SAFETY DISCIPLINE FEED-BACK REPORT

DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

Written by : Florent BOEMARE on 04/10/2016
Contract n 8518J DALIA Mar Profundo Project
Client : TOTAL
Safety leader : Franoise Penven-LHer
Other person to be contacted : Franoise Penven-LHer

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................2

ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................................2

PFP METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................2

BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................6
4.1
Reference Documents................................................................................................6
4.2
Quotations...................................................................................................................6
4.2.1 Quotations about Identification of the isolatable sections...........................6
4.2.2 Quotations about Inventory calculation........................................................6
4.2.3 Quotations about FEHA study........................................................................7
4.2.4 Quotations about Identification of the Critical Safety Equipment (CSE)..7
4.2.5 Quotations about PFP protection...................................................................8

ISSUES ENCOUNTERED ON DALIA PROJECT/LESSONS LEARNED:...............9

5.1
Terms used to define the fire protection:.................................................................9
5.2
PFP drawings..............................................................................................................9
5.3
Scenarios eliminated in the FEHA:..........................................................................9
5.4
Pool fire dimensions:................................................................................................10
5.5
Time to extinguish a pool fire:................................................................................10
5.6
Leakage point location.............................................................................................10
5.7
Collaboration with structure..................................................................................10
5.8
Reliability of the Firewater system:........................................................................11
5.9
Reliability of the Flare system:...............................................................................11
5.10 Vessels containing hydrocarbon gas:......................................................................11

POSSIBLE AMELIORATION OF THE PFP DESIGN................................................11

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SAFETY DISCIPLINE FEED-BACK REPORT

DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

Written by : Florent BOEMARE on 04/10/2016
Contract n 8518J DALIA Mar Profundo Project
Client : TOTAL
Safety leader : Franoise Penven-LHer
Other person to be contacted : Franoise Penven-LHer

INTRODUCTION

This document summarises the methodology developed on DALIA project for the design of Passive
Fire Protection based on FEHA results. These results and the assumptions made have been confirmed
by the QRA. The methodology is presented hereunder as a flowchart with the assumptions made
according to regulations. Then are recorded the different documents used for the elaboration of the
PFP report (Doc ref 8518J-001-RT-1900-10). At the end of this document, a summary of the main
problems encountered on the DALIA project are listed.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFP
CSE
EDP
EER
ER
FEHA
FGS
PFP
QRA
SCE

Active Fire Protection

Critical Safety Equipment
Emergency DePressurisation
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Emergency Response
Fire and Explosion Analysis
Fire and Gas System
Passive Fire Protection
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Safety Critical Equipment

Note: SCE and CSE corresponds to the same type of equipment. The two notations can be used and
are used depending on the referenced documents.
Note: In the following sections, the survivability criteria corresponds to the duration for which the
SCEs integrity has to be kept.

PFP METHODOLOGY

See flowchart here below

Page 2 of 12

Equipment Process Datasheets

P&ID (for pipe diameters)
- Pipes length (provided by piping)
- Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) for streams
- Heat and mass (material) tables

Plant P&ID

Identification of the isolatable sections:

- groups of equipmentInventory
items and calculation
pipes that can
isolated
by the action
of an ESD system (ESDV or SDV) or the operation of a non-return
forbesingle
isolatable
sections.
valve.
The calculated volumes are multiplied by the stream densities provided from the Heat and Mass (Material) tables to obtain the liquid and gas
- Inventories are isolated
from
each isolatable
other at normal
mass
in each
sectionoperating conditions. Non-process hydrocarbon inventories are assumed to be isolated at
normal storage conditions.

FEHA study
Assumptions for the FEHA study
- The installation as been properly split into fire zones. Only one single fire is
occurring at a time and the fire is restricted to one single fire zone.
- Leak size considered: 7mm, 22mm and 70mm as per E&P forum QRA datasheet
directory, part 8, table 2.5, (1996) (agreed with Client). The three leak sizes have been
considered in the PFP study.
- An ESD system has been implemented and is operative without any failure
- EDP system operates correctly without failure upon demand in the fire zone and the
adjacent fire zone
- AFP systems are initiated without failure upon demand and without delay
- Trained operators initiate pre-determined procedure without failure or delay, but
cannot take correct decisions in the first 5 minutes following a catastrophic event.

