
There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of
an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.[6] In the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was
alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and
Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly,
Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under
Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to
hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for
Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in
Muslim rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to
depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a
motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.
[7]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. [8]
Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant
suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083,[9] which provides Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein

only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in

accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil
Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the
essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce,
paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support
and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal,
breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and
wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband
and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim
laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of
petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that
indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws,
the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently,
the sharia courts are not vested with original andexclusive jurisdiction when
it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their
general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which
provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of
the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to
dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this
case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

[1]

Jr., (Chairman),

Vitug,

Motion to Dismiss, p. 3; Rollo, p. 52.

Panganiban, and Quisumbing,

[2]

Order, p. 2; Records, p. 20.

[3]

Sec. 19, BP 129 as amended.

[4]

Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.
[5]

Sec. 2, Rule 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

[6]

Sandel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117250, 19 September 1996, 262

SCRA 109.
[7]

Id., p. 110.

[8]

Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120730, 28 October 1996, 263

SCRA 660.
[9]

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,

G.R. No. 193902

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 193908

x-------------------------------------------------x

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,

G.R. No. 194075

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus CARPIO, J.,
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Respondent.

Chairperson,
NACHURA,

x------------------------------------------ PERALTA,
--------x
ABAD, and
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
MENDOZA, JJ.
Petitioner,
Promulgated:

June 1, 2011
- versus -

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated July 30, 2010
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos
(Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in
G.R. No. 194075.
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in
Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had
converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the
two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio
(Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman
obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was
confirmed by the Sharia CircuitDistrict Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela,
Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:

DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam)
D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on
the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her
husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein
respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to
confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18,
1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully
convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly

converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that
there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby
issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby
granted. Consequently, the marriage betweenMarietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby
confirmed dissolved.
Issued
this
18th day
Province, Philippines.

of

June,

1992,

at

Isabela, Basilan

(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge[3]
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989.
As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos
wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of
Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte.
Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil
ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her
and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean,
and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and
Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The
volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter
battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which
vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining
visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of
cases against Zamoranos, to wit:
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently,
on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration
of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at
the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De
Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before
the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the
time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; (c)
Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and
(d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her

minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody;
(ii) her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her
inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and
disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection
Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were
dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA
Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative
case was still pending resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249,
Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July
18, 2004.[4]
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor,
through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2,
2005, findingprima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.
[5]
Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed
against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors
February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the
City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at
the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for
reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos. [7]
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005
resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated
August 15, 2005.[8]Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before
the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal
complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006,
issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed
the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.
[10]
Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the
Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance
Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of
Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006,
before the Secretary of Justice. [11] Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin
motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May
17, 2006.[12]

Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous

motions, was likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered
a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos
and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage,
whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
thePhilippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation
of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December
28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous
marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The
previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long
been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce
by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in
accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and
consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry.
Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first
husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is
merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change
the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage
on December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify,
alter or change the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989
entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended.
In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist
in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice
Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to
be considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second
marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary.
Therefore, the divorce by Talaqdissolved the marriage between
[Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD
1083, x x x.
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides
x x x:
Application
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the

marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any

part of the Philippines.
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos]
and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the
Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be properly within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating
to:
a)

Marriage;

b)

Divorce recognized under this Code;

xxxx
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with
any civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding
undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and
sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum]
against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for
bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar or [based on]
the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and
so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the aboveentitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x.
It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in
the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[13]

On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the

dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April
3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became
final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
[14]

In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon
motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 0612305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15]
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
arguing that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her
person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main,
that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249
categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC
provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos
claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed. [16]
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos
Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration
thereof was likewise denied.[17]
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and
reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City.
As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA
dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a
Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary
remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of
the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition
for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court
is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is
not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence,
such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or
quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as
opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxxx

In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos]

Motion to Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City].
The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos]
[M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal
basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We
find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of
the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 0612305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even
assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioners motion to quash is
erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.[18]
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of
Zamoranos petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by
Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her
two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively,
which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for
Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed
Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier
petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the
conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the
CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before
Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No.
1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman
severed their marriage ties;
4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of
[Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by
the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites;
and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of
marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit
Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of
Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions

of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who

was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered
into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari;
and
2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual
findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[19]
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties
from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in
law to perform.[20]
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It
is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal. [21]
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse
interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and,
when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law.[22]
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain
situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have
recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court
issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in
the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; [23] (d) to promote
public welfare and public policy; [24] and (e) when the cases have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof.[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in
this instance.

Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in
denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the
conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which
heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on
the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In
that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil
courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia
Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res
judicata. The provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect
to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of
a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facieevidence of
the death of the testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.[26]
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case.
Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia
Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of
Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for
Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first
marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under
Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce
from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that,
Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto,
who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic
rites, declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such,
authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both
parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance
with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife,
Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their
marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became
irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after
I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the
[C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in
accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their
documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court
was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the
records, effects and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were
totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal
purposes it may serve.
2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which
confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former
Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos

and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit

reads, in pertinent part:
1.
I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City
of Pagadian;
2.
The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island
Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as
the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan
Sharias Circuit Court;
3.
The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was
housed
at
the
old Capitol Building,
in
the
City
of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4.
As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can
recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province
mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam)
Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife;
which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1083;
5.
In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost
by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City
of Isabela;
6.
This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of
whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who
married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the
nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by
P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses
penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is
correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts
and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested
jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal
Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts

of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has
jurisdiction over this case.[30]
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this
case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is
not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law.
This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused
contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has
yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should
have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and
had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce
by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA
when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the
criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the
advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural
Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts
have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by
the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of
general application, the former shall prevail.

(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special
laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in
order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and
nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a nonMuslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on
the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between
any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall
prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy
under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and
Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in
the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in
accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code
on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between
the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or
laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry
out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized
not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of
the Philippines shall apply.
xxxx
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.

xxxx
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
xxxx
Article 29. By divorcee.
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has
observed an idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of
divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may
remarry only after delivery.
xxxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the
marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the
exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It
may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxxx
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single
repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which
he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of
repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation
and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time,
shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by
resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage.
Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain
sugra).
xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as
it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract
another marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article
78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower
in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the
marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support
in accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall
be dissolved and liquidated.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or
Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the
marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the
Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever
comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial
one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim
Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this
Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and
when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s]
when the Civil Code of thePhilippines will govern the marriage and divorce
of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one
of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to
severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.[33]
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as
confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and
attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition
in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,

the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for
Bigamy is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan, with Associate Justices

Rodrigo F. Lim, Sr. and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; rollo (G.R. No.
194075), pp. 34-62.
[2]
Issued by Judge Oscar V. Badelles; id. at 176-177.
[3]
Id. at 343-344.
[4]
Id. at 38.
[5]
Id. at 39.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 39-40.
[8]
Id. at 43.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 43-44.
[12]
Id. at 44.
[13]
Id. at 48-50.
[14]
Rollo (G.R. No. 193902), p. 245.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 194075), p. 51.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 52.
[18]
Id. at 58-60.
[19]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[20]
Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 225 Phil. 459, 471-472 (1986).
[21]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 1.
[22]
Madarang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143044, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA
318, 327.
[23]
Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 361,
citing Mead v. Hon. Argel, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982).
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id.
[26]
The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 158642, September 22,
2008, 566 SCRA 142, 150.

[27]

Rollo (G.R. No. 193902), p. 215.

Id. at 213.
[29]
Id. at 214.
[30]
Rollo (G.R. No. 194075), p. 176.
[31]
1984 ed., Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 53-54.
[32]
Id. at 98.
[33]
Id. at 175.
[28]