THE CARVAKA THEORY OF PRAMANAS:

Pradeep P. Gokhale

A RESTATEMENT

The C5rvaka, or Lokayata, system of philosophy has been treated either

as a permanent purvapaksa, an obviously weak position that is vulnerable
to all sorts of objections, or, contrarily, as an obviously strong position
because of its down-to-earth approach to the world and to life. Both

Lecturer in the
Department of
Philosophy at the
University of Poona

these treatments seem to be unfair to the system. The former is so

because it neglects the fact that the Carvaka system has often been
presented in two forms: as a naive position1 and as a sophisticated one,
where the sophisticated one may not be so vulnerable as the naive. And
the latter, strong, treatment is unfair because it does not take seriously
the need for a rational restatement and reconstruction of the system so
that it can resist the various objections raised by rival systems.
It is precisely this task of restatement and reconstruction of the
C5rvaka system that I want to begin in this essay, at however rudimentary
a level. For the sake of brevity, I will concentrate here on the Carvaka
theory of pramanas. We find two prima facie incompatible views as
representing the Carvaka theory of pramanas:
(1) Pratyaksa is the only pramana.
(2) Pratyaksa is the major pramana, but anumana of a certain kind is
also pramana.
Now while trying to restate the Carvaka theory of pramanas in the
light of the two views above, we are likely to face a dilemma. If we accept
the first view as the authentic Carvaka view, then we will be justified in
doing so because at least we are not mixing up the Carvaka view with
the view of any other system of Indian philosophy, but at the same time
what we present as the authentic Carvaka view will easily be vulnerable
to objections from rival systems.2 On the other hand, if we accept the
second view as the authentic Carvaka view, then that view will not so
easily be vulnerable to objectionsbut then it may be difficult to distinguish this view from the view of others, such as Vaiesikas and Buddhists,
who also accept pratyaksa and anumana as the only pramanas.
My attempt in this eassy will be to restate and reconstruct the
Carvaka view of pramanas in such a way that the dilemma might be
overcome. It can be done, I think, in the following way. We find two
senses in which the word Pramdria is used in ancient Indian philosophical
literature.3
(1) According to one usage, pramana is a means or instrument or
source of true cognition. But in this sense, pramana need not necessarily
yield true cognition. What is a means of true cognition may also function
occasionally as a means of false cognition. Let us call this sense the
instrumental sense of 'pramana'.

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October 1993
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1993
by University of
Hawaii Press

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(2) According to the other usage, pramana means an authoritative

they in fact characterize the two kinds of sadhya or, roughly speaking,

means of knowledge or an authority. In this sense pramana is that means

or source of knowledge which always yields true cognition and true
cognition alone. Consequently pramana can serve as a justifying ground

the objects of anumana. When an object of anumana, or rather an object

experience, the anumana is called utpannapratiti. Consequently the re-

of the same kind as an object of anumana, is already the object of one's

for knowledge. Let us call this second sense the authoritative sense of

sult of such an anumana is empirically testable, at least in principle. In the

'pramana'.

smoke-fire instance, what we infer, namely, fire (on the mountain), is not

The Carvaka approach to pramanas can be restated in the light of

the distinction above, as follows:

ence of fire already. Naturally the existence of the fire (on the mountain)

(a) Pratyaksa is the only pramana in the authoritative sense.

(b) A certain kind of anumana is also pramana, but only in the instru-

object of anumana (rather, an object of the same kind as the object of

completely new to us; it is utpannapratiti because we have some experiis empirically testable, at least in principle. When, on the contrary, the

mental sense.

anumana) is not something we have already experienced, but the 'experi-

Let me attempt to substantiate this briefly. Pratyaksa is a means of

ence' of it (in the broader sense) is supposed to be generated through the

anumana itself, the anumana is called utpaclyapratIti. In the argument for

immediate cognition. We can be certain about our cognition of the object

which is immediately given to us. Anumana and the other pramanas on

the existence of God, for instance, God, that is, the object of anumana,

the other hand are the means to mediate cognition. We cannot be

is not something we have already experienced or that we are likely to

certain about the truth of the cognition that they yield. Therefore, per-

experience, but the 'experience' of God in the form of its inferential

ception is the only pramana in the authoritative sense.

