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Policy Philosophies,
Public Management, and
the Public Interest
Before turning to the meat of the bookthe chapters related to theory
and practice in the management of public organizationsthis chapter is a
fanciful fling at ~the broad philosopht6~l-value premises of public
management and public policy. In this chapter there is no concern with
social science, observable data, verification, operational concepts, and all
those other matters dear to the hearts of analytically oriented students and
practitioners of public administration. This chapter is designed to
encourage reflection about good and bad in policy and
administration, with particular attention to that old bugaboo of
empirically oriented social scientists, the public interest.
The concept policy philosophy is introduced here to help us explore the
value component of policy. The basic notion is that a relatively small
number of primal values have influenced policy and administration
throughout the ages. These clusters of valuesand this is the substance of
a policy philosophy, a cluster of valuesfilter into the policy process
through the political culture, the legal system, and even the psychological
predispositions of individual decision-makers. Another of the ways that
policy philosophies have been influential is through various conceptions
of the public interest. If a policy philosophy is an enduring set of values
about the basic ends and means of government, any particular conception
of the public interest may be thought of as a conclusion drawn from the
premises of a policy philosophy.
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POLICY PHILOSOPHIES
To reiterate, a policy philosophy is a set of values about the purposes
of government or the most desirable means of achieving purposes. The
policy philosophy concept should not be taken as absolute and should not
be rigidly defined, nor should the particular policy philosophies identified
in this chapter be taken as an exhaustive list. The policy philosophies
discussed here have been subjectively developed and loosely defined, and
others may wish to develop additional or alternative policy philosophies
that are more in accord with their subjective interpretation of the basic
value clusters influencing policy and administration.
Six policy philosophies will be discussed hereprotectorism, rationalism, brokerism, pragmatism, transferalism, and egoism. The values
associated with each are discussed, the place of the policy philosophy in
modern and classic political thought is alluded to, and in a later section
the relation of each to various conceptions of the public interest is
explored.
Protectorism
The chief premise of protectorism is that policy exists to protect people
from one another and from themselves. The political executive as
protector is a theme that emerges early in political philosophy. One of the
first protectorist philosophers was Plato. While there is a strong
antidemocratic element involved in the elevation of restraint to a guiding
principle, the antidemocratic bias is only one aspect of protectorism and
not the most important. The pillar of this conception of governing is a
negative view of mankindboth in regard to abilities and, more
important, to intentions. Man is, by this view, a natural troublemaker and
a consistent malefactor. The view that the common man is ill-equipped
for political participation is clearly assumed in Platos Republic; the
inevitability of conflict and the need for a legitimate enforcing and
regulatory agent are beliefs that pervade Hobbess Leviathan. The
underpinnings of protectorism lie, then, in these assumptionsman must
be protected because of his limited knowledge and abilities; man must be
protected from his aggressive and avaricious nature.
The implications of this policy philosophy are far-reaching. First, the
prospects for an open government arc dim. Both Plato and Hobbes
viewed governing as a matter to be entrusted to the few. Plato divides
society into three classesthe guardians, a largely hereditary
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Source:
The Republic of Plato, trans. F. M. Cornford (Oxford university
Press, 1945). Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651).
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A modern curator of protectorism is Edward Banfield, and his The
Unheavenly City embodies several of its values. In assessing the social
programs of the 1960s, Banfield observes:
PHILOSOPHIES, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
good policy reflects an awareness and accommodation of diverse interests, then every effort must be made to insure that the interests have a
forum.
A penetrating critique of brokerist policy making is provided by
Theodore Lowi in his The End of Liberalism 5 Lowi attacks interestgroup liberalism, a cousin of brokerism, as a mechanism for assuring
conservatism in policy making. Giving precedence to the view of
established groups insures conservatism because established groups are
by nature conservative. Less established groups dont usually have easy
access to policy-making machinery. Lowis indictment of interest-group
liberalism is somewhat less pertinent for brokerism. Pure brokerism
assumes access of all groups, while interest-group liberalism recognizes
that groups do not have equal access.
A more troubling issue is that interests may not be balanced
effectively even if all organized groups are assured access and influence.
Some interests are not represented in an organized fashion by any group.
Until recently the interests of the poor were not included in the brokerist
policy equation because no significant organized group represented
them. Likewise, the interests of the consumer have not been articulated
by organized groups until recently. The thousands of persons in prisons
and mental institutions are represented in second-hand fashion if at all,
even though these political nonpersons have a great stake in many
policy issues.
