Combined Materials Criminal Law 2016

August - 2016 MATERIALS
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
1. MALUM PROHIBITUM and MALUM IN SE - It is a general principle in law

that in malum prohibitum case, good faith or motive is not a defense because the law
punishes the prohibited act itself. However, if fraudulent intent is expressly
mentioned as an element thereof, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense
(Saguin vs. People, G.R. No. 210603, November 25, 2015).
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called
acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law
forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference
to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in
acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has
the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious
to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself (Dungo vs.
People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015).
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws.
In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as
plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation (Dungo vs.
People, supra).
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala
prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the
penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a
crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute
prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In
the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute (Dungo vs. People, supra).
2. PRAETER INTENTIONEM - Accused kicked and punched the victim, who
died as a consequence. Circumstance shows lack of intent to kill. However, accused
is liable for homicide because intent to kill is conclusively presumed. Even if there is
no intent to kill, the penal law holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences of his unlawful acts. However, they are entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of praeter intentionem (Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22,
2015).
Article 49 applies only to error in personae. This provision is neither applicable
to aberratiu ictus (Guillen case) nor to praeter intentionem (Wacoy vs. People, G.R.
No. 213792, June 22, 2015). In Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015 Accused kicked and punched the victim, who died as consequence. It appears that
their purpose is merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life
of the victim. Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication
without proper attribution is prohibited by law.

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consequences thereof. However, they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of

praeter intentionem or lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13
(3).
3. ABERRATIU ICTUS In People vs. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015
- Accused treacherously shot his intended victim. A bystander, was also hit by reason
of mistake of blow. Both victims died. Accused is responsible not only for the death of
the intended victim but also for the death of the third person, who was hit by a stray
bullet. He is liable for two separate crimes of murder. This is not a compound crime
since there is no showing that the victims were killed by single act but several acts.
When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes. Treachery will be appreciated even though one was killed because of
aberratio ictus. In People vs. Flora and Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000, the
accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims,
Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court,
due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder.
4. UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION The act of pulling "something" out cannot
constitute unlawful aggression (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 197546, March 23, 2015).
5. INSANITY In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely
deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such
complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately
before the commission of the offense (Verdadero vs. People, G.R. No. 216021, March
02, 2016).
6. ACCESSORY - It is not necessary that the principal should be first declared
guilty before an accessory can be made liable as such (People vs. Billon, C.A., 48 O.G.
1391). One can be held liable as an accessory even if the principal was not convicted
because he is at large (People vs. Inovera, 65 O.G. 3168); or he died or is unidentified,
or was acquitted due to technicality (Vino vs. People, G.R. No. 84163, October 19,
1989) The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or
accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People vs. Bayabos, G.R.
No. 171222, February 18, 2015).
The English text of Article 19 of RPC, which provides whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason x x x., is an inaccurate translation of the Spanish text.
Settled is the rule that the Spanish text prevail over the English text (People vs.
Billon).
7. ACCESSORY AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE - A truck with illegal
lumber was confiscated. After the confiscation, the accused unlawfully took it from the
authorities. Accused is not liable as an accessory since he did not conceal the
instrument of the crime for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. Illegal
possession of lumber had already been discovered at the time the accused took the

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confiscated truck. However, accused is liable for obstruction of justice under P.D.
1829. The truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence
that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for illegal
possession of lumber. It is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession of the lumber. Accused took the truck or intentionally suppressed the
truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as
evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for illegal possession of lumber.
Such suppression is punishable under PD No. 1829 (Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No.
181111, August 17, 2015).
8. PENALTY - The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex
crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, the court should impose the penalty for the
graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid,
and will not attain finality (De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015).
9. RECLUSION PERPETUA - Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua shall
not be eligible for parole (Section 3 RA No. 9346). In cases where reclusion perpetua is
imposable, there is no need to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. But it is understood that convicted persons
penalized with this penalty are not eligible for parole in accordance with Section 3 of
RA No. 9346. In cases where death penalty is imposable, but the same is reduced to
reclusion perpetua because of RA No. 9346, the phrase "without eligibility for
parole" shall be used to qualifyreclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the
accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for RA
No. 9346 (A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, August 04, 2015).
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of RPC
and 30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592, is a lighter
penalty than life imprisonment, which has no duration. Hence, amendatory law, which
prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment for a crime punishable
under it, is favorable to the accused; and thus, it shall be given a retroactive effect
(People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 05, 2014; People vs. Pang, G.R. No.
176229, October 19, 2011).
10. SUPPLETORY APPLICATION RPC is not generally applicable to malum
prohibitum. However, when a special law (such as RA No. 10591 on illegal possession
of loose firearm), which punishes malum prohibitum, adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties in RPC, the the provisions under this Code shall apply (People vs. Simon,
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994) such as: (1) Article 68 on the privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; (2)
Article 62 on special mitigating circumstance of syndicated or organized crime group
(People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012); (3) Article 64 on application of
penalty in its minimum period if there is a confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No.
184355, March 23, 2015; Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007);
and (4) Article 160 on special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (People vs.
Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997).

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11. PARDON - Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, cannot run in the Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not
expressly restored his right to hold public office or remitted the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Under Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, a
pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office unless such right
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. Under Article 41, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon (2015 Bar Exam).
President Estrada, who was convicted of plunder and sentenced to suffered
reclusion perpetua, was pardoned by President Arroyo. He is eligible to run as Mayor
because the terms of the pardon expressly restored his civil and political
rights,which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. Pardon at issue
which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration
(Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
This power is conferred by the Constitution; hence, only the Constitution can limit the
exercise thereof. The only instances in which the President under the Constitution
may not extend pardon are as follows: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
12. PROBATION - Under Section 9 of PD No. 968, the benefits of the probation
shall not extend to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine
of not less than P200. But RA No. 10707, which was approved on November 26,
2015, has amended PD No. 968 by increasing the penalty for the offense under
previous conviction, which will constitute a bar to probation for the offense under the
present conviction. Under PD No. 968 as amended by RA No. 10707, the benefits of
the probation shall not extend to those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than 6 months and 1 day
and/or a fine of more than P1,000.However, even if the penalty for the offense under
previous conviction is lesser than that as stated above, one cannot avail of probation
for the offense under present conviction if he already availed of the benefit of
probation for the previous offense.
Under the original version of PD No. 968, alarm and scandal and direct assault
were probationable since the penalties prescribed for these crimes are not more than 6
years of imprisonment. However, on October 5, 1985, PD 1990 had amended Section 9
of PD No. 968 by making crimes against public disorder non-probationable. Hence,
the benefits of PD No. 968 as amended by PD 1990 could not be extended to those
convicted of direct assault (2012 Bar Examination) and alarm and scandal (2013 Bar
Examination) because these are crimes against public disorder. However, RA No.
10707, which was approved on November 26, 2015, has amended PD No. 968 by

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deleting crime against public disorder in Section 9 thereof. In sum, under the present
law on probation, alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable.
In Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011 - The accused,
who was convicted by the lower court of a non-probationable offense of frustrated
homicide, but on appeal was found guilty of a probationable offense of attempted
homicide, may apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC because of
the following reasons: (1) The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his
right to probation through no fault of his; (2) If the accused will not be allowed to
apply for probation, he will be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment;
(3) While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the accused has the right to
apply for that privilege; (4) Under the law, appealing from judgment of conviction is a
waiver right to appeal. In this case, the accused did not appeal from the judgment of
a conviction for attempted homicide rendered by the appellate court.
In Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 1, 2014, accused was
convicted of homicide, a non-probationable crime, by the trial court. However, the SC
found them liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a
probationable crime, because of lack of dolo. They can still apply for probation. The
SC reaffirmed the Colinares principle.
RA No. 10707, which was approved on November 26, 2015, has adopted the
Colinares doctrine. Under Section 4 of PD 968 as amended by RA No. 10707, when a
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the
defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision
before such decision becomes final. This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the
benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which already
imposes a probationable penalty.
Probation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of
RPC. Hence, the discharge of the probationer shall not extinguish his criminal liability.
The essence of probation is the suspension of the execution of sentence. Thus, the
criminal liability remains despite of the discharge of the probationer but the sentence
will not be served (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014).
However, this rule is not anymore controlling because of the amendments introduced
by RA No. 10707. Under Section 16 of PD No. 968 as amended by RA 10707, the final
discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to totally extinguish his criminal liability as
to the offense for which probation was granted. In sum, probation is now a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability in addition to those mentioned in Article 89 of RPC.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
13. Under the Spanish Penal Code, the modes of committing illegal detention
are "Secuestrare" and "Encerrare". "Secuestrare" means sequestration or
imprisonment. "Encerrare" includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also
the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time (People
vs. Baldago, G.R. No. 128106-07, January 24, 2003). There is deprivation of liberty if

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the victim was left in a place from which she did not know her way back home (People
vs. Jacalney, GR No. 168552, October 03, 2011)even if she had the freedom to roam
around the place of detention. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains
at the mercy and control of the abductor (People vs. Baluya, GR No. 181822, April 13,
2011).
14. THREATS - What is the difference among grave threats, light threats and
other light threats? In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which
may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened
does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light
threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition
(Calauag vs. People, (G. R. No. 171511, March 4, 2009).
15. BLACKMAIL - Blackmailing may constitute: (1) Light threats under Article
283; (2) Threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a libel for
compensation under Article 356; and (3) robbery with intimidation against person.
Example: X, DENR officer, threatened to confiscate the hot logs from complainant and
prosecute it for illegal logging unless the latter will give her P100,000. Complainant
gave X the amount demanded. The crime committed is robbery with intimidation
(extortion). In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in
causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense of mental
distress in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of
injury to person or property must continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the
time of the delivery of the money. In this case, the P100,000.00 "grease money" was
taken by X from complainant through intimidation. By using her position as the DENR
officer, X succeeded in coercing the complainants to choose between two alternatives:
to part with their money, or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and
confiscation of the logs (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10,
2009).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
16. In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a convicted prisoner
and not merely a detention prisoner. In delivery of prisoner from jail, the person, who
escaped through the help of the accused, is either a detention prisoner or convicted
prisoner. In infidelity in the custody of prisoner, the person, who escaped in
connivance with or consent of or through negligence of the accused-custodian, is
either a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner. Evasion in the service of sentence
and delivery of prisoner from jail are committed by means of dolo. Infidelity in the
custody or prisoner is committed by means of dolo or culpa; if this crime is committed
by means of dolo, it is called conniving with or consenting to evasion; if committed by
means of culpa, it is called evasion through negligence.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
17. FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT In falsification of private document
involving making untruthful statement in a narration of facts, the existence of a
specific law imposing obligation to disclose the truth is not indispensable to make one

