CIVICS GROUP

ASSIGNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING

FEDERALISM AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND

DISADVANTAGES IN THE CURRENT
ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT
Prepared by Nahom Mekonnen ATE/9365/08
Addisu Mersha

ATE/9368/08

2008 EC

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
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Definition
WHY FEDERALISM?
Federalism's Constitutional Status Today

4.
The Constitutional Rights of Ethno-cultural
Communities in Ethiopia
5.
Public Reaction to Ethno-linguistic
Federalism
6.
Ethno-linguistic Federalism and Localization
of Conflicts
7.
Conclusions and Implications
8.
Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia
9.
Introduction to impacts of federalism on
Ethiopian ethnic conflicts
10. The Enduring Debate on Ethnic Federalism
11. Asymmetries in Ethiopias Ethnic Federation
12. Horizontal asymmetries
13. Regions
14. Vertical asymmetries
15. Politics of Resource Sharing and its Conflict
Potential
16. Subsidy formula: Bigger versus smaller
regions
17. Ethnic based transfer of resources fuels
conflicts
18. Autonomy and Generation/Transformation of
Ethnic Conflicts
19. Federal restructuring and identity conflicts
20. Intra-federal boundary conflicts
21. Intra-regional conflicts in multiethnic regions
22. Conclusion (List of advantages and
disadvantages of federalism)

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Definition
Federalism is a political concept describing the practice whereby a group
of members are bound together by agreement or covenant (Latin: foedus,
covenant) with a governing representative head. It refers to a system of
government in which sovereignty is constitutionally shared between a
central governing authority and constituent political units (such as states or
provinces). Leading examples of such a political system, or federation,
include Ethiopia, Switzerland, Germany, the United States, Canada,
Australia and India. Federalism is a system based upon democratic rules
WHY FEDERALISM?
Why do we have state and local governments? Why not govern the entire
nation from Addis Ababa? Why not have a unitary governmenta
centralized regime responsible to all the people and capable of carrying out
uniform policies throughout the country?
The argument for federalismfor dividing powers between national and
state governments (and for further dividing state powers among many types
of local governments)centers on the advantages of decentralization.
Federalism's Constitutional Status Today
What is left of federalism today? If there are no real constitutional restraints
on the powers of the national government, if people look primarily to the
national government to solve their problems, if the national government's
superior fiscal resources give it powerful leverage over states and
communities, what remains of the federal division of power between the
states and the nation? Are there any guarantees of state power remaining
in our federal system?
The notion of representational federalism denies that there is any
constitutional division of powers between the states and the nation and
asserts that federalism is defined by the states' role in electing members of
Congress and the president. The United States is said to retain a federal
system because national officials are selected from subunits of government;
that is, the president is selected through the allocation of Electoral College
votes to the states, and the Congress through the allocation of two Senate
seats per state and the apportionment of representatives to states based on
population. Whatever protection exists for state power and independence
must be found in the national political processin the influence of state and
district voters on their senators and representatives. Representational
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federalism does not recognize any constitutionally protected powers of the

states.
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted this notion of the
representational federalism, especially in its Garcia decision when it
declared that there were no "a priori definitions of state sovereignty," no
"discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority," and no protection
of state powers in the Constitution. According to the Court, "State sovereign
interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations
on federal powers." The Court rhetorically endorsed a federal system but
left it up to Congress, rather than to the Constitution or the courts, to decide
which powers should be exercised by the states and w Federalism in
Ethiopia
At just over 77 million, Ethiopia is the third-most populous country in Africa.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has been implementing an ethno-linguistic federal
politico-legal arrangement. As per Articles 1 and 47 of the Constitution of
the Federal Democratic republic of Ethiopia, the country is a federation of
nine ethno-linguistically divided regional states. These can be classified into
three groups, based on (i) their population numbers, as minority or majority
in the federation; (ii) ethno-linguistic diversity, as multi-ethnic or
homogeneous; and (iii) way of life, as settled or pastoralist.1 The Tigray,
Afar, Amhara, Oromia and somali regional states (taking the name of their
majority inhabitants) are more or less ethnically homogeneous, with a
dominant ethno-linguistic community at regional level.
Percentages of the population that are from their respective dominant
ethno-linguistic communities in these states are as follows: Tigray 94.98%,
Afar 91.8%, Amhara 91.2%, Oromia 85%, and somali 95.6%.2 The remaining
four regional states(southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples region or
SNNP; Gambella; Benshangul/Gumuz and Harari) are multi-ethnic, without a
de jure dominant ethno-linguistic community. This does not mean there is
no ethno-cultural dominant community in power, even if that community
could be a minority in number.3 In an ethnic federal arrangement, a
minority ethno-cultural community could have dominant power as a result
of economic or/and political domination it exercises.
The Constitutional Rights of Ethno-cultural Communities in Ethiopia
Article 39(3 and 5) of the Federal Constitution assumes that every ethnocultural community has its own territory, and confers the right to a full
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measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions

of government in the territory that it inhabits. It also defines ethno-cultural
communities as Nation, Nationality or People as a group of people who
have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs,
mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a
common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable,
predominantly contiguous territory. The Federal Constitution not only
recognizes ethno linguistic identity, but it also establishes regional states
based on such identity. The Federal Constitution has many striking features,
one of which is the right of ethno-cultural communities to selfdetermination, including the right to establish a regional state or
independent state. This makes the Ethiopian Constitution unique. Pursuant
to the Preamble and Articles 1, 8, 39 and 40 (4) of the Constitution,
Ethiopias ethno-linguistic federalism is such that the ethno-cultural
communities as a group not Ethiopian nationals are sovereign, and are
the building blocks of the federation. Constitutionally speaking, the
constituent units of the Ethiopian federation are neither Ethiopian nationals
nor the regional states, but rather the ethno-cultural communities. A
combined meaning of Articles 9, 39 and 47 (2) of the Federal Constitution
makes this point very clear. Moreover, the preamble to the Federal
Constitution, which reflects the object and purpose of the Federal
Constitution and the legislative intention of the framers, begins by saying:
We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia: strongly committed,
on full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a
political community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a
lasting peace, bringing a democratic order and advancing our economic and
social development can be fulfilled if only individual and peoples
fundamental freedoms and rights, to live together on the basis of equality
and without any sexual, religious or cultural discrimination.4
Taking the purposive interpretation approach (the spirit and legislative
intention) of the Federal Constitution, group/ collective rights of ethnocultural communities are given an equal constitutional footing. Moreover, as
stipulated in Articles 5, 8, 39 and 47, all sovereign power resides in the
ethno-cultural communities, and they are entitled to self-determination and
self-rule, and their right to establish regional or independent states of their
own. The Constitution also confers on all ethno-cultural communities an
internal authority in their affairs and empowers them to exercise and
promote their culture, language and historical heritage through selfgovernment. A conjoined reading of Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution
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reveals that the regional states enjoy wide-ranging executive and judicial,
but limited legislative, powers.5 The Federal Constitution, though mostly de
jure, has reduced the federal executive branch of the government to a
weaker status than ever before in the history of Ethiopia. However, there
are serious disparities between de jure constitutional power granted to
regional states, and the de facto power exercised by regional states. Under
Article 39(4), the Federal Constitution has conferred to ethno-cultural
communities not only the right of self-determination but also the right to
secede and establish an independent state of their own. Of course,
secession could only be exercised through long and stringent procedural
requirements, such as: (i) the demand is supported by a two-thirds majority
vote of the regional state legislature in which the ethno-cultural community
is found; (ii) the federal government organizes a referendum for the ethnocommunity requesting such referendum within three years of that vote by
the regional legislature; and(iii) the referendum is supported by a majority
vote of the same ethno-cultural community. Similarly, the respective
regional states are expected as some already have to grant special
administrative status to ethno-cultural communities within a regional state
with a dominant ethno-linguistic community. These administrative units are
carved-out territories constituted as special zones (Leyu Zone) or special
districts (Leyu Woreda). This indigenization of political power and selfadministration at the lowest administrative levels i.e., the Woreda has
empowered indigenous people to take their destiny in their hands, as well
as to reinstate their culture, language, historical symbols and other
traditional institutions, including conflict-resolving mechanisms.7
Another important power of ethno-cultural communities is their collective
ownership of land and its resources. The special right of pastoralist peoples
to landform grazing and protection from displacement is also granted under
Article 40 of the Federal Constitution. such a priority to the collective rights
of ethno-cultural communities is not without reason, but a response to the
past historical legacy of ethno-linguistic domination that prevailed for so
long in Ethiopia.8 These constitutional provisions are the product of
compromises by the ethno-linguistic based liberation forces that toppled the
former military regime in Ethiopia.
The Federal Constitution is one under which ethno cultural communities are:
first, the ultimate sovereign entities, where constitutional power of both the
federal and regional states rests. Second, they are constitutionally entitled
to establish regional states, or their own states, independent from Ethiopia.
In short, under the Ethiopian federal system, ethno-linguistic communities
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constitute the federation.9 Federalism, in general, is a system of

