Part I Preliminary Considerations

Legal System in the Philippines

Under Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act),

commercial banks are allowed to invest in real property subject
to the limitation that:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere (To stand by

decisions and not to disturb settled matters)
Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 132051, 25 June 2001
DECISION

Sec. 25. Any commercial bank may purchase, hold and convey
real estate for the following purposes:
(a) such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation
in the transaction of its business: Provided, however, that the
total investment in such real estate and improvements thereof,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of

including bank equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent (50%)

of net worth x x x x x x . (Emphasis Ours)

adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and continues to

Investments in real estate made by savings and mortgage

guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability

banks are likewise subject to the same limitation imposed by

in the law.

the aforequoted provision.[1]

The principle finds application to the case now before us.

Bound by such limitation, the management of Banco

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino for

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the

brevity) devised means to pursue its endeavor to expand its

Resolution dated December 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in

banking operations. To this end, Tala Realty Services

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44257.

Corporation (Tala for brevity) was organized by Banco

Filipinos four (4) major stockholders namely, Antonio Tiu,

Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Tala
and Banco Filipino agreed on this scheme Tala would acquire
the existing branch sites and new branch sites which it would
lease out to Banco Filipino.
On August 25, 1981, pursuant to their agreement, Banco

The facts of the present controversy may be summed up as

follows:
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 51(95) filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iloilo City on March 29, 1995,
Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on
August 25, 1981 which provides in part:

Filipino sold its eleven (11) branch sites all over the country to
Tala. In turn Tala leased those sites to Banco Filipino under
contracts of lease executed by both parties on the same day.

1. That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of

eleven (11) years, renewable for another period of nine (9)
years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions

Years after, dissension between Tala and Banco Filipino

mutually agreeable to both parties.[2],

arose in connection with their lease contracts resulting in a

chain of lawsuits for illegal detainer. Some of these cases are

its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31,

still pending in courts. At present, three of the illegal detainer

1992. However, Banco Filipino has continued to occupy the

cases have been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

premises even after the expiration of the lease.

The case at bar, involving Banco Filipinos Iloilo City

On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the

branch site, is one of those cases for illegal detainer filed by

following terms and conditions: that the bank should pay

Tala against Banco Filipino based on these grounds: (a)

P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as of September 1,

expiration of the period of lease and (b) non-payment of

1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance

rentals.

deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of

P500,000.00.

Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it

stopped paying rents.
In its letter dated April 14, 1994, Tala notified Banco
Filipino that the lease contract would no longer be renewed;
that it should pay its back rentals, including goodwill, deposit
and adjusted rentals in the amount of P2,059, 540.00 and
vacate the premises on or before April 30, 1994. [3] In its second
letter dated May 2, 1994, Tala demanded upon Banco Filipino
to pay the rents and vacate the premises.[4]
In answer to Talas complaint, Banco Filipino denied
having executed the lease contract providing for a term of
eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for
twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on
August 25, 1981 providing:
That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty
(20) years, renewable for another period of twenty (20) years at
the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually
agreeable to both parties.[5]

On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that

the eleven (11)-year lease contract superseded the twenty (20)year lease contract. Thus, the court ordered the ejectment of
Banco Filipino from the premises on these grounds: expiration
of the eleven (11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the
adjusted rental. Banco Filipino was likewise ordered to pay
back rentals in the amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the
period from May 1994 up to the time that it shall have
surrendered to Tala possession of the premises.[6]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City
affirmed the MTC decision.[7]
Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the challenged decision.[8]
Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision, invoking in its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration the Decisions of the same court in two of the
other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala against Banco
Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In
these cases, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the
lease contract providing for a period of twenty (20)

years. Finding Banco Filipinos motions for reconsideration

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that

meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed

principle of the law of the case finds application in the instant

Resolution, thus:

case.[10]

This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August

Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal

30, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104, having been declared final

detainer should not have been dismissed by the Court of

and executory by no less than the Supreme Court in G.R. No.

Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

127586, now constitutes the law of the case between the parties

39104. Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.

in the present case. Accordingly, this Court is not at liberty to

disregard or abandon the same at will without wreaking havoc
on said legal principle.

motion

against the bank which reached the Supreme Court is CA-G.R.

SP No. 39104. This involves the site in Malabon. The Court of

WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration and

supplemental

The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala

for

reconsideration

are

hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Courts Decision of August 25,

1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new one is
rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision and DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment filed
against herein petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo
City.[9]
Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:

Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be ejected from the

subject premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease
contract has not expired. Tala elevated this Court of Appeals
decision to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586. In a
Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the Supreme Court
dismissed Talas petition as the appeal was not timely perfected,
thus:
Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by
petitioner that it is no longer pursuing or holding in abeyance

recourse to the Supreme Court for reasons stated therein, the

however, that the eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because

Court

Resolved

to DECLARE

THIS

CASE

(1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive Vice-President of

of

Court

private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the

to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed

contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the

has become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having

said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include

been timely perfected.[11]

the said document; and (3) the said contract was never

TERMINATED and DIRECT the

Clerk

submitted to the Central Bank as required by the latters rules

We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court

and regulations (Rollo, pp. 383-384.).

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104 holding that the twenty

(20)-year contract of lease governs the contractual relationship

Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and

between the parties is not a precedent considering that the

simulation that rightly make any court suspicious and wary of

Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on

imputing any legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract.

the merits.The petition was dismissed on mere technicality. It is

significant to note, however, that the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 129887,[12] through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, resolved
the identical issue raised in the present petition, i.e., whether
the period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) or
eleven (11) years, thus:

Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco

Filipino testified that he was responsible for the daily
operations of said bank. He denied having signed the eleven
(11)-year contract and reasoned that it was not in the interest of
Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). The fact was
corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipinos

Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year

lease contract controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC,

Legal Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract

and whose initials allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She

what was submitted to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-

disowned the said marginal initials (id., p. 385).

year lease contract.

The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by

Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino

requiring submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his

deliberately omitted to submit the eleven (11)-year contract to

monthly notarial report with copies of acknowledged

the Central Bank, we do not consider that fact as violative of

documents

and

the res inter alios acta aliis non nocet (Section 28, Rule 130,

requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such notarial

Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: Sec. 28. Admission by

report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire

third party - The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an

consequences including the possible revocation of the notarys

act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter

notarial commission.

provided.; Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil.

thereto

attached. Under

this

procedure

472, 477 [1909]) rule in evidence. Rather, it is an indication of

The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala

said contracts inexistence.

Realtys alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract did not retain a

copy thereof for submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court

It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-

of the proper RTC militates against the use of said document as

year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract

a basis to uphold petitioners claim. The said alleged eleven

between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco

(11)-year lease contract was not submitted to the Central Bank

Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract

whose strict documentation rules must be complied with by

is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is

banks to ensure their continued good standing. On the contrary,

entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as

it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms

and conditions thereof (Art. 1673, New Civil Code). (Emphasis

Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 110398, 281 SCRA 534, 542-543

supplied)

(1997)], to wit

The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was

Petitioner

criticizes

the

lower

courts

reliance

on

further reinforced on June 20, 2000 when the First Division of

the Mecenas case, arguing that although this case arose out of

this Court, this time, speaking through Madame Justice

the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, rendered a Decision in G.R. No.

different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner

137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract,

contends that the decision in this case should be based on the

thus:

allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it,

or, in short, on the record of this case.

In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R.

No. 129887), we have no option but to uphold the twenty-year

The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may

lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by

be true with respect to the merits of the individual claims

petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid

against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its

down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,

ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of

it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases

which there is only one truth. Otherwise, one would be

where the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non

subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees,

quieta movere.

falsehood on the other!

That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case,

Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts

even though the subject property is different, may be gleaned

policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance

from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs.

with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere

(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been

different (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452,

settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to

118A, 394, 395 [1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v.

the same event have been put forward by parties similarly

Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re

situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a

Burtts Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus,

competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt

in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its

to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason & Corp. v. Mariano,

rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining

85

the validity of a land title on the principle of stare decisis et

SCRA

644

[1978]). In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.J.

non quieta movere.(underscoring, Ours)

Eq. 519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of New

Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the
pending case were presented and applicable principles declared
in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare
decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio
App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the
doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who
are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the
judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia
court expressed itself in this wise: Stare decisis simply declares
that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be

Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of

G.R. No. 129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that
in the instant case is located in Davao, we can very well apply
the conclusion in G.R. No. 129887 that it is the twenty-year
lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the
parties the same, but more importantly, the issue regarding its
validity is one and the same and, hence, should no longer be
relitigated.
Considering the above rulings, we hold that the term of the
lease in the present case is also twenty (20) years.

Resolving now the issue of whether or not respondent

the legal situation of private respondent since the account was

Banco Filipino should be ejected for non-payment of rentals,

opened in private respondents name. Clearly, there was cause

the First Division of this Court in the same G.R. No. 137980

for the ejectment of private respondent. Although the increase

held:

in monthly rentals from P700.00 to P1,800.00 was in excess of

20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as amended by R.A. No. 6828,

Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should

be ejected for non-payment of rentals, we do not agree with the
ruling in G.R. No 129887 that since the unpaid rentals
demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate which it
unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did not agree,

what private respondent could have done was to deposit the

original rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or in
a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this
Court held in Uy v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 671, 676
[1989]):

there lies no ground for ejectment. In such a case, there could

still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of

The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979

rentals. The recent case of T & C Development Corporation vs.

(P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on

Court of Appeals[13] is instructional on this point. It was there

the part of the lessor to accept was justified. However, what the

cautioned that

lessee should have done was to deposit in 1979 the previous

rent. This deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984

The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay

indicating a delay of more than four years.

the monthly rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to

February 16, 1993, despite demands to pay and to vacate the

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct

premises made by petitioner. Even if private respondent

in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover,

deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter

he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the

rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not

instituting ejectment proceedings. We reiterate the ruling in T

appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been

& C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever petitioner

instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the

took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate,

proper reliefs. x x x

it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should

have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial

While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied

for the payment of rentals due from the eleventh year to the
twentieth year of the lease, to wit3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the
LESSEE shall pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P1,020,000.00) Philippine
Currency representing advance rental to be applied on the
monthly rental for period from the eleventh to the twentieth
year,

authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to,

petitioner. This circumstance, i.e., respondents failure to pay
rent at the old rate, does not appear in G.R. No. 129887. Thus,
while we are bound by the findings of this Courts Second
Division in that case under the principle of stare decisis, the
fact that respondents failure to pay any rentals beginning April
1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the
premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No.
129887. In this case, we uphold petitioners right to eject
respondent from the leased premises.

the records show that such advance rental had already been
applied for rent on the property for the period of August, 1985
to November, 1989.

It bears stressing that the facts of the instant case and those
of G.R. Nos. 129887 and 137980 are substantially the
same. The only difference is the site of respondent bank. The

Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all

beginning April, 1994, it gave petitioner good ground for

opposing parties are likewise the same.

Clearly, in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.R. Nos.

129887 and 137980, which we follow as precedents,
respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on the ground of
expiration of the lease. However, since it stopped paying the
rents beginning April 1994, its eviction from the premises is
justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 44257
is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner Talas prayer for
ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino.
Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco Filipino
to vacate the subject premises and to restore possession thereof
to petitioner Tala. Respondent is also ordered to pay Tala the
monthly rental of P21,100.00 computed from April 1994 up to
the time it vacates the premises.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., no part. Former counsel of a party.

J.R.A. Phils. Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.

No. 177127, 11 October 2010

Factual Antecedents

DECISION

Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation, is

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

engaged in the manufacture and wholesale export of jackets, pants,

trousers, overalls, shirts, polo shirts, ladies wear, dresses and other

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

wearing apparel.[4] It is registered with the Bureau of Internal

Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer[5] and as an Ecozone Export

Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has

Enterprise with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).[6]

been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve

subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.[1] We
ruled then, as we rule now, that failure to print the word zero-rated in
the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input
value-added tax (VAT) on zero-rated sales.

On separate dates, petitioner filed with the Revenue District

Office (RDO) No. 54 of the BIR, Trece Martires City, applications
for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales
for the taxable quarters of 2000 in the total amount
of P8,228,276.34, broken down as follows:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules

of

Court

seeks to set aside the January 15, 2007 Decision[2] and the March16
, 2007

1st quarter P 2,369,060.97

2nd quarter 2,528,126.02
3rd quarter 1,918,015.38
4th quarter 1,413,073.97[7]

[3]

Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.

5. Being allegedly registered with the

The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by

Philippine Economic Zone Authority as an export

the respondent. Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a petition

enterprise, petitioners business is not subject to VAT

before the CTA.

pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 in relation

to Section 109 (q) of the Tax Code. Hence, it is not

Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals

entitled to tax credit of input taxes pursuant to

Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95;

On April 16, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for

Review[8] with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input
VAT which was docketed asCTA Case No.

6. The amount of P8,228,276.34 being

claimed by petitioner as alleged unutilized VAT
input taxes for the year 2000 was not properly

6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.

In his Answer,[9] respondent interposed the following special
and affirmative defenses, to wit:

documented;
7. In an action for refund, the burden of
proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
refund, and failure to [do so] is fatal to the claim for

4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is

subject

to

administrative

investigation/examination by the Bureau;

refund/ credit;

routinary
8. Petitioner must show that it has complied
with the provisions of Section 204 (c) and 229 of the

Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[14] to which respondent filed an Opposition.

refund/credit;

[15]

Petitioner, in turn, tendered a Reply.[16]

9. Claims for refund are construed strictly

against the claimant for the same partake the nature
of exemption from taxation.[10]

The Second Division of the CTA, however, stood firm on its

Decision and denied petitioners Motion for lack of merit in
a Resolution[17] dated October 5, 2005. This prompted petitioner to
elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc.[18]

After trial, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a

Decision[11] denying petitioners claim for refund/credit of input VAT

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

attributable to its zero-rated sales due to the failure of petitioner to

indicate its Taxpayers Identification Number-VAT (TIN-V) and the
word zero-rated on its invoices.[12] Thus, the fallo reads:

On January 15, 2007, the CTA En Banc denied the petition,

reiterating that failure to comply with invoicing requirements results
in the denial of a claim for refund.[19] Hence, it disposed of the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

instant

petition

is

hereby DENIED

DUE

COURSE, and, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack

of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]

petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
is DENIED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY,
the Decision dated June 30, 2005 and Resolution
datedOctober 5, 2005 of Second Division of the

Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No. 6454 are

hereby AFFIRMED.

Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether

the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is
fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales.

SO ORDERED.[20]
Petitioners Arguments
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice

Petitioner submits that:

Acosta) concurred with the findings of the majority that there was
failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the invoicing

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY

requirements;[21] he dissented, however, to the outright denial of

DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A

petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving

MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH

petitioners transactions and VAT status.[22]

LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:

Petitioner sought reconsideration[23] of the Decision but the

A.

THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS

CTA En Banc

UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO NOT

denied the same in a Resolution[24] dated March 16, 2007. Presiding

REQUIRE

Justice Acosta maintained his dissent.

RECEIPTS

THAT

INVOICES

ISSUED

BY

AND/OR
A

VAT-

REGISTERED TAXPAYER, SUCH AS THE

Issue

PETITIONER, SHOULD BE IMPRINTED

WITH THE WORD ZERO-RATED.

B.

THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS

PETITIONERS

PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX CODE

ZERO-RATED

TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.

AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE

WORDS ZERO-RATED BE IMPRINTED ON
THE

SALES

RECEIPTS
REGULATIONS

E.

INVOICES/OFFICIAL
UNDER
NO.

EVIDENTIARY

7-95

RULES

THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF THE

REVENUE
ARE
AND

NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO

FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT

NOT

THE

WORD

ZERO-RATED

THE

INVOICES. PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR

ZERO-RATED

ON

ITS

ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A

ITS

TRANSACTIONS

TAXPAYERS CLAIM FOR REFUND.

CANNOT UNDULY BENEFIT FROM ITS

OMISSION CONSIDERING THAT THEY

C.

RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE

ARE

NON-RESIDENT
[THAT]

FOREIGN

INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT

CORPORATIONS

ARE

NOT

IMPLEMENT THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT

COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT

INSTEAD, [EXCEED] THE LIMITATIONS

SYSTEM.

OF THE LAW.
F.
D.

PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIAL
UNEQUIVOCALLY

PRESENTED
EVIDENCE

THAT
PROVED

IN

CIVIL

CLAIMS

FOR

CASE[S],

SUCH

REFUND,

AS

STRICT

COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL RULES

OF

EVIDENCE

IS

NOT

REQUIRED.

MOREOVER, A MERE PREPONDERANCE

OF EVIDENCE WILL SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY

invoices/receipts is

THE GRANT OF A CLAIM.[25]

fatal to a claim for

credit/refund

of

input VAT
Respondents Arguments
Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions

The question of whether the absence of the word zero-rated

which are strictly construed against the claimant, respondent seeks

on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input

the affirmance of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the

VAT is not novel. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic

CTA En Banc. [26] He insists that the denial of petitioners claim for

Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly

tax credit/refund is justified because it failed to comply with the

Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v.

invoicing requirements under Section 4.108-1[27] of Revenue

Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[28] In that case, we sustained the

Regulations No. 7-95.

denial of petitioners claim for tax credit/refund for non-compliance

with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which

Our Ruling

requires the word zero rated to be printed on the invoices/receipts

covering zero-rated sales. We explained that:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the
The absence of the

export sale of goods and services. The tax rate in this

word zero-rated on

case is set at zero. When applied to the tax base or

the

the selling price of the goods or services sold, such

zero rate results in no tax chargeable against the

and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997

foreign buyer or customer. But, although the seller in

NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337.

such transactions charges no output tax, he can claim

Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied

a refund of the VAT that his suppliers charged him.

to its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237

The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating, which

required the VAT-registered taxpayers receipts or

allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating

invoices to indicate only the following information:

to the export sales, making him internationally

competitive.

(1) A statement that the seller is a

VAT-registered

For the effective zero rating of such

transactions, however, the taxpayer has to be VAT-

person,

followed by his taxpayers

identification number (TIN);

registered and must comply with invoicing

requirements. x x x

(2) The total amount which the

purchaser

xxxx

[paid]

or

is

obligated to pay to the seller

with the indication that such

Petitioner Panasonic points out, however,

that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of

amount includes the valueadded tax;

the word zero-rated, the Secretary of Finance unduly

(3) The date of transaction, quantity,

expanded, amended, and modified by a mere

unit cost and description of

regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95) the letter

the goods or properties or

Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which

nature of the service; and

the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9,

1995 and [which] took effect on January 1, 1996. It

(4) The name, business style, if any,

address

and

already required the printing of the word zero-rated

taxpayer's

on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When

identification number (TIN)

R.A. 9337 amended the 1997 NIRC on November

of the purchaser, customer or

1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a

client.

part of the tax code. This conversion from regulation

to law did not diminish the binding force of such

Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections

113 and 237 did not require the inclusion of the

regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the

enactment of that law.

word zero-rated for zero-rated sales covered by its

receipts or invoices. The BIR incorporated this

Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from

requirement only after the enactment of R.A. 9337

the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of

on November 1, 2005, a law that did not yet exist at

Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC

the time it issued its invoices.

(Presidential Decree 1158) for the efficient

enforcement of the tax code and of course its

But when petitioner Panasonic made the

amendments. The requirement is reasonable and is

export sales subject of this case, i.e., from April 1998

in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from

to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section

the covered sales of goods and services. As aptly

4.108-1 of RR 7-95, otherwise known as the

explained by the CTAs First Division, the

appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of

invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers

WHEREFORE,

the petition is hereby DENIED. The

from falsely claiming input VAT from their

assailed Decision

purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent

dated January 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated March 16, 2007 of

such word, a successful claim for input VAT is

the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.

made, the government would be refunding money it

did not collect.
Further, the printing of the word zero-rated
on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject
to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are
zero-rated. Unable to submit the proper invoices,
petitioner Panasonic has been unable to substantiate
its claim for refund.[29]

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners

claim for credit/ refund of input VAT for the taxable quarters of 2000
must be denied.Failure to print the word zero-rated on the
invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on
zero-rated sales.

SO ORDERED.

then the court shall register title in favor of the

Law of the case

applicant to all lands describe in the application.

Leoncio Zarate vs. The Director of Lands, G.R. No. L13334, 18 March 1919

On the return of the record to the Court of First Instance of

Nueva Ecija, which court after the dissolution of the Court of

MALCOLM, J.:

Land Registration had jurisdiction, an order was issued by the

judge, finding that a homestead patent had been issued to

In a decision of this Court in the case of Zarate vs. Director of

Lands, now appearing in volume 34 of the Philippine Reports,
at page 416, the dispositive part reads:
The judgment of the Court of Land Registration is
hereby modified and it is declared that the applicant has
the right to register title to all of the lands described in
the application, with the exception of that portion
claimed as a homestead by Apolonio Gamido, which
homestead shall be excluded from registration by the
applicant provided the Court of Land Registration shall
find that said Apolonio Gamido has obtained a patent
for said land; but if the Court of Land Registration finds
that said Gamido has not yet obtained a patent therefor,

Apolonio Gamido and consequently directing the exclusion of

this portion of the land described in the main decision in
Zarate vs. Director of Lands [supra]. The applicant appeals
from this order, although his contention is not well grounded,
resulting principally through an erroneous conception of the
original decision of this court as written in English. In other
words, Gamido having compiled with the express mandate of
the appellate court, his homestead should remain his property.
As was said by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
St. Louis Smelting and Refining Co. vs. Kemp ([1881]), 104
U.S., 636), "The patent of the United States is the conveyance
by which the nation passes the title to portions of the public
domain."

We are not insensible to the fact that the decision in

duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible

Zarate vs. Director of Lands [supra] announced the doctrine

if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be

that "Under Act No. 926, a patent issued under the homestead

litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent

Law has all the force and effect of a Torrens title acquired

appeal." Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy in

under Act No. 496; and that being the case . . . we must respect

order to end litigation. "There would be no end to a suit if

the title so secured, provided it be a fact that the patent has

every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a

been secured in any of said homestead proceedings," and that

court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate of

this doctrine has been modified (or reversed) by the later

chances from changes in its members." (See Great Western Tel.

decisions

Co. vs. Burnham

of

this

court.

(See

for

instance

De

los

[1895],
[1857],

162

U.S.,

339,

343;

20

How.,

467,

481;

Reyes vs. Razon [1918], 38 Phil., 480.) Recognition of the

Roberts vs. cooper

expression 'Law of the Case" saves the situation.

Messinger vs. Anderson [1912], 225 U.S., 436.)

A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court

The phrase "Law of the Case" is described in a decision

has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues

coming from the Supreme Court of Missouri in the following

to be the law of that cae even on the subsequent appeal. The

graphical language:

rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in

other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings
in the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former
decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of
the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a
rule is "necessary to en bale an appellate court to perform its

The general rule, nakedly and badly but, is that legal

conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the
general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts,
not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the
trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto,

but they become and remain the law of the case in all

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Street, Avancea and Moir,

after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The

JJ., concur

rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and

reason. Without the rule there would be no end to
criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., concurring:

In Short, there would be endless litigant were allowed

to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or

It has not been proven by the petitioner that the land occupied

on the chance of our rewriting proposition once gravely

by Apolonio Gamido was his own property, and in view of the

ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law

fact that the said land is not public land, it can not be the object

of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed

of a homestead application, and for this reason it follows that

on a first appeal, would result in the foolishness of the

the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.

inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it

grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like
ordinary sensible persons. The Administration of justice
is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good
one of frequent and beneficial use. (Mangold vs. Bacon
[1911], 237 Mo., 496, 512.)
Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, J., concur.

described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9863,

which she purchased from Marina M. de Vera-Quicho and
Margarita de Vera. Petitioner ascribed fault upon Averia and
Casilang with unlawful refusal to turn over the property in her
Veronica Padillo vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.

favor; and that respondent Averia even instituted Civil Case

119707, 29 November 2001

No. 1690-G,5 a suit for rescission of two (2) deeds solely for
harassment and dilatory purposes although the suit actually

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the

1

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 22, 1994 in

established petitioner's right of ownership over the subject

property.

CA-G.R. CV No. 40142 reversing the Decision dated March

31, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 54

Petitioner Padillo prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ

in Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of res judicata.

to place her in the possession and use of her said property, and
prohibiting respondents from disturbing the same; and

Civil Case No. 9114, which found its way to this Court via the
3

instant petition, is a petition for declaratory relief and damages

initiated by petitioner Veronica Padillo4 on December 14, 1983.
In the petition filed against respondent Tomas Averia, Jr. and
one Beato Casilang, petitioner Padillo alleged that she is the
absolute owner of a Two Hundred Fifty-One (251) square
meter parcel of land with improvements thereon located in
Quezon Avenue, Lucena City, Quezon Province, covered and

ultimately, that judgment be rendered ordering respondent

Averia and Casilang to pay jointly and severally to petitioner
Padillo: (a) One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
annual unrealized income for the use of her said property from
January 4, 1982, (b) moral and exemplary damages the amount
of which she leaves to the court for proper evaluation and (c)
attorney's fees of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) .plus
Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) per appearance in court.

In his Answer,6 Casilang specifically denied the material

involved the lot subject of the sale. A subsequent decision dated

allegations of the petition. He alleged that as early as June 1,

June 2, 1983 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca,

1982, he vacated the subject property and, thus, the case

Quezon, Branch 62 in said Civil Case No. 1620-G ordered

against him should be dismissed.

Marina M. de Vera-Quicho to execute the necessary documents

over the property covered by said Transfer Certificate of Title

On March 2, 1984, respondent Averia filed his Answer with

Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss7 wherein he invoked the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 1620-G, a suit for specific
performance against Marina M. de Vera-Quicho. He further
raised the defenses of litis pendencia, laches, estoppel, res
judicata and lack of cause of action, and prayed for the

(TCT) No. T-9863 and enjoined the Register of Deeds of

Lucena City to desist from entering any encumbrance or
transaction on said certificate of title and/or cancel the same
except in favor of respondent Averia.8 The said decision
became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed therefrom.9

dismissal of the petition as well as the grant of his

counterclaims for damages.

M. C. No. 374-82,10 was instituted by petitioner Padillo on July

6, 1982 to compel the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to

It appears that prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 9114,

there were already three (3) actions which involved the said
property, namely, Civil Case No. 1620-G, M.C. No. 374 82,
and Civil Case No. 1690-G.
Civil Case No. 1620-G was instituted by respondent Averia
against Marina M. de Vera-Quicho and the Register of Deeds
of Lucena City for specific performance and/or damages which

register the deed of sale dated February 10, 1982 wherein

Margarita de Vera11 sold to petitioner Padillo her one-half
() pro-indiviso share of the lot and the building erected
thereon, covered by TCT No. T-9863, considering the refusal of
the Register of Deeds to register said deed of sale in view of a
restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 1620-G. The petition
to register the deed was opposed by respondent Averia.