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liable for this crime. What is important is legal obligation to disclose the truth. In
Manansala vs. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015, the accused was held
liable for falsification of document involving a petty cash replenishment report of a
private company because he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him.
In Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the damage which is an element of
estafa must be capable of pecuniary estimation. In Article 172, the element of damage
is falsification of private document is not required to be capable of pecuniary
estimation. The Spanish text of this provision uses the word perjuicio (prejudice).
Thus, falsification of private document, which prejudices a third person, is a felony. In
Manasala case, the offended party was dismissed from service because of the false
report that he made cash advances from the company without liquidating on time. The
accused was convicted of falsification of private document since the offended party
was prejudice by such falsification.
The offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position,
which is an element of falsification of document by a public officer when (1) he has the
duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or
(2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies (People vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015).
In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (People vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015).
Under Article 48 of the RPC, when a single act constitutes two or more crimes,
a complex crime is committed for which only one penalty is imposed. Complex crimes
under Article 48 refer to either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less
grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another.[17] The phrase "necessary means" in Article 48 does not mean indispensable;
otherwise, the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. For instance,
the crime of simple estafa is ordinarily committed in the manner defined under the
RPC; but if the accused resorts to falsification merely to facilitate and insure the
commission of estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification (David vs. People, G.R. No. 208320, August 19, 2015).
In this case, it was duly proven during the trial that petitioner falsified several
BOC Form No. 38-A, a commercial document, in order to facilitate and insure the
commission of estafa. BOC Form No. 38-A is a commercial document used by
authorized collecting banks, such as Land Bank, as official receipt for the payment of
additional or deficiency customs taxes and duties. The falsification of the BOC forms,
which are commercial documents, was a necessary means to commit estafa (David vs.
People, G.R. No. 208320, August 19, 2015).

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Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose previous criminal conviction) in

a sworn application for the patrolman examination constitutes perjury (People vs.
Cruz, 108 Phil. 255). Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose pending
criminal case) in unsworn PDS constitutes falsification of document (Sevilla vs. People,
G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014). If there are several mistakes the PDS including
those which are not important, accused cannot be convicted of falsification of
document since it appears that failure to disclose pending criminal case is not
deliberate. Hence, accused is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
falsification (Sevilla vs. People, supra).
Making it appears that a person participated in an act or proceeding where in
fact he did not is not the actus reus in perjury. Hence, a mayor, who made it appear
that affiants swore and signed the affidavit before him where in fact they did not, is
liable of falsification of document and not perjury (Lonzanida vs. People, G.R. Nos.
160243-52, July 20, 2009).
In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Regidor, Jr., vs.
People, G. R. Nos. 166086-92 Feb. 13, 2009).
18. MALVERSATION - The crime of malversation of public funds has the
following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the
funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d)
that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them (Mesina vs. People, G.R. No.
162489, June 17, 2015).
Accountable officer For purpose of malversation, national officer shall be
considered as an accountable officer if he has custody or control of public property by
reason of the duties of his office (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines) such
as a principal of a public high school entrusted with public funds. such as a principal
of a public high school entrusted with public funds (Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074,
August 31, 2011) or a cashier, treasurer, collector, property officer or any other officer
or employee who is tasked with the taking of money or property from the public which
they are duty-bound to keep temporarily until such money or property are properly
deposited in official depository banks or similar entities; or until they shall have
endorsed such money or property to other accountable officers or concerned offices
(Panganiban vs. People, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015).
However, the Local Government Code expanded the concept of accountable
local officer. Local officer shall be considered as an accountable officer if he has
possession or custody of local government funds because of the nature of their
functions or has participated in the use or application of thereof (Zoleta vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015).

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A mayor as far as the money in the local treasury is concerned is an

accountable officer because the mayor and the treasurer have duty to participate in
the release of funds. Their signatures are needed to disburse municipal funds. No
payment can be effected without their signatures. They had control and responsibility
over the funds; hence, they are accountable officer (Manuel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 158413, February 08, 2012). But a mayor as far as cash advance for travel is
concerned is not an accountable officer (Panganiban vs. People, G.R. No. 211543,
December 09, 2015).
However, a non-accountable officer or private individual can be held liable for
malversation if he conspires with an accountable officer in committing the crime
(People vs. Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008). Moreover, private individuals
can be held liable for malversation if he in any capacity whatever, have charge of any
insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator
or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority,
even if such property belongs to a private individual (Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code).
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable
officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other
persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license
to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds.
There is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers to extend loans to anyone
against "vales" or chits given in exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, the the
Commission on Audit time and again, through repeated office memoranda and rulings
had warned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by any disbursing officer
because such transactions are really forms of loans (Meneses vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 100625 May 20, 1994).
Dolo or culpa Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To
sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence. If the accused is charged of intentional malversation, but evidence shows
that the crime is committed through negligence, he can be convicted of culpable
malversation because of the variance rule. Dolo or culpa is just a mode of committing
malversation. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, accused can still be
convicted of malversation (Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074, August 31, 2011).
19. In Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013 Accused, a mayor issued permits to transport salvaged forest products. According to
prosecution, DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits
to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that accused usurped
the official functions that properly belong to the DENR.
Accused chose to exercise the right to protect the environment and to share in
this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayoran act which was
executed with the cooperation of non-governmental organizations, stakeholders, and
concerned citizens. His acts may be invalid but it does necessarily mean that such
mistakes automatically justify his conviction.

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There is no showing that accused possessed that criminal mind when he in

his capacity as mayor issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is
that accused, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest
products in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area.
Good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official
functions. The requirement of permits to transport was accuseds decision alone; it
was a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly. If, indeed, accused intended to usurp the official functions of
the DENR, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the
authority and credibility to publicly object against accuseds allegedly intended
usurpation. Thus, the presence of DENR official during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly
strengthens accuseds claim of good faith.
The DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue
permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that,
pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
20. Failure To Render Accounting - In People vs. Lumauig, G.R. No.166680,
July 7, 2014 - Article 218 of RPC consists of the following elements: (1) that the
offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom; (2) that he
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) that he is required by
law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial
auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts
should be rendered.
Petitioner received cash advance for payment of the insurance coverage of
motorcycles purchased by the Municipality in 1994. Under COA Circular, petitioner is
required to liquidate the same within 20 days after the end of the year or on or before
January 20, 1995. To avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the
cash advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20,
1995. Petitioner was liable for failure to render account under Article 218 because it
took him over six years before settling his accounts. Demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime is not required. Article 218 merely
provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to render account.
21. Technical Malversation - In Dela Cuersta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
164068-69, November 19, 2013 - The informations alleged that accused as members
of the Philippine Coconut Authority, acting in conspiracy with each other and with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, gave financial assistance to COCOFED, a
private entity, without an appropriate budget, giving unwarranted benefit to the same
and causing undue injury to the Government.
The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be
appropriated for a public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a
specific project. For instance there is no earmarking if money was part of the
municipalitys general fund, intended by internal arrangement for use in paving a
particular road but applied instead to the payrolls of different barangay workers in the

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municipality. That portion of the general fund was not considered appropriated since
it had not been earmarked by law or ordinance for a specific expenditure. Here, there
is no allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to
COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures.
What is more, the informations do not allege that the subject P2 million and P6
million were applied to a public use other than that for which such sums had been
appropriated. Quite the contrary, those informations allege that those sums were
unlawfully donated to a private entity, not applied to some public use. Clearly, the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the crimes with which they are
charged would be violated if they are tried for technical malversation under criminal
informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed against them.
22. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment - To commit the offense of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, the offender must be a judge who is
adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of
law. The term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention
to do an injustice. Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence
but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith
and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. In
other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar
motive in issuing the judgment. Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability. The
failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable(Re:
Verified
Complaint for Disbarment of AMA LAnd Inc. against CA Association Justice Bueser
et.al., OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014).
23. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DOCUMENTS - The elements of
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC are: (1) The
offender must be a public officer; (2) There must be a document removed, destroyed or
concealed; (3) The document destroyed or removed must be entrusted to such public
officer by reason of his office; and (4) Damage or prejudice to the public interest or to
that of a third person must be caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of
such document (Zapanta vs. People, GR No. 192698-99, April 22, 2015). Differences
between infidelity in the custody of document and estafa under Article 315 (3) (c) of
RPC: (1) In both crimes, the offender removed, concealed or destroyed document; (2) in
infidelity of the custody of document, the offender is a public officer entrusted with the
document; while in estafa, the offender is a private individual; (3) In estafa, intent to
defraud is an element; but this is not element of infidelity in the custody of document.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
24. PARRICIDE - Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide - other than the

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fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim (People vs. Guting, G.R.
No. 205412, September 09, 2015).
In parricide, if the victim is his father, mother, or child, the relationship can
either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, other ascendant such as
grandparent or other descendant such as grandchild, the relationship must be
legitimate (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013).
25. Excessive Chastisement - X tied his son to a coconut tree and, there
after hit on his right eye and right leg. As a consequence, his son sustained injuries
that would heal in one week upon medication. Is X liable for slight physical injuries
despite the fact that his intention in beating his son is merely to discipline him? Yes.
X cannot evade criminal culpability by the circumstance that he merely intended to
discipline his son (People vs. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011).
26. DEATH IN A TUMULTOUS AFFRAY - The elements of death caused in a
tumultuous affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally (Note: If there is conspiracy, this element is not present;
conspirators are liable for homicide or murder; People vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. L-36234
February 10, 1981); (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the
course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased
(Not: If the killers are identified, this element is not present; since they are identified,
they are liable for homicide or murder; Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22,
2015); and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified.
27. STAGES OF RAPE Touching of either labia majora or labia minora of the
pudendum by an erect penis capable of penetration consummates the crime (People
vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000; People vs. Butiong, G.R. No.
168932, October 19, 2011). Touching the labia by instrument or object (such as
tongue or finger) also consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault (People
vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 6, 2011). If there is no touching of the labia, the
crime is either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness depending upon the intent the
offender. If the intention is to have sexual intercourse, the crime is attempted rape;
otherwise, the crime is acts of lasciviousness.
Undressing the victim (People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014) or
touching her vagina by the hand of the accused (People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No.
202060, December 11, 2013) or rubbing his penis on the mons pubis of the
pudendum (People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003) is merely
acts of lasciviousness because intent to have sexual intercourse is not clearly shown.
To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be shown that the erectile penis is
in the position to penetrate (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014) or
the offender actually commenced to force his penis into the victim's sexual organ
(People vs. Banzuela, supra). Touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts are "susceptible of double interpretation." These circumstances may show that

