Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
CASE NO. 1: The petitioner, Alfredo Guieb and the private respondent, Manuel Asuncion,
were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, in the
barangay election
canvass of votes in the said barangay, the former was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Trial Court (
election protest
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Espaol, rendered a decision confirming the
proclamation of the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the private respondent.
The private respondent
appealed
In its decision of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, reversed
the decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and declared the
private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes over the
petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied on 25 November
1994, the private respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
In its order of 8 December 1994, 5 the RTC declared that the motion should be properly filed
with the court of origin and that the decision of 31 August 1994 had already become final; it
then ordered the remand of the records of the case to the MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
for proper disposition.
On 12 December 1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to
file a petition for review on certiorari. On 29 December 1994, he sent by registered mail his
petition, which this Court received only on 25 January 1995. It turned out, however, that his
motion for extension of time to file a petition had already been denied on 4 January 1995 for
his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on 20 December 1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. 6
In its order of 19 January 1995, the MTC deferred action on the said motion and required the
petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the status of his petition with this Court. For failure
of the petitioner's counsel to comply with the said order, the court issued an order on 7
February 1995 granting the issuance of a writ of execution. On 13 February 1995, however,
the court received the said counsel's Compliance dated 9 February 1995 9 wherein he
informed the court of the petitioner's motion to reconsider this Court's resolution denying
the motion for extension of time to file his petition.
In the resolution of 8 February 1995, this Court required the respondent to comment on the
petition.
1
On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or
Suspend Execution. This motion was, however, denied on the ground that the writ, having
been hand-carried by the private respondent to the office of the sheriff, must have already
been implemented and, therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same has become
moot and academic.
On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that in the
presence of a barangay kagawad and barangay residents, he enforced the writ and
proclaimed the private respondent as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan.
QUESTION 1.On the basis of the above facts, who should be the rightful punong barangay of
Nilombot? Support your answer.
the MTC
final
decision in
Minute Resolution
No. 96-3076 of 29
October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for
violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents
Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public
school teachers, for having engaged in
The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the
cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed
with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Alien, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as
follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada
Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua
only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor
only.
In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding
judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed
the
COMELEC
Law
Department
to
file
the
cases
with
the
appropriate
2
of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction
over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed
six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:
It is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec.
261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a
penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and
not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right
of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep.
Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable
accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided,
However, that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed
considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.
The two motions for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of
Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by
the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, the petitioner filed this special civil
action. It contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
to try and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code and this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
QUESTION: Which Court, MTC or RTC has jurisdiction over the said offenses? Explain your
ANSWER.
RTC
of Appeals[i][7] that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section
32, the
does
not
specific provisions of
3
law
of
Regional
of
the
Otherwise
stated,
even if
Trial
those
Courts
excepted
cases
are
and
punis
hable by
we
stated
in
Morales,
jurisdiction
is
Constitution or by Congress.
conferred
Outside
by
the
the
cases
enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may
thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined
by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to
the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a
special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific
sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the
effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never
intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from
the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129
providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as
other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, [iv][10] to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, [v][11] to be faithful to the law,
and to maintain professional competence. [vi][12] COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,vs.
HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen,
Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN,
respondents. (G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998)
After
canvassed
Sorsogon, petitioner Gerry B. Garay, a candidate for vice-mayor, was credited with 5,411
votes and private respondent Jaime Gata, Jr., his rival, 5,391 or a
margin of
box
together with the election returns, other election papers, documents and/or
paraphernalia.
Because the votes in precinct 30-A would obviously affect the standing of the said
candidates,
the
proclaim
Municipal
Board
of
Canvassers
MBC)
did
not
a certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) showing he garnered
116 votes against 68 votes for Garay in said precinct, respondent Gata brought the matter
to the respondent Commission. In his appeal, 3 respondent Gata included a copy of the Tally
Board, duly authenticated by the BEI, showing the same count as the Certificate of Votes:
that is, Gata 116 votes and Garay 68 votes. If these were added to the already canvassed
votes, Gata would win by a 28-vote margin.
In the meantime, while the said
4 on the
respondent
special
ground of
Resolution promulgated on August 7, 1995 annulling the special election and directing the
MBC to reconvene and to include "in the canvass, the votes reflected on the Tally Board
submitted by the Board of Election Inspectors . . . ." As a result, respondent Gata was
declared winner. The Commissioner En Banc said that it was "convinced without taint of any
doubt that the votes shown in the tally board and certificate of votes reflect the true and
genuine will of the electorate. . . ."
QUESTION: 1.Discuss whether the COMELEC EN BANC is correct in its action.
wrong
the ballot box together with the election returns and other election documents and
paraphernalia.
The respondent Commission's plea that it is
doubt that the votes shown in the tally board and certificate of
votes reflect the true and genuine will of the electorate"
Tally Board
were already
COMELEC before
special election.
because the
it
in
the
is
Certificate
possession
Certificate before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) during the canvassing. When
the latter rejected it, Gata appealed to the COMELEC from the said ruling, attaching to his
appeal a copy of the Tally Board. Nevertheless, the respondent Commission still decided to
hold the special election.
The Certificate of Votes presented by Gata may have been obtained by him pursuant to
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). [vii][7]
Thus, when the said Certificate was rejected by the MBC, it must have been because Gata
not only failed to comply with the procedure for its identification and offer as mandated in
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6646 which reads:
"SEC. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence
to
prove
falsification
tampering,
or
any
alteration,
anomaly
6
impugn
canvass.
certificate
of votes can
never
be a
prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly committed in the election
returns concerned, when duly authenticated x x x." A certificate of votes does not constitute
sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are,
pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236, and 238 of B.P. Blg. 881.
RETURNS,
not
cert.
of
votes,
constitute
ELECTION
sufficient
Moreover, in the instant case, the fact that the tally board made its appearance
only when Gata attached it to his appeal makes it highly suspect and therefore unreliable.
Such appearance has not been convincingly explained even by Lyn M. Garil, chairman of the
BEI. Her affidavit that the Tally Board "dropped to the floor" as the armed men left the
polling place is hearsay. Section 217 of B.P. Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) requires
that the tally board or sheet shall, together with other election documents, be placed inside
the ballot box:
"SEC. 217. Delivery of the ballot boxes, keys and election supplies and documents. - Upon
the termination of the counting of votes, the board of election inspectors shall place in the
compartment for valid ballots, the envelopes for used ballots hereinbefore referred to, the
unused ballots, the tally board or sheet, a copy of the election returns, and the minutes of its
proceedings, and then shall lock the ballot box with three padlocks and such safety devices
as the Commission may prescribe. Immediately after the box is locked, the three keys of the
pad locks in three separate envelopes and shall be sealed and signed by all the members of
the board of election inspectors. The authorized representatives of the Commission shall
forthwith take delivery of said envelopes, signing a receipt therefore, and deliver without
delay one envelope to the provincial treasurer, another to the provincial fiscal and the other
to the provincial election supervisor.
The ballot box, all supplies of the board of election inspectors and all pertinent papers and
documents shall immediately be delivered by the board of election inspectors and the
watchers to the city or municipal treasurer who shall keep his office open all night on the
day of election if necessary for this purpose, and shall provide necessary facilities for said
delivery at the expense of the city or municipality. The book of voters shall be returned to
the election registrar who shall keep it under his custody. The treasurer and the election
registrars, as the case may be, shall on the day after the election require the members of
the board of election inspectors who failed to send the objects referred to herein to deliver
7
the same to him immediately and acknowledge receipt thereof in detail. "(Sec. 161, 1978
EC).
election
documents
contained
actively
participated
in
the
said
election.
The
latter's
active
dismissed
Therefore,
Gata's appeal
dismissing it on the merits because of Gata's failure to "furnish the Commission all pertinent
documents necessary for [the Division] to rule on the matter."
The COMELEC En Banc committed a more serious error, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, when it reversed its First Division and gave due course to the appeal. Worse, it
annulled the special election had declared that Gata's "certificate of votes" and "tally board"
reflected the true and genuine will of the electorate." The latter declaration effectively
overturned its earlier decision to hold the special election which decision was obviously
based on its finding that the said "certificate of votes" and "tally board," then already before
it, were insufficient or inadequate to prove that there was failure of election. Moreover,
final;
been
held
the
winner
8
and Tally Board as reflective of the will of the electorate, and annulling the special elections,
the Comelec also in effect declared without adequate basis, said special elections as not
reflective of such popular mandate.
On the other hand, if the position of the COMELEC were to be sustained, then we would in
effect be ruling that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it called and conducted the special election, which was not at all raised as
an issue in this case. So too, we would permit the COMELEC to reverse and set aside a final
and already executed decision to hold the special election; and allow it to decide a
controversy - viz., the appeal from a ruling of the MBC - which had in fact and in law been
rendered moot and academic by the special election.
While it is true that the respondent Commission has the power to annul special elections or
declare a failure of special elections where it is shown that no voting had taken place or the
election therein resulted in a failure to elect; and the votes not cast would affect the results
of the.election,[ix][9] nonetheless, in the instant case, the June 17, 1995 electoral exercise was
not a failed election, as voting had taken place and the election did not result in a failure to
elect.
In other words, the people spoke freely and honestly in a contest voluntarily
participated in by both parties herein. Hence, the popular will as clearly expressed in the
votes cast and counted should prevail over dubious election documents of a previous failed
election in the same precinct. Since the validity and binding force of this special election
has not been put at issue and since for all it is worth, such electoral exercise, both in the
casting and canvassing of votes, was conducted regularly and peacefully, then this Court's
duty is to resolve the issue "in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority" as
expressed in such special election, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the unquestioned choice of the majority. [x][ (GERRY B.
GARAY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. G.R. No. 121331 August 28, 1996)
CASE NO. 4:FACTS: Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU
GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for the
mayoralty
position of
Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 may 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in
the
municipality.
As was heretofore stated, voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49)
precincts where the average voter turnout was 22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of 9,830
registered voters therein cast their votes. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all.
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in the five
(5) precincts which failed to function during election day. On 30 July 1992 another special
election was held for a sixth precinct.
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election
9
conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various irregularities such as the alteration, tampering
and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition moot since
the votes in the subject precincts were already counted.
Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates, to wit:
1.
SPA No. 92-324: On 6 June 1992, private respondent Datu Gamba Dagalangit filed
an urgent petition praying for the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 22-A alleging
therein that when the ballot box was opened, ballots were already torn to pieces. On 14 July
1992, the petition was granted and a special election for Precinct No. 22-A was set for 25
July 1992. 4
2.