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ASSUMPTIONS

FEHA study

Fire scenarios:
Flame/radiation length at different durations
Elimination of the non credible scenarios (see 5.3)

On the Dalia FPSO, as no fire scenarios are lasting more

than 60min (see 4.2.3, 4.2.5, 5.5), the flame/radiation
lengths needed were at 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60 min.

Identification of the isolatable sections on plot plans

Is the considered fire duration higher than the minimum required?

According to CMPT appendix V, the minimum failure time

for steel is taken at 5-10min for a jet fire and 10 min for a
pool fire. (5min for a jet fire was taken here to be more
stringent)

Yes

No

Draw circles with radius corresponding to

the flame length (jet fire) or radiation length
(pool fire and jet fire) until 37.5kW/m

Are there Safety Critical Equipment (SCE or

CSE) in this zone? (see 4.2.4)
No
No PFP required

For the radiation length, the minimum value considered

is 37.5kW/m, intensity at which damage is caused at
equipment (value agreed with Client)
If 3D model is not completed, the exact valve and flange
locations are not available. For jet fire, the starting point
will be considered around each equipment of the
isolatable sections.
For pool fire, due to the plausible leakage locations, a
pool can be formed everywhere on an offshore plated
deck. Thus the whole deck will be considered as limits
for the pool fires.

The SCE (or CSE) have been identified according to the

documents referenced below.

Yes
Page 4 of 12

Yes

ASSUMPTIONS

Presence of Active Fire Protection or EDP (for gas

equipment) on the SCE?
Yes

jet fires on process facilities (excluding riser), the

Definition of the type of protection and duration toFor
be applied
Emergency Depressurisation time is 30min. This is based
on:
- Time to detection of fire or leak: 2 min
- Time to close valves: 1 min
- Time for operator to initiate blowdown: 5 min
Pool fire or jet/pool fire radiations
- Blowdown to safe level (7 barg or 50% of designed
pressure): 15 min
- Contingency: 7 min

No PFP required

Jet fire

Duration of the
integrity to be kept
(X1 min)

The type of protection depends on the type of fire:

cellulosic, hydrocarbon pool or jet fire.

No

Duration of the
fire (X2 min)

Duration of the
integrity to be kept
(X1 min)

Duration of the
fire (X2 min)

Protection: X1 or X2 (smallest value) against jet fire, pool fire or jet/pool fire
radiations

PFP recommendations
PFP Design

Risk to assets, personal

and environment is
acceptable

Quantitative Risk
Assessment

Risk Reduction
Measures

Risk to assets, personal

and environment is not
acceptable

Page 5 of 12

For pool fires, where deluge is provided for extinguishing

purposes, a 60 min fire protection is deemed sufficient for
those areas on equipment not specifically deluged.
Due to the assumptions, inventory blowdown will not last
more than 30min and pool fires will not last more than 60
min where AFP for extinguishing purpose is present.
X1 : Duration of the integrity of the SCE to be maintained:
- 120 min for EER or ER in hazardous areas
- 60 min for EDP
- 60 min for EER or ER in non-hazardous areas
- 120 min for hydrocarbon inventory that cannot be EDP
- 120 min for structures supporting risers and ESDV
- Duration of the fire for other SCE

SAFETY DISCIPLINE FEED-BACK REPORT

DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

4

BIBLIOGRAPHY

4.1

Reference Documents

As no codes or standards are applicable on the Dalia project for the PFP recommendations,
All the assumptions listed above and some other data are taken from international regulations
and from other projects. The origins of the statements are presented below.
(1)

