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2.
operate the Harris County Jail. As part of its responsibilities and services, Harris County also
operates a law enforcement agency, the Harris County Sheriffs Office, that, among other duties,
operates and controls the Harris County jail system, including the Harris County Jail. Defendant
Harris County is located at 1200 Baker Street, Houston, Texas 77002, in Harris County, Texas.
Defendant Harris employed persons including Andrew Rowell, John Doe I, John Doe II and other
employees who, in the course and scope of their employment, were required to observe, watch
over, and manage persons placed in custody within the Harris County Jail. At all relevant times
herein, Harris County acted under color of law and pursuant to certain customs, policies, and
Harris County herein means Harris County and its Sheriffs Office, Corrections
Department, Boards, Personnel Divisions, agents, policy makers and/or officials, collectively or
individually.
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practices that were the moving force behind the constitutional violations asserted herein. Harris
County may be served with process by serving its County Judge, Hon. Ed Emmett at 1001 Preston,
Suite 911, Houston, Texas 77002.
3.
of Texas. He is being sued in his individual capacity only. At all times relevant to this cause, he
was operating in the course and scope of his agency and/or employment relationship with the
Harris County, acting under color of law, and pursuant to the Harris Countys customs, policies,
and practices which were the moving force behind the constitutional violations asserted herein.
Andrew Rowell may be served at 1200 Baker Street, Houston, Harris County, Texas 77002.
4.
Texas. He is being sued in his individual capacity only. At all times relevant to this cause, he was
operating in the course and scope of his agency and/or employment relationship with the Harris
County, acting under color of law, and pursuant to the Harris Countys customs, policies, and
practices which were the moving force behind the constitutional violations asserted herein. John
Doe Is identity is unknown at this time. Once John Doe Is identity is revealed through the
discovery process, Plaintiff will amend his complaint to specifically identify John Doe I.
5.
Texas. He is being sued in his individual capacity only. At all times relevant to this cause, he was
operating in the course and scope of his agency and/or employment relationship with the Harris
County, acting under color of law, and pursuant to the Harris Countys customs, policies, and
practices which were the moving force behind the constitutional violations asserted herein. John
Doe IIs identity is unknown at this time. Once John Doe IIs identity is revealed through the
discovery process Plaintiff will amend his complaint to specifically identify John Doe II.
This Court has jurisdiction over the claims raised in this Complaint under 42 U.S.C.
Defendants reside, and the acts complained of arose, in the Southern District of Texas.
8.
U.S.C. 1367 to adjudicate pendent claims arising under the laws of the State of Texas.
9.
10.
The Harris County Jail has a long history of using an unnecessary application of
memorandum entitled Investigation of the Harris County Jail (2009 DOJ Memorandum). The
DOJ concluded generally that certain conditions in the Jail violate the constitutional rights of
detainees.
12.
Of the many constitutional deficiencies identified by the DOJ, two are specifically
pertinent to this case: (1) Harris County permitted its employees to use significant force without
having measures in place that would enable it to review the propriety of such uses of force; and
(2) jail supervisors approved officers use of force without investigating the need for that force.
The DOJ referred to these deficiencies as systemic.
13.
Harris County alter its procedures for use of force situations to ensure that staff are utilizing
appropriate force techniques. The DOJ submitted these recommendations to the Harris County
Despite the DOJs 2009 recommendations, violence against Harris County Jail
detainees by Harris County employees and the subsequent withholding of appropriate medical care
has continued. By way of example, in 2011, Harris County Jail detainee Norman Hicks died after
being punched by a jail guard involved in previous use-of-force incidents. The Harris County
Medical Examiner ruled the death a homicide. The Harris County Jail guard punched Hicks in the
face breaking face bones. Hicks fell and hit his head. No one alerted supervisors or medical staff
of the injuries. When a jail sergeant noticed Hicks a half-hour later, he was not breathing.
15.
On information and belief, Harris County Jail has a history of determining that
actions by employees that constitute an unnecessary use of forcespecifically closed fisted strikes
to the facewere justified and within the guidelines of policy, procedure, and law. Such
determinations and persistent practices were a driving force behind injuries to prisoners, including
Jerome Bartee, Jr.
16.
On information and belief, Harris County to this day has intentionally and
Upon information and belief, despite any official policies that may be in writing,
Harris County has had actual knowledge of and has permitted and condoned a custom or practice
of using excessive force against inmates and detainees in the Harris County jail and denying them
proper medical treatment since at least 2009 and continuing to at least September 4, 2016.
18.
improper and illegal policies, customs, and practices that cause severe injuries, including those
injuries suffered by Jerome Bartee, Jr.
19.