SPC No. 92-336: On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to declare failure of election in twenty-nine (29) more precincts as
a result of alleged tampering of ballots 5 and clustering of precincts. 6 On 16 July 1992, the
petition was dismissed. COMELEC ruled that there must be a situation where there is
absolute inability to vote before a failure of election can be declared. 7 Since voting was
actually conducted in the contested precincts, there was no basis for the petition.
3.
SPA No 92-368: On 20 June 1992, private respondent filed another petition, this
time seeking to exclude from the counting the ballots cast in six (6) precincts on the ground
that the integrity of the ballot boxes therein was violated. 8 Again, on 14 July 1992,
COMELEC considered the petition moot, as the issue raised therein was related to that of
SPA No. 92-311 which on 9 July 1992 was already set aside as moot. 9
4.
SPA No. 92-347: On 1 July 1992, Datu Bagato Khalid Lonta, a fourth mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition which in the main sought the declaration of failure of election in all
sixty-seven (67) precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, on the ground of massive
disenfranchisement of voters. 10 On 9 July 1992, COMELEC dismissed the petition, ruling
that the allegations therein did not support a case of failure of election.
On 8 July 1992, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions. 12 But
COMELEC treated the same as a motion for reconsideration and promptly denied it
considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading. 13
Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election
set for 25 July 1992. Petitioner impugned the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July
1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes. Finally, on 31 July 1992,
private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del
Sur.
On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration of
failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate
were able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin private respondent from assuming office.
On 10 August 1992, petitioner lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of
Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only of some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao,
del Sur.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner
is already deemed to have abandoned the instant petition.
10
It may be noted that when petitioner filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Sur, he informed the trial court of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3
of his protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the
proclamation of the herein protestee. . . ." Evidently, petitioner did not intend to abandon
his recourse with this Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue it. Where only an
election protest ex abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the
petition seeking to annul an election.
QUESTION:1. Whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the
petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in LumbaBayabao, Lanao del Sur. After all, petitioner argues, he has meritorious grounds in support
thereto, viz., the massive disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and
unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should have at least heard before rendering
its judgment.
2. Is a low turn out of voters in an election a ground for a failure of
election?
Answer
NO
. 4: The main issue is whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due
notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the
precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. After all, petitioner argues, he has meritorious
grounds in support thereto, viz., the massive disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged
terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should have at least heard
before rendering its judgment.
not
a pre-proclamation
petition
must
of
this
nature
be
acted
upon
with
dispatch
only
is that a
after
11
hearing
other petitions 20 which sought to include forty-three (43) more precincts in a special
election
without
conducting any
in
Sec.
2.
Failure
of
violence,
election.
If,
on
account
terrorism,
analogous causes
of
force majeure,
fraud
or
other
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after
due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Before
COMELEC
declare
first,
can
act
on a
verified petition
failure of election,
no voting
seeking to
votes
place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since
actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken
place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. 22 COMELEC therefore did
not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright.
There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute
sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly
requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a special election. 23
Indeed,
the
fact
that
verified petition
automatically mean
held
that a
hearing
is
on the case
before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition must still
elect
conditions
are
to
filed
does
not
will be
show
on its
declare a failure to
outright.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking to
declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to
receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better
ventilated in an election contest. These irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare
a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the misdeeds of a relative
few. 24 Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement
of innocent voters as losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.
There can be failure of election in a political unit
defiled
be ascertained
and
cannot
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must
be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. 25
Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent was
elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid constituency. MOHAMAD L. MITMUG vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. (G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994)
CASE NO. 5: FACTS: RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for
mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority of
some 24,000 votes Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On
15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to
13
Declare
Failure of Election
and to Declare
Null and
of
widespread
alleged
anomalies
frauds
and
violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the
delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered
voters did not appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the
legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he
was credited with less votes than he actually received; (d) control data of the election
returns was not filed up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and,
(f) there was delay in the delivery of election returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed
the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure
of election.
QUESTIONS:
1.Canicosa bewails that the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters. What is the proper remedy on this aspect?
2.Canicosa also avers that more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were
not able to vote, instead, strangers voted in their behalf. Is this a ground for failure of
election?
3.Canicosa complains that the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes
brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor selflocking metal seals. Is this also a ground for failure of election?
4.Canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting en banc to rule on
his petition. He maintains that his petition should have first been heard by a division of
COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant to
Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution. Is his contention correct?
5.In totality, was there a failure of election, in the case at bar?
ANSWER
NO
5:
warrant
Indeed,
a
the
grounds
declaration
of
cited
by
failure
Canicosa
of
do
not
election.
Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. -
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
14
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely:
(a
not
of force majeure,
on account
the
causes; or (c)
causes.
None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those enumerated.
Canicosa bewails that the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters. But this is not a ground to declare a failure of
election. The filing of a petition for declaration of failure of election therefore is not the
proper remedy. The day following the last day for registration of voters, the poll clerk
delivers a certified list of voters to the election registrar, election supervisor and the
COMELEC, copies of which are open to public inspection. On the same day, the poll clerk
posts a copy of the list of registered voters in each polling place. Each member of the board
of election inspectors retains a copy of the list which may be inspected by the public in their
residence or in their office during office hours.[xi][2]
Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the final list of voters was
posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec. 148 of RA No. 7166. Based on the lists thus posted
Canicosa
could
have
filed
registered voters
regular courts.
The
question
right to
15
vote
rule
[xii][3]
which is
not within
justiciable issue
regular courts.
properly
COMELEC to
right to vote
is a
cognizable by our
Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. - The municipal and metropolitan
trial courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of inclusion and
exclusion of voters from the list in their respective municipalities or cities. Decisions of the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be appealed directly by the aggrieved party to
the proper regional trial court within five days from receipts of notice thereof, otherwise said
decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days
from the time the appeal was received and its decision shall be immediately final and
executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts (Sec. 37, PD
1896, as amended).
On the other hand, Canicosa could have also filed with the COMELEC a
verified
annulment of
7166:
Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. - Any book of voters the preparation of which has
been affected with fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any other
similar irregularity or which is statistically improbable may be annulled after due notice and
hearing by the Commission motu propio
Provided, that no order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed
within sixty (60) days before an election.
If indeed the situation herein described was common in almost all of the 557 precincts as
alleged by Canicosa,[xiii][4] then it was more expedient on his part to avail of the remedies
provided by law in order to maintain the integrity of the election. Since Canicosa failed to
resort to any of the above options, the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before
the election remains conclusive on the question as to who had the right to vote in that
election, although not in subsequent elections.[xiv][5]
Canicosa also avers that more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were
not able to vote, instead,
this
is
Again,
declaration
of
failure
of
election.
16
Canicosa
was
watcher
in
watcher
is
allowed
every
empowered
by
law
to
appoint
precinct
The
to challenge
announcement of the results of the election, and before leaving the polling place, the board
of election inspectors shall issue a certificate of votes upon request of the duly accredited
watchers x x x x
Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Secs. 235 and 236 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence
to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or anomaly committed in the election returns
concerned x x x x
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that in case of inconsistency as to the number of
votes written in the election returns and the certificate of votes, a petition for correction of
election returns must immediately be filed with COMELEC by all or a majority of the
members of the board of election inspectors or any candidate affected by the error or
mistake. In order to make out a case for correction of election returns, there must be an
error and at least a majority of the members of the board of election inspectors agrees that
such error existed. Canicosa never mentioned that he petitioned for the correction of the
election returns before the COMELEC
cannot
election returns were delivered late, we still cannot see why we should declare a failure to
elect.
in Calamba into a
mockery or farce
to make us conclude
[xv][6]
In Mitmug v. Commission on
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must concur: (a) no voting has taken
place in the precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and, (b) the votes that were not cast would affect
the result of the election. From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than
an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect. [xvi][7]
Canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting en banc
to rule on
his petition. He maintains that his petition should have first been heard by a division of
COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant to
Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.[xvii][8]
But this provision applies only when the COMELEC acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
To
reiterate, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition are that: (a) the names of the
18
registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their respective precincts; (b) more
than one-half of the legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting
in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually received; (d) the control
data of the election returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i. e., without padlocks nor self-locking
metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election returns.
Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987 Constitution grants extensive administrative
powers to the COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Likewise, Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. -
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections x x x x
Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the
COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
case, as aforestated, the issues presented demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions.
The COMELEC exercises direct and immediate supervision and control over national and
local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections. Its power of direct supervision and control includes the power to
review, modify or set aside any act of such national and local officials.
[xviii][9]
It exercises
immediate supervision and control over the members of the boards of election inspectors
and canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control includes the power to revise,
reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have
done, even if questions relative thereto have not been elevated to it by an aggrieved
party, for such power includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself such
steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law. [xix][10]
Specifically, Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less votes than he actually
received. But he did not raise any objection before the Municipal Board of Canvassers;
instead, he went directly to the COMELEC.
dismissed his petition, that it was error on the part of COMELEC to rule on his petition while
sitting en banc.
We have already disposed of this issue in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections
[xx][11]
thus
should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem
of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes
obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in
computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC
may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function
to decide questions affecting elections.
Moreover, it is expressly provided in Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that
19
any
[xxi][12]
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates that respondent therein
received 4,951 votes or more than what he actually obtained. In resolving the case we ruled
that the
in mathematical addition
canvassers.
administrative.
The
remedy
invoked
In Feliciano v. Lugay
[xxii][13]
was
purely
concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition for
declaration of failure of election, as an administrative question. Likewise, questions as to
whether elections have been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured
and therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to vote.
governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions and were
in a bitter electoral battle.
"On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections, Cong. Romualdo filed a petition
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin (Br. 28)
presided over by respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer,
the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as
respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to
restrain
the
undertaking
public
respondents
and/or
works
prohibit and
from
pursuing
projects
certain
and
from
allegedly because,
violation of the
Answer NO 6:The
Judge
was
wrong
to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling
within the
violations
Omnibus Election
of the
Zaldivar doctrine. At most, the facts in the latter case do not illustrate
as clearly the announced doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific
provision of the Revised Election Code then in force was alleged to have been violated. What
was sought to be enjoined was the alleged wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of
the power, by virtue of his office, to appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize voters
into supporting the congressional candidate of his choice. In holding that the then Court of
First Instance did not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court considered the constitutional
power
of
the
Commission on Elections
exclusive
charge
administration
elections
of
of
all
the
laws
to
have
enforcement
relative
to
the
conduct
and
of
likewise relied on the provisions of the Revised Election Code vesting upon the COMELEC (a)
direct and immediate supervision over municipal, city and provincial officials designated by
law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and (b) authority to suspend them
from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its instructions, orders,
decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal if found guilty of non22
the
present
law,
appointment
creation
office,
or
or filling up of
however,
except
hiring
of
in
case
of
urgent
need,
new employees
new positions
in any
the
or
the
government
banned
and
if made
45)
thirty (30)
without
violation thereof constitutes an election offense. 21 Then too, no less than the present
Constitution and not just the Election Law as was the case at the time of Zaldivar expressly
provides that the Commission may "[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision." 22
Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." 23
It may thus be said without fear of contradiction that this vast array of powers and functions
now enjoyed by the Commission under the present Constitution provides a stronger
foundation for, and adds vigor and vitality to, the Zaldivar doctrine.