This defense of pratyaksa as the only authentic source of knowledge
needs further qualification. Pratyaksa has been classified into nirvikalpaka
and savikalpaka (which roughly mean nonjudgmental and judgmental,

judgment is something we are going to generate anew through the

inference itself. Hence this anumana is classed as utpddyapratiti.
Now the Carvaka position on anumana as pramana can be restated

respectively) by Buddhists and others. Of these two, nonjudgmental

as follows: empirically testable anumana is pramana in the instrumental

sense of the term pramana, but anumana which is not so testable is not

perception is truly the source of immediate cognition. One cannot be

pramana even in the instrumental sense.

as certain about judgmental perception as one can be about nonjudg-

The interpretation above has certain implications. The classification

of anumana just given is parallel to the Vaiesika classification of

mental perception. Thus the Carvaka defense of pratyaksa as the only

pramana (in the authoritative sense) has to be qualified and revised in the
light of the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka pratyaksa.

anumana into clista and samanyatodrsta. It is well known that Vaiesikas

accept both these kinds of anumana as pramana. Buddhist logicians, too,
would accept them as pramana if they were based on the strong causal

Now when the Carvakas deny pramana-hood to anumana, it is in this

strong sense, the authoritative sense, and not in the weaker or instrumental sense of the term pramana. In the weaker sense, anumana of a
certain kind also is pramana. But then the next question is: which kind of

pramana in the strong sense, that is, the authoritative sense of the term.

anumana is pramana according to the Carvakas, although in the weaker

sense of the term pramana? Here two different proposals are suggested

C5rvakas, on the other hand, are suggesting that perception may give us
certain knowledge; anumana of the empirically testable (utpannapratiti,

by the Carvakas. We will consider each one, separately.

or drsta in Vaiesika terms) kind can give us only probable cognition,

I. First Proposal: Empirically testable Anumana Is Pramana

Jayantabhatta, in his Nydyarnatijari, refers to the view that anumana
is of two kinds: utpannapratiti and utpadyapratrti. The inference of fire

of the empirically nontestable kind (utpddyapratiti, or sarnanyatodrsta in

or identity connection between hetu and sdelhya. What is more important, Vagesikas and Buddhists seem to accept all such anumanas as

which may turn out to be true or false after investigation; but anumana

from smoke belongs to the former kind. The inference of transcendent

entities like God belongs to the latter. Hence the former kind of anumana
is acceptable as pramana, but the latter is not. Jayantabhatta attributes

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Vaiesika terms) does not give us any 'cognition' worth the name, and
hence the question of its truth or falsehood does not arise. This brings
us to an epistemological model which closely resembles that of some
logical positivists.5 This model excludes samanyatodrsta-anumanas from
the sphere of pramanas because they involve a leap from empirical to

this view to what he calls more educated (suiksitatara) Carvakas.4

Now what is this distinction? Utpannapratiti means that which is
experienced in the past, and utpaclyapratiti means that which is yet to be

it excludes the so-called metaphysical knowledge from the sphere of

experienced. Although these are supposed to characterize anumana,

But all educated Carvakas do not seem to accept this model, perhaps

transcendent and are therefore type-crossing inferences. Consequently,

knowledge proper.
Pradeep P. Gokhale

677

because, along with inferences for God, soul, and so forth, it also excludes
inferences for the existence of material objects, other persons, space,

that is, if they are explainable in terms of or reducible to artha and kama
as understood above. This model also distinguishes the Carvaka theory

time, and so forth from the sphere of knowledge proper. Although

Cdryakas are opposed to otherworldly metaphysical beliefs, they do not

of pramanas from that of other systems of Indian philosophy because

other systems do try to justify with arguments the transmigration of self,

seem to be opposed to the metaphysics of common sense. This brings

us to another proposal regarding the status of anumana suggested by the
Carvakas.
II. Second Proposal: Anumana Which Does Not Transgress the Worldly
Framework Is Pramana
In the Tattvasatigrahapalijika, Kamalala quotes Purandara's statement that Carydkas do admit lokaprasiddha-anumana, but the kind of
anumana which is made by transcending the worldly way (laukika marga)
is denied by them.6 Here, by lokaprasiddha-anumana, Carvakas seem to
mean an inference which is acceptable within the framework of our
mundane life. This framework of mundane life could be explained by
referring to some beliefs basic to our life in this world: for example, our