governance of great variance, depending on the problem(s) it is supposed to
solve. It is better understood as a system with diverse features of state
power-sharing.10 However, all federalist systems share some common
broad characteristics albeit with some varieties.11 the most important
characteristic is that, in federalism, power is not delegated to regional
states from the center, as in the case of a unitary system. Rather, the
central government is delegated by, and obtains its power from, the
regions. In federalism, the central (federal) government is not the author of
its own power, for the ultimate power rests in the constituent unities in the
Ethiopian case, the ethno cultural communities. However, no single federal
system is universally superior. Any constitution, as a political and legal
institution, has to reflect the political history and principal social structure of
the society it serves. In the drafting of the Ethiopian Constitution, Samuel
Huntington pointed out:
A Constitution has to reflect the history, culture of the society, its level of
economic development and social structure, ethno-linguistic composition,
and most importantly the goals of its leaders. Political parties reflect the
principal social identities and cleavages within society. In Ethiopia the
principal cleavage appears to be ethno-linguisticand regional
[cleavages].12
Huntington goes on to argue that the Constitution, as a political and legal
institution, reflects the political history and principal social structures of
Ethiopian society. Most importantly, he suggests it has attempted a
consociation accommodation of the principal forces of political mobilization
ethnic-based parties. Taking these historical facts and the nature of the
political parties into consideration in the Ethiopia of the 1990s, majoritarian
democracy would have furthered ethno-linguistic domination and
disintegration13, while a simple unitary system would have allowed the
majority ethno-cultural group (in number or in power) to remain
permanently in power, leaving other principal forces of political mobilization
and minorities in opposition or at the benign concessions of power.14 What
is more, since most of the political forces that toppled the former Ethiopian
military regime were mobilized along ethno-linguistic lines, suppressing
political mobilization based on ethnicity would have been a recipe for the
further disintegration of Ethiopia. Huntington made a similar point, noting
that a straight plurality system would lead to some ethno-linguistic groups
being a permanent minority in their district and having no [meaningful]
representation.15
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Constitutionally speaking, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism can be taken

as consociational in nature for two reasons. One, the Federal Constitution
lays down the institutional arrangement for ethno-cultural communities to
be meaningfully represented in all government institutions. Second, it has
granted a sort of veto power through the right to unilateral secession
against ethno-linguistic domination or tyranny from the center.
Consequently, the Ethiopian federal system is designed to serve as a
consociational institution where ethno-cultural communities negotiate and
compromise for unified political and economic space.
Public Reaction to Ethno-linguistic Federalism
The Ethiopian Peoples revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) the ruling
party in Ethiopia since 1991 and the architect of the Federal Constitution is
criticized from two opposing political positions. Some characterize the
EPRDF government as pro-secession, relentlessly working to disintegrate
the country. Others portray it as opposed to the self-determination
aspirations of ethno-linguistic communities and intent of continuing the
hegemonic domination of the central state that has prevailed for so long in
Ethiopia. Those who favor the former position argue that EPRDF is
implementing the constitutional right of ethno-linguistic communities, with
an ultimate aim of disintegrating Ethiopia.16 They believe they have to fight
to abolish or/and amend the federal nature of the Federal Constitution.
These are avowed opponents of the federal system. They believe that
EPRDF is sincere in implementing the Federal Constitution by respecting the
ethno-linguistic federal arrangement, including the right to selfdetermination up to secession. They argue that, by legitimizing ethnicity as
the only valid marker for membership of a homeland regional state, it has,
however, impacted negatively on the economic and socio-political
development of the country.
Conversely, those in support of the latter position argue that the EPRDF
commitment to ethno-linguistic communities rights to self-determination is
a sham, and a method of perpetuating the previous regimes of Ethiopia.17
They are of the opinion that the Federal Constitution is not being
implemented fully. They demand some groupings to the point of waging
armed struggle genuine implementation of the Federal Constitution. Some
Ethiopian scholars, such as Ali said, even argue that a more aggressive
fiscal federalism corresponding to the devolution of political power is
necessary, if Ethiopia is to remain peaceful.18
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In sum, even if both positions are in opposition to the ruling party they,
however, have two diametrically opposed positions on the federal system:
the first opposes ethno linguistic federalism and the Federal Constitution;
the latter demands a full implementation of the same constitution. some
scholars, for example Gamest, have commented that the adoption of
Ethiopian federalism was a fundamental error because it is based on
ethnicity, and will deeply imprint ethno-linguistic identity.19 In Ethiopia,
ethno linguistic identities were already deeply imprinted before the adoption
of ethno-linguistic federalism in 1994, as a result of the ethno-linguistic
domination that had existed for so long. Ethiopia is an ethnically diverse
country with a past political history of ethno-linguistic domination.20
Moreover, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism is designed to address the
national question (a popular name for the 1960s struggle against ethnolinguistic domination in Ethiopia).21 Politicized ethno-cultural communities
are not new products of Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism. Rather, ethnolinguistic federalism is an outcome of the old mobilization and struggles of
politicized ethno-cultural communities. This politicization of ethno-linguistic
groups, or the ethnicisation of Ethiopian politics, is not a one-day event due
to promulgation of the Federal Constitution; it is, instead, a product of
Ethiopias long political history.
Nonetheless, what is new is that now ethnically-based political mobilization
and power-sharing is constitutionally legitimized. Under ethno-linguistic
federalism, communities are not only politicized cultural and linguistic
communities, but also are entities bearing sovereignty with constitutional
standing. In a nutshell, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism is a response to
the unfavorable conditions that prevailed in a unitary system. Ethnolinguistic communities are more responsive to ethnic than to social or
democratic slogan. Politically speaking, it seems that mobilization along
ethno-linguistic lines has been, and perhaps presently is, easier in Ethiopia
than mobilization around overarching countrywide ideals and principles.
But, it is wrong to assume that responsiveness to an ethnic slogan is
necessarily anti-social or undemocratic. Ethno-linguistic liberation fronts
were the forces that toppled the former military rule. They were also the
main forces behind the drafting of the Federal Constitution. Logically, they
would not commit suicide by promulgating a law that disbands them.
At a public level, the political reaction to the ethno linguistic federalist
arrangement in Ethiopia can be summarized in three views: first, those who
support ethno-linguistic federalism as a matter of the human rights of
ethno-linguistic communities to self-determination, including the right to
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secession. These are forces of diversity and freedom. They support

federalism even at the cost of unity, and they believe that federalism is the
only means to promote freedom and check tyranny. This strand of thinking
is similar to the theory of multiculturalism, which recognizes distinct groups
within a society and allows them some space of public expression.23
second, there are those who believe that ethno-linguistic federalism, while
regrettable, is the only way to keep the country unified and prevent its
disintegration. This is a calculated version of unity. They view ethnolinguistic federalism as a means to strengthening unity, and they support
diversity for the sake of unity. We may call them calculative federalists:
inherently, they are opposed to secession. A third view is totally opposed to
ethno-linguistic federalism. It seeks to do away with it and seeks another
form of federalism, or a unitary system. unitary in approach, they look at
the federal system as an instrument to undo the assimilation efforts of
previous regimes, particularly that of emperors Menelik and Haile
selassie.24 This line of thought is similar to the theory of cultural
assimilation, which encourages the absorption of minorities into the
dominant culture. It is contrary to the principle of multiculturalism.25
Each of these positions has legitimate concerns that demand serious
consideration but not equally. The third position wrongly believes that only
a unitary system will ensure the unity of the country. But this position could
lead to policy of forced assimilation and worse, blind nationalism. It could
cause total disregard to democratic rights, group injustice and probably
massive human rights violation, including ethnic cleansing and genocide. If
such a view was to be implemented by force again, it could return the
country to bloody civil war and gross violations of human rights. Moreover, it
could lead, ultimately, to the disintegration of Ethiopia the very situation
the holders of this view abhor.
To put it in a historical perspective, the framers of the Federal Constitution
had five choices. The first was a blanket denial of the existence of diversity
and its political expression. The second was to promote Ethiopian nationality
as an overarching ideology, thereby denying the existence of ethnolinguistic communities. The third was to promote Ethiopian nationality as an
overarching ideology while recognizing ethno-linguistic communities, but
disallowing any political expression and space for them. The fourth was to
promote the right to self-determination as overarching, regardless of the
implications for Ethiopian unity. Finally, there was the option to promote
Ethiopian nationalism while also recognizing and allowing political
expression and territorial self-rule for ethno-linguistic communities. This last
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option is perhaps the best of all the options for unity with peace and
equality. It looks at federalism as an instrument for conflict management a
political solution to a political concern and as a tool to contain
disintegrative forces and to create a balance between the forces of unity
and of diversity. It also addresses the concerns of the forces of diversity, and
averts the secession inclinations. For this reason, it is predictable that there
will always be strong resistance to any hasty change of the existing
arrangement.
Ethno-linguistic Federalism and Localization of Conflicts
Another perhaps inherent problem of ethno-linguistic federalism is its
tendency to localize and or create new conflicts. A good example is the case
of Gambella, which is one of the ethnically-heterogeneous regional states
without a dominant ethno-cultural community. In Ethiopia, regional states
with a dominant ethno-cultural community (such as Amhara, Tigray,
Oromia, Somali and Afar) seem less prone to inter-ethnic conflict than those
without a dominant ethno-linguistic community. Gambella also exhibits the
phenomenon of spontaneous and pastoralist migration (of the Nuer). The
national identity of the inhabitants of its border areas is very fluid and,
hence, cross-border migration of the pastoral Nuer, the Anywaa refugees
fleeing the conflict in Gambella to the Sudan, and Sudanese refugees fleeing
to Ethiopia due to the civil war in Sudan changes the ethno-linguistic
population balance. It thus has a dynamic demographic composition. In
ethno-linguistic federalism, demographic changes have huge effects on the
power and resource-sharing system in ethno-linguistic arrangements.
The politics of numbers has a significant role in power-sharing. This has
created arguments and disagreement about the outcome of the 1994
population census; because of the implications of the census, results for
power-sharing between ethno-linguistic communities are profound. In
Ethiopia, regional states with pastoralist populations seem more vulnerable
than those with sedentary populations. Gambella is such a case. It has
many pockets of 1980s resettlement villages and many old and newly
constructed refugee camps, run by the United Nations High Commissioner
for refugees (UNHCR). These settlement villages and refugee camps have
often been at the center of conflict, and have been attacked repeatedly. The
effect of large-scale migration (about 110 000 forced migrants) on a
regional state such as Gambella, with a core population of only about
160000, can be huge.27
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Hence, one could argue that, at a local level, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic

federalism has sometimes created the very problem it was intended to
address namely, further ethno linguistic domination and conflict. But the
point needs to be made that ethno-linguistic federalism per se does not
necessarily cause ethnic conflict. Switzerland, Belgium and Canada are good
examples of this point.

