RULE 128

B. Concept of Proof

1. DEFINITION

GOMEZ vs. GOMEZ-SAMSON

Facts: Metrobank foreclosed 2 real estate mortgages and won as

the highest bidder. They filed a petition for writ of possession but
was dismissed due to their failure to consolidated their ownership
of the properties
Issue: WON the question of consolidation of ownership is a
question of law.
Held: No. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts. The test is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence. If evaluation of evidence is needed, then it
is not a question of law, but of fact. Consolidation is essentially
factual in nature, as it requires the presentation of evidence.
VILLANUEVA vs. CA
Facts: In an action for collection of sum of money, petitioners were
ordered to pay their obligation including interest. They then filed a
petition before the SC averring that the lower court erred in
ordering them to pay the interest and that the amount of the
principal obligation is incorrect.
Issue: WON SC may review question of facts.
Held: No. The jurisdiction of SC in cases brought to it from the CA is
limited to the review of errors of law. Though the rule admits of
exceptions, petitioner failed to raise issues which would constitute
sufficient ground for the SC to reverse the findings of the trial and
appellate courts.

Facts: An action sought to declare null and void a donation inter

vivos which was allegedly executed fraudulently. The Donors Tax
was presented to prove the intercalation of the deeds of donation
on blank pieces of paper.
Issue: WON the factum probans in the case established the factum
probandum.
Held: No. The factum probandum petitioner is trying to establish
here is the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank
pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The factum
probans, which is the alleged payment of the Donors Tax after the
death of Consuelo, did not establish the factum probandum. Hence,
petition is denied.
FAR EAST MARBLE vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner Far East Marble received from private respondent
(the former Commercial Trust Bank Company which was absorbed
by BPI) the following, viz: a) several loans evidenced by promissory
notes; and b)the former was extended by the latter credit facilities
in the form of Trust Receipts. Petitioner Tabuenas (Ramon and Luis)
executed in favor of BPI a continuing guaranty whereby they
bound themselves, jointly and severally, to answer for the loan
obligations of Far East to the bank. Far East failed to pay its
obligations (both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and
Ramon and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with their solidary
liability under the continuing guaranty. As a result, in 1987,
private respondent BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel
mortgage with replevin against petitioners. Far East filed a
compulsory counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory notes but alleged further that it
has already prescribed, so it raised the defense of prescription and
lack of cause of action; it also denied that BPI made prior demands
for payment. BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear
affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of action against Far
East have not prescribed, since within 10 year from the time its

cause of action accued, various written extrajudicial demands were

made by BPI to Far East.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint based on prescription and lack of
cause of action. Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to
allege that the period of prescription was interrupted, the phrase
repeated requests and demands for payment is vague and
incomplete so as to establish in the minds of defendant, or to
enable the court to draw a conclusion, that demands or
acknowledgments of debt were made that could have interrupted
the period of prescription.

to the Complaint); (2) said promissory notes and trust receipts had
matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and demands for
payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.

CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for further
proceedings

Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated

requests and demands for payment, Far East has failed to pay" is
sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is
not a cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised,
should, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals (DBP vs.
Ozarraga, 15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent
evidence. But even as Far East raised the defense of prescription,
BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period was
interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for
payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.

Issue: WON BPI has no sufficient cause of action because the

phrase repeated requests and demands for payment is not
sufficient to state a cause of action?

SALITA v. MAGTOLIS

Held: Sec 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise

statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or
causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8
declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint,
"shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" are the essential and
substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right
and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions
of the defendant, while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to
prove or establish said ultimate facts.
Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1)
the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 732
[1991]); Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals et al., 170 SCRA 800
[1989]). These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint,
particularly when it was therein alleged that: (1) for valuable
consideration, BPI granted several loans, evidenced by promissory
notes, and extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to
Far East (photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly attached

FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married. They

separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin filed a petition for
annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity.
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a
bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his
Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita)
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she
was unable to understand and accept the demands made by
his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine
upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her
mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She
argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement
of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an
averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from
which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ."
The RTC upheld the sufficiency of the BOP. Hence, Joselita filed a
petition for certiorari against the order of RTC Judge Magtolis.

ISSUE: W/N the allegations in the BOP are the ultimate facts
needed to adequately and intelligently allow Joselita to prepare her
answer to the petition.
RULING: Yes. Ultimate facts have been defined as "those facts
which the expected evidence will support." As stated by private
respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements
are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on
the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very
definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A
motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should
form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information
may be obtained by other means.