The rationale of the said doctrine needs to be stressed here so that henceforth, no judge will
lose his bearings when confronted with the same issue. Otherwise, he should be held to
account for either the sheer ignorance of the law or the callous disregard of pronouncements
by this Court to accommodate partisan political feelings. We declared in the said case:
authority
was
Constitution
invoked?
which
The
obvious
empowers
answer
the
is
literal
language
Commission
of
the
on
the
enforcement
and
23
shadow
of
partisanship
would
suspicion
fall
on their
as
to
alleged
the matter before them is decided. It is imperative that the faith in the impartiality of the
judiciary be preserved unimpaired. Whenever, therefore, the fear may be plausibly
entertained that an
Regional
24
Trial Court
violations
of
the
Election
Code.
The
criminal actions
Constitution
itself
grants
to
for
it
therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints
for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon
written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under
the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. 28 However,
such written complaints should be filed with the "
Law Department of
Election
Supervisors
or
Regional
Election
stoppage of
Indeed,
while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he
committed
serious
charges for the violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code are true, then no one should be spared from the full force of the law. No
government official should flout laws designed to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections or make a mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter
lessons of the past have shown that only elections of that nature or character can guarantee
a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect, preserve and enhance an
institution which is vital in any democratic society.
SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., ET AL. G.R. No. 104848
certiorari
Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996
of the COMELEC
Resolution
the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification
against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign,
in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC
charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition
to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an
Amended Petition 4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letterscomplaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations
committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, 5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the
complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga
adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit
any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes,
while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,
notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to
file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted
upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En
Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261,
26
par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par.
(o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political
subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the
proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim
Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume
the duties and functions of the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing
of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly,
four (4) informations 7 for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the
COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996
Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in
its Resolution No. 2050 that
1.
Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any
of the grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed
directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be
inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu
propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the
Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct
a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the electionlaws . . . .
2.
Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who
has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case.
However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case.
However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of
guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with
the court before which the criminal case is pending and said court may order the suspension
of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides
for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification
case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The
disqualification case was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners; and
(3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the lettercomplaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is
deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was
clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of
the disqualification case.
27
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the
instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the
COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and
the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction; second COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of
R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations
against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should
have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if
petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of
22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee
was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no
summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to
answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called
Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC
correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995
elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the
Silvestre v. Duavit ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The
COMELEC insisted that the
disqualification case was filed before the election but was still
pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification
case was filed after the election but before the proclamation of
the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the
election and after the proclamation of the winner.
QUESTIONS:
1.The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad. On the basis of the
facts, didthe COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion?
YES.
2.Trinidad further avers that the COMELEC was correct in summarily dismissing the
disqualification case because the docket fees were not duly paid. Is the contention correct?
NO.
28
NO.
VICE MAYOR
or
Amended Petition
after
the
consequence.
was
filed
elections,
is
of
no
petitioner against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the
elections.
Consequently, the
supplements
alleged
and
in the complaint
An
amendment
which merely
the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. [xxiv][9]
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of
petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, If the fees above
described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid
and may dismiss the action or proceeding.
permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain
the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees.
did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not considered
by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the same.
procedural
29
Hence,
private
respondent
has
no cause to
Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case
filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election
. What
acts
complained
committed
by
disqualified.
The
the
of
have
candidate
in
fact
sought
been
to
be
Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the
proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of winners,
wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
Moreover,
infringes
on Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646,
[xxv][10]
which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted.
not
declared by final
pendency
suspension
(underscoring supplied).
i.e., until
judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signifies that this requirement of the law is
mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. [xxvi][11] The
implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election.
the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in
effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial
legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been
issued beyond the scope of its authority.
Interpretative rulings
must always be in
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions
into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the
scope
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee.
A candidate
the
disqualification
case
based
on
the
31
more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
not
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such
power.
It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.
Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the
annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within
the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x x x Really, were a victim of a
proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation
and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects.
Its
criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the
quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral
aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified
from office.
character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after
due notice."
It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction. [xxviii][13]
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to suspend the
proclamation of Trinidad.
that the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to
be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
doubt that the evidence of Trinidads guilt was strong as shown in the Report and
Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department
Parenthetically,
there
against the
respondent
for
disqualification for the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation and
32
fact,
on
the
basis
Recommendation
of
an
indication
that
and
criminal informations
Court,
Report
this
there
(4)
indeed
prima facie
elected does
the second
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast
in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray,
void or meaningless.[xxix][14]
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the
sociological and psychological elements behind voters preferences.
of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to
by giving them
Thus, it would be
The wreath of
33
authorizes
a declaration
of
plurality
of
votes
and
does
not
entitle
[xxxi][16]
candidate,
substantially changed.
the
conditions
would
have
such circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No.
7160,[xxxiii][18] which provides in part Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, ViceMayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the ViceGovernor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x x
For purposes of this chapter, a
elective local official
permanent vacancy
arises when an
to assume office,
fails to qualify,
dies,
is
xxxx
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for
interpretation but merely application.
be created
for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such
eventuality, the
succeed
as
provided
by
law.[xxxiv][19]
MANUEL
C.
SUNGA,
COMELEC)
Municipal
to
Councilor
annul
in
proclamation
view
computation
Statement
the
power
of
of
an
error in the
totals
in
the
of the proclamation,
for a total of Nine Hundred Thirty Four (934) votes. Mr. Torres should have been number ten
(10) in the winning column and that if correction shall be made Mr. Torres shall garner a total
of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Twenty One (11,121) votes while Mr. de Peralta garnered
a total of Eleven Thousand Six Hundred Ten (11,610) votes. 2
On 16 May 1995 the COMELEC set the case for hearing. Summonses with notices of hearing
were sent to petitioner Atty. Rosauro I. Torres and private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de
Peralta requiring them to file their respective answers to the letter of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
Petitioner filed his answer alleging that the subject matter of the letter-petition of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, which was the correction of votes garnered by him, properly
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Sec. 251 of the Omnibus
Election Code. On the other hand, private respondent argued for the annulment of the
proclamation of petitioner and prayed for his (private respondent) proclamation as the
winning candidate.
On 28 June 1995 respondent COMELEC issued the assailed En Banc resolution granting the
letter-request of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the correction of the number of votes
garnered by petitioner. Respondent Comelec also ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers
to reconvene and proclaim private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth
winning councilor of Tanza, Cavite.
On 5 July 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a corrected Certificate of Canvass
of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates which included private respondent
Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor and excluded petitioner from the
new list of winning candidates. 3
Petitioner came up to this Court alleging that public respondent COMELEC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the request of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
correct the votes garnered by petitioner and in ordering the proclamation of private
respondent as the eighth winning candidate thereby ousting petitioner from the new list of
winners. Petitioner also argues that the Municipal Board of Canvassers had no legal
personality to file the action motu proprio before the Comelec for correction; that corrections
are allowed only when there has been no proclamation yet, citing Respicio v. Cusi; and
finally, that once the Municipal Board of Canvassers has declared and proclaimed the
winners in an election its functions are finished and its existence is terminated.
The Office of the Solicitor General submits that respondent COMELEC acted beyond the
limits of its power and authority when it ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and correct its alleged mistake in counting the votes cast for candidate Dimaala
in favor of petitioner; that by having done so, respondent COMELEC had exercised original
jurisdiction over a municipal election contest contrary to what the Constitution mandates;
that Art. IX-C, Sec. 2, par 2, of the Constitution provides that the Commission on Elections
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction overall contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Respondent COMELEC filed its own comment alleging that the proclamation of petitioner was
36
flawed from the beginning for being tainted with clerical error or mathematical mistake in
the addition of votes; that pursuant to the ruling in Villaroya v. Comelec 5 public respondent
has original jurisdiction on all matters relating to election returns, including the verification
of the number of votes received by opposing candidates in the election returns as compared
to the statement of votes in order to ensure that the true will of the people is known; and,
that according to Tatlonghari v. Comelec, 6 when what is involved is purely mathematical
and/or mechanical error in the operation of the adding machine committed by the board of
canvassers but does not involve any opening of ballot boxes, examination and appreciation
of ballots and/or election returns, all that is
position
of
COMELEC
Sec. 7.
clearly shown
manifest errors
tallying
of election
canvassing
were
returns,
or
before
committed
in
the
certificates
proclamation that
tabulation
or
more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the
election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake
in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of
votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included
in the canvass, the board may motu proprio or upon verified petition by any candidate,
political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing,
correct the errors committed.
In Castromayor v. Comelec[xxxv][7] we held that although the above provision applies to preproclamation controversies, and even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already
been made, there is nothing to prevent its application to cases like the one at bar in which
the validity of the proclamation is precisely in question. In Duremdes v. COMELEC,[xxxvi][8] this
Court sustained the
in
Sec. 7, Rule
37
candidate
the
REMEDY
protest
proclaimed as winning
election
over which the Regional Trial Court and not the COMELEC nor the
Municipal Board of Canvassers has original jurisdiction. However, as this Court already
ruled in Duremdes
It is Duremdes further submission that his proclamation could not be declared null and void
because a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made,
the
proper
recourse
being
assumption,
an
election protest.
however,
proclamation.
that
there
has
Where a proclamation is
This
been
is
on
the
valid
assumption
of
office
cannot
deprive
the
Statement
of Votes is
merely
tabulation
votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is involved in the
instant case is simple arithmetic.
authority
to
resolve
any
question
[xxxviii][10]
ATTY.