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the intention of the accused is either to commit rape or simple seduction (or acts of
lasciviousness). Since intent to have sexual intercourse is not clear, accused could not
be held liable for attempted rape. Hence, he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness
(Cruz vs. People, supra; People vs. Lamahang).
In People vs. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015, the commission of rape
can be established by circumstantial evidence even if the victim, being the sole
witness, was rendered unconscious during its commission. Accused slapped victim
and punched her in the stomach. She was rendered unconscious. When she regained
consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and felt pain in her vagina. Accused
was convicted of rape.
For there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act
of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight,
is not completed (People vs. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015).
28. SWEETHEART THEORY - In rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven
by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and,
second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important
as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust
(People vs. Victoria, G.R. No. 201110, July 06, 2015).
29. CHILD ABUSE - Under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, child abuse or
cruelty is committed by any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603 but not covered by
the RPC.
Under Section 3 (b), "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical
abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by
deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
Section 10 (a) punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of PD No.
603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. We stress that Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse other than child
prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5, attempt to commit child
prostitution under Section 6, child trafficking under Section 7, attempt to commit
child trafficking under Section 8, and obscene publications and indecent shows under
Section 9 (People vs. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013).
In Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013 - Accused saw the
victim and his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck

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minor-victim at the back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused
committed the act at the spur of the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to
debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a human being, or to humiliate or
embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is not child abuse under
RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries.
In Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014 - Although the
accused, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline her minor student, her infliction of
the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that
she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority. Accused was convicted of
child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610.
The Family Code has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by
a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her minor
student, who even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands, is liable for child
abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610 (Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988,
October 08, 2014).Accused saw the victim and his companions hurting his minor
daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the back with his hand and
slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of the moment, they
are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a human
being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is
not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries (Bongalon vs.
People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
Tenacious resistance - Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced
under RA No. 8353 is Section 266-D, which provides Any physical overt act
manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or
where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid
consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution rape (People vs. Sabadlab,
G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012). The legislators agreed that Article 266-D is
intended to soften the jurisprudence on tenacious resistance (People vs. Dulay, G.R.
Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002, En banc). Failure to shout should not be taken
against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04, 2013; see: People
vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324, March
20, 2013). It is not necessary for the victim to sustain physical injuries. She need not
kick, bite, hit or scratch the offender with her fingernails to prove that she had been
defensive (People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004).
Incestuous rape- In incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation
need not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who
is private complainants father, would suffice (People vs. Samandre, G.R. No. 181497,
February 22, 2012) In rape committed by a father, his moral ascendancy and
influence over the victim substitute for the requisite force, threat, and intimidation,
and strengthen the fear which compels the victim to conceal her dishonor (People vs.

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Ortega, G.R. No. 186235, January 25, 2012; People vs. Broca, GR No. 201447,
January 09, 2013 People vs. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013, ; People vs.
Osma, G.R. No. 187734, August 29, 2012).
Person Deprived Of Reason The term statutory rape should only be confined
to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the
victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the
crime committed is simple rape committed against a person "deprived of reason"
(People vs. Dalan, G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014). In rape, the phrase "deprived of
reason" refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation, which includes (a) idiot
(equivalent to two-year old child); (b) imbecile (seven-year old child); (c) moron or
feebleminded (twelve-year old child) and (d) borderline intelligence. A person is guilty of
rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a
"borderline mental deficiency (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011;
G.R. No. 140209, December 27, 2002, People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13,
2012);
Demented Person - The term demented refers to a person who has dementia
(schizophrenia) or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason includes
those suffering from mental retardation. Accused was charged in the Information with
rape of a demented person. Evidence however shows that the victim is not demented
but mentally retarded. Mistake in the information will not exonerate the accused he
failed to raise this as an objection (People vs. Ventura, Sr. GR. No. 205230, March 12,
2014) or there is an allegation in the information that his mental age is below 7 years
old (People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 05, 2013,).
Deafmute - The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental
abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman
is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a
deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. These circumstances must be proven.
Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence
of proof that she is an imbecile (People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 05, 2013).
30. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES - RPC punishes the rape of a mentally
disabled person regardless of the perpetrators awareness of his victims mental
condition. However, the perpetrators knowledge of the victims mental disability, at
the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime (People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041,
June 05, 2013). Since knowledge is an element of this qualifying circumstance, it
must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution
(People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014). In People vs. Lascano, G.R. No.
192180, March 21, 2012 the information in the present case merely stated that the
victim was blind; it did not specifically allege that the appellant knew of her blindness
at the time of the commission of the rape. Hence, the crime committed is simple rape.
In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and special
aggravating circumstance under Section 31(c) of RA No. 7610 in sexual abuse under
Section 5, the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his
ward. He must be legally appointed was first (People vs. Flores G.R. No.
188315, August 25, 2010).

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31. RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT - Rape through sexual intercourse,

which is commonly denominated as organ rape or penile rape, is committed by a
man by having carnal knowledge with a woman. This is not a gender free crime since
the offender must be a man while the victim must be a woman. On the other hand,
rape by sexual assault is committed by a person by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. If the offender used instrument or object in committing a
crime, the crime is called instrument or object rape. In rape through sexual assault,
the gender of the offender and the victim is not material. That is why this crime is
called gender-free rape (See: People vs. Soria, G.R. No. I 79031, November 14, 2012).
32. UNTENABLE DEFENSE
Marital consent Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of
RPC uses the term man in defining rape. Rape can be committed without regard to
the rapists legal relationship with his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC as amended
by RA No. 8353, in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed (People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),
Pardon - For crimes of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness, pardon
and marriage extinguish criminal liability. However, pardon should have been made
prior to the institution of the criminal actions (People vs. Dollano, Jr., GR No. 188851,
October 19, 2011). Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as
a crime against persons. Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime
or that which cannot be prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved
party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not
extinguish the offender's criminal liability (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June
06, 2011).
33. PROSTITUTION - Accompanying a child and offering her sexual services in
exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered the victim
to the one who raped her is not liable for rape as principal indispensable cooperation
since bringing the victim to the rapist is not indispensable to the commission of the
crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused
is regularly offering the sexual service of the child in exchange for money, the crime
committed is not anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring the child as
purpose of prostitution constitutes qualified trafficking in person because the former
took advantage of vulnerability of the latter as a child and as one who need money.
Minority is qualifying circumstance (People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 03,
2014). Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a prostitute
abroad constitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal recruitment. Syndicate
is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if the accused is less than three, but
the allegation and evidence shows that there are at least three traffickers and
recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying circumstance (People vs. Lalli,

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G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People vs. Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June 13,
2012).
34. FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE - The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1)
the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in
his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because
of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. In ascertaining
whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following factors:
(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused (Ibaez vs. People, G.R. No.
190798, January 27, 2016).
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
35. ROBBERY - When robbery by means of violence and intimidation is
committed in the dwelling, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery,
the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the
offended party's house (People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011).
When robbery by means of violence and intimidation is committed after an unlawful
entry or forcible entry, the crime committed is a complex crime. When the elements
of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation and robbery by using force
upon thing are present, the crime is a complex one under Article 48 of said Code.
Hence, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house shall be imposed in its maximum
period (People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972; People vs. Disney,
G.R. No. L-41336, February 18, 1983, En Banc and Fransdilla vs. People, GR No.
197562, April 20, 2015). When robbery with homicide is committed after unlawful
entry or forcible entry, the crime committed is special complex crime of robbery with
homicide with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry or forcible
entry (People vs. Baello, G.R. No. 101314, July 01, 1993). After entry into the dwelling
by means of simulation of authority, homicide is committed by reason or on occasion
of robbery, the crime committed is robbery with homicide while simulation of
authority is absorbed (People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
36. COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY - In Sebastian case, the Supreme Court
ruled that when the elements of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation
and robbery by using force upon thing are present, the accused shall be held liable of
the former since the controlling qualification is the violence and intimidation.
However, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house if the robber is armed is
graver than simple robbery. Hence, by hurting the victim, the offender shall be
penalized with a lighter penalty.
In People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972, the Supreme Court
En Banc expressly abandoned the Sebastian doctrine. It was held that imposing a
much lighter penalty if violence upon person is used in addition to forcible entry in
committing robbery defies logic and reason. When the elements of both robbery by

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means of violence and intimidation and robbery by using force upon thing are present,
the crime is a complex one under Article 48 of said Code. Hence, the penalty for
robbery in inhabited house shall be imposed in its maximum period.
In People vs. Disney, G.R. No. L-41336, February 18, 1983, En Banc and
Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Napolis doctrine.
37. ESTAFA THROUGH ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK - In order to
constitute estafa through issuance of bouncing check, the postdating or issuing a
check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In sum, the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of
the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, it must be shown that the
offended party to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money
or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender (People vs. Reyes,
GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013). Issuance of bouncing check to cover preexisting obligation is not estafa.
To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law
upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor (People vs.
Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013). But receipt of notice of dishonor is not
an element of this crime.
38. OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING Other forms of swindling under Article
316 (a) of RPC is committed by any person who, knowing that the real property is
encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.
The law was taken from Article 455 of the Spanish Penal Code. However, the words
"como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code, which means "free from encumbrance" do not
appear in the English text of RPC, nonetheless, the same are deemed incorporated in
the RPC. The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real
property by the offender under the express representation that there is no
encumbrance thereon. Hence, for one to be criminally liable for estafa under the law,
the accused must make an express representation in the deed of conveyance that the
property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No.
146770, February 27, 2003).
In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender
perpetrates false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as
selling it, which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused
represents that he owned the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents
in the deed of conveyance that the property is free from encumbrance. In EstrelladoMainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015 - The accused is not liable under
paragraph 2 since he did not make an express representation in the deed of
conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance.
Neither is he liable under paragraph 1 since he did not pretend to be the lawful owner