BALITAAN v. CFI BATANGAS

FACTS: Balitaan filed an information for estafa against her
employee alleging that the latter did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
the sum of P127.58 to her (accused) own use and benefit.
During the presentation of Balitaan as the first witness for the
prosecution, a cash voucher allegedly received by the accused,
where 3 checks are indicated, was presented, identified and
marked as exhibit. The 3 checks have the ff amounts: P500, P500
and P632.97. During Balitaans testimony, counsel for the accused
objected averring that the presented evidence is immaterial. The
defense counsel argued that the information only states that the
sum of P127.58 was received by the accused, so that the presented
evidence, the checks having received in so much amount are
immaterial and irrelevant.
The prosecution maintained that there was already a testimony of
their witness that there is certain amount received and that portion
(P127.58) thereof was not delivered to the offended party; that
what they are proving are preliminary evidence going directly to
the present issue of P127.58; and that the exhibit and evidence is
germane as they want to show that there is misappropriation of the
amount from the total amount of P1,632.97.
The defense further argued that the information alleges that the
accused received the sum of P127.58; that the information does

not cite that this amount was only a part of the cash received, thus,
the presented evidence will be immaterial. However, the court
overruled the objection. At the close of the direct examination of
Balitaan, counsel for the accused moved to strike out the foregoing
testimonies but respondent court also denied the motion.
Petition for certiorari was filed by the defense before the CFI of
Batangas seeking to annul the orders of lower court overruling the
objections and denying the motion to strike out the testimony. CFI
granted the petition ordering the testimonies to be stricken out
from the record. Hence, this petition against the CFI.
ISSUE: W/N matters of evidence must be included in the
information.
RULING: As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished
from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be
averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an
information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded,
as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.
Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime
suffices. All that is required is that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him
intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her
conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Applying these principles, the Court ruled that the existence of the
three checks need not be alleged in the Information. This is an
evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein.

PARANAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC. v CA

FACTS: Lee Ching Bing assigned all his rights and interest in a
leased property to Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. (PKEI) by
virtue of a deed of assignment and with the conformity of the
Lessor-owner-defendant Santos. The Contract of Lease gives the
lessee the right of first refusal.
The property being leased was sold to a third party, not the PKEI,
for 5M. PKEI sent a letter to Santos requesting her to rectify the
error and consequently realizing her error, Santos had it
reconveyed to her and offered it to PKEI for 15M. PKEI refused to
buy it for 15M and counter-offered to buy the property for 5M.

Santos did not reply to the counter-offer and eventually sold it to

her first buyer for 9M.
These facts were alleged in the complaint of PKEI. Santos moved to
dismiss the complaint stating that it states no cause of action since
it is clear that Santos already made the offer to PKEI but the latter
rejected.
RTC and CA granted the motion and dismissed the complaint
stating that the complaint created a cause of action but neutralized
itself by its subsequent averments which erased or extinguished its
earlier allegations of an impending wrong. It was further stated that
there was an absent of any actionable wrong in the very face of the
Complaint itself. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N a complaint has to establish facts proving the existence
(factum probandum) of a cause of action.
2. W/N the factual allegations (factum probans) in the complaint,
which were hypothetically admitted by the adverse party,
constitute bases for deciding a case on the merits.
RULING:
1. No. A cause of action already exists if the following elements are
present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right,
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.
In determining whether allegations (factum probans, as
hypothetically admitted by the defendant) of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts
proving the existence of a cause of action (factum probandum) at
the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case.
2. No. Although a careful examination of the complaint reveals that
it sufficiently alleges an actionable contractual breach (factum
probans) on the part of private respondents, whether there was
actual breach (factum probandum) which entitled petitioner to

damages and/or other just or equitable relief, is a question which

can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party
can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and
defenses.
Having come to the conclusion that the complaint states a valid
cause of action for breach of the right of first refusal and that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, private respondents,
however, cannot be denied their day in court.
While, in the resolution of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the facts
alleged (factum probans) in the complaint are theoretically
admitted, such admission is merely hypothetical and only for the
purpose of resolving the motion. In case of denial, the movant is
not to be deprived of the right to submit its own case and to submit
evidence to rebut the allegations in the complaint.
NOTE: Emphases here are supplied by me including the words
factum probans and factum probandum words in the
parentheses. There were no clear mentions of such words in the
case. I just sought to relate the case with the topic under which it
was assigned; hence, I came up with this content of the digest. IT
IS ADVISABLE THAT YOU READ THE WHOLE CASE (its just short
anyway) AS I MIGHT HAVE INTERPRETED IT INCORRECTLY. Please
share to us if you have a different interpretation should you decide
to read it in its entirety.