38
CASE NO. 9: Facts: Manuel Milla and Regina Balmores-Laxa were candidates for councillor
of Gerona, Tarlac in the May 14, 2001 elections. On
was proclaimed as the 8th wining candidate by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC)
based on the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass. One month after his
proclamation or on June 18, 2001, Regina filed a petition with the COMELEC against Manuel
and the BOC for correction of entries in the Statement of Votes based on fraud or
irregularities in the canvassing of votes, specifically the entries for the 4 precincts in the
Statement of Votes did not correspond to the election returns for the respective precincts.
On June 29, 2001, Manuel took his oath of office and assumed office.
The BOC admits the erroneous tally, and prays that it it be allowed to reconvene
to effect the correction of entries in the Statement of Votes, inorder to give way for Reginas
winning as the eight councillor of Gerona.
In its Resolution of December 18, 2001, the COMELEC EN BANC, denied the BOCs
motion to reconvene, declared Manuels proclamation as null and void and proclaimed
Regina as the eight winning candidate.
Manuel argued that:
1) the petition of Regina was filed beyond the reglementary period of five days from
proclamation
determined
that
the
petition
appears
petition
filed
by
respondent
before
the
COMELEC
involves
an
pre-
election
39
contest
improbability,
and indeed it is not, for while the petition alleged fraud and statistical
the
remedy
sought
was
merely
for
correction of
election returns.
4) that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction over the petition of Regina.
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the
Commission:
1) x x x
2)
When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of
the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of
canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of
one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3)
there has been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the
certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in
the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite
the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been
made.
b) x x x
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date
of proclamation and must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected thereby.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
In holding that it validly assumed jurisdiction over the petition, the COMELEC asserts that
[a] proclamation that is based on a clerical or mathematical mistake (or a blatant padding
of votes) is not a valid proclamation [h]ence, the same can be challenged even after the
proclaimed candidate has assumed office. [2][26]
The Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the
proclamation. Any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation.
40
[3][27]
In the case at bar, as the Statement of Votes contained erroneous entries, the COMELEC
rightfully assumed jurisdiction over respondents petition for the correction thereof and
declaration of nullity of petitioners proclamation.
such and similar petitions may be filed directly with the COMELEC, [5][29] the above-quoted
defeat
the
will
of
the
electorate. [6][30]
For
palpably
void
proclamation,
with
the
Exercise
exclusive
original
jurisdiction
over
all
contests
relating
to
the
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable .
(3) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners above-claim
the
petition
filed
by
does
respondent
NOT
before
the
likewise
COMELEC
lie.
involves
By his admission,
an
pre-
election
and indeed it is not, for while the petition alleged fraud and statistical
improbability,
the
remedy
sought
was
merely
for
correction of
election returns.
The
All
shall
be
in
42
provided
division,
decisions shall be
that
decided
by the Commission
en banc.
of
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
it should have first been heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, 37 and then by the
En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division were filed.
Since, as reflected above, the
December 18, 2001 is thus null and void and it is in this light that the present petition is
GRANTED. This leaves it unnecessary to pass on petitioners second assigned error. Manuel
Milla v. Regina BALMORES-LAXA, (G.R. No. 151216, July18, 2003)
CASE NO. 10: Facts: Atty. Romulo Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constittuiona infirmity. He
raises the following questions:
1)
Does Sec. 5(d) of said Act allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of
Art. V of the Constitution?
2)
Does Sec. 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices (i.e. senators, pres. and vice pres.) and party list
representatives violate the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, SEC. 4 of the Constitution
that the winning candidates for Pres. and Vice Pres. shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress?
3)
May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Sec.
25 of said Act, exercise the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and
Regulations
shall
promulgate
without violating
the
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f)
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the
day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:
SEC. 1.
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
......
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised
by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless
he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration
under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify the
Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the impression
that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines to
live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising
those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given
period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than
real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered.[13][23] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the
Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is
44
it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189.
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are
mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest.[17][27] The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily
from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider
the intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional convention. [18][28]
Article
VI
(The
Legislative
Department)
of
the
Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the significance of
absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from
the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that
previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting.
The
of
absentee
voting
constitutional provisions
may
the privilege
flow
from
some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by
soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district or
precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.
When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with
equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may
be limited in their application to particular types of elections.
The statutes
Further,
in
passing
on
statutes
regulating
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.
One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes
is used synonymously with domicile.[22][32] (Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this
country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to
require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which here
has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing or working abroad.
Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought to be about two million
such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these
provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the
exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that time the
phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of workers are
to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, the
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no insuperable
obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have
adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to
embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under
pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to detach themselves from their
families to work in other countries with definite tenures of employment. Many of them are on
contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their
residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of
suffrage in their countries of destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which
47
says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens an
effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying that, I
would like to make a comment on the meaning of residence in the Constitution because I
think it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court,
particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the
meaning of residence in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying goes, to
improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation,
reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
the place of his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections.
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such
residence of origin.
In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
residence in the Philippines and residence in the place where he will vote. As far as
residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but as far as
residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems
to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place
for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional
obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote
which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy the right of
suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino communities.
The
Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and
unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a
logistical exercise of global proportions.
administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine government, mainly through the
COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of
this mechanism that will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore,
seeking shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to
meet the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have
mentioned. But I want to thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect
may be entertained at the proper time. . . .
...
...
48
[23][33]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos
reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small
measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the
choice of this countrys leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering
the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos
with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially because the
Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the term
absentee voting also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us say,
studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for instance, in Mindanao,
to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where they are
registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing students
and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote. I believe that
those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The reason we want
absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that
there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of
legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is possible, then
legislation can take care of the rest.[24][34] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the
inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1.
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional
Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency requirement
prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed system of absentee
voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain qualifications for
the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise
of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that the
domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS.
requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is flexible.
For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the
requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
49
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change the word
Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD, it
should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING
ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
ABROAD because QUALIFIED would assume that he has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed amendment,
I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable
qualified
citizens,
Philippines, to
vote.
According to
Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already took that into
account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to registration we
will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require where the registration is.
If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be continuously abroad for a long
time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not
like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to provide a
system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new qualifications for
these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD.
That is right.
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.[25][35] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the
responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated
in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why
the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to
the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner
Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the
assumption is that they have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
In fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed
how the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in the case
of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can
cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered to vote in the
Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are registered in Angeles
City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only for
50
the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for the
record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner Suarez that
this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the
Filipino is temporarily abroad.
there on a business trip. It just so happens that the day before the elections he has to fly to
the United States, so he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing
there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This is not limited only to
Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on
the date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in
that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need this
clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily abroad, it
need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore,
when we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles and he would
be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may
provide the procedure for registration, like listing ones name, in a registry list in
the embassy abroad. That is still possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees with
this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting age
while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a
registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with the
registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name is then entered
in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a registered
voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to comply
with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are more
clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered
Commissioners to propose amendments.
amendments.
[26][36]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines,
and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in
51
statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, [27][37] the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement
found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No.
2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional
provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any
statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the Philippines. They
are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not
alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora.
This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is
synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to ones home .
And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines
and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a
clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of
the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress
must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding
physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our
offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it
reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card holders, but the
Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate cannot be a
party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
52
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are separated only
by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros
for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. I am not talking even about the
Election Code. I am talking about the Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he
must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified
to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already welldebated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of
Article
was
placed
immediately
after
the
six-month/one-year
residency
voting
is
an
exception
to
the
six-month/one-year
residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I think this is so wellentrenched that one need not argue about it residency has been interpreted as
synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible
to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the
country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this
exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to vote.
[28][38]
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting
process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified
by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president,
vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed
law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b)
Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged
Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal
of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who
have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments
issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d)
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
53
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident
from
the
National
Registry
of
Absentee
Voters
and
his/her
permanent
we thought that we would require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr.
President, the three administration senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote
[Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for the
requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an affidavit that he will go
back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a green-card holder, that
means he may not return to the country any more and that contradicts the definition of
domicile under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to
the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the family, may
decide No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United States if we file an
affidavit that we want to go back. But we want to give him the opportunity to make
that decision. We do not want to make that decision for him.
[29][39]
(Emphasis
supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are
disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because
the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos
who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still be
considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of
suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have
not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines;
otherwise, their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their names from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently
residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who
has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her
intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and
vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the
place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for
purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
11.1.
registration has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No.
8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to
vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said
55
application to vote within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be
accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas
absentee voter certificate of registration.
11.2.
Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to,
the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the
country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3.
absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee
voter.
Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile
in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from
this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of
origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to
express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the
affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would affect
the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those
who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the opportunity
and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
enough resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election
conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to
the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d)
would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the
affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on their promise to
return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a ground to contest
the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further confusion and doubt on the
integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has
exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year
from the execution of the affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to
determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As expressed in Taada vs. Tuvera,[30][40] the
Court is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find
it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected
problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a registered
overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his name may be
ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the votes cast
56
by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three years as promised?
What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the winning
candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three
years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the
elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the
immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B.
Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act
...
18. 5
The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding
the
foregoing,
the
Commission
is
empowered
to
order
the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not
taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been
rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass
of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two
or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can
57
only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and
Vice-President.[31][41]
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for
the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress
by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and
vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special
Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of
transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of
Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of
canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C.
implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C [33][43] of the Constitution. COMELEC
joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be
subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may
review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not
more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee.
conditions:
a)
Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for
fraud;
b)
Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude
Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and wellsecured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
......
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations
promulgated
by
the
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue
the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within
sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and
political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
[35][45]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions,
orders and rulings.[36][46] In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue
the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within
sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure
60
The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon review
The
The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission of the same law;
61
IX-A
mandating
of
the
the
Constitution
independence
of
to
the
COMELEC
to
proclaim
the
under
Filipino father
and
She is
Autralian national
Certificate of Residence
Passport.
in 1943 to a
an Australian mother.
married to a Filipino.
Immigration as an
born in Australia
Alien
Australian citizenship.
Question: Did Lopez application for ACR and ICR and her being a holder of an Australian
passport constitute her renunciation of Phil. Citizenship?
62
Answer
NO
63, renunciation
Her application for
of citizenship must
renunciation or repudiation
Rico
Balde was
legitimate son
American).
He
was
be express.
amount to express
of her citizenship.
born
of
American mother
not
CA No.
in 1934 in Chicago,
USA,
Filipino father
as a
and
an
continuously
resident
in
the
Philippines. In 1958 at the age of 24 and in 1979 at the age of 45, he applied
with the
Bureau
REGISTRATION (
of
Immigration
voter,
issued
in the
a Phil.