On July 7, 1983, during the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82,

In the meantime. a decision dated September 23, 1983 was

Civil Case No. 1690-G was instituted by respondent Averia

rendered in M.C. No. 374-82 wherein Branch 57 of the RTC,

against spouses Edilberto de Mesa and petitioner Padillo.12 The

Lucena City ordered the Register of Deeds to register the deed

said case is a complaint for rescission of two(2) deeds of sale,

of sale dated February 10, 1982.17Respondent Averia assailed

namely: (a) the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan na may Pasubali" dated

the decision in M.C. No. 374-82 via a petition for certiorari and

January 5, 1982 wherein Marina M. de Vera-Quicho sold to

prohibition in G.R. No. 6512918 with the Supreme Court

petitioner Padillo her one-half () pro-indiviso share over lot

contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to order the

together with the house thereon, subject of TCT No. T-9863,

registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of

which was registered and annotated at the back of said TCT on

an antecedent contract to sell. In a Decision dated December

January 11, 1982 per Entry No. 54967, and (b) the deed of sale

29, 1986, the Supreme Court declared that the trial court has

dated February 10, 1982 subject of M.C. no. 374-82.

jurisdiction since Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529

Respondent Averia claimed ownership of the same lot subject

(Property Registration Decree) eliminated the distinction

of TCT No. T-9863 by virtue of an unregistered contract to sell

between the general jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction of

dated January 5, 1982 executed in his favor by Marina M. de

the Regional Trial Court acting as a cadastral court under

Vera-Quicho.13 Petitioner Padillo sought the dismissal of the

Section 112 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act). 19 The Supreme

amended complaint.14 In an Order dated September 30, 1983,

Court set aside the September 23, 1983 decision of the trial

Civil Case No. 1690-G was dismissed by Branch 61 of the

court and ordered a new trial where all parties interested in the

RTC

case may appear and be given opportunity to be heard.

of

Gumaca,

Quezon

Province

for

improper

venue.15 Respondent Averia interposed an appeal with the Court

of Appeals.16

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision, a new trial was

conducted in M.C. No. 37482. Following notice and hearing in

the new trial, the trial court rendered a Decision dated May 5,

respondent Averia's motion to dismiss and ordered the case

1988, which declared petitioner Padillo as sole and exclusive

temporarily archived in view of the pendency in the Court of

owner of the property in question and ordered the Register of

Appeals of the appeal of respondent Averia in Civil Case No.

Deeds of Lucena City to register the questioned deed of sale in

1690-G.24

favor of petitioner Padillo.

When the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed, in a
The decision of the RTC in M.C. No. 374-82 was appealed to

decision dated September 16, 1987, the dismissal of Civil Case

the Court of Appeals20 which rendered judgment on December

No. 1690-G for improper venue,25 the hearing in Civil Case No.

28, 1990 sustaining the decision of the trial court. Dissatisfied,

9114 was resumed on November 19, 1987 26but resolution of

respondent Averia appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition

respondent

for review on certiorari which was denied in a Resolution dated

Dismiss27 was deferred in view of the pendency of M.C. No.

June 17, 1991 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals had

374-82.28

committed

any

reversible

error

in

the

Averia's

November

18,

1987

Motion

to

questioned

judgment.21Respondent Averia sought reconsideration but the

same was denied in a Resolution dated August 26, 1991. 22 A
subsequent motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on October 21, 1991.23

When M.C. No. 374-82 was finally resolved in the decision

dated May 5, 1988, the trial court in an Order dated June 1,
1988 proceeded to deny respondent Averia's Motion to Dismiss
and Motion to Suspend Further Proceeding in Civil Case No.
9114.29

While the foregoing proceedings ensued in M.C. No. 374-82,

the trial court in Civil Case No. 9114, issued an Order dated
March 20, 1984 wherein it deferred the resolution of

Thereafter, respondent Averia assailed the denial of his motion

to dismiss in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, before the Court of Appeals, which

on December 21, 1989 rendered a decision therein ordering the

1) Unrealized income from the lot and building

suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 9114 to await

in the sum of P150,000.00 every year from

the final termination of M.C. No. 37442 then pending appeal

January 5, 1982 until Tomas Averia vacates the

with the Court of Appeals.30 No appeal was filed therefrom,

same;

hence, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.

2) Attorneys fees in the sum of P107,000.00

15356 became final.31

plus P1,000.00 per appearance in the hearing of

With the Supreme Court denying the petition to challenge the

the case and litigation expenses of P10,000.00;

Court of Appeal's affirmance of the decision in M.C. No. 37482,32 the trial court rendered the assailed March 31, 1992
Decision33 in Civil Case No. 9114, which reads:
WHEREFORE,

in

view

of

the

3) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

4) Exemplary damages of P20,000.00; and

foregoing

5) Costs of suit.

considerations, judgment is rendered ordering Tomas

Averia, Jr. or any persons claiming any right from him,

SO ORDERED.

to vacate and surrender the possession of the lot

covered by TCT No. T-9863 of the Registry of Deeds of
Lucena City and the building erected thereon, to
Veronica Padillo and to pay the latter the following
amounts:

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court in CAG.R. CV No. 40142 rendered its subject decision on November
22, 1994 reversing the trial court based on the ground of res
judicata. The appellate court ratiocinated:

The Court finds that res judicata bars the appellee's

vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302; Carandang vs.

claims. MC No. 374-82 resolved the case on the merits.

Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344; Catholic Vicar Apostolic

Civil Case No. 1620-G, dismissed on account of

of the Mountain Province vs. Court, 165 SCRA 515). It

improper venue, may not strictly speaking be

matters little that the instant case is supposedly one for

considered an adjudication of the case on the merits . . .

declaratory relief and damages, while the former case is

one originally for registration of the appellee's

xxx

xxx

xxx

Not having claimed the damages she supposedly

suffered despite the new trial ordered for MC No. 37482, and the clarification of the expanded jurisdiction of
the court a quo, the appellee is correctly perceived by
the appellant to have already lost her right to recover
the same in the instant suit. In finding the decision in
the former case a bar to the latter, the Court is guided
by the long-standing rule that a final judgment or order
on the merits rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties is conclusive in a
subsequent case between the same parties and their
successors-in-interest litigating upon the same thing and
issue (Vencilao vs. Varo, 182 SCRA 492, citing Sy Kao

documents of title. A party cannot by varying the

form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated between the parties and their privies
(Filipinas

Investment

and

Finance

Corp.

vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA S06; Bugnay

Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176
SCRA 804). On the principle, moreover, that res
judicata bars not only the relitigation in a subsequent
action of the issues raised, passed upon and adjudicated,
but also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of any
other issue which could have been raised in the first but
was not (Africa vs. NLRC, 170 SCRA 776), the court a

quo clearly erred in not holding the instant action to be

though the Court may stand on these particulars,

barred by prior judgment.34

however, it bears emphasis that the instant case was

determined to be barred by res judicata not so much on

Disagreeing with the foregoing disquisition, petitioner sought

reconsideration of the same but it proved unavailing inasmuch
as petitioners motion for reconsideration35 was denied in a
Resolution36 dated April 7, 1995. The Court of Appeals, in
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration in the negative,
rendered the following pronouncements:
Contrary, however, to [Padillo's] position, the Court's
application of the principle of res judicata was neither
based nor in any way dependent on the inaccuracies
emphasized in the motion and incidents she filed. While
it is readily conceded that the Court was obviously
referring to Civil Case No. 1690-G as that which the
Gumaca Court dismissed on account of improper
venue, the passage which states that the self-same was
filed ahead of MC No. 374-82 is one actually quoted
from the trial court's March 31, 1992 decision which
[Padillo] did not and still does not contest. Corrected

account of the decision rendered in Civil Case No.

1690-G but by that rendered in MC No. 374-82. It
consequently matters little that the latter case was
originally filed ahead of the former as [Padillo] had
been wont to stress. The fact that its new trial was only
ordered on December 29, 1986 together with a
clarification of the land registration court's expanded
jurisdiction under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1592 effectively rendered the decision promulgated
therein a bar to the claim for damages [Padillo] pursued
in the instant case. It is, moreover, repugnant to the
prohibition against multiplicity of suits to allow
[Padillo] or any party-litigant for that matter to
claim in a separate action the damages she supposedly
suffered as a consequence to the filing of another.
Considering that the December 21, 1989 decision
rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 granted the petition

then filed by [Averia] (p. 200, rec.), the Court, finally,

PETITIONER THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE

fails to appreciate the sapience of [Padillo's] invocation

COMMERCIAL PROPERTY UNDER TCT NO. T-

thereof as a bar to the appeal herein perfected by

9863.

[Averia]. x x x37
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition for review

ERRED

IN

REVERSING

THE

JUST

AND

anchored on seven (7) assigned errors, to wit:

EQUITABLE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 9114.

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AMOUNTING

D. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

TO GRAVE 'ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS

ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF THE

INCORRECT CITATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF

APPELLATE COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 15356

FACTS UPON WHICH IT PREDICATED ITS

BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES ON THE SAME

DECISION.

CAUSE AND ISSUES.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

E. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

ERRED AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN

DISCRETION IN FAILING TO NOTE THE BAD

DISREGARDING

THE

FAITH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN MOST OF

JUDGMENTS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT IN CA-G.R.

HIS ACTS TO POSSESS A PROPERTY NOT HIS

CV NO. 18802 AND THAT OF THE SUPREME

OWN.

COURT

IN

G.R.

THE

NO.

EFFECT

96662

OF

DECLARING

F.

RESPONDENT

COURT

APPEALS

counterclaim for damages in Civil Case No. 1690-G for the

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61 promptly

FAILING TO NOTE AND OBSERVE THAT PRIVATE

dismissed it. Furthermore, res judicata as a ground for the

RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY PROLONG THE

dismissal of the instant case was already rejected by the Court

UNDUE

PFTITIONER'S

of Appeals in the December 21, 1989 decision promulgated in

REALTY EVEN AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S

CA-G.R. SP No. 15356. Lastly, petitioner cites anew the

DECISION IN G.R. NO. 96662.

alleged inaccuracies in the finding that Civil Case No. 1690-G

EXPLOITATION

OF

OF

was filed ahead of M.C. No. 37442 and that Civil Case No.
G. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
DISCRETION
CONSTITUTIONAL

IN

VIOLATING

1620-G was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca,

Quezon on the ground of improper venue.

THE

MANDATE

ON

"CONSULATION" AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 13,

The doctrine of res judicata is embodied in Section 47, Rule 39

of the Revised Rules of Court,39 which states:

ARTICLE VIII OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW.38

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The
Petitioner attacks the appellate court's posture that petitioner

effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court

should have set up her claim for unrealized income, litigation

of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the

expenses and/or attorney's fees, as well as moral and exemplary

judgment or final order, may be as follows:

damages, as a distinct cause of action in M.C. No. 374-82 for

she contends that it was not anticipated that respondent Averia
would oppose M.C. No. 37s82. Neither could she invoke art

xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with

matter and cause of action. When the three (3) identities are

respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any

present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first

other matter that could have been raised in relation

constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final

thereto, conclusive between the parties and their

as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties

successors in interest by title subsequent to the

and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter

commencement of the action or special proceeding,

which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

litigating for the same thing and under the same title

or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might

and in the same capacity;

have been offered for that purpose. But where between the first
case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or

their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged,
or which was actually and necessarily included therein

such judgment is invoked, there is no identity of cause of

action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to
those

matters

actually

and

directly

controverted

and

determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This

is what is termed conclusiveness of judgment.40

or necessary thereto.
Under ordinary circumstances, this Court would have
Section 49 (b) refers to bar by prior judgment while Section 49
(c) enunciates conclusiveness of judgment.
Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case
where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where
such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject

subscribed to the appellate court's conclusion that M.C. No.

37442 barred petitioner's claim for damages in Civil Case No.
9114 since all four (4) essential requisites in order forres
judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" to attach are present in
the instant case, to wit:

1. The former judgment must be final;

technical or dilatory objections.44 Finally, there is identity of

parties, subject matter and causes of action. M.C. No. 374-82

2. It must have been rendered by a court having

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and

and Civil Case No. 9114 both involved the petitioner and
respondent Averia. The subject matter of both actions is the
parcel of land and building erected thereon covered by TCT
No. T-9863. The causes of action are also identical since the

4. There must be between the first and second action

same evidence would support and establish M.C. No. 374-82

identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and

and Civil Case No. 9114.45

identity of cause of action.41

However, a different conclusion is warranted under the
M.C. No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the

principle of law of the case. Law of the case has been defined

Supreme Court, is a final judgment.42 Branch 57 of the

as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically,

Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, in the new trial it

it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the

conducted in M.C. No. 374-82, following clarification by the

controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in

Supreme Court of its expanded jurisdiction,43 had obtained

the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether

jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties

correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on

thereto. The judgment of Branch 57 of Lucena City in M.C.

which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of

No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the

the case before the court.46 As a general rule, a decision on a

Supreme Court, is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on

prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the

the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the

case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the

parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal,

party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.47

The concept of Law of the Case was further elucidated in the

The phrase "Law of the Case" is described in a decision

1919 case of Zarate v. Director of Lands,48 thus:

coming from the Supreme Court of Missouri in the following

graphical language:

A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court

has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues

The general rule, nakedly and badly put, is that legal

to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule

conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the

made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other

general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts,

cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in

not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the

the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former

trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto,

decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of

but they become and remain the law of the case in all

the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a

after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The

rule is 'necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its

rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and

duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible

reason. Without the rule there would be no end to

if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be

criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation.

litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent

In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be

appeal.' Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end

intolerable if parties litigant were allowed to speculate

litigation. 'There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate

on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance

litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to

of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on

criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from

solemn argument and handed down as the law of a

changes in its members.' x x x

given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a

first appeal, would result in the foolishness of the

inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it

of fact, although it may include questions of law, and

grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like

although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the

ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice

same action or general proceeding, it is generally

is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good

concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly

one of frequent and beneficial use. x x x49

independent proceeding.

The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of

Significantly in the instant case, the law of the case on the

this principle called the law of the case which is totally

matter of the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82 to bar Civil Case

different from the concept of res judicata. Law of the case does

No. 9114 has been settled in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356.

not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and applies
only to that one case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or
privies in one case by what has been done in another case. 50 In
the 1975 case of Comilang v. Court of Appeals (Fifth
Division.),51 a further distinction was made in this manner:

It is worthwhile to consider that at the time this Court in G.R.

No. 65129 ordered the new trial of M.C. No. 374-82, after
clarifying the expanded jurisdiction of the trial court with
authority to decide non-contentious and contentious issues,
Civil Case No. 9114 was already existent. When the issue of

The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former

the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of

adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It

pendency of M.C. No. 374-82 was raised before the trial court

relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its

wherein the said Civil Case No. 9114 was docketed, the trial

operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case.

court chose to merely defer resolution thereof. And when the

The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it

said issue of litis pendentia was raised before the Court of

is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues

Appeals via a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. SP

No. 15356, the Court of Appeals, while agreeing with

Petitioner, therefore, should not be faulted for yielding in good

respondent Averia's arguments on the existence of litis

faith to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division,

pendentia, which would ultimately result in res judicata,

in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 and continuing to pursue her claim

incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No. 9114

for damages in Civil Case No. 9114. The decision of the Court

to await the final termination of M.C. No. 374-82, instead of

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 on the matter of the issue

dismissing the case and/or ordering that the claim for damages

of existence of M.C. No. 37442 as a bar to Civil Case No. 9114

be filed in M.C. No. 374-82.

should dictate all further proceedings.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on

Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, this Court is not

December 21, 1989 and by then, M.C. No. 374 82 had long

inclined to sustain the monetary award for damages granted by

been resolved by the trial court and pending appeal with the

the trial court.

Court of Appeals. Since no appeal was filed from the decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, the
resolution therein of the appellate court which ordered the
suspension instead of dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114,
became final. Thus, even if erroneous, the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 has become the law of
the case as between herein petitioner Padillo and respondent
Averia, and may no longer be disturbed or modified.52 It is not
subject to review or reversal in any court.

Concerning the alleged forgone income of One Hundred Fifty

Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) per year since 1982 as testified
on by petitioner as the income she could have realized had
possession of the property not been withheld from her by
respondent Averia,53 we consider such amount of expected
profit highly conjectural and speculative. With an allegation
that respondent made millions for the improper use and
exploitation of the property, petitioner's testimony regarding
the matter of unrealized income is sadly lacking of the requisite

details on how such huge amount of income could be made

vacated the property,56 it is but just for him to pay petitioner the

possible. Petitioner did not detail out how such huge amount of

unrealized rentals of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred

income could have been derived from the use of the disputed

Pesos (P97,600.00) for that period of time. Furthermore, said

lot and building. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual,

amount of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos

compensatory and consequential damages must be proved, and

(P97,600.00) shall earn interest57 at the legal rate58 computed

cannot be presumed. If the proof adduced thereon is flimsy and

from the finality of this decision.59

insufficient,

as

allowed.54 Verily,

in
the

this

case,

testimonial

no

damages

evidence

on

will

be

alleged

unrealized income earlier referred to is not enough to warrant

the award of damages. It is too vague and unspecified to induce
faith and reliance.

On the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts

of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), respectively, we find that there is no sound
basis for the award. It cannot be logically inferred that just
because respondent Averia instituted Civil Case No. 1690-G

The only amount of unrealized income petitioner should be

while M.C. No. 374-82 was pending, malice or bad faith is

entitled to is the unrealized monthly rentals which respondent

immediately ascribable against the said respondent to warrant

Averia admits to be in the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos

such an award.

(P800.00) a month or Nine Thousand Six Hundred Pesos

(P9,600.00) a year during the sixth (6th) to tenth (10th) year of
the Contract of Lease between Marina de Vera Quicho, as
Lessor, and respondent Averia, as Lessee, which fell on 1982 to
1986.55 Inasmuch as respondent Averia had been in possession
of the property from January 1982 to February 1992 when he

The issue of whether the trial court in M.C. No. 374-82 could
adjudicate contentious issues was only resolved by this Court
in G.R. No. 65129 on December 29, 1986 60 long after the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1690-G which was instituted by
respondent Averia.61 That respondent Averia instituted a

separate suit which was subsequently dismissed and all actions

With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the

or appeals taken by respondent Averia relative to M.C. No.

exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not

374-82 does not per se make such actions or appeals wrongful

awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the

and subject respondent Averia to payment of moral damages.

policy that no premium should be placed on the right to

The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right

litigate.65 Attorney's fees as part of damages are not the same as

to litigate. Such right is so precious that moral damages may

attorney's fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In

not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. One

the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable

may have erred, but error alone is not a ground for moral

compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal

damages.62

services he has rendered to the latter, while in its extraordinary

concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for

In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish

damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.66

suffered by a person for having been made a party in a civil

case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award

Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the

of moral damages.63 The emotional distress, worries and

instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 67 As such,

anxieties suffered by her and her husband64 are only such as are

it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law

usually caused to a party hauled into Court as a party in a

that would bring the case within the exception and justify the

litigation. Therefore, there is no sufficient justification for the

grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable.

award of moral damages, more so, exemplary damages, and

Thereunder, the trial court may award attorney's fees where it

must therefore be deleted.

deems just and equitable that it be so granted. While we respect

the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this case, we find
the award of the trial court of attorney's fees in the sum of One

Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (P107,000.00) plus One

SO ORDERED.

Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per appearance in the hearing of

the case and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive. Attorney's fees
as part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at
the expense of the losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably
reduced to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
Because of the conclusions we have thus reached, there is no
need to delve any further on the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 22, 1994 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 40142 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent
Tomas Averia, Jr., to pay petitioner Veronica Padillo the
amounts of (a) Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P97,600.00) as unrealized rentals which shall earn interest at
the legal rate from the finality of the this decision until fully
paid, and (b) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
attorney's fees.

Bellosillo,

Mendoza,

Buena, J., on official leave.

and

Quisumbing,

JJ., concur.

Eloisa Tolentino vs. Roy Loyola, et. al., G.R. No. 153809,
27 July 2011

On November 9, 1999, the petitioner

filed

Complaint-Affidavit

charging

DECISION

respondents with Violation of Section 3 (e) of

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

R.A. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, for Malversation of

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Public Funds thru Falsification of Public

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside

Documents and, administratively, for Grave

the Decision[1] dated December 3, 2001 of the Court of Appeals

Misconduct, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty,

as well as its Resolution[2] dated May 28, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP

and Falsification of Official Documents.

No. 61841, entitled Eloisa L. Tolentino v. Atty. Roy M. Loyola,

et al. The December 3, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals

The complaint averred that in a letter

affirmed the Decision[3]dated May 23, 2000 of Ombudsman

dated October 6, 1998, respondent Municipal

Aniano

Mayor

A.

Desierto

in

OMB-ADM-1-99-1035,

which

Roy

M.

Loyola

requested

the

dismissed the administrative complaint that petitioner filed

Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite for the

against herein respondents. On the other hand, the May 28,

creation of twenty-four (24) unappropriated

2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denied the motion for

positions for the inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla,

reconsideration filed by petitioner.

to wit:

The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed Court

of Appeals ruling, are as follows:

xxxx

One (1) Local Rev. Coll. Officer

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

II SG 15

One (1) Computer Programmer

ACCOUNTING OFFICE

III SG 18
One (1) Licensing Officer II SG

One (1) Bookkeeper II SG 9

15
ENRO
GENERAL SERVICE OFFICE
Two (2) Environment Mngt.
One (1) Supply Officer III SG 18

Specialist II SG 15

Eight (8) Driver I SG 3

One (1) Clerk III SG 6

Two (2) Utility I SG 1

DA
HUMAN

RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Agriculture Chief Center IV SG

18

One (1) HRM Officer II SG 15

Farm Foreman SG 6
Three (3) Farm Worker II SG 4

TREASURERS OFFICE

On

November

23,

1998,

the

Municipal Mayor as Chairman with Amelia C.

Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite passed

Samson, HRMO V, as Secretary, together with

Municipal Resolution No. 061-98 approving the

the following respondents Board Members:

creation of only 19 out of the 24 requested

Edwin E. Tolentino, Domingo R. Tenedero and

positions, under the different offices of the

Roel Z. Manarin, filled-up the aforesaid

Municipality of Carmona for inclusion in the

inexistent positions and appointed the following:

1998 Plantilla of Personnel. The following

proposed positions were [allegedly] set aside:

1.

Irene C. Paduyos Farm

Foreman

xxxx

2.

Mustiola A. Mojica Farm

Worker II

DA

3.

Ma. Cecilia F. Alumia Farm

Worker II

Agriculture Chief Center IV SG

18

4.

Lilibeth R. Bayugo Farm

Worker II

Farm Foreman SG 6
Three (3) Farm Worker II SG 4

The appointment papers of the aforesaid

personnel were subsequently approved by the

Despite the disapproval of the aforesaid

positions, on April 5, 1999, the Personnel
Selection Board presided by the respondent

Civil Service Commission.

Thereafter, respondents Budget Officer

The respondents filed their respective

Domingo C. Flores, Municipal Treasurer Alicia

Counter-Affidavits on February 16, 2000,

L. Olimpo, Municipal Accountant Annaliza L.

alleging among others that the Appropriation

Barabat, Municipal Agriculturist Nenita L.

Ordinance No. 006-98 which is the Annual

Ernacio and Municipal Administrator Amador

Budget of the Municipality of Carmona for the

B. Alumia, allowed and caused the payment of

year 1999 carries with it the 24 positions

salaries of the aforesaid employees.

requested in the letter-request dated October 6,

1998 of the respondent Mayor for the inclusion

The petitioner further alleged that by the

of such 24 positions in the proposed 1998

respondents concerted efforts to make it appear

Annual Budget. The approval of the budget was

that the inexistent positions were created,

in the form of an ordinance. Moreover, the

causing the unlawful payment of salaries to

appointments were approved by the Civil

illegally appointed employees, the respondents

Service Commission and the salaries were paid

are liable for malversation of public funds thru

out of savings.

falsification of public documents. Likewise, the

respondents are allegedly liable administratively

On March 9, 2000, the petitioner filed a

for gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct,

Consolidated Reply refuting the allegations in

dishonesty

the respondents Counter-Affidavits, to which

documents.

and

falsification

of

official

respondent Mayor Loyola filed a RejoinderAffidavit. On April 3, 2000, the petitioner

submitted a Consolidated Rebuttal.

Petitioner
On May 23, 2000, upon recommendation

submits

the

following

issues

consideration:

of the OIC Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon

Emilio A. Gonzales III, Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto ordered the dismissal of the instant

administrative Complaint for lack of merit. The

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

respondent moved for a reconsideration of the

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

aforesaid Decision which the respondents

THAT

opposed. The said motion for reconsideration

WERE CREATED BY CIRCUMSTANCES

THE

QUESTIONED

POSITIONS

was however denied.[4]

II
Petitioner appealed the Ombudsmans dismissal order to

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

the Court of Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

the

2001

HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD

Decision. Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration but

BE DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE FOR

this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its May 28, 2002

GRAVE MISCONDUCT, GROSS NEGLECT

Resolution.

OF

assailed

ruling

in

its December

3,

DUTY,

FALSIFICATION
Hence, the instant petition.

DOCUMENTS[5]

DISHONESTY
OF

AND
PUBLIC

for

On November 23, 1998, Municipal Resolution No. 061Petitioner, then Vice-Mayor of Carmona, Cavite filed

98 was passed, mentioning the creation of 19 government

the present case against respondent Mayor, members of the

positions out of the 24 government positions requested by

Sangguniang Bayan, and municipal officials to expose the

respondent Roy M. Loyola (Loyola), who was then the

alleged malfeasance committed by the respondents. She

Municipal Mayor. Thus, it was petitioners theory that 5 of the

maintains that when Appropriation Ordinance No. 006-98,

24 positions requested by respondent Loyola for inclusion in

[6]

the

otherwise known as the 1999 Annual Budget for the

plantilla

were

not

validly

created. When

the

Municipal Government of Carmona, Cavite was passed, the

1999Plantilla of Positions was submitted together with the

same did not create the 24 government positions at issue. Aside

Appropriation Ordinance No. 006-98 to the Sangguniang

from the fact that no express provision for the creation of the

Panlalawigan for approval, the Plantilla or Personnel Schedule

government positions at issue can be found in the said

for the Department of Agriculture was allegedly drastically

ordinance, no intent on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan to

changed by respondents Loyola, Samson and Domingo Flores,

include said positions can be gleaned from the Minutes of the

making it appear that the five questioned positions were created

Sangguniang Bayan Session held on November 9, 1998 when

and vacant. This was made possible because the preparation of

the said ordinance was passed. The Minutes would allegedly

the Plantilla or Personnel Schedule for the different offices of

show that the proposed creation of 19 government positions

the Municipal Government of Carmona, Cavite was undertaken

was deferred until such time that the copy of the proposed

by respondent Samson, reviewed by respondent Flores, and

1999 Plantilla of Positions was submitted by respondent

approved by respondent Loyola.

Amelia C. Samson to the Sangguniang Bayan.