C. Uses of Evidence
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the PCGG, represented by the
Republic, against Tantoco Jr. and Santiago before the
Sandiganbayan. In response, the defendants filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion for Bill of Particulars but it was denied.
The case was set for Pre-Trial.
Before the scheduled Pre-trial, a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents were filed by the defendants.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents. In opposition
thereto, PCGG filed an MR alleging, among others, that (1) the
interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of

fact which defendants sought to (extract) through their aborted

Motion for Bill of Particulars;" and that (2) the interrogatories "are
really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and
irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to
first present its evidence."
The MR was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N evidentiary matters maybe inquired into by the parties
prior to trial.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that the office of a bill of particulars is
limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a
pleading. It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the
common perception is that said evidentiary details are made known
to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is
adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings. However,
the truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and
learned by the parties before the trial. The Rules of Court make this
possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in
Rules 24 to 29.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions
or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is
called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to
all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or
evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The
objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible
information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain
evidence for use upon said trial.
The deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing
expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to discovery, even when
permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial
intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules, limitations inevitably
arise when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass,
or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And . . . further
limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh
unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and

not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law.
In this case, some of the documents are, according to the
verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the
material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be
used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into
which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the
end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial.
The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in
relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is
indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.

FORTUNE CORPORATION v. CA
FACTS: A motion to take oral deposition, after written deposition
was made, of the main witness was denied. The lower court in
denying the motion states that petitioner had already taken the
written deposition and that they already denied the same as
offered evidence.
ISSUES: W/N the taking of oral deposition and its use as evidence
in the trial should be allowed.
RULING: Yes. Where a more comprehensive examination of the
adverse party is desired it should ordinarily be done by taking his
deposition. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant,
whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, expecting only those
matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give
every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts
before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.

2. ADMISSIBILITY, WEIGHT OR CREDIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE vs. PARUNGAO
FACTS: Parungao was pointed by his inmates as a conspirator and
the mastermind of the jailbreak. The inmates testimonies were
based on what they heard.

ISSUE: W/N the testimonies of the other inmates were admissible

against Parungao.
RULING: No. The testimonies are not admissible being merely
hearsay because those are matters not of their own personal
knowledge but matters only narrated to them by other inmates.

PRATS AND COMPANY v. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY

FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in
the RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from the Phoenix
Insurance Co. the sum of P117,800.60 with interest, by reason of a
loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for
said loss was covered by insurance issued by the defendant
company. Phoenix Insurance admitted the insurance of the
insurance but by way of special defense, alleged that the fire in
question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and
the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a
fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of the express terms of the
policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint
with respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93 with
interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys
received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of
remnants of the insured stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or
connived therein and submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge
found.
RULING: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show
that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing
of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of
the contents of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases of
old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of
being taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in
the back part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office.
Also, the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm
box not to allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already
have done it, when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never

touched and he himself turned on the alarm. The finding of the

trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the
support of his claim is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had
submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P
12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600;
and secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the
insurance company the value of the goods which had been
surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. As
a conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or
connive therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof

PEOPLE v. ABALOS
FACTS: In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio
Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, were having a
heated argument, a woman shouted Police officer, help us!
Somebodys making trouble here. The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then
appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos, What is it, sir?
The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face
him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused
hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick,
three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera
vehicle. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with
that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at
the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious
in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he
sustained from that blow. The trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault
with murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial erred in finding the accused guilty
of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
RULING: In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should
not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that
witness bore clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that
he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor
visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman

who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to
corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails
as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness
Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the
authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has
convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of
Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein
appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution
witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in
testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing
in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. There was
thus no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to
present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her
testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be
warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate. Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should
be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony. Also, no
unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal
considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and
intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify
regarding her husband's slaying.
He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore
clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not
have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the
prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had
called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate
Basal's narration of the events.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has
convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of
Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein
appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution
witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in

testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing

in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. There was
thus no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to
present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her
testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be
warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate. Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should
be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony.
Also, no
unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal
considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and
intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify
regarding her husband's slaying
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and
attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous
considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased
patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank.
Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident
was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of
appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and
unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent
death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists
whom he all knew, he being also a long-time resident of that
municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost
located along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning,
was just seventeen meters away from them. Notwithstanding the
fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the
illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses
provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the
combatants.
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor
visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed
on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in

broad daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's

identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he
himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's
assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that
worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father
clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his
purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. What these facts
establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident
were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident,
contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's testimony is thus
negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been
given not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also
be reasonably acceptable in itself.
Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also
corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely
labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked
by a member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error
in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right
then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was
the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in
Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee
from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was
then armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore,
absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no
weight in law.