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of property by a title issued in the name of her father. The complainant is aware that
the title is still in the name of the father of the accused.
39. OTHER DECEIT - In estafa under Article 315, the false representation is
committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits. Following the principle of ejusdem generis, other deceit
as a means to commit estafa must be similar to pretending to possess power,
imaginary transaction etc. If the deceit is not similar to pretending to possess power or
imaginary transaction, the crime committed is other deceit under Article 318. In
Guinhawa vs. People, G.R. No. 162822 August 25, 2005 - Fraudulent representation
of the seller that the van to be sold is brand new constitutes other deceit under Article
318. On the other hand, in People vs. Rubaton, C.A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19,
1069, false representation that accused has a palay by reason of which the victim
parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes estafa under Article 315.
Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is imaginary.
The false pretense made by accused that Primelink was authorized to sell
membership shares is estafa. False pretense of qualification to sell securities is within
the contemplation of the provision on estafa (Lopez vs. People, GR No. 199294, July
31, 2013)
40. THEFT - The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of
theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable
of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015);
A tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The
landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties.
Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's consent. Petitioner
harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have
been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner (Ligtas vs. People, G.R. No. 200751,
August 17, 2015).
The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle will not preclude the presence
of the third element. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the
intent to gain or animus lucrandi. Intent to gain is an internal act presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle which the appellant failed to overcome with
evidence to the contrary. Verily, the mere use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes
gain (People vs. Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913, September 02, 2015).
Employee, who failed to return the motorcycle and money of the company, is
liable for carnapping and qualified theft (People vs. Asamuddin, supra)
41. THEFT THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION - Misappropriation of personal
property in possession of the accused may constitute estafa or theft depending upon
the nature of possession. If his possession of the property is physical or de facto,

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misappropriation thereof is constitutive of theft. If the possession is juridical or legal,

misappropriation thereof is estafa through misappropriation. But if the accused
acquired not merely possession but also ownership over the property, his liability in
connection with the property is merely civil.
If there is a contract of agency, the possession of the agent over the property
owned by principal is juridical. Under the Civil Code, an agent can even assert, as
against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse
him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his
fault (Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703). Thus, failure of the agent to return
the money or property to the principal is estafa (Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No.
182424, September 22, 2014; Tria vs. People, G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014).
In Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014 Accused induced
to complainant to entrust to her the funds for the taxes because she knew someone at
the BIR who could help her facilitate the remittance, and even reduce the amounts
due. She received the money for remit the same to the BIR with full freedom and
discretion. Thus, she had juridical possession of money. The crime committed is
estafa.
Driver of jeepney under boundary arrangement, who did not return the vehicle
to the owner-operator, is liable for carnapping. The law prohibits operator of motor
vehicle from leasing it. In the eye of the law the driver was only an employee of the
owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his possession of the jeepney is
physical (People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955), and thus, misappropriation
thereof is carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004)
In Roque v. People, the Court ruled that qualified theft may be committed even
when the personal property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the
commission of the felony. The concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping being the same, the holding in Roque v. People[44] equally applies to
carnapping. Hence, in People v. Bustinera, appellant, who was hired as taxi driver, was
found guilty of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539 after he failed to return the Daewoo
Racer taxi assigned to him by the cab company where he was employed (People vs.
Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913, September 02, 2015).
As a rule, the possession of the employee is only physical possession. Hence,
misappropriation of property is considered as theft. If the property is accessible to the
employee because of his function as such, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
confidence can be appreciated. The following employees were convicted of qualified
theft for misappropriating the property of their employer: (a) bank teller (People v.
Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932), (b) collector (Matrido vs. People, G.R.
No. 179061, July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015)
and (c) cash custodian (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta
vs. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014).
However, there are instances where the possession of the employee is
considered as juridical. 1. In Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012 - A

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corporate officer received the property to be utilized in the fabrication of bending machines
in trust from the corporation and he has absolute option on how to use them without
the participation of the corporation. Upon demand, the officer failed to account the
property. Since the corporate officer received the property in trust with absolute option
on how to use them without the participation of the corporation, he acquired not only
physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. He is liable for
estafa through misappropriation. 2. In People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6,
2014 The President of the Bank is holding the banks fund in trust or for
administration for the banks benefit. His possession is juridical. Hence,
misappropriating the funds by making fictitious loan is estafa. 3. In Gamboa vs.
People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014 - Accused employed as Liaison Officer of a
pawnshop received money in trust to secure or renew licenses and permits. His
possession is juridical. Hence, misappropriating the money is estafa.
42. THEFT OF BULKY GOODS - If the bulky goods are taken by the accused
inside a compound (such as SM), theft is consummated even if the accused failed to
bring out the stolen goods from the compound, which makes him unable to freely
dispose it. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Inability
to dispose the stolen property is not an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful
taking, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage (Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007). If the
accused is charged with frustrated theft, he could not be convicted of the crime
charged because theft has no frustrated stage. Neither could he be convicted of
consummated theft since it was not alleged in the information. But he could be
convicted of attempted theft because this crime is necessarily included in the charge of
frustrated theft (Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015).
Asportation - The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of
theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable
of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015);
43. Theft Of Intangible Property - The term "personal property" in the Revised
Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code. Consequently, any
personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation can be the object of theft. Business may be appropriated under Bulk
Sales Law. Thus, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service is a personal property (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13,
2009).
The word "take" in the RPC includes controlling the destination of the property
stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, use
of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity.
Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as
electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating
or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from

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such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature
(Laurel vs. Abrogar).
FINDER OF LOST PROPERTY - Any person who, having found lost property,
shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If
the finder surrenders the property found to a policeman, who fails to deliver it the
owner, the policeman is liable for theft. He acquired the position occupied by the
actual finder. Appropriating the property is of the same character of that made by one
who originally found the same (People vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March 31, 1923).
44. QUALIFIED THEFT - The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) that there
be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified "if committed
by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is a
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance (People vs. Bayon, GR No. 168627, July 02,
2010).
Abuse of confidence - A project manager, who took construction materials
from the project site, is liable for qualified theft since the stolen properties are
accessible to him (Zapanta vs. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013). If the
accused as an employee had no physical access to, or material possession of, the
stolen goods owned by his employer, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
confidence cannot be appreciated (Viray vs. People, GR No. 205180, November 11,
2013). Breaking the main door because accused was denied access to complainants
house means the latter has no confidence on the former. Qualified theft with abuse of
confidence is not committed (Viray vs. People, GR No. 205180, November 11, 2013).
The crime committed is robbery by using force upon thing.
Identity of the offended party - In oral defamation, a crime against honor, the
identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material
element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is material (People vs.
Uba, 106 Phil. 332). If the subject matter of a crime against property was money,
identity of the offended party in the information is indispensable for the proper
identification of the offense charged. Since money is generic, it can only be identified
connecting it to the offended party. Thus, the erroneous designation of the offended
party is fatal to the prosecution of the crime. If the subject matter of a crime against
property is specific, identity of the offended party in the information is not
indispensable for the proper identification of the offense charged. Since property is
specific, it can be identified even without connecting it to the offended party (Senador
vs. People, GR No. 201620, March 06, 2013).
Claim of ownership - Properties allegedly stolen are subject to estate
proceeding. The fact that these properties were taken under claim of ownership
negates the element of intent to gain. One who takes the property openly and avowedly

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under claim of title offered in good faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim
of ownership is untenable. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. (Sy vs. Gutierrez,
GR No. 171579, November 14, 2012).
45. UNINHABITED HOUSE - The establishment allegedly robbed was a store
not used as a dwelling. Hence, the crime committed is robbery in a private building
(Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 181138, December 3, 2012).
46. CARNAPPING - Under the Anti-Carnapping Act, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. To prove
the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only
of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" (People vs. Nocum et. Al., G.R. No.
179041, April 1, 2013).
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
47. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUNESS AND RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT
Prior to RA No. 8353, rape through sexual assault was considered as acts of
lasciviousness. However, upon the passage of RA No. 8353, acts, which were as acts of
lasciviousness before, are now treated as rape through sexual assault. However, the
concept of rape through sexual assault has not acquired some of the characteristic of
acts of lasciviousness.
If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is absorbed
by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But the
doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through sexual assault. Inserting
lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim and raping her
constitutes two counts of rape by sexual assault and rape through sexual intercourse
(People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into
the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual
assault and organ rape (In People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).
If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of lasciviousness, the
accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts of
lasciviousness is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is
rape through sexual intercourse, but the crime proven is rape through sexual assault,
the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not applicable since
rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of rape through
sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are materially and substantially
different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, which is
necessarily included in the charge of rape through sexual intercourse (People vs.
Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051,
October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015).
48.
ACTS
OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS
AND
CONSENTED
ACTS
OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS - Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal

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Code is committed against a person of either sex. On the other hand, consented acts
of lasciviousness under Article 339 of the same Code is committed against woman.
Acts of lasciviousness is committed under the any of the circumstances of committing
the old form of rape, and that is, (1) using force or intimidation; or (2) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (3) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age. While consented acts of lasciviousness under
Article 339 of the same Code is committed under the any of the circumstances of
committing qualified seduction or simple seduction (e.g. acts of lasciviousness
committed if committed against: (1) a woman by ascendant or brother; (2) a virgin over
twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest,
home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall
be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman; or (3) against a woman who
is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age
committed by means of deceit (See: Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October
20, 2015).
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
49. BIGAMY - The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have
been valid had it not been for the existence of the first (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R.
No. 138509, 31 July 2000; Vitangcol vs. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016);
(5) fraudulent intention (People vs. Manuel, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005).
1. Validity of the first marriage - To avoid criminal liability for bigamy, the
first marriage must be declared null and void before contracting the second marriage.
This requirement is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which provides: The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of the first marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense in bigamy (People vs. Teves, G.R. No.
188775, August 24, 2011).
Contracting second marriage without previous declaration of nullity of the first
marriage consummates the crime of bigamy. Once the crime consummates, criminal
liability will attach to the accused and will not be extinguished except through a mode
mentioned in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code such as death, pardon etc. Thus,
after the consummation of the crime of bigamy upon celebration of the second
bigamous marriage, the criminal liability shall not be extinguished by subsequent
declaration of nullity of the first marriage(Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1,
2000) even though obtained before the filing of the complaint for bigamy (People vs.
Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013); or the second marriage (Tenebro vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, supra); or first marriage and second marriage (Jarillo vs.
People, GR No. 164435, September 29, 2009).

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Subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage- Contracting second

marriage during the subsistence of first marriage consummates the crime of bigamy.
Criminal liability will not be extinguished even though after the consummation of the
crime or celebration of the second marriage, the first marriage has been declared null
and avoid because of psychological incapacity (Mercado vs. Tan, supra) or lack of
license and affidavit of cohabitation(Lasanas vs. People,G.R. No. 159031, June 23,
2014). Contracting a second marriage constitutes the crime of bigamy unless a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage has been secured beforehand. Because
of Article 40 of the Family Code, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense (Lasanas vs.
People,supra).
Even if the first marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code, this is not a
defense. Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs. People, GR No.
164435, June 29, 2010).
Exception: The principle that one who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy is not applicable
where the parties merely signed the marriage contract without marriage ceremony
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No.
145226, February 06, 2004).
2. Validity of the second marriage For the accused to be convicted of
bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015). In sum, the second
marriage would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People v.
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247). The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.
a. Subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage - Contracting
second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage consummates the crime of
bigamy. Criminal liability will not be extinguished even though after the
consummation of the crime or celebration of the second marriage, such second
marriage has been declared null and avoid because of psychological incapacity. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages
(Tenebro vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, supra; Walter vs. People, GR No.
183805, July 03, 2013). Note: Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in this
case because this provision contemplates a situation where first marriage, and not the
second marriage, is null and void.