Passport in 1987.
Question: By
registering twice
Deportation) as an
Answer:
ACT
NO
No.
63,
with the
BID
12. AZNAR v. COMELEC , 185 scra 708 Ruling: No. Under COMMONWEALTH
there
citizenship,
are
three
modes
to
express renunciation
and by subscribing to an
lose
Filipino
naturalization,
by
oath of allegiance to
a foreign country. His application for an ACR and ICR is not one of them to make
him lose his Phil. Citizenship.
Filipino. An application
a
renunciation
for an
of Philippine citizenship.
CASE NO. 13: FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano=103,853; Ernesto S. Mercado=100,894; Gabriel V. Daza III=54,275.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen
based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
born
1955,
and
is
considered
in
American
citizen
under
US
Laws.
But
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
QUESTION: Is the COMELEC ruling correct? Explain.
Answer
NO
COMELEC
13:
petitioner,vs.EDUARDO
BARRIOS
IS
WRONG
MANZANO
and
the
.ERNESTO
COMMISSION
S.
ON
MERCADO,
ELECTIONS,
This provision is
[xxxix][8]
who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing
dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To
begin
dual
with,
allegiance.
The
application
person
[9]
is
citizenship
former
of the
different
is
arises when, as a
different laws
result
of the
from
dual
concurrent
of
simultaneously considered
national
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance,
person
simultaneously
positive
act,
STATES.
loyalty
to
owes,
by
some
TWO
OR
MORE
individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision
was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who
explained its necessity as follows:[xli][10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.
That is often a
function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections
of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan
of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At
that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our
natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila.
It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a
new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows:
DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[xlii][11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship
in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us
who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and
which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to
that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it
is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
66
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the
wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their
oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of
double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate
what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature.
But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country,
arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase
dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
No one can
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect,
be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE.
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at
birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that
he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [xlv][14] of which
at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as
a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[xlvi][15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces
his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with
the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it
wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of
course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at
birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However,
the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and
1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so
that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation
was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[xlvii][16] as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on
March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6.
NATURAL-
BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY
THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I
IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
v. COMELEC it was held:
Thus, in Frivaldo
[xlviii][17]
Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local
position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections
of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of
his American citizenship.
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the
age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as
69
an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997.
There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he
had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court
said in Aznar v. COMELEC[xlix][18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at
bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no
express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss
of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To
recapitulate,
that
he
reservation,
concerned,
does
repudiated
mental
his American
Philippines,
without
effectively
citizenship
so
youth
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2)
Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will
South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4)
General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5)
Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6)
Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition,
members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12,
1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the
71
existing regions some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the
province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz
and
restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art.
XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del
Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are
alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization.
This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to
guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government agencies taking into
consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes
the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize.
Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of
statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring
(reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order
429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not
valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance
appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives
of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities.
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative
Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and
prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of
Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to
"merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed
in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground
that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII"
but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
QUESTIONS:
1. Given the set of facts, is it within the power of the President to merge administrative
regions, transfer regional seats? Explain.
2.Discuss the validity/invalidity of the issues raised by petitioner Jaldon.
72
Answer no. 14: JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN, ET AL. vs. OSCAR M. ORBOS, ET AL. (G.R. No. 96754
June
22,
1995)
YES.
prerogatives
It
of
is
the
administrative regions.
within
the
president
political
to
merge
POLITICAL
departments,
bureaus,
offices,
agencies
and
including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to
promote "
government."
required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to
the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after
the opening of its next regular session
reorganization
plan
would
become
As this
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the
President
power
of
governments
to
general
over
local
not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but
are
"mere
purposes."
groupings
of
contiguous
provinces
for
administrative
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General (122 Phil. 965,
973-4 [1965]) as "administrative in nature." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of
its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions.
PROVISION THAT PROVINCES AND CITIES WHICH DO NOT VOTE FOR INCLUSION THEREIN
SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; QUALIFIED. While Art. XIX,
13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is
subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge
the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain
in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may
nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency
of administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more
than a redefinition of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local
governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a
province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or
to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the
right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be
overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political representation. Petitioners nonetheless insist that
only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President. To be sure Art. XIX, 13
is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be
so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the
petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational.
The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in
E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features;
(a) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land
area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio74
economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga
City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has
always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions are
mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. . . [
They] are
cities,
municipalities
and
power to reorganize
administrative
regions
carries
with
it
the
power
to
center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of
large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructures to house
regional
offices.
CASE No 15.Facts: Juan Calderon was born on 20 August 1939.His grandfather was Pedro
Calderon, a Spanish national, who died in the Philippines on September 11, 1954.His father
was Andoy Calderon who married on September 16, 1940 Jean Stuart, an American national.
The records futher showed that Andoy got married to Juana Calingasan on August 12, 1938.
Questions: 1. Juan Calderon would like to run as Vice-President of the Philippines in
the next election. Is he qualified to run? Explain.
who was considered by law as Filipino citizen under the Jones Law of 1902. (Filipinization en
masse)
2.Granting that he filed his certificate of candidacy as Vice-President, can his opponent file
75
an election protest
against him before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal? Explain.
The
PET
has jurisdiction
already proclaimed
president
only
until
one
of the
candidates
is
CASE NO. 16.Facts: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co., from
September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his employment
was terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not disputed.
In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,
Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City,
Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local
elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for
the position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC
was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The mayor
communicated with the PNOC-EDC thru Engr. Ernesto Patanao, Resident Manager, Tongonan
Geothermal Project to express the view that Pineda could not actively participate in politics
unless he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC. 1 Nothing seems to have resulted from this
protest.
The local elections in Leyte, scheduled for January 1988, were reset to and held on February
1, 1988. Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed
elected to, the office of councilor. Some vacillation appears to have been evinced by Pineda
at about this time. On February 8, 1988, he wrote to the COMELEC Chairman, expressing his
desire to withdraw from the political contest on account of what he considered to be election
irregularities; and on March 19, 1988, he wrote to the Secretary of Justice seeking legal
opinion on the question, among others, of whether or not he was "considered automatically
resigned upon . . . filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in case he
was elected, he could "remain appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-owned
or controlled corporation." Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as
councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. And despite so qualifying as councilor,
and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan
Geothermal Project, Ormoc City.
QUESTIONS:
1. Does the Civil Service Commission cover Pinedas appointment? Explain.
No,
because
PNOC
is
GOCC
without
SECTION
66
PROVIDES
of
the
OMNIBUS
CANDIDATES
ELECTION
HOLDING
CODE
APPOINTIVE
UPON
FILING
CANDIDACY;
APPLIES
EMPLOYEES
IN
OF
TO
CERTIFICATE
OF
OFFICERS
AND
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
ID.; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the
Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on and subsequent
enactment of related and repealing legislation i.e., Republic Acts Numbered 7166: "An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991),
6646: "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other
Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An Act Resetting the Local Elections, etc."
(effective November 6, 1987), it was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2(1), Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2)
categories those with original charters, and those organized under the general law and
(b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those covered by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in corporations having original
charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed
in said corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet Congress
made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled
corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related
statutes, particularly as regards the rule that an any employee "in government-owned or
77
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy." What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore
not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil
Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for
termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
Case No. 17. Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista
were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992.
Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against
petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a winning margin of
706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said
municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal
mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without
precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans
protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the
COMELEC.
Rule on the propriety of awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
Answer no 17:
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited
damages in favor of private respondent.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that
actual or compensatory
ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant.
Considering that actual or compensatory damages are appropriate only in breaches of
obligations in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts and on the - occasion of crimes and
quasi-delicts where the defendant may be held liable for all damages the proximate cause of
which is the act or omission complained of, the monetary claim of a party in an election case
must necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-contract or a tortious act or
omission or a crime, in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages.[liii][15]
In the absence of any or all of these, the claimant must be able to point out a specific
provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party.[liv][16] For instance, the claimant may cite any of the following provisions of the Civil
Code under the chapter on human relations, which provisions create obligations not by
contract, crime or negligence, but directly by law:
ART. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. x x x[lv][17]
Claimed as part of the damages to which private respondent is allegedly entitled to, is
P169,456.00 constituting salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995 that
would have accrued to him had there not been an execution of the trial courts decision
pending appeal therefrom in the COMELEC.
SUBSEQUENT OUSTER
as a
result
NOTWITHSTANDING HIS
of an
election protest, an
of that office, is
79
ENTITLED
to
EMOLUMENTS
the
and
COMPENSATION,
ALLOWANCES
legally
FROM
CONTRACTS
OR
QUASI-CONTRACTS,
in the
context of election cases. Absent any of these, we could not even begin to contemplate
liability for damages in election cases, except insofar as attorneys fees are concerned, since
the Civil Code enumerates the specific instances when the same may be awarded by the
court.
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
80
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.[lix][21]
Given the aforecited laws, and jurisprudence on the matter at issue, let us now look into the
basis of respondent COMELEC for awarding actual damages to private respondent in the
form of reimbursement for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and salary and
other emoluments that should have accrued to him from March, 1994 to April, 1995 had the
RTC not issued an order for execution pending appeal.
The First Division of the COMELEC ruled on private respondents claim for actual or
compensatory damages in this wise:
x x x under the present legal setting, it is more difficult than in the past to secure an award
of actual or compensatory damages either against the protestant or the protestee because
of the requirements of the law.
In the instant case, however, We are disposed to conclude that the election protest filed by
the protestant is clearly unfounded. As borne out by the results of the appreciation of
ballots conducted by this Commission, apparently the protest was filed in bad faith without
sufficient cause or has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the protestee-appellant
for which he incurred expenses. The erroneous ruling of the Court which invalidated ballots
which were clearly valid added more injury to the protestee-appellant. This would have
been bearable since he was able to perfect his appeal to this Commission. The final blow,
however, came when the Court ordered the execution of judgment pending appeal which,
from all indications, did not comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. There was no good and special reason at all to justify the execution ofjudgment
pending appeal because the protestees winning margin was 149 votes while that of the
protestant - after the Court declared him a winner - was only a margin of 154 votes. Clearly,
the order of execution of judgment pending appeal was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
For these reasons, protestee-appellant seeks to recover the following:
1. Actual damages representing attorneys fees for the new counsel who handled the
Appeal and the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals x x x -P3 72, 5 00.00
2. Actual expenses for xerox copying of Appellants Brief and the annexes (14 copies at P
1.50 x x x -P11,235.00
3. Actual expenses for xerox copying of ballots x x x - P3,919.20
4. Actual damages for loss of salary and other emoluments since March 1994 as per
attached Certification issued by the Municipal Account of Kidapawan x x x - P96,832.00 (up
to October 1994 only)
Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code attorneys fees and expenses of litigation can be
recovered (as actual damages) in the case of clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding.