Conclusions and Implications

In comparison to previous regimes in Ethiopia, the federal system has
empowered ethno-cultural communities in many areas of cultural, linguistic,
social and political life, and has thereby, to some degree, offset the
historical legacy of ethno-linguistic domination. It has also concretized the
rights of minority and indigenous communities. However, even if the de jure
equality of ethno-linguistic communities has been constitutionally ensured,
much remains to be done to ensure de facto equality in many areas where
marginalized ethno-cultural communities have had a limited capacity to
make use of these constitutional rights. What is particular to Ethiopian
federalism is that the right to self-determination, including that of secession,
acts as a brake on any desire of a central government towards the
tyrannical and discriminatory treatment of ethno-cultural communities. A
reversal of the constitutional rights of ethno-linguistic communities, by
either the central or a state government, would be politically costly. Any
attempt at discrimination among ethno-cultural communities, or the
domination of one ethno-linguistic community by another, or the
unconstitutional seizure of political power at the center, would put the unity
of the country at risk as then ethno-linguistic communities could attempt
their constitutional right to secession.
Other constraints, discussed above, are attributable to the immaturity of the
federal system. The major problems can best be described as ones of
implementation, interpretation, legal lacunae and shortcomings. A
democratizing of the culture of all parties especially that of the ruling
EPRDF is vital if the federal arrangement is to function well. Since EPRDF is
an umbrella organization of four ethnic-based parties that control almost all
the regional states, it exercises effective control over the federation through
its member and affiliated political parties in the regions. This party chain of
command has effectively replaced state control. Almost all decisions of the
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party are made and implemented using party structures, instead of the
state structure. Procedurally, this system violates no laws; substantively,
this party control does not encourage discourse and deliberative democracy.
Its byproduct is also a weakened state institution and strong parties. While
the Federal Constitution provides excellent formal institutional ground fora
peaceful Ethiopia, and ownership of decision-making powers including
economic ones by local people EPRDFs party culture and structure inhibits
the implementation of the constitution effectively.
The father of the constitution EPRDF itself has, through its organizational
culture of democratic centralism and centralized party structure, weakened
the federal system and regional state structures. The political constitution of
EPRDF effectively antagonizes the federal system it has built. In short,
democratic centralism is an antithesis of federalism. For instance, regional
state presidents are more accountable to the party than to their election
constituents or parliaments. In addition centralising attitudes are also widely
shared among technocrats and civil servants who prioritize economic
efficiency or nationalism before administration of justice and protection of
human rights. Thus another key binding constraint to an effective
federalism in Ethiopia is the ruling partys excessive control of regional party
leaders and the central government resource-backed centralizing drifts and
attitudes. The gradual effect, however, can be devastating for the unity of
the country when such strong party control weakens or vanishes, for the
regional states may fall into the hands of extreme nationalist officials.
Other implementation problems, such as violations of the human rights of
internal migrants, are often the result of a lack of understanding or lack of
political will of regional state officials to implement the Federal Constitution
properly. One way in which the leading difficulties in federalism and the
relationship between the center and regions could be tackled would be to
conduct training on the relevant laws, to increase their knowledge among
the concerned organs of the federal and regional state. This would facilitate
the building of a human rights-protective federalism. Striking a balance
between the forces of unity and diversity, between regional state power and
federal power requires the educating and training of officials, academics
and public servants at both the center and in the regional states.
A more important recommendation in this regard is the need for the
promotion of a democratic pan-Ethiopian national unity based on equality,
the rule of law, respect for human rights and commonly shared values in
regard to the historic past, economic development and political
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commitments. In this regard, a deliberate policy of promoting consensus

and unity in diversity around positive historic legacies has to be designed
and implemented. The victory of Adwa, Ethiopias tolerance and long
acceptance of all major religions, etc. could serve as unifying historical
symbols for Ethiopia. While addressing historical grievances due to previous
exclusionist regimes and rejecting any new political tendencies to bring
back the old regimes of discrimination and exclusion, much has to be done
in championing commonly appreciated and accepted legacies. The historic
legacy of Aksum in culture, religion and language, the meaning of the
victory at Adwa for all black and freedom-loving peoples, as well as the role
of iconic Ethiopia leaders like Ras Alula, are not necessarily incompatible
with democratization and the new constitutional federal experiment. The
idea of national unity through the promotion of an historical legacy of an
inclusive kind, as discussed by Donald Levine, is an important area of
improvement. The introduction of civic education, democratic patriotism,
the celebration of the Day of the Flag and the acknowledgement of the
iconic leaders and emperors of Ethiopia would contribute much to a unifying
project. Which should be exercised by the national government.

Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

In 1991, as the EPRDF ousted the Derges authoritarian rule, it embarked on
a radical transformation of Ethiopias political system by inviting all ethnicbased and other opposition parties to a transitional national conference held
in Addis Ababa in July 1991. About thirty different groups attended and
adopted a provisional national charter, created an 87-member Council of
Representatives, and formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE,
led by the EPRDF that controlled 32 of the 87 seats in the Council of
Representatives (Africa Review, 2009, and Vaughan, S. 1994).
As mentioned above, the EPRDF vigorously redefined the political landscape
and restructured the state into the contemporary Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia. In December 1994, a constitutional assembly ratified a
new constitution, which was fully implemented in 1995. Using Tigrai as the
model (see Desta, 2015), the EPRDF spearheaded the formation of nine
asymmetrical, ethnic-based regional states. These encompassed five single
ethnic states (i.e., Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Orimiya, and Somali) and four
multi-ethnic regions (i.e., Benishangul- Gumuz, Southern Nations,
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nationalities, and peoples, Gambella, and Hara). The Addis Ababa and Dire
Dawa cities were designated as federally administered city-states.
On August 21, 1995, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia created a
federal structure of government. In accordance with Article 39 of the
constitution, each region was assured the unconditional right to selfdetermination, including the right to secession. As stated by Alem Habtu,
the ideological antecedents of the EPRDF ethnic federalism project can be
traced to Marxist-Leninist ideology and its conception of the national
question. The project followed the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The
Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) at home and abroad had introduced
Marxism-Leninism to Ethiopia in the mid1960s (Habtu, 2003). Though
controversial, the integration of political with secessionism makes Ethiopias
federalism unique because it is the only federal nation that has integrated
political pluralism with the right of secession for its constituents, after the
dissolution of the USSR in 1985 (Habtu, 2003).
The implementation of Ethnic-federalism for the last twenty years in
Ethiopia has produced polarizing debates. Advocates have argued that
implementing ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has rendered stability and has
provided each region the opportunity to develop, promote, and preserve its
language and culture. As pervasively argued by Simoeon (1982), ethnonational federation not only fosters deliberation and political participation
but it also enhances the citizens capacity to empathize with one another
more readily than in a heterogeneous setting.
Comparing ethnic federalism to the centralized form of feudal monarchy and
unitary military dictatorship that previously ruled Ethiopia, critics have
countered that administering the Ethiopian state under ethnic federalism is
deepening with little or no recognition of self-rule for each constituent.
Extending their argument they claim that Ethiopias structure upon ethnic
federalism has denied economic and political rights to its inhabitants
because it has hardly involved the stakeholders in designing and
implementing the nations federal development process. To mitigate these
problems, they propose that the Ethiopias ethnic federalism needs to be
altered constantly in order to cope with the challenges that are likely to
arise in an age of globalization. More specifically, they suggest that some of
the existing regions need to be subdivided into more manageable units. In
the upcoming book, the status of Ethiopias ethnic federalism will be
systematically and rigorously reviewed to answer the pertinent questions
posed above.
16 | P a g e

Introduction to impacts of federalism on Ethiopian

ethnic conflicts
The preceding topic discussed the history and ideology of Ethiopian
federalism with the objective of setting the ground for the forthcoming
discussions on the effect of federalism on ethnic conflicts in the study
regions. This chapter seeks to provide a useful link between the several
case studies drawn from the two study regions and developments at the
country level. It discusses the impacts of federalism on ethnic conflicts from
three interrelated angles. First, it discusses the contending debates
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of federalism for ethnic
conflict management in the Ethiopian context. As the theoretical debates
reviewed in previous sections, the discourse on federalism in Ethiopia has
been polarized. As will be discussed in this chapter, some consider the
federal system as a solution to the problem of ethnic conflicts, while others
argue that instead of reducing conflicts it would exacerbate them. Second,
this section identifies some of the asymmetrical features of the Ethiopian
federation and considers their implication on federal stability and conflicts.
Federal asymmetries in Ethiopia have both vertical and horizontal
dimensions. The former is primarily about the relationship between the
political center and the regions, while the latter refers to the variations that
exist among the federating units in terms of political and economic power.
In fact, because of the use of ethnicity as the chief instrument of state
reorganization, there is immense asymmetry in the geographic and
population size of the regions in Ethiopia. This could have a negative
repercussion on federal stability. Third, the chapter also outlines some of
the emerging trends of autonomy conflicts in the country. These will be
discussed from the following four broad trends identity conflicts, intrafederal boundary conflicts, intra-regional conflicts, and conflicts between
titular and non- titular communities in ethnically constituted regions.