At all times relevant to this cause, Harris County was required to train its detention
employees on the use of appropriate force on persons in custody to keep them safe from physical
or psychological injury or harm.
20.
old African-American man, a husband and a father of three, was driving his wifes car. A police
officer stopped Bartee for allegedly failing to use a turn signal. After a highly questionable search
of his wifes vehicle, the police allegedly found a container with a trace, un-testable amount of a
controlled substance and a gun that was registered to his wife. The police arrested Bartee and
booked him into the Harris County Jail that same day.
21.
On or about September 3, 2016, and at all times relevant to this matter, Harris
County was required to keep Bartee safe and free from unnecessary physical and psychological
injury or harm. Harris County was also required to provide Bartee with appropriate medical care
if he suffered physical and psychological injury or harm while in Harris Countys custody.
22.
On or about September 4, 2016, Bartee notified Harris County Jail employees that
At about 7:30 p.m. on September 4, 2016, Harris County employee Andrew Rowell
escorted Bartee to the Harris County Jail medical clinic for treatment of a toothache.
24.
without provocation forcibly pushed Bartee into a door in the clinic hallway. Bartee reacted
verbally to the unnecessary use of force. Immediately thereafter, Rowell and several other Harris
County employees, including John Doe I and John Doe II, began to inflict an unnecessary and
excessive physical beat-down of Bartee in the hallway of the jails clinic. They threw Bartee into
a chair and podium that were in the hallway. They then threw Bartee to the ground and lay on top
of him. While subduing him on the ground, the detention employees and Harris County Sheriff
Deputies who had joined the beating punched, kicked and stomped on Bartee as other Harris
County employees joined in or otherwise watched and encouraged the beating frenzy. The beating
lasted for several minutes which allowed time for Harris County employees and Sheriff Deputies
who were not involved at the beginning to join in the beating. When the beating finally stopped, a
Sheriff Deputy handcuffed a nearly unconscious Bartee and pulled him up from the pool of his
own blood in which he lay.
25.
Harris County employees, Bartee suffered bilateral nasal bone fractures, left orbital floor blowout
fracture, multiple cuts and bruises, and a closed head injury. He was bloodied and beaten to near
unconsciousness.
26.
The photograph below is Bartee upon booking into the Harris County Jail on
September 3, 2016:
27.
28.
The injuries to Bartee were caused, in part, by Harris County employees, including
Defendants Andrew Rowell, John Doe I and John Doe II, through a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property including Harris County Jail furniture (chair and podium) that Bartee was
thrown against, batons that Bartee was hit with, shoes that Bartee was stomped with, and the Harris
County Jail floor that Bartee was slammed onto.
29.
digitally recorded by the Harris County Jails newly installed, $5 million, high-definition
surveillance video cameras.
30.
The video of the beating shows seven Harris County employees in white shirts, two
Harris County employees in blue shirts and three uniformed Harris County Sheriff Deputies
engaging in, encouraging or supporting the County-sponsored mob violence within the Harris
County Jail. The most brutal violence was meted out by Defendants Andrew Rowell, John Doe I
and John Doe II, as Sheriff Deputies.
31.
The video shows that, toward the end of the beating, one of the blue-shirted Harris
County employees looks up at the surveillance camera and realizes that the surveillance video
camera system was recording the beating. He then attempts to have another Harris County
employee turn off the video recording.
32.
took a bloodied and badly bruised Bartee to the emergency department at Ben Taub Hospital to
have the lacerations on his face stitched up. Upon information and belief, no x-rays or other
diagnostic tests or medical treatment was provided at the request of the Harris County detention
employees. Even if any such minimal treatment was provided, Harris County withheld pertinent
information from Bartee about the extent of the injuries and provided no medical treatment for
them.
33.
badly beaten and stitched-up Bartee to the Harris County jail general population.
34.
Upon information and belief, on or about September 4, 2016, Harris County Sheriff
Ron Hickman and other Harris County policy makers viewed the video recording of the beating.
35.
Sheriff Hickman and/or other Harris County Sheriff Office personnel, the Harris County District
Attorney filed charges against Bartee for assaulting a public servant, Andrew Rowell.
36.
County Sheriffs Office Internal Affairs Division conducted an investigation of the incident that
included analyzing the beating video and questioning the Harris County employees involved.
37.
ABC 13 and KPRC 2, became aware of the beating and reported about it on their television news
casts that included a photo of Bartee taken by a family member. The Houston Chronicle also
reported on the beating.
38.
the concerns raised by Bartees families and the news medias investigative journalists. There,
Sheriff Hickman publicly announced that Harris County Jail detention employees had used an
unnecessary application of force (a.k.a. excessive force) against Bartee. Sheriff Hickman
announced that his investigation led him to suspend with pay three Harris County detention
employees in connection with the beating. Upon information and belief, Defendants Andrew
Rowell, John Doe I and John Doe II were the suspended Harris County employees.