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b. Second marriage is void for lack of marriage license - If the second

marriage is void due to lack of marriage license, the accused may or may not use the
nullity thereof as a defense.
The accused misrepresented that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. Accused cannot use the
voidness of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy because she fraudulently
secured a certificate of marriage, and that is presenting a falsified affidavit of
cohabitation instead of marriage license, The States penal laws on bigamy should
not be rendered nugatory by allowing the accused to deliberately ensure that the
second marriage be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages (Santiago vs. People, supra).
The second marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage
license. Accused can use the voidness of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy.
In this case, accused did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. He did not fraudulently secure a Certificate of Marriage,
and later used this criminal act as basis for seeking her exculpation. The crime
committed is not bigamy under Article 349 (Santiago vs. People, supra; People v. De
Lara, 3 No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079) but marriage contracted
against the provisions of the law under Article 350 (People vs. Peralta, CA-GR No.
13130-R, June 30, 1955).
Accomplice in bigamy - The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint
liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of
them is valid and subsisting. In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second
spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused
(Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015).
The punishment of the second spouse as a principal to the crime is wrong. The
second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. A
person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to
another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy (Santiago vs. People, supra).
Three marriages - X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead
when X contracted his third marriage. X is liable for bigamy involving the second
marriage on the basis of his first marriage. X is not liable for bigamy involving the
third marriage on the basis of the first marriage since the first has already been
extinguished by reason of death of the first wife when he contracted the third. He is
not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the second marriage
since the latter is null and void for being a bigamous marriage.
50. ILLEGAL MARRIAGE - A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony
despite knowledge that the couple had no marriage license, is liable for illegal

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marriage. The non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple does not negate
criminal liability of the priest. Article 352 does not make this an element of the crime.
The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing
officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife. For purposes of determining if a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements (Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014).
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
51. MEANS TO COMMIT DEFAMATION - Under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, a libel is committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code, already punishes it. Online defamation constitutes similar
means for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February
18. 2014).
The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the
internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first
published. To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the
amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate, Article
360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in
their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No.
184800, May 5, 2010).
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not
only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the
offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of
the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a
rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the
part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony (De Leon vs. People, G.R. No.
212623, January 11, 2016).
There are cases where the Court considered the circumstances of the concerned
parties and held that the defamation was grave serious in nature.
In U.S. v. Tolosa, where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and
scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married
lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that
the crime committed was grave slander. In Balite v. People, the accused was found

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guilty of grave oral defamation as the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended
party constituted the crime of estafa.
In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances were not
grave on the basis of the peculiar situations obtaining.
In the case of People v. Arcand, a priest called the offended party a gangster in
the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight
slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. In Pader v.
People, the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight oral defamation as it
considered the expression, "putang ina mo," as expression to convey anger or
displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting considering that he was
drunk when he uttered those words and his anger was instigated by what the private
complainant did when the former's father died. Also in Jamilano v. Court of
Appeals, where calling someone "yabang" (boastful or arrogant) was found not
defamatory, the complainant's subsequent recourse to the law on oral defamation was
not sustained by the Court.
Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the
crime committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:
First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with
each other as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing
incident, there was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3
Leonardo.
Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first
hearing on the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The
gap between the gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a
span of time within which the wounded feelings could not have been healed. The
utterance made by De Leon was but a mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside
his system and unleashed during their encounter.
Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to
strike deep into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties
should have been considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident
that De Leon hurled those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3
Leonardo because De Leon's utterance could simply be construed as his expression of
dismay towards his actions as his friend and member of the community (De Leon vs.
People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016).
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
52. To make a doctor liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, it
must be shown that he did not treat his patient in accordance with the standard of
care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. Failure to present specialist as witness to testify on this standard is
fatal to the prosecution of the case (Solidum vs. People, GR No. 192123, March 10,
2014).

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In People vs. Dumayag, G.R. No. 172778, 26 November 2012 - Section 37 of

R.A. No. 4136 mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of
the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway
is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a
curve in the highway, where the drivers view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily,
drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high
degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to
it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his
presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.
53. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM An accused is a child in
conflict with the law as along as he is under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense. Reaching the age of majority at any stage of the case will
not deprive him of his entitlements under the law as a child in conflict with the law.
Thus, the exempting circumstance of minority is still appreciable even if the accused
is already an adult at the time of the rendition of judgment. However, there is an
exception to this rule. Upon reaching the age of 21 years, he is not anymore entitled to
the benefit of a suspended sentence.
The rights and privileges of a child in conflict with the law are as follows:
1. Exemption of criminal liability - If the child is 15 years of age or below,
minority is an exempting circumstance (Section 6 of RA No. 9344). Lack of
discernment is conclusively presumed.
If the child is above 12 years of age up to 15 years of age, he is exempt from
criminal liability but he can be considered as a neglected child and be mandatorily
placed in a youth care facility or Bahay Pag-asa in the following instances: (a) If the
child commits serious crimes such as parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide or rape, robbery with homicide or rape,
destructive arson, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or
offenses involving dangerous drugs punishable by more than 12 years of
imprisonment; and (b) In case of repetition of offenses and the child was previously
subjected to a intervention program and his best interest requires involuntarily
commitment.
In case of commission of serious crime, a petition for involuntarily commitment
shall be filed by social worker in court. In case of repetitionof offenses, his parents or
guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment.
However, if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute
such authorization, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed social worker in court; but the child may be subjected to intensive
intervention program supervised by the local social officer instead of involuntary
commitment (Section 20-A and 20-B of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630).
2. Privilege mitigating circumstance If the child is above 15 years of age
but below 18 years of age, minority is either exempting or privileged mitigating. If the
child acted without discernment, the circumstance of minority is exempting. If the

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child acted with discernment, the circumstance of minority is a privileged mitigating.

This privilege mitigating circumstance shall be appreciated even if minority was not
proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented on appeal
(People vs. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013) and even if the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death (People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions in Revised Penal Code are not
applicable unless the accused is a minor. In such case, the penalty of life
imprisonment shall be considered reclusion perpetua. In sum, if the accused is a
minor, Article 68 of Revised Penal Code on the privilege mitigating circumstance of
minority shall apply to crime of illegal possession of dangerous drug even though this
is malum prohibitum punishable by life imprisonment. Hence, the penalty of life
imprisonment for illegal possession of dangerous drug committed by a minor, which is
treated as reclusion perpetua, shall be graduated to reclusion temporal because of the
privilege mitigating circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227,
July 20, 2011)
5. Suspension of sentence of child in conflict with the law - The suspension
of sentence of minor is now found in Section 38 of RA 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Law. Hence, Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code and
relevant provisions in PD 603 (Youth and Welfare Code) on suspension of sentence of
minor are deemed repealed.
a. Promulgation of judgment - Once the child in conflict with the law is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction,
shall place him under suspended sentence, without need of application (1984 Bar
Exam). But the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed (Section 38 of RA 9344). In other words, the
suspension of sentence does not extend to civil aspect of the case. If the child in
conflict with the law is found innocent or exempt for criminal liability the
pronouncement of judgment of acquittal shall not be suspended.
In suspension of sentence of minor, what is being suspended is the
pronouncement of sentence or promulgation of judgment of conviction. In probation,
what is being suspended is the service of sentence. In parole, what is being suspended
is the service of the unserved portion of the sentence. The convict is only entitled to
apply for parole after the serving the minimum penalty under the indeterminate
sentence law.
b. Application, not required - Under the old rule, application for suspension of
sentence is required. But under Section 38 of RA 9344, the court shall place the child
in conflict with the law under a suspended sentence without need of application.
c. Reaching the age of majority -Under the old rule, a child in conflict with
the law is not entitled to a suspended sentence upon reaching 18 years of age.
However, under Section 38 of RA No. 9344, the suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at
the time of pronouncement People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).

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While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides suspension of sentence can still be

applied even if the child is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement, Section 40 limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches
the age of 21. Hence, child in conflict with the law, who reached 21 years of age,
cannot avail of suspension of sentence (1973, 1977, 2003, 2009, and 2013 Bar
Exams; People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011, Padua v. People, G.R.
No. 168546, July 23, 2008, People vs. Salcedo, GR No. 186523, June 22, 2011; People
vs. Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270,
October 21, 2015).
d. No disqualification - Under the old rule, the child in conflict with the law is
disqualified from the benefit of suspended sentence if he had been sentenced to death,
life imprisonment, reclusion Perpetua (1995 Bar Exam). However, under RA No. 9344,
Section 38 makes no distinction as to the nature of offense by the child. Thus, the
court should not distinguish between a minor, who is guilty of capital offense or lesser
offense. The Senate debate discloses that the suspension is applicable to heinous
crime (People vs. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009; People vs. Jacinto,
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21,
2015). Even a recidivist minor is entitled a suspended sentence.
6. Probation If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be
filed within the period of perfecting an appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation
Law). However, the accused is a child in conflict with the law, application for probation
may be filed at any time (Section 42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can be filed even
beyond the period of perfecting an appeal or even during the pendency of an appeal.
Under Section 9 of PD 968, one is sentenced to suffer a penalty (maximum
indeterminate penalty) of more than 6 years is not qualified to apply for probation (e.g.
one who is sentenced to suffer 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum is not entitled to apply for probation).
However, under Section 70 of RA No. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Law), a first time minor
offender can apply for probation for the crime of illegal possession or use of dangerous
drug even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment (2014 Bar Exam). But
Section 70 of RA 9165 is only applicable if the minor is being charged with possession
or use of dangerous drugs. If the charge is selling dangerous drugs, the applicable rule
is Section 24 of RA No. 9165, which disqualifies drug traffickers and pushers for
applying for probations. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as
victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators (Padua vs. People, G.R.
No. 168546, July 23, 2008).
7. Agricultural camp or other training facilities - The child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities in accordance with Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs.
Mantalba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People vs. Salcedo, GR No. 186523, June
22, 2011; People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011; People vs. Ancajas,
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).

