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RULE81-85
LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. PASTOR T.
QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO January 31, 1984
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the
defendants-appellants paid P304.50 under each indemnity
agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums and
documentary stamps.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the
defendants-appellants. Defendants-appellants appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the Court of Appeals in
a resolution certified the herein case to this Court after
finding that this case involves only errors or questions of law.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a
rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the
bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an
all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over
the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of
legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for
the every purpose for which it was filed.. It is the duty of the
courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of
the deceased persons by intervening in the administration
thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be
done.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8.
9.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to
the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question
of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of
settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing
"finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to
determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not
property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be
sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
2.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to render a
final account of her administration within ten (10) days from
receipt
hereof.
"Paulina R. Santos de Parreo is appointed special
administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes
de Santos and upon her filing a bond in the amount of
P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, letters of
special administration be issued to her.
A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which
prompted Gregoria Aranzanso to appeal the order.
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court was justified in
revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as the
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed
regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes
may be removed from her office but only for a cause or
causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is
found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads
as follows:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
ADMINISTRATORS, GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL. The law on
removal of appointed regular administrators is found in Rule
82, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows; "Sec.
2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies,
resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be
granted
to
any
suitable
person.
REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR MAY BE REMOVED ONLY FOR
CAUSE. Appellant having been appointed regular
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be
removed from her office but only for a cause or causes
provided by law. The decision of this Court, cited in the
appealed order that she, among other persons, is without
right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in
question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of
Court.
ORDER REMOVING APPELLANT AS ADMINISTRATOR SET
ASIDE. The decision denied to appellant the right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana
Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He
can be a stranger to the deceased. Her intervention in the
settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although
she might be one if her direct attack on the adoptions of the
two girls should succeed. The order removing appellant as
administrator is set aside and she is reinstated as
administrator of the intestate estate in question.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
the decision dated December 27, 1985 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court 1 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Special
Proceeding No. 84520 removing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
administratrix and appointing private respondent Rosa Lim
Kalaw in her stead as the administratrix of the estate of their
late
father
Carlos
Lim
Kalaw.
It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate,
Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance
of Letters of Administration with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming
Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old), Victoria Lim Kalaw (57 years
old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw (43
years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.
TC issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a
preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into
her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her
late
father.
The trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as
the judicial administratrix of said estate and a Letter of
Administration was issued to the petitioner after the latter
took her oath of office.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration of said estate
which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz.
RES.
judge issued
render an accounting
instruction that said
petitioner since the
returned to the Court
not
received
PR Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura
Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix of their fathers estate and to appoint instead
private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of
petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of
her administration since her appointment as administratrix
more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to
render an accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof. She
likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion
praying for her removal as administratrix alleging that the
delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that
Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the
intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted
to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a
considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel
Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to
said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to
render
an
accounting
report.
IAC GRANTED REMOVAL.Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw is
hereby REMOVED as such Administratrix of the Estate of the
late
Carlos
Lim
Kalaw."
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the appellate court in sustaining respondent Judge
Diaz order removing her as judicial administratrix considering
that she had already submitted an accounting report covering
the period from December, 1977 to December, 1983 in
compliance with respondents Judge order.
ISSUE:
W/N
PETIONERS
ADMINITRATRIX PROPER.
REMOVAL
AS
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
the deceased Doa Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doa
Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only
heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F.
Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
Court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the
estate.
While petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical
treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes
filed a motion to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as coadministratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and
omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the
heirs.
Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an order which required Beatriz
F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition, if
any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still
in the United States attending to her ailing husband.
Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration
granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as
the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the respondent Judge
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent
Judge's order should be nullified on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by
respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided
under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept
resignation of executor or administrator.
Proceedings upon death, resignation or
removal If an executor or administrator
neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .
ISSUE: WON there is sufficient cause to reverse the order of
the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of
the estate.
HELD: YES. The rule is that if no executor is named in the
will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased who shall act as representative not
only of the court appointing him but also of the heirs and the
creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its discretion, the
probate court may appoint one, two or more coadministrators to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their
trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to
remove an administrator.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in
orderly and efficient administration.
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown,
the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her.
Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed
without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove
fruitless, then the probate court should ascertain what assets
constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to
those assets and whether the children of the second marriage
(the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the
principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still
have a share, howsoever small, in the decedent's estate.