The extreme emphasis placed on interest balancing in the brokerist
policy philosophy can lead to logrolling and coalition building with only
passing consideration to questions of justice and morality. Lowi speaks
of the decline of meaningful adversary proceedings in favor of
administrative, technical, and logrolling considerations
questions of
equity rather than questions of morality. 6 The brokerist conception of
governing is, according to Lowi, partly responsible for increased
political cynicism; citizens are asked to accept policy decisions not
because they are good but because they reflect group interest.
The origins of brokerism and of the conception of policy making as
the balancing of interests are less apparent than are the origins of
protectorism. Perhaps this is because, as Lowi asserts, this conception
has become a dominant theme only since the second quarter of the
twentieth century. Still, some elements of brokerism can be found in the
writings of several classic political philosophers. A superficial reading of
Bentham might lead one to believe that the utilitarian philosopher was
chiefly a brokerist. Bentham is perhaps the single classic philosopher
that embodies some of the values of all the policy philosophies outlined
here, but interpreting as brokerism his principle
. . .
...
...
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...
making situation
According to the rationalist view of the public interest, public administrators respond to the directives of elected officials who have translated
the public will into law. A common criticism of the rationalist view, as
Schubert points out, is that sometimes there is no clear public will.
Brokerism:An Aggregationalist Conception of the Public
Interest
The realist theory of the public interest advanced by Schubert draws
from the values of the policy philosophy of brokerism:
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The Realists are skeptics and sophisticates who have put behind
them myths which postulate any independent, substantive concern for
such notions as the public will and the public interest.
For them the supreme virtue of a democratic system
of government is the multiplicity of points of access that it affords for the
manifold conflicting interests which necessarily arise
in a pluralistic society. The function of government officials is to
facilitate the continuous readjustment of conflicting interest
...
The difficulty with the realist view of the public interest, according to
Schubert, is a failure to judge one set of interests as better than another.
An interest is an interest and must, by this rather mechanistic
conception, be represented if equilibrium is to be achieved.
Transferalism: An Element in the Normative Conception
of the Public Interest
All policy philosophies and all conceptions of the public interest have
a normative component; even in rationalism, an objective phi losophy, the
values of expertise and minimal discretion introduce an element of
normativeness. Transferalism is a policy philosophy with an explicit and
operational goal and (unlike rationalism) is less concerned with means
than with ends. By most criteria it is distinctly normative.
As a policy philosophy with an estimable but limited goaleconomic
equality in societytransferalism doesnt give rise to a general
conception of the public interest. Even the most ardent transferalist would not be
likely to contend that the meaning of the public interest is the redistribution of
wealth. There are simply too many significant public issues in which
economic equality is not a central consideration. While questions of economic
equality might impinge on a wide array of public issues, transferalism is more a
value to be taken into account in particular questions concerning the public
interest.
Protectorism:
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CONCLUSION
Conceptions of policy philosophies and the public interest are unlikely
to contribute materially to behavioral analysis of bureaucracy and
administration. But such broad philosophical interpretation can be useful
in understanding assumptions about how government should operate and what is
worth achieving. Behavioral approaches contribute to our understanding of
how things work but provide only a few clues to how things should
NOTES
1. Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p.
257.
8. Ibid., p. 124.
9. Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York:
The Free Press, 1969).
10. Sar Levitan, The Great Societys Poor Law (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1969).
11. John Donovan, The Politics of Poverty (New York: Pegasus, 1967).
12. Daniel Greenburg, The Politics of Pure Science (New York: New
American Library, 1968).
13. Gilbert Steiner, The State of Welfare (Washington, D.C.: The
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1961).
28. B. J. Diggs, The Common Good as Reason for Political Action,
Ethics, 83, 4 (July 1973), 283293.
29. C. Colm, In Defense of the Public Interest, Social Research, 27,
3 (Autumn 1960), 295307.
30. W. A. R. Leys and C. M. Perry, Philosophy and the Public
Interest (Chicago: Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy,
1959).
FURTHER READING
Appleby, P. H. Morality and Administration in Democratic
Government. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952.
Domhoff, C. William. Who Really Rules? New Haven and
Community Power Reexamined. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Books, 1978.
Dvorin, Eugene and R. H. Simmons. From Amoral to Humane
Bureaucracy. San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972.
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Flathman, R. E. Public Interest. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.