The Enduring Debate on Ethnic Federalism

The political role that ethnicity should play in the politics of African countries
has remained controversial. Many African countries seek to downplay its
role in national politics fearing it would have adverse impacts on their
project of nation building (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004: 18; Okafor
2000: 34). Despite this, ethnicity implicitly and explicitly plays crucial roles
in the politics of African states (Berman 1998: 334). Ethiopia took a
divergent path from the rest of Africa when it reconstituted itself as an
17 | P a g e

ethnic federation and officially sanctioned the formation of ethnic political

parties. However, the reconstitution of the Ethiopian state to an ethnic
federation remains controversial (Aalen 2002; Aalen 2006; Abbink 1997;
Alem 2004; Asnake 2003). The ongoing debate on the impact of federalism
and conflict in Ethiopia could be discussed from three angles. First,
government officials and some scholars argue that ethnic federalism would
help end conflicts that ravaged the country at least since the 1960s. In this
respect, Meles Zenawi, the leader of the EPRDF and who has been serving
as the head of the central government since 1991 argued that:
From a purely legal point of view, what we were trying to do was to stop the
war, and start the process of peaceful competition. The key cause of the
war all over the country was the issue of nationalities. Any solution that did
not address them did not address the issue of peace and war . People
were fighting for the right to use their language, to use their culture, to
administer themselves. So without guaranteeing these rights it was not
possible to stop the war, or prevent another one (cited in Vaughan 2003:367).
Many scholars who consider the restructuring of Ethiopia into an ethnic
federation as a novel decision share the above argument (Alemseged 2004:
606-608; Andreas 2003: 143; Mengisteab 1997; Young 1998a: 203). For
instance, Kidane Megisteab stated that the bold policy measures such as
those initiated by the EPRDF were essential to stop the perpetual bloodshed,
to avert the countrys total disintegration and to mend ethnic relations
(1997: 126). Similarly, John Young remarked that the establishment of
ethnically based local administrations appears historically and politically
sound (1998a: 203). In the same way, Andreas Eshete underlined that the
restructuring of Ethiopia into an ethnic federation demonstrated EPRDFs
readiness to face the fact of ethnic diversity [and the] new political
arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identity around the countrys
constituent nations and nationalities (2003: 143). Second, in contrast to
the above optimistic views, ethnic federalism attracted criticism from both
opposition politicians and academics. Many political parties such as the
EPRP, MEISON, the former All Amhara Peoples Organization (APPO), and
others who were largely excluded from the political process of the postMengistu period were critical of the experiment on the ground that it would
encourage secessionism (Aalen 2002: 42-3). In contrast, the most important
factors that still elicit skepticism from many scholars are the reliance of
Ethiopian federalism on ethnicity as its organizing principle and the
recognition of secession. Terrence Lyons, for example, suggested that
18 | P a g e

organizing politics around ethnicity engenders ethnic tensions, violence and

more seriously encourages political activists to organise on parochial ethnic
issues and thereby fragments national politics (1996:25). Similarly, Jon
Abbink underscored that Ethiopia by constitutionalizing ethnicity sought to
reify and freeze ethnic identity which is by nature fluid and shifting (1997:
172). Undeniably, the use of ethnicity as the key organizing device of the
federation brought a critical challenge to the development of an overarching
countrywide citizenship (Aalen 2006: 256). This problem partly emanates
from the persistent failure of the EPRDF to recognize alternative expressions
of identity (Bahru 1994: 8). Ethnic federalism has been also unsuccessful in
accommodating many (perhaps millions of) Ethiopians who wish to identify
themselves first as Ethiopians instead of their predefined ethnic identity. In
this, the EPRDF shares a paradoxical similarity with its predecessors, that is,
obstinate refusal to accommodate different conceptions of Ethiopian
statehood. Its predecessors, the imperial and the Derg regimes were not
interested in accommodating any conception of Ethiopia other than a united
country under the framework of the great tradition of Ethiopian history that
glorified the historic independence and unity of the country without
recognizing problems of ethnic inequality (Clapham 2002a: 14). The EPRDF,
in contrast, considers the Ethiopia of the pre-1991 period a mere collection
of ethnic groups under the hegemony of the Amhara ruling classes and
brought upon itself the risky task of reinventing the country into a political
community of sovereign ethnic groups. Third, criticism of the federal
experiment in Ethiopia is by no means limited to those opposed to the
elevation of ethnicity as the crucial instrument of state reconstitution. Such
ethno-nationalist movements like the OLF and ONLF, which were initially
supportive of ethnic federalism, oppose the present system because of its
failure to make good its promises (Young 1998a: 190). For example, some
Oromo nationalists consider the present system a mere continuation of
Abyssinian colonialism but under the supremacy of the Tigrayan elite
instead of their Amhara counterparts (Asafa 1993: 397). If one goes beyond
these polarised views, it would be possible to observe that ethnic federalism
has both advantages and drawbacks. Some of its key advantages include
provision of linguistic and cultural autonomy and political representation for
many marginalised ethnic groups (Abbink 2006: 395). In contrast, the
drawbacks of the system include the ethnification of politics and the
proliferation of conflicts in many parts of the country. In some cases, ethnic
federalism led to the renegotiation of ethnic identity tearing apart common
ties that developed over a long period. Concomitantly, long running conflicts
19 | P a g e

between neighbouring ethnic groups over land resources turned into interstate type boundary conflicts (Asnake 2004).
Asymmetries in Ethiopias Ethnic Federation
C.D. Tarlton, as discussed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, examined
how de facto asymmetries affect federations. Similarly, this section
identifies several asymmetrical features of Ethiopian federalism and
discusses their impact on political stability from two angles, horizontal and
vertical.
Horizontal asymmetries
The constitutional promise to provide all the ethnic groups of the country
with the right of self-administration translated into practice in an
asymmetrical manner. Thus from among the estimated 85 ethnic groups
only five ethnic groups (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromo and Somali) were
allowed to have their own ethnic regions where they constitute the majority.
In contrast, several dozen smaller ethnic groups were either put together in
multi-ethnic regions (SNNPRS, Gambella and Benishangul- Gumuz) or
attached as minority ethnic groups to the bigger ethnic regions (see table
1.2). Almost all of these multi-ethnic regions faced inter-ethnic conflicts over
a range of issues such as territory, representation and sharing of resources.
In some cases, some ethnic groups seek to separate from the existing multiethnic regions and form their own ethnic regions using the constitutional
provision for internal secession (art. 47). This also engenders tensions and
conflicts. Similarly, the desire of the EPRDF to make ethnic and
administrative boundaries congruent albeit at different levels1 when it
reconstructed the country into an ethnic federation led to huge asymmetry
among the members of the federation (see table 1.2). As a result, there are
huge disparities among the regions in terms of population and territorial
size. Some of the regions such as Oromia, Amhara and Somali are
territorially too big with the resultant administrative and logistic difficulties,
while such regions as Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella are too
small with the difficulty of ensuring their economic viability. Such an
asymmetry could have the potential to destabilise multiethnic federations.
That is why the majority of multiethnic federations avoid congruence
between ethnic and regional boundaries in order to reduce the prospect of
separatist nationalism (Brietzke 1995: 28). Accordingly, federations divide
the dominant ethnic groups into several units. For instance, some attribute
the resilience of Nigerian federalism to its territorial reorganisation from the
initial three units, which were largely coterminous with three bigger ethnic
20 | P a g e

groups (Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo) into the present 36 states in which
the bigger groups were divided into several competing constituting units
(Horowitz 1985: 601-28). The Ethiopian federal arrangement deviates from
this trend and could adversely affect the stability of the federation in several
inter- related ways. As pointed out by Christopher Clapham, in the absence
of the overarching control of the EPRDF, Ethiopian federalism could lead to
unstable bipolarity between the two largest regions, Oromia and Amhara,
which respectively constitute more than 35 and 25 per cent of the total
population (2006: 233). More worryingly, because of the huge asymmetry,
the contribution of each of the ethnic regions to the stability of the
federation is greatly asymmetrical. In this respect, the secession of some of
the ethnic regions like Oromia would lead to the overall fragmentation of the
ethnic federation, while the right of secession becomes meaningless for
many of the ethnic groups, which cannot make a viable federating unit let
alone an independent state.
Furthermore, federalism in Ethiopia faces an anomalous horizontal
asymmetry regarding political power. This is because the ruling elite in the
ethnic federation come from one of the relatively smaller ethnic regions
(Tigray) that accounts for only about six per cent of the overall population.
The TPLF achieved this position because of its military victory over the
previous military regime. However, failure to widen the political space and
share power 17 years after its ascent to state power could have negative
repercussions on federal stability and development. The main danger in this
respect comes from the inability to elevate the federal government both in
popular perceptions and practice above ethnic partisanship (Aalen 2006:
256). For instance, during the May 2005 national and regional election
campaigns, almost all the opposition parties criticised the dominance of the
TPLF at the federal level. Paradoxically, the EPRDF itself is not immune from
such criticisms. For instance, the OPDO/EPRDF, which has the largest
number of seats in the federal parliament was sternly criticised by the top
leadership of TPLF/EPRDF for having an anti-Tigrayan attitude and a
narrow nationalist view that preaches like the opposition, the Oromo
National Congress (ONC), Oromo supremacy as opposed to OLFs goal of
separation (EPRDF 2000a:13-15).