3. TYPES/CLASSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE
PEOPLE vs. PRECIOSO
FACTS: The accused's were charged of robbery in band with
multiple rape before the RTC Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. While
sleeping at the Galvadores' store, the victims were awakened by
four armed men who were covered with handkerchiefs and
stockings and only their eyes and mouths were visible. Despite this,
victim Leah recognized accused Rolando Precioso, a neighbor,
through his voice and general physical appearance. They escorted

Leah to the Spouses Galvadores' house on the pretext that her

niece is suffering from stomach ache. Rafael Galvadores called out
to Teresita Pescador, a househelp, to open the door. Teresita
recognized accused Precioso, one of their neighbors who
frequented the store, through his physical appearance, his clothes
and his voice. The men ransacked the house looking for valuables,
then, Rafael and Leah were brought to the store by Precioso, and
he then raped Leah in the presence of Rafael and others. He
removed the cover of his face to kiss Leah, allowing Leah and
Rafael to recognize him. Accused Monforte raped Teresita at the
garage, she scratched his face, as a result of which his mask fell
off, allowing her to see his face. Leah was raped by Monforte too
twice and she was able to see his face since the handkerchief over
his face was removed. The accused were convicted through the
positive identification of Teresita and Leah. On appeal, the accused
questions the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.
ISSUE:
1. WON the witnesses and their testimonies are credible
2. WON the defense of alibi can be appreciated
HELD:
1. Trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses'
testimony is accorded great respect on appeal, and the records do
not show that the court below disregarded any consideration which
would warrant a departure from this jurisprudential dictum.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the
trial court in the raison d'etre that the latter is in a better position
to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present
case.
The absence of evidence of any improper motive impelling the
principal witness sustains the conclusion that his testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit. Furthermore, considering the inbred
modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to airing in public things that
affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would
assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not

true. Complainants, both young barrio girls, would not have publicly
admitted that they had been criminally ravished if that was not
true, for their natural instinct is to protect their honor. Their
testimony given at a public trial wherein they narrated their ordeal
with all the sordid details thereof, as synthesized in appellee's brief
and set forth earlier, could not have been conjured and fabricated
by these hapless and innocent victims.
2. The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially
sterile and jurisprudentially weak as they were not able to
demonstrate by convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time it was committed. Precioso claimed that when the crime was
committed, he was sleeping in the house of his grandmother, but
said house is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the
house of the Galvadores spouses. Monforte, on the other hand,
would like to convince the trial court that he was working at the
time. We have consistently ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible
witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused,
the former deserve more credence.
*The crime charged in the case at bar cannot be correctly
categorized or denominated as robbery in band with multiple rape
as there is no such composite crime. The offense in the case at bar
is the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Cuadrilla, in this
instance, is merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

RULE 129
1. CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
PEOPLE vs. RULLEPA
FACTS: Accused was charged with Rape before RTC of Quezon City.
On November 20, 1995, Cyra May, then only 3 1/2 years old, told
Gloria, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa

puwit at sa bibig ko". Kuya Ronnie is the Buenafes house boy, who
was sometimes left with Cyra May at home. Gloria asked Cyra May
how many times he did those things to her, to which she answered
many times. Cyra May indicated the room where accused slept and
pointed at his pillow. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things to
Col. Buanafe,Cyra's father, and Gloria but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of
November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. The spouses brought
accused to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations
against him. The Medico-Legal Officer's examination shows that the
victim is still a virgin but there are abrasions on the labia minora
which could have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps
an erect penis. Accused denied having anything to do with the
abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that he used to
be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty
urinating and that she was coached. The two elements of statutory
rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman,
and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. The first
element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The issue now is the second element. The
prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her
mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the
time of the rape.
ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice of victim's age.
HELD: Courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the
victim in determining her age. On the other hand, a handful of
cases holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed
by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, cannot take judicial
notice of the victims age.
The court held that the process by which the trier of facts judges a
persons age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as
judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and
expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the
ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. It is the
cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. When the trier
of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her