And, while the case of Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Carlos Tan (91 Phil. 724) disallowed
recovery of salaries and allowances (as damages) from elected officials who were later
ousted, under the theory that persons elected has (sic) a right to compensation during their
incumbency, the instant case is different. The protestee-appellant was the one elected. He
81
was ousted not by final judgment but by an order of execution pending appeal which was
groundless and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Protestant-appellee occupied the
position in an illegal manner as a usurper and, not having been elected to the office, but
merely installed through a baseless court order, he certainly had no right to the salaries and
emoluments of the office.
Actual damages in the form of reimbursement for attorneys fees (P3 72,500.00), actual
expenses for xerox copies (P15,154.00), unearned salary and other emoluments from March
1994 to April 1995 or 14 months at P12,104.00 a month (P169,456.00), totalled
P557,110.00. To (sic) this amount, however, P3 00,000.00 representing that portion of
attorneys fees denominated as success fee must be deducted this being premised on a
contingent event the happening of which was uncertain from the beginning. Moral damages
and exemplary damages claimed are, of course, disallowed not falling within the purview of
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It goes without saying that if the protestant-appellee fails to pay the actual damages of
P257,110.00, the amount will be assessed, levied and collected from the bond of
P500,000.00 which he put up before the Court as a condition for the issuance of the order of
execution of judgment pending appeal.[lx][22]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision on March 29, 1995.
The COMELEC en banc, however, did not find any new matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reconsideration of said decision
and accordingly affirmed in toto the said decision. Hence, this petition raises, among others,
the issue now solely remaining and in need of final adjudication in view of the mootness of
the other issues anent petitioners right to the contested office the term for which has
already expired.
We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner
no breach of contract or quasi-contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable
for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to a specific
provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party. [lxi][23]
We
find
respondent
damages
COMELECs reasoning
in question to be
in
awarding
fatally flawed.
the
The COMELEC
found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own
appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial court.
Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that this is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is
nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest
private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous
ruling of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the filing of a
case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear
proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be penalized.
WITHOUT BASIS,
having
been
clearly
unfounded
one
under
the
aforementioned circumstances.
Respondent COMELEC also found the order granting execution of judgment pending appeal
to be defective because of alleged non-compliance with the requirement that there be a
good and special reason[lxii][24] to justify execution pending appeal. We, however, find that
the
exercise
prerogatives
granting
issuing
of its
the order
First, it
should be noted that the applicability of the provisions of the Rules of Court, relating to
execution pending appeal, has ceased to be debatable after we definitively ruled in Garcia
vs. de Jesus[lxiii][25] that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows
to
the
proclamation
made
by
the
Board
of
Canvassers.[lxv][27]
x x x Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right
to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision
of a court of justice? Indeed x x x the board of canvassers is composed of persons who are
less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their
being more apt to yield extraneous considerations x x x
x x x.[lxvi][28]
Capping
this combination of circumstances which impel the grant of immediate execution is the
undeniable urgency involved in the political situation in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato. The appeal before the COMELEC would undoubtedly cause the political vacuum in
said municipality to persist, and so the trial court reasonably perceived execution pending
appeal to be warranted and justified. Anyway, the bond posted by petitioner could cover
any damages suffered by any aggrieved party. It is true that mere posting of a bond is not
enough reason to justify execution pending appeal, but the nexus of circumstances
aforechronicled considered together and in relation to one another, is the dominant
consideration for the execution pending appeal.[lxvii][29]
Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking
legal sanction. Respondent COMELEC ruled that inapplicable in the instant case is the ruling
in Rodriguez vs. Tan[lxviii][30] because while in that case the official ousted was the one
proclaimed by the COMELEC, in the instant case, petitioner was proclaimed winner only by
the trial court and assumed office by virtue of an order granting execution pending appeal.
Again, respondent COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that
since petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the trial court and
assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting execution
pending appeal, the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper.
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one
who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,[lxix][31]
the
It
matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared
petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral
process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the
risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate
that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation
84
the
duties
pertaining
The
CLEARLY
ATTRIBUTABLE
TO
THE
that
damage
may
be
said
to
be
equivalent
to
no remedy.[lxxiii][35]
During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died. [lxxvi][3] Four days after such death
or on December 19, 1995, the trial court dismissed the election protest ruling as it
did that
and/or
Substitution
with
Motion
for
Reconsideration). [lxxviii][5]
private
aspirations
but
is
imbued
with
proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary
civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the
imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate
elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and
procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs.
Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31,
1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the
public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary
cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of
an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political
opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any
manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its
final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62
Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings
in the election protest filed against him, and it may stated as a rule that an
election
[lxxxiii][11]
The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of
the contest nor ousts the trial court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. Apropos
is the following pronouncement of this court in the case of Lomugdang v. Javier:[lxxxiv][12]
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public
interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not
abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so rule in Sibulo Vda. de Mesa vs.
Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 29, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to
hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57),
and that the protestees cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest
nor detract the Courts jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).[lxxxv][13]
The asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled
to be substituted in the election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal
basis. Categorical was our ruling in Vda. de Mesa and Lomugdang that:
x x x the Vice Mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the
proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein.
protestee is unseated, the Vice-Mayor succeeds to the office of Mayor that becomes vacant
if the one duly elected can not assume the post.[lxxxvi][14]
To finally dispose of this case, we rule that the filing by private respondent of his Omnibus
Petition/Motion on January 15, 1996, well within a period of thirty days from December 19,
1995 when Jamillas counsel informed the trial court of Jamillas death, was in compliance
with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court, though not
generally applicable to election cases, may however be applied by analogy or in a
suppletory character,[lxxxvii][15] private respondent was correct to rely thereon.
The above jurisprudence is not ancient; in fact these legal moorings have been recently
87
CASE NO. 19. Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality
of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.
During
petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city,
to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000
ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of
Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos.
ANSWER no 19: As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that
the
Consequently, the
inhabitants
These
88
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal
mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon this Court
involving the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,[39][18] the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who became the
mayor by operation of law and who served the remainder of the mayors term should be
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under
the Constitution. Private respondent in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon
the death of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He
was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when private
respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for the
remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must be one for which [the
official concerned] was elected.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the
position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local government unit. The nature of
the responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor.
The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the
present case, petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city,
continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were
changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no
substantial change occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the
inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC,[40][19] petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as
mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his
proclamation and filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that
there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the May
1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor.
petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had already served three
consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner therein cannot be considered
as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the
May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office
by reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that
deemed
abolished
due
to
the
89
conversion.
Unlike in
Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from
office,
respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall elections. Therein
respondent Hagedorn had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992
until 2001 and did not run in the immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002,
the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On
August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the
recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the ground that he cannot run
for the said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that
the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of
terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his
third term and before the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the
service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a
few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months
respectively. Indeed,
which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants
of
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
particular
local
government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception
to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor
would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC,[43][22] he
should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes.
On the
contrary, this Court held in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not
necessarily entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the
winner of the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would have
been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the
present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to
be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making the
winning candidates election a nullity. [44][23] In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes
were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner
Latasa.[45][24] The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular
election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
which should be filled by succession.[46][25] LATASA V. COMELEC, 154829, DEC. 10, 2003
CASE NO. 20. Distinguish domicile from residence within the framework of
election law.
RESIDENCE
DOMICILE,
as
far
as
election
law
is
concerned.
Answer no 20: DOMINO V. COMELEC, 134015, JULY 19, 1999 It is doctrinally settled that the
term
means the
SAME THING
as domicile,
presence
[21]
which
personal
[xc][22]
be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time.[xci][23]
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur [xcii][24] and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights,
Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established a new domicile of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
To successfully effect a
change
of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. [xciv][26] In other words, there
must
basically
be
animus
manendi
change of residence
residence
actual.
The
coupled
with
purpose to remain in
indefinite period
must
be
of time; the
voluntary;
new domicile
and
the
must be
[xcv][27]
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein
in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that
place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
92
To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative
of
that
intention.
[xcvi][28]
PHYSICAL PRESENCE
No change of domicile
will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without
actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of
physical presence without intention.[xcvii][29]
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a
change of domicile.
INTENTION TO RESIDE
NOT
abandonment
domicile.
of
ones
original
how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
[xcviii][30]
Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as
the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further,
strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of
the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance is a doubtful case upon the
93
place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. [xcix][31] The fact that a party
is a
his domicile.
[c][32]
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over
which he had no control cannot be sustained.
purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.:
June 14, 15, 21, and 22.[ci][33]
While,
Dominos
intention
to
establish
residence
in
that he sought
and
[ciii][35]
and his
[civ][36]
and
void.
[cv][37]
It is a principle that the House Electoral Tribunal is an independent body and that each
member also enjoys security of tenure. The membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause. What are some of these just causes?
party that he represents (d) formal affiliation with another political party or
removal for other valid cause.
after proclamation
file
exceptions
an
election protest.
to this rule?
proclamation
is
3. The rule is that there is no rule, constitutional or statutory, which provides for an appeal
from a decision or final order or resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
In this case, how or what procedure is possible inorder to reverse the ruling of the HRET?
Judicial review
Supreme Court,
through a
special civil
Kabataan (SK)
before
by the
his
Before
after
the
matter
shall
be
filed
before
the
protests. Will this prohibition apply also to election protests involving barangay
officials? Explain.
Not allowed.
demurrer
to
evidence
is
not allowed in
evidence.
8.
The
to an
election contest.
annulment of
an
election
in an
two
may be
raised
grounds
as an
for an
election protest?
good
bad ones.
be distinguished
from the
conditions are established that the annulment of the election can be justified
because
In other words,
and
the
disenfranchised
election protest
good
good reason
reason must
(b) the
be
stated
in the
PUBLIC INTEREST
good
order
the
LENGTH OF TIME
(Ramas v.
Relongpango
v.
Comelec
(1995);
Malaluan
v.Comelec;
Zarate
v.
10.A violation of any of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, which is
specifically penalized
is
under
not
thereof
Answer:
(Malinias v.
Comelec(2002).
1. In a petition for a
not
consider petitioner's
failure of
97
election
in Sultan Gumander.
by the
COMELEC?
Answer:(G.R.