We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set
aside because the probate court failed to receive evidence as
to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule
is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in
a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties
are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to
submit to the probate court the question of title to property
and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely
pass judgment thereon.
However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had
been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court
and be examined under oath as to how they came into the
possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of
Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover
the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco
vs. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil. 244).
The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's
estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the
transferees of some of the assets. The issue of prescription
should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal).
Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership
(Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the moment that a coheir
claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary
properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but that of
ownership (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).
At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration
some evidence was already introduced on the assets
constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. The petitioner
testified and presented Exhibits A to J and X to Y-3. The
oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The
stenographic notes for the said hearing should be transcribed.
In addition to that evidence. The probate court should require
the parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the
seven parcels of land and the materials of the two houses
enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961,
on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the
allegations in oppositors' inventory dated November 7, 1961.
After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide
once and for all whether there are still any assets of the
estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the
requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more
assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to
recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed,
it should dismiss the intestate proceeding.
SC - (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961,
granting the administratrix's motion of May 4, 1961 for the
delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other
order of December 11, 1961 approving the amended
inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on
the ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c)
this case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down in
this decision.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
undivided during her husband's lifetime and the heirs'
legitimes be satisfied from the fruits of yhe properties. Feliz
Balanay, Sr., though initially opposed to the probate for he
was preterited, later on relented and reniunced his share in
her estate.
FACTS:
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
the contractual relationship created between his
client Felix Leong and his family partnership over
properties
involved
in
the
ongoing
testate
proceedings.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
becoming the target of deceit and exploitation, Respondent
Atty. Jayme, and two of petitioner's nearest relatives
intervened in that proceeding and joined Atty. Madarang's
petition for guardianship.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
counsel. The oppositors may present proofs to rebut the
administrator's evidence in support of his accounts.
Administration expenses should be those which are necessary
for the management of the estate, for protecting it against
destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production
of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and
productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of
liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue
among the persons entitled thereto.
I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family
residence P10,399.59. As already shown above, these
expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the
terrace and interior of the family home, the renovation of the
bathroom, and the construction of a fence.
It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to
preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social
standing in the community.
Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the
co- owners. They were necessary for the preservation and use
of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the coowners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use
the family home in comfort, convenience and security.
We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the
use of the income of the estate to defray those expenses.
II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of
the family residence without paying rent P1 603.11
Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper,
light and water bills, and the cost of gas, oil floor wax and
switch nail
Those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de
Guzman, inuring to her benefit. Those expenses, not being
reasonable administration expenses incurred by the
administrator, should not be charged against the income of
the estate.
Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net
income of the estate. She occupied the house without paying
rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while
occupying the family residence.
III. Other expenses P558.20. Among these expenses is
the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which, as admitted by
the administrator
should be disallowed. Another item,
"representation expenses", was not explained. it should
likewise be disallowed.
The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad.
administration the sum of P268.65 which was incurred during
the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased.
Those expenses are disallowed because they have no
connection with the care, management and settlement of the
decedent's estate.
The other expenses for the lawyer's subsistence and the cost
of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator are
allowable expenses.
IV. Irrigation fee P1,049.58. represented the "allotments"
for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan
crop, which allotments were treated as "assumed expenses"
deducted as farming expenses from the value of the net
harvests.
The fact is that the said sum was paid by the administrator to
the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in the Official
Receipt. It was included in his accounting as part of the
farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a
legitimate expense of administration.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is
affirmed with the modifications that the sum of (a) P1,603.11
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether
separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming,
therefore, ex
gratia
argumenti, that
Atty.
Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the
fees in question before the respondent court could validly try
his "motion".
II.
It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an
executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees
from the estate.
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor
may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has
incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from
the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a
compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's
commissions, and never as attorney's fees. It is also left to
the sound discretion of the court.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
1.
REMEDIAL
LAW;
SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS;
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR, WHEN TO RENDER
ACCOUNTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. The rendering of an
accounting by an administrator of his administration within
one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by
the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception
is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of
time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the
debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist
in
the
case
at
bar.
2.
REMOVAL
OF ADMINISTRATOR;
JUSTIFIED, FOR
NEGLIGENCE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. subsequent
compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge
her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more
than six years, which justifies petitioners removal as
administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in
her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled
rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him.
As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, the sufficiency of any ground
for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to
or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to
interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the
matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless
positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.