anumana, I think, in the following way. On the one hand Cary5kas begin
their epistemological enterprise by accepting pratyaksa as authority.
Consequently what is basically given to us is the data of nirvikalpaka
pratyak.sa. On the other hand, Carvakas have a strong theoretical and
practical commitment to our mundane life in this world. So at least a
broad framework of our life in this world is also something that is 'given'

and so forth. Naturally the inferences in the justification of such beliefs

could be called lokaprasiddha-anumanas. According to this proposal,

according to the Cdrvakas. But that the latter is given is more a part of
pragmatic necessity than epistemic necessity for them. Now the Carvakas

however, lokaprasiddha-anumanas are pramana in the instrumental

sense, though they may not be so in the authoritative sense.

given framework, which cannot be explained satisfactorily without

Here a question may arise: how are such inferences to be treated as

pramana, even in the instrumental sense, if some of them are clear cases

has to be accepted because p cannot be explained satisfactorily without

of type-crossing because they involve a leap from empirical to metaphys-

Although some such inferences involve a leap from empirical to

metaphysical, both these 'empirical' and 'metaphysical' as asserted in
lokaprasiddha-anumana are consistent with what may be called the

would say that most of our commonsense beliefs do follow from this
accepting them. The form of reasoning involved here is: "Given p, q
accepting q." This, the Carvakas would say, is the form of the special kind
of lokaprasiddha-anumana. But this is essentially the form of arthapatti,
the essence of which is anyatha-anupapatti. I am suggesting that the
Carvaka notion of lokaprasiddha-anumana can be elucidated by regarding arthapatti to be a special kind of it. By applying this special kind of

commonsense view of the world. The kind of leap that should be avoided

anumana, I, as a C5rvaka, for instance, could say that the framework of

my life, in which, for instance, I write an article and present it before you,

in an inference is not from empirical to metaphysical but from common-

cannot be explained satisfactorily unless I accept the existence of mate-

sensical worldly metaphysics to otherworldly metaphysical nonsense.

rial objects like pen and paper and the existence of the other persons who
are supposed to be my audience. Hence the existence of the material

Now let us consider some of the implications of this proposed model.

This model seems to be more convincing than the earlier one, insofar as
it attempts to answer the problems of skepticism and solipsism on the

objects, the external world, other persons, and so forth follow by

arthapatti (a kind of lokaprasiddha-anumana) from the framework of our

one hand and transcendent metaphysics on the other by pointing out

life in this world that is readily given to us.

the pragmatic contradictions and metaphysical nonsense that they may

Here one could raise an objection that arthdpatti as a pramana was

lead to. By avoiding solipsistic implications, it presents the picture of a

primarily introduced by the Mimarnsakas, and they used it for proving

transcendent entities like aporva. Now, can Cdrvakas employ arthapatti,

human as a rational being trying to lead a successful life in a social

framework. This is quite consistent with the Carvaka approach to
purusarthas according to which artha and kama, understood as the

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or dr.sta-anumana of the earlier classification. But the question remains as

to what would be the nature of that anumana which is lokaprasiddha but
not drsta; and how do we conceive of its nature?
We can arrive at the notion of this special type of lokaprasiddha-

belief in the existence of material objects, the existence of other persons,

ical? Carvakas proposing this model of anumana as pramana could perhaps answer this question as follows.

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the existence of other worlds, and so forth, for which they employ
inferences that transcend the worldly view of life.
But this model raises more further issues also. The lokaprasiddhaanumana of this classification is broader than the utpannapratiti-anumana

mundane goals, are the major or the only purusarthas, and dharma and
moksa are significant only if interpreted within the worldly framework,

but at the same time avoid the conclusions that the Mimaririsakas have
drawn by using it? The question can be answered briefly as follows. One
has to distinguish between the essence of a pramana and its application.
The Carvakas could admit arthapatti in its essence and use it as a kind of Pradeep P. Gokhale

679

lokaprasiddha-anumana without admitting all its improper applications

made by the MTmarnsakas.
What is the essence of arthapatti? We can say that it is ' anyathaanupapatti' ('nonexplanability otherwise'). According to this notion the
argument from arthapatti has to satisfy two conditions: (1) it should be

with regard to the metaphysical beliefs of other systems. In this way the
educated Carvakas can be said to be putting arthapatti to both constructive as well as destructive use, though they do it in the garb of
lokaprasiddha-anumana.