No.
L-58309-10,February
25,
1982,MANGACOP
MANGCA
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS) Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is
null and void for being violative of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 is
provisions
are
untenable.
inapplicable
Firstly,
both cited
since the
while COMELEC
applies only
"
election contests"
per
and "
Sec.
thereof,
to
Null
Proclamation
and
Void
the
Canvass
and
cited
by
Copacabana
do
NOT
grounds
warrant
execution
QUESTION: On the basis of the facts above stated, who should be the rightful winner of the
election?
Jose Nunag, the petitioner should be the rightful baangay captain. By analogy, the
case of GUIEB is applicable.(G.R. No. 118118,August 14, 1995ALFREDO GUIEB vs. LUIS M.
FONTANILLA, ET AL.) The private respondent should have appealed the decision of the MTC
to the COMELEC; the MTC should not have given due course to the appeal; and the RTC
should have dismissed outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.In accepting the appeal
and deciding the case on its merits, the respondent judge manifested either ignorance or
palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and decision. It must be noted
that a judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of
his court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the laws; it
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. 16 Canon 4 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be "studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if
the respondent judge were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional provision and
decision, he would have cut short the journey of a very simple case and put an end to the
litigation. What this Court stated in Aducayen vs. Flores 17 deserves reiteration:Nor is this all
that has to be said. There is need, it does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts,
which according to the Constitution refer to all those outside this Tribunal, to exercise
greater care in the discharge of their judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Moreover, while it
becomes hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum of
effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that
they betray awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case,
then resort to us would be less frequent. That way our time could be devoted to questions of
greater significance. Not only that, there would be on the part of party litigants less expense
and greater faith in the administration of justice, if there be a belief on their part that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles. Such an indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as a
manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The situation thus calls for a more conscientious and
diligent approach to the discharge of judicial functions to avoid the imputation that there is
on the part of a number of judges less than full and adequate comprehension of the
law.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 31 August
1994 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and its order of 25 November
1994 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the said court to entertain and decide the
appeal. The decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
is hereby declared final for failure of the private respondent to appeal the same before the
proper forum, and the writ of execution to enforce the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
4.
These
cases
were
consolidated
because
they
have
the
same
objective;
the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent,
Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was
elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
100
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January
13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3') petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87- 595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC
No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on
January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the
petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a
green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued
to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may
freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children
there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all
previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception
of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
does
not
sufficiently
establish
that
he
has
On the contrary,
As
the
respondent
meets
the
basic
ANSWER:The comelec is
INCORRECT.Miguel
did
NOT posses
green card,
resident
or
which
immigrant
proves
that
it of the
he
is
permanent
United States,
but the
disqualified to become
therefore,
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality
where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office
must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess
that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided
in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January
18, 1988.In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent
residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the
resident aliens
incapable
of such
of a
assumption
is that
foreign country
duties
under
the
laws
of
the
immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never really intended to live
there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to
the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for
immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the
United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will
not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving
him the best of both worlds so to speak. Miguel's application for immigrant status and
102
permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it.
surrendered
his
green
card
to
the
5. During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T. Capco vied for the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros, which was won by Capco by a margin of
6,330 votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed and has since been serving as Mayor of
Pateros.
Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence terrorism
and analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and
unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC a
petition to declare a failure of election and nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the
Pateros Board of Canvassers.
The COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition.
Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to Supreme Court,
arguing the same matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He avers that the COMELEC
en banc does not have the power to hear and decide the merits of the petition he filed below
because under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including preproclamation controversies, "shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
QUESTION: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? Is the procedure adopted proper? On
the above facts, who should be the rightful mayor?
tenable;
thenis the
the
procedure
adopted was
rightful mayor.(G.R.
Contention
is
not
improper; Capco
BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL). In reality, Borja's petition was nothing
but
simple
election
protest
involving
an
elective
103
municipal position
falls
within
the
appropriate
of
the
Election contests for municipal offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a
municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days
after
proclamation
COMELEC
of
the
in
results
of
the
turn
election.
(Emphasis
exercises
supplied)
The
appellate
The
COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borja's petition, not only for being
deficient in form
but
also
for
having
been
filed
before
the
wrong tribunal. This reason need not even be stated in the body of the
decision as the same is patent on the face of the pleading itself. Nor can Borja claim that he
was denied due process because when the COMELEC en banc reviewed and evaluated his
petition, the same was tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case. The fact that Capco was
not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein certainly did not deprive him of his day in
court. If anybody here was aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco
whose arguments were never ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was because the
COMELEC's actuation was favorable to him.
cannot
be
discretion,
said
let
to
alone
have
committed
grave
abuse
abuse
of
thereof,
in
provisions
of
the
law,
it
deserves,
not
6. For your resolution is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set
aside the resolution dated May 7, 2001 of the Commission on Elections as well as the
resolution dated May 12, 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001
for
the
disqualification
candidate
ground
that
of
petitioner
Nestor
Magno
mayoralty
as
of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the
petitioner
was
Sandiganbayan
of
four
counts
of
direct
bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on
July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of
prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the
Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting
the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running
for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
QUESTION: IS THE COMELEC correct in its ruling? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: COMELEC was
qualified
to
run
convicted
after
service of sentence
discharge
7.
It
appears
that
of
while
the
the
Quezon
election
candidates were
canvassing
two
years
in the case
still
from
at bar from
probation.
canvassing
winning
or
of a crime is
City
returns
Board
but
of
Canvassers
was
BEFORE
the
proclaimed,
petition
of votes and/or
seeking to
petitioner commenced
suspend
proclamation
the
105
to
While
the
petition
COMELEC,
the
was
pending
before
the
including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it.
Hence this petition.
Alleging
that
to a
before ruling on his petition. He then proceeded to argue that the election returns
106
themselves, as well as the minutes of the canvassing committee of the City Board of
Canvassers were, by themselves, sufficient evidence to support the petition.
QUESTIONS:
1) Rule on the contention of the petitioner: whether he was deprived of due process.
2)Are his grounds valid to justify a failure of election?
NO.
No.
3) In your opinion, is the remedy availed by him proper? If not proper, what is the corrct
No
nothing
declaration
alleged
therein
at all that
support
elections
bereft
of any
an
action
for
He
never
not held or
were either
With respect to
could
failure of elections.
of
suspended.
that
failure to elect
substantive support
failure to elect
to
came about.
pre-proclamation controversy,
it is well to
note that the scope of pre-proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated
under
reason
underlying the
delimitation
controversies
consistent
should be
11 The
pre-proclamation
summarily decide,
desire
that the
canvass
and
12
That
is
why
such
questions
which
require
more
107
deliberate
necessarily
and
consideration,
are
left
for
examination
in
longer
the
corresponding
protest. 13
However,
issues
proper
for
of NO CONSEQUENCE
situation is that a
COMELEC
is
remedies
for
pre-proclamation case
no longer viable,
being a regular
the
more
appropriate
election protest
quo warranto
before the
or a petition
exceptions 15 to the foregoing rule but found nothing that could possibly apply to the
instant case based on the recitations of the petition. What is more, in paragraph 3 of the
COMELEC's Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on Pending Cases) dated June
29, 1998, it is clearly stated therein that "All other pre-proclamation cases . . . shall be
deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A. 7166. 16 (Emphasis supplied). Section 16
which
is
referred
to
in
the
aforecited
omnibus
resolution
refers
to
the
process
in that he was not allowed to present his evidence before the COMELEC to
fail.
Election Code
misplaced. The
COMELEC
est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. The statutory
provision cannot be expanded to embrace any other situation not contemplated therein such
as the one at bar where the COMELEC is not taking ant step to suspend or annul a
proclamation.
8. As a general rule, the filing of the election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes
the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amount to the abadonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon
the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
1.What is the reason for this general rule?
is no longer viable.
2.What are the exceptions to the general rule above cited.
that a
no longer viable.(Gallardo
v. Rimando,
G.R. No. 91798, 13 July 1990, 187 SCRA 463; Casimiro v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 84462-63, 29
March 1989, 171 SCRA 468; Salvacion v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 84673-74, 21 February 1989,
170 SCRA 513; Padilla v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 68351-52, 9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424.) The
109
rule
admits
canvassers
not
the
exceptions,
of
was
board
of
was
proper remedy;
petition
for
or
(c)
as
where:
(a)
the
was
not
really a
petition to annul
petition
however,
an
election
protest
expressly
made
proclamation
was
null
and
or
void.(see
2.
purely administrative
and
not
quasi-judicial matter/nature
When
the
required
number
of
votes cannot
be
of
failure
of
4. In the exercise of
5. In
jurisdiction
of
COMELEC en banc.(see
p.
111
Agpalo)
10. FELIPE L. LAODENIO, petitioner, and ROGELIO LONGCOP, respondent, were candidates
for the position of Mayor of Mapanas, Northern Samar, during the 8 May 1995 elections. On
15 May 1995 Longcop was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.On 20
May 1995 Laodenio filed a petition with respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
annul the proclamation of Longcop and to declare illegal the constitution of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers as well as its proceedings. He alleged in his petition that
During the canvass, respondent board of canvassers adjourned repeatedly starting May 9,
1995, after the poll clerk of precinct no. 7-A testified before the Board that the election
returns for the said precinct was tampered with and falsified to increase the total votes cast
in favor of respondent Longcop from 88 to 188.
On 10 May 1995, the Board resumed its canvass but it adjourned again at past 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon as it has (sic) not yet decided on what to do with the election returns for
precinct (sic) nos. 7-A and 5-A. When it adjourned on May 10, 1995 it announced that it will
(sic) only resume canvass on 12 May 1995 at the capital town of Catarman, Northern Samar.
110
The Board however reconvened on 12 May 1995 in Mapanas and proceeded with the
canvass. The respondent board thereafter adjourned and surreptitiously reconvened on 15
May 1995, with a new chairman who was allegedly appointed by the Provincial Election
Supervisor.When the election returns from Precinct (sic) Nos. 5-A and 7-A were (sic) about to
be canvassed, petitioner manifested his oral objections thereto and likewise submitted his
written objection on the same day, 12 May 1995.
The respondent board however did not give the petitioner opportunity of file an appeal
(from?) its decision to proceed with the canvass of the election returns from precinct (sic)
nos. 7-A and 5-A. fter a thorough discussion of the two legal counsel, the members of the
board of canvassers denied the objections of Laodenio on the ground that an oral objection
should simultaneously be filed with a written objection in a proper form. Majority of the
board voted for the inclusion of the returns from precinct 7-A on the ground that the protest
was not in proper form. The parties were notified of the ruling of the Board in open session.