39.
of the suspended Harris County detention employees, including, Andrew Rowell, John Doe I and
John Doe II as an unnecessary application of force against Bartee.
40.
At all times material to this cause, Sheriff Hickman was one of the policymakers
acknowledged that a culture in the jail existed that promoted and condoned the excessive use of
force against inmates and detainees. He publicly stated that he was very hopeful that the newly
installed video surveillance cameras would help change the custom and practice of jail personnel
using an unnecessary application of force on jail inmates and detainees.
42.
conference that the video of the beating would not be released to the public or media.
43.
conference that Harris County alleged that the beating stemmed from altercation between Rowell
and Bartee that was initiated by Bartee.
44.
On or about September 7, 2016, Bartee was released from the Harris County Jail.
45.
On or about September 7, 2016, immediately after being released from jail, Bartee
returned to Ben Taub Hospital where he received further medical treatment and learned for the
first time of the serious nature and extent of his injuries. Below is a photo of Bartee at the hospital:
46.
On or about September 8, 2016, the 339th District Court of Harris County ordered
Harris County to provide a copy of the video to Bartees counsel representing him on the assault
charge with instructions that the video may not be shared with third parties, including the media.
47.
On or about September 8, 2016, the Harris County District Attorney dismissed the
assault charge against Bartee for lack of evidence. Upon information and belief, the decision to
dismiss the charges came after the Harris County District Attorney viewed the beating video and
concluded that Bartee did not initiate the incident that led to the unconscionable and excessive
beating he suffered.
48.
Each of the Defendants caused, and is responsible for, the unlawful conduct
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described herein, and resulting injuries by, among other things, personally participating in the
unlawful conduct, acts or omissions, or acting jointly with the others who did so; by authorizing,
acquiescing in or setting into motion policies, practices, plans or actions that led to the unlawful
conduct; by failing and refusing with deliberate indifference to Bartees rights, to initiate and
maintain adequate training and supervision; and by ratifying the unlawful conduct that occurred
by agents and officers under their discretion and control, including failing to take remedial or
disciplinary action.
49.
The Defendants each acted under color of law and deprived Bartee of his
constitutional rights, including his right to be free from excessive and unreasonable force in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.
50.
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to protecting Bartee from harm and failed
to prevent said harm, further failed to provide urgently needed medical care and their conduct was
unreasonable in failing to protect Bartee from harm.
51.
During all relevant times, Defendants, with specific notice of Bartees injuries,
failed to offer or procure appropriate interventions and failed to ensure that he received the medical
attention he required.
52.
Bartee has requested a copy of the video for these civil claims, but Harris County
Bartee underwent 4 hours in surgery on September 26, 2016 to repair the fractures
in his nose and to have a metal plate implanted in place of the badly fractured left orbit. He was
discharged home on September 28, 2016. Below is Bartee shortly before and after surgery:
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54.
The beating has caused Bartee to suffer not only physically, but also mentally and
emotionally. The injuries have prevented Bartee from returning to work and he has suffered
economic losses as a result.
COUNT I
Harris County - 1983 and 1988/Monnell Policy Claim
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-54.
55.
pursuant to one or more interrelated de facto, as well as explicit, policies, uses, practices and/or
customs of Harris County regarding use of excessive force and withholding medical care in the
jail.
56.
Harris County, acting at the level of official policy, practice, and custom, with
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Harris County knew of its illegal policy, pattern, custom and/or practice of
administering excessive force and providing inadequate medical care as far back as the DOJs
admonitions in the 2009 Memorandum. The policies, customs, patterns and practices described in
the 2009 DOJ Memorandum continued in this case, as evidenced by the video of the assault on
Bartee and subsequent inadequate medical care.
58.
The video of the beating shows about a dozen variously classified Harris County
Harris County owed Bartee a duty to supervise, train, and direct its jail detention
employees in appropriate, humane methods of detention and restraint and provision of medical
services. Harris County could not delegate this duty someone else. For purposes of Plaintiffs
Section 1983 and 1988 claims, Harris Countys policymakers promulgated policies and procedures
that encouraged its employees to or failed to discourage its employees from employing
unnecessary application of force (a.k.a. excessive force) against pretrial detainees, causing
serious injuries and refusing or failing to remedy those conditions.
60.
Harris Countys policy, practice and/or custom of using excessive force and failing
to provide adequate medical care provided the moving force that caused Bartees injuries and
damages. Absent these policies, practices, and/or customs, Harris County employees would not
have utilized the unnecessary excessive force that severely injured Bartee.
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61.