Totalfinaelf general specification Safety Passive Fire Protection GS-SAF-337

Mar Profundo Girassol Project Passive Fire Protection report AO31-4-40-X00-00-0TR-0043
(3)
OML 99/70 AMENAM/KPONO project AMP1 platform Passive fire protection report
6019T-10-T-1900-20
(4)
Dalia Mar Profundo Project Topsides Fire and Explosion Hazard Analysis 8518J-001RT-1900-22
(5)
Nigeria OPL 246 AKPO Field Development Project NG50-6-BE-SAF-TR-AB-000010
(6)
Dalia Mar Profundo Project Concept Safety Description 8518J-001-JSD-1900-01
(8)
AMENAM/KPONO project AMP2 platform Passive fire protection philosophy and
requirements 8502S-001-RT-1900-08 Rev AA
(9)
CMPT, A guide to quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, appendix V
chapter V.3.5 (1999)
(2)

4.2
4.2.1
(4)

(4)

Quotations about Identification of the isolatable sections

Hydrocarbon inventories are identified for groups of equipment items and pipes that can be
isolated by the action of an ESD system (ESDV or SDV) or the operation of a non-return
valve.
Inventories are assumed to be isolated from each other at normal operating conditions. In
addition, non-process hydrocarbon inventories (diesel for example) are assumed to be isolated
at normal storage conditions.
4.2.2

(4)

Quotations

Quotations about Inventory calculation

The system inventories are calculated for single isolatable sections. The inputs for the volume
calculation are:
- Equipment Process Datasheets (provided by process)
- Pipes diameter (given on P&ID)
- Pipes length (provided by piping)
The streams involved in each isolated sections are identified from the Process Flow Diagrams
(PFD)
The volumes are then multiplied by the stream densities provided from the heat and mass
tables to obtain the liquid and gas mass in each isolated section.

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DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

4.2.3

(1)

It is assumed for this study that:

- The installation as been properly split into fire zones. Only one single fire is occurring at a
time and the fire is restricted to one single fire zone.
- An ESD system has been implemented and is operative without any failure (ESD response
time and ESDV closure time to be considered)
- EDP system operates correctly without failure upon demand in the fire zone and the
adjacent fire zones (all EDP facilities are correctly protected by PFP and AFP to ensure
that the system remains serviceable and a case No blowdown as a very low frequency
of occurrence)
- AFP systems are initiated without failure upon demand and without delay (all AFP
facilities are correctly protected by PFP to ensure that the systems remain operable)
- Trained operators initiate pre-determined procedure without failure or delay, but cannot
take correct decisions in the first minutes following a catastrophic event.
4.2.4

(1) (3)

Quotations about FEHA study

Quotations about Identification of the Critical Safety Equipment (CSE)

Critical Safety Equipments are elements, which can:

- endanger personnel in buildings
- damage critical systems required in an emergency (EER, EDP, flare system, firewater
system, FGS)
- lead to escalation of fire event
- endanger escape of personnel
Are considered as CSE:

Emergency Response (ER) facilities: Control room(1), emergency switch gear room(1),
emergency centre(1), telecommunications room(1), firewater pump enclosures(1) (3), elevated
flares(1), emergency station(1), active fire-fighting means(1)

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) facilities: temporary refuges(1), muster areas(1),
embarkation posts(1), telecommunication mast if exposed to fire(1), life-saving
equipments(8), stairways and bridge accesses(3) (8)

Structures supporting Emergency Response (ER) facilities(1)

Structure supporting Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) facilities(1)

Structure supporting risers and ESDVs(1)

Structure supporting equipment likely to fall down onto ER or EER facility and/or risers
and ESDVs: Process vessels that are close to an ER or EER equipment, (1)

Risers between sea level and ESDVs(1)

Emergency Shut-Down Valve (ESDV) (8) / Blow-Down Valve (BDV) (8) / Pressure Safety
valves (PSV)

Emergency De-pressurisation (EDP) facilities: flare header from the flare KO drum to the
pipe rack(8), flare drums skirt(8), saddle supports(8) and supporting structure(8), flare system
piping supports(3)