Regions
Yet another feature of horizontal asymmetry refers to the dichotomy that
prevails between the highland/central and lowland/peripheral regions.
This is indeed an inherited asymmetry. In the present context, the highland
21 | P a g e

regions where the large majority of the population of the country live
include Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR. These regions are relatively
well off in terms of social and physical infrastructure as compared to the
lowland regions Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella. Almost
all of the peripheral regions remain insecure and have experienced over the
last 17 years several violent conflicts. Some of the conflicts in these ethnic
regions relate to the ethnic federal structure. As examined in this thesis, the
Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions were affected by inter and intraregional conflicts (chapters 7 and 8).
Vertical asymmetries
Vertical asymmetry refers to the dominance of the federal government and
the ruling party over the regions. Asymmetrical power relations between the
two orders of government could be seen from two angles. First, the
constitution provides the federal government the powers to formulate and
implement the countrys policies, strategies and plans in respect of overall
economic, social, and development matters (art. 51/2). It also has the
power to enact laws for the utilization and conservation of land and other
natural resources, historical sights and objects (art.51/3). After giving such
sweeping powers to the federal government, the constitution outlines the
powers of the regions. These include enacting and executing the state
constitutions and other laws and to formulate and execute economic,
social and development policies, strategies and plans of the state (art.
52/2). Hence, Ethiopia established a centralised federation where policy
decisions come from the centre and the sub-units are responsible for
implementation (Andreas 2003). The other aspect of vertical asymmetry
refers to the dependence of the regions on federal subsidies for much of
their finances (discussed in the next section). Second, the emergence of a
dominant one party system under the aegis of the EPRDF reinforces the de
jure asymmetry in intergovernmental relations.
Politics of Resource Sharing and its Conflict Potential
Regardless of their level of economic and political development, federating
units are almost never self-sufficient in terms of finance. Even those
federations that are fiscally decentralised and allow their sub- national units
to have broad-based taxes do not escape from this reality (Boadway and
Shah 2007). Vertical imbalance between the two orders of government is
mainly because the federal government constitutes the appropriate level of
government for taxation, while the sub-national governments provide the
optimum level for applying policies (Bird et al. 2003: 359). As a result,
22 | P a g e

federal governments tend to collect more money than they are required to
spend, while the sub-national governments cannot meet their expenditure
responsibilities by themselves (Ibid). Furthermore, almost all federations
face horizontal imbalances because of the differences that exist among their
members in terms of geographic and population size, economic wealth and
others. In order to address these imbalances, federations mainly use such
instruments as sharing of tax bases and revenue. While tax base sharing is
widely practiced in the industrial world, revenue sharing has been the
preferred instrument of addressing horizontal and vertical imbalances in
developing countries like Ethiopia (Shah 1994: 36). The politics of sharing
the national cake is, however, one of the contentious issues in almost all
federations. Even in prosperous federations like Canada, it has a negative
impact on national unity (Milne 1986: 87). The problem is more profound in
countries that suffer from economic stagnation, chronic poverty and
rampant corruption (Bird, et al. 2003: 359). In such countries mustering a
countrywide solidarity, which gives political legitimacy for equalisation
policies tends to be difficult. Indeed, this may in part explain the difficult
path fiscal federalism passed in Nigeria. As observed by Gana and Egwu
(2003: xix):
In no other federation is the thorny nature of fiscal federalism dramatised as
in Nigeria. The resurgence of ethnic nationalism among the oil producing
communities in the Niger Delta and the claim for resource control provide
one strong evidence of the furore generated by the politics of resource
allocation.
The politics of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia, though not as tense as in Nigeria
has been controversial. There are both vertical and horizontal imbalances.
Vertical imbalance refers to the dominance of the federal government in
terms of revenue and expenditure (Keller 2002; Paulos 2007; Solomon
2006a). Hence, the federal government for the last several years collected
on average more than 80 per cent of all government revenue (see table
4.2). It also remained the largest spender. For instance, in the period from
1996/97 to 2000/01, it spent more than 63 per cent of all government
expenditures in the country (see table 4.3). This is despite the transfer of
the task of providing social services such as health and education to the
regions.
Like many other federations, Ethiopia uses unconditional federal subsidy
(block grant) to address both vertical and horizontal imbalances. However,
this has been contentious. What follows is a consideration of the problem of
23 | P a g e

resource sharing from the following two angles subsidy formula and the
potential of ethnic based transfer of resources to conflicts.
Subsidy formula: Bigger versus smaller regions
Since 1994/95, the federal government has been using a formula based
division of revenue. The main concern of revenue sharing appears to be
bringing equality among the regions and keeping the bureaucratic
structures of the new regions afloat (Paulos 2007). The formula is composed
of three elements regional population size, level of poverty and revenue
generation capacity. There have been so far five revisions to the subsidy
formula. This shows the controversies that accompany the politics of
resource sharing. Many studies address the principles and mechanisms of
resource allocation in federal Ethiopia (Keller 2002; Paulos 2007; Solomon
2006a). Thus, the main concern of this section is to highlight some of the
controversies of resource sharing that could have implications on federal
stability. First, there has been disagreement between the three larger
regions (Oromia, Amhara and SNNPR) and smaller regions (Tigray, Afar,
Somali, Harari, B-G and Gambella) on the weight given to population size in
the revenue sharing formula. The bigger regions complained that the
amount of money they receive per-capita was significantly lower than the
smaller regions (see table 4.4) In contrast, the smaller regions argued that
financial transfer mechanisms to the regions should consider their
marginality in terms of social and fiscal infrastructure. In addition to the
disquiet of the larger regions, critics of the regime accused the TPLF
dominated federal government of using a politically biased mechanism of
resource allocation to benefit its home province, Tigray. Merera, for
example, argues that in budgetary allocation of resources (subsidy formula)
to the regions, the federal government consistently favoured the Tigray
region. Using the statistics for three consecutive fiscal years, 1993/94 to
1998/99 (see table 4.4), he underscored that the Tigray region received
more federal subsidy on per- capita basis than such other regions as
Oromia, Amhara and the SNNPR. Such allocation of finance, according to
Merera, tends to heighten ethic nationalism and served opposition forces
like Oromo movements as an important weapon of agitation (Merera 2003:
175). Because of the controversy it generated, there were several changes
to the subsidy formula. Particularly the weight given population size steadily
grew from 33.3 per cent in 1996/97 to 65 per cent in the 2002/03 fiscal year
(Solomon 2006a; Ye Federation Dimits 2005: 10). However, this has not
satisfied the larger regions. Hence, the federal government attempted to
introduce a new subsidy formula largely borrowed from Australia.2 The new
24 | P a g e

formula drops the controversial system of giving weight to the three

variables (population size, level of poverty and revenue generation
capacity). And aims at providing funds to the regions in order to cover the
gap that emerges between their own revenue and expenditure so that they
can provide public services (such as education and health) that meet
national standards (Ye Federation Dimits 2005: 10). In 2001, when the new
formula was up for endorsement at the HoF, in an unprecedented move, the
four EPRDF administered regions were divided. Hence, the larger regions
Oromia, Amhara and SNNPR supported the new formula. In contrast, the
Tigray region stood with the smaller regions of Afar, Somali, B-G and Harari.
Although the bigger regions command more than 80 per cent of the votes at
the HoF, adoption of the formula was postponed indefinitely. After several
delays, the HoF in 2007 decided to implement the new formula in a phased
manner. However, it remains unclear how both the larger and smaller
regions will receive the new formula. Second, the constitution gives the
mandate to decide on the revenue sharing formula to the HoF, which is not
only a political organ but also disproportionately dominated by a single
region, the SNNPR (more on the HoF in chapter 10). Until now, the HoF did
not encounter serious difficulties in deciding the formula because the
dominant party controls the federal government, all the regions, the lower
house of parliament and the HoF itself. In this context, the task of the HoF
has largely been rubberstamping the recommendations of the federal
executive. Nevertheless, it is difficult to envisage how the HoF would devise
a revenue sharing formula that would be acceptable for all ethnic regions, if
rival political parties in a multiparty context come to control either the
federal or the regional governments.
Ethnic based transfer of resources fuels conflicts
Fiscal decentralization usually shows positive impacts on economic
efficiency and empowerment of communities at local/regional levels
(Kinuthia-Njenga 2002: 98). It may as well induce local and regional conflicts
over financial resources (Sukma 2006: 20). In other words, grievances of
unequal ethnic gains real or imagined in resource allocation could lead to
conflicts. In the Ethiopian case, the amount of money that a given ethnic
group (administrative unit) receives from the federal distribution fund
depends on its location on the administrative hierarchy. Accordingly, ethnic
groups with regional status receive a relatively larger amount of federal
subsidy than those with a lower level administrative unit. A comparison of
flow of financial resources at the level of ethnic groups helps appreciate this
problem (Solomon 2006b: 224). For instance, a comparison of the Harari
25 | P a g e

region that has an estimated population of 185,000, and the Sidama who
were given a zonal status within the southern region with an estimated
population of 2,776, 928 gives us a grossly unequal distribution of funds.
The Harari region for the 2006/07 fiscal year received a subsidy of
120,530,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) [about 10,0441,000] from the coffers of
the federal government. In contrast, for the same fiscal year, the Sidama
received a subsidy of 30,756,000 ETB from the southern region. Such a
variance in the allocation of resources fuels demands for a higher level of
administrative unit. This party explains the persistent demand of the
Sidama of the southern region for a regional status. When we come to the
study regions, there are similar agitations. For instance, the Bertha of the
Benishangul-Gumuz region demanded the establishment of a separate
region, while smaller clans (e.g. Sheikash and Dubbe) within the Somali
region advocate for woreda status (chapters 6 and 7). Second, lack of
transparency over government expenditure implicitly gives an incentive for
ethnic entrepreneurs to demand administrative structures on behalf of their
ethnic groups. According to Richard C. Cook, the problem of elite capture,
that is the improper use of financial and other resources by local/regional
politicians in the wake of decentralisation would be more pronounced, if
there is no strong support from the central authorities to prevent it from
happening (2002: 244). The record of Ethiopian federalism in terms of
financial accountability has been so far dismal. The problem is greater at
local and regional levels (Ali 1998). This is owing to problems of institutional
capacity and lack of political will. The federal parliament does not largely
exercise its oversight functions, even after the Federal Auditor General (FAG)
on more than one occasion reported financial improprieties. Lack of
resources and capacity are the usual scapegoats for the inaction of
parliament (World Bank 2003: 35). However, the main problem is lack of
political will by the dominant party that after all controls the federal
parliament, the executive and all the regional governments. This problem
was demonstrated in a public way when the former Federal Auditor General,
Lemma Argaw surprised the country in July 2006 by telling parliament that
both the federal and the regional governments could not account for 7.2
Billion ETB (about $900 million) spent during the 2003/04 fiscal year (EIU
2007: 3; ION 2006). Neither parliament nor the executive wanted to pursue
this report and hold those who were responsible for misuse of government
funds accountable. Paradoxically, the federal government was not furious
with those officials who infringed on the countrys financial rules and
procedures, but on the Auditor General himself. Thus when the Prime
26 | P a g e