Rowell, John Doe I and John Doe II, who caused or contributed to cause Bartees injuries had
previously exhibited a tendency to employ excessive force against detainees and to ignore pretrial
detainees serious medical needs. Harris County knew of those tendencies and intentionally
refused to take reasonable action to prevent such conduct from occurring.
62.
Complaint provided the moving force for and caused Bartees injuries.
63.
County violated Bartees constitutional rights, including but not limited to those granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983.
COUNT II
Harris County Negligence
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
64.
Harris County negligently implemented its policy regarding the excessive use of
force and the provision of medical care to injured detainees. Harris County negligently trained and
supervised its detention employees regarding use of force and provision of medical care. Such
negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and damages Bartee suffered.
COUNT III
Andrew Rowell, Individually 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-53 of the Complaint.
65.
On September 4, 2016, at all times material to this cause, Andrew Rowell acted
intentionally, willfully, wantonly and unreasonably used excessive force to inflict physical and
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mental injuries on Bartee, which deprived Bartee of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured
by the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988.
67.
Andrew Rowells acts and omissions were a proximate cause of Bartees injuries
and damages.
COUNT IV
Andrew Rowell, Individually Negligence/Assault
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
69.
mentally harm Bartee. Andrew Rowell breached that duty by using excessive force against Bartee
in the beating at the Harris County jail. Bartee suffered physical and mental injuries and damages
as a proximate result of the breach. Consequently, Andrew Rowells conduct constitutes
negligence.
70.
from his standpoint at the time of its occurrence involved an extreme degree of risk, considering
the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others. Andrew Rowell had actual,
subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference
to the rights, safety or welfare of others, including Bartee. Consequently, Andrew Rowells
conduct constitutes gross negligence. Such gross negligence was a proximate cause of the
occurrence and Bartees injuries and damages.
COUNT V
John Doe I, Individually 42 U.S.C. 1983
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
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71.
On September 4, 2016, at all times material to this cause, John Doe I acted under
color of law.
72.
On September 4, 2016, while acting under color of law, John Doe I intentionally,
willfully, wantonly and unreasonably used excessive force to inflict physical and mental injuries
on Bartee, which deprived Bartee of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the U.S.
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988.
73.
John Doe Is acts and omissions were a proximate cause of Bartees injuries and
damages.
COUNT VI
John Doe I, Individually Negligence/Assault
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
75.
On September 4, 2016, John Doe I owed a legal duty to not physical or mentally
harm Bartee. John Doe I breached that duty by using excessive force against Bartee in the beating
at the Harris County jail. Bartee suffered physical and mental injuries and damages as a proximate
result of the breach. Consequently, John Doe Is conduct constitutes negligence.
76.
On September 4, 2016, John Doe Is conduct, which when viewed objectively from
his standpoint at the time of its occurrence involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the
probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others. John Doe I had actual, subjective
awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the
rights, safety or welfare of others, including Bartee. Consequently, John Doe Is conduct
constitutes gross negligence. Such gross negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence and
Bartees injuries and damages.
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COUNT VII
John Doe II, Individually 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
77.
On September 4, 2016, at all times material to this cause, John Doe II acted under
color of law.
78.
On September 4, 2016, while acting under color of law, John Doe II intentionally,
willfully, wantonly and unreasonably used excessive force to inflict physical and mental injuries
on Bartee, which deprived Bartee of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the U.S.
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988.
79.
John Doe IIs acts and omissions demonstrated a deliberate indifference to and
John Doe IIs acts and omissions were a proximate cause of Bartees injuries and
damages.
COUNT VIII
John Doe II, Individually Negligence/Assault
Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1-54 of the Complaint.
81.
On September 4, 2016, John Doe II owed a legal duty to not physical or mentally
harm Bartee. John Doe II breached that duty by using excessive force against Bartee in the beating
at the Harris County jail. Bartee suffered physical and mental injuries and damages as a proximate
result of the breach. Consequently, John Doe IIs conduct constitutes negligence.
82.
On September 4, 2016, John Doe IIs conduct, which when viewed objectively from
his standpoint at the time of its occurrence involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the
probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others. John Doe II had actual, subjective
awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the
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rights, safety or welfare of others, including Bartee. Consequently, John Doe IIs conduct
constitutes gross negligence. Such gross negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence and
Bartees injuries and damages.
DAMAGES
83.
Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs complained of herein,
Plaintiff Jerome Bartee, Jr. suffered compensatory, special, and punitive damages
b.
c.
d.
85.
86.
Plaintiff Jerome Bartee, Jr., prays that for judgment on his behalf and against all Defendants
jointly, severally, and in solido, as follows:
a.
b.
c.
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d.
Judicial interest;
e.
f.
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