age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is

conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the
very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away
with the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court; on the contrary, it does. A persons appearance, where
relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court.
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy,
or of being under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually
regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe
the person brought before it. Experience teaches that corporal
appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every
case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it
may be in each case worth. In particular, theoutward physical
appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his
age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically
over-cautious. Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of
fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by
observation of such persons.] The formal offer of the person as
evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination
of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before
the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly
refused.
Pruna case laid down guidelines in appreciating age as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the

testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member

of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130
of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document,
or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the
victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it
is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the
age of the victim.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect
to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the
disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great
that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates
the relatives testimony.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years
old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial
court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age
from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that
the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was

below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the

offense, is present.

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS vs. CA

FACTS: Korean Airlines, a resident foreign corporation, through
Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent and legal counsel, filed a
Complaint against ETI with the RTC Manila, for a collection of sum
of money. ETI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Atty.
Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he
had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of
the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting. KAL
submitted on an Affidavit, executed by its general manager,
alleging that the board of directors conducted a special
teleconference, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also
averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors
approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. The KAL
manager also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written
copy of the aforesaid resolution. Trial court denied the motion to
dismsis of ETI and gave credence to the claims of KAL and Atty.
Aguinaldo. ETI filed a MR of the Order, contending that it was
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said
teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the
MR. ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing
the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice of teleconference
HELD: Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide
in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial
notice that business transactions may be made by individuals

through teleconferencing.Teleconferencing is interactive group

communication (three or more people in two or more locations)
through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing
can bring people together under one roof even though they are
separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication
may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1)
video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with
sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through
keyboard
terminals,
and
(3)
audio-conferencing-verbal
communication via the telephone with optional capacity for
telewriting or telecopying.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of
members of board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in
light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange
Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on
November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with
related to such conferencesThus, the Court agrees with the RTC
that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a
group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or
corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim
participated in a teleconference along with the respondents Board
of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted;
even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that
a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the
motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty.
Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its
behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that
Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the
identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent
appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company
lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office.

The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of

the teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000;
Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000,
within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing
him to file the complaint and execute the required certification
against forum shopping. The court granted the motion.
The
respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15
more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was
with its main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its
Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for
an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March
6, 2000. It was on the said date that the respondent submitted an
affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia,
that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on
June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved
the resolution.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a
teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved the said resolution
(with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the
additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. If
the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long
before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have
incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy
thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28,
2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was
such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it
even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with
its main office in Korea, only to allege later that no written copy
existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged,
for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where
the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO

FACTS: Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from

power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of

Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell
from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22,
the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers and duties of the Presidency.
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as
president.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent
Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the
respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and
pressures directed at him by the mobs. News reports have also
been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated
that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced
by this bias of their superior.
ISSUE:
1. WON the court can take judicial notice that the petitioner
resigned as President.
2. WON the court can take judicial notice of news reports
HELD:
1. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual
ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by
resort to judicial notice.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elementsare beyond quibble: there must be an

intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of

relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace
in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
2. Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is
insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as
to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled.
Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner,
i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to
change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to
prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter
believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result
of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper
court.

2. ADMISSIONS, JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

PHIL. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (MAXICARE) vs. ESTRADA
FACTS: Maxicare is a domestic corporation engaged in selling
health insurance plans whose Chairman Dr. Roberto K. Macasaet,
Chief Operating Officer Virgilio del Valle, and Sales/Marketing
Manager Josephine Cabrera were impleaded as defendantsappellants. On September 15, 1990, Maxicare allegedly engaged
the services of Carmela Estrada who was doing business under the
name of CARA HEALTH SERVICESto promote and sell the prepaid
group practice health care delivery program called MAXICARE Plan
with the position of Independent Account Executive.
Maxicare formally appointed Estrada as its General Agent,
evidenced by a letter-agreement dated February 16, 1991. The
letter agreement provided for plaintiff-appellees Estradas
compensation in the form of commission. Maxicare alleged that it
followed a franchising system in dealing with its agents whereby
an agent had to first secure permission from Maxicare to list a
prospective company as client. Estrada alleged that it did apply
with Maxicare for the MERALCO account and other accounts, and in
fact, its franchise to solicit corporate accounts, MERALCO account
included, was renewed on February 11, 1991. Plaintiff-appellee
Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the
officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but when
MERALCO decided to subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare
directly negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and
conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-appellee Estrada out
of the discussions on the terms and conditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada is entitled to the commission
despite her admission that the negotiation between her and
MERALCO failed.
RULING: Yes. The statement in Annex F amounted to an
admission, provides a contrary answer to Maxicares ridiculous
contention. We intoned therein that in spite of the presence of
judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence presented.