Equipment that can lead to escalation of the fire event: Non redundant primary structures
that are mandatory to the integrity of the platform(8), Vessels skirts(3), saddles supports(3)
and structural equipment supporting vessels and exchangers containing hydrocarbons(2),
enclosures containing fuel sources(1), Main decks (required to be fire barriers) (1), Pressure
vessels for LPG(1)

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DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

Process vessels that are not depressurised but should be EDPd in case of an emergency(1)
Pipe rack with flare piping(8), emergency depressurising line(8), fire fighting water
system(2), riser anchoring system(2), cables for ESDV, BDV systems(8)
Equipment which have high asset value and/or long procurement time(2)
Mooring chain and chain stopper(2)
Other element as per Totalfinaelf general specification GS SAF 337(1)

4.2.5

(9)

(2)

(2)

Quotations about PFP protection

The minimum fire duration represents the minimum time necessary for the rupture of process
equipment or the collapse of a steel support/structure. For fires lasting less than these
minimum durations, the integrity of the steel element will be kept and no PFP are required.
According to the CMPT appendix V, these minimum fire durations are:
5 minutes for a jet fire
10 minutes for a pool fire or for jet fire radiations.
For pool fires, where deluge is provided for extinguishing purposes, a 30 min fire protection is
deemed sufficient for those areas on equipment not specifically deluged. This duration was
not validated on DALIA project were 60min fire protection has to be considered according to
basic engineering phase.
For jet fires on process facilities (excluding riser), the PFP protection time is 30min. This is
based on:
- Time to detection of fire or leak: 2 min
- Time to close valves: 1 min
- Time for operator to initiate blowdown: 5 min
- Blowdown to safe level (7 barg or 50% of designed pressure): 15 min
- Contingency: 7 min

(1)

How long shall the item stability/integrity be maintained?

120min for EER or ER in hazardous areas
60min for EDP
60min for EER or ER in non-hazardous areas
120min for hydrocarbon inventory that cannot be EDP
120min for structures supporting risers and ESDV

(5)

If a secondary structural member can be exposed to a hydrocarbon fire risk, then passive fire
protection shall also be applied to a minimum of 450mm beyond the junction point with the
primary member.

(2)

Where process equipment is provided with PFP, the HC lines of diameter >4 shall also be
provided with PFP. This applies to all lines containing HC gas. Should the line contain any
HC liquid, it is assumed that liquid mass shall provide sufficient cooling, and therefore no
PFP shall be applied.

(1)

All cables used for safety systems that need to be energised to operate shall be fire resistant as
per IEC 331. All other cables shall be flame retardant as per IEC 332. Fail-safe circuits do not
have fire resistant cables.

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DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

(1)

(1)

Penetrations through a partition (cables, ducts, pipes, doors and windows, etc.) shall be
specified for the same fire rating as the partition itself.
Clearance shall be provided around active PFP materials to allow the complete development
of their intumescences during the specified protection duration time. As a default value, the
minimum clearance shall be assumed as 100mm. The operability of escape doors shall not be
affected by intumescences development.
5
5.1

ISSUES ENCOUNTERED ON DALIA PROJECT/LESSONS LEARNED:

Terms used to define the fire protection:

The terms used to define the time of protection to be applied and the type of fire are quite
ambiguous. For example, the Totalfinaelf specification GS SAF 337 use the term H-60 for
walls and enclosures to define a protection that will keep the integrity of the element during
120 minutes against hydrocarbon fire. The 60 means that the opposite face of the wall will
have to be insulated during 60minutes. This is a major difference with a 60minutes
hydrocarbon fire rating protection. There are also other notations used on other project like
350/JF/60 (the critical surface temperature of the element to be protected is 350C and it has
to be protected 60min against jet fires).
In the rapport, we have defined the passive fire protection by: X minutes jet/hydrocarbon/
cellulosic fire rated or X minutes protection against jet/hydrocarbon/cellulosic fire for
structures, valves, decks, supports, and the Totalfinaelf notation for enclosures and
buildings.
5.2