Petitioner alleges that this is a clear case of falsification
because the 1999 Plantilla allegedly did not indicate a specific

amount allocated for the created but vacant government

Petitioner likewise asserts that the approval by the Civil

positions at issue in the Proposed Budget for January-

Service Commission of the questioned appointments is tainted

December 1999. Consequently, as purportedly admitted by

with illegality; hence, void ab initio. In her view, what were

respondent Flores, the funding for the government positions at

approved are falsified and uncreated government positions;

issue was sourced from the savings of the municipal budget for

therefore, the confirmation or approval of the invalid

1999.

appointments has no force and effect. Moreover, contrary to the

Ombudsmans findings, whatever flaw that attended the
In the same manner, petitioner argued that the

creation of the government positions at issue had not been

enactment of Appropriation Ordinance No. 001-99 (Annual

cured by Municipal Resolution No. 012-00 dated March 13,

Budget for 2000) on November 8, 1999 with the government

2000 passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, affirming the creation

positions at issue again reflected to have been created and

of the assailed positions. The said Resolution is also allegedly

funded, is also an act of falsification committed by

an act of falsification committed by the Sangguniang Bayan

respondents. The said continuing act of falsification prompted

members because they made it appear that the said positions

the petitioner to bring the same to the attention of the

were created.

Sangguniang Bayan during its regular session on November 8,

1999. However, the Sangguniang Bayan members did not

On the other hand, respondents counter petitioners

deliberate on such unwarranted inclusion. Hence, petitioner

assertions by asserting that the dismissal of the criminal case,

wrote a letter to the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang

which involved the same set of facts, allegations and arguments

Panlalawigan on November 16, 1999.

as the administrative case at bar, by the Ombudsman and later

affirmed

successively

by

the

Court

of

Appeals via a

Decision[7] dated June 8, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61840 and

by this Court in a minute Resolution [8] dated September 25,

factual findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals

2001 in G.R. No. 149534, effectively barred the review of the

should be accorded great weight and finality.

dismissal of the administrative complaint before this Court

because of the application of the law of the case doctrine.

After a careful review of the records, we find the

petition to be without merit.

Respondents further argue that, as per jurisprudence on

the matter, the reelection of respondent Loyola as Mayor of the

Before proceeding to the discussion on why the

Municipality of Carmona, Cavite during the May 14, 2001

petitioners contentions fail to convince, it is appropriate to

local election had the effect of automatically abating the

restate here the law of the case doctrine in light of respondents

administrative charge leveled against him for an offense

erroneous appreciation of the same.

allegedly committed during his preceding term.

In Padillo v. Court of Appeals,[9] we had occasion to
Moreover, respondents aver that under Section 7, Rule

explain this principle, to wit:

III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, the decision of the

Ombudsman in an administrative case absolving a respondent

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion

of the charge filed against him is final and unappealable, thus,

delivered on a former appeal. More specifically,

the petition before the Court of Appeals and, subsequently, this

it means that whatever is once irrevocably

Court should have been disallowed. In any case, the appeal

established as the controlling legal rule or

before the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the reglementary

decision between the same parties in the same

period. Lastly, respondents contend that it is axiomatic that the

case

continues

to

be

the law

of

the

case, whether correct on general principles or

not, so long as the facts on which such decision

the same case. The "Law of the Case," as

was predicated continue to be the facts of the

applied to a former decision of an appellate

case before the court. As a general rule, a

court, merely expresses the practice of the

decision on a prior appeal of the same case is

courts in refusing to reopen what has been

held to be the law of the case whether that

decided. Such a rule is "necessary to enable an

question is right or wrong, the remedy of the

appellate

party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a

satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be

rehearing.[10]

impossible if a question, once considered and

court

to

perform

its

duties

decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the

same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal." Again, the rule is necessary as a matter
The concept of law of the case was further elucidated in
the 1919 case of Zarate v. Director of Lands,[11] to wit:

of policy to end litigation. "There would be no

end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by
repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to

A well-known legal principle is that

when an appellate court has once declared

criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of

chances from changes in its members." x x x.[12]

the law in a case, such declaration continues to

be the law of that case even on a subsequent

The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where

appeal. The rule made by an appellate court,

an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal

while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot

and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further

be departed from in subsequent proceedings in

proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court

becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a

subsequent appeal.[13]

reasonable doubt.[15] Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not

mean evidence that which produces absolute certainty; only

Contrary to respondents assertion, the law of the

case doctrine does not find application in the case at bar simply

moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which

produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[16]

because what was involved in G.R. No. 149534 was a criminal

proceeding while what we have before us is an administrative
case. Although both cases possess a similar set of facts,

Having disposed of that issue, we now proceed to

discuss the reasons why the instant petition must fail.

allegations and arguments, they do not serve the same

objectives and do not require the same quantum of evidence

On a procedural note, the assailed ruling of the

necessary for a finding of guilt or conviction/liability which

Ombudsman obviously possesses the character of finality and,

makes them entirely different cases altogether and, therefore,

thus, not subject to appeal. The pertinent provision in this case

beyond the purview of the legal principle of law of the case.

is the old Section 7, Rule III of Ombudsman Administrative

Order No. 7, Series of 1990 (Rules of Procedure of the Office

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required

of the Ombudsman), before it was amended by Ombudsman

to support any finding. Substantial evidence is such relevant

Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003 (Amendment of

evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to

Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7), which states that:

support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there

is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of

Sec. 7. FINALITY OF DECISION.

the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might

Where the respondent is absolved of the charge

not be overwhelming.[14] While in criminal cases, the accused is

and in case of conviction where the penalty

imposed is public censure or reprimand,

Findings of fact by the Office of the

suspension of not more than one month, or a

Ombudsman when supported by substantial

fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision

evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or

shall be final and unappealable. In all other

decision imposing the penalty of public censure

cases, the decision shall become final after the

or reprimand, suspension of not more than one

expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof

(1)

by the respondent, unless a motion for

unappealable.

month's

salary

shall

be

final

and

reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall

have been filed by him as prescribed in Section
27 of RA 6770.

As shown by the aforementioned regulation and statute,

a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of an

The basis for the said rule of procedure is Section 27 of

administrative charge is final and unappealable.

Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act), to wit:

The Court categorically upheld this principle in Reyes,
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of

Jr. v. Belisario,[17] to wit:

Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the

Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.

Notably, exoneration is not mentioned in

Section 27 as final and unappealable. However,
its inclusion is implicit for, as we held in Barata

xxxx

v. Abalos, if a sentence of censure, reprimand

and a one-month suspension is considered final

administrative case does not mean, however,

and unappealable, so should exoneration.

that the complainant is left with absolutely no

remedy. Over and above our statutes is the

The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of

the

Ombudsman

Rules

is

to

deny

Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII

the

empowers the courts of justice to determine

complainant in an administrative complaint the

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

right to appeal where the Ombudsman has

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

exonerated the respondent of the administrative

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

charge, as in this case. The complainant,

instrumentality of the Government. This is an

therefore, is not entitle to any corrective

overriding authority that cuts across all branches

recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration

and instrumentalities of the government and is

in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to

implemented

the courts, to effect a reversal of the

for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the

provides. A petition for certiorari is appropriate

right to appeal but only in case he is found liable

when a tribunal, clothed with judicial or quasi-

and the penalty imposed is higher than public

judicial authority, acted without jurisdiction

censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a

(i.e., without the appropriate legal power to

fine equivalent to one month salary.

resolve a case), or in excess of jurisdiction (i.e.,

through

the

petition

although clothed with the appropriate power to

The absence of any statutory right to

resolve a case, it oversteps its authority as

appeal the exoneration of the respondent in an

determined by law, or that it committed grave

abuse of its discretion by acting either outside

Ombudsman Act in case the respondent is exonerated by the

the contemplation of the law or in a capricious,

Ombudsman for an administrative charge.

whimsical,

arbitrary

or

despotic

manner

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction). The Rules of

In any event, the instant petition failed to show any

Court and its provisions and jurisprudence on

grave abuse of discretion or any reversible error on the part of

writs of certiorari fully apply to the Office of

the Ombudsman in issuing its assailed administrative decision,

the Ombudsman as these Rules are suppletory to

as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which would compel this

the Ombudsmans Rules. The Rules of Court are

Court to overturn it.

also the applicable rules in procedural matters

on recourses to the courts and hence, are the

Elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the

rules the parties have to contend with in going to

Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by

the CA.[18]

substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,

especially when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not file a petition

Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and instead

made. In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the

filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,

with the Court of Appeals. The latter is effectively an appeal to

determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute

the Court of Appeals which is disallowed by the Rules of

its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect

Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman as well as the

to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this

Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again

except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible

been made when the Sanggunian included them

miscarriage of justice would thereby result.[19]

in the 1999 Plantilla of Positions under

Ordinance No. 006-98 enacting the 1999 Annual

The Court quotes with approval the findings and

Budget.

conclusion of the assailed Ombudsman ruling which was also

adopted by the Court of Appeals:

The positions having been created,

personnel were appointed thereto by the

We believe that the questioned positions

respondent Mayor which appointments were

had been created under the circumstances.

confirmed by the Civil Service Commission.

Evidence shows that on October 6, 1998,

Since

respondent

the

confirmed/approved by the CSC all questions

Sanggunian to create twenty-four (24) positions

pertaining thereto including the validity of the

by including the same in the 1998 plantilla.

creation of positions has been rendered moot

Such creation has been taken up by the

and academic. It is the CSC which is

Sanggunian in its session and traces of favorable

empowered to look into the validity of creation

action thereon has been shown in the minutes of

of positions and appointments thereto. Also,

the Sanggunian session held on November 19,

such confirmation further strengthened the

1998 when the 1999 Annual Budget was taken

presumption of regularity of official functions

up (pp. 3-4, Complainants Consolidated Reply).

particularly the creation of position.

Mayor

Loyola

requested

Though the four (4) positions had not been

created by a separate ordinance, its creation has

the

appointments

were

There

being

appointment

positions and the exigencies of the service

confirmed by CSC and the concerned personnel

demand that these vacancies should be filled up.

having rendered services, payment of their

There is misconduct if there is a transgressi[on]

salaries is proper and legal. Thus, respondent

of some established and definite rule of action

Flores, as Budget Officer; Olimpo as Treasurer;

(Phil. Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Federico B.

Barabat as Accountant; Alumia as Administrator

Moreno). In the instant case, evidence show that

and Ernacio as the Agriculturist/Head of Office

respondents did not transgress some established

acted in accordance with law when they

and definite rule of action. Had there been a

processed and allowed the payment of salaries

transgression in the creation of positions and

to the four (4) employees. The payment of

appointments

salaries to the employees who has rendered

Commission should have so stated when the

service to the government does not constitute

appointments

grave

approval/confirmation.

misconduct,

valid

neglect

of

duty

and

thereto,
were

the

Civil

submitted

Service
for

dishonesty.
Since the appointed personnel has
The appointments made by respondent

already rendered service, the processing and

Loyola including the selection and screening of

payment of their salaries was but legal and

employees by the Selection Board could not be

proper and does not constitute dishonesty,

considered grave misconduct and dishonesty by

falsification and neglect of duty on the part of

respondents who compose the Board. There

the respondents responsible therefore. Had

were vacant positions caused by the creation of

respondents refused to pay the salaries of the

concerned employees, they could have been

Norte. Neither was there any appropriation for

held liable for neglect of duty.

the said position in the municipal budget for

1975-1976 although an appropriation for the

In sum, respondents could not be held

administratively

liable

since

their

official

position of Municipal Secretary was retained in

said budget.

actions starting from the creation of positions to

selection

of

personnel,

appointment,

and

ultimately payment of salaries were all in

Respondent took his oath of office

before Mayor Aquino on February 1, 1976.

accordance with the law.[20]

In a special session held on February 23,
To reiterate, the Court is not a trier of facts. As long as

1976, the "Sangguniang Bayan" of Piddig

there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsmans

passed Resolution No. 1 creating the position of

decision, that decision will not be overturned.[21] We are also

"Sangguniang Bayan" Secretary as a "vital"

guided by the ruling in Cortes v. Bartolome,[22] which similarly

position, and Resolution No. 2 revalidating the

dealt with a purportedly invalid appointment to an allegedly

appointment of respondent as such.

inexistent office, to wit:

xxxx
It is undisputed that on January 1, 1976,
there was no existing position of "Sangguniang

While it may be that at the time of

Bayan" Secretary in the organizational set-up of

appointment, no position of "Sangguniang

the municipal Government of Piddig, Ilocos

Bayan" Secretary formally existed, whatever

defect there may have been initially was cured

longer necessary to pass upon the remaining corollary issues of

subsequently by the creation of said position and

the instant petition.

the revalidation of respondents appointment.

That appointment was ultimately approved by

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

the Civil Service Commission on May 11, 1976

hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 3,

thus giving it the stamp of finality. x x x[23]

2001 as well as the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 of the Court

(Emphases supplied.)

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61841 are AFFIRMED. The

assailed Decision dated May 23, 2000 of the Ombudsman in
OMB-ADM-1-99-1035 is likewise AFFIRMED.

In the case at bar, the 24 new positions were included in

Ordinance

No.

006-98

enacting

the

1999

Annual

Budget. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan later affirmed

the creation of all questioned positions in separate resolutions
and continued to include the said positions

in the

appropriations in subsequent budget ordinances. It is likewise

undisputed that the questioned appointments were all approved
by the Civil Service Commission.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners underlying premise
for her administrative complaint, i.e., the alleged non-creation
of the subject positions, cannot be upheld and thus, it is no

SO ORDERED.

Part II Statutory Construction, Interpretation and

Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the

Judicial Legislation

deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Definition of Statutory Construction

Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29 September 1966

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the

station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose

CASTRO, J.:

estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by

the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter

referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls
for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its
dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all
"motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the
privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each

next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this
level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos
bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an
Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a
screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station
will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven
different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can
from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners
of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round
trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers,
in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional
second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of

P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of

deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines,

the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a

or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or

sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,

employee of the Bureau of Posts:

second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes

in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first;
P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation

Written or printed matter in any form advertising,

describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information

prize for each of the remaining four participants.

concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst

scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or

the media for publicizing the contest but also for the

chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for

transmission

thereto,

obtaining any money or property of any kind by means

representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities

of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or

for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in

promises.

of

communications

relative

view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised

Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as
follows:

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory

evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter.

distribution of money, or of any real or personal

No matter belonging to any of the following classes,

property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that

whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be

any person or company is conducting any scheme,

imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be

device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of

any kind through the mails by means of false or

or payment by any postmaster of any postal money

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the

order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company

Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other

or to the agent of any such person or company, whether

officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the

such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,

person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word

corporation, or association of any kind, and may

"fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the

provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of

outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class

the sums named in money orders or telegraphic

mailed by or addressed to such person or company or

transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or

the representative or agent of such person or company.

its agent.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster

system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director

General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru

of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that

counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to

any person or company is engaged in conducting any

justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-

lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of

lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then

money, or of any real or personal property by lot,

Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within

chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or

the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant

company is conducting any scheme, device, or

the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7,

enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind

1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,

through the mails by means of false or fraudulent

stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part

pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue

of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling

authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds

opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated

that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'

case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the

announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the

Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest

rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not

involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a

violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right

"gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law,

to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use
of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well
threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will
have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the
present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered
declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative
of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner
the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public". After issues were joined and upon the respective
memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as
follows:

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon
two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient
cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the
proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal
Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules
of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at
the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any
person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now
section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification,

this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the

products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged

matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to

with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the

wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the

power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof

controversy must be between persons whose interests are

particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections

adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a

1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against

legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved

legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right

must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The

aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion

Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,

scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties

1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G.,

in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,

No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-

amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the

8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand

appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise

being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action

by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the

for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases

pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a

thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly

declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the

present controversy, a number of significant points stand out in
bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of
some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to
exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate
media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its

construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus

reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on
their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with
which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only
by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground.
And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open

warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was

confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and

"conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and

inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and

all its representatives."

stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs.

Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy
prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the
use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge
thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The
justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a
denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere
theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as
their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty

And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is

long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's
"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of action.
Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a
positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284
Pac. 350).

occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of

construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that

business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's

there is here no question of construction because the said

proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to

appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a

uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's

given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest",

bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a

hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of

fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are

this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption

that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the

nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,

legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their

presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate

application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.

resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of

Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and

speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the

dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper,

law with respect to its application to a given case, where that

animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which

intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the

looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,

fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the

1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.

law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the

Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d.,

case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee

901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur.,

is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the

2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the

Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended

situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to

meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as

choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a

much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the antilottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a

pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is
anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of
the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the
disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer

contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the

contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only
incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain
imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which
may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if
it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or

permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous

extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control

censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh

the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby

these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of

but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.

liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in

Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of

order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules

this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford

relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights
and duties under a law we can see in the present case any
imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity
in our intervention.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion

we have herein just reached is not without precedent.
In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d.,
487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising
was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding

promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if

effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes

such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be

that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a

subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation

declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very

was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the

least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he

county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales

obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions

promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway,

applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal

17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs.

system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect,

Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82

judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself

A. 2d., 903.

and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for

that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous

declaratory relief.

cases having to do with the power of the United States

Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative

Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely nonmailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud
orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the
postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As
early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278,
283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal
Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been
attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is

all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,

such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts,
raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner
vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House
vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil.,
962;

Valhalla

Hotel

Construction

Company vs.

Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed
scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the
appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed
down to the existence of the element of consideration therein.
Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened

inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be

down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms

paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or

any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law

does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by
the clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate
therein is couched. Thus

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station,

request for the entry form which is available on demand, and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask
the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is
seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p.
291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers,

property by chance.

labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?

Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex
gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer
will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . .
." .

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex

customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize
would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the
privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if
the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex

service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A

way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the

contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy

drawing;

anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt

consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex.

does

not

supply

the

element

of

Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being
admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the

sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be

"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not

encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance

a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with

to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element

under the Postal Law.

of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the

proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People
vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether
the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance,
and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive
something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant
is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled
from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or

scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is
equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief
appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this
aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here
invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of
both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the
appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby

Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which

to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the

opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of

consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which

to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they

that element is not essential, the determination of whether or

buy the appellee's products.

not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we

have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's

contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the
term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is

that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated

yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a

in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that

consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that

a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default

the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under

of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery,

which goods are sold for their market value but by way of

is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73;

inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54

Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,

C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed.,

88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater

p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd

Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this

ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of

is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities

Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs.

declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the

State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn.

prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of

507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term

prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P.

clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted,

2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563,

there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is

565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796;

attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open

City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39

Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S.,

the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the

851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App.,

term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning

705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The

than that which is consistent with the nature of the word

apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the

associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it

specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In

involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise"

some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery"

be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the

and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs.

slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of

People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of

consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by

statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State,supra;
State ex

rel.

Stafford

vs.

Fox-Great

Falls

Theater

Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state

of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must
be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable
statutory provision.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to

be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof
being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail
fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of
the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which
on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As
applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes,

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in

justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their

question is used in association with the word "lottery". With the

tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public

meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known

morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208).

principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which

Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be

Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as

hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows

ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a

contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly

sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the

be said to obtain. If, as it has been held

"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules

submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance

the Postal Law.

does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a

device to evade the law and no consideration is derived,

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No

directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the

costs.

chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or

stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d.,
286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed.,

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift
enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries,
they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be
denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Constitutional Construction
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
83896, 22 February 1991

G.R. No. 83815

February 22, 1991

Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner

of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and

CRISPIN

T.

National Economic Development Authority, respondents.

REYES, petitioners,

vs.

Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and

PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform;

Juan

CARLOS

Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

DOMINGUEZ, as

Secretary of Agriculture;

T.

David

for

petitioners

in

83896.

LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture

and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as
Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of
Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and
Employment;

LUIS

SANTOS, as

Secretary of Local

Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National

FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated
August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary;

JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary

Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science

functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,

and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade

undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of

officials of the Executive Department may, in addition

Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health;

to his primary position, hold not more than two

REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and

positions

in

the

government

and

government

corporations

and

receive

the

corresponding

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect,

compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation

allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and

shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to

assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or

boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the

positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to

Chairman.

the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or

follows:

assistant secretary or other appointive official of the

Executive Department holds more positions than what

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of

is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must

the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,

relinquish the excess position in favor of the

unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any

subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case

other office or employment during their tenure. They

shall any official hold more than two positions other

shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly

than his primary position.

practice any other profession, participate in any

business, or be financially interested in any contract

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the

government

in

government-owned

or

controlled

corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of

the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by

the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII

Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines

prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along

charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and

with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to

self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then

the

No.

Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, construing Section 13,

83815 3 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 4 from holding

Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B,

any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition

rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of

to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive

1987, 5 declaring

Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines

(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other

further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the

public office, including membership in the boards of

extraordinary writs of prohibition andmandamus, as well as a

government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the

temporary restraining order directing public respondents

Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is

therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their

made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council

primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those

under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by

authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any

law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their

salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges

respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the

and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and

President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days

compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund

before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated

any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received

Executive Order No. 284. 6

petitions

as

Annex

"C"

in

G.R.

that

Cabinet

members,

their

deputies

from such positions.

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both
DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they

allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the

The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ

general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article

Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and

I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each

clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 9 and DOJ

addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers

Opinion No. 155, series of 1988, 10 being the first official

one, the President and her official family, and the other, public

construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of

servants in general allegedly "abolished the clearly separate,

Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB

higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned

of the Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments

to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the

or designations of an appointive executive official to positions

Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies

other than his primary position, is "reasonably valid and

and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to

constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284,

lead by example." 7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides:

promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is

consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ

Sec. 7. . . . . .

Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155,

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary

functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including

government-owned

corporations or their subsidiaries.

or

controlled

series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No.

284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions
which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by
the primary functions of the public official, but only to the
holding of multiple positions which are not related to or
necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned (disparate positions).

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is

There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President,

being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission

Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies

that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than

or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the

those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by

Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement

virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

between petitioners and public respondents lies on the

Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other

constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that

office or employment in Government are those provided in the

because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed

Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception

as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article

must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case

VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-

of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of

officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of

the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article

Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in

Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service
Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil
Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and
cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies

VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand,

maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive
officials mentioned therein are concerned.

specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the

Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as

Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned

Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose

admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in

sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the

general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy

whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and

reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by

calculated to effect that purpose. 11

law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive

official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation
or their subsidiaries."

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their

deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or
boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this

We rule in the negative.

country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E.

Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the

intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the

proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and

government-owned and controlled corporations created by
presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were
designated to head or sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and
other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have
remained up to the present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the

(13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each;

government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials

Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas

who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-

of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Pea of

enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in

ten (10) each. 13

government was strongly denounced on the floor of the

Batasang Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to
the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled
"1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned
and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and
Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of
Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the

serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was
therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people
successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft
into

its

proposed

Constitution

the

provisions

under

consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct,

Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of

the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental

propriety and morality in government service were the data

offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr.

contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the

Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases,

governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies,

one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution

instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of

during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given

twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo

by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet

R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z.

members holding multiple positions in the government and

Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen

collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom

Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of

would be discontinued.

Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the

Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section

7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against
the holding of multiple offices or employment in the
government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the
intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so
far as holding other offices or employment in the government
or elsewhere is concerned.

or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under

Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o
member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government,including

government-owned

or

controlled

corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2),

Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on
disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of

Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-

the civil service in general and members of the armed forces,

President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or

are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the

assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

President and his official family as a class by itself and to

Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their

impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute,

not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be

stricter with the President and his official family was also
succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after
Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor

office or employment.

deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence

the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General

provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or

Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive

indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any

Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually

business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in

have to be stricter with the President and the members of the

any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government

Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore,

or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there

government-owned

is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14

or

controlled

corporations

or

their

subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions

imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials
or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the

primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,

Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by

their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly

the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking

authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,

officials of the Executive Branch from the President to

Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to

Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil

all elective and appointive public officials and employees,

servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary

while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception

downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position

applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members

in the government during their tenure.

of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise

would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This

provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot

observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who,

possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section

under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office

7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said

or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but

qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would

who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of

render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and

Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or

purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter

designation in any capacity to any public office or position

prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the

during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless

Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding

otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13,

other offices or employment in the government during their

Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB

tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article

would render meaningless the specific provisions of the

VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of

Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a

member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,

relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not

and must lean in favor of a construction which will render

nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence

every word operative, rather than one which may make the

can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under

words idle and nugatory. 20

consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB

providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article
VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner
must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-avis Section 13, Article VII.

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987

Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that

exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.

no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all

On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is

the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions

prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a

bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view

positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding

and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of

multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever

the instrument. 17 Sections bearing on a particular subject

the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be

should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate

understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal

the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and one section is not

negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable

Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only

construction, the two can be made to stand together. 19

to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to

wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the

Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as

Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which

President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)

would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson

and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-

and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant

officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of

secretaries, would also be prohibited.

Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution

Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment

must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied

Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his

by the Executive officials specified therein without additional

department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can

compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and

his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these

as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office.

agencies.

The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"

within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise would
lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President
of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24,
1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary,
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and

The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the

Monetary

Board. 24 Neither

can

their

respective

undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank

Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees
in providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking
and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended
such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a

continuously operative charter of government, is not to be

officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports

interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable;

Authority, 29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority. 30

and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should

be avoided. 26

The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an exofficio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not

and Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of

to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional

the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman

compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as

and members of the Board to qualify they need only be

required by the primary functions of the concerned official's

designated by the respective department heads. With the

office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of

exception of the representative from the private sector, they

office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character

sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must already be

merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character,

holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for

but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise

instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the

denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a

Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a

consequence of office, and without any other appointment or

representative from that office. The same is true with respect to

authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-

the

officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of

appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the

his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or

representatives so designated merely perform duties in the

appointment. 28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the

Board in addition to those already performed under their

Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-

original appointments." 32

representatives

from

the

other

offices.

No

new

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the

such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in

order of importance and thus means chief or principal function.

government-owned or controlled corporations and their

The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the

subsidiaries.

plural. 33 The additional duties must not only be closely related

to, but must be required by the official's primary functions.
Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's
primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the
Maritime Industry Authority 34 and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President,

Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants
which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by
their offices or appointments by virtue of their special
knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive
offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is
a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy
direction, continuity and coordination among the different

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,

offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its

remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien

multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws

to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional

affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering

functions would fall under the purview of "any other office"

basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power

prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press

vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet

Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the

members, to have control of all the executive departments,

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same

bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully

rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet

executed. 35 Without these additional duties and functions being

official management functions and/or monetary compensation,

assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the

governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or

of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is

instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law

actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary

and as required by their primary functions, they would be

function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary

supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control and

and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his

resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.

department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to

collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional

duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,

per them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such

euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

such additional duties or functions must be required by the

primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform

It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the

the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without

proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section

receiving any additional compensation therefor.

7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the

General Provisions, the exception "unless required by the

The ex-officio position

being

actually

and

in

legal

contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the

official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It should be
obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting

functions of his position," 36 express reference to certain highranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet
were made. 37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas
Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are
instances when although not required by current law,
membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other
offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said

officials'

primary

functions.

The

example

given

by

Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became

Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and

Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless

Industry. 38

otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his

position. . . ."