As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the

general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1)
when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact
made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission
by denying that he made such an admission.

secret recipe but the latter denies his request every time.Tirso soon
fired Magdalo and contended that the Bill of Assignment
transferred/ceded to the Corporation the secret formula. Magdalo
wishes to have the Bill of Assignment rescinded.

For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party,

but cites the admission out of context, then the one making the
admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his
admission was taken out of context.

ISSUE: W/Nthe formula was deemed transferred based on the Bill

of Assignment.

This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the

admission is made to appear. That is the reason for the modifier
such.
In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not,
ipso facto, an admission of the statements contained therein,
especially since the bone of contention relates to Estradas
entitlement to commissions for the sale of health plans she claims
to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the entirety of the
records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared
that her involvement as broker is the proximate cause which
consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare.
Moreover, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the
purpose for which the evidence is offered to be specified.
Undeniably, the letter was attached to the Complaint, and offered
in evidence, to demonstrate Maxicares bad faith and ill will
towards Estrada.
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS: This case is about the right to use the secret formula of
Magdalo Francisco, Sr., in making his Mafran sauce (Banana-based
sauce). Magdalo invented the sauce in 1938 but had no capital to
mass produce it so he sought help from the rich Tirso Reyes.
Together they formed Universal Food Corp in an agreement
embodied under a Bill of Assignment. Magdalo was there appointed
as chief chemist who prepared the sauces secretly inside his lab.
There had been many requests from Tirso for Magdalo to share his

The RTC ruled in favor of UFC and Tirso. CA reversed the same for
Magdalo. UFC filed a petition for certiorari with SC, hence, the case.

RULING: No. a perceptive analysis of the entire instrument and the

language employed therein would lead one to the conclusion that
what was actually ceded and transferred was only the use of the
Mafran sauce formula. This was the precise intention of the parties,
4 as we shall presently show.
Firstly, one of the principal considerations of the Bill of Assignment
is the payment of "royalty of TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the net
annual profit" which the petitioner corporation may realize by
and/or out of its production of Mafran sauce and other food
products, etc. The word "royalty," when employed in connection
with a license under a patent, means the compensation paid for the
use of a patented invention.
Secondly, in order to preserve the secrecy of the Mafran formula
and to prevent its unauthorized proliferation, it is provided in
paragraph 5-(a) of the Bill that the respondent patentee was to be
appointed "chief chemist ... permanent in character," and that in
case of his "death or other disabilities," then his "heirs or assigns
who may have necessary qualifications shall be preferred to
succeed" him as such chief chemist. It is further provided in
paragraph 5-(d) that the same respondent shall have and shall
exercise absolute control and supervision over the laboratory
assistants and personnel and over the purchase and safekeeping of
the chemicals and other mixtures used in the preparation of the
said product. All these provisions of the Bill of Assignment clearly
show that the intention of the respondent patentee at the time of
its execution was to part, not with the formula for Mafran sauce,
but only its use, to preserve the monopoly and to effectively
prohibit anyone from availing of the invention.

Thirdly, pursuant to the last paragraph of the Bill, should dissolution

of the Petitioner corporation eventually take place, "the property
rights and interests over said trademark and formula shall
automatically revert to the respondent patentee. This must be so,
because there could be no reversion of the trademark and formula
in this case, if, as contended by the petitioner, the respondent
patentee assigned, ceded and transferred the trademark and
formula and not merely the right to use it for then such
assignment passes the property in such patent right to the
petitioner corporation to which it is ceded, which, on the
corporation becoming insolvent, will become part of the property in
the hands of the receiver thereof.
Fourthly, it is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint
that what was ceded and transferred by virtue of the Bill of
Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself).
This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in
paragraph 3 of the petitioner's answer. Hence, it does "not require
proof and cannot be contradicted." The last part of paragraph 3 of
the complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are reproduced below
for ready reference:
3. ... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned
to said corporation his interest and rights over the said trademark
and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the
formula in the preparation and manufacture of the mafran sauce,
and the trade name for the marketing of said project, as appearing
in said contract
3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of
plaintiff's complaint.
Fifthly, the facts of the case compellingly demonstrate continued
possession of the Mafran sauce formula by the respondent
patentee.
Finally, our conclusion is fortified by the admonition of the Civil
Code that a conveyance should be interpreted to effect "the least
transmission of right," and is there a better example of least
transmission of rights than allowing or permitting only the use,
without transfer of ownership, of the formula for Mafran sauce.