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8. Full credit of preventive imprisonment A convict is entitled to a full or

4/5 credit of his preventive imprisonment (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code).
However, if the convict is a child in conflict with the law, he shall be credited in the
services of his sentence the full time spent in actual commitment and detention
(Section 41, RA 9344; Atizado vs. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010).
54. CHILD ABUSE - Twelve years old and above - If the child is 12 years old
and above, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse (or child prostitution)
under RA No. 7610 and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted
as follows:
If the acts committed against a child, who is 12 years old and above, constitute
sexual abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator cannot be charged
with both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. Both crimes are of the same nature since the essence of both is having sex
without consent. Consent of the child is not recognized by law. Likewise, rape cannot
be complexed with sexual abuse. Under Section 48 of RPC, a felony cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. In such case, he shall be
prosecuted either for sexual abuse or rape through sexual intercourse (People v. Abay,
G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009; People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 183090, Nov. 14,
2011, People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011, People v. Matias, G.R. No.
186469, June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June
19, 2013) depending upon which of the laws prescribes a higher penalty.
sexual abuse and rape through sexual intercourse or rape through sexual assault with
homicide, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted for rape because the Revised Penal Code
prescribes a higher penalty.
sexual abuse and rape through sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator
shall be prosecuted for sexual abuse because RA No. 7610 prescribes a higher penalty.
In Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 If the victim of
the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of
age, the accused shall be liable for consented acts of lasciviousness under Article 339
of the Revised Penal Code or acts of lasciviousness under Article 336. However, in case
the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) RA No.
7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack
of consent, then Art. 336 of the Code is no longer applicable. Accused shall be held
liable for sexual abuse. In instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by
Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 (on sexual abuse), where the penalty is reclusion
temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by (rape through) sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision
mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if
the offended party is a child victim

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Under twelve years old If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the
accused constitute sexual abuse (or child prostitution) under RA No. 7610 and rape or
acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted penalized as follows:
a. If the acts committed against a child, who is under 12 years old, constitute
sexual abuse and rape through sexual intercourse, the perpetrator shall not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse under RA No. 7610. He shall be prosecuted and penalized
for statutory rape under Revised Penal Code (People vs. Pangilinan, GR No. 183090,
November 14, 2011). Under Section 5 of RA No. 7610, when the child exploited in
prostitution or subject to sexual abuse is under twelve years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted for rape under the Revised Penal Code.
b. If the acts committed against a child, who is under 12 years old, constitute
sexual abuse and acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted for acts of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code but penalized under RA No. 7610, which
has prescribed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Under Section
5 of RA No. 7610, when the child exploited in prostitution or subject to sexual abuse is
under twelve years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the Revised
Penal Code on lascivious conduct: Provided, That the penalty for it shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period
Before the perpetrator can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness with the
penalty under RA No. 7610, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse (Navarrete vs. People, G.R. No. 147913,
January 31, 2007; Amployo v. People, G.R. No. 157718, 26 April 2005).
c. If the acts committed against a child, who is under 12 years old, constitute
sexual abuse and simple rape through sexual assault, the letters of Section 5 of RA No.
7610 require that the perpetrator shall be prosecuted and penalized under Revised
Penal Code. However, this rule is unfair. If the victim is under 12 year old, the penalty
for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium
period; while that for rape through sexual assault is only prision mayor. In sum, the
penalty for acts of lasciviousness is higher than that for rape by sexual assault
although the criminal degree of the former is lesser than that of the latter. To prevent
unfairness, the Supreme Court in People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16,
2011 imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No.
7610 for simple rape through sexual assault committed against a 10 year old child.
The Court stated: To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of RA No. 8353 (on
rape through sexual assault), to have disallowed the applicability of RA No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610
is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children.
d. If the acts committed against a child, who is under 12 years old, constitute
sexual abuse and qualified rape by sexual assault, the letters of Section 5 of RA No.
7610 require that the perpetrator shall be prosecuted and penalized under Revised
Penal Code. This rule is not unfair since the Revised Penal Code has prescribed grave
penalty for it, and that is, reclusion temporal. Hence, the letter of the law shall be
applied to its full extent. In People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011,
since the crime committed (against an 8-year-old child) is rape through sexual assault

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with qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship, the rationale of unfairness

to the child victim that Chingh case wanted to correct is absent because RPC as
amended by RA No. 8353 already prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for this
crime. Hence, there is no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by RA No. 7610
for sexual abuse. The penalty under RPC should be imposed.
55. ESTAFA AND ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT It is settled that a person may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042, in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa (People vs. Arnaiz, G.R. No. 205153, September 09, 2015).
The accused for deceitfully recruiting without license 6 complainants to work abroad
is liable for one count of large scale illegal recruitment and 6 counts of estafa through
false pretense (People vs. Solina, G.R. No. 196784, January 13, 2016).
56. ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION - The essence of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an
act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it
to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own
use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No.
165411, June 18, 2009).
Refusal to remit rentals for properties owned by corporation to corporate
officers, who are not validly elected, does not constitutes estafa through
misappropriation (People vs. Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015).
Demand not necessary However, demand to return or to make accounting is
not specified in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as an element of estafa. The
importance of demand in estafa has something to do with evidence. Failure to account
upon demand for funds or property held in trust without offering any satisfactory
explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation
(Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012).In a prosecution for estafa
through misappropriation, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of
misappropriation or conversion(People vs. Arambulo,G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015).
57. BP BLG. 22 and ESTAFA - There is no estafa if the check was issued to
cover pre-existing obligation or replace a previously issued check. In People vs. Chua,
G.R. No. 130632, September 28, 1999 - Ineluctably, the replacement checks were
issued in payment of an obligation long contracted and incurred. It cannot therefore
be said that accused committed fraudulent acts in the issuance and the indorsement
of the replacement checks. In short, the replacement checks were by no means the
device used by accused to induce complainant to lend her money without which the
transaction would not have been consummated.
However, accused is liable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing four
replacement checks. The law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check
punishable as a special offense. The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act
of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum

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prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical
to public welfare. It is undisputed that the four replacement checks in question were
issued by accused and that these were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
58. BP BLG. 22 - If there is no proof as to when the written notice of dishonor
was received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided
in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period (Danao v. Court of Appeals). In Chua vs. People,
G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015, the notice of dishonor, while bearing the signature of
accused, does not indicate any date as to his receipt thereof. Hence, there is no way to
ascertain when the five-day period under the law would start and end. It cannot
simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of receipt
thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence.
Accused was acquitted.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. The check was issued in Pampanga, deposited in Makati bank and
dishonored by drawee bank in Pampanga. The court of the place where the check was
deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of BP 22. The Metc of Makati has jurisdiction of the case (Morillo
vs. People, G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015). The complainant may also file the
case in Pampanga, the place of issuance.
Demand letter was given with the security guard with the instruction to hand
it to accused. But there is no showing that the letter ever reached accused. Counsel
sent a demand letter to accused by registered mail which was returned with the
notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that accused did not claim it despite three
notices to her. Since there is insufficient proof that accused actually received the
notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds
cannot arise. Accused was acquitted. However, he is still civilly liable (San Mateo vs.
People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013).
An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt by reason of
failure to establish receipt of notice of dishonor does not preclude the award of civil
damages (San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013).
Exerting effort - Exerting efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her
creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank is a
circumstantial evidence of receipt of notice of dishonor. Accused would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from
her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and
the dishonor of her checks (Campos vs. People. G.R. No. 187401, September 17,
2014).
No right to expect - Under Section 114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the drawer in either of the following
cases where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor

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will honor the check. Since petitioner's bank account was already closed even before
the issuance of the subject check, he had no right to expect or require the drawee
bank to honor his check. By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, petitioner is not
entitled to be given a notice of dishonor (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26,
2008, ).The crime involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing
check. However, it is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP
22.
Payment - Payment of check before the filing of information is a defense. The
spirit of B.P. Big 22, which is the protection of the credibility and stability of the
banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently
corrected their mistakes and restituted damages even before charges have been filed
against them. In sum, by making payment of the check before the filing of the
information, the purpose of the law has already been attained. 1. Payment after
receiving subpoena from the office of city prosecutor (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834,
November 26, 2014) 2. Payment through notarial foreclosure two years before the
filling of cases (Griffith vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 129764, March 12, 2002)3. Payment six
(6) months before the filing of case (Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007)
Payment of check after the filing of information is not a defense. Since there is
no showing of intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of
the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude the
prosecution of accused. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its
full extent (Lim vs. People, supra).
In estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the
check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the
value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will
merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability (Lim vs.
People, supra). Note: The essence of estafa is to punish fraud and not to protect the
integrity of the check.
Suspension of payment - Suspension of payment order issued by SEC before
the check was presented for payment is a defense in violation of BP Blg. 22.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed
suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it
again becomes operative when a condition occurs - or a situation arises - warranting
the termination of the suspension of the contract. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and
when the event that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time
complainant presented the check for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there
was yet no obligation due from accused. Thus, accused is not liable for violation of BP
Blg. 22 (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014).
Suspension of payment order issued by SEC after three months from receipt of
notice of dishonor is not a defense in violation of BP Blg. 22. Since there is no
suspension of payment when the notice of dishonor was received, the drawer was not
precluded from making good the check during that three-month gap when he received