used for satisfactorily explaining some object, say A, which is acceptable,

What I have done in this essay is to take some rudimentary steps toward

and (2) it should show that the object A can be explained satisfactorily

a restatement and reconstruction of Carvaka epistemology. I have sug-

only by accepting the other object, say B (which is the object of

arthapatti), and not without accepting it. (In other words accepting A

gested that at least two models of sophisticated Carvaka epistemology

are available to us. Both of them accept pratyaksa as pramaria in the

should force us to accept B on account of some explanatory necessity.)

authoritative sense. But the first model asserts that empirically testable
inference, too, is prarnaria, though in the instrumental sense, while the

Now it is possible for the Carvakas to claim that although the Mimariisakas and others use arthapatti they do not try to fulfill the conditions

second model asserts that an inference that does not transgress the
worldly framework is prat-mina in an instrumental sense. I have also

above rigorously enough. For instance, when the Mimarnsakas prove the
existence of apurva, because accepting apUrva is inevitable according to

suggested that this second model is more convincing than the first.

them in order to explain Vedic injunctions such as "One who wishes for

This second model seems to provide us with an epistemological

framework which can be consistently accepted by Sugiksita Carvakas.

heaven should perform sacrifices," the Carvakas would say that the
Mirnarhsakas are here accepting the Vedic injunctions, which are themselves questionable. So condition (1) is not satisfied. Or, when some
philosophers try to prove the existence of the soul, because the signs of

This framework, it seems, is strong enough to explain the Carvakas'

commitment to a material-practical world, and their commitment to a
value framework in which kama and artha are regarded as the central or
the only purusarthas. It is also strong enough to criticize other theories of

life (such as breathing and so forth) which are seen in the living body
cannot be explained satisfactorily if the existence of the soul is not

knowledge and reality accepted by other metaphysical schools. I am of

accepted,? the Carvakas would say that accepting the soul is not necessary in order to explain breathing and so forth; these signs of life could

course not suggesting that such an epistemological framework is already

available to us with all its details. It is, on the contrary, a matter of

very well be explained as functions of the living body itself.

The discussion above leads us to the view that one can introduce the
form of arthapatti in one's methodological framework without accepting

reconstruction and regeneration on our part if we want to treat the

Carvaka system as a living system that can grow and develop further.

the consequences that others have drawn by using or misusing it. I am

suggesting that the formal core of arthapatti seems to be accepted by the

NOTES

Carvakas (though they do not call it so), and they have fitted it into their
conception of lokaprasiddha-anumana, but at the same time the consequences of arthapatti which Mimariisakas derive would not be accepted

I am grateful to the organizers of the Indian Philosophical Association

by them.
One more point regarding arthapatti would be quite relevant here.
The formal core of arthapatti can be made operative in two opposite
directions. It can be used for justifying as well as for refuting someone's
position. For example, the prasariga method of argument, which has

(1990 session, Bombay) for allowing me to present the paper of which the
present article is a revised version.

been widely used by M5dhyamika Buddhists (and also by the skeptic

)ayaraibhatta), can be understood as the method of arthapatti in its
negative form. In prasariga argument, too, we try to show that for explaining the given object A we are forced to accept some other object B,

1 By 'naive position' I mean the position of dhurta (knave) Carvakas.

Dhurta Carvakas may be knavish or crafty in practice; their theory,
however, is often found to be crude and naive. By 'sophisticated
position' I mean that of SuSiksita Carvakas.
2 The famous objection of Naiyayikas and others is that if Carvakas
accept only pratyaksa as prarnaria, then they cannot even communi-

but we proceed by showing that B being an unacceptable consequence,

cate this view to others, because communication involves the capac-

the 'given' object A, too, must be unacceptable. It, too, is an argument

from arthapatti to the extent to which it is based on explanatory or
Philosophy East & West justificatory necessity. The Carvakas largely use this method of refutation

ity to know the contention and the understanding that the audience

680

possesses. But this amounts to the knowledge of other minds, which

is not possible solely with pratyaksa.