The foregoing reasons support the conclusion of the CA that what

was actually ceded and transferred by the respondent patentee
Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. was only the use of the formula. The Bill of
Assignment vested in the petitioner corporation no title to the
formula.

SPOUSES FABIA vs. IAC

FACTS: Hugo Mararac sold the land in question to Leonardo
Mararac and Monica Resuello on March 27, 1971. At that time, the
lot now owned by plaintiffs was owned by plaintiff Angel Mararac
and JuanitoMararac, who was the husband of plaintiff
CarlinaRafanan who died in 1976. Leonardo Mararac and Monica
Resuello sold to the defendants the land in question on February
25, 1975. At that time, the lot in eastern side of the land in
question was owned by Angel Mararac and his brother,
JuanitoMararac. On April 8, 1975, defendants declared the land for
tax purposes.
At the time of sale of the land in question to the defendants in 1975
there was no offer to exercise right of legal redemption. At the time
of the sale of the land in question to Leonardo Mararac and Monica
Resuello in 1971, there was no offer of legal redemption. There was
no legal redemption offered during the period between the first and
second sale. The southern boundary of the lot in question is a
barrio road with approximate area of 10 meters wide. The land in
question in relation to plaintiffs' lot is not separated by ravine, by
brook, trail, road or other servitude for the benefit of others. The
land in question is fenced and was fenced even before the first sale
in March 27, 1971. Defendants own rural lands other than the land
in question. From Barangay Balogo, to Basing along the road
touching the southern boundary of the land in question are lines of
houses on both sides.
House of plaintiffs is along the said road. A portion of the land in
question on the side farther from the road, is used as a fishwell.
Plaintiffs offered to redeem the land in the amount paid by the
defendants as well as an amount for the return of investment of the

property and interest, and payments of attorney's fees and are able
and willing to make the payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land in question maybe considered rural
for purposes of legal redemption.
RULING: Undeniably, the land adjoining that which is sought to be
redeemed is a piece of residential land on which the respondents
live. The stipulation of facts of the parties recites:
"1. Plaintiffs reside on a lot east of the land in question and
adjacent to it;
Again, this is deemed an admission by the respondents of the
residential character of their own land thus disqualifying them from
rightfully redeeming the property in question.
Thus, the circumstances under which legal redemption may be
exercised not having been found present in the case at bar, the
respondents have no right to enforce against the petitioners.
As provided under Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course
of the trial or proceedings do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake.
No such palpable mistake has been shown. Evidence militates
against the respondents contention that the above description
does not bind them. The description was merely copied from the
deed of sale between the propertys original owners and the
petitioners when the self-same document was presented by the
respondents as their own evidence, marked as Exhibit B, of the
petitioners Declaration of Property for Tax Purposes which contains
the assessors official finding and classification that the land
covered by the declaration is residential.
The character of the locality, the streets, the neighboring and
surrounding properties give a clear picture of a residential area.
Lots, including the disputed property, with residential houses line
the streets. There are concrete and semi-concrete houses, a chapel,
an elementary school, and a public artesian well. Evidence

consisting of photographs of the petitioners land show a onestorey nipa and bamboo house. Trees and plants abound on the
petitioners property, yet, the same do not, by their mere presence
make the lot agricultural. As correctly held by the lower court:
the ordinary Philippine residence is traditionally profuse with trees
and plants for home sufficiency, esthetic appreciation, and
ecological balance. In fact, the lots neighboring the land in
question are likewise planted with trees and plants and some even
have fishwells. Truly a residential home lot is not converted into
agricultural land by the simple reservation of a plot for the
cultivation of garden crops or the planting of bananas and some
fruit trees. Nor can an orchard or agricultural land be considered
residential simply because a portion thereof has been criss-crossed
with asphalt and cement roads with buildings here and there
(Republic of the Philippines v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778). We have to
apply the rule of reason based on the specific facts of each case.
The land, subject matter of the petition, being primarily residential,
cannot be considered as rural for purposes of legal redemption
under the law.
The stipulation of facts is deemed an admission by the
respondents of the residential character of their own land thus
disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in
question.