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the letter and when the SEC issued the order (Tiong Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608,
August 26, 2008).
59. RA NO. 3019 In Giangan vs. People, G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015 Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he
was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road
had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the
turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused
were acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith means honest, lawful intent;
the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered
inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished. He was
acquitted of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 because the element of evident
bad faith is not present.
Private individual - Only public officer can be held criminally liable for
violation of RA No. 3019. However, if there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in
violating RA No. 3019 is imputable to the private individual although there are not
similarly situated in relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides
penalty for public officer or private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a private
individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the public officer with
whom the private individual allegedly conspired, the latter can still be prosecuted for
violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal liability but not the crime.
Hence, if there is proof of the crime and conspiracy of dead public officer with private
individual, the latter can still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go,
GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014).However, the public officer with whom the private
individual allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
Conspiracy of silence or inaction As a rule, the principle of conspiracy as
a mode of committing a crime or for purpose of applying the collective responsibility
rule is only applicable to intentional felony. The concept of conspiracy, the elements of
which are agreement and decision to commit a crime, are not consistent with culpable
felony. Persons cannot definitely agree and decide to commit a culpable crime.
However, there is an exception, and that, the doctrine of conspiracy of silence or in
action. In Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013 - A paymaster obtained
cash advances despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash advances. The
City Treasurer certified that the cash advances are necessary and lawful. The City
Accountant certified that the expenditures are supported by documents and previous
cash advances are liquidated and accounted for. The City Administrator approved the
voucher and countersigned the check. The paymaster is liable for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA No. 3019 committed through gross inexcusable negligence. The City
Treasurer, City Accountant and City administrator are liable because of conspiracy of
silence or inaction. Public officers omissions to question irregularities indicate a
common understanding and concurrence of sentiments respecting the commission of
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Undue delay - There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State
for the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges against the
respondents before the proper court. On the charge of robbery, the preliminary
investigation would not require more than five years to ascertain the relevant factual
and legal matters. Because of the inordinate delay in resolving the criminal complaint
by the Ombudsman against respondent, the cases against respondent were dismissed
(People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, and Perez, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013).
Under Section 3 (a), a public officer, who persuades, induces or influences
another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, shall be
punished for corruption. However, the deliberation in the Senate regarding the bill on
anti-graft shows that the mode of committing the crime under Section 3 (a) is
persuading, inducing or influencing a public officer by another public officer to commit
an offense or to violate rules and regulations by means of consideration, reward,
payment or remuneration (See: Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006).
Hence, Grace Poe is not committing this crime since she is not inducing Secretary De
Lima to commit an offense or violate rules in connection with the criminal complaint
against INC officers by means of consideration, reward, payment or remuneration.
Section 3 (b) is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law.
Preliminary investigation is not a contract or transaction is not a contract or
transaction within the contemplated of Section 3 (b). Hence, requesting or receiving
money in connection with a preliminary investigation is not a violation of this
provision (Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 31, 1984; People vs.
Sandiganbayan. and Justice Secretary Perez, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013).
In Consigna vs. People, G.R. no. 175750, April 2, 2014 Petitioner, a municipal
treasurer, is considered a public officer discharging official functions when she
misused such position to be able to take out a loan from complainant, who was misled
into the belief that former, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the
municipality. The petitioner misrepresented that the loan is to be used to pay for the
salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal
gymnasium. The victim could have been the Municipality of General Luna since the
checks signed by the mayor was issued to the complainant. It was just fortunate that
the mayor instructed the bank to stop payment of the checks issued by petitioner.
Thus, the municipal treasurer can be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019 for causing damage to complainant.
Section 3 (3) of RA No. 3019 is not applicable exclusively to public officers
charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions. It may
apply to other public officers (Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72,
June 30, 1987; Stilgrove vs. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, March 28, 2008; Consigna
vs. People, G.R. No. 175750, April 2, 2014).
Second element - The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed
either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality,

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or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence (Plameras

vs. People, GR No. 187268, September 04, 2013).
Arias principle - The property bought by the City is overpriced. Accused was
charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for causing damage to the
government through manifest partiality and evident bad faiths. The only evidence
presented by the prosecution is his on the voucher. He was acquitted. Accused cannot
be convicted on grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher.
Heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates on preparation
of bids, purchase of supplies, or negotiations (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
81563 & 82512, 19 December 1989).
However, the principle in the Arias case where is not applicable where
circumstances other than signature of the voucher shows evident bad faith, manifest
partiality or gross inexcusable negligence such as: (1) Where the accused has
foreknowledge of existing anomaly - e.g. mayor signed the inspection report and the
disbursement voucher despite the fact that he had foreknowledge that the materials
delivered by Guadines have already been confiscated by the DENR (Escara vs. People,
G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005); (2) Where there is deviation from ordinary procedure
e.g. mayor issued and encashed municipal checks despite the facts that the
disbursement vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber but the checks were payable
to the accused and not to Kelly Lumber (Cruz vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
134493, August 16, 2005); and (3) Where accused approved the voucher without
indication of the retention money required by law, and he even inspected the
construction site of PAL Boat, in which he should have noticed the financial weakness
of the contractor and the defective works (Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 156577,
December 03, 2014).
Arias principle is not applicable if the public officer acting in his capacity as
head of office has not relied on his subordinates but on officers of equal rank such as
heads of the Office of the City Treasurer and, the Office of the City Accountant (Jaca
vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law regarding the entitlement of a
government employee who was wrongfylly removed to RATA, absent any showing of
some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily
amount to bad faith (Ysidoro vs. Hon. Leonardo-De Castro, G.R. No. 171513,
February 06, 2012).
Third element - His action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions. There are two (2) ways by which a public official violates
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be
charged under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term or connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. ] In other words, the
presence of one would suffice for conviction. "To be found guilty under the second
mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in

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the exercise of his official, administrative and judicial functions." The element of
damage is not required for violation of Section 3 (e) under the second mode (Braza vs.
the Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013; Rivera vs. People, G.R.
No. 156577, December 03, 2014).
First mode - The concept of "undue injury," in the context of Section 3(e) RA
No. 3019 is the same as the civil law concept of "actual damage." It is required that
undue injury must be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
Speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient. The damages suffered cannot be
based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or
guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable
regarding specific facts which could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or
actual damage (M.A. Jimenez Inc. vs. The Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 155307, June
06, 2011).
Second mode - In the first mode of committing the crime, the undue injury is
caused to any party including the government. In the second mode, the unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference is given to private party. Giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to the government or public official is not
constitutive of the crime under Section 3 (e). The term "private party" may be used to
refer to persons other than those holding public office (Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000) or public officer acting in a private capacity to protect
his personal interest (Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 06, 2011).
Giving unwarranted benefit to the mayor transferring him from the provincial jail and
detained him at a residence is a violation of Section 3 (e). Such privilege was accorded
to the mayor not in his official capacity, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus,
for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), the mayor was a private party
(Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, supra).
In Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September
11, 2013 The elements of the offense under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: (1)
That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; (2) That
he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation
by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request,
or contract with the government; (3) That the public official with whom the offender
has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense,
considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first
cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family
physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free
access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such
family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns
& Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3)
President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal

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relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
The rule directing full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is a means of preventing
said evil and is aimed particularly at minimizing if not altogether curtailing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the
public service. By the SALN, the public is able to monitor movement in the fortune of a
public official; it serves as a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth (Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Office of the Umbudsman, G.R. No.
197307, February 26, 2014).
Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA No. 6713
and Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M. No. P-99-1342,
June 8, 2005). Since both laws provide a penalty for failure to file SALN, the offender
should only be prosecuted and punished either under one or the other.
60. MONEY LAUNDERING - Money laundering is committed by any person
who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or
relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:(a) transacts said monetary instrument
or property;(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses
said monetary instrument or property;(c) conceals or disguises the true nature,
source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said
monetary instrument or property;(d) attempts or conspires to commit money
laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);(e) aids, abets, assists in or
counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs
(a), (b) or (c) above; and(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he
facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c)
above. Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that
a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so (Section 4 of RA No. 9160 as
amended by RA No. 10365).
Unlawful activity refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof
involving or having direct relation to the following: (1) piracy, murder, distructive
arson, kidnapping for ransom, crimes involving dangerous drugs; (2) hijacking,
carnapping, fencing, robbery, qualified theft, and estafa; (3) bribery and corruption of
public officers, frauds and Illegal exactions, malversation, graft and corruption, and
plunder; (4) forgeries and counterfeiting; and (5) child pornography, photo-video
voyeurism, child abuse, crimes involving explosives and unlicensed firearm, trafficking
in person, illegal recruitment, terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism, and
financing of terrorism and; smuggling, and illegal gambling.
Unlawful activity also includes violation of the Electronic Commerce Law, the
Revised Forestry Code, Fisheries Code, Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection
Act, the National Caves and Cave Resources Management Protection Act, the
Intellectual Property Code; the Securities Regulation Code; and felonies or offenses of
a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws of other countries (Section
3 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).

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Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the above-enumerated unlawful activity. The prosecution of money
laundering shall proceed independently of any proceeding relating to the unlawful
activity (Section 6 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).
61. LOOSE FIREARM - When loose firearm is used in committing a crime with
a graver penalty, the accused shall be prosecuted for the graver crime, but the court
shall apply the penalty in its maximum period (Section 29, RA No. 10591). Use of loose
firearm is a special aggravating circumstance (People vs. Salibad, G.R. No. 210616,
November 25, 2015) similar to quasi-recidivism because its presence will require the
application of the penalty in its maximum period regardless of the presence of
mitigating circumstance (People vs. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016).
For example, if a loose firearm was used in committing homicide, the accused
shall be held liable for homicide and the court shall apply reclusion temporal
prescribed for it in its maximum period. This special aggravating circumstance can be
appreciated even though the loose firearm was not presented as evidence (People vs.
Salibad, supra) as long as there is proof that accused used firearm in committing a
crime (slugs were recovered from the dead body of the victim) and he has no license to
possess a firearm (People vs. Salahuddin, supra).
62. DANGEROUS DRUGS
Use of dangerous drugs - Where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for
possession is only in the form of residue and there is a positive confirmatory test
result, the accused should be charged with use of dangerous drugs rather than
possession of dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the law to
file charges of use of dangerous drugs in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of
drug use and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life
(People vs. Matinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010).
Possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion
constitutes a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs (David vs. People, G.R.
No. 181861, October 17, 2011).
For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority.
However, mere possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
Attempted Sale - A, poseur buyer, asked X if he has available shabu for
sale. X answered in the affirmative and showed to A a plastic sachet containing
shabu. A immediately identified himself as a policeman, and then, apprehended X
and confiscated the shabu from his pocket. What is the crime committed by X? X
is liable for attempted sale of shabu punishable under Section 26 of RA
9165. Attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of
showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. The sale was aborted when the police

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officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest (People vs. Figueroa,
G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).
Delivery - Is the absence of marked money as evidence fatal to prosecution of
sale and delivery of dangerous drugs? No. The law defines deliver as a persons act of
knowingly
passing
a
dangerous
drug
to
another
with
or
without
consideration. Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and
the delivery of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of
marijuana may be sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked money
(People vs. Domingcil, G.R. No. 140679, January 14, 2004).
Lack Of Coordination With Pdea - Silence of the law as to the consequences of
the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the prior authority of the PDEA
cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without such PDEA
participation illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible
(People vs. Clarite, G.R. No. 187157, February 15, 2012). Lack of coordination with
the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not an
indispensable requirement in buy-bust operations. Neither Section 86 of Republic Act
No. 9165 nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations make PDEAs participation a
condition sine qua non for the conduct of a buy-bust operation (People vs. Mendosa,
G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)
Confirmatory Test - In Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012 In no instance did accused challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of
confirmatory drug test conducted on her. Accused only questioned the alleged
omission when she appealed her conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day
for her to do so. Well entrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Photography And Inventory Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; However, the
Implementing rules of RA No. 9165 provides that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, his representative
or counsel, media and DOJ, and any elected public official. Non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not necessarily render the items
seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the
letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved (David vs. People, Gr No.