The Chairman of the Board start(ed?) to open the envelopeof precinct no. 7-A and the same
was examined by counsel of the both parties. 7The Board, upon examination of the returns
from precinct 7-A; found it to be inside an envelope with serial no. 073983 signed by all the
members of the Board and with paper seal no. 516478 likewise signed by all of them. The
returns bore the respective signatures and thumbmarks of the poll clerk, the third member
and all six watchers. The Minutes disclosed further that on May 12, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., the
members of the Board resume to canvass the election returns for precinct 7-A. It was
supposed to canvass last May 10, 1995, but was deferred because the Board waited for
protestant Laodenio to file his appeal from our ruling on May 10, 1995. Since there was no
appeal, the Board proceeded with the canvass of precinct 7-A.
At 2:37 p.m., Laodenio filed his protest in proper form but the board denied the protest on
the ground that it was filed out of time. The protest was filed after the canvass of the
election returns was completed. With regard to the action of the Board on the election
returns from precinct 5-A, the Minutes narrated as follows Precinct 5-A. An envelope with
serial no. 073973 signed by all the members of the board with paper seal. The envelope is in
good condition. The election returns was properly signed by all members of the board with
their thumbmarks and the watchers have also their signatures and thumbmarks in the
corresponding spaces. An oral protest was filed by petitioner. At 4:49 p.m., a protest in
prescribed form was filed. At 8:00 p.m., the Board of Canvassers voted as follows: The
chairman for exclusion and the two members for inclusion because on its face the election
returns does not have any sign of tampering and that when the election returns copy for the
Municipal Trial Court was opened to compare with the contested returns the entries are (sic)
the same. The parties were informed of the ruling in open session. After the ruling, the
protestant did not indicate his intention to appeal.
On 25 May 1995 petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court.
On 28 August 1995 respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition of Laodenio for
lack of merit. 2 It was of the view that the adjournments were justified and were not
improperly prolonged as claimed by petitioner; he was in fact deemed to have acquiesced to
the new composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers when he actively participated in
the proceedings therein; there was no showing that he manifested on time his intent to
appeal the rulings of the Board, neither was there any proof that he appealed therefrom;
and, on the authority of Padilla v. Commission on Elections 3 the pre-proclamation
controversy was no longer viable since Longcop had already been proclaimed and had
assumed office. On 23 October 1995 the motion for reconsideration was denied. 4
111
Petitioner raises these issues: (1) The direct filing of a petition with COMELEC to
contest the illegal conduct of the Board of Canvassers is allowed under Rule 27, Sec. 4, of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and, (2) The pre-proclamation controversy was not
rendered moot and academic by the filing of an ordinary election protest
QUESTION: Is LAODENIO correct?
ANSWER: Laodenio is
filing of the
incorrect. ALTHOUGH
PETITION
COMPOSITION
directly to the
of the
to
QUESTION
BOC
may
the
the
BE DONE
and
only when it
file
COMELEC,
his
appeal
to
the
112
the filling
controversy
or
was
made
ad
protest
was
alleges
filed
as a
that the
election
precautionary
appropriated
remedy.
Respondent
Longcop
having
been
proceedings
are
summary
in
petitioner.
An
a.
election protest
from a
pre-proclamation
controversy
PRE PROC
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
Sec. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to
affecting
the
proceedings
CANVASSERS
or coalition of political parties
of
any question
the
pertaining to or
BOARD
OF
preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
ELECTION RETURNS.
2
3
4
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues
that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
115
5
6
7
8
the lapse
of
FIVE DAYS
executory after
ELECTION PROTEST
returns
contesting
the
elections
or
with the Commission by any candidate who was voted for in the same office
and who Commission by any candidate who was voted for in the same office
and who received the second or third highest number of votes or, in a multislot position, was among the next four candidates following the last ranked
winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election
contained in the Statement of Votes. The party filing the protest shall be
designated as the protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the
protestee.
provincial
or
city
official
on
the
ground
of
INELIGIBILITY OR OF DISLOYALTY TO
THE REPUBLIC of the Philippines may file a petition for
quo
warranto
Department.
with
the
Electoral
Contests
Adjudication
13. In a decision of the Commission on Elections that declared the Luis Hapitan as the real
winner in an election contest, it awarded damages, consisting of attorney's fees, actual
expenses for xerox copies, unearned salary and other emoluments for the period, from
March 1994 to April, 1995, en masse denominated as actual damages.
Is this decision allowable under the Election Code? Explain.
116
14. Distinguish the enforcement from the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC.Cite
examples.
15. During the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Corazon L. Cabagnot and private
respondent Florencio T. Miraflores were candidates for the governorship of Aklan province.
Miraflores was proclaimed winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Alleging various
irregularities, Cabagnot filed on May 16, 1995 with the respondent Commission a
"Memorandum of Appeal" 3 docketed as Comelec Case No. SPC 95-094 and a "Petition" for
disqualification of Miraflores 4 identified as Sp. Proc. No. SPA 95-233. a few days thereafter,
on May 22, 1995, she submitted to said Commission a "Petition Ad Cautelam" 5 docketed as
EPC No. 95-25 which is an alternative election protest seeking to impugn the election and
proclamation of private respondent Miraflores.
On January 23, 1996, the Comelec First Division issued the first assailed Order
designating Kalibo, Aklan as the venue for the revision of ballots. On February 16, 1996,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "there is imperative need to
maintain the venue of the revision of ballots in Manila, a neutral place . . . to insulate the
(said) revision . . . from disorderly partisan activities which could delay and/or disrupt the
proceedings." It also "noted that Cabagnot had requested for initial revision of only 3 out of
the 7 municipalities being contested, so as to save time, effort and expenses of all
concerned. And Cabagnot is willing to shoulder the required and necessary expenses (for the
change of venue to Manila), if only to determine the true results of the election".
On
that
"(t)he
designation
of
the
venue
for
the
power,
the
Commission
is
granted
wide
The COMELEC is
Main Office in Manila, thus :Sec. 9. Venue of the revision. The revision of
the ballots shall be made in the office of the clerk of court concerned or at such places as
the Commission or Division shall designate and shall be completed within three (3) months
from the date of the order, unless otherwise directed by the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied.)
16.In an election protest the COMELEC issued an Order which stated that in the performance
of its duty to find the truth and ascertain as to the true winner, it can make a determination
as to wheter ballots had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only
one hand, without need of calling handwriting experts or subjecting them to technical
examination.The protestant objected to that order, praying that a handwriting expert must
be commissioned to do the work.
Is the protestant correct? Protestant is
243 SCRA 706 [1995]; Bulaong v. COMELEC, supra; Bocobo v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 576
[1990]. we held that:
the ballots
technical examination of
should have been ordered to determine whether they had been written by
The
rule
is
settled
that
the
118
not indispensable in
examining or
while
comparing
handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence
aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an
itself
being sufficient
inspection
protest
election
with the Regional Trial Court of Agusan. On June 29, 1994, the trial Court
votes
of the ballot
decision were sent to and received by Relampagos and Cumba on July 1, 1994.On the same
day, Cumba appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying
the proper appellate docker fees. On July 8, 1994 the trial court gave due course to the
notice of appeal.On July 12, 1994, Relampagos filed with the trial court a
motion
whimsical abuse
of
discretion
motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all
too
on 1 July
within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any
motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is
deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule
43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties
to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal
and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC.
Upon the
only
on 12 July 1994, or
It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the
COMELEC
has
extraordinary
the
writs
of
jurisdiction
certiorari,
to
issue
the
prohibition,
and
CASTROMAYOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) What has just been said also
disposes of petitioner's other contention that because his proclamation has already been
made, any remedy of the losing party is an election protest. As held in the Duremdes case:It
is DUREMDES' further submission that this proclamation could not be declared null and void
because a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made,
the proper recourse being an election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that there
has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. (Aguam vs.
COMELEC, L-28955, 28 May 1968, 23 SCRA 883). It should be pointed out, in this connection,
that what is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is
merely tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the
election returns. In making the correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an
administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any
question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en
banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.
19.Gatchalian and Aruelo were rival candidates for vice-mayor in the May 11, 1992
elections. On May 13, Gatchalian was declared winner by a margin of 4 votes. Aruelo filed a
petition to annul the proclamation of Gatchalian on May 22, 1992. Pending the resolution of
his petition, Aruelo filed with the RTC an election protest ex abundante cautela, for which he
paid P610 as docket fee (which fell short of P150).
Gatchalian filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the election protest was filed out of time,
and that the RTC had no jurisdiction on the same.
Is Gatchalian correct? Explain
.( G.R. No. 107979 June 19, 1995,DANILO F. GATCHALIAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL.)The election
it was
Aruelo had ten days from May 13, 1992 to file an election protest. Instead of filing an
election protest, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a pre-proclamation case against Gatchalian
on May 22, 1992, or nine days after May 13, 1992.
docket fees for the claim of damages and attorney's fees. For failure to pay the filing fee
prescribed under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the election protest
must be dismissed. Under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
"[n]o
of
three
hundred
pesos
manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the
end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512,
December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably
intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no
gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the
protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the
contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the
office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract
from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los
Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves
vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa
did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may stated as
a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite
the death of the protestee. 11The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes
a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court of its jurisdiction to decide
the election contest. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this court in the case of
Lomugdang v. Javier: 12Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter
clothed with public interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly
commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so rule in
Sibulo Vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 29, 1966, in the same
spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense
(Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in office is not a ground
for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Courts jurisdiction to decide the case
(Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584). 13The
asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled to be
substituted in the election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal basis.
Categorical was our ruling in Vda. de Mesa and Lomugdang that:. . . the Vice Mayor elect has
the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to
intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the Frotestee is unseated, the Vice-Mayor
succeeds to the office of Mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected can not assume
the post. 14To finally dispose of this case, we rule that the filing by private respondent of his
Omnibus Petition/Motion on January 15, 1996, well within a period of thirty days from
December 19, 1995 when Jamilla's counsel informed the trial court of Jamilla's death, was in
compliance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court,
though not generally applicable to election cases, may however be applied by analogy or in
a suppletory character, 15 private respondent was correct to rely thereon.
QUIZZER
QUESTION: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in
the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against him or in a civil action for damages
against him?
Accordingly,
there
is
clear
conflict
of
123
investigation
stage
of
the
counsel
of
the
People
of
the
case
is
brought
on
appeal.
This
terms
It
is
and
a
provisions
situation
which
125