Minister addressed parliament on the issue, he chastised the FAG for

trespassing on the powers of the regions by auditing federal subsidies. He
even suggested that the regions, if they so wish can burn their money (EIU
2007: 17). The claim of the PM about the FAGs transgression of regional
jurisdiction appears to be groundless as the legal mandate of the Federal
Auditor General includes auditing accounts involving budgetary subsidies
and any special grants extended by the federal government to regional
governments (art. 7/2).4 In November 2006, the PM sacked the Auditor
General without following the necessary procedures (EIU 2007: 17; Groum
2006). In short, the lack of transparency and accountability about the use
of government funds could have negative repercussions on the stability of
the federation. It gives incentive for regional and local elites to compete or
even engage in conflict in order to seize administrative structures so that
they can more easily access and squander public resources. Moreover, this
will negate the idea of equalization and countrywide solidarity. In addition
to the problem sharing government revenue, there are controversies
regarding the transfer of non-budgetary resources and business companies
associated with the TPLF/EPRDF. In fact, Paulos Chanie who studied
Ethiopias post-1991 decentralization reform from a neo-patrimonial
perspective came to the conclusion that in spite of the strong allegation that
the EPRDF favors the Tigray region through official subsidy transfers, it
refrained from doing this because of the potential of open favoritism for
conflict. The TPLF/EPRDF, however, used what Paulos called non-official
forms of the patronage network which includes parapartals, off budget funds
and non-transparent infrastructure allocation to the regions (Paulos 2007b:
425). Many allege that that the Tigray region, the home province of the
ruling elite at the federal level benefited more from the assignment of off
budgetary resources by the federal government and international aid
agencies than the other regions (Paulos 2007a: 104; Solomon 2006a: 105).
Similarly, the role of business companies affiliated with the EPRDF remained
divisive. This particularly refers to the conglomerate of companies under the
Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). According to
some reports, the total capital of these companies is more than 3.5 Billion
ETB roughly 320 million (Paulos 2007: 379). They have a strong presence in
many sectors of the economy. There are still controversies regarding their
initial capital, relationship with the government and others (Merera 2003;
Paulos 2007; Solomon 2006b). In short, lack of transparency regarding party
businesses and off-budgetary flow of resources would create mistrust of
ethnic favoritism and hence undermine the development of a nation-wide
27 | P a g e

solidarity, which is immensely important for the development of federalism

as an institution of inter-ethnic bargaining and compromise. 4.5 Federalism
and Secessionist Wars
Recognition of the right of secession is one of the factors that make the
Ethiopian federation unique from almost all other federations. Yet, Ethiopia
is not the first country in the world to recognize constitutionally the right of
secession. The constitutions of the former Soviet Union and Burma used to
contain provisions on secession (Duchacek 1970: 219). But none of these
countries allowed administrative autonomy let alone a constitutionally
mediated secession. In contrast, the dominant trend among federations
historically has been to prohibit secession and to use force to clampdown
secessionist forces. For instance, two of the oldest and democratic
federations, the USA and Switzerland averted the threat of secession by the
use of force (Burgess 2006: 272). Recently, Nigerias federation stabilized
after the defeat of the secessionists of Biafra. The Indian constitution makes
clear that the unity of the country cannot be infringed (Stepan 1999: 22).
The situation in Canada is slightly different from these broad trends. In its
ruling on the question of Quebecs independence, the Supreme Court of
Canada in 1996 neither allowed unilateral secession nor prohibited the
prospect of Qubecs separation. It decided to make secession a subject of
democratic negotiation and deliberations (Schneiderman 1999: 9). When we
come to Africa, except Ethiopia, secession is taboo. After independence, the
consensus in Africa was the inviolability of the colonial boundaries. In this
respect, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the
African Union (AU) in 1963 passed a resolution outlawing revision of colonial
boundaries. As explained by Christopher Clapham, the post-1945
international system reinforced the territorial integrity and statehood of
African countries (Clapham 1996: 16). The Ethiopian situation is different
from the prevailing international norms. Hence, the country not only allowed
the secession of one of its provinces (Eritrea), but also constitutionalized the
right of secession. In this respect, the 1991 interim charter provided that
every nation, nationality, and people could exercise its right to selfdetermination of independence when [it] is convinced that [its rights] are
denied, abridged or abrogated (art. 2/C). In a similar fashion, the 1994
constitution recognized the right of nations, nationalities and peoples to
self- determination, which includes secession. Still, there are crucial
differences between the charter and the constitution in their approach to
secession. For the charter, secession was something remedial, to be sought
if there are infringements on the rights of ethnic groups. In contrast, the
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latter took a liberal approach allowing the free pursuit of secession, at least
at the theoretical level. Moreover, the constitution, unlike the charter
contained some procedures that guide the exercise of secession.
Nonetheless, the procedures seemed to have been designed to moderate
the somewhat revolutionary gestures of the constitution on secession. That
explains why the framers of the constitution gave the central role in
managing questions of secession to the federal government. Hence, the
federal government is responsible for arranging the crucial referendum that
could lead to a unilateral declaration of independence, transferring
sovereignty to the seceding state and dividing assets between the new and
the rump state. However, it is inconceivable how the federal government
would administer a question of secession in a transparent manner, if that
will lead to the overall fragmentation of the country. What is the
contribution of the recognition of the right of secession and the overall
ethnic regionalization of the country in preventing secessionist wars? The
official view of the EPRDF is that had it not been for the introduction of
ethnic federalism and recognition of the right of secession in 1991, Ethiopia
would have fragmented by the combined pressures of more than 17 armed
ethno-nationalist forces fighting against the Derg (GebreAb 2003: 202). In
this context, the recognition of the right of secession in particular is
presented as an instrument that stabilized the ethnic federation by
preventing unwarranted centralization as the ethnic groups have an
insurance policy of unconditional exit. The arguments made in favor of
secession are problematic for several reasons. First, a constitutional
guarantee for secession instead of cementing a federal union could
stimulate separatist nationalism (Brietzke 1995: 32). Indeed, the ethnic
federalization of Ethiopia and the inclusion of the secession clause seemed
to have strengthened ethnic nationalism by providing ethno-nationalist
movements territorial, institutional and legal bases. Second, secession
prevents the development of the political art of compromise, an important
ingredient in federal development and thus encourages estranged political
parties to pursue a separatist path instead of peacefully struggling within
the system (Ibid). Such tendencies are evident in the Ethiopian case as well.
Both the OLF and the ONLF, which today are engaged in secessionist armed
rebellions, were part of the EPRDF led transitional government. They left the
political process after their fell out with the EPRDF. The EPRDF and its
member generations may as well choose the secessionist path, if their
present hegemonic hold on power is threatened. For instance, according to
the Indian Ocean Newsletter, top officials of the TPLF during the noisy post29 | P a g e

electoral crisis of 2005 reportedly circulated a document, which among

other things considered the secession of Tigray, if the chauvinists (the
opposition) would end up in power in Addis Ababa (ION 2005). The other
major argument, made in favor of ethnic federalism is the noticeable decline
in the strength of armed ethnic liberation movements that threatened the
political centre until 1991. Government officials argue that after the
adoption of ethnic federalism and the recognition of the right of secession,
the raison dtre for ethno-nationalist armed movements has been
nonexistent (GebreAb 2003: 202). This optimistic view about federalism is to
some extent shared by some scholars. For instance, David Turton who
edited a book on ethnic federalism in Ethiopia suggested (2006: 1-2):
When one considers the level of internal conflict, military violence and
repression by agencies of the state that characterized Ethiopia under the
previous regime, the restructuring of Ethiopia as an ethnic federation has
been an undeniable success. It has not only prevented the violent
dismemberment of the country, but also provided peace and security for the
great majority of its population and laid down, for the first time in the
history of Ethiopia, the legal foundation for a fully-fledged democracy.
In a similar fashion, Alem Habtu sympathized with the decision of including
the secession clause in the federal constitution for the sake of its
symbolism. In this respect, he suggested that ethnic groups in border
regional states (Somali) consider the secession clause to be the necessary
condition for their continued membership in the Ethiopian state (2005:
329). In view of the too obvious failure of federalism in Ethiopia to either
ensure political autonomy or end secessionist rebellions, it would be difficult
to suggest a direct relationship between the decline in the strength of
armed liberation movements and the ethnic federal structure as suggested
by Turton above. In the first place, the proposition that posits ethnic
federalism prevented the violent dismemberment of the country at the
beginning of the 1990s fails to appreciate the fact that the major armed
rebel movements that really threatened the political center during that
period were the EPLF and the TPLF. Both of these organizations after their
decisive military victory in May 1991 realized their ultimate objectives. The
EPLF, which was fighting to break away Eritrea, became the government of
independent Eritrea. For its part, the TPLF became the government of the
new ethnically federated Ethiopia and controls its home province.
Federalism was thus neither used as a compromise nor brought power
sharing through relatively free and fair elections. In such an atmosphere,
the present system cannot handle demands of ethno-nationalist movements
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(for example Somali and Oromo) for more autonomy or secession.7

Likewise, calls for an inclusive political space that allows peaceful and
democratic contestation for power have been ignored. Consequently, the
EPRDF not only dismisses those forces that demand changes as antipeace, terrorists, narrow nationalists, chauvinists and rent-seekers, but
also has been engaged in armed conflict with such ethno-nationalist
movements as the ONLF and the OLF. So far, OLFs attempt to create a
large-scale armed rebellion failed. In contrast, the armed rebellion of the
ONLF has been steadily strengthening. At present, Ethiopias undeclared
war in the Somali region is receiving more international attention and
scrutiny (HRW 2008). In both cases, the government used force to contain
these separatist movements. Thus the EPRDF deployed troops in the largely
Ogadeni inhabited parts of the Somali region, while in Oromia; it is engaged
in a somewhat periodic crackdown of those who are suspected of
sympathizing with the OLF, throwing thousands of people into jails (HRW
2005; Scherrer 2003). According to Negasso Gidada, former President of
Ethiopia, by the time he left office in 2001, there were roughly 25,000
people in prison on OLF-related charges throughout Oromia and in Addis
Ababa (cited in HRW 2005: 12). Thus, the maintenance of Ethiopias
ethnic federalism requires, like the ex- communist federations of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, the use of force (Aalen 2006: 255).