Pradeep P. Gokhale

681

3 These two senses of the word pramana have been pointed out by
Professor S. S. Barlingay in his "A Modern Introduction to Indian

CHEN BEIXI, LU XIANGSHAN, AND EARLY TOKUGAWA

John Allen Tucker

(1600-1867) PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICOGRAPHY

Logic," 2d rev. and enlarged ed. (Delhi: National Publishing House,

1979), p. 16.
4 "SuSiksitatarah prahu12. dvividhamanumanam. kiricidutpannapratiti
kincidutpadyapratiti. i.varadyanumanarh to utpadyapratiti" (NyiyamarijarT, Kashi Sanskrit Series [Benares, 1936], pt. 1, p. 113).
5 Where this model falls short of a logical positivistic epistemology is
mainly in the account of analytic truths. But this may be because
Indian epistemology in general does not have any independent or
special concern for so-called purely logical or conceptual knowledge,
possibly because it regards them to be hypothetical and not categorical in character.
6 "purandarastu aha, lokaprasiddhamanumanarh carvakair apisyate
eva. yattu kaiscil laukikarh margamatikramya anumanam ucyate tan
nisidhyate" Tattvasatigrahapanjika, the commentory on verse 1481
of Tattvasarigniha).

I. Introduction
Two of the more influential Chinese thinkers relative to philosophical
developments in Japanese Neo-Confucianism of the early Tokugawa
period were Chen Beixi (Jpn: Chin Hokukei) (1159-1223) and Lu Xiangshan
(Jpn: Riku Shozan) (1139-1193). Curiously enough, the contributions of
these two Chinese Neo-Confucians to the contours and contents of

Professor in the
Department of History,
Philosophy, and
Religious Studies at
the University of
North Florida
ill Darr fill

seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Japanese philosophizing have

been severely neglected. This essay attempts to show how the ideas of
these late Song dynasty (960-1279) thinkers merged briefly but distinctively in one of the earliest Neo-Confucian texts produced by a Japanese
during the Tokugawa, Hayashi Razan's Seiri jigi genkai (Vernacular Explication of Chen Beixi's Xingli ziyi) (1659), and then went on to influence
a series of works by Japanese thinkers whose ostensible purpose was
to criticize Neo-Confucianism, including those by Yamaga Soko (1622-

7 Naiyayikas like KeavarrIkra (the author of the Tarkabhasa) present

the argument for the existence of the soul (atman) in this form: the

1685), Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), Ito Jinsai (1627-1705), and Ogyu Sorai
(1666-1728).

living body possesses a soul because it possesses breathing and so

forth. Keavamira gives this as an example of Kevalavyatireki hetu.

Soko, Jinsai, and Sorai are usually cited as the key, seminal philosophers of the so-called "School of Ancient Learning" (kogaku), a school

It is worth noting that Naiyayikas, who do not accept arthapatti as

an independent pramana, sometimes reduce it to kevalavyatireky-

which is often described as the antithesis of virtually all forms of Neo-

anumana.

philosophy of the School of Ancient Learning are interpretable as sys-

WWIUT 1),11
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gt al*

Confucianism. However, this essay suggests that salient portions of the

tematic developments of (1) the genre, methodology, and conceptual
repertory of philosophical lexicography as exemplified by Chen Beixi's
Xingli ziyi (Jpn: Seiri jigi, The Meanings of Neo-Confucian Terms),' and (2)
the critical logic informing Lu Xiangshan's etymological estimation of Zhu
Xi's (1130-1200) notion of wuji er taiji (Jpn: mukyoku nishite taikyoku,
"the ultimate of nonbeing and also the great ultimate").2 While the
positive influence of Neo-Confucianism on the Japanese school of ancient learning has been generally elucidated by Neo-Confucian scholars
like Wm. Theodore de Bary, this essay supplements the judgments of de
Bary by unveiling several quite particular, hitherto unbroached, generic
and logical influences of Chen Beixi and Lu Xiangshan on the Japanese
acceptance of, and reactions to, Neo-Confucianism during the Tokugawa
period.
II. Chen Beixi's Xingli ziyi
Neo-Confucian texts, such as Zhu Xi's Sishu jizhu (Jpn: Shisho shucha

Philosophy East & West

682

Commentaries on the Four Books; hereafter, Zhu's Commentaries), had

appeared in Japan several centuries before the Tokugawa period. However, Beixi's Ziyi (Jpn: Jo), a brief, conceptually organized primer ex-

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October 1993
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1993
by University of
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