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181861, October 17, 2011, ; Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013;
People vs. Morate, GR No. 201156, January 29, 2014; People vs. Ladip, GR No.
196146, March 12, 2014; People vs. Bis, GR No. 191360, March 10, 2014).
Chain Of Custody As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same (People vs. Constantino,
Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014).
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buybust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People vs. Constantino, Jr.
GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014)
Paraphernalia With Traces Of Shabu In People vs. Matinez, G.R. No.
191366, December 13, 2010 - This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing
charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for
possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the
intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time
offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as
required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for
the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the
penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and
provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this
Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to
exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is
only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15
is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to
be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs
should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than
mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.

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Importation Of Dangerous Drugs - In People vs. Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272,
January 21, 2015, accused were caught by police authorities on board a speedboat
carrying shabu. They were charged with importation of dangerous drugs. However,
since it was not proven that the drugs came from China or foreign country they were
convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, which is necessarily included in the
charge of importation.
63. HAZING - In Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012, the
accused was liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving the death
of Lenny Villa during hazing rite. This is not anymore controlling. The crime
committed if a neophyte died during hazing rite is hazing punishable by RA No. 8049.
Prior to RA No. 8049, good faith is a defense in homicide where the victim is
killed during hazing. The consent of the victim and lack of intent to kill of the accused
will negate dolo, which is an important element of homicide. Hence, the crime
committed only reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (Villareal vs. People, supra).
Having in mind the principle of mala in se adhered to under the RPC, where good faith
is a defense, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita where
good faith is not a defense. The deliberation of the Senate shows that what is
important is not the intention to kill the neophyte during the hazing but the result of
the act of hazing. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law
provides that any person charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Also,
the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim to be sodomized or
injured shall not be a defense in hazing. The very act of inflicting physical pain or
psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. Sodomy or death of the victim
will only aggravate the offense (Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015).
The elements of the crime of hazing are: (1) That there is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization; (2) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,
sorority or organization; and (3) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury (Dungo vs. People, supra; People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No.
171222, February 18, 2015).
Under Section 4 of RA 8049, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority
or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm upon
recruit, neophyte or applicant on occasion of hazing shall be liable as principals for
the crime of hazing. Hazing is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization or a requirement
for employment in a corporation by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations.
The law, however, did not limit the definition of these groups to those formed
within academic colleges and universities. Organization includes but is not limited to
groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational

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institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the

PNP, and the AFP. The Philippine Merchant Marine Academy is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law (People vs. Bayabos). Even the president,
manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment are covered by the law (Dungo vs. People, supra).
R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as
approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission,
duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the
PNP, shall not be considered as hazing (Dungo vs. People, supra).
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof
provides that initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed
provided that the following requisites are met: (1) That the fraternity, sorority or
organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization; (2) The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before
the conduct of such initiation; (3) That the written notice shall indicate: (a) The period
of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days; (b) The names of those
to be subjected to such activities; and (c) An undertaking that no physical violence be
employed by anybody during such initiation rites (Dungo vs. People, supra).
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or
organization or their representatives that they must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these valid initiations. The
duty of such representative is to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be
inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant (Dungo vs. People, supra).
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities,
sororities or organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section
2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not have a clear liability for
non-compliance with Section 3 (Dungo vs. People, supra).
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If
the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical
injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable
as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person during the hazing is prima
facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the commission of the acts
punishable herein.
RA No. 8049 presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable
presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy.
Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the
commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable
presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which

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can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of
the hazing.
Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in
the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their
presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
This rule on prima facie evidence does not shatter the presumptive innocence
the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still
to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely,
it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the
latter may adduce."
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni
of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the
hazing. Although these planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing
were committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The provision took in
consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their former
officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would be officers or members of an organization
group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by
inducing the victim to be present thereat. These officers or members are penalized, not
because of their direct participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their
indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing.
The accused claim that the information avers a criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by
inducement. The information alleged that the accused during a planned initiation rite
and being then officers of APO fraternity used personal violence upon a neophyte
resulting to his death. The "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing victim to attend it. Accused not only induced victim to be
present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. The hazing would not have
been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to
be present (Dungo vs. People, supra).
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who
was present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take
action to prevent them from occurring. The liability of the adviser arises, not only from
his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of
the fraternity, group, or organization. The hazing must be held in the home of one of
the officers or members. The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted in their homes and failed to take any action to avoid the same from
occurring.

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The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school
authorities, including faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be punished as accomplices.
Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an
accomplice to the crime. The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the
same (Dungo vs. People, supra)
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities
involving physical or psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only
covered the infliction of physical harm. At best, the only psychological injury
recognized would be causing insanity to the victim. Conversely, even if the victim only
sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there is still a prescribed
penalty (Dungo vs. People, supra).
64. PLUNDER - The elements of plunder are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be held liable for plunder even if
the principal offender, who masterminded the plunder of pork barrel, is a private
individual, the Pork-barrel Queen. What is important is that Senator Pogi in
connivance with Pork-barrel Queen acquired ill-gotten wealth). On the other hand,
Pork-barrel Queen can be held liable for plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (Example: Misuse of funds in the
amount P10 million by awarding contract to a close relative, who is not the
lowest bidder; Misuse of funds or fraud disposition of government asset to P100
million by diverting the construction of road leading to his farm instead of the
poblacion).
Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not
responsible for the misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate
implementing agency of the government to check that the recipient of the fund
is not bogus? No. Assuming that the duty to check that the recipient of the
Senators PDAP is not bogus belongs to the appropriate agency of the
government, the Senator is still liable since malversation can be committed
through culpa.
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer; (Example: Collecting or

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receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of

P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account and
receiving bi-monthly collections from jueteng, a form of illegal gamblingin the
aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00 of which was deposited in the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation (People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No.
26558, September 12, 2007).
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to government (Example: Ordering the GSIS and the SSS by President
Estrada to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation (People vs. Joseph
Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007);
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines;
Note: The word combination means at least two different predicate
crimes; while the term series means at least two predicate crimes of the same
kind (Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006).
Thus, a single predicate crime amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder.
The intention of the lawmakers is that if there is only one predicate crime, the
offender has to be prosecuted under the particular crime, which is already
covered by existing laws. What is punishable under the law is "acts of plunder",
which means that there should be at least, two or more, predicate crimes (See
deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on Justice, May 7, 1991).
17. To be held liable for plunder, ill-gotten wealth must be amassed,
accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of the overt or criminal acts.
There is no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired
thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now
P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space
or time, since the law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the
prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others,
amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or more overt or
criminal acts (Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965. February
26, 2002).
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).

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If a Senator, his assistant and private individuals conspires in acquiring illegotten wealth by misappropriating the pork barrel amounting to P172 million of the
former, the total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the conspirators including the
private individuals shall be considered for purpose of determining if plunder has been
committed (Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015).
The damages suffered by the government in diverting the road from the
poblacion to the farm of the accused shall not be considered in determining if plunder
is committed. What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the
public officer and not the amount of damage suffered by the government.
In People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007 One of the predicate crimes alleged in the information is misappropriation of the excise
tax share of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
following predicate crimes were alleged and proven by evidence (1) series of acts of
receiving collections from "jueteng" in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and
(2) series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares
of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of
Belle Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts indicates
an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth in the amount of
more than P50 million. Estrada was convicted of plunder.
65. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - The elements of psychological violence
against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 are: (1) The offended party is a
woman and/or her child or children; (2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of
the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode; (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental
or emotional anguish; and (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions
(Dinamling vs. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015).
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental
or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such
acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party (Dinamling vs.
People, supra).
Neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical
violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at
bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the
mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be
proven. Accuseds acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping victim of her pants

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and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of
psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in her public
ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress (Dinamling vs. People,
supra).
The fact that the victim is pregnant is an aggravating circumstance under
Section 6 of RA No. 9262 (Dinamling vs. People, supra).
66. VAGRANCY - Before Article 202 of RPC punished vagrancy and
prostitution. But Article 202 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10158 merely penalizes
prostitution. In sum, RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by omitting portions
of Article 202 involving crime vagrancy. A reading of the Senate deliberation pertaining
to the passage of law decriminalizing vagrancy shows that they considered vagrants as
victims of poverty and that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress the very people that
the government sought to protect.
In view of the new policy of the State decriminalizing vagrancy, which is
embodied in RA No. 10158, ordinance, which punishes vagrancy, should be declared
as contrary to law, and hence, invalid. Settled is the rule that what the national
legislature expressly allows by law, a local legislature may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution (Lina vs. Pana, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001). The spring cannot rise
higher than its source.
RA No. 10158 shall be given retroactive effect. Under Section 2 and 3 thereof,
all pending cases for vagrancy shall be dismissed and all persons serving sentence for
vagrancy shall be immediately released. Since RA No. 10158 expressly provides
retroactive application to the law without distinction, case will be dismissed even
though the accused is a habitual delinquent.
2. Under Article 351 of RPC, a woman in contracting marriage within 301 days
from death of husband, or dissolution or annulment of marriage is liable for the crime
of premature marriage. However, RA No. 10655 decriminalizes premature marriage by
repealing Article 351. Premature marriage has been decriminalized because Article
351 discriminates women since this provision is not applicable to men. Moreover,
Article 351 sought to prevent a possible confusion as to whether the father of the child
born within the prohibited period is the first husband or the second. This preventive
measure is not anymore necessary since paternity and filiation could now be easily
determined through modern technology.
67. WIRE TAPPING LAW MMDA officer is extorting money from a driver
of a vehicle, who committed trafficking violation along Edsa. The officer threatened the
driver that he will confiscate her drivers license unless she will give him P500.00.
However, MMDA officer is not aware that his act of extorting money is being videorecorder by a passenger. The passenger violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. The
recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the
provisions of RA No. 4200(Anti-Wire Tapping Law). The law covers even those recorded
by persons privy to the private communications. The law is applicable even if the
conversation being recorder pertains to criminal extortion (Mamba vs. Garcia, A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001). Passenger is criminally liable for violating law. On the

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other hand, MMDA officer is liable for attempted robbery. However, in proving
attempted robbery, the driver cannot use the recording since the same is not
admissible in evidence.

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August - 2016 MATERIALS

JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

1. MALUM PROHIBITUM and MALUM IN SE - It is a general principle in law

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consequences thereof. However, they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of

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Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose previous criminal conviction) in

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A mayor as far as the money in the local treasury is concerned is an

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There is no showing that accused possessed that criminal mind when he in

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31. RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT - Rape through sexual intercourse,

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misappropriation thereof is constitutive of theft. If the possession is juridical or legal,

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Subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage- Contracting second

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b. Second marriage is void for lack of marriage license - If the second

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