PFP drawings

Based on FEHA results, drawings are made showing the jet/pool fire lengths at t = 15, 30,
60min. These drawings were not issued to Client to avoid comments because on these
drawings,
- radiation lengths were not shown because the data was not available in the FEHA. A
provision of circa +2m has been taken on the drawings
- distances were taken from equipment and not from all the leakage points (flanges, valves)
because these leakage points couldnt be located at that point
- fire scenarios considered were for hole size leaks of 7, 22 and 70mm (as per the FEHA)
but leaks could be of any size
Based on the above, the drawings were only made to have a general overview of the zones
were PFP has to be applied.
5.3

Scenarios eliminated in the FEHA:

Some scenarios (cargo tanks fires, ballast tank fires, sea pool fires) have not been assessed in
the FEHAs because they were considered non credible (low frequency of occurrence or
presence of active or passive fire protection). These assumptions have been confirmed by the
QRA. For the Sea pool fire scenario, refer to the corresponding feed-back.

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DALIA PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP) METHODOLOGY

5.4

Pool fire dimensions:

The DALIA FPSO is splited into pancakes (utilities, separation, compression,). On the
process pancakes, the main deck is plated and the above decks are made of grating.
On these process pancakes, there are many plausible leakage locations. A leak located on the
main deck or on the deck above will form a pool on the process main deck (the only one
plated). Due to all these plausible leakage locations, a pool can be formed everywhere on the
plated deck.
To be stringent, the whole deck is considered as limits for the pool fires. Only one pool fire
case is considered per pancake: it is a pool that fills the whole plated deck.
On the Dalia Project, there is a deluge area coverage provided in addition to the deluge of the
equipment. The application rate for this area coverage is 10.2L/min (same as for the deluge of
a vessel). Based on this deluge area coverage, the pool fire dimensions have been reduced.
The flame height will not be higher than the elevation at which the deluge nozzles are
installed and the pool fire radiations will be limited to the bound of the plated deck where the
pool is present.
5.5

Time to extinguish a pool fire:

The pool fire duration has been an issue on this project. On AMENAM the pool fire was
considered with an infinite duration whereas on GIRASSOL, 30 minutes was the time
considered to extinguish a pool fire where Active Fire Protection for extinguishing purpose
was present.
On the DALIA project, a pool fire will be extinguished by a mixture of water + 1% AFFF.
According to vendor tests (found on internet), a pool fire deluged by foam with the rates
defined in the NFPA will be extinguished within the 5 minutes. As these arguments where not
sufficient for the Client, the time taken to extinguish a pool is 60 minutes, as per the Basic
engineering phase.
5.6

Leakage point location

The PFP report on DALIA project has been issued before the 3D model was accomplished.
Therefore the valves and flanges location were not available. As the highest concentration of
valves and flanges is normally around equipment, they were taken as origin for the jet flame
and jet fire radiation lengths. Caution must be paid on the fact that the contours are not exact
and the drawings produced are just an overview of the areas where there is a probability of a
X minutes jet fire.
For the manifold area, a fine study has been made by structure department to prove that the
manifold structure doesnt need to be fireproofed. For this study, all the possible leakage
points have been identified and the precise flame/radiation lengths have been considered.
5.7

Collaboration with structure

The collaboration with structure is essential to calculate the critical temperature of the critical
elements and to determine the non redundant primary structures to be fireproofed. Based on
the drawings prepared by safety and on the PFP report, Structure department prepares
structural drawings to show the exact members to be fireproofed. For the elaboration of the
structural drawings, a strong collaboration with the structure department is essential to justify
if some structures or supports are redundant. On the Dalia project, Safety and Structure have
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worked together on some specific scenarios like the manifold area. For this case, a sensitivity
study has been asked by the Structure department to Safety to locate all the possible leaking
point and to identify the exact scenarios that can occur in this area. The purpose of this study
was to justify that considering all the credible scenarios, no PFP was needed in this area.
5.8