Autonomy and Generation/Transformation of Ethnic Conflicts

Ethiopian federalism led to the operationalization of one of Donald
Horowitzs (1985: 598-9) key propositions about the role of federalism in
proliferating points of power and decentralizing conflicts. While this is true,
federalism has not led to the emergence of inter-ethnic electoral
cooperation and/or alignments based on interests other than ethnicity that
Horowitz suggested helps reduce interethnic conflicts (Ibid). Instead, as Jon
Abbink observed:
The post-1991 regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to bring
solutions, has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic
tensions in the country, and has basically only decentralized the problems
by defining the sources of conflict to be on the local and not national
level. Ethnic struggles between communities are quite frequent, and
have led to a localization of conflicts away from challenging the central
state, and to an essentialisation of ethno- cultural or linguistic differences,
which then can (re)define local group relations (2006: 390).
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Consequently, the most noticeable impact of federalism in Ethiopia has

been its decentralization of ethnic conflicts at regional and local levels
(Abbink 2006; Asnake 2004; Dereje 2006; Gashaw 2006; Vaughan 2006).
For instance, according to a 24 May 2008 Reuters news report:
More than 20 people were killed in three days of clashes over land in
western Ethiopia last week. A long-standing dispute over land along the
border between Oromia and Benishangul states in western Ethiopia erupted
into violence claiming the lives of more than 20 people from both sides last
week. In April, land clashes in the southern Ethiopian town of Wondo-Genet
killed 18 people (Reuters 2008).
The above report shows one of the increasingly important trends of conflicts
in the country. Such conflicts, which are low scale and localized have
become regular features of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The proliferation
and decentralization of such conflicts could be mainly explained by the
principle of ethnic atomization or what Daniel Bach called in the Nigerian
context, self-perpetuating internal political fragmentation (1989: 218). In
this context ethnic entrepreneurs who seek to control the meagre resources
made available at regional and local levels engage in the politics of ethnic
entitlement. This more often than not emphasizes ethnic otherness and
causes conflicts between neighboring ethnic groups. Indeed, in many of the
regions such as Somali, Gambella, SNNPR and Benishangul-Gumuz, violent
conflicts emerged over a number of issues ranging from land, borders and
identity to control of local administrative structures. The following is an
outline of four major conflict trends with brief explanatory examples.

Federal restructuring and identity conflicts

Ethnicity has emerged the central organizing device of Ethiopian federalism;
any group that wishes to have an administrative structure and
representation needs recognition as a nation, nationality or people. For the
relatively larger ethnic groups, this process has been straightforward. In
contrast, defining the ethnic identity of many minority ethnic groups has
emerged as one of the arenas of local/regional conflicts. The governments
instruments of ethnic codification and regulation are problematic as they
are largely based on primordial features of identity (discussed in chapter 2).
Nonetheless, many ethnic entrepreneurs are today engaged in a struggle for
recognition of separate ethnic identities as this could lead to representation
at regional and federal levels. The key attraction is provision of a separate
local government organization, as this would give ethnic entrepreneurs the
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chance to access government resources. Consequently, there are numerous

petitioners inundating the offices of the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFedA)
and the HoF seeking recognition of their separate ethnicity. One of the
prominent examples of identity conflicts in federal Ethiopia was the SilteGurage identity dispute in the southern region.8 The Silte, traditionally
considered part of the Gurage ethnic group effectively mobilized for
recognition of their separate ethnic identity. Ethnic federalism that
emphasizes primordial notions of identity contributed to uncovering the
internal diversities among the several sub- clans of the Gurage undermining
their communal ties (Markakis 1998: 130-1; Nishi 2005: 164). Silte ethnic
entrepreneurs who based their argument for a separate ethnic status on
their shared Islamic identity, language and relative economic marginality
mobilized for state recognition of a separate ethnic identity since 1992
(Smith 2007: 579). The EPRDF, which was initially lukewarm to this
demand, eventually arranged a referendum whereby the members of the
Silte community were asked whether they are Gurage or not (Ibid 582). The
voters overwhelmingly decided to disassociate themselves from the Gurage.
This paved the way for the formation of the Silte administrative zone. As a
result, the Silte political class now has access to political and economic
resources that accompany zonal status. Nonetheless, the separation
adversely affected the relationship between the two groups. Today many
minority groups throughout the country seek to emulate the Silte model.
Since the basis for this model is renegotiation of ethnic identity and
accentuation of ethnic otherness, it could engender tensions between
neighbouring groups (such as Gabbra and Oromo relations in Moyale, see
chapter 8). For its part, the government is generally unenthusiastic to
accommodate such demands because of the enormous cost of maintaining
smaller administrative units. Yet its reluctance, after having put up the legal
and economic incentives for such an endeavour does not dissuade ethnic
entrepreneurs from pressing for the redefinition of their ethnic identity.
Moreover, renegotiating ethnic identity more often than not exploits ethnic
resentment and engenders conflicts. In the end, this contributes to intra and
inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. This thesis, examined how ethnic
entrepreneurs of minority clans (ethnic groups) seek to renegotiate their
identity with the hope of controlling local government administrative
structures and land in chapters 6 and 8.

Intra-federal boundary conflicts

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The institutionalization of federalism in Ethiopia led to the making of

boundaries with the premise of matching ethnic and politico- administrative
boundaries (Cohen 2000: 191). Above all, this process is characterized by a
rigorous ethnicisation of territory. Indeed, there appears to be an ethnic
landlord for all the territory of the country. The two large multi-ethnic cities
of the country (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa), which could not be claimed by
a single ethnic group, were not even spared from this process. In the case of
Addis Ababa, the federal constitution states:
The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the
provision of social services or utilization of natural resources and other
similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the
location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected
(art.49/5). This vague provision may not have an impact for now because a
single party controls the federal government, the Addis Ababa municipality
and the Oromia region. The situation could become problematic if this
changes. When we consider the delineation of the boundaries of regions,
the process has not been smooth (Asnake 2004). Ethnic regionalisation
transformed age-old territorial conflicts into inter-regional boundary
conflicts. This particularly refers to the transformation of resource conflicts
between pastoral communities in the lowland regions of the country into
inter-regional boundary conflicts (chapter 8). The process of boundary
making among ethnically constituted regions also led to the generation of
violent conflicts among various ethnic groups of the country that did not
have a history of protracted territorial conflicts. For instance, inter-regional
boundary making led to a violent conflict between the Gedeo9 (SNNPR) and
the Guji10 (Oromia) in southern Ethiopia (Abbink 2006; Asebe 2007; Ayele
and Getachew 2001). The groups have a long history of neighbourly
relations and both were within the former Sidamo province before 1992. In
line with the principles of ethnic regionalisation, the Guji who belong to the
Oromo ethnic group became part of the Oromia region, while the Gedeo
became part of the SNNPR. Like anywhere else in the country, the new intrafederal boundary, which divided the two ethnic groups, was not tidy as
there were mixed villages. Hence, inter-ethnic territorial disputes followed
ethnic regionalisation. According to Assebe Regessa, one of the key causes
for the conflict between the two groups was grievances of those Guji
(Oromo) separated from their ethnic kin and kith and left within the newly
established Gedeo administrative zone in the SNNPR (2007: 82). In 1995,
following the demands of the Guji, the government sought to demarcate the
boundary of the two regions through a referendum. However, the
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referendum ignited a protracted conflict between the two groups, which in

1998 claimed the lives of thousands of people (Ibid). The 1998 war left a
deep scar in the inter-ethnic relations of the two groups, which would take
several years to heal and a sustainable resolution to the conflict remains
elusive. It is in fact difficult to conceive how such land/territorial conflicts
could be solved as any dispute on land or land usebecomes a collective
community issue, and pits communities against each other (Abbink 2006:
396). These localised territorial conflicts, though lethal to the concerned
communities; do not pose a threat to the political centre. When we come to
the study regions, they both experienced intra-federal boundary conflicts.
The Somali region, for example, faced the transformation of age-old
resource conflicts between its Afar and Oromo neighbours into intra-federal
boundary conflicts (discussed in chapter 8). Likewise, there are boundary
conflicts between the Benishangul-Gumuz region and its Oromo and Amhara
neighbours (discussed in chapter 9).

Intra-regional conflicts in multiethnic regions

As stated above, even if the federal constitution promised a symmetrical
federal system, where all the ethnic groups of the country would exercise
equal self-determination rights, the translation of this principle led to an
asymmetrical federalism in which the larger ethnic groups were given their
own ethnic regions and the smaller were put together to establish multiethnic regions. All of the multi-ethnic regions faced violent inter- ethnic
conflicts over a range of issues including sharing of political power and
resources (Solomon 2006a; Vaughan 2006; Dereje 2006). In order to
illuminate this trend, what follows briefly considers the conflict between the
Anywaa11 and the Nuer12 ethnic groups who emerged as the major titular
ethnic groups in the newly established Gambella region. The Gambella
region, in western Ethiopia, is one of the peripheral and border regions of
the country. The region is composed of five titular ethnic groups and has a
substantial non-titular population known locally as highlanders.13 None of
the titular ethnic groups constitutes more than 50 per cent of the regions
population.14 Ever since its formation, the region faced a lethal mix of twodimensional conflicts. There are conflicts between the titular ethnic groups
of the region (Nuer and Anywaa) and violence mars inter-ethnic
relationships between the titular ethnic groups (particularly the Anywaa)
and the highlanders (Abbink 2006; Asnake 2004; Dereje 2006; Vaughan
2006; Young 1999). In 1992, when the Gambella region was established,
the two ethnic groups joined the politics of autonomy in an unequal fashion.
35 | P a g e

The Anywaa who established the Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement

(GPLM) in 1979 and collaborated with the EPRDF in the struggle against the
Derg assumed the political upper hand with the blessing of the EPRDF
(Young 1999). Thus, the Anywaa political class managed to seize the
attendant political and economic resources, which the establishment of the
new region brought. The Nuer, who felt that they were excluded from the
power structures of the new region established the Gambella Peoples
Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP) in 1992 and began to press for equitable
representation (Ibid 332). The two groups locked in a struggle over political
power, citizenship and land use produced conflicting narratives. According
to Dereje, the Anywaa who considered the increase in the population size of
the Nuer and their mobilisation for political inclusion as a threat to their
survival,15 sought to justify their claim to be the dominant political force in
the region through such arguments as settlement history, current
settlement pattern, contribution to regime change and degree of connection
with the national centre (2006: 218). In contrast, the Nuer advanced
several arguments that could help them ensure their citizenship rights and
equitable representation. These included common ethnic origin with the
Anywaa, the egalitarian Nuer concept of land ownership and their
population size, which in a dramatic fashion increased to 40 per cent after
the release of the 1994 population census (Ibid 221). The deep divisions
and suspicions that prevailed between the two groups led to a cyclic conflict
that led to the death of hundreds of people and destruction of property
(Medhane 2007: 13). The federal government, which was mainly interested
in maintaining political control, has not helped to contain the conflict by
facilitating the emergence of a political community that articulates regional
interest (Dereje 2006: 224). The relationship between the Anywaa and the
politically excluded highlanders was also characterised by intractable
conflicts. This reached a climax in December 2003 when some of the
highlanders joined by government soldiers massacred hundreds of Anywaa
in an apparent retaliation for the killings of some highlanders (Medhane
2007: 16). Both study regions have shown evidence of this trend of conflict
(between titular ethnic groups). In Benishangul-Gumuz, the Gumuz and the
Bertha, which emerged as the dominant ethnic groups, were tied in a power
struggle (see chapter 7). In contrast, the Somali region saw several interclan political conflicts 4.6.4 Conflicts between titular and non-titular groups
The last trend of conflict is between titular and non-titular groups. The main
reason for such conflicts is the obvious lack of congruence between
personal and territorial ethnicity. Like anywhere else in the world, the
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settlement of individuals and communities does not always correspond to

ethnic and administrative boundaries. It is evidently impossible to maintain
an ethnically homogenous sub-national unit because of migration. The same
is true in Ethiopia where millions of Ethiopians live out of their presumed
ethnic homelands because of years of forced and voluntary migrations. The
makers of the federal constitution did not foresee how the
institutionalization of ethnic federalism would affect relationships between
titular and non-titular communities. This problem has been exacerbated by
the essentially primordialist definition of ethnicity that prevails in the
political discourse of the country and in the constitution. Hence, after the
institutionalization of federalism in several parts of the country patterns of
relationships between the two groups were changed. The non-titular
became new minorities with limited political rights. While the titular groups
sought to use their new autonomy to assert their economic and political
power, the non-titular groups felt insecure, discriminated and
disenfranchised. As a result, there are tensions in the relationships between
the two groups in many parts of the country. The problem is greater in most
cities where the non-titular communities account for a significant portion of
the population. In order to illuminate this trend, the situation in the Harari
region will be briefly considered. The city of Harar found in eastern Ethiopia
has a long history. It was the seat of an important Islamic kingdom before its
incorporation into the Ethiopian State after the 1887 battle of Chelenqo. The
Harari lent the town their name and are traditionally identified with it. The
establishment of the Harari region gave the Harari a titular status. However,
the Harari city state is multi-ethnic and the Harari who became the main
titular group are a small minority within the region. According to the 1994
census, the ethnic composition of the Harari regional state looks like: Oromo
(52.3%), Amhara (32.6%), Harari (7.1%), Gurage (3.2%) and others (4.8 %).
From among the several ethnic groups that are found in the region, the
Harari and the Oromo were declared as co-owners of the region and thus
the region has been under a coalition government of the OPDO/EPRDF and
the EPRDF affiliated Harari National League (HNL). However, power sharing
between the two ethnic organisations has remained asymmetrical, whereby
the Harari control key offices such as the president and the secretary of the
regional administrative council. This arrangement excludes about 40 per
cent of the total regional population from political contestation and
representation. Thus, there are tensions in the relationship between the
titular ethnic groups (particularly the Harari) who dominate the structures of
the new regional state and the non-titular groups. Without some sort of
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mitigation, this problem may engender violence (Asnake and Hussein 2007).
Both of the study regions observed this trend of conflict (tension). As
discussed in chapter 7, there are conflicts between the titular and the nontitular groups in the Benishangul-Gumuz region.

Conclusion
Reconstruction of the Ethiopian State into an ethnic federation was
approached as a novel concept that would provide a new legitimate basis to
the Ethiopian State and resolve ethnic conflicts. Some enthusiasts even
suggested the emulation of this experiment by the rest of Africa.
Nevertheless, seventeen years after its introduction, the record of Ethiopias
federalism, particularly from the backdrop of its promises, remains
troublesome. It has neither granted political autonomy nor ended
secessionist wars. Instead, several conflicts related to federalism rage in
many parts of the country at local/regional levels. The elevation of ethnicity
as an instrument of state reorganization has been problematic because of
its fluidity and flexibility. In other words, ethnicity is subject to contraction
and expansion. It, moreover, takes a different order of pre-eminence in
different situations (Phadnis and Ganguly 2001: 350). In spite of this, the
framers of the Ethiopian constitution not only declared the countrys ethnic
groups sovereign, but also allowed the right of ethnic self-determination up
to secession. The use of ethnicity as the building block of the federation put
in motion a new arena of local/regional conflict over definition of ethnic
identity. This has a paradoxical impact on ethnic autonomy. While the ethos
of ethnic federalism has been to provide political and cultural autonomy to
the various ethnic groups of the country, the State now has taken the key
role of deciding which (minority) group meets the criteria to be recognized
as either nation, nationality or people. The use of ethnicity alone as a key
instrument of organizing the State has engendered a number of interrelated problems. As A.C. Cairns suggested, federalism can contribute to
harmony and civility when the ethnic groups in question are territorially
concentrated and thus capable of escaping from each other (cited in
Gagnon 1993: 23). This was not the case in Ethiopia. In several ways, ethnic
regionalization affected inter-ethnic relations at local and regional levels.
Indeed, what William Riker (1964) called local tyranny has been observed in
many of the regions in Ethiopia. The institutionalization of ethnic federalism
led to the making of intra-federal boundaries with the premise of matching
ethnic and politico-administrative boundaries. However, this process was
accompanied by violent conflicts. In some cases, the process of making
38 | P a g e

boundaries between the new regions transformed resource conflicts

between neighboring ethnic groups into nation-state type boundary
conflicts. In other cases, boundary making resulted in new border wars
between communities that had no history of protracted territorial conflicts
(Gedeo and Guji).
Advantages of Federalism
The argument for federalismfor dividing powers between national and
state governments (and for further dividing state powers among many types
of local governments)centers on the advantages of decentralization,
which are as follows:
1. Federalism permits diversity. Local governments may deal directly with
local problems. The entire nation is not straitjacketed with a uniform policy
to which every state and community must conform. State and local
governments may be better suited to deal with specific state and local
problems. Washington bureaucrats do not always know the best solution for
problems in Commerce, Texas.
2. Federalism helps manage conflict. Permitting states and communities to
pursue their own policies reduces the pressures that would build up in
Washington if the national government had to decide everything.
Federalism permits citizens to decide many things at the state and local
levels of government and avoid battling over single national policies to be
applied uniformly throughout the land.
3. Federalism disperses power. The widespread distribution of power is
generally regarded as a protection against tyranny. To the extent that
pluralism thrives in the United States, state and local governments have
contributed to its success. State and local governments also provide a
political base for the survival of the opposition party when it loses national
elections.
4. Federalism increases political participation. It allows more people to run
for and hold political office. Nearly a million people hold some kind of
political office in counties, cities, townships, school districts, and special
districts. These local leaders are often regarded as closer to the people
than Washington officials. Public opinion polls show that Americans believe
that their local governments are more manageable and responsive than the
national government.

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5. Federalism improves efficiency. Even though we may think of eighty

thousand governments as inefficient, governing the entire nation from
Washington would be even worse. Imagine the bureaucracy, red tape,
delays, and confusion if every government activity in every community in
the nationpolice, schools, roads, fire departments, garbage collections,
sewage disposal, street lighting, and so onwere controlled by a central
government in Washington. Even in the Soviet Union, where centralized
discipline and party control are a matter of political ideology, leaders have
been forced to resort to decentralization simply as a practical matter.
Moreover, federalism encourages experimentation and innovation in public
policy in the states.
Disadvantages of Federalism
However, federalism has its drawbacks.
1. Federalism allows special interests to protect their privileges. For many
years, segregationists used the argument of states' rights to avoid federal
laws designed to guarantee equality and prevent discrimination. Indeed,
the states' rights argument has been used so often in defense of racial
discrimination that it has become a code word for racism.
2. Federalism allows local leaders to frustrate national policy. They can
obstruct not only civil right policies but also policies in areas as diverse as
energy, poverty, and pollution.
3. Federalism allows the benefits and costs of government to be spread
unevenly. Some states spend more than twice as much per capita as other
states on education. Even in the same state, some wealthy school districts
spend two or three times as much as poorer districts. The taxes in some
states are much higher than in other states; five states have no state
income tax at all.
4. Federalism creates disadvantages in poorer states and communities,
which generally provide lower levels of education, health, and welfare
services; police protection; and environmental protection than wealthier
states and communities.
5. Federalism obstructs action on national issues. Although decentralization
may reduce conflict at the national level, some very serious national issues
may be swept under the rug. For many years, decentralizing the issue of
civil rights allowed segregation to flourish. Only when the issue was
40 | P a g e

nationalized in the 1960s by the civil rights movement was there any
significant progress. Minorities can usually expect better treatment by
national agencies than by state or local authorities.

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