While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and

Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional

What was clearly being discussed then were general principles

functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the

which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence

official may be imposed upon him without offending the

of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was

constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot,

primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the

however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is

adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary

by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy

functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule

between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary

covering all appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional

session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then was

Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said

Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the

Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded said Section

proposed article on General Provisions. 39 At that time, the

13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section

article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on

3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7,

third reading on July 22, 1986, 40 while the article on the

par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.

Executive Department, containing the more specific prohibition

in Section 13, had also been earlier approved on third reading
on August 26, 1986. 41 It was only after the draft Constitution
had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Committee on

That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the
President and his official family is by reason of the legal
principles governing additional functions and duties of public

officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that

At any rate, we have made it clear that only the additional

the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-

functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by

President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants

the primary functions may be considered as not constituting

from holding during their tenure multiple offices or

"any other office."

employment in the government, except in those cases specified

in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates

and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail

42

as said

proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution

when the meaning is clear.1wphi1Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they

posts held without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate
and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest
intent and the people' understanding thereof.

give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did

not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII

votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental

in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987

law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what

Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is

appears upon its face." 43 The proper interpretation therefore

unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions

depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting

that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries

it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 44

may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than

two (2) positions in the government and government

controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say

corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to

that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent

hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of

than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean

the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,

Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise

specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum

provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and

expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and

The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical

consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet
members would be stripped of their offices held in an exofficio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by
virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, exofficio posts held by the executive official concerned without
additional compensation as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of his office do not fall under the

responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental

offices or employment. He should be precluded from
dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many
positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness
and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this
concentration

of

attention,

knowledge

and

expertise,

particularly at this stage of our national and economic

development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and
taking in more than what he can handle.

definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the

constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm,

employment

including

the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment

chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or

and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of

held

by

virtue

of

legislation,

Local Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National

officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any

Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A.

one for such services. 47 Any per diem, allowances or other

Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to

emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual

immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as

services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be

herein defined, in the government, including government-

retained by them.

owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With

respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have
become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying
the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents
may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held
that "in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de
facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the

petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado

and

undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems

unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an

Jr.,

JJ.,

concur.

Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet (The construction of
law obtains the force of law)
People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974

appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other

compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,

Davide,

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas

ammunition and four (4) empty shells without

(provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889,

first securing the necessary permit or license to

finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of

possess the same.

Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an

indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories
provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his
conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling
in People v. Mapa. 1

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered

a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day

from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment

of

poblacion,

as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and

Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,

the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

to possess and carry the firearm in question.

September,

1964,

in

the

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a

person not authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver
Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the abovementioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from
Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your

the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.

civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an

L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will

effective agent in the detection of crimes and in

have the right to bear a firearm, particularly

the preservation of peace and order in the

described below, for use in connection with the

province of Batangas, especially with respect to

performance of your duties.

the suppression of trafficking in explosives,

jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
robbery and the detection of unlicensed
firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET
AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to
take effect immediately, or as soon as you have

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter

upon the performance of your duties by taking
your oath of office and filing the original thereof
with us.
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,

your duties shall be those generally of a peace
officer

and

particularly

to

help

in

Kind: ROHM-Revolver

the

preservation of peace and order in this province

and to make reports thereon to me once or twice
a month. It should be clearly understood that
any abuse of authority on your part shall be

Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22

considered sufficient ground for the automatic

cancellation of your appointment and immediate

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC

separation from the service. In accordance with

Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with

duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities,

ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases

wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar

of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned

subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in

in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating

Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was

circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent

temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22

and Confidential Agent.

RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the

performance of his duties.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang,

supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of

In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of

his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and

conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the

Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm

time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition

subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal

without license or permit, he had an appointment from the

on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.

Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the

Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while

maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes,

conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused

with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and

had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent

ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the

by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander

Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or

of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry

permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative

the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the

Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the

accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally

requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess

liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the

firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to

assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of

amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised

crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace

Administrative Code.) The next section provides

officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police

that "firearms and ammunition regularly and

who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are

lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or

exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of

marines

license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the

Philippines],

circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of

guards in the employment of the Bureau of

the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out

Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,

the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the

lieutenant

capture of a Huk leader. InMapa, expressly abandoning the

municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and

doctrine

that

guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not

in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the

covered "when such firearms are in possession

following ground:

of such officials and public servants for use in

in Macarandang,

and

by

implication,

[of

the

Armed

the

Philippine

governors,

Forces

of

the

Constabulary,

provincial

treasurers,

the performance of their official duties." (Sec.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter

879, Revised Administrative Code.)

specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for

any person to ... possess any firearm, detached

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is

parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any

made for a secret agent. As such he is not

instrument or implement used or intended to be

exempt. ... .

used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of

firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret

construction

Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential

legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate.

Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing

The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a

doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.

restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim

Macarandang (1959)

Our

obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a

decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine

competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down

came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should

in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence,

appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings

hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in

in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in

possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by

view

of

the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in

theMacarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor

the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is

General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends

overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine

reversal of the appealed judgment.

should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties

of

the

and People

v.

complete

Lucero (1958).

reversal

merely

establishes

the

contemporaneous

who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution

thereof. This is especially true in the construction and

application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance
of society.

shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred

as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's

his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and

authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing

doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which
no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor,
appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not
to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca

Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.

first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island

52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court

vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship,

(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the

they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple

marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and

did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college

void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the

and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an

part of respondent.

ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six

months later, the young couple established their residence in
Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in
Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful
marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The
union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological
incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of
being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the

afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to

physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial

stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would

Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of

beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a

imprisonment.

loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the

children. The children themselves were not spared from
physical violence.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal

home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children

the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their

left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in

marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise

Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent

sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for

ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive

support pendente lite.

respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to

change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was

served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by
the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock,

appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court

respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the

ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion

presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She

between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August

submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City

1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no

General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions

evidence to establish that there was collusion between the

and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay

parties.

authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial

leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late,

court and declared the marriage between petitioner and

was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted

respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their
children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent
vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was
psychologically incapacitated.

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That

the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so
provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the
incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by

it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab
initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal

that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because

of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of
the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.

partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of
Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in
holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null
and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the

plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the
decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the

doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,

[2]

promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines

including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the

set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,

Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the

[3]

phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code

promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no

retroactive

application

and,

on

the

assumption

that

has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of

the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines

psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical

therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not

authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like

mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the

circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and

application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only

Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in

a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings

Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of

and not its dismissal.

Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court

did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no
evidence that has been shown to prove psychological
incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity

Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
`psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly

The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly

declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the

must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage

Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and

which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,

reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,

respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is

parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in

hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to

good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of

confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most

lex prospicit, non respicit.

serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of

an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the
Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
[4]

The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from

Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books,
and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code,
the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos
when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the
term. Molina,

that

followed,

has

additionally

provided

procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in

trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological

incapacity. Molina

has

strengthened,

not

overturned, Santos.

The interpretation or construction placed by the courts

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her

establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the

allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a

law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus

case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let

constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is

alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to

enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself

warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional

later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new

immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be

doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of

equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an

inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court
commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital
relationship

with

respondent,

totally

terminating

that

relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting

denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up,
neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,

(Chairman),

Panganiban,

Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-

(exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of

service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred
to as Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional
When is there room for interpretation or construction?
Songco v. NLRC, GR L-50999 23 March 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:

Office No. 4) an application seeking clearance to terminate the

services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and
Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision

This application was seasonably opposed by petitioners

of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case

alleging that the company is not suffering from any losses.

No. RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo

They alleged further that they are being dismissed because of

Cipres, Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.,

their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case,

Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN- IV-20855-78-

however, petitioners manifested that they are no longer

T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E.

contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed that the sole

Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the

issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to

appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the decision

petitioners. Petitioners, who were in the sales force of Zuellig

of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to pay

received monthly salaries of at least P40,000. In addition, they

petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month salary

received commissions for every sale they made.

The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between

On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then

Zuellig and F.E. Zuellig Employees Association, of which

prevailing provides:

petitioners are members, contains the following provision (p.

Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The

71, Rollo):

termination of employment of any employee

ARTICLE XIV Retirement Gratuity

due to the installation of labor saving-devices,

redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, and

Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated

from employment due to old age, sickness,
death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault
of said employee shall receive from the
company a retirement gratuity in an amount
equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of
service. One month of salary as used in this
paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to
the salary at date of retirement; years of service
shall be deemed equivalent to total service
credits, a fraction of at least six months being
considered one year, including probationary
employment. (Emphasis supplied)

other similar causes, shall entitle the employee

affected thereby to separation pay. In case of
termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or
to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and other similar
causes, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year.
(Emphasis supplied)

In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules

employee as provided herein shall be based on

Implementing the Labor Code provide:

his latest salary rate, unless the same was

reduced by the employer to defeat the intention

xxx
Sec. 9(b). Where the termination of employment
is due to retrechment initiated by the employer
to prevent losses or other similar causes, or
where the employee suffers from a disease and

of the Code, in which case the basis of

computation shall be the rate before its
deduction. (Emphasis supplied)
On June 26,1978, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 78, Rollo):

his continued employment is prohibited by law

or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of

RESPONSIVE

TO

THE

FOREGOING,

his co-employees, the employee shall be entitled

respondent should be as it is hereby, ordered to

to termination pay equivalent at least to his one

pay the complainants separation pay equivalent

month salary, or to one-half month pay for every

to their one month salary (exclusive of

year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction

commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of

of at least six (6) months being considered as

service that they have worked with the

one whole year.

company.

xxx

SO ORDERED.

Sec. 10. Basis of termination pay. The

The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations

computation of the termination pay of an

Commission was dismissed for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the

remuneration or earnings, however designated,

On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of

Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated
April 7, 1980 filed by petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the
ground that he wants "to abide by the decision appealed from"
since he had "received, to his full and complete satisfaction, his
separation pay," resolved to dismiss the petition as to him.
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and
allowances should be included in the monthly salary of
petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation
pay.

capable of being expressed in terms of money,

whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task,
piece, or commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or
unwritten contract of employment for work
done or to be done, or for services rendered or to
be

rendered, and

includes

the

fair

and

reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary

of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities
customarily furnished by the employer to the

The petition is impressed with merit.

employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not

include any profit to the employer or to any

Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal

person affiliated with the employer.

amount of separation pay due them, whether under the Labor

Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions

Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor

and allowances should be added together. They cited Article

Code as well as its implementing rules to include commission

97(f) of the Labor Code which includes commission as part on

in the computation of separation pay, it could have explicitly

one's salary, to wit;

said so in clear and unequivocal terms. Furthermore, in the

definition of the term "wage", "commission" is used only as

Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in

one of the features or designations attached to the word

the definition of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly

remuneration or earnings.

declared by the courts that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or

Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be

included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of
computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been
settled in the case of Santos v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76721,
September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166, where We ruled that "in
the computation of backwages and separation pay, account
must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also
of her transportation and emergency living allowances." This
ruling was reiterated in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124 and recently,
in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524,
January 20, 1989.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or
not earned sales commission should be included in the monthly
salary of petitioner for the purpose of computation of their
separation pay.

construction; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland

Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17,
August 22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
G.R.No. L-2 7455, June 28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain and
unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make
it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. How ever, it
may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with Article
XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the
Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing
Rules, there appears to be an ambiguity. In this regard, the
Labor Arbiter rationalized his decision in this manner (pp. 7476, Rollo):
The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96
(sic) of the Code can be correctly be (sic) stated
as a general definition. It is 'wage ' in its generic
sense. A careful perusal of the same does not

show any indication that commission is part of

The above terms found in those Articles and the

salary. We can say that commission by itself

particular Rules were intentionally used to

may be considered a wage. This is not

express the intent of the framers of the law that

something novel for it cannot be gainsaid that

for purposes of separation pay they mean to be

certain types of employees like agents, field

specifically referring to salary only.

personnel and salesmen do not earn any regular

daily, weekly or monthly salaries, but rely
mainly on commission earned.

.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code

and other Decrees on Labor has its own
pecularities

and

nuances

and

should

be

Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section

interpreted in that light. Thus, for a specific

10, Rule 1, Book VI of the implementing rules

provision, a specific meaning is attached to

in conjunction with Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of

simplify matters that may arise there from. The

the Code specifically states that the basis of the

general guidelines in (sic) the formation of

termination pay due to one who is sought to be

specific rules for particular purpose. Thus, that

legally separated from the service is 'his latest

what

salary rates.

concerning termination pay should be the

should

be

controlling

in

matters

specific provisions of both Book VI of the Code

x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use
'monthly pay or monthly salary'.

and the Rules. At any rate, settled is the rule that

in matters of conflict between the general
provision of law and that of a particular- or
specific provision, the latter should prevail.

On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):

We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which

defines the term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective

From the aforequoted provisions of the law and

the implementing rules, it could be deduced that
wage is used in its generic sense and obviously
refers to the basic wage rate to be ascertained on
a time, task, piece or commission basis or other
method of calculating the same. It does not,
however, mean that commission, allowances or
analogous income necessarily forms part of the
employee's salary because to do so would lead
to anomalies (sic), if not absurd, construction of
the word "salary." For what will prevent the
employee from insisting that emergency living
allowance, 13th month pay, overtime, and
premium pay, and other fringe benefits should
be added to the computation of their separation
pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the real
intent of the Code and its rules.

Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and

Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules, which
mention the terms "pay" and "salary", is more apparent than
real. Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or
consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium,"
or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for
services rendered. Indeed, there is eminent authority for
holding that the words "wages" and "salary" are in essence
synonymous (Words and Phrases, Vol. 38 Permanent Edition,
p. 44 citing Hopkins vs. Cromwell, 85 N.Y.S. 839,841,89 App.
Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary," the etymology of which is
the Latin word "salarium," is often used interchangeably with
"wage", the etymology of which is the Middle English word
"wagen". Both words generally refer to one and the same
meaning, that is, a reward or recompense for services
performed. Likewise, "pay" is the synonym of "wages" and
"salary" (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.). Inasmuch as the

words "wages", "pay" and "salary" have the same meaning, and

salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for

commission is included in the definition of "wage", the logical

services rendered demonstrate clearly that commission are part

conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the separation

of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact

pay of petitioners, their salary base should include also their

that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend

earned sales commissions.

on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, are part

of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact

The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for

deciding the petition in favor of the petitioners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia
argumenti, that the commissions were in the form of incentives
or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to
put a little more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to
them, still these commissions are direct remuneration services
rendered which contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig
. Commission is the recompense, compensation or reward of an
agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or
bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the
amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing Weiner v. Swales, 217
Md. 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the work of a

that some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend
on commissions and allowances or commissions alone,
although an employer-employee relationship exists. Bearing in
mind the preceeding dicussions, if we adopt the opposite view
that commissions, do not form part of wage or salary, then, in
effect, We will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not
receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to separation pay
in the event of discharge from employment. Will this not be
absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the
liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering the purpose of
separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which
confront a dismissed employee thrown the the streets to face
the harsh necessities of life.

Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the

substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as

issue of the salary base that should be used in computing the

provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that

separation pay, We held that:

"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the

provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules

The commissions also claimed by petitioner

('override

commission'

plus

'net

deposit

incentive') are not properly includible in such

base figure since such commissions must be
earned by actual market transactions attributable
to petitioner.
Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present
case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to
petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In
the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is
the average commissions earned during their last year of
employment.
The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the
Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and

and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v.

NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140; Manila
Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78763, July
12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides
that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision

of

the

respondent

National

Labor

Relations

Commission is MODIFIED by including allowances and

commissions in the separation pay of petitioners Jose Songco
and Amancio Manuel. The case is remanded to the Labor
Arbiter for the proper computation of said separation pay.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ.,

concur.

In her Petition for Quo Warranto[1] seeking the ouster of private

respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other things, private
respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation

Amores v. HRET, GR 189600, 29 June 2010

issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was

disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC

DECISION

since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination

and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.

7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner)

challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No.
09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively
dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning

change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas

Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at
least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be
qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA
No. 7941.

the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.

Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the partylist organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
in the House of Representatives, and denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.

Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private

respondent was deemed to have entered a general denial
pursuant to public respondents Rules.[2]

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14,

RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in

2009,[3] dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto,

party-list affiliation.

finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations

which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by

least one seat in the House of Representatives through National

Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009,[4] petitioner filed

Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9,

the present Petition for Certiorari.[5]

2007. It also found the petition which was filed on October 17,
2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent

from private respondents proclamation.

created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of

RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions,

Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral

fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the

nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent

laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial

held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the

proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not

first three congressional terms after the ratification of the

enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July

Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter

10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his

registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which

own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.

CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.

In his Comment,[6] private respondent avers in the main that
In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation

petitioner has not substantiated her claims of grave abuse of

from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and

discretion against public respondent; and that he became a

their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of

member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector

years before the 2007 elections.

To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially

proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007 elections,

It bears noting that the term of office of party-list

along with other party-list organizations,[9] it was by no

representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will expire

measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as

on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot

required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.

and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this case

would still be of practical value.[7]

Section
Representatives

13. How
are

Party-List

Chosen. Party-list

The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to

representatives shall be proclaimed by the

wit: (1) whether petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto was

COMELEC based on the list of names

dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2)

submitted

whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private

organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC

respondent.

according to their ranking in said list.

by

the

respective

parties,

On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent

committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioners
Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No.

10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules[8] from the

07-60 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and

issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is

Transparency v. COMELEC[10] after revisiting the formula for

erroneous.

allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the

Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

exact date of private respondents proclamation, the Court

party-list representative unless he is a natural-

overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the

born citizen of the Philippines, a registered

merits. Alternatively, since petitioners challenge goes into

voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period

private respondents qualifications, it may be filed at anytime

of not less than one (1)year immediately

during his term.

preceding the day of the election, able to read

and write, a bona fide member of the party or

Qualifications for public office are continuing

organization which he seeks to represent for at

requirements and must be possessed not only at

least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the

the time of appointment or election or

election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of

assumption of office but during the officer's

age on the day of the election.

entire

tenure. Once

required

In case of a nominee of the youth sector,

qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably

he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more

challenged.

any

of

the

[11]

than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the

election. Any youth sectoral representative who

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first

attains the age of thirty (30) during his term

discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under

shall be allowed to continue in office until the

Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:

expiration

of

his

underscoring supplied.)

term.

(Emphasis

and

The Court finds no textual support for public respondents

As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only

interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those nominated

in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9

during the first three congressional terms after the ratification

thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the

of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is

first three congressional terms after the ratification of the

thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth

Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last

sector.

elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or

two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the

law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no

room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.[12]

sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective
of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public
respondents ratiocination that after the third congressional term
from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998,

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee

Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties

of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not

registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This

more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election , so

distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit

it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day

nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not

is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this

distinguish, we must not distinguish.[13]

mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System

Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails

to find even an iota of textual support for public respondents

ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private

organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine

respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its

party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral

overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was

affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for

no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:

nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has

been effected at least six months before the elections. Again,

Section

Affiliation;

since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be

Effect. Any elected party-list representative who

given its literal meaning and applied without attempted

changes

sectoral

interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as

affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit

expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the

his

index of intention.[14]

seat:

15. Change

his political
Provided,

of

party
That

or

if

he

changes

his political party or sectoral affiliation within

six (6) months before an election, he shall not be
eligible

for

representative

nomination
under

organization. (emphasis

his

as
new

and

party-list
party

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of

RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

or

underscoring

supplied.)

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be

a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes

already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being

in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter

stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. [15] Moreover, he

may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list

did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before

May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he

Representatives

shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families

CIBAC.

representing

the

party-list

organization

sector only on March 17, 2007.[16]

SO ORDERED.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose
victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list
organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different
matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was
eventually proclaimed as a party-list representative of CIBAC
and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the
compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position
until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same.[17]
WHEREFORE, the

petition

is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130

dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is
declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of

Associate Justice

supplemental papers, withdrawal and change of lawyers, not to

speak of the case having been passed from one departing to
another retiring justice. It was not until May 3, 1999, when the
case was re-raffled to herein ponente, but the record was given
When can courts construe or interpret the law?

to him only sometime in the late October 1999.

RCBC v. IAC, G.R. No. 74851, 9 December 1999

By way of review, the pertinent facts as stated in our

decision are reproduced herein, to wit:

RESOLUTION

On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for

Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments

MELO, J.:

(SEC Case No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange

On September 14, 1992, the Court passed upon the case at

Commission (SEC).

bar and rendered its decision, dismissing the petition of Rizal

Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), thereby affirming

One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and

the decision of the Court of Appeals which canceled the

liabilities was RCBC.

transfer certificate of title issued in favor of RCBC, and

reinstating that of respondent BF Homes.
This

will

now

resolve

petitioners

On October 26, 1984, RCBC requested the Provincial Sheriff

of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on

motion

for

some properties of BF Homes. A notice of extra-judicial

reconsideration which, although filed in 1992 was not deemed

foreclosure sale was issued by the Sheriff on October 29, 1984,

submitted for resolution until in late 1998. The delay was

occasioned by exchange of pleadings, the submission of

scheduled on November 29, 1984, copies furnished both BF

Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the

Homes (mortgagor) and RCBC (mortgagee).

delivery to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering the auctioned

properties.

On motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued on November 28,

1984 in SEC Case No. 002693 a temporary restraining order

On February 13, 1985, the SEC in Case No. 002693 belatedly

(TRO), effective for 20 days, enjoining RCBC and the sheriff

issued a writ of preliminary injunction stopping the auction sale

from proceeding with the public auction sale. The sale was

which had been conducted by the sheriff two weeks earlier.

rescheduled to January 29, 1985.

On March 13, 1985, despite SEC Case No. 002693, RCBC
On January 25, 1985, the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of

filed with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 140, Rizal (CC 10042)

preliminary

an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal

bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond until January 29,

and his deputy to compel them to execute in its favor a

1985, the very day of the auction sale, so no writ of preliminary

certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.

injunction

upon

petitioners

filing

of

injunction was issued by the SEC. Presumably, unaware of the

filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public
auction sale on January 29, 1985, in which RCBC was the
highest bidder for the properties auctioned.

In answer, the sheriffs alleged that they proceeded with the

auction sale on January 29, 1985 because no writ of
preliminary injunction had been issued by SEC as of that date,
but they informed the SEC that they would suspend the

On February 5, 1985, BF Homes filed in the SEC a

issuance of a certificate of sale to RCBC.

consolidated motion to annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC

and the sheriff for contempt. RCBC opposed the motion.

On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management

Committee for BF Homes.

On RCBCs motion in the mandamus case, the trial court issued

x x x: (1) even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extra-

on May 8, 1985 a judgment on the pleadings, the dispositive

judicially foreclose its mortgage on petitioners properties, the

portion of which states:

SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction over those

assets, and (2) that there was extrinsic fraud in procuring the

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Judgment on the

pleadings is granted and judgement is hereby rendered ordering
respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate
of the Auction Sale of January 29, 1985, involving the

judgment because the petitioner was not impleaded as a party

in the mandamus case, respondent court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it, and it was deprived of its right to be heard.
(CA Decision, p. 88, Rollo).

properties sold therein, more particularly those described in

Annex C of their Answer. (p. 87, Rollo.)

On April 8, 1986, the IAC rendered a decision, setting aside the

decision of the trial court, dismissing the mandamus case and

On June 4, 1985, B.F. Homes filed an original complaint with

the IAC pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. 129 praying for the
annulment of the judgment, premised on the following:

suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles, until the

resolution of case by SEC in Case No. 002693, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dated May 8, 1985 in Civil Case
No. 10042 is hereby annulled and set aside and the case is
hereby dismissed. In view of the admission of respondent Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation that the sheriffs certificate of
sale has been registered on BF Homes TCTs . . . (here the TCTs
were enumerated) the Register of Deeds for Pasay City is

hereby ordered to suspend the issuance to the mortgagee-

these do not constitute actions against private respondent

purchaser, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, of the

contemplated under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No.

owners copies of the new land titles replacing them until the

902-A.

matter shall have been resolved by the Securities and

Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 002693.

3. Even

assuming arguendo that

the

extra-judicial

sale

constitute an action that may be suspended under Section 6(c)

(p. 257-260, Rollo; also pp. 832-834, 213 SCRA 830[1992];

of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the basis for the suspension

Emphasis in the original.)

thereof did not exist so as to adversely affect the validity and

regularity thereof.

On June 18, 1986, RCBC appealed the decision of the then

Intermediate Appellate Court (now, back to its old revered

4. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance

name, the Court of Appeals) to this Court, arguing that:

of Special Civil Case No. 10042.

1. Petitioner did not commit extrinsic fraud in excluding

5. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction over Special Civil

private respondent as party defendant in Special Civil Case No.

Case No. 10042.

10042 as private respondent was not indispensable party

thereto, its participation not being necessary for the full
resolution of the issues raised in said case.
2. SEC Case No. 2693 cannot be invoked to suspend Special
Civil Case No. 10042, and for that matter, the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in petitioners favor, as

(p. 5, Rollo.)
On November 12, 1986, the Court gave due course to the
petition. During the pendency of the case, RCBC brought to the
attention of the Court an order issued by the SEC on October
16, 1986 in Case No.002693, denying the consolidated Motion

to Annul the Auction Sale and to cite RCBC and the Sheriff for

its name. Thereafter, RCBC presented a motion for the

Contempt, and ruling as follows:

dismissal of the petition, theorizing that the issuance of said

new transfer certificates of title in its name rendered the

WHEREFORE, the petitioners Consolidated Motion to Cite

petition moot and academic.

Sheriff and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation for

Contempt and to Annul Proceedings and Sale, dated February
5, 1985, should be as is, hereby DENIED.

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, a greatly divided

Court (Justices Gutierrez, Nocon, and Melo concurred with
the ponente, Justice Medialdea; Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices

While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the

Bidin, Regalado, and Bellosillo concurred only in the result;

consolidation of the titles subject of the Omnibus Motion dated

while Justice Feliciano dissented and was joined by Justice

September 18, 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial banking

Padilla, then Justice, now Chief Justice Davide, and Justice

Corporation, and therefore, denies said Motion, neither can this

Romero; Justices Grio-Aquino and Campos took no part)

Commission restrain the said bank and the Register of Deeds

denied petitioners motion to dismiss, finding basis for

from effecting the said consolidation.

nullifying and setting aside the TCTs in the name of

RCBC. Ruling on the merits, the Court upheld the decision of

SO ORDERED.
(p. 143, Rollo.)

the Intermediate Appellate Court which dismissed the

mandamus case filed by RCBC and suspended the issuance of
new titles to RCBC. Setting aside RCBCs acquisition of title

By virtue of the aforesaid order, the Register of Deeds of

and nullifying the TCTs issued to it, the Court held that:

Pasay City effected the transfer of title over subject pieces of

property to petitioner RCBC, and the issuance of new titles in

. . . whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for

rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors

may no longer assert such preference, but . . . stand on equal

Then Justice Feliciano (joined by three other Justices),

footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so

dissented and voted to grant the petition. He opined that the

as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination

SEC acted prematurely and without jurisdiction or legal

among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a

authority in enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from proceeding

petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale

with the public auction sale. The dissent maintain that Section

shall not be delivered pending rehabilitation.Likewise, if this

6 (c) of Presidential Decree 902-A is clear and unequivocal

has also been done, no transfer of title shall be effected also,

that, claims against the corporations, partnerships, or

within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD

associations shall be suspended only upon the appointment of a

902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable

management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or

rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is

body. Thus, in the case under consideration, only upon the

preferred over the others.

appointment of the Management Committee for BF Homes on

March 18, 1985, should the suspension of actions for claims

In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches

against BF Homes have taken effect and not earlier.

as soon as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. Were it

otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying the
creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime
dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and
imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also p. 838, 213 SCRA 830[1992].)

In support of its motion for reconsideration, RCBC

contends:
The restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission enjoining
the foreclosure sale of the properties of respondent BF Homes
were issued without or in excess of its jurisdiction because it

was violative of the clear provision of Presidential Decree No.

The law on the matter, Paragraph (c), Section 6 of

902-A, and are therefore null and void; and

Presidential Decree 902-A, provides:

Petitioner, being a mortgage creditor, is entitled to rely solely

Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the

on its security and to refrain from joining the unsecured

Commission shall possess the following powers:

creditors in SEC Case No. 002693, the petition for

c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and

rehabilitation filed by private respondent.

personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the

We find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.

Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the

The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of

distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all other
creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is
concerned, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are
not yet applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its
preferred status because it foreclosed on the mortgage prior to
the appointment of the management committee on March 18,
1985. The

Court,

therefore,

reconsideration on this score.

grants

the

motion

for

Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary to

preserve the rights of the parties-litigants to and/or protect the
interest of the investing public and creditors; Provided,
however, that the Commission may, in appropriate cases,
appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships
or other associations not supervised or regulated by other
government agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers
of a regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
such functions and powers as are provided for in the
succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: Provided, finally, That upon
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for

claims against corporations, partnerships or associations

speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion

under management or receivership pending before any court,

for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu

tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (As

Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708

amended by PDs No. 1673, 1758 and by PD No. 1799.

[1968]).

Emphasis supplied.)
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
It is thus adequately clear that suspension of claims against

mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see

a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only

to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees

upon the appointment of a management committee or a

Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co.,

rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of actions

Inc. vs. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano vs.

for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes

Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).

effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation

is filed with the SEC may, to some, be more logical and wise
but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language
of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and
noble, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to
define the wisdom of the law plainly judicial legislation.

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning

may the court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is
a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or
more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is
admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case,

It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the

Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law

the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial

functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true
intent.

Furthermore, as relevantly pointed out in the dissenting

2. protect the interest of the investing public and

opinion, a petition for rehabilitation does not always result in

the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a management
committee. The SEC has to initially determine whether such
appointment

is

appropriate

and

necessary

under

the

circumstances. Under Paragraph (d), Section 6 of Presidential

Decree No. 902-A, certain situations must be shown to exist
before a management committee may be created or appointed,
such as;

creditors. (Section 6 (c), P.D. 902-A.)

These situations are rather serious in nature, requiring the
appointment of a management committee or a receiver to
preserve the existing assets and property of the corporation in
order

to

protect

the

interests

of

its

investors

and

creditors. Thus, in such situations, suspension of actions for

claims against a corporation as provided in Paragraph (c) of
Section 6, of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is necessary, and

1. when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,

here we borrow the words of the late Justice Medialdea, so as

wastage or destruction of assets or other properties;

not to render the SEC management Committee irrelevant and

or

inutile and to give it unhampered rescue efforts over the

2. when there is paralization of business operations of

distressed firm (Rollo, p. 265).

such corporations or entities which may be

Otherwise, when such circumstances are not obtaining or

prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders,

when the SEC finds no such imminent danger of losing the

parties-litigants or to the general public.

corporate assets, a management committee or rehabilitation

On the other hand, receivers may be appointed whenever:

receiver need not be appointed and suspension of actions for

claims may not be ordered by the SEC. When the SEC does not

1. necessary in order to preserve the rights of the

parties-litigants; and/or

deem it necessary to appoint a receiver or to create a

management committee, it may be assumed, that there are

sufficient assets to sustain the rehabilitation plan and, that the

clarified, might mislead the Bench and the Bar, the Court

creditors and investors are amply protected.

resolved to discuss further.

Petitioner

additionally

argues

in

its

motion

for

It may be recalled that in the herein en banc majority

reconsideration that, being a mortgage creditor, it is entitled to

opinion (pp. 256-275, Rollo, also published as RCBC vs. IAC,

rely on its security and that it need not join the unsecured

213 SCRA 830 [1992]), we held that:

creditors in filing their claims before the SEC-appointed

receiver. To support its position, petitioner cites the Courts
ruling in the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, (172 SCRA 436 [1989]) that an order of
suspension of payments as well as actions for claims applies
only to claims of unsecured creditors and cannot extend to
creditors holding a mortgage, pledge, or any lien on the
property.

. . . whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for

rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors
may no longer assert such preference, but . . . stand on equal
footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so
as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination
among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a
petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale
shall not be delivered pending rehabilitation.Likewise, if this

Ordinarily, the Court would refrain from discussing

additional matters such as that presented in RCBCs second
ground, and would rather limit itself only to the relevant issues
by which the controversy may be settled with finality.
In view, however, of the significance of such issue, and the
conflicting decisions of this Court on the matter, coupled with
the fact that our decision of September 14, 1992, if not

has also been done, no transfer of title shall be effected also,

within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD
902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is
preferred over the others.

In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches

SEC (pp. 269-270; emphasis in the original). This ruling is a

as soon as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. Were it

reiteration of Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. vs. Hon. Jesus M.

otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying the

Elbinias (pp. 99-100;186 SCRA 94 [1990] per Fernan, C.J.:

creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime

Third Division).

dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and
imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also p. 838, 213 SCRA 830[1992].
Emphasis supplied.)

Taking the lead from Alemars Sibal & Sons, the Court also
applied this same ruling in Araneta vs. Court of Appeals (211
SCRA 390 [1992] per Nocon, J.: Second Division).
All the foregoing cases departed from the ruling of the
Court in the much earlier case of PCIB vs. Court of

The foregoing majority opinion relied upon BF Homes,

Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 262 [1990] per Cruz, J.:

Appeals (172 SCRA 436 [1989] per Medialdea, J.: First

Division) where the Court categorically ruled that:

First Division) where it was held that when a corporation

threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the

SECs order for suspension of payments of Philfinance as well

creditors should stand on an equal footing. Not anyone of them

as for all actions of claims against Philfinance could only be

should be given preference by paying one or some of them

applied to claims of unsecured creditors. Such order can not

ahead of the others. This is precisely the reason for the

extend to creditors holding a mortgage, pledge or any lien on

suspension of all pending claims against the corporation under

the property unless they give up the property, security or lien in

receivership. Instead of creditors vexing the courts with suits

favor of all the creditors of Philfinance. . .

against the distressed firm, they are directed to file their claims
with the receiver who is a duly appointed officer of the

(p. 440. Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in BPI vs. Court of Appeals (229 SCRA 223 [1994]

per Bellosillo, J.: First Division) the Court explicitly stated that
. . . the doctrine in the PCIB Case has since been
abrogated. In Alemars Sibal & Sons v. Elbinias, BF Homes,
Inc.

v.

Court

of

Appeals,

Araneta

v.

Court

of

Appeals and RCBC v. Court of Appeals, we already ruled that

whenever a distressed corporation asks SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer
assert such preference, but shall stand on equal footing with

Bench and the Bar, the following rules of thumb shall are laid
down:
1. All claims against corporations, partnerships, or
associations that are pending before any court, tribunal, or
board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is
secured or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

other creditors. . . (pp. 227-228).

2. Secured creditors retain their preference over unsecured
It may be stressed, however, that of all the cases cited by
Justice Bellosillo in BPI, which abandoned the Courts ruling
in PCIB, only the present case satisfies the constitutional
requirement that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc (Sec 4,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). The rest were division

creditors, but enforcement of such preference is equally

suspended upon the appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board, or body. In the event that the
assets of the corporation, partnership, or association are finally
liquidated, however, secured and preferred credits under the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code will definitely have
preference over unsecured ones.

decisions.
In
It behooves the Court, therefore, to settle the issue in this
present resolution once and for all, and for the guidance of the

other

words,

once

management

committee,

rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant to

P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed

corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body

shall be suspended accordingly.

creditors of distressed corporations shall, in a way, stand on

This suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective

the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor. P.D. 902-A does not state anything to this
effect. What it merely provides is that all actions for claims
against the corporation, partnership or association shall be
suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to
rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility
for doing so. (This will be in consonance with Alemars, BF
Homes,Araneta, and RCBC insofar as enforcing liens by

However, in the event that rehabilitation is no longer

feasible and claims against the distressed corporation would
eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors shall enjoy
over

the

unsecured

creditors

(still

maintaining PCIB ruling), subject only to the provisions of the

Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit (our
ruling in State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
277 SCRA 209 [1997]).

equal footing with all other creditors, must be read and

understood in the light of the foregoing rulings. All claims of
both a secured or unsecured creditor, without distinction on this
score, are suspended once a management committee is
appointed. Secured creditors, in the meantime, shall not be
allowed to assert such preference before the Securities and
Exchange Commission. It may be stressed, however, that this
shall only take effect upon the appointment of a management
committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, as opined in
the dissent.

preferred creditors are concerned.)

preference

The majority ruling in our 1992 decision that preferred

In fine, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration for

the cogent reason that suspension of actions for claims
commences only from the time a management committee or
receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC, therefore,
could have rightfully, as it did, move for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a
management committee was not appointed by the SEC until
March 18, 1985.

WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is

Plaintiff-appellee Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. is a duly registered

hereby GRANTED. The decision dated September 14, 1992 is

partnership, not wholly owned by Filipinos, engaged since

vacated, the decision of Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-

1958 in the manufacture, processing and marketing of

G.R. No. SP-06313 REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the

vegetable oil extracted from corn, rice, copra, soybean,

judgment of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial

peanuts, fish, and other vegetable products. 1wph1.t

Region, Branch 140, in Civil Case No. 10042 REINSTATED.

On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved, Section
SO ORDERED

1 of which prohibited, among others, partnerships whose

capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines

When courts need not resort to interpretation or

construction.
Go Ka Toc Sons v. Rice and Corn Board, G.R. No. L23607, 23 May 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the rice and/or corn

industry. The law was to take effect on January 1, 1951.
However, Section 3 (a) allowed such partnerships, upon
registration with the municipal treasurer, to continue business
until two years from and after January 1, 1961.
SEC. 3. All such persons, associations, partnerships or
corporations that have complied with the requirements
provided in Section two hereof, if they so apply, shall
be allowed to continue to engage in their respective
lines of activity in the rice and to and/or corn industry
only for the purpose of liquidation, as follows:

(a) Those engaged in the retail, wholesale, culture,

amount of capital investments of alien persons and entities

transporting, handling, distribution or acquisition for

engaged in the rice and/or corn industry to the amount stated in

the purpose of trade of rice and/or corn and the by-

their statement made pursuant to Section 2 of the law.

products thereof shall be allowed to continue to engage

therein for a period of two years from the date of

These two circulars have been duly published and translated

into the local dialect pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act

effectivity of this Act;

3018.
xxx

xxx

xxx
Plaintiff-appellee, having been required by agents of RICOB to

On November 21, 1960, the newly created Rice and Corn

register in accordance with Section 2 of the law and the latter's

Board1 issued Resolution No. 10, pursuant to Section 6 of the

resolution, dated January 3, 1961, ruling that manufacturers

law, defining the term "by product" used in the law, as follows:

and/or dealers of bijon, noodle, corn starch,gawgaw, rice wine,

poultry feeds and other by products of rice and corn are

By-product shall mean the secondary products resulting

from the process of husking, grinding, milling, and
cleaning of palay and corn, such as, but not limited to
"binlid," "darak," "tanop," "tiktik," "corn husk," "corn
drips," and "corn meals."
And on July 10, 1961, the RICOB issued Gen. Circular No. 1,
as amended, which defined the term "capital investment" used
in Section 3 of Republic Act 3018 which limits the maximum

covered by the law, filed action in the Court of First Instance to

declare the said law and RICOB Resolution No. 10, Nov. 21,
1960 and Gen. Circular No. 1, July 10, 1961, as inapplicable to
it. Pending trial on the merits, the lower court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for.
To abbreviate the proceedings, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts. Thereupon, the lower court rendered
judgment (a) declaring Republic Act 3018 not applicable to

plaintiff's business; (b) declaring null and void RICOB's

Section 1 of the law defines "rice and/or corn industry" as

Resolution No. 10, dated November 21, 1960 and General

including the handling of distribution, either in wholesale or

Circular No. 10, as amended, dated July 10, 1961 in so far as

retail, and the acquisition for purpose of trade, of the by-

they were and are being made applicable to plaintiff's business

products of rice and corn.

and (c) making and declaring permanent and perpetual the

preliminary writ of injunction issued in the case.

SECTION 1. No person who is not a citizen of the

Philippines, or association, partnership or Corporation,

Not satisfied with the foregoing ruling, defendant RICOB,

the capital or capital stock of which is now wholly

through the Solicitor General has taken the instant appeal to

owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall directly or

raise questions purely of law.

indirectly engage in the rice and/or corn industry except

as provided in Section three of this Act.

Admittedly, plaintiff-appellee has stopped from engaging in the

purchase and sale of rice and/or corn since the lapse of the two-

As used in this Act, the term rice "and/or corn industry"

year period from the effectivity of the law. It has limited its

shall

activities to the trade, processing andmanufacture of corn and

warehousing, transporting,

rice oil from raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or

importation, handling

embryo ("sungo") and "tahup," as well as from rice husk it

wholesale or retail, the provisions of Republic Act

secures from others who mill rice and corn. In the processing

Numbered Eleven hundred and eighty to the contrary

and manufacture of coin oil, plaintiff also produces a residue

notwithstanding, or the acquisition for the purpose of

called "corn meal" or "corn meal germ" which it sells and

trade of rice (husked or unhusked) or corn and the by-

trades. Are these activities covered by Republic Act 3018?

products thereof:Provided, That public utilities duly

mean

and

include
the

the

culture,

milling,

exportation,
distribution,

either

in

licensed and registered in accordance with law may

x x x In the opinion of the Court, it was never the

transport corn or rice. (Emphasis supplied).

intention of the Legislature in enacting Republic Act

No. 3018 to include in its purpose or scope the

Now, "tahup," "sungo" and "rice husk," which plaintiffs

acquires from rice and corn millers and from which it
manufactures the vegetable oil and produces the "corn meal" or

processing of the by-products of rice and corn because

Filipinos do not depend for their survival by eating the
by-products of rice and corn. . . . .

"corn germ meal" that it subsequently distributes and sells are

clearly by-products of rice and/or corn.2

Assuming, without admitting, that the law in question

really

Although the term "by-product" is not particularly and by

specifically stated in the title of Republic Act 3018, its
inclusion in the body of the law is not invalid, as the lower
court held, since it is germane to the subject matter expressed
3

in the title of the law.

Neither is the statutory inclusion of said term in the definition

of the phrases "rice and/or corn industry" an invalid legislative
usurpation of the court's function to interpret the laws, as the
lower court also ruled. This definition is part of the law itself.

intended

to

include

in

its

object

the

nationalization not only of the rice and corn industry

but also the trade of the by-products just mentioned
above, the business in which the plaintiff has been
engaged and since December 31, 1962, as is at present,
engaged, the Court is of the opinion that in the trade,
processing, manufacture of corn and rice oil from the
raw materials of corn germ proper or embryo (sungo)
and tahup and from rice husk converting the remaining
parts into "corn meal" or "corn germ meal" which is
traded and sold and that it acquired its raw materials

Finally, the lower court determined the purpose and intention

behind the law, thus:

from those engaged milling rice and/or corn. the said

Republic Act No. 3018 does not cover the plaintiff's

of said law the defendant's business activities described

business activities just mentioned.

above in which it engaged since December 31, 1962,

and in which it has been engaged partly engaged since

This is a fair and reasonable interpretation and

its formation in 1959.

application of said Republic Act No. 3018, because to

include in its control, limitation and prohibition the

What the court a quo did was to resort to statutory

business of the plaintiff mentioned above, would be not

construction. But this was improper as well as incorrect. The

only to render the said law unconstitutional for not

law is clear in enunciating the policy that only Filipinos and

including in its title "and the by-products thereof," but

associations, partnerships or corporations 100% Filipino can

also to unreasonably stretch out and expand the scope

engage even in the trade and acquisition of the by-products of

and intention of the law to include in its context the

rice and/or corn. So the court's only duty was to apply the law

processing and extracting of oil from rice and corn and

as it was.4 The purpose of the Act, as expressed in the

the manufacture of corn meal or corn germ meal and

introductory note of the bill, can control the language of the

the selling and trading of the same.

law only in case of ambiguity.5 There is none here.

Furthermore, the court below's interpretation would render the

As a logical result of this interpretation of the law

spelled out by this Court, it must necessarily follow that
the Resolution No. 10, Annex 1 and the general circular

statute nugatory and defeat its aims, rather than apply and
effectuate its provisions,6 since it struck off the phrase "byproducts thereof" from the text of the law.

dated July 10, 1961, quoted under paragraph 3 of the

parties' Stipulation of Facts are hereby declared null and

Since plaintiff-appellee is covered by the statute, there is no

void in so far as they attempted to include in the scope

necessity for an extensive discussion regarding the validity of

Resolution No. 10 of November 21, 1960. The power and

authority of appellant RICOB to issue such rules and
regulations implementing the law, proceeds from the law
itself.7 Said resolution, by enumerating some specific examples
of by-products of rice and/,or corn, merely carried out the
provisions of law. And the sole reason why the lower court
invalidated it, was its mistaken stand that the term "byproduct" ought not to have been made a part of the statute.
The foregoing considerations render moot and academic the
question regarding the validity of General Circular No. 1 on
July 10, 1961.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
writ of injunction issued therein is annulled and set aside. No
costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and
Castro
Makalintal, J., took no part.

JJ.,

concur.

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction

by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and
holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in
an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a
violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4,
committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August,
1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession
People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 August 1967

and under his custody and control one home-made revolver

(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of

FERNANDO, J.:

ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license

or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary
to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963,

corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,

the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused:

answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the

"May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in

lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and

possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a

his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit

the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the
governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the
Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal
an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his
exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law
would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such
question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to
get a license for his firearm."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit

the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part
presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as
secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of
Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing
him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such
secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the

that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel

document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal

for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the

asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this

above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the

pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition

question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and

mentioned in the information was found in his possession on

qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the

August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having

requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were

secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the

admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective

Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,

memoranda.1wph1.t

lieutenant

governors,

provincial

treasurers,

municipal

treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a
decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate

prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."6

penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay
the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a

are forfeited in favor of the Government."

secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally

clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to
this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically

allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture

of

firearms,

parts

law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has

of

firearms,

or

ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and

ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the

without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It

cannot be set aside.
Accused

however

would

rely

on People

v.

Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal

on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member

of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879."

The crucial question in this petition for the review of a decision

Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this

of the Court of Appeals, to be passed upon for the first time, is

Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory

whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any

provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts

showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an

with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer

indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate

speaks with authority.

a third party in favor of a surety company. The Court of

Appeals held that it could not. Petitioner Luzon Surety Co.,

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Inc., dissatisfied with such a judgment, which was an

affirmance of a lower court decision, would have us reverse.
We do not see it that way. The Court of Appeals adjudicated the
matter in accordance with law. We affirm what it did.
As noted in the brief of petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., on
October 18, 1960, a suit for injunction was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental against its Provincial
Sheriff by respondents-spouses, Josefa Aguirre de Garcia and

Luzon Surety v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, 31 October

1969
FERNANDO, J.:

Vicente Garcia "to enjoin [such Sheriff] from selling the sugar
allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership, pursuant to a
writ of garnishment issued by virtue of a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 3893 of the same Court of First
Instance ... against the respondent Vicente Garcia ... ."1

There was a stipulation of facts submitted. There is no question

First Instance of Negros Occidental, docketed as its Civil Case

as to one Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and petitioner Luzon

No. 3893, against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

Surety Co., Inc., executing a surety bond in favor of the

to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney's fees,

Philippine National Bank, Victorias Branch, to guaranty a crop

and costs of the suit. On or about August 8, 1957, in turn, a

loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of

third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon B.

P9,000.00. On or about the same date, Vicente Garcia, together

Lacson and Vicente Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement,

with the said Ladislao Chavez and one Ramon B. Lacson, as

was instituted by Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound

themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify now petitioner
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses,
costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of
whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any
time sustain or incur in consequence of having become
guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid;
and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or
other matters growing out of or connected therewith for
attorney's fees.

Then, as set forth by the parties, on September 17, 1958, the

lower court rendered a decision condemning Ladislao Chavez
and Luzon Surety Co., Inc., to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the amount of P4,577.95 representing the principal
and accrued interest of the obligation at the rate of 6% per
annum as of January 6, 1956, with a daily interest of P0.7119
on P4,330.91 from January 6, 1956, until fully paid, plus the
sum of P100.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The
same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants,
Ladislao Chavez, Vicente Garcia, and Ramon B. Lacson, to pay
Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the total amount to be paid by it to the

It was likewise stipulated that on or about April 27, 1956, the

Philippine National Bank filed a complaint before the Court of

plaintiff Philippine National Bank.

On July 30, 1960, pursuant to the aforesaid decision, the Court

We reiterate what was set forth at the opening of this opinion.

of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued a writ of

There is no reason for a reversal of the judgment. The decision

execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the

sought to be reviewed is in accordance with law.

claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. Thereafter, a writ

of garnishment was issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental dated August 9, 1960, levying and garnishing the
sugar quedans of the now respondent-spouses, the Garcias,
from their sugar plantation, registered in the names of both of
them.2 The suit for injunction filed by the Garcia spouses was
the result.

As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that

the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the New Civil Code.
However, as such administrator the only obligations incurred
by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal
property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his
career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is

As noted, the lower court found in their favor. In its decision of

doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the

April 30, 1962, it declared that the garnishment in question was

case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as

contrary to Article 161 of the Civil Code and granted their

guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as

petition, making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent.

that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the

Luzon Surety, Inc. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals,

conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this

which, as mentioned at the outset, likewise reached the same

case, when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting

result. Hence this petition for review.

as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which

may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership."3

In the decision before us, the principal error assigned is the

While not entirely, without basis, such an argument does not

above holding of the Court of Appeals that under Article 161 of

carry conviction. Its acceptance would negate the plain

the Civil Code no liability was incurred by the conjugal

meaning of what is expressly provided for in Article 161. In the

partnership. While fully conscious of the express language of

most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that

Article 161 of the Civil Code, petitioner, in its well-written

provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations

brief submitted by its counsel, would impress on us that in this

contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal

case it could not be said that no benefit was received by the

partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some

conjugal partnership. It sought to lend some semblance of

advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.

plausibility to this view thus: "The present case involves a

There is none in this case. Nor could there be, considering that

contract of suretyship entered into by the husband, the

the benefit was clearly intended for a third party, one Ladislao

respondent Vicente Garcia, in behalf of a third person. A

Chavez. While the husband by thus signing the indemnity

transaction based on credit through which, by our given

agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or

definitions, respondent Vicente Garcia, by acting as guarantor

esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business

and making good his guaranty, acquires the capacity of being

community, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too

trusted, adds to his reputation or esteem, enhances his standing

remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the

as a citizen in the community in which he lives, and earns the

provision.

confidence of the business community. He can thus secure

money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal
partnership."4

Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of

interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It
peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement is
made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to

the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. So it

That is but fair and just. Certainly, however, to make a conjugal

is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and

partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the

what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.5

husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of

the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the

Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the additional

requirement in the present Civil Code that a debt contracted by
the husband to bind a conjugal partnership must redound to its
benefit. That is still another provision indicative of the

solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. 7 The husband,

therefore, as is wisely thus made certain, is denied the power to
assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership.

solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the
family as a unit. Its interest is paramount; its welfare uppermost

No useful purpose would be served by petitioner assigning as

in the minds of the codifiers and legislators.

one of the errors the observation made by the Court of Appeals

as to the husband's interest in the conjugal property being

This

particular

emphasizes

the

codal

provision in

responsibility

of

question
the

rightfully

husband

as

administrator. He is supposed to conserve and, if possible,

augment the funds of the conjugal partnership, not dissipate
them. If out of friendship or misplaced generosity on his part
the conjugal partnership would be saddled with financial
burden, then the family stands to suffer. No objection need
arise if the obligation thus contracted by him could be shown to
be for the benefit of the wife and the progeny if any there be.

merely inchoate or a mere expectancy in view of the

conclusion thus reached as to the absence of any liability on the
part of the conjugal partnership. Nor was it error for the Court
of Appeals to refuse to consider a question raised for the first
time on appeal. Now as to the question of jurisdiction of the
lower court to entertain this petition for injunction against the
Provincial Sheriff, to which our attention is invited, neither the
Court of Appeals nor the lower court having been asked to pass
upon it. Of course, if raised earlier, it ought to have been

seriously inquired into. We feel, however, that under all the

Article 161 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in describing

circumstances of the case, substantial justice would be served if

the charges and obligations for which the conjugal partnership

petitioner be held as precluded from now attempting to

is liable, do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue

interpose such a barrier. The conclusion that thereby laches had

to the conjugal partnership from the husband's transactions; but

intervened is not unreasonable. Such a response on our part can

that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally

be predicated on the authoritative holding in Tijam v.

would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio

Sibonghanoy.8

behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmea, 34 Phil. 336, that

obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of

December 17, 1965, now under review, is affirmed with costs
against petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Sanchez,
Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
REYES, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in
my opinion, the words "all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in

profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership.

TRENT, J.:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of
vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519, found guilty,
and were each sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Hart and
Miller were further sentenced to a fine of P200, and Natividad
to a fine of P100. All appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows
that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge
about two or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy
charge; that he had been conducting two gambling games, one
in his saloon and the other in another house, for a considerable
length of time, the games running every night. The defense
showed that Hart and one Dunn operated a hotel and saloon at
Angeles which did a business, according to the bookkeeper, of
P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that
Hart was also the sole proprietor of a saloon in the barrio of
Punctuation and Grammar: An Aid to Construction
US v. Hart, G.R. No. L-8848, 21 November 1913

Tacondo; that he raised imported hogs which he sold to the

Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business netted him

during the preceding year about P4,000; that he was authorized

attended to business in an efficient manner every day; and that

to sell several hundred hectares of land owned by one Carrillo

his work was first class.

in Tacondo; that he administered, under power of attorney, the

same property; and that he furnished a building for and paid the
teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being
under Government supervision.

The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he

had gambled nearly every night for a considerable time prior to
his arrest on the charge of vagrancy, in the saloon of one
Raymundo, as well as in Hart's saloon; that Natividad

The evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had

sometimes acted as banker; and that he had pleaded guilty to a

the reputation of being a gambler; that he pleaded guilty and

charge of gambling and had been sentenced to pay a fine

was fined for participating in a gambling game about two

therefor about two weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy

weeks before his arrest on the present charge of vagrancy; and

charge. The defense showed that Natividad was a tailor,

that he was seen in houses of prostitution and in a public dance

married, and had a house of his own; that he made good

hall in Tacondo on various occasions. The defense showed

clothes, and earned from P80 to P100 per month, which was

without contradiction that Miller had been discharged from the

sufficient to support his family.

Army about a year previously; that during his term of

enlistment he had been made a sergeant; that he received rating
as "excellent" on being discharged; that since his discharge he
had been engaged in the tailoring business near Camp
Stotsenberg under articles of partnership with one Burckerd,
Miller having contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the
business netted each partner about P300 per month; that Miller

From this evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants

was earning a living at a lawful trade or business, quite
sufficient to support himself in comfort, and that the evidence
which the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists
of their having spent their evenings in regularly licensed
saloons, participating in gambling games which are expressly

made unlawful by the Gambling Act, No. 1757, and that Miller

in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or

frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution.

dissolute person or associate of known thieves or

ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual

Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven clauses,

separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain
class of persons who, within the meaning of this statute, are to
be considered as vagrants. For the purposes of this discussion,
we quote this section below, and number each of these seven
clauses.
(1) Every person having no apparent means of
subsistence, who has the physical ability to work, and
who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons
or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of
support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket,
thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or
by his having been convicted of either of said offenses,
and having no visible or lawful means of support when
found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or

hours of the night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in

any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than
such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the
permission of the owner or person entitled to the
possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person
who lives in and about houses of ill fame; (7) every
common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant.
It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of
support would not be a bar to a conviction under any one of the
last four clauses of this act, it was not the intention of the
Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no
visible means of support. Relying upon the second clause to
sustain the guilt of the defendants, the Attorney-General then
proceeds to argue that "visible means of support" as used in
that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but is
confined entirely to "or tramping or straying through the

country." It is insisted that had it been intended for "without

The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the

visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause,

proposition that neither visible means of support nor a lawful

either the comma after gambling houses would have been

calling is a sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of

ommitted, or else a comma after country would have been

the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge

inserted.

of vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the

Legislature has so provided. He then proceeds to show, by a

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it

is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true
legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute
which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted
should be based upon something more substantial than the

"mere grammatical criticism" of the second paragraph, that the

Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or
a lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on
the charge that the defendant was found loitering around
saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses.

mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of

the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in

A most important step in reasoning, necessary to make it

apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an

sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a

additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the

construction of the law. What is loitering? The dictionaries say

words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based

it is idling or wasting one's time. The time spent in saloons,

upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will

dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that.

not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give

So that under the proposed construction, practically all who

to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding

frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for which

superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting

they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law. We

others where necessary.

cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to

penalize what, in the case of saloons and dram shops, is under

paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn., sec.

the law's protection. If it be urged that what is true of saloons

3023), with the same punctuation:lawph!1.net

and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this respect,

we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no
distinction whatever between loitering around saloons and
dram shops, and loitering around gambling houses.

. . . or of any person to be found loitering about saloons

or dram shops, gambling houses, or houses of ill fame,
or tramping or strolling through the country without any
visible means of support.

The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the

Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and
harmful parasites of society. While the statutes of the various
States of the American Union differ greatly as to
theclassification of such persons, their scope is substantially
the same. Of those statutes we have had an opportunity to
examine, but two or three contain a provision similar to the
second paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 2228;
N. D. Rev. Codes, sec. 8952; N. M. Comp. Laws 1897, sec.
1314.) That the absence of visible means of support or a lawful
calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction for
loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is
not even negatived by the punctuation employed. In the State
of Tennessee, however, we find an exact counterpart for

A further thought suggest itself in connection with the

punctuation of the paragraph in question. The section, as stated
above, is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons.
To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph 2,
as to one of which visible means of support or a lawful calling
is not a good defense, and as to the other of which such a
defense is sufficient, would imply a lack of logical
classification on the part of the legislature of the various
classes of vagrants. This we are not inclined to do.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a
living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher that
the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the
legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal

law. The games in which they participated were apparently

played openly, in a licensed public saloon, where the officers of
the law could have entered as easily as did the patrons. It is

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

believed that Act No. 1775 is adequate, if enforced, to supress

the gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at
a lawful trade or business.
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the
costs de oficio.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf
of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and
ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA,
JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA,
JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO,
ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and
DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

Internal, external aids in construction

Floresca v. Philex Mining, G.R. No. L-30642 30 April 1985

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA
SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of

and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and

First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16,

LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction.

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own

behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex

ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and

Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who,

AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;

while working at its copper mines underground operations at

Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR.,
MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P.

that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the

complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules
and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:

MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First

Instance of Manila, respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

9. That for sometime prior and up to June

28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

reckless negligence and imprudence and

deliberate failure to take the required
precautions for the due protection of the lives of

its men working underground at the time, and in

tunnels of all its men above referred to,

utter violation of the laws and the rules and

including those named in the next preceding

regulations duly promulgated by the

paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;

Government pursuant thereto, allowed great

amount of water and mud to accumulate in an
open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1
which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft.
column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby
exerting tremendous pressure on the working
spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on
the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
with the collapse of all underground supports
due to such enormous pressure, approximately
500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud
and water, accompanied by surface boulders,
blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were

then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on
the said date, five (5) were able to escape from
the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within
the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,
including those referred to in paragraph 7
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great
many of them were still alive, entombed in the
tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to
defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue
operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx

timber supports and carried off materials,

machines and equipment which blocked all

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated

avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its

the law and the rules and regulations duly

promulgated by the duly constituted authorities

industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the

as set out by the Special Committee above

Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA

referred to, in their Report of investigation,

772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no

pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed

jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated

completely to provide its men working

May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the

underground the necessary security for the

causes of action are not based on the provisions of the

protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact

Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the

that it had vast financial resources, it having

Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary

made, during the year 1966 alone, a total

damages, particularly:

operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net

earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per
its llth Annual Report for the year ended
December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets
totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966;

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre- existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed

xxx xxx xxx

by the provisions of this Chapter.

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to

1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex

alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an

(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the

the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners'

obligor consists in the omission of that diligence

motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge,

which is required by the nature of the obligation

on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of

and corresponds with the circumstances of the

June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the

persons, of the time and of the place. When

complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order

negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of

which was opposed by petitioners.

Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the

established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton

attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.

Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or

compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of
workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's
negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the
employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50%
of the compensation fixed in the Act.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent

Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case
on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of

complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on

errors:

damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and

2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFSPETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges

gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to
take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its
employees working underground. They also assert that since
Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the
allegations in their complaint including those contained in the

II

annexes are deemed admitted.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that

TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION

respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the

BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS

Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of

FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE

Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss

resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man

A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower
court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the

through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the

fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for
damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the

regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and

for compensation under the Workmen's

wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and

Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the

for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the

Supreme Court, ...

same.
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries

855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen

are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5

against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in

and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated

by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The

appeal to the Supreme Court.

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

employee by reason of a personal injury

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent,

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

does not remove the case from the exclusive character of

other rights and remedies accruing to the

recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because

employee, his personal representatives,

Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in

dependents or nearest of kin against the

case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points

because of said injury ...

out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the

petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's

Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims

of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca

who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of

Act or whether they have a right of selection or

damages under the Civil Code.

choice of action between availing of the

worker's right under the Workmen's

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel

Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the
University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as
corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS
Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections,
formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared
as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective
memoranda.

Compensation Act and suing in the regular

courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the
employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of
the employer or of his other employees or
whether they may avail cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of

November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or
worker or that of his heirs in case of his death
under the Workmen's Compensation Act is
exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say,
whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation
provided under the Workmen's Compensation

in addition for damages in the regular courts.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of
the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in
case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages
(not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act)
with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an
employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara
believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured
employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in

accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction

Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is

to try the case,

selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of

his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the
benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the
latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty.
Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy
provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail
themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by
filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and
vice versa.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for

compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a
complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the
total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand
(P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to
compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the
complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of
and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead
alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on
the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee

consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death

Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that

they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.

in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the

In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the

nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for

petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected,

damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test

it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs.

Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In the present case, there exists between Philex and the

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton

deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged

attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all

gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that

damages which may be reasonably attributed to

amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of

the non-performance of the obligation.

contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The

provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract
when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the

payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under
the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation and not

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the

as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate

damages for which the obligor who acted in

the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman

good faith is able shall be those that are the

and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether

natural and probable consequences of the breach

negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.

of the obligation, and which the parties have

Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of

foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at

actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

the time the obligation was constituted.

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is
liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long

as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-

Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that

aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of

unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did

the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other

not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and

hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the

exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the

wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable

right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in

by a person who has sustained injury either in his person,

the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial

property or relative rights, through the act or default of another

expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical

(25 C.J.S. 452).

expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's

Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden
of proving the causal relation between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages
suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there
is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee
that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated;
and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los

50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer

to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational
disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount
sought to be recovered is over and above that which was
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which
cannot be granted by the Commission.

Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA

551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who

The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the

Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees

suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities

in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside

the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu

liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort.

Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker

The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to

has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed

afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social

amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to

legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has

prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for

been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or

higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action

injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54

simultaneously.

SCRA 379).
In Pacaa WE said:
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection
or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's
right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz

Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured
workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in
the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
again speaking for the Court, pointed out that
the injured worker has the choice of remedies
but cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and thus balanced the relative
advantage of recourse under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra

proving the causal connection between the

cannot maintain his action for damages against

defendant's negligence and the resulting injury,

the respondents (defendants below), because he

and of having to establish the extent of the

has elected to seek compensation under the

damage suffered; issues that are apt to be

Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim

troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having

(case No. 44549 of the Compensation

staked his fortunes on a particular remedy,

Commission) was being processed at the time he

petitioner is precluded from pursuing the

filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It

alternate course, at least until the prior claim is

is argued for petitioner that as the damages

rejected by the Compensation Commission.

recoverable under the Civil Code are much more

Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6

extensive than the amounts that may be awarded

aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker

under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they

Company recovers, by derivative action against

should not be deemed incompatible. As already

the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the

indicated, the injured laborer was initially free

compensation he may have paid the herein

to choose either to recover from the employer

petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.

the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law

or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While
perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity
obtainable by the first course is balanced by the
claimant's being relieved of the burden of

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma

(104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule
should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as

report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then

already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution

Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,

of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement

1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

reached by Philex and the said heirs.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in

benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not

its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a

preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court

quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito

because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been

Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and

remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners

Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for

only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had

compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then

petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules

Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as

and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not

of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs

have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation

decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.).

Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.

Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their

The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a

opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp.

mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an

121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense

intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to

that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation

the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the

Act before they learned of the official report of the committee

petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the

created to investigate the accident which established the

payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act

criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which

should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in

Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor,

their favor.

especially to working women, and minors, and

shall regulate the relations between landowner

and tenant, and between labor and capital in

Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court

does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies
and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social
justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6,
7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles
2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the
New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

industry and in agriculture. The State may

provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to
"promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition
of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership
and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment,
welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the
people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II,
1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and
regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure

assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions

the well-being and economic security of all the

of work"(Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

people should be the concern of the State (Art.

II).

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor

Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the

institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973

New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on

Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in

August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of

Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as

against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The

State shall afford protection to labor, promote
full employment,ensure equal work opportunities

seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore

collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution
and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the

relations between workers and employers. The

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and

State shall assure the rights of workers to self-

9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal

organization, collective bargaining, security of

principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice

tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of

(emphasis supplied).

Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence,

enunciated:

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the

aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to

impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173

withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes

of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's

of political controversy, to place them beyond

Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on

the reach of majorities and officials and to

June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor

establish them as legal principles to be applied

by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in

property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of

the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

worship and assembly, and other fundamental

law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

rights may not be submitted to vote; they

depend on the outcome of no elections (319
U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise

directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living of the laborer."

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173

of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the
Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of
the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May
1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor
Code).

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June

20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The
rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury (emphasis supplied).

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the

dependents or nearest of kin against the

Philippine Islands for work outside the same

employer under the Civil Code and other laws,

may stipulate with such laborers that the

because of said injury.

remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply

exclusively to injuries received outside the
Islands through accidents happening in and
during the performance of the duties of the
employment; and all service contracts made in
the manner prescribed in this section shall be
presumed to include such agreement.

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply to injuries received
outside the Island through accidents happening
in and during the performance of the duties of
the employment. Such stipulation shall not

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's

prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits

Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth

of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the

Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

place where the accident occurs, should such

law be more favorable to them (As amended by

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The

section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

employee by reason of a personal injury

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code,

other rights and remedies accruing to the

because said Article 173 provides:

employee, his personal representatives,

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly

otherwise provided, the liability of the State

repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,

Insurance Fund under this Title shall be

R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A.

exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of

No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other

the employer to the employee, his dependents or

laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring

anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on

to the GSIS or SSS).

behalf of the employee or his dependents. The

payment of compensation under this Title shall
bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred
sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System during the period of
such payment for the same disability or death,
and conversely (emphasis supplied).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as

aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even
remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code
provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code
for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article
173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable
under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System
provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the
"System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance
System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e]
of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions

application or interpretation merely establishes

of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.

the contemporaneous legislative intent that the

construed law purports to carry into effect" (65

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the

SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume
the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18
SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

Philippines.
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in
People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court
upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court's

Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right
of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee
to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was
not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in
the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA
442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the
Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case

penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision

Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act,

on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in

reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila

the various state constitutions of the American Union.

Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of

Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions

Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by

on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range

Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by

and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially

Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the

Fernando and Villamor.

New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and

Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code
is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of

now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and

State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not

even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater

property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed

reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same

specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To

interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and

relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers

Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three

arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide

(3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice

safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers

guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining,

is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the

consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The

employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and

dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross

Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because

or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with

they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of

his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the

Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of

protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from

Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which

the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.

has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due
to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice

guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the
power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton

gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for
production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb
and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of
live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian
shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to
be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation
that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a

one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert

constitutional provision.

otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837

case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act

and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of
the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining

by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the
era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only
ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries

continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that

Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the

the courts cannot legislate.

decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and

utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It
robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To
stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the
quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master
and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the
master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably
be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that
provoked the American Civil War which generated so much
hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains
and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil

Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the
New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court,
in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to
fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,
like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage
all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the
human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil
Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution
foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may
have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.

'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial

legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297

legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the

U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also

Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny

entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson.

(The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.).

In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life,

Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even

feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all

independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash

statute books."

Company, 1949 335 US 538).

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173

likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall

of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury

pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the

caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part

Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.

of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability.

Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or

Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the

Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious

judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President

liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was

negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by

reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt

the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the

the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only

workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer

between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The

remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee

Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief

whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the

Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial

employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety

measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the

(277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes

employee.

pronounced:

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not

epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has

establish and divide fields of black and white.

outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise

Even the more specific of them are found to

word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal"

terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from

(Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of

one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come

the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that:

to the fundamental distinctions it is still more

"Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an

obvious that they must be received with a

interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents

certain latitude or our government could not go

established in those items exert an unhappy influence even

on.

now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard

Law Review 383, 387).

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an

individual who but for such action would be free

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he

from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do

pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone:

whenever they determine which of two

"that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only

competing principles of policy shall prevail.

interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular

motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204
1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that

of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in

however we may disguise it by veiling words

the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases

we do not and cannot carry out the distinction

that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such

between legislative and executive action with

judicial legislation has not protected public interest or

mathematical precision and divide the branches

individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the

into waterlight compartments, were it ever so

underprivileged.

desirable to do so, which I am far from

believing that it is, or that the Constitution
requires.

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting

the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope
of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges

them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384

should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain

US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo

cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the

vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under

courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may

custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel

degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone,

and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him

Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice

against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession

Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf

from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of

Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said

Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20,

Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the

Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order

power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or

adherents were critical of the activism of the American

decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples

Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the

holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes

double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial

are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-

decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double

equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to

jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260,

public parks and public buses.

261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in

Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense
is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill
of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in
the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs.
Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case
of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes
equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the
case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294),

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing

principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted
in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a
conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting
maternity leave to working women-according primacy to
property rights over human rights. The case of People vs.
Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US
45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing
against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of
due process to protect property rights as against human rights
or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum
hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated
finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300

US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court

jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers

upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of

and political questions and invoking American precedents.

guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working

hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for
women employees.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973

Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court
the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of

legislative enactment or executive act.

powers as well as the rule on political questions have been

evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial
decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller,
307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US
210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF

DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against

PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO

judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the

THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S

case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of

COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO

political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There

COSTS.

is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions

expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by
the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on
political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs.

Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.

Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Reyes had said:

Separate Opinions

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not

damages. This argument is but a play on words.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

The term compensation' is used in the law (Act

3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of

indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of

for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or

five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the

in the course of employment. ...

general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,

however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law",

is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in

not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint

Title XVIII-Damages that:

involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to

the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND

Compensation

OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH,

INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled

SPECIAL LAWS.

to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options

cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one
will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had

already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's

B.

Compensation Act, and they have already received

compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated
differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act
had already become a "finished transaction".

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting

opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further
add:

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners

should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under
the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the
Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in
regards to" the "election of remedies", because those
proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a
person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first
election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer
be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very
least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the
first election he has made, when he makes the second election
he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first
election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was

approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10,
1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine
legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the
law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota
and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws
of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's
Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the
Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The
following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation
Text, pp. 266, 267.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to

employee

employees in 'all industrial employment' and

employees of the territory and its political

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to

subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1,

compensation

p. 713.)
shall exclude all other rights and remedies
Compensation is not payable when injury is due

accruing to the employee, his personal

to employee's willful intention to injure himself

representatives, dependents or nearest of kin

or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,

against the employer

S.S., p. 713.)
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of
When the act is applicable the remedy

said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis

thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

supplied)

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing

Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature

provision:

worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is
that the meaning and intention of the lawmaking body must be sought, first of all in the

words of the statute itself, read and considered

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of

in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted

the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions

and most obvious significations, according to

which may be provided in the Act itself.

good and approved usage and without resorting

to forced or subtle construction Courts,
therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of
words and the rules of grammar. Consequently,
the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs.
Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is

made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus,
Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an
employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act,

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

or sue such other person for damages, in

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5

were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under
the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated
the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of
Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent

not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer

by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries

under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

received outside the Islands through accidents

happening in and during the performance of the

5. There should be no question but that the original first

paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or

duties of the employment (and all service

contracts made in the manner prescribed in this
section be presumed to include such agreement).

employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the

Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second

Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the

paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined

employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator

words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the

had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5

end of the paragraph:

such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive;
yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of

the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the
accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)

(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue

the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially)

latter be more favorable to him.

by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to

provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in

the Act or under the Civil Code.

1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without

regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with

the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense

the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably

chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689

legislating.

[1938]).
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to

trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.

have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the

part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA
772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by
50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer.
That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not
to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on
the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions
of the Civil Code.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial
accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a
radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the
principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and
not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of

the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the

himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the

present Labor Code on employees' compensation.

worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he

should discover and guard against himself.

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils

associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial

The problems associated with the application of the fellow

revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage

servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of

suits to get recompense.

contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily

raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking

damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer
was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused

system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered

employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.

by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created

not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a

solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element

host of common law defenses available to him as well. The

of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the

worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he

employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was

accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley

to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious

u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837

procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more

"the mere relation of the master and the servant never can

readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-

imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care

related injuries.

of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's

recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the

compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near

desired direction. However, employers liability legislation

certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured

proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's

worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit

compensation.

for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only

disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined
amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain
cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not
receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he
could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required
to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative
agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming
mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation
system, individual workers who may want to sue for big
amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire
working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as
follows:

An appreciation of the nature of the

officially at the employer or his agents. In most

compensation principle is essential to an

cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.

understanding of the acts and the cases

The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers

interpreting them.

of the victim, were torn between friendship or

loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear

By the turn of the century it was apparent that

the toll of industrial accidents of both the
avoidable and unavoidable variety had become
enormous, and government was faced with the
problem of who was to pay for the human
wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern
industry. If the accident was avoidable and
could be attributed to the carelessness of the
employer, existing tort principles offered some
measure of redress. Even here, however, the
woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of
torts litigation in court placed the employee at a

of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The

expense and delay of litigation often prompted
the injured employee to accept a compromise
settlement for a fraction of the full value of his
claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted,
a large share of the proceeds of the judgment
were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.
Thus the employer against whom judgment was
cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while
only a part of this enured to the benefit of the
injured employee or his dependents. The
employee's judgment was nearly always too
little and too late.

substantial disadvantage. So long as liability

depended on fault there could be no recovery
until the finger of blame had been pointed

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the

advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by

economic principle that those persons who

reason of the general adoption of the

enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in

compensation principle.

the form of goods or services- should ultimately

bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...

In order that the compensation principle may

operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost
be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that

xxx xxx xxx

will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the

product of the industry affected. Thus

Under this approach the element of personal

fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic

predictability and moderateness of cost are

necessary from the broad economic
viewpoint. ....

considerations. The employer absorbs the cost

of accident loss only initially; it is expected that

Compensation, then, differs from the

this cost will eventually pass down the stream of

conventional damage suit in two important

commerce in the form of increase price until it is

respects: Fault on the part of either employer or

spread in dilution among the ultimate

employee is eliminated; and compensation

consumers. So long as each competing unit in a

payable according to a definitely limited

given industry is uniformly affected, no

schedule is substituted for damages. All

producer can gain any substantial competitive

compensation acts alike work these two major

changes, irrespective of how they may differ in

are matters concerning which the acts differ

other particulars.

considerably. The interpretation of any

compensation statute will be influenced greatly

Compensation, when regarded from the

viewpoint of employer and employee represents
a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to
society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not
at fault, and the employee surrenders his former
right to full damages and accepts instead a more
modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of
compensation cannot be overemphasized. The
statutes vary a great deal with reference to the
proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the
period during which compensation is to be paid

by the court's reaction to the basic point of

compromise established in the Act. If the court
feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way,
a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme
conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly
favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the
courts that employers can have little reason to
complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent
conflict in compensation decisions throughout
the various jurisdictions must be attributed to
this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's
Compensation American Casebook Series, pp.
63-65).

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the

employee by reason of a personal injury

trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in

other rights and remedies accruing to the

to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious

employee, his personal representatives,

with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be

dependents or nearest of kin against the

followed.

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

because of said injury. ...

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a

spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.

For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and
allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.
Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's
compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to
receive employment compensation, can still elect to file
damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this
reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which reads:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless

otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of
the employer to the employee his dependents or
anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on
behalf of the employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a
matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If

employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of

Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get

five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the

insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The

general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,

issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the

however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It

poor victims and their families. All workers covered by

is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in

workmen's compensation and all employers who employ

Title XVIII-Damages that:

covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest

sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND

OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH,
INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY
SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs.
Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.

Separate Opinions

Reyes had said:

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

damages. This argument is but a play on words.

The term compensation' is used in the law (Act

3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of

indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded

for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or

Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in

in the course of employment. ...

regards to" the "election of remedies", because those

proceedings had become a "finished transaction".

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law",

not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a

involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to

person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first

the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's

election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer

Compensation

be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very

least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled

to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options
cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one

first election he has made, when he makes the second election

he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first
election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had

already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's

B.

Compensation Act, and they have already received

compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated
differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act
had already become a "finished transaction".

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting

opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further
add:

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners

should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under
the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to

approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10,

employees in 'all industrial employment' and

1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

employees of the territory and its political

subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1,

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine

p. 713.)

legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the

law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota

Compensation is not payable when injury is due

and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws

to employee's willful intention to injure himself

of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's

or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,

Compensation Act, p. 2]

S.S., p. 713.)

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the

When the act is applicable the remedy

Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The

thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation

Text, pp. 266, 267.

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our

Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 112. Hawaii

worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The
rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to

to forced or subtle construction Courts,

compensation

therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of

shall exclude all other rights and remedies

accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of

words and the rules of grammar. Consequently,

the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs.
Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis

supplied)

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing

provision:

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is

that the meaning and intention of the lawmaking body must be sought, first of all in the
words of the statute itself, read and considered
in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted
and most obvious significations, according to
good and approved usage and without resorting

received outside the Islands through accidents

happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of
the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions
which may be provided in the Act itself.

4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is

5. There should be no question but that the original first

made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus,

paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

Section 6, in part, provides:

formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or

employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an

employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act,
or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5
were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under

Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil

Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the
employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator
had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5
such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive;
yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated
the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries

received outside the Islands through accidents

happening in and during the performance of the

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in

duties of the employment (and all service

1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without

contracts made in the manner prescribed in this

regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of

section be presumed to include such agreement).

the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense

chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second

[1938]).

paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined

words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to

end of the paragraph:

have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the

part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of

the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the
accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory
character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so
desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph
of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue
the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the
latter be more favorable to him.

employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA
772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by
50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer.
That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not
to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on
the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions
of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially)
by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to

provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils

the Act or under the Civil Code.

associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial

revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with

suits to get recompense.

the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably

legislating.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking

damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the

trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused
by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ
not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial

host of common law defenses available to him as well. The

accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a

worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he

radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions

accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley

of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the

u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837

principles evolved in the long history of workmen's

"the mere relation of the master and the servant never can

compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and

imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care

not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of

of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of

the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the

himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the

present Labor Code on employees' compensation.

worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he

should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being

servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of

recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the

contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily

desired direction. However, employers liability legislation

raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a

proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's

system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered

compensation.

employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in

order to be compensated.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's

compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created

certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured

solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element

worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit

of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the

for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only

employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was

disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined

to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious

amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain

procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more

cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not

readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-

receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he

related injuries.

could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required

to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative
agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming
mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation
system, individual workers who may want to sue for big

amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire

manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of

working class.

torts litigation in court placed the employee at a

substantial disadvantage. So long as liability

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as

follows:

depended on fault there could be no recovery

until the finger of blame had been pointed

An appreciation of the nature of the

compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases
interpreting them.

officially at the employer or his agents. In most

cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers
of the victim, were torn between friendship or
loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear

By the turn of the century it was apparent that

of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The

the toll of industrial accidents of both the

expense and delay of litigation often prompted

avoidable and unavoidable variety had become

the injured employee to accept a compromise

enormous, and government was faced with the

settlement for a fraction of the full value of his

problem of who was to pay for the human

claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted,

wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern

a large share of the proceeds of the judgment

industry. If the accident was avoidable and

were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.

could be attributed to the carelessness of the

Thus the employer against whom judgment was

employer, existing tort principles offered some

cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while

measure of redress. Even here, however, the

only a part of this enured to the benefit of the

woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was

injured employee or his dependents. The

employee's judgment was nearly always too

spread in dilution among the ultimate

little and too late.

consumers. So long as each competing unit in a

given industry is uniformly affected, no
xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the

economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in
the form of goods or services- should ultimately
bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx

producer can gain any substantial competitive

advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may
operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost
be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that
will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the
product of the industry affected. Thus

Under this approach the element of personal

predictability and moderateness of cost are

fault either disappears entirely or is

necessary from the broad economic

subordinated to broader economic

viewpoint. ....

considerations. The employer absorbs the cost

of accident loss only initially; it is expected that
this cost will eventually pass down the stream of
commerce in the form of increase price until it is

Compensation, then, differs from the

conventional damage suit in two important
respects: Fault on the part of either employer or

employee is eliminated; and compensation

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the

payable according to a definitely limited

proper point of balance. The amount of weekly

schedule is substituted for damages. All

compensation payments and the length of the

compensation acts alike work these two major

period during which compensation is to be paid

changes, irrespective of how they may differ in

are matters concerning which the acts differ

other particulars.

considerably. The interpretation of any

compensation statute will be influenced greatly

Compensation, when regarded from the

viewpoint of employer and employee represents
a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to
society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not
at fault, and the employee surrenders his former
right to full damages and accepts instead a more
modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of
compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

by the court's reaction to the basic point of

compromise established in the Act. If the court
feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way,
a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme
conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly
favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the
courts that employers can have little reason to
complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent
conflict in compensation decisions throughout

the various jurisdictions must be attributed to

compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to

this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's

receive employment compensation, can still elect to file

Compensation American Casebook Series, pp.

damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this

63-65).

reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

which reads:

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the

compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been

employee by reason of a personal injury

carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious

other rights and remedies accruing to the

with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be

employee, his personal representatives,

followed.

dependents or nearest of kin against the

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a

because of said injury. ...

spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without

touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and

allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.
Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless

otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of

the employer to the employee his dependents or

sickness due to the failure of the to comply with

anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on

any law, or with any order, rule or regulation of

behalf of the employee or his dependents.

the Workmen's Compensation Commission or

the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a

matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If
employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance
Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The
issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the
poor victims and their families. All workers covered by
workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest
sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

Footnotes
1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.In case of the employee's death, injury or

employer violate the provisions of Republic Act

Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its
amendments or fail to install and maintain safety
appliances, or take other precautions for the
prevention of accidents or occupational disease,
he shall be liable to pay an additional
compensation equal to fifty per centum of the
compensation fixed in this Act.

to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down

Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial Legislation

specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of

Republic v. CA and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, 13 February

Article 36 of the Family Code.

1997
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
PANGANIBAN, J.:

challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new

ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void

14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La

Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the

meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case

The Facts

ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers

find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and

irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted

spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he

that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband

squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid

and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and

and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to

frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of

their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that

insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their

sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job

marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital

in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole

duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run

breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had

the household and handle their finances.

a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship

was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were

stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married
on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;

with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature

and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself

2. That out of their marriage, a child named

as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best

Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July

interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order

29, 1986;

to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible

marriage from the start.

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more

than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her

The Issue

and her child;

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
5. That the respondent is not asking for

Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the

damages;

phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of

the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to

6. That the common child of the parties is in the

custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.

the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of
one spouse indicative of how he or she regards

the marital union, his or her personal

incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply

relationship with the other spouse, as well as his

the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their

or her conduct in the long haul for the

responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological

attainment of the principal objectives of

nature which renders them incapable of performing such

marriage. If said conduct, observed and

marital responsibilities and duties."

considered as a whole, tends to cause the union

to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

reason to leave the spouses to their individual

fates.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking

thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge

committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)

incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and

presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she

(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear

showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some

juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony

of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8

marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable

differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

COURT

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove

that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the
Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the
marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is

existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort

also living with another woman.

was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial

impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's

Q Is it also the stand of the

psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each
other but they are
psychologically fit with other

part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part

of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

parties?
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they
psychologically unfit for their

merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and

jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite

professions?

two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

The Court has no

more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the

Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral

argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

written memoranda.

and the family and emphasizes the permanence,

inviolability and solidarity

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the

following guidelines in the interpretation and application of

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,

guidance of the bench and the bar:

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in

the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family,

11

recognizing it "as the foundation

of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"

thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.

incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its

manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of

the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I

marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood

do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable

changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted

at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such

as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright

moment, or prior thereto.

incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much

less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in

the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the

assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced

related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or

by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the

employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in

husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the

diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to

same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-

cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to

complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the

procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential

petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the

obligation of marriage.

decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our

religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,

courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code

the State and the Church while remaining independent,

Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of

separate and apart from each other shall walk together in

Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which

synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and

provides:

cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the

nation.
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal

essential obligations of marriage due to causes

and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No

of psychological nature. 14

decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General

issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or

opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already

given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends

ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more

crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the

cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.

20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was

psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge
the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present
case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the

SO ORDERED.

basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,

but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological

Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to

say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a

judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld

petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the

incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the

mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of

parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but

vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under

a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them

Art. 45 of the Family Code.

incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and

duties.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,

understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly

the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological

on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the

incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or

provision in question underwent revisions.

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is

not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness."

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision

read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even

if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after

capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are

the celebration.

lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological

incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the

do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to

marriage." 1

session was over:

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser

degree.

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital

obligations, even if such lack or incapacity

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

becomes manifest after the celebration.

"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz

opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained
that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of

an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not

canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect

in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for

marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is

the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such

incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

2. reasons of public policy;

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or

3. special cases and special

even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily

situations.

absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered
the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban
B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question
of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility
that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed

under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.

Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa

suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the

remarry.

time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until

annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining

void marriages, viz:

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of

essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage as
contract;

beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed

provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds

in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be

of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and

dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated

practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal

marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be

provisions of Canon Law.

nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full

tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by

of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the

Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the

essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what

parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for

is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by

nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid

any party who, at the time of the celebration, was

down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

number of married couples have found themselves in limbo

marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under

state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law

contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their

validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such

intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When

anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee

the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually

decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological

incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the

ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in

1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as

existent from the beginning.

homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a

broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to
be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'

psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned

for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability
to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means

that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion

the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack

of a psychological expert became increasingly important in

of due competence means that the person was incapable of

such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and

carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made

after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they

during the wedding ceremony.

were asked to give professional opinions about a party's

mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to

lack of valid consent.

all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or

both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2

obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely

cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according
to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and

support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment

ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital

precluding conjugal communion even with the

capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in

best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic

reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability

to fulfill marital obligations are the following:

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)

(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental

lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx

financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope

with the ordinary stresses and strains of

The psychological grounds are the best

marriage, etc.

approach for anyone who doubts whether he or

she has a case for an annulment on any other

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the

psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

terms. A situation that does not fit into any of

the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are,

for more then five years is not proof of her psychological

experts are already detecting a shift in their use.

incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art.

Whereas originally the emphasis was on the

36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and

parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at

subsisting.

the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),

recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at
the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of
someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered
into. 4

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of

Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,
after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus
with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her
husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of

end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court

the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological

to declare the marriage null.

incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in

the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding

Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic

Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

concluded:

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity

(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
If a spouse, although physically capable but

of the spouses.

simply refuses to perform his or her essential

marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,

shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion
The Revision Committee, constituted under the

of judgment concerning essential matrimonial

auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the

rights and duties, to be given and accepted

Code explained:

mutually;

(T)he Committee would like the judge to

3. who for causes of psychological nature are

interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,

unable to assume the essential obligations of

guided by experience, the findings of experts

marriage

and researchers in psychological disciplines, and

by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

that should give that much value to Canon Law

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that
the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are

with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds

incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that

would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage

merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for

covenants that concomitantly must be assumed

legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various

and discharged by the parties to the marriage

circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law

which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the

were indifferent on the matter.

Family Code, include their mutual obligations to

live together, observe love, respect and fidelity

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos

vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital

and render help and support. There is hardly any

doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality

or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage

the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,

contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family

respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the

marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the
marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.

possibility of these various circumstances being

themselves, depending on the degree and

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has

severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological

envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as

incapacity. 4

another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also

put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for

then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;

remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language
its unequivocal command on how the State should regard

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the

inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge

marriage and the family, thus

Section 2, Article XV:

for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:

by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such

that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than
by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of

expediency or convenience, but one that demands a

family life and shall protect and strengthen the

meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

family as a basic autonomous social

institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-

Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA

parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but

20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was

a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them

psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge

incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and

the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present

duties.

case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar

conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,

the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals

mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of

which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld

vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under

petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and

Art. 45 of the Family Code.

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to

understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital

on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the

obligations, even if such lack or incapacity

provision in question underwent revisions.

becomes manifest after the celebration.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

read:

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of

reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically

marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained

that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect
in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser

the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban

degree.

B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question

of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as

agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility

that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.

"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice

Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining

psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

void marriages, viz:

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for

1. lack of one or more of the

the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such

essential requisites of marriage as

incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

contract;

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or

even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special
situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons

under "special cases and special situations," hence its

are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because

special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as

of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the

finally enacted.

essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what

is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

any party who, at the time of the celebration, was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be

provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds

dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated

of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and

marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be

practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal

nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full

provisions of Canon Law.

tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by

combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required

Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the

persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid

parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for

consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not

nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid

ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and

down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a

Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that

number of married couples have found themselves in limbo

internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to

freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic

be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but

Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under

related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'

state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons

and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means

contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such

anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological

of due competence means that the person was incapable of

carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.

incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a

ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the

existent from the beginning.

1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as

homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a

broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for

psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid

consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in

annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to

persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the

the advances made in psychology during the past

marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of

decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-

revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious

important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and

willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for

premarital causes.

what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept

proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability
to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion

understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give

of a psychological expert became increasingly important in

valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume

such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and

the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now

after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they

considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial

were asked to give professional opinions about a party's

consent. 2

mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely

challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this

both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential

area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for

obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely

cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the

necessary to the mature marital relationship:

community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.

lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according

The courts consider the following elements

crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal

relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment

support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the

precluding conjugal communion even with the

ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital

best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic

capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in

factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability

reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

to fulfill marital obligations are the following:

(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental

lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral

responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack

values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual

of due competence). An advantage to using the

has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the

ground of lack of due competence is that the at

inadequate personality where personal responses

the time the marriage was entered into civil

consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.

divorce and breakup of the family almost is of

someone's failure out marital responsibilities as

xxx xxx xxx

promised at the time the marriage was entered

into. 4

The psychological grounds are the best

approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of

the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband
for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art.
36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and

the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological

attribute the causes to psychological incapacity

incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,

than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and

after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus

protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological

with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to

incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a

the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to

spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her

prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her

spouse is considered a sign of psychological

husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to

incapacity.

procreate children based on the universal principle that

procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:

We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

If a spouse, although physically capable but

simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity

(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to

interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio

V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified

guided by experience, the findings of experts

and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. 1

by the Family Code. Thus

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party

Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

who, at the time of the celebration, was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are

the essential marital obligations of marriage,

incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the
auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the
Code explained:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological

unable to assume the essential obligations of

incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not

marriage

been meant to comprehend all such possible

cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by

that should give that much value to Canon Law

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that
the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along
with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.

some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low

intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos

doubt that the intendment of the law has been to

vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:

confine the meaning of "psychological

incapacity" to the most serious cases of

possibility of these various circumstances being

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an

themselves, depending on the degree and

utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to

severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological

have sexual relations with the other. This

incapacity. 4

conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the

Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for

then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge
the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the

during the marriage, they become mere grounds

marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the

for legal separation under Article 55 of the

marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Family Code. These provisions of the Code,

however, do not necessarily preclude the

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of

incurable.

family life and shall protect and strengthen the

family as a basic autonomous social

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has

institution . . . .

envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as

another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also

Section 1, Article XV:

put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still

remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language
its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family

as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but
for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such

institution, is the foundation of the family and

that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than

shall be protected by the State.

by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the

constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been

Section 12, Article II:

meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere

expediency or convenience, but one that demands a

on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads as

meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in

How must legislative intent be ascertained?

the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the

Aisporna v. CA, G.R. No. L-39419 12 April 1982

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did

DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks
the reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1in CA-G.R.
No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiffappellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City
Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found
the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to
pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or
procurement of an application for insurance by
soliciting therefor the application of one
Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized
insurance company, registered under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the
issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy
No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not
exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said

Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of

accused having first secured a certificate of

Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act

authority to act as such agent from the office of

the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the

of private prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo

Philippines.

with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for

having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are
quoted hereunder:

acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance

by soliciting therefore the application of one
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla
Compaa de Seguros, ... without said accused

IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that

having first secured a certificate of authority to

since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969,

act as such agent from the office of the

appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was

Insurance Commission, Republic of the

duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent

Philippines."

to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to

expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at
Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh.
D was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period
of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana
M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy, and
for reasons not explained in record, present
information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance

and in the trial, People presented evidence that

was hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy
was issued with active participation of appellant
wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her
defense sought to show that being the wife of
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in
his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a
renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time,

her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left

In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner

a note on top of her husband's desk to renew ...

assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by the

appellate court:

Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as

charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a

ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF

violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance

COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL

Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October 22,

ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY

1974. 5

THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189

OF THE INSURANCE ACT.

In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved,

without giving due course to this instant petition, to require the

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the

ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO

comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent,

EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted

SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S

that petitioner may not be considered as having violated

GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner

submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor General, on behalf of
the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on
May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN
PETITIONER.
We find the petition meritorious.

The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be

procurement of applications for insurance, or

convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189

receive for services in obtaining new insurance,

of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph

any commission or other compensation from

of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine

any insurance company doing business in the

whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the

Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first

aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance

procuring a certificate of authority so to act

agent found on its second paragraph.

from the Insurance Commissioner, which must

be renewed annually on the first day of January,

The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act

reads as follows:
No insurance company doing business within
the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof,
shall pay any commission or other
compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance, unless such person
shall have first procured from the Insurance
Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as
an agent of such company as hereinafter
provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker in the solicitation of

or within six months thereafter. Such certificate

shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner
only upon the written application of persons
desiring such authority, such application being
approved and countersigned by the company
such person desires to represent, and shall be
upon a form approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, giving such information as he
may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall
have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to
revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No
such certificate shall be valid, however, in any
event after the first day of July of the year

following the issuing of such certificate.

business of insurance, the Insurance

Renewal certificates may be issued upon the

Commissioner shall immediately revoke the

application of the company.

certificate of authority issued to him and no

such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such

Any person who for compensation solicits or

convicted person.

obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance

company, or transmits for a person other than

A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the

himself an application for a policy of insurance

first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent,

to or from such company or offers or assumes to

sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of

act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be

applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate

an insurance agent within the intent of this

of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while

section, and shall thereby become liable to all

its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within

the duties, requirements, liabilities, and

the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph

penalties to which an agent of such company is

thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

subject.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is
Any person or company violating the provisions

prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of

of this section shall be fined in the sum of five

the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus

hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person

acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the
commission of any offense connected with the

... it can no longer be denied that it was

appellant's most active endeavors that resulted
in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and

then acting as agent, and received the pay

such company is subject.

thereof her defense that she was only acting

paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance

as helper of her husband can no longer be

Law,

sustained, neither her point that she received no

compensation for issuance of the policy because

now it is true that information does not even

allege that she had obtained the insurance,

any person who for

for compensation

compensation solicits or obtains

insurance on behalf of any
insurance company or transmits
for a person other than himself an
application for a policy of
insurance to or from such
company or offers or assumes to

which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of

the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but
what appellant apparently overlooks is that she
is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st
paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided
that,

act in the negotiating of such

insurance, shall be an insurance

No person shall act as agent, sub-

agent within the intent of this

agent, or broker, in the

section, and shall thereby become

solicitation or procurement of

liable to all the duties,

applications for insurance, or

requirements, liabilities, and

receive for services in obtaining

penalties, to which an agent of

new insurance any commission

or other compensation from any

agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation,

insurance company doing

but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person

business in the Philippine Island,

solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an

or agent thereof, without first

insurance agent.

procuring a certificate of
authority to act from the
insurance commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the
first day of January, or within six
months thereafter.

We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by

the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to
define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its
second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of

therefore, there was no technical defect in the

an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence

wording of the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4

must be overruled. 12
Any person who for compensation ... shall be
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate

an insurance agent within the intent of this

court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent

section, ...

under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to

the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph.
Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the
second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance

Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second

paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the
other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph
of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended

to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third

enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More

paragraphs of the aforesaid section.

importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a

Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second

paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be

statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of

various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated. 17

ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The

particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found

detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part

in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent

of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any

mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by

of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A

the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first

statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to

paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has

all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law,

established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not

it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single

receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance

part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases,

policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused was

clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view

convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the

of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be

receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not

interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every

an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of

part of the statute must be considered together with the other

Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole

We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article

After going over the records of this case, We are fully

689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or

convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did

indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate

not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing

to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either
directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen
vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled
Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and

the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while

acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance

Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez,

contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the

Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the

negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused
could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence
that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved. 20

Plana, J., took no part.

Republic v. CA and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, 13 February

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new

1997

ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to

assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological

PANGANIBAN, J.:

incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been

swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers
find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition
to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May

14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La

in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole

Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent

breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had

Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on

a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship

the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of

was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her

the Family Code.

job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job

and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying
with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best
interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted
that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital

duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run

6. That the common child of the parties is in the

the household and handle their finances.

custody of the petitioner wife.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own

stipulated:

testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria

Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
1. That the parties herein were legally married
on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;

and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio

General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her

and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for
damages;

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of

the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to

marriage. If said conduct, observed and

the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended

considered as a whole, tends to cause the union

"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the

to self-destruct because it defeats the very

world which is anathema to our culture."

objectives of marriage, then there is enough

reason to leave the spouses to their individual

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court

fates.

relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage

between the parties broke up because of their opposing and

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge

conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that

committed no indiscretion in analyzing and

"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as

deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We

Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil

find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and

laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

conclusions thus made.

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of

psychologically incapacity as a broad range of

the Court of Appeals.

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of

one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological

nature which renders them incapable of performing such

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear

marital responsibilities and duties."

showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an

incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some

marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove

thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological

that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)

married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to

incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the

be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor

intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of

physical) illness.

'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she

and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony
of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8
COURT

Q It is therefore the

A Yes, Your Honor.

recommendation of the
Q Neither are they

psychiatrist based on your

psychologically unfit for their

findings that it is better for the

professions?

Court to annul (sic) the

marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no

more questions.

Q There is no hope for the

marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is
also living with another woman.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged

personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial

Q Is it also the stand of the

impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's

psychiatrist that the parties are

part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part

psychologically unfit for each

of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of

other but they are

antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows

psychologically fit with other

love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the

parties?

beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor

jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family

of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against

Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts

its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both

interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite

our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage

two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.

and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an

Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National

entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the

thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the

Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this

parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by

occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their

the state.

informative and interesting discussions during the oral

argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with
written memoranda.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the

following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its

manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The

absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not

evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of

necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the

Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the

person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,

assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not

or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption

related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or

thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given

employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in

here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the

diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to

principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause

cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to

must be identified as a psychological illness and its

procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential

incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given

obligation of marriage.

qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of

the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that

marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood

the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I

changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted

do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable

as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright

at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such

incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much

moment, or prior thereto.

less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening

disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be

the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the

person from really accepting and thereby complying with the

The following are incapable of contracting

obligations essential to marriage.

marriage: Those who are unable to assume the

essential obligations of marriage due to causes

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced

of psychological nature. 14

by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the

husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of

complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the

our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such

petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the

harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to

decision.

decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our

law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

should also be decreed civilly void.

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous

Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of

religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,

Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which

the State and the Church while remaining independent,

provides:

separate and apart from each other shall walk together in

synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,

and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No

Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General

issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor

General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice

Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already

crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the

ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more

case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-

cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA

20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.

psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge

the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present
case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations

but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is

incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to

not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their

say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial

responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential

judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the

that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to

appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its

some psychological (not physical) illness."

own judgment for that of the trial court.

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the

mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals

which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld

vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under

Art. 45 of the Family Code.

petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil

incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the

Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to

parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but

understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly

a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them

on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the

incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and

provision in question underwent revisions.

duties.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,
the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or

read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party

marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained

who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting

that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties

in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to

vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of

understand the essential nature of marriage or

appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect

was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to

in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable

discharge the essential marital obligations, even

marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is

if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after

capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are

the celebration.

lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological

incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the

do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to

marriage." 1

session was over:

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser

degree.

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital

obligations, even if such lack or incapacity

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

becomes manifest after the celebration.

"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz

opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or

an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not

canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said

that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered

"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice

the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban

Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be

B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question

psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa

agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for

the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily

that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity

becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.

absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons

under "special cases and special situations," hence its

are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because

special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as

of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the

finally enacted.

essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what

is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

any party who, at the time of the celebration, was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be

provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds

dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated

of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and

marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be

practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal

nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full

provisions of Canon Law.

tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by

combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required

Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the

persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid

parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for

consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not

nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid

ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and

down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a

Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that

number of married couples have found themselves in limbo

internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to

freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic

be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but

Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under

related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'

state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons

and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means

contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such

anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological

of due competence means that the person was incapable of

carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.

incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a

ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the

existent from the beginning.

1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as

homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a

broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for

psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid

consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in

annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to

persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the

the advances made in psychology during the past

marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of

decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-

revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious

important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and

willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for

premarital causes.

what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept

proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability
to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion

understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give

of a psychological expert became increasingly important in

valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume

such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and

the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now

after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they

considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial

were asked to give professional opinions about a party's

consent. 2

mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely

challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this

both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential

area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for

obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely

cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the

necessary to the mature marital relationship:

community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.

lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according

The courts consider the following elements

crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal

relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment

support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the

precluding conjugal communion even with the

ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital

best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic

capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in

factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability

reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

to fulfill marital obligations are the following:

(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental

lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral

responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack

values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual

of due competence). An advantage to using the

has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the

ground of lack of due competence is that the at

inadequate personality where personal responses

the time the marriage was entered into civil

consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.

divorce and breakup of the family almost is of

someone's failure out marital responsibilities as

xxx xxx xxx

promised at the time the marriage was entered

into. 4

The psychological grounds are the best

approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of

the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband
for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art.
36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and

the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological

attribute the causes to psychological incapacity

incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,

than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and

after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus

protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological

with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to

incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a

the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to

spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her

prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her

spouse is considered a sign of psychological

husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to

incapacity.

procreate children based on the universal principle that

procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:

We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

If a spouse, although physically capable but

simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity

(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio

and researchers in psychological disciplines, and

V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the

by decisions of church tribunals which, although

guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the

not binding on the civil courts, may be given

proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209

persuasive effect since the provision was taken

("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term

from Canon Law. 1

"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified

by the Family Code. Thus

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from

Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are

incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion

of judgment concerning essential matrimonial

The Revision Committee, constituted under the

auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the

rights and duties, to be given and accepted

mutually;

Code explained:
3. who for causes of psychological nature are
(T)he Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts

unable to assume the essential obligations of

marriage

that should give that much value to Canon Law

cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and

some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low

construction of the statutory enactment. 2

intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.

. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that

the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along
with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:

and construed independently of, but must stand

in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological

incapacity" to the most serious cases of

incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an

been meant to comprehend all such possible

utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to

have sexual relations with the other. This

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the

conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the

inception of marriage, like the state of a party

Family Code which considers children

being of unsound mind or concealment of drug

conceived prior to the judicial declaration of

addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality

nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage

contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for
then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not

reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The

physical, in nature;

fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language

its unequivocal command on how the State should regard

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the

marriage and the family, thus

inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge

the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,

Section 2, Article XV:

respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the

institution, is the foundation of the family and

marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the

shall be protected by the State.

marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Section 12, Article II:
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has

family as a basic autonomous social

envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as

institution . . . .

another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also

put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively

promote its total development. (The 1987

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice

Constitution)

Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.

As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but
for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless
by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such
that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than
by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends

crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA
20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge
the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present
case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial

Separate Opinions

judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals

mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of

which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld

vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under

petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and

Art. 45 of the Family Code.

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,
the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly
on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally

incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to

produced the following revised provision even before the

do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to

session was over:

marriage." 1

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that

time of the celebration, was psychologically

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital

degree.

obligations, even if such lack or incapacity

becomes manifest after the celebration.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of

an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not

reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or

canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said

marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained

that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as

that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties

"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice

vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of

Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be

appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect

psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable

marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for

the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or

even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily

3. special cases and special

absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

situations.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed

the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban

under "special cases and special situations," hence its

B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question

special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as

of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa

finally enacted.

agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility

that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining

void marriages, viz:

annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of

1. lack of one or more of the

essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;

essential requisites, some marriages are void from the

beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds

of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and

dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated

practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal

marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be

provisions of Canon Law.

nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full

tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by

of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the

Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the

essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what

parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for

is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by

nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid

any party who, at the time of the celebration, was

down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

number of married couples have found themselves in limbo

marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under

state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law

contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their

validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such

intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When

anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee

the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually

decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological

declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed

incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a

in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be

ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the

existent from the beginning.

1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as

homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to
be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'
and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means

broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for

psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability
to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion

of due competence means that the person was incapable of

of a psychological expert became increasingly important in

carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made

such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and

during the wedding ceremony.

after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they

were asked to give professional opinions about a party's

mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to

lack of valid consent.

all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or

both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2

obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely

cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according
to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and

support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment

ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital

precluding conjugal communion even with the

capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in

best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic

reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability

to fulfill marital obligations are the following:

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)

(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental

lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx

financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope

with the ordinary stresses and strains of

The psychological grounds are the best

marriage, etc.

approach for anyone who doubts whether he or

she has a case for an annulment on any other

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the

psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

terms. A situation that does not fit into any of

the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are,

for more then five years is not proof of her psychological

experts are already detecting a shift in their use.

incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art.

Whereas originally the emphasis was on the

36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and

parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at

subsisting.

the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),

recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at
the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of
someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered
into. 4

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of

Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,
after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus
with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her
husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of

end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court

the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological

to declare the marriage null.

incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in

the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding

Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic

Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

concluded:

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity

(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
If a spouse, although physically capable but

of the spouses.

simply refuses to perform his or her essential

marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless

VITUG, J., concurring:

and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals

attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
We declared:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio

V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in

psychologically incapacitated to comply with

which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of

the essential marital obligations of marriage,

unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can

shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

appellate court.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion

auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the

of judgment concerning essential matrimonial

Code explained:

rights and duties, to be given and accepted

mutually;

(T)he Committee would like the judge to

interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,

3. who for causes of psychological nature are

guided by experience, the findings of experts

unable to assume the essential obligations of

and researchers in psychological disciplines, and

marriage

by decisions of church tribunals which, although

not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

that should give that much value to Canon Law

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that
the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are

incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along

incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds

enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage

merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various

circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law

which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the

were indifferent on the matter.

Family Code, include their mutual obligations to

live together, observe love, respect and fidelity

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos

3

vs. Court of Appeals; viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage

and render help and support. There is hardly any

doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family

Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the

lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only

marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the

during the marriage, they become mere grounds

marriage may occur only thereafter; and

for legal separation under Article 55 of the

Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for
then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and

incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as
another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also
put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not

fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language

physical, in nature;

its unequivocal command on how the State should regard

marriage and the family, thus

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the

inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge
the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless

institution, is the foundation of the family and

by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such

shall be protected by the State.

that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than
by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social

constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been

meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:

When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?

Floresca v. Philex Mining, G.R. No. L-30642 30 April 1985

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family

as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)

ERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of

the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and
ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA,
JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA,

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be

JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;

significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but
for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO,

ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf

DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR.,

MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA
SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and

vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P.
MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own
behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,

MAKASIAR, J.:

ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and

AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of

First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16,
1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who,
while working at its copper mines underground operations at

Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in

column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby

that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the

exerting tremendous pressure on the working

complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules

spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on

and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the

the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,

required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men

with the collapse of all underground supports

working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:

due to such enormous pressure, approximately

500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud

xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June
28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and
reckless negligence and imprudence and
deliberate failure to take the required
precautions for the due protection of the lives of
its men working underground at the time, and in
utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the
Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an
open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1
which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft.

and water, accompanied by surface boulders,

blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped
timber supports and carried off materials,
machines and equipment which blocked all
avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its
tunnels of all its men above referred to,
including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were
then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on
the said date, five (5) were able to escape from

the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within

protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact

the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,

that it had vast financial resources, it having

including those referred to in paragraph 7

made, during the year 1966 alone, a total

hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,

operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net

notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great

earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per

many of them were still alive, entombed in the

its llth Annual Report for the year ended

tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to

December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets

defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue

totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,

operations, in utter disregard of its bounden

1966;

legal and moral duties in the premises;

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated
the law and the rules and regulations duly
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
as set out by the Special Committee above
referred to, in their Report of investigation,
pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed
completely to provide its men working
underground the necessary security for the

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex

alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an
industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA
772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated
May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the
causes of action are not based on the provisions of the

Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary

damages, particularly:

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton

attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damages which may be reasonably attributed to

damage to another, there being fault or

the non-performance of the obligation.

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage

done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre- existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to
1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages

may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent
Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case
on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners'

(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the

motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge,

obligor consists in the omission of that diligence

on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of

which is required by the nature of the obligation

June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the

and corresponds with the circumstances of the

complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order

persons, of the time and of the place. When

which was opposed by petitioners.

negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of

Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN

for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the

DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-

established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation

PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF

Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or

JURISDICTION.

compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of

II

workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the

employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING

negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the

TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION

employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's

BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50%

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS

of the compensation fixed in the Act.

FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of
errors:

A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower

court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the

complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on
damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and
2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges

gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries

take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its

are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5

employees working underground. They also assert that since

and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the

allegations in their complaint including those contained in the
annexes are deemed admitted.

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the

other rights and remedies accruing to the

claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation

employee, his personal representatives,

Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of

dependents or nearest of kin against the

Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss

because of said injury ...

resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man

through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the
fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for
damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the
regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and
wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and
for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same.

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's

Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims
for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil.

University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as

855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen

corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS

against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in

Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections,

the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated

formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared

by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to

as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective

appeal to the Supreme Court.

memoranda.

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent,

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of

does not remove the case from the exclusive character of

November 26, 1976, is:

recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because

Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in
case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of
safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points
out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the
petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf
of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca
who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of
damages under the Civil Code.

Whether the action of an injured employee or

worker or that of his heirs in case of his death
under the Workmen's Compensation Act is
exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say,
whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation
provided under the Workmen's Compensation
Act or whether they have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing of the

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel

worker's right under the Workmen's

Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the

Compensation Act and suing in the regular

courts under the Civil Code for higher damages

benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to

(actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the

sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher

employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of

damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the

the employer or of his other employees or

latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty.

whether they may avail cumulatively of both

Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy

actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation

provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail

under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue

themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by

in addition for damages in the regular courts.

filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and

vice versa.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of

the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee

case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages

Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

(not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act)

they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.

with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an

In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the

employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara

petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected,

believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured

it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in

accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is
selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of
his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction

to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for
compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a

complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the

contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The

total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand

provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract

(P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions

when there is fraud or bad faith, read:

of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to

compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the
complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of
and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead
alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on
the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a
consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death
of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that
in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the
nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test
is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the

court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is able shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach
of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted.

Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the
deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged
gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that
amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of

attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all

damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the

wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable

payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.

by a person who has sustained injury either in his person,

property or relative rights, through the act or default of another

The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's

(25 C.J.S. 452).

Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under

the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden

compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages,

of proving the causal relation between the defendant's

payments under the acts being made as compensation and not

negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages

as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate

suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there

the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman

is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee

and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether

that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated;

negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.

and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los

Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of

Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA

actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is

The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the

liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long

Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees

as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-

Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that

aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of

unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did

the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other

not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and

hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the

exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the

right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in

legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has

the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial

been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or

expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical

injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54

expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's

SCRA 379).

Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only

50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer
to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational
disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount
sought to be recovered is over and above that which was
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which
cannot be granted by the Commission.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured

employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection
or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's
right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act

compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who

and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities

in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside
the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort.
The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to
afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu

Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker
has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for

higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action

(case No. 44549 of the Compensation

simultaneously.

Commission) was being processed at the time he

filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It

In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz
Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured
workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in
the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
again speaking for the Court, pointed out that
the injured worker has the choice of remedies
but cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and thus balanced the relative
advantage of recourse under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.

is argued for petitioner that as the damages

recoverable under the Civil Code are much more
extensive than the amounts that may be awarded
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they
should not be deemed incompatible. As already
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free
to choose either to recover from the employer
the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law
or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While
perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity
obtainable by the first course is balanced by the
claimant's being relieved of the burden of

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra

proving the causal connection between the

cannot maintain his action for damages against

defendant's negligence and the resulting injury,

the respondents (defendants below), because he

and of having to establish the extent of the

has elected to seek compensation under the

damage suffered; issues that are apt to be

Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim

troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having

staked his fortunes on a particular remedy,

quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito

petitioner is precluded from pursuing the

Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and

alternate course, at least until the prior claim is

Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for

rejected by the Compensation Commission.

compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then

Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6

Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as

aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker

of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs

Company recovers, by derivative action against

decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.).

the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the

Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their

compensation he may have paid the herein

opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp.

petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.

121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense
that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma

(104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule
should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as
already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution
of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement
reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in
its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a

Act before they learned of the official report of the committee

created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which
report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,
1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court

because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been

justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of

remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners

Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6,

only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had

7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF

petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules

PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973

and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not

Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles

have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation

2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the

Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.

New Civil Code of 1950.

The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a

mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art.
II).

should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in

their favor.

Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor,

especially to working women, and minors, and

B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court
does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies
and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social

shall regulate the relations between landowner

and tenant, and between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to

regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the

"promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and

relations between workers and employers. The

security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition

State shall assure the rights of workers to self-

of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership

organization, collective bargaining, security of

and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social

tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment,

(emphasis supplied).

welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the

people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II,
1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and
regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and
assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions
of work"(Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the

aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be
impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173
of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on
June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor

Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the

institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973

New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on

Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in

August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of

Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as

against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The

State shall afford protection to labor, promote
full employment,ensure equal work opportunities

seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore

collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution
and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173

9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal

of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the

principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice

Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of

Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of

the workers and employees.

Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence,

Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as

enunciated:

Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to

1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides

withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes

that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the

of political controversy, to place them beyond

provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and

the reach of majorities and officials and to

regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor

establish them as legal principles to be applied

Code).

by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and

property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections (319
U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in

the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise
directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living of the laborer."

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June

employment; and all service contracts made in

20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act

the manner prescribed in this section shall be

provided:

presumed to include such agreement.

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth

employee by reason of a personal injury

Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury (emphasis supplied).

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives,

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the

dependents or nearest of kin against the

Philippine Islands for work outside the same

employer under the Civil Code and other laws,

may stipulate with such laborers that the

because of said injury.

remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply

exclusively to injuries received outside the
Islands through accidents happening in and
during the performance of the duties of the

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply to injuries received

outside the Island through accidents happening

bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in

in and during the performance of the duties of

Section 699 of the Revised Administrative

the employment. Such stipulation shall not

Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred

prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits

sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act

of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the

Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as

place where the accident occurs, should such

amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six

law be more favorable to them (As amended by

hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act

section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as

amended, and other laws whose benefits are

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly
nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code,
because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless
otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of
the employer to the employee, his dependents or
anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on
behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall

administered by the System during the period of

such payment for the same disability or death,
and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly
repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A.
No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other
laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring
to the GSIS or SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or

aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even

interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall

remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code

form a part of the legal system of the

provisions heretofore quoted.

Philippines.

It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in

for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article

People vs. Licera ruled:

173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable

under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System
provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the
"System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance
System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e]
of the New Labor Code).

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions

application or interpretation placed by the Court

of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.

upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the

enactment of the said law since the Court's

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

application or interpretation merely establishes

the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect" (65
SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume

Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by

the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18

Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

Fernando and Villamor.

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code

Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by

is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of

Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right

the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not

of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee

even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as

to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater

not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in

reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same

the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA

interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and

442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of

Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three

either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the

(3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice

Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil

guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot

pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case
penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the
Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act,
reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila
Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of
Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision

on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in
the various state constitutions of the American Union.
Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions
on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range
and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially

Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice

New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and

guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the

Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and

provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the

now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and

power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the

State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing

legislation aforementioned.

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the

property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To

relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers
arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide
safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers
against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining,
is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the
consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The
dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross
or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with
his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the
protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from
the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a

constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of
the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining
employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because
they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of
Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of
Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which
has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due
to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and

other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton

and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the

gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for

master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably

production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb

be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that

and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of

provoked the American Civil War which generated so much

live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian

hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains

shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to

and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation

that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each
one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert
otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837
case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked
by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the

human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C

era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only

ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that

continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The

the courts cannot legislate.

Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the

decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and
utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It
robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To
stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the
quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil

Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. "

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution

New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court,

likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall

in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to

pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the

fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,

Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.

like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage

Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief

all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the

Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the

human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President

Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil

Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution
foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may
have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial
legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the
Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny
(The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.).
Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even
independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash
Company, 1949 335 US 538).

reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt

the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The
Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief
Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial
legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297
U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also
entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson.
In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life,
feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all
statute books."

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under

(Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173

the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that:

of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury

"Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an

caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part

interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents

of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability.

established in those items exert an unhappy influence even

Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or

now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard

Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious

Law Review 383, 387).

liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable

negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by
the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the
workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer
remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee
whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the
employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety
measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the
employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the
epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has
outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise
word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal"

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he

pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone:
"that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular
motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204
1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government
(277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes
pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white.
Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from

one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come

It does not seem to need argument to show that

to the fundamental distinctions it is still more

however we may disguise it by veiling words

obvious that they must be received with a

we do not and cannot carry out the distinction

certain latitude or our government could not go

between legislative and executive action with

on.

mathematical precision and divide the branches

into waterlight compartments, were it ever so

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an

individual who but for such action would be free
from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do

desirable to do so, which I am far from

believing that it is, or that the Constitution
requires.

whenever they determine which of two

competing principles of policy shall prevail.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges
should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain

xxx xxx xxx

cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the

courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may
degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone,
Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice
Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf
Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said
Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the
power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or
decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples

of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the

the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases

double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial

that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such

decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double

judicial legislation has not protected public interest or

jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260,

individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the

261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in

underprivileged.

Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting

the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope
of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among
them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384

Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense

is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo

vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill

custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel

of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in

and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him

the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs.

against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession

Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).

from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of
Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order
adherents were critical of the activism of the American
Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case

of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes
equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the
case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294),

holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes

US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court

are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-

upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of

equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to

guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working

public parks and public buses.

hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for
women employees.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing

principle.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of

powers as well as the rule on political questions have been

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted

in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a
conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting
maternity leave to working women-according primacy to

evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial

decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller,
307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US
210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

property rights over human rights. The case of People vs.

Pomar is no longer the rule.

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against

judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US

45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing
against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of
due process to protect property rights as against human rights
or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum
hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated
finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300

case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of

political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There
is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions
expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by
the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on
political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine

jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

and political questions and invoking American precedents.

Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973
Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court
the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

legislative enactment or executive act.

A
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF
DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of

AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER

five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the

PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF

general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,

DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN

however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It

PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO

is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in

THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S

Title XVIII-Damages that:

COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO

COSTS.

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND

OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH,

SO ORDERED.

INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY

SPECIAL LAWS.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente,

Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs.

already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's

Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.

Compensation Act, and they have already received

Reyes had said:

compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated

differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not

had already become a "finished transaction".

damages. This argument is but a play on words.

The term compensation' is used in the law (Act

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners

3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of

should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under

indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded

the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the

for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or

Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in

in the course of employment. ...

regards to" the "election of remedies", because those

proceedings had become a "finished transaction".

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law",

not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a

involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to

person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first

the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's

election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer

Compensation

be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very

least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled

to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options
cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one
will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had

first election he has made, when he makes the second election

he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first
election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

B.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to

opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory

employees in 'all industrial employment' and

provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further

employees of the territory and its political

add:

subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1,

p. 713.)

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was

approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10,

Compensation is not payable when injury is due

1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

to employee's willful intention to injure himself

or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine

S.S., p. 713.)

legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the

law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota

When the act is applicable the remedy

and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws

thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's

Compensation Act, p. 2]

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our

Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the

Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The
following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation
Text, pp. 266, 267.

worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

words of the statute itself, read and considered

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted

employee

and most obvious significations, according to

good and approved usage and without resorting

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to

compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer

to forced or subtle construction Courts,

therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of
words and the rules of grammar. Consequently,
the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs.
Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of

said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis
supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine
Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

provision:

by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is

received outside the Islands through accidents

that the meaning and intention of the law-

happening in and during the performance of the

making body must be sought, first of all in the

duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of

not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer

the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions

under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

which may be provided in the Act itself.

5. There should be no question but that the original first
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is

paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus,

formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or

Section 6, in part, provides:

employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the

Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an

employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act,
or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5

Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the

employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator
had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5
such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive;
yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under

the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries

the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the

received outside the Islands through accidents

latter be more favorable to him.

happening in and during the performance of the

duties of the employment (and all service
contracts made in the manner prescribed in this
section be presumed to include such agreement).

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in

1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without
regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of
the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second

chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689

paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined

[1938]).

words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the

end of the paragraph:

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to

have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of

part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the

the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's

employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-

Compensation Law of the place where the

A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA

accident occurs, should such law be more

772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by

favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)

50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer.

That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory

character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so
desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph
of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue

to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on

the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions
of the Civil Code.

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially)

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial

by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to

accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a

provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under

radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions

the Act or under the Civil Code.

of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the

principles evolved in the long history of workmen's

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with

the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably
legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the
trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and

not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the
present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils
associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial
revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage
suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking
damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer
was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused
by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ
not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a

host of common law defenses available to him as well. The

of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the

worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he

employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was

accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley

to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious

u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837

procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more

"the mere relation of the master and the servant never can

readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-

imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care

related injuries.

of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of

himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the
worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he
should discover and guard against himself.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being

recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the
desired direction. However, employers liability legislation
proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's

The problems associated with the application of the fellow

compensation.

servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of

contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily
raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered
employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's

compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near
certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured
worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit
for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created

amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain

solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element

cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not

receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he

wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern

could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required

industry. If the accident was avoidable and

to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative

could be attributed to the carelessness of the

agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming

employer, existing tort principles offered some

mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation

measure of redress. Even here, however, the

system, individual workers who may want to sue for big

woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was

amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire

manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of

working class.

torts litigation in court placed the employee at a

substantial disadvantage. So long as liability

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as

follows:

depended on fault there could be no recovery

until the finger of blame had been pointed

An appreciation of the nature of the

compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases
interpreting them.

officially at the employer or his agents. In most

cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers
of the victim, were torn between friendship or
loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear

By the turn of the century it was apparent that

of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The

the toll of industrial accidents of both the

expense and delay of litigation often prompted

avoidable and unavoidable variety had become

the injured employee to accept a compromise

enormous, and government was faced with the

settlement for a fraction of the full value of his

problem of who was to pay for the human

claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted,

a large share of the proceeds of the judgment

Under this approach the element of personal

were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.

fault either disappears entirely or is

Thus the employer against whom judgment was

subordinated to broader economic

cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while

considerations. The employer absorbs the cost

only a part of this enured to the benefit of the

of accident loss only initially; it is expected that

injured employee or his dependents. The

this cost will eventually pass down the stream of

employee's judgment was nearly always too

commerce in the form of increase price until it is

little and too late.

spread in dilution among the ultimate

consumers. So long as each competing unit in a

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the
economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in
the form of goods or services- should ultimately
bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx

given industry is uniformly affected, no

producer can gain any substantial competitive
advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may
operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost
be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that
will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the
product of the industry affected. Thus

predictability and moderateness of cost are

at fault, and the employee surrenders his former

necessary from the broad economic

right to full damages and accepts instead a more

viewpoint. ....

modest claim for bare essentials, represented by

compensation.

Compensation, then, differs from the

conventional damage suit in two important

The importance of the compromise character of

respects: Fault on the part of either employer or

compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

employee is eliminated; and compensation

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the

payable according to a definitely limited

proper point of balance. The amount of weekly

schedule is substituted for damages. All

compensation payments and the length of the

compensation acts alike work these two major

period during which compensation is to be paid

changes, irrespective of how they may differ in

are matters concerning which the acts differ

other particulars.

considerably. The interpretation of any

compensation statute will be influenced greatly

Compensation, when regarded from the

viewpoint of employer and employee represents
a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to
society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not

by the court's reaction to the basic point of

compromise established in the Act. If the court
feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way,
a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme

conservatism may be transformed by a

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a

sympathetic court into a fairly liberal

spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without

instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly

touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.

favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the

For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and

courts that employers can have little reason to

allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never

complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent

envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.

conflict in compensation decisions throughout

Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's

the various jurisdictions must be attributed to

compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to

this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's

receive employment compensation, can still elect to file

Compensation American Casebook Series, pp.

damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this

63-65).

reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

which reads:

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the

compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been

employee by reason of a personal injury

carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious

other rights and remedies accruing to the

with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be

employee, his personal representatives,

followed.

dependents or nearest of kin against the

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to

because of said injury. ...

dissent from the majority opinion.

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless
otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

the employer to the employee his dependents or

anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on

behalf of the employee or his dependents.

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a

five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the

matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If

general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,

employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance

however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It

Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get

is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in

insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The

Title XVIII-Damages that:

issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the

poor victims and their families. All workers covered by
workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND

OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH,

INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled

SPECIAL LAWS.

to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options

cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs.

Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.
Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not
damages. This argument is but a play on words.
The term compensation' is used in the law (Act
3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of
indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded
for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or
in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law",
not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint
involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to
the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's
Compensation

will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had

already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and they have already received
compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated
differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act
had already become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners
should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under
the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the
Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in
regards to" the "election of remedies", because those
proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a
person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first
election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer
be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very

least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the

first election he has made, when he makes the second election

Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The

he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first

following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation

election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

Text, pp. 266, 267.

B.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to

opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory

employees in 'all industrial employment' and

provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further

employees of the territory and its political

add:

subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1,

p. 713.)

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was

approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10,

Compensation is not payable when injury is due

1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

to employee's willful intention to injure himself

or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine

S.S., p. 713.)

legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the

law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota

When the act is applicable the remedy

and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws

thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's

Compensation Act, p. 2]

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is

Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature

that the meaning and intention of the law-

worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

making body must be sought, first of all in the

words of the statute itself, read and considered

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation

in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted

and most obvious significations, according to
good and approved usage and without resorting
to forced or subtle construction Courts,
therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of

shall exclude all other rights and remedies

words and the rules of grammar. Consequently,

accruing to the employee, his personal

the grammatical reading of a statute must be

representatives, dependents or nearest of kin

presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs.

against the employer

Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis

supplied)

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing

with such laborers that the remedies prescribed

provision:

by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries

received outside the Islands through accidents

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5

happening in and during the performance of the

were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under

duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated
the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of

the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions
which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is
made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus,
Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an
employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act,
or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent
not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer
under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or
employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the
Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil
Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the
employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator
had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5
such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive;
yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.

(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory

character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries

desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph

of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue
the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the
latter be more favorable to him.

received outside the Islands through accidents

happening in and during the performance of the

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in

duties of the employment (and all service

1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without

contracts made in the manner prescribed in this

regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of

section be presumed to include such agreement).

the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense

chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second

[1938]).

paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined

words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to

end of the paragraph:

have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the

part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of

the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the
accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)

employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA
772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by
50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer.

That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not

of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the

to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on

principles evolved in the long history of workmen's

the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions

compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and

of the Civil Code.

not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of

the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially)

present Labor Code on employees' compensation.

by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to

provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils

the Act or under the Civil Code.

associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial

revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with

suits to get recompense.

the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably

legislating.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking

damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the

trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused
by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ
not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial

host of common law defenses available to him as well. The

accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a

worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he

radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions

accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley

u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837

procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more

"the mere relation of the master and the servant never can

readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-

imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care

related injuries.

of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of

himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the
worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he
should discover and guard against himself.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being

recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the
desired direction. However, employers liability legislation
proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's

The problems associated with the application of the fellow

compensation.

servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of

contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily
raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered
employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's

compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near
certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured
worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit
for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created

amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain

solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element

cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not

of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the

receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he

employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was

could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required

to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious

to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative

agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming

employer, existing tort principles offered some

mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation

measure of redress. Even here, however, the

system, individual workers who may want to sue for big

woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was

amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire

manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of

working class.

torts litigation in court placed the employee at a

substantial disadvantage. So long as liability

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as

follows:

depended on fault there could be no recovery

until the finger of blame had been pointed

An appreciation of the nature of the

compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases
interpreting them.

officially at the employer or his agents. In most

cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers
of the victim, were torn between friendship or
loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear

By the turn of the century it was apparent that

of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The

the toll of industrial accidents of both the

expense and delay of litigation often prompted

avoidable and unavoidable variety had become

the injured employee to accept a compromise

enormous, and government was faced with the

settlement for a fraction of the full value of his

problem of who was to pay for the human

claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted,

wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern

a large share of the proceeds of the judgment

industry. If the accident was avoidable and

were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.

could be attributed to the carelessness of the

Thus the employer against whom judgment was

cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while

of accident loss only initially; it is expected that

only a part of this enured to the benefit of the

this cost will eventually pass down the stream of

injured employee or his dependents. The

commerce in the form of increase price until it is

employee's judgment was nearly always too

spread in dilution among the ultimate

little and too late.

consumers. So long as each competing unit in a

given industry is uniformly affected, no
xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the

economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in
the form of goods or services- should ultimately
bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx

producer can gain any substantial competitive

advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may
operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost
be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that
will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the
product of the industry affected. Thus

Under this approach the element of personal

predictability and moderateness of cost are

fault either disappears entirely or is

necessary from the broad economic

subordinated to broader economic

viewpoint. ....

considerations. The employer absorbs the cost

Compensation, then, differs from the

The importance of the compromise character of

conventional damage suit in two important

compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

respects: Fault on the part of either employer or

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the

employee is eliminated; and compensation

proper point of balance. The amount of weekly

payable according to a definitely limited

compensation payments and the length of the

schedule is substituted for damages. All

period during which compensation is to be paid

compensation acts alike work these two major

are matters concerning which the acts differ

changes, irrespective of how they may differ in

considerably. The interpretation of any

other particulars.

compensation statute will be influenced greatly

by the court's reaction to the basic point of

Compensation, when regarded from the

viewpoint of employer and employee represents
a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to
society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not
at fault, and the employee surrenders his former
right to full damages and accepts instead a more
modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.

compromise established in the Act. If the court

feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way,
a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme
conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly
favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the
courts that employers can have little reason to

complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent

envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.

conflict in compensation decisions throughout

Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's

the various jurisdictions must be attributed to

compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to

this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's

receive employment compensation, can still elect to file

Compensation American Casebook Series, pp.

damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this

63-65).

reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

which reads:

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the

compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been

employee by reason of a personal injury

carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious

other rights and remedies accruing to the

with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be

employee, his personal representatives,

followed.

dependents or nearest of kin against the

employer under the Civil Code and other laws

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a

because of said injury. ...

spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without

touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and

allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless

otherwise provided, the liability of the State

Insurance Fund under this Title shall be

sickness due to the failure of the to comply with

exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of

any law, or with any order, rule or regulation of

the employer to the employee his dependents or

the Workmen's Compensation Commission or

anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on

the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the

behalf of the employee or his dependents.

employer violate the provisions of Republic Act

Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a

matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If
employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance
Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The
issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the
poor victims and their families. All workers covered by
workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest
sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.
Footnotes
1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.In case of the employee's death, injury or

amendments or fail to install and maintain safety

appliances, or take other precautions for the
prevention of accidents or occupational disease,
he shall be liable to pay an additional
compensation equal to fifty per centum of the
compensation fixed in this Act.