Reliability of the Firewater system:

A study has been made by piping to prove the reliability of the supports in case of a credible
fire scenario is impacting the firewater lines. For the lines itself, the material used on Dalia
(GRE Bonstrand series) is certified 30min jet fire resistant (see feed back tenue au feu du
GRE)
5.9

Reliability of the Flare system:

This protection is essential in the PFP design. Blow-down will allow reducing the impact of
jet fire by reducing the duration of the fire. But if a fire impacts the flare lines, blow-down can
be damaged and generates a domino effect.
A study has been made in the ESSA study showing that the probability of blow-down system
to be damaged is credible. To reduce this risk, resistance to blast of the flare headers has been
increased (1.5 bar instead of 0.3 bar, in fact already taken into account by structure) and it has
been recommended to reduce the time to initiate blow-down (Company action).
5.10 Vessels containing hydrocarbon gas:
On Dalia FPSO, the time to achieve blow-down is 30min. Vessels containing gas and
impacted by a jet fire may fail within 10min. These vessels are not deluged nor fireproofed
(only the supports are fireproofed) but the risk associated with equipment failure are
considered in the QRA and no risk reduction measures were identified for these vessels.
6

POSSIBLE AMELIORATION OF THE PFP DESIGN

A finer optimisation of the PFP design can be made if the Civil/Structure department can use a
software that calculates the impact of heat loads on structure (e.g. ABACUS). On the DALIA
project, this was not done as the available Structure manpower was not sufficient to perform
this study.
By using this software, precise radiation levels can be given to the FEHA for various times.
On the Dalia project, as these calculations were not possible, a constant value of 37.5kW/m
was considered (value corresponding to steel resistance during one hour without protection).
The CMPT (Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations) gives an
example of the type of formula that can be used:
Where:
tf
Tf
Ta

time to failure (s)

failure temperature (K)
ambient temperature (K)
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q
qo
K
Cp
M/S

heat flux density (kW/m)

output heat flux, in range 4-30kW/m (corresponds to the sum heat loss by
radiation + heat loss by convection + heat loss by conduction)
heat exposure factor, in range 0.2 1
specific heat capacity of steel, typically 0.46 kJ/kgK
mass per unit surface area of member (kg/m)

The failure temperature depends on the steel structure load and on the steel type.
Usually, steel structures are affected by a typical jet fire between 5 and 10 min exposure. The
fire rating is also provided for standard times (15, 30, 60 and 120 min). therefore, considering
the above example, if the Structure department provides the radiations levels (R1 to R6)
corresponding to predefined durations, the FEHA can provide for each of the fire scenario the
radiation lenghts:
Time (min)
Radiation (kW/m)
Radiation length (m)

5
R1

10
R2

15
R3

30
R4

60
R5

120
R6

By doing this, the radiations lengths, and thus the elements potentially impacted, will be
reduced.
EXAMPLE:
Consider a steel plate with the following properties:
Steel critical temperature
Tf = 400C = 673.15 K
Specific heat capacity of steel
Cp = 0. 46 kJ/kgK
Heat exposure factor
K = 0.5
Output heat flux
qo = 15 kW/m
Plate thickness
10 mm
Mass per unit surface area of member
M/S = density*thickness = 7850*0.01
Ambient temperature
Time to failure tf (min)
Time to failure tf (s)
Radiation q (kW/m)

Ta = 25C = 298.15 K
5
300
120

10
600
75

15
900
60

30
1800
45

60
3600
37.5

120
7200
34

In this case, the above radiations levels are given as input to the FEHA, which gives back the
corresponding radiations lengths.
Comparing this example to the value (37.5kW/m) used on the Dalia project, we can see that
for 5, 10, 15 and 30 min, the radiations lengths will be smaller if the optimisation is done (the
higher the radiation level is, the smaller will be the radiations length). Thus, the PFP on
elements